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Title: Bahrain: The Role of the Military Author: William Johannes Wesselhoeft Date: March 26, 2013 Institution name/journal where submitted: Boston University

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The military approach: Bahrain’s al-Khalifa family has maintained its governmental power in times of civic unrest due to its use of military. Bahrain: the role of the military.

“The class that bears the lance or holds the musket regularly forces its rule upon the class that handles the spade or pushes the shuttle.” Gaetano Mosc

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Abstract This paper discusses the use of military in response to Bahraini protest movements in

2011 and 2012 The evidence used are specific events which occurred involving the military and

or protestors. I discuss the military’s role in Bahraini stability, as well as the stability factor of

latent conflict. I hypothesize that use of the military cemented regime control during the

uprisings, and concluded much the same. I found that Bahrain’s military is likely an internal

stabilizing presence, and that martial law was another military factor in managing recent unrest

in Bahrain.

Military involvement in government stability: theory

Shifts in balance of power can be attributed to a number of things; and one among those

is military might. Military advantage in a situation; the ability to dominate through violence, I’d

argue can essentially determine the outcome of a dispute. Because military force is such a basic

and recurring theme to shifts in balance in power in history (although it may not explain all of

them) I will proceed with an overview of the military as a determinant of revolutionary outcome.

By looking at a history of successful revolutions, one might determine that a strong

enough opposition force was the key factor. In many cases, military control by the government

was not strong enough to resist the rebel impetus for change, and in the end, a failure to quell a

revolution by the military led to its success. Cases both modern and historical would indicate that

the military played a role in the outcome of a revolution.

There is a lot of theory on the emergence of revolution. Starting with the first generation

of thought in the 19th century which focused on social psychology, to the second generation of

thought which focused on a disequilibrium as the cause of revolution, proceeding to the third

generation which capitalized on Marx’s class conflict ideas and finally leading to the current

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fourth generation which focuses on contentious politics such as strikes, demonstrations, riots and

terrorism.12 It seems that the schools of thought have narrowed in a consistent manner, with the

least descriptive theories as the oldest and the most descriptive as the newest. The fourth

generation of thinking is most pertinent to my own theoretical framework, and I will employ it in

the context of military influence on regime stability. Jack A. Goldstone in his “Toward a fourth

generation of Revolutionary theory,” states that: “Rather than try to develop a list of the

“causes” of revolutions, it may be more fruitful for the fourth generation of revolutionary theory

to treat revolutions as emergent phenomena, and to start by focusing on factors that cement

regime stability. Weakness in those factors then opens the way for revolutionary leadership,

ideology, and identification, along with structural factors such as international pressure and

elite conflicts, to create revolutions.”

The specific I will choose from Goldstone’s statement is “factors that cement regime

stability; weakness in those factors opens the way for revolutionary leadership.” As a corollary

to this thought, the weakness of regime stability could be influenced by the weakness in its

structural factors, for example the military. Thus, the stability of a regime could be strengthened

by the military as well. Here I will assert the opinion of western news agencies (including al

Jazeera in its video Bahrain: shouting in the dark), that Bahrain has repressed a revolution

through use of military force, among other things such as media suppression and counter

propaganda, and the overall destruction of the revolutionary movement by destroying the

symbolic site of revolution (Pearl Roundabout), arrests of public voices of the movement, and

diversion of responsibility for unrest to the outside entity of Iran (with its alleged interest to

                                                                                                                         1  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution  2  Tilly,  Charles.  The  Contentious  French.  Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  1986.,  Tarrow,  Sidney.  Power  in  Movement:  Social  Movements  and  Contentious  Politics,  2nd  ed.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1998.    

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destabilize the Sunni rule in Bahrain).3 This strategic and systematic deconstruction of

revolutionary force has thus far been effective in quelling any regime change. This information is

undoubtedly biased, as upon reviewing state news reports from the Bahraini News Agency, it is

clear that the government presents its explanation for events as well. I am led to interest in this

conflict because there are conflicting rationales behind actions presented by news agencies, and

yet they report the same events (albeit with differing rationales, as stated). Because military

involvement in publicized and accounted for on both sides of the bias spectrum, and because

militaries are theoretically thought be a stabilizing or destabilizing force in a regime, I seek to

investigate the military’s role in the Bahraini uprisings.

And to the incidence of uprisings I attribute the use of military force as a major

contributor. As Barry Rubin stated in a 2001 article about Arabian Gulf governments, “They

have also built militaries that can successfully maintain internal order.”4 This attribution of the

military being the determinant of the internal order in Gulf countries would suggest that internal

order in Bahrain is also attributable to a successfully built military. A factor that cements regime

stability is the military’s consent; history has seen that without it there may be a coup attempt.

Beyond that it seems that basic theories of politics which refer to equilibrium in the state in

regards to the internal balance of power between factions5 would cohere with military as being a

determinant of who is in power, and who is in power determining how the military acts. In

revolution, a military may overthrow a regime, and during the repression of revolution the

military may aid in quelling uprising. As a side note, I do not state that military is the only

                                                                                                                         3  http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-­‐05-­‐13/bahrain-­‐pearl-­‐revolution-­‐monarchy/54939728/1  “Bahraini  rulers  "truly  believe"  that  Iran,  a  majority  Shiite  nation,  is  behind  the  unrest,  Rubin  says.  Iran  has  made  claims  to  sovereignty  over  Bahrain  and  insulted  its  Sunni  Muslim  rulers.”  4  The  Military  in  Contemporary  Middle  East  Politics  –  Barry  Rubin,  MERIA  Journal,  vol.  5  ,  no.  1  –  march  2001  http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a4.html  5  I  am  referring  to  the  second  generation  of  revolutionary  theoretical  thought  

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cementing factor in regime stability, rather that it can be a significant contributor to the balance

of power between ruler and subject.

Military control in Bahrain: theory

To reiterate the words of Barry Rubin:

“[Gulf governments] have also built militaries that can successfully maintain internal order.”

The persistence of Gulf monarchies would attest that monarchies are successful in

keeping their position as political hegemons in their countries to some extent. In fact, the two

most powerful positions in Bahrain’s military are the Supreme Commander and Commander in

Chief; titles both held by members of the country’s ruling family.6 The Arab Spring has shown

Libya use its military to fight rebels who were ultimately successful, and part of Egypt’s military

dissent to facilitate a similar overthrow. Meanwhile, stability has seemed apparent in Saudi

Arabia and other Gulf States, which have experienced less turmoil from 2010 to present with

uprisings. Bahrain seems to be somewhere between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in terms of stability,

because protests and violence are present and well-publicized, but the Bahraini military has

remained unified and in support of the al Khalifa monarchy. This leads me to my inquiry, where

I would like to consider the power of the unified Bahraini military in the maintenance of stability

in Bahrain. I hypothesize that:

H1: military action cemented regime control by Bahrain’s monarchical government

during Bahrain’s uprisings.

                                                                                                                         6  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Khalifa_family  

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Charles Tilly identified “the leading elite’s loss of control over the military instrument as

a decisive revolutionary factor.”7 It seems that the theory following the same stream of thought,

that military in Tilly’s idea was influential in revolutionary situation, conversely applies to

Bahrain, that the leading elite’s continued control over the military is a decisive revolutionary

factor, and could therefore explain a government grip on power despite the incidence of a

revolution. Bahrain’s8 grip on power being facilitated by military action is concurrent with the

interests of the maintenance of its regime is a deciding factor in the outcome of revolutionary

uprisings, and therefore what could mean the monarchy’s loss of power.

A monarchy as an authoritarian regime has been found to spend a proportionally larger

amount of money than democratic regimes, coherent with an idea proposed by Immanuel Kant.

In monarchical Gulf States this would seem to be consistent.9 “liberal states tend to devote

proportionally less to their militaries than do autocratic states.10” Increased military spending

by a government would infer that the government values the military more. Compare the German

government, which I identify as relatively liberal and democratic, in comparison to the Saudi

government, which I identify as conservative and monarchical. It may be further promoted that

the Saudi Government values its military more than the German government, due to the Saudi                                                                                                                          7  Tilly,  European  Revolution  8  Here,  and  in  the  future,  when  I  refer  to  Bahrain’s  grip,  hold  or  maintenance  of  power,  I  mean  the  current  monarchical  government  9  Saudi  military  spending  10.4%  USA  4.5%  Bahraini  3.7%  Germany  1.4%,  World  Bank;  note  the  USA  is  self-­‐declared  liberal,  yet  maintains  a  (slightly)  proportionally  larger  military  than  Bahrain,  perhaps  due  to  the  USA’s  aggressive  foreign  policy;  thus  the  USA  could  be  considered  a  somewhat-­‐anomaly  in  this  context,  due  to  a  far  more  aggressive  and  militarily  involved  foreign  policy  than  the  other  mentioned  countries;  overall  World  Bank  data  shows  significantly  higher  overall  %  GDP  spending  in  Gulf  monarchies  (often  around  6.5%  higher)  than  in  leading  EU  democracies  such  as  France,  England  and  Germany.    10  Reduced  military  spending,  according  to  Kant,  will  promote  both  peace  and  prosperity.  First,  by  spending  less  on  their  militaries,  republican  states  will  advance  peace  by  avoiding  conflict  spirals.  Second,  Kant  argues  that  leaders  can  better  safeguard  political  rights  and  provide  more  resources  for  education  and  other  social  goods  by  devoting  less  to  military  spending.  For  Kant  and  subsequent  liberals,  these  considerations  will  lead  democratic  states  to  devote  less  to  their  militaries  than  authoritarian  states.  Fordham,  B.  O.  and  Walker,  T.  C.  (2005),  Kantian  Liberalism,  Regime  Type,  and  Military  Resource  Allocation:  Do  Democracies  Spend  Less?.  International  Studies  Quarterly,  49:  141–157.  doi:  10.1111/j.0020-­‐8833.2005.00338.x  

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government spending nearly nine times the proportional amount of its gross domestic product on

military annually. When we compare Bahrain’s and Germany’s military spending per year, it is

apparent that Bahrain spends over two and a half times the proportional GDP that Germany does.

Because the German and Bahraini governments are the deciders of expenditures, and therefore

the Bundestag and the al-Khalifa family, it would be rational to extrapolate that the al Khalifa

family’s government places proportionately higher value in its military by spending more on it

than the German Bundestag allocates. Bahrain’s political identity as liberal compared to Saudi

Arabia11, but conservative compared to Germany is consistent with their military spending in the

aspect of proportional GDP as coherent with ideology from Kant. If we move forward with the

argument that the Bahraini Monarchy sustains more proportional military than the German

Bundestag does, we can discuss what factors may cause that.

The role of the military is obviously dependent on the state’s needs. In the United States

of America’s case, we see political needs for foreign influence and propagation of democracy

culminate in an according military, and we can see evidence of that in its major deployment to

Afghanistan. In Germany’s case, where military policy seems comparatively less aggressive, we

see deployment into the same conflict region, yet in much smaller numbers.12 Bahrain’s absence

of deployment on any foreign soil may indicate that it has a purpose at home. By keeping the

military home, a sense of stability via repression may be induced; the conspicuous presence of

military forces could be felt by citizens as a factor of domination or tension. Bahrain spends

proportionally much more (2.3% more of GDP) on its defense budget than less-aggressive

Germany which has foreign deployments, and only slightly less (0.7% of GDP) than very

                                                                                                                         11  Bahrain  has  a  semi  elected  congress,  Saudi  Arabia  does  not.  They  both  have  Kings.  12  http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf  International  Security  Assistance  Force  USA  90,000  Germany  4,701  

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aggressive USA which has foreign deployments. It could be extrapolated that military defense

spending is not for foreign deployments, but for domestic reasons. This leads to the next step in

my argument, that the role of the national military plays a greater role in domestic stability in

Bahrain than probably in the USA and most likely in Germany.

Because Bahrain has no apparent need for a military with offensive capability, it would

be reasonable to assume that Bahrain’s military is primarily defensive. Additionally, the name of

Bahrain’s military is the Bahrain Defence Force. A prominent threat to Bahraini sovereignty has

traditionally been Iran, due to a divide in religious sect (Sunni versus Shia) of the ruling parties

of each country.13 However, due to: the influence that Saudi Arabia enjoys over Bahrain14, with

its comparatively huge military, the influence that the USA enjoys over the entire region with its

stationing of the United States Navy Fifth fleet in Bahrain15, and the overall political isolation

which Iran experiences from Sunni Middle eastern nations (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain

Sunni in rulership), and political pariahdom from Western nations (USA, EU countries) due to

conflict of interest with alleged nuclear weapons production,16 a real threat to the territorial

integrity of Bahrain could be thought to be quite unrealistic, due the nature of the balance of

power which I have just outlined.17 Perhaps then, the role that the military plays is to pronounce

                                                                                                                         13  1981  coup  attempt  in  Bahrain  was  found  to  be  Iranian  funded;  2012  Kharrazi  former  Iranian  ambassador  in  Paris,  said  that  it  was  easy  for  Iran  to  occupy  Bahrain.  “If  Iran  wanted,  it  could  take  control  of  Bahrain  in  a  few  hours  by  using  its  rapid  reaction  forces,”  he  said,  quoted  by  the  Iranian  agency.”  http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/iran-­‐threats-­‐on-­‐bahrain-­‐condemned-­‐1.1037118  14  Additionally,  the  ruling  families  of  Saudi  Arabia  and  Bahrain  are  both  Sunni  and  so  share  some  common  cultural  ground  in  this  respect  15  http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/  16  http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html  Iran's  Nuclear  Program  (Nuclear  Talks,  2012)  17  Although  there  has  been  more  than  one  alleged  coup  attempt  by  Iranians  in  the  Bahraini  government,  Iran  may  see  Bahrain  as  a  strategic  position,  yet  I  reiterate,  due  to  the  current  balance  of  power  in  the  region,  an  Iranian  military  invasion  would  likely  be  self-­‐destructive  (USA  5th  fleet,  Saudi  Arabia,  GCC,  UN).  

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military strength internally; which shows the people that Bahrain has a relatively strong military;

there is no other obvious purpose which I have been able to extrapolate.

If we assume the purpose of the military in Bahrain is predominantly to pronounce

military strength internally, rather than to wage war in foreign countries, or to defend from

invasions, then it could indicate that there are domestic stability issues which are being addressed

by relatively high military presence. In the same way that a high number security forces are

deployed into Afghani regions with high amounts of military conflict18, Bahraini military may be

playing a logically similar role by unengagedly combatting latent conflict in their own country.

In a sense, perhaps Bahraini security forces are playing the role of counter force in a country

with a lot of latent conflict. It could be proposed that the balance of power between ruler and

subject in Bahrain was in relative equilibrium before the uprisings; a fragile balance between

repressive security and repressed will for political change could be put forth by this argument.

The idea of latent conflict manifests here in this idea of fragile equilibrium in terms of stability.

An example of latent conflict in Bahrain will now be outlined.

"The Battle of Karbala' still rages between the two sides in the present and in the future.

It is being held within the soul, at home and in all areas of life and society. People will remain

divided and they are either in the Hussain camp or in the Yazid camp. So choose your camp." —

'Ashura' banner in Manama, 200619 Because there remains a sectarian divide between the Sunni

ruling royal family (al-Khalifas) and the Shia majority, there seems to be a cultural platform for

latent conflict. In fact when pro-democracy protests broke out in 2011, at least some Sunni

supporters of the royal family rallied and pronounced their common ground with the ruling

                                                                                                                         18  127,000  total  according  to  NATO  19  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karbala,  http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.de/2011/07/dialogue-­‐and-­‐statistics.html  

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family.20 One indication of instability could be attributed to the consistent divide in Bahrain

between the estimated 65% Shia majority and 35%21 Sunni minority who hold the most powerful

positions in government. As earlier stated, the al Khalifas hold the top two most powerful

positions in the military, along with the Kingship and nearly all relatively significant posts below

the Kingship as well.22

On the contrary to sectarianism being the root of latent conflict which military would be

charged with suppressing, is video footage collected by al Jazeera news agency showed

protestors holding signs which read, “Sunni + Shia = Bahrain,” and “Sunnis are Shias are

brothers, they cannot be sold.”23 The narrator also commented that the government had been

trying to make this out as a sectarian conflict, rather than a united struggle for democracy. This

may lead one to believe that Sunnis and Shias are divided in religious sect, but not to an extent

that would breed conflict.

With this information taken into account, it becomes less clear whether this conflict is

sectarian or pro-democratic, as the protestors confront military security. After reviewing my

research, I decided that this conflict was a combination of the two, however also that the

variables of sectarianism and pro-democracy were not mutually exclusive, rather they were

coherent.24 The overall cause for revolution seemed to be a lack of democratic rights on behalf of

                                                                                                                         20  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18voices.html  21  This  is  an  estimate;  government  figures  present  49%  Shia  to  51%  Sunni  among  Muslims  in  Bahrain,  while  international  estimates  are  closer  to  70%  Shia  and  30%  Sunni.  The  government  report  has  been  called  suspicious,  due  to  its  1%  difference  which  shows  Sunni  majority  and  therefore  Sunni  legitimacy  in  government,  as  well  as  historic  censuses  which  show  significantly  higher  Shia  percentage.  See  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18voices.html  for  more  information  on  government  censuses  and  then  a  critique.    22  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Khalifa_family  23  Al  Jazeera  video  production,  “Bahrain:  shouting  in  the  dark.”  24  One  piece  of  evidence  for  a  combination  sectarian  and  pro-­‐democracy  movement  was  in  the  al  Jazeera  video  footage  that  showed  the  ID  cards  of  wounded  security  officers  in  a  hospital;  they  were  all  Sunnis  and  many  

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the population of Bahrain- revolutionaries call for fair elections and freedom.25 Secondarily,

there was absence of Shia representation in the most powerful forces of government, and thus

revolutionaries demanded that the King step down from political power, to allow more

democratic participation.26 Because this conflict is characterized by pro-democracy slogans in

addition to sectarian statements, and the military’s job is seemingly to promote stability

internally, this seems to be a larger conflict between ruler and subject rather than Sunni and Shia

alone.

This state of latent conflict, whether one perceives it as dominantly pro-democratic

(between ruler and subject) or dominantly sectarian, requires a significant amount of repression

to maintain. Jack A. Goldstone posited that fourth generation revolution theorists should look at

how a regime cements its stability, and the regime of Bahrain may have cemented its stability

through a strong military presence. In conflict theory put forth by Jeong, conflicts have an

escalation phase which is followed by a flashpoint, which leads to incident.27 It could be posited

then, that the Arab Spring revolts in Tunisia and Egypt were the “spark that caused the fire,” in

Bahrain. It is an assumption of mine that the Bahrain protests were not random; rather they were

provoked and encouraged.28 Thus, perhaps a greater military role (as it represented the now

dethroned rulers of Libya and Egypt) not only repressed the urge for political demonstration, but

therefore also provoked further demonstration. Military security could have further invoked

protest, as their presence presented a clear opposition to the protesters’ pro-democratic

demonstrations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        recruited  from  outside  of  Bahrain.  An  interviewee  stated  that  Shias  were  often  unemployed  because  they  were  discriminated  against  in  employment  for  police  and  military  jobs,  though  I  found  no  statistical  evidence  for  this.  It  should  be  noted  that  there  are  allegations  against  al  Jazeera  for  taking  a  biased  stance  on  the  revolution.    25  http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201132982742988712.html  26  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/18/bahrain-­‐mourners-­‐call-­‐downnfall-­‐monarchy    27  “Spark  that  causes  explosion  when  sufficient  explosive  gas  is  provided,”  Jeong  ch  5  28  Provoked  by  military  presence,  encouraged  by  Arab  Spring  

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Evidence & Discussion

I will now aim to look at evidence to support the theory that I have outlined that military

force has been used in Bahrain, and that it has been used by its government to cement internal

stability. The following evidence is taken from the BBC, which is admittedly not a perfect

source. However, it has built a good reputation over its longevity and I would argue that the

organization aims to present factual material and aims for conscientious honesty in its

presentation. Because BBC is a news agency among many others, and the reports have shown to

present similar facts in different fashions, I will attempt to overlook all suggestive wording in the

reports and instead evaluate the events which took place.29 For example evidence piece one (The

evidence which I choose to look at is a “Bahrain Profile - BBC,” where I choose to look at a

timeline, where a chronology of key events is written.30):

The Selected Reports

(BBC) In response to protests in Manama in February 2011, the government instituted an

aggressive military crackdown, where several protesters died. (I will interpret in factual terms,

                                                                                                                         29  I  justify  this  as  an  accurate  source  because  of  the  commonality  in  the  fact-­‐ladenness  of  reports  which  were  evident  across  news  agencies;  I  compared  primarily  the  BBC  and  the  Bahraini  News  Agency  (BNA,  state  owned,  which  may  infer  that  its  reports  are  accompanied  by  a  pro-­‐government).      30  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐14541322  The  events  which  I  choose  as  evidence  have  also  been  reported  by  other  major  new  agencies  such  as  the  Telegraph,  al  Jazeera  and  even  the  Bahrain  News  Agency  (the  state  news,  however  it  reports  some  events  with  different  reasoning,  citing  the  destruction  of  pearl  roundabout,  e.g.,  as  a  facelift  for  better  traffic  flow  through  the  area.  Out  of  the  government's  keenness  to  optimize  services  and  improve  the  infrastructure,  work  to  facelift  the  GCC  Roundabout  and  boost  flow  of  traffic  in  this  vital  area  of  the  capital  has  started  today.  (picture  of  destroyed  monument)  http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/450175.  Compare  this  report  to  the  BBC  report,  which  reports  the  Focal  point  of  demonstrations  -­‐  the  Pearl  monument  -­‐  is  demolished.  (On  the  BBC  timeline).  My  goal  is  to  overlook  the  bias  of  the  rationale  which  different  news  reports  present,  and  rather  instead  of  that  I  look  at  the  actions  and  determine  their  rationale  using  my  research.    

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disregarding implicit wording): (Interpretation) Protests occurred in Manama in February 2011.

The military was involved in them. Some protesters died31.

The fact is that protests occurred at Pearl Roundabout and the military was deployed to

contain them. The rationale or justification of military deployment can be skewed and

manipulated, however I look at the basic government response. Instead of allowing the protests

to move on, professional soldiers were deployed. I am not inciting that military deployment to

protest sites is abnormal, however it indicates that the government was threatened by the protests

to an extent, and that in order to keep the under control, the government decided on military

action.

(Interpretation) Saudi Arabian troops were deployed into Bahrain by the Gulf

Cooperative Council (GCC) after diplomatic talks, taking positions of security concern and not

in direct interaction with protestors. Authorities called martial law. The site of the original

protests was destroyed (Pearl Roundabout) by government hired construction vehicles.32

Saudi interest is quite implicit here. There are a number of speculations of why Saudi

Arabia offered soldiers to Bahrain during a time which coincided with significant civil unrest. A

popular speculation is that Saudi Arabia does not want to see the repercussions of Arab Spring

instability in its own country, as Bahrain perhaps has.33 Bahrain’s acceptance of Saudi troops on

                                                                                                                         31  BNA  news  gives  similar  reports,  yet  does  not  draw  them  together  to  put  forth  that  the  government  is  repressing  protests;  rather  non-­‐interaffiliated  reasons  are  given.  Further,  a  report  was  not  found  on  their  website  which  described  the  deployment  of  military,  rather  instead  was  found  an  article  about  Bahraini  soldiers  being  called  off  of  the  streets  by  the  Crown  Prince.  http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/447611  32  Original:  (BBC)  2011  March  -­‐  Saudi  troops  are  called  in  following  further  unrest.  Authorities  declare  martial  law  and  clamp  down  hard  on  pro-­‐democracy  activists.  Protests  continue,  despite  ban  on  demonstrations.  Focal  point  of  demonstrations  -­‐  the  Pearl  monument  -­‐  is  demolished.  http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/450088  -­‐  Peninsula  Shield  deployment.  Pearl  Roundabout  -­‐  <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/450175>.      33  Bahraini  protests  are  contemporaneous  with  civil  unrest  for  democratic  values  that  have  occurred  in  countries  across  the  Arab  world.  

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their soil could implicate that the Bahraini and Saudi government share a common stability

motive. Further, they both have Sunni monarchies, which could explain a sympathetic response

from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain during GCC emergency meetings. The Peninsula Shield Force, as

the multinational defense force which is funded by the GCC and based in Saudi Arabia. It is

intended to deter, and respond to, military aggression against any of the GCC member countries:

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.34

Martial law was called by the King, implying a relative state of security emergency.

Whether it was necessary or not is up to debate, however the fact is that martial law was called,

giving security forces the legislative power to overrule ordinary law in their task of security. This

invocation of martial law gave the military more power in quelling unrest and did indeed result

in more deaths and injuries. If we assume that the regime felt threatened in response to protests

which called for regime change, then we can link a response in the form of military deployment

and also further strengthening of military force in the interest of the government’s interest to

manage protests in the case of the Peninsular Shield’s deployment.

35(Interpretation) Abdulhadi al-Khawaja was charged under martial law with plotting

against the state and sentenced to life in prison.

The use of martial law to detain a suspect who allegedly plotted against the state could

indicate that the military is dealing with more charges than just one to contain anti-governmental

behavior. It may be that the declaration of martial law is an implicit result of deploying military

                                                                                                                         34  This  is  a  Wikipedia  citation,  and  there  is  no  official  peninsular  shield  website  available;  for  this  reason  that  official  declaration  of  the  peninsular  shield’s  usage  is  somewhat  ambiguous,  however  an  agreed  upon  usage  is  given.  35  Original  (BBC)  In  June  2012  opposition  activist  Abdulhadi  al-­‐Khawaja  was  jailed  for  life  by  a  military  court  with  allegations  for  “plotting  against  the  state.”  It  should  be  noted  that  the  BNA  reports  that  he  is  safe  and  receiving  good  health  care,  but  none  of  the  BNA’s  report  describe  what  he  is  charged  with,  rather  that  he  is  simply  being  “kept  safe”  http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/advance_search?name=Abdulhadi+al-­‐Khawaja+&tid=0&type=1  

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to manage civilian unrest. Taking legislative power out of the hands of the citizenry thereby

strengthens the military ability to influence a revolutionary uprising and because it has been an

actor on the government’s behalf, has strengthened the government position related to the

protestor position on the uprising. By strengthening the government and thereby weakening the

protestor through the declaration of martial law, which increases the influence of military on the

situation, it becomes lucid that the military has become a strong actor on the revolution in

situations of protests and jurisdiction.

Conclusion

Ongoing protests being contemporaneous with military deployment and martial law may

imply a cause and effect relationship between protestors’ political agenda and the way the

government responded with military force and military jurisdiction. From this, it may be

extrapolated that the al-Khalifa government has dealt with protests using its military, and that

because the military is in the hands of the al-Khalifas alone (not the protestors or citizenry), the

use of military force on the protestors was lacking in legitimacy, because the protestors and al-

Khalifas have different political agendas. That said, is an absolute monarchy legitimate? This is

open to academic discussion and is highly relevant to context. I would argue that the action of an

external state in military deployment shows a weakness of the Bahraini government, as its

maintenance then could be reliant on external support.

I hypothesized that the government of Bahrain had cemented internal political stability

through use of its military. My hypothesis seems to shed some truth on the importance of the

military in Bahrain in relation to politics. I will now review what I have written about in this

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paper, in order to reiterate the logical connection between that I see between military use and al-

Khalifa family’s interest.

I started by discussing schools of thought which inferred that the military was an

important stabilization factor for a regime, and especially important in monarchies where

legitimacy may be compromised. I then discussed Tilly and Goldstone’s revolutionary theories

in their relevance to the military. Data shows that military spending is higher in states with more

conservative forms of government. I brought up the issue of Bahrain and how it is purported in

the media, and committed to looking at facts reported by the media, not at implicative

statements. After that I moved into theory building, where I built upon the ideas of a few select

scholars.36 I looked at who controlled the military, and then looked at the funding and possible

purposes of Bahrain’s military by comparing them to other countries. I discussed reasons for

Bahrain having a strong military, and addressed the question of sectarianism, which led me to a

theory of latent conflict in Bahrain which was not only sectarian but also ruler-subject. Then I

asserted the “spark that ignited the gasoline” theory to Bahrain, and continued on to how

sectarian stability was relevant to the maintenance of the current government; this led me to the

possibility of military presence being a provoking factor in further sectarian and other (pro-

democratic) opposition.

After that, I presented my evidence for the military being a major actor in the

government’s interest, by looking at carefully selected news articles and then interpreting the

facts that they contain, first making sure that other news agencies (even the Bahraini News

Agency, which is state-run) reported consistently similar facts. I discussed my evidence of

military influence on the revolutionary protests in Bahrain, and then concluded that the

                                                                                                                         36  Tilly,  Goldstone,  Kant,  Rubin  

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government had quelled the protests using military force and jurisdiction, evident in the

deployment of military through cause and effect logic, and the institution of martial law and

arrest of a leading opposition member. In attendance of my hypothesis, I briefly discussed and

then concluded that a major stability factor in the al Khalifa regime is its use of the military, due

to its power over the military.

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Bibliography

I would like to note that open source information (from Wikipedia.org) was used when no other alternative could be found.

Al Jazeera English. "Bahrain: Shouting in the Dark." YouTube. YouTube, 04 Aug. 2011. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xaTKDMYOBOU>.

Al Jazeera English. "Misunderstanding Bahrain's Shia Protesters" Web. 29 June 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201132982742988712.html>.

Alami, Mona. "In Bahrain, the Spark behind Pearl Revolution Still Glows." USA Today. Gannett, 13 May 2012. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-05-13/bahrain-pearl-revolution-monarchy/54939728/1>.

Analysis Intelligence. "OSINT Analysis: Bahrain Unrest Case Study | Analysis Intelligence." Web. 25 June 2012. <http://analysisintelligence.com/intelligence-analysis/osint-analysis-bahrain-unrest-case-study/>.

"Bahrain News Agency | Home." Bahrain News Agency | Home. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://bna.bh/portal/en>.

Barak, Oren, and Assaf David. "The Arab Security Sector : A New Research Agenda for a Neglected Topic." Armed Forces & Society 36.5 (2010): 805-24. Sage Journals. Sage, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 24 Nov. 2009. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://afs.sagepub.com/content/36/5/804.full.pdf+html>.

BBC News. "Bahrain Profile." BBC, 14 June 2012. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14541322>.

Cucuta, Radu Alexandru. "The Revolution and the Military. An Analysis of the Egyptian and Iraqi Revolutions." - Lex Et Scientia International Journal. 417-434, 2010. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://ro.vlex.com/vid/revolution-egyptian-iraqi-revolutions-224476573>.

Fordham, B. O. and Walker, T. C. (2005), Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do Democracies Spend Less?. International Studies Quarterly, 49: 141–157. doi: 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2005.00338.x

Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations. New York: Random House, 1957. Print.

Gulfnews. "Iran Threats on Bahrain Condemned." Web. 29 June 2012. <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/iran-threats-on-bahrain-condemned-1.1037118>.

Goldstone, Jack. "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory." Annual Review of Political Science, June 2001. Web. 29 June 2012. Vol. 4: 139-187 DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.139http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531902

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Jeong, Ho-Won. "Chapter 2, Chapter 5." Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print.

NATO. "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures." International Security Assistance Force.10 May 2012. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf>.

Noueihed, Lin. "Analysis: Tiny Bahrain Could Provoke Regional Conflict." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 14 Mar. 2011. Web. 25 June 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/14/us-bahrain-protests-forces-analysis-idUSTRE72D83320110314>.

Press, Associated. "Bahrain Mourners Call for End to Monarchy." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 18 Feb. 2011. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/18/bahrain-mourners-call-downnfall-monarchy>.

Rubin, Barry. "The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics." The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics. 2001.Web. 29 June 2012. <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a4.html>.

Tilly, Charles. The Contentious French. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986., Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

The World Bank Group. "Military Expenditure (% of GDP)." Data. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS/countries/1W-BH?display=graph>.

Wikipedia."Al Khalifa Family." Wikimedia Foundation, 18 June 2012. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Khalifa_family>.

Wikipedia. "Revolution." Wikimedia Foundation, 24 June 2012. Web. 29 June 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution>.

Just a further link and an end-comment. The Bahraini revolution has so much bias in its new reports that it’s hard to decipher the actual state of the public’s opinion in this matter of revolution. Here is a link to the Bahraini Revolution’s Facebook page (named Feb.14 because that was the start date of protests: http://www.facebook.com/Bahrain.Feb14. Obviously they have their own agenda and are bias too, but I want to emphasize my deep sympathy for the promotion of human rights and the transition to democratic government, wherever it is, whenever it is. The government of Bahrain’s steps to contain the revolution may be a course of action which reduces civilian harm and deaths, and could be promoting a peaceful transition of Bahrain’s absolute monarchy to democracy instead of allowing an all-out rebellion to occur which is seen in multiple other Arab countries. My opinion supports revolutionaries in their call

21    

for international jurisdiction and help; I would like to state that the government’s strength in selective media coverage and tact in diplomacy has made it so that the international community does not really have a solid reason to intervene; their facts are not solid enough and unrest is perhaps not intense enough in Bahrain. All in all, I hope to see Bahrain transition to democracy in a way that is supported by the al-Khalifa family, and in a way that everyone is happy, where the monarchy retains some of its immense wealth, but also where corruption (such as the sale of a major piece of down-town Bahrain real estate was sold to the al-Khalifas for 1 Bahraini dollar) is unearthed and condemned with legal jurisdiction. Finally, the behavior of the government to seduce its citizens with $3000 to each family and promises of a boost in the economy shows that the al-Khalifas know how to play to the desires of the people while continuing their monarchical rule and conceding the least amount possible. In my opinion, a minor redistribution of wealth is a very small price to pay considering the al-Khalifas immense wealth and the protest action for their dethroning.

Linked is the Wikipedia entry about the Bahraini uprising. The fact and figures table on the right may give one a solid basic overview of the conflict. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahraini_uprising_(2011%E2%80%93present)

This work is my own, I did not plagiarize or use this for another class.

William  Johannes  Wesselhoeft