The Unplanned Obsolescence of Psychological...

The Unplanned Obsolescence of Psychological Science and anArgument for Its Revival

Stanley B. KleinUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

I examine some of the key scientific precommitments of modern psychology, and arguethat their adoption has the unintended consequence of rendering a purely psychologicalanalysis of mind indistinguishable from a purely biological treatment. And, becausethese precommitments sanction an “authority of the biological,” explanation of phe-nomena traditionally considered the purview of psychological analysis is fully sub-sumed under the biological. I next evaluate the epistemic warrant of these precommit-ments and suggest that there are good reasons to question their applicability topsychological science. I conclude that experiential aspects of reality (reflected in mentalconstruct terms such as memory, belief, thought, and desire) give us reason to remainopen to the need for psychological explanation in the treatment of mind.

Keywords: biophysical determinism, consciousness, metaphilosophy of science, mind,psychological science

In a letter to the APS Observer, Scott Lilien-feld notes a trend among Departments of Psy-chology to adopt a change of name. This de-partmental rebranding consists in adding“Brain” (or a cognate—e.g., Neuro) to “Psycho-logical Science”:

Dartmouth’s Department of Psychology has becomethe Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences;Indiana University’s department is similarly termed theDepartment of Psychological and Brain Sciences; andDuke’s department now calls itself the Department ofPsychology and Neuroscience. These departments arehardly alone; the University of Colorado at Boulder’spsychology department has recently become the De-partment of Psychology and Neuroscience, and theUniversity of Louisville’s department has become theDepartment of Psychological and Brain Sciences. (Lil-ienfeld, 2011)

We participated in a similar makeover atUCSB. Our program, since its inception, went

by the name “Department of Psychology.”However, motivated by a perceived change incircumstances (e.g., the President’s initiative tomap the human brain and funding agenciesgrowing appetite for proposals with a neurosci-ence flavor), we decided a product rebrandingmight be in order (perhaps “repurposing” bettercaptured our motivation for change). Aftermuch, occasionally heated, debate we opted forthe name Department of Psychological andBrain Sciences.

My reason for relating this little episode ofdepartmental history is not to argue—as didLilienfield—that the titular conjunction (i.e.,“psychological” and “brain” sciences) might betaken as a tacit endorsement of Cartesian dual-ity. Departmental renaming, in my view, hasimplications beyond the problem of dualism—implications that call to question whether psy-chology still has anything of substance to offerto a science of the mind.

Goals of the Article

The currently popular view is that the mind canbe conceptualized as “a naturally selected systemof organs of computation” (Pinker, 2005, p. 22).Accompanying this are three corollaries – (a) abio-physical reduction of mind is (or soon will be)

I thank Alba Papa-Grimaldi, Dan Robinson, and GalenStrawson for helping make this article better than it other-wise would have been. Any weak arguments and incoher-encies that remain do so despite their best efforts to set meon the correct path.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-dressed to Stanley B. Klein, Department of Psychologicaland Brain Sciences, 551 Ucen Road, University of Califor-nia at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106. E-mail:[email protected]

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Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice © 2015 American Psychological Association2015, Vol. 2, No. 4, 000 2326-5523/15/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000079

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mailto:[email protected]

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000079

within reach (e.g., Papineau, 2001),1 (b) the ap-pearance of conscious free will is a trick played bythe mind (e.g., Wegner, 2003), and (c) “uncon-scious processes can carry out every [emphasisadded] fundamental high–level function that con-scious processes can perform” (Hassin, 2013, p.195). Considered together, these propositions—which are more in the nature of scientific precom-mitments (clarification of this and other termsused in the text is found in Table 1) than nomo-logical necessities mandated by the data (see sec-tion “Questioning the Precommitments”)—haveconsiderable influence on how we approach re-search and theory in psychological science (e.g.,Piccinini, 2006).

I argue that these propositions, when taken asfour premises of a deductive argument, lead to theconclusion that biological mechanism is both anecessary and sufficient explanation for humanbehavior. Put differently, it no longer is clear whatwork psychology has to offer current theories ofmind: A commitment to unconscious neural com-putation and physical determinism sanctions apurely biological treatment of phenomena tradi-tionally considered the concern of psychologicalanalyses. In light of this, it would seem that thedepartmental renaming process should be taken astep further: The title should be simply “BrainSciences”—a rebranding likely to please elimina-tive materialists, psycho-neural identity theorists,and administrators (who will welcome an oppor-tunity to prune departmental letterhead in thesecost-cutting times).

In the next section I discuss the role of physi-calism (i.e., the mind is a biological computerinstantiated by a physical brain) and the otherprecommitments coloring our understanding ofmind. In section “The Question: Is There StillRoom for Psychology in the Science of Mind?,” Iargue that these precommitments open the door toa “science of mind” in which phenomena custom-arily considered the concern of psychological sci-ence are fully subsumable under biological expla-nation (the “individuation problem”; section “CanWe Individuate Psychological From the Biologi-cal Activities of the Brain?”). In the final twosections I take issue with the premises outlined insection “Precommitments: Physicalism, Deter-minism, the Unconscious,” and contend that ascience of mind that neuters the causal and ex-planatory efficacy of psychological explanation ismisguided.

Precommitments: Physicalism,Determinism, the Unconscious

In this section I touch briefly on some ofthe key precommitments that underwrite mostcontemporary approaches to understandingthe mind (even a moderately satisfying treat-ment of this very complex topic would requirevolumes). These precommitments, thoughfunctionally independent, when treated syllo-gistically endorse a reconceptualization of“Psychological and Brain Sciences” in whichthe first predicate (i.e., psychological) is leftwithout a clear explanatory role. I refer to thisas “the authority of the biological” (see sec-tion “The Question: Is There Still Room forPsychology in the Science of Mind?”).

Physicalism and Neural Computation

The terms materialism and physicalism bothare used to refer to the doctrine that everythingthat exists—whether molecule, mineral, ormind—exists wholly as matter. Materialism,whose roots trace to the atomists of Greek an-tiquity, is the doctrine that all reality is consti-tuted of solid, inert substances (i.e., material)that interact energetically and deterministicallyvia physical contact (e.g., Crane & Mellor,1990).

Developments in modern physics pose seri-ous difficulties for some of the properties attrib-uted to “matter” by traditional materialist doc-trine. Discoveries (primarily in the last century)suggest that matter need be neither inert norsolid (think “fields of force”), and that objectscan interact instantaneously despite separationby space-like intervals (an interval is space-likeif an object can be present at two events only ifit travels faster than the speed of light).

In what follows, I therefore adopt the term“physicalism” when discussing the metaphysi-

1 In my journal articles I typically cite a large number ofsupporting documents—ranging from the mid-100s to morethan 300! In an effort to conserve journal space, I have beenasked to forgo my proclivity toward encyclopedic referenc-ing. Accordingly, in all but one (very important) case I citeonly a single salient exemplar of the position under consid-eration. However, lest the reader worry that this paucity ofdocumentation suggests an idealized review of the litera-ture, I encourage those concerned (or simply interested) tocontact me via e-mail (see the Author’s Notes) and I willsupply additional bibliographic material.

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cal doctrine that nature is limited to facts aboutmatter and its interactions. Physicalism holdsthat all substances are identical with the type ofthings studied by physicists (e.g., Spurrett &Papineau, 1999). This includes physical partic-ulars (e.g., subatomic particles), physical prop-erties (e.g., mass) and the laws that govern them(e.g., F � MA). A simpler way of putting thephysicalist doctrine is that everything that existseither is an entity or is composed of entitiesstudied by physical science.2

Although physicalism encompasses all natu-ral phenomena, my interests are more circum-scribed—that is, the implications of physicalismfor the science of psychology. Physics deals

only in objective and quantifiable properties ofphysical objects (e.g., size, shape, mass, andmotion). It has no place for qualitative aspectsof nature reflected in mental construct termssuch as belief, desire, pain, trust, happiness,anger, joy (e.g., Wilson, 2006). To close thismetaphysical gap, physicalism stipulates thatmental phenomena are reducible to, or identicalwith, physical phenomena: If physicalism is

2 Physics, of course, is an ever-evolving discipline (com-pare present-day physical principles with those characteriz-ing Newtonian mechanics). To avoid definitional slippage,let’s stipulate that physicalism embraces not just our currentunderstanding of nature, but future discoveries as well.

Table 1Glossary of Key Terms Not Defined in the Text

1. Consciousness. Consciousness comes in many kinds (e.g., sentience, access consciousness, noetic consciousness,temporal consciousness, phenomenal consciousness; e.g., Klein, in press). My use of the term consists in theproposition that X is conscious if and only if there is “something it is like” for the organism to be in that state (e.g.,Nagel, 1974). That is, consciousness consists in first-person experience (see below). This usage is what mostphilosophers have in mind when discussing phenomenal consciousness.

2. Epiphenomenon. X is an epiphenomenon if it occurs alongside or, in parallel to, a primary phenomenon, Y, but hasno causal relevance for the enactment of Y. An example would be smoke issuing from the operation of a steamengine. Smoke (the epiphenomenon) occurs alongside the workings of the engine (the primary phenomenon), but hasno effect on the engine’s performance.

3. Experience. In my treatment, all experience is conscious: It is the qualitative aspect of the mental state (see below)you are having right now. Some who use the term have in mind sensation (e.g., pain) and perception (e.g., that treeover there). For me, experience also can be about internally generated content such as memories, thoughts andimages.Throughout the text, I treat the term “experiential reality” as synonymous with terms qualitative, subjective, mental,and psychological reality (in distinction from non-qualitative aspects of reality). Although I realize that it is nottechnically precise to do so, it is an expositional convenience made necessary, in part, by the usage of quotes cited inthe text. I acknowledge the duality of my position.

4. Functional Independence. As used in this article, two (or more) presuppositions (e.g., determinism, physicalism) arefunctionally independent if the positions endorsed by presupposition X are not entailed by the positions endorsed bypresupposition Y. This does not imply that X has nothing to do with Y, or that they are disjunctive (e.g., they can beorthogonal); indeed, as argued in this article, functionally independent presuppositions can serve as the premises of adeductive argument. Rather, the idea is that although X and Y both can contribute to our understanding of a particularstate of affairs, their contributions are unique.

5. Mental States. A mental state consists in content (i.e., its intentional objects; e.g., Brentano, 1995) and theirconscious apprehension. Thus seen, a mental state is the experienced outcome of sub-experiential (see below)processes taking place (presumably) in the brain. Mental states give rise to the great variety of psychologicalexperiences familiar to both academic discourse and personal phenomenology (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, memories,imagination, thoughts, inferences, and so forth).

6. Mind. Mind is the collection of sub-experiential processes required for having a mental state and the mental statesthey enable.

7. Qualia. Qualia are individual instances of conscious experience. They are specific instances of the “what it is like”character of mental states (i.e., the way it feels to have this pain, memory, desire, belief, perception, plan, image,thought, etc.).

8. Scientific Precommitments. A presupposition that helps determine the formative background of the questions we asknature, rather than a fact or law we discover in virtue of the answers we receive. Precommitments are necessary forand facilitate the performance of scientific inquiry, though they are not formally part of science (e.g., Rescher, 1984).

9. Sub-Experiential. Learned or inherited processes (and the content on which they act) that take place unconsciously.Although subexperiential processes play a necessary role in enabling experience, they are not the experience itself.An analogy may help: Although a play consists in a great many behind the scenes activities (securing funding,finding a venue, casting calls, etc.), none of these activities is, strictly speaking, the play as experienced.

3UNPLANNED OBSOLESCENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY

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correct, all mental states are substances thathave an entirely physical nature.

The most likely candidate for the physicalityof the mental is the body in which they arepresumed to reside. One part of the body—thebrain—seems disproportionately relevant. Themost popular physicalist approach to the mind ispsycho-neural identity theory (e.g., Place,1956)—the idea that the mind is identical withthe physical-chemical states of the brain. AsCrane (1995) notes “there is no well-motivatedphysicalist position which is not an identitytheory” (p. 22).3

But in what way does the brain effect an exclu-sively physical realization of events attributed tothe workings of mind? Inspired by Turing’s anal-ysis of computation (Turing, 1936)—that is, theidea that a logical calculus can be implemented indigital computing machine—neuroscientists (e.g.,Anderson & Rosenfeld, 1988), cognitive psychol-ogists (e.g., Marr, 1982), and philosophers ofmind (e.g., Putnam, 1960) have taken the positionthat the brain is an organic version of Turing’smachine, fashioned by natural selection to solveproblems by executing a series of logical opera-tions. Although the mechanism of organic com-putation is thought to be the processing of trains ofneuronal spikes, the exact manner in which thisenables thought and behavior still is not well-understood (e.g., Piccinini & Scarantino, 2011). Inthis way, mental states are reduced to physicalprocesses and the mind is seen as nothing aboveand beyond the computational states of the brain.

Although the popularity of computationalismhas fluctuated over the years among philoso-phers of mind (e.g., Piccinini, 2006), the ideathat neurons are the physical units that enablethe brain to perform computations (i.e., the neu-ron doctrine) has remained a central tenet ofneuroscience (e.g., Gold & Stoljar, 1999). Byviewing mind as consisting wholly in neuralcomputation, physicalism situates the mind se-curely within its purview.

Determinism and Free Will

If one accepts physicalism as an ontologi-cally complete description of nature (as manydo; e.g., Papineau, 2001), then all effects arephysical effects and anything producing a phys-ical effect must itself be physical. Accordingly,what we take to be mental causation (e.g., freewill, intentions, decisions) is, in reality, nothing

other than the physical workings of neurons.Qualitative, indeterministic notions of personalagency are taken to be illusions that blind us tothe “fact” that every effect is a physical effectand therefore fully determined by a physicalcause (e.g., Wegner, 2003).

In what may be the first systematic articula-tion of a physicalist conception of causality,Laplace (1825/2011) posed a thought experi-ment (often referred to as his “demon argu-ment”). Specifically, he held that if there existeda magical being (the demon) who could know(a) all the initial conditions (e.g., the participat-ing particles of matter, their location, state ofmotion and so forth), (b) all the physically rel-evant laws governing their behavior and inter-action, and who (c) possessed an intellect suf-ficiently sophisticated to perform the properanalyses, then the demon (d) could predict withabsolute certainty the future state of any system.That is, if conditions a through c can be met,and physicalism is true, nature is amenable to anexhaustively deterministic rendering. No addi-tional considerations need be taken into ac-count: Free will and other forms of mentalagency are nothing more than tricks of themind, misleading us into believing that our vo-

3 Various well-known problems with identity theory (es-pecially the multiple realizabitity of mental states; e.g.,Kim, 1998) have opened the door to alternate conceptions ofphysicalism as well as competing theories of mind. Forexample, functionalism (e.g., Block, 1980)—which individ-uates mental states in terms of their overall functional rolesand identifies token mental states in terms of whateverrealizes those roles (e.g., neural computation, silicon chipsor even rusty tin cans attached by string) in particularcases—doesn’t require physicalism, but is compatible withit. If some version of functionalism is right, this might bethought to secure an important degree of autonomy forpsychological science with respect to brain science. If mindsare realized by but not reducible to brains, then psychologyoperates at a higher level of generality than neuroscience,and the findings of the latter can’t give full answers to thequestions posed by the former.

A detailed discussion of functionalism would move us farfrom the points I wish to make. However, it is important tonote that although functionalism, if true, may be able tosolve the individuation problem in principle, it cannot (eas-ily) do so in practice. The problem centers on the attempt toindividuate behaviors based on their functional role. As Iargue in section “Individuation based on properties extrinsicto the enabling medium: A functional analysis,” it is unclearhow to identify which brain-based functions are high-level(and thus amenable to psychological rather than biologicalexplanation) absent recourse to assertion, stipulation, andthe threat of tautology.

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litional concerns have traction in a world ruledentirely by physical contingency.4

Subsequent developments in physics suggestthat Laplace’s demon argument, though still theconceptual bedrock of most formulations ofphysical determinism, is in need of fine-tuning(e.g., Balaguer, 2010). For example, the precisespecification of the fate of any determinist pro-cess depends in a highly sensitive manner onexact knowledge of initial conditions of therelevant set of subatomic particles (i.e., the fun-damental constituents of matter). However, be-cause, by the principle of quantum indetermi-nacy (e.g., Heisenberg, 1958/1999), knowledgeof these conditions never can be obtained withsufficient precision, the equations of motioncannot be solved in an unambiguous manner.Consequently, at the level of individual particle,premise ‘a’ cannot be realized without allowingmargins of error in prediction. (Although calcu-lating the fate of individual particles is, by thelaws of physics, indeterminable, quantum me-chanics does enable precise prediction about thedistribution of large aggregates of particles;e.g., Thompson, 2008. In this way, human be-havior, which transpires at a macrolevel of re-ality, might be seen capable of being accommo-dated by deterministic principles— but, seefootnote 5).

Of course, the fact that one can explain aperson’s behavior in terms of nonmentalisticparticulars and their properties does not pre-clude the possibility mentalistic explanationalso can have causal relevance (this sometimesis referred to as the doctrine of compatibilism;e.g., Nichols, 2008). Indeed, some have arguedthat concerns about free will arising from mod-ern neuroscience (which embraces the physical-ist doctrine) are largely unwarranted (e.g.,Roskies, 2006).

Compatibilism (of which there are severalversions), however, faces serious challenges.For example, any attempt to endow mentalstates with causal potency appears to violate afundamental tenet of science—the conservationof energy (see section “Energy conservation andfree will”). According to this critique (some-times referred to as the “argument from causalclosure under the physical”), for a physical en-tity with purely physical properties to act onother physical entities to alter their physicalproperties, these entities must exchange energy.But, because energy is a property of physical

entities (e.g., E � MC2), any exchange betweena nonphysical aspect of reality (e.g., an unre-duced mental state) and the physical world (e.g.,the brain) would result in a net increase inenergy in the universe, thus contravening theprinciple of energy conservation (physicalistsdo not face this problem in virtue of their iden-tification of mental properties with physicalproperties).

Physical determinism thus rules out anycausal relations between nonphysical and phys-ical aspects of reality. Because unreduced,agency-relevant mental states (e.g., volition,free will, intention, decision) are seen as inca-pable of interacting with physical reality, theyeither are (a) dismissed as socially sanctionedverbal conventions, recruited to help us cling toour belief in free will (e.g., the illusion argu-ment), or (b) if they exist apart from physicalsubstance (in some unknown manner), they doso absent any causal potency (the epiphenome-non argument).

The Unconscious Mind

If all is physical, then causality cannot beexplained by appeal to mental state constructs.Terms such as judgment and free will are, atbest, epiphenomena (it is worth mention thatthere is a sense in which the treatment of mentalconstruct terms as epiphenomena runs counterto physicalist doctrine. This is because, if, say,a “judgment” really occurs—even as a meagerepiphenomenon—it either is real, and physical-ism fails, or it is a word that refers to what isentirely physical, and then it isn’t causally in-ert). This neutering of qualitative aspects ofmind fits comfortably with the modern view ofthe brain as a neuro-computational device (seesection “Physicalism and Neural Computa-tion”): Computers—whether consisting in sili-con chips or neural networks—are physical de-vices that manipulate symbols in the service ofsome outcome which, of doctrinal necessity(see section “Determinism and Free Will”), isfully deterministic. Given these assumptions,there is no need to consider even the possibilityof a role for mental aspects of reality in anaccount of the mind and its operations.

4 Interestingly, it never is made clear by proponents ofphysical determinism how the qualitative experience of anillusion fits into a nonqualitative universe.


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Consistent with this perspective, psychologi-cal scientists have taken an increasingly defla-tionary view of the role of consciousness inhuman behavior. Demonstrations that functionstraditionally assumed to be underwritten byconscious mentation (e.g., memory, attitudes,thinking, calculation, reading) can be performedunconsciously have become commonplace. Wethus have unconscious memories, attitudes, be-liefs, thoughts and so forth (for recent reviewssee Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Hassin, 2013).The conclusion drawn is that much of whatformerly was attributed to the experiential as-pects of mind can be fully accommodated bysubexperiential processes. Taken in conjunctionwith the principles of physicalism, biologicaldeterminism and causal closure (sections“Physicalism and Neural Computation” and“Determinism and Free Will”), unconsciousmentation calls into question what (if any)causal role remains for consciousness in theachievement of cognitive and behavioral out-comes.

Another reason to question the casual effi-cacy of consciousness comes from work byLibet and his colleagues on volitional behavior(for review see Libet, 1993). In a typical study,a participant has EEG electrodes attached to hisor her scalp. S/he then is asked to perform somesimple motor activity (e.g., raise a finger) withina particular time frame. The choice of exactlywhen (within the time allotted) to initiate the actis left to the participant’s discretion. S/he fur-ther is instructed to disclose the moment s/hefirst becomes conscious of a desire to act (e.g.,by noting the position of a moving dot on anoscilloscope timer). By comparing the partici-pant’s conscious decision to initiate a behavior(as indicated by the dot’s location on the timer)with changes in his or her EEG signals, Libetdiscovered that cortical activity commenced (onaverage) several hundred milliseconds beforeparticipants indicated awareness of their inten-tion to act. In other words, a conscious decisionappeared to be reliably preceded by an uncon-scious change in neural activity. Libet termedthis subexperiential change in cortical conduc-tivity the “readiness potential” (Note: Althoughthis term most often is associated with Libet, itactually antedates his writings by a few de-cades).

These findings have numerous implicationsfor theories of mind. For present purposes, the

take-away message is that if subexperientialprocesses (as identified by the readiness poten-tial) are the true initiators of volitional menta-tion (i.e., if the processes that eventuate in anact commence prior to the conscious intentionto act), serious questions are raised about therole of consciousness in volitional accounts ofbehavior (a domain of inquiry traditionally con-sidered a safe haven for advocates of the causalpotency of consciousness).

Contemporary psychological literature con-tains numerous demonstrations of the allegedsufficiency of unconscious mentation for con-trol of thought and behavior. Because no syn-opsis can do the topic justice, one more (albeithighly influential) example will have to suffice.Blindsight—the ability of people suffering cor-tical blindness (resulting from lesions in thestriate cortex) to respond appropriately to visualstimuli they cannot consciously “see” (e.g.,Weiskrantz, 1997)—seems a clear case of afunction unequivocally psychological in nature(perception) that is capable of being performedin the absence of conscious mentation. For ex-ample, in one study a patient was asked tolocate a visual stimulus presented on a screen.Because s/he could not consciously detect thepresence of the stimulus, s/he was instructed to“guess” its location. Research showed thatblindsight patients were able discern properties(e.g., location, shape) of visually presentedstimuli at levels of accuracy (often substan-tially) higher than would be expected fromchance alone.

The Question: Is There Still Room forPsychology in the Science of Mind?

Mental construct terms are pervasive in psy-chology: They are “part and parcel of the inter-pretation of data whenever and wherever every-day psychological phenomena are underinvestigation” (e.g., Hutto, 2013, p. 30). How-ever, if (a) physicalism is true, and (b) deter-minism (instantiated by subexperiential neuralcomputation), accounts for all human acts, then(c) an analysis of mind in terms of psycholog-ical constructs is in danger of being supersededby a purely biological rendering.

Anticipating (and perhaps fostering) the sen-timents of contemporary cognitive and neuro-scientists, Minsky (1986) maintained that mindssimply are what brains do. But brains do lots of

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things, many of which (e.g., digestion, balance,respiration, hormonal regulation) do not fallwithin the purview of psychological science.Accordingly, the question arises “Is there aprincipled way to individuate brain-based phe-nomena that do and do not require psychologi-cal explanation?”

In what follows, I attempt to show that suchindividuation is more a matter of social conven-tion and interdisciplinary turf wars than theprincipled outcome taxonomic analysis or no-mothetic necessity. I conclude that if one as-cribes to the precommitments discussed in Sec-tion 2, a biological level of explanation is bothnecessary and sufficient to explain all brain-based behaviors—even those traditionally con-sidered the province of psychological analysis.And if explanation in terms of psychologicalmechanisms and processes is left with no workto do, there is no need for a science of psychol-ogy.

Can We Individuate Psychological Fromthe Biological Activities of the Brain?

Before we can determine whether phenom-ena assumed to require psychological explana-tion can be individuated from phenomena forwhich biological explanation is mandated wefirst must have a clear idea of which phenomenatraditionally fall within the purview of psycho-logical analysis. The American PsychologicalAssociation (APA)—which can be taken as au-thoritative on this topic—defines psychology as“the scientific study of the behavior of individ-uals and their mental processes” (adapted fromGerrig & Zimbardo, 2002). Thus seen, psychol-ogy is the study of the mind and its “presump-tive” effects on behavior (Note: The APA doesnot draw a distinction between “mental” and“mind”; see Table 1. Although the definitionabove refers to “mental processes,” in otherdefinitions these processes are attributed to“mind”). I use the word “presumptive” becausethe APA does not explicitly draw a causal linkbetween mind and behavior. However, I think itreasonable to infer that the behaviors referred toin their definition are those whose actualizationis in the interests of the mind, not those chargedwith sustaining the biological integrity of theorganism (e.g., neural maintenance of hormonalbalance). Unfortunately, as the reader likely hasnoted, the “line of demarcation” is not sharp.

For example, are eating behaviors (e.g., foodpreferences, regulation of caloric intake) medi-ated by the mind or do they serve the purposesof homeostatic maintenance? There is, ofcourse, no reason why such behaviors cannot beviewed as occupying that intersection on a Venndiagram where the possibilities overlap. But thissimply adds to the problems facing attempts toindividuate the purely psychological from thepurely biological.

By definition, then, psychology is concernedwith behaviors that fall under the aegis of mind.But the mind—which is nothing over and abovewhat the brain does (e.g., Minsky, 1986)—consists in both experiential and subexperientialprocesses (see Table 1). And if, as argued insection “Precommitments: Physicalism, Deter-minism, the Unconscious”, experiential realityexists solely as an epiphenomenon, it has nocausal potency. Thus, all behavior attributableto the mind (e.g., recollection, volition, beliefs,plans) must result from computations per-formed by subexperiential neural activity (theneuron doctrine). But, because every brain-based behavior—whether in the service of mind(e.g., attempting to remember one’s past) orbodily integrity (e.g., regulating glucose lev-els)—is neurally enacted, what makes the for-mer “psychological” and the latter “biological”?

Individuation based on properties intrinsicto the enabling medium: A neuro-computa-tional analysis. Short of finding some indi-viduating signature in the neural substrate, theapportioning of behavior-to-discipline seemsbased largely on stipulation (rather than princi-pled argument) in the service of justifying in-terdisciplinary boundaries. Consider, as one ex-ample, a brain function taken by most to fallclearly within the purview of psychological sci-ence—intelligence. As Bechtel and Wright’s(2009) note, psychological explanation appliesto “any [emphasis added] attempt to understandphenomena related to intelligent behavior” (p.113). Although the concept of “intelligence” isdifficult to define (e.g., Neisser et al., 1996),most agree that intelligent behaviors are cogni-tively complex, goal-directed acts that enable anindividual to adapt effectively to environmentalcontingencies (e.g., Sternberg & Salter, 1982).

But, these criteria are too broad to enableunambiguous classification. A purely homeo-static behavior can be complex, goal-directed,and facilitate adaptive responses to circum-


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stance (see below). What sanctions the identifi-cation of any particular behavior as intelligent(and thus within the compass of psychologicalscience)? The (often unstated) assumption isthat intelligent acts are “high-level” functions ofthe brain, and that psychology is concerned withexplaining high-level brain function (e.g., Vy-gotsky, 1980). But now the circularity is in fullview: Behavior X is psychological in virtue ofbeing underwritten by high-level neural activ-ity. But, behavior X is a high-level activity ofthe brain in virtue of its psychological nature.This approach to the assignment of behavior-to-discipline thus begs the question by assuming(i.e., high-level brain activity are psychologicalphenomena) what it is trying to prove (i.e.,psychological explanation targets high-level ac-tivity of the brain).

There are, of course, ways to avoid this tau-tology, but these solutions have their own prob-lems. For example, designating a behavior asintelligent often falls victim to species-prejudices. Take, for example, the ability tofollow directions on a map. Most would classifythis as an obvious example of high-level psy-chological behavior (indeed, a branch of psy-chological science is devoted, in part, to itsinvestigation; e.g., Montello, 2005). In contrast,navigation by sense of smell ranks rather low onthe human intelligence scale. But for other spe-cies (e.g., canines), olfactory navigation re-quires substantial neural complexity and adap-tive sophistication (while viewing a map has noobvious adaptive significance). Thus, for onespecies, navigation by sense of smell wouldseem an exemplar of high-level intelligencewhile for another it is a primitive and inefficientmethod to find one’s way. The level (and henceintelligence) ascribed to olfactory navigationvaries by species.

If nominal designation (e.g., olfactory navi-gation) cannot unequivocally position a behav-ior on a “levels” hierarchy, perhaps assignmentmight be accomplished by considering theneuro-computational complexity required for anact’s achievement. The ability to effectivelynavigate potentially unfamiliar surroundings—whether by smell or printed instruction—wouldseem to involve a considerable degree of com-plex computational resources. On this view,map reading in humans and olfactory naviga-tion in canines both would qualify as high-level,intelligent behavior.

There are at least two problems with thisproposal. First, what is the metric that mapscomplexity-of-computation to intelligence-of-behavior? Compare a largely motoric behavior(e.g., keeping one’s balance in a blizzard) witha behavior clearly cognitive in nature (e.g.,planning to cope with the effects of the storm).Although the latter intuitively seems intelligent(and thus computationally demanding—requir-ing involvement of such things as imagination,reasoning, planning and executing the acts theyencourage), the former also appears to makeconsiderable computational demands (e.g., ves-tibular and kinesthetic feedback need to be con-stantly monitored and updated; muscle groupshave to be activated, coordinated and respon-sive to a largely unpredictable environment).An index based solely on computational com-plexity seems too general to allow specificationof behaviors attributable to intelligence.

Perhaps we can avoid this problem by focus-ing not on computational complexity per se, butrather on the particular kind of computationalcomplexity associated with brain structures thatenable intelligent acts. But herein lays a secondproblem. To assess the computational complex-ity (or any other intelligence-relevant property)of a neural structure we need to know whatidentifies that structure as an intelligent struc-ture. And this is notoriously difficult (e.g., Jeri-son, 1973). A number of proposals—for exam-ple, volume of gray matter, cortical thickness,neural efficiency, structural interconnectivity—have been advanced, but each has sustainedserious criticism (for a partial review see Lud-ers, Narr, Thompson, & Toga, 2009). Absentscientific consensus on the neural bases of in-telligence, it is difficult to assign behaviors aplace on a “level-of-function” scale based onconsideration of their enabling properties.

Another way to individuate intelligent (high-level) from nonintelligent (low-level) behaviormight be to consider the range of problems towhich the behavior can be applied (e.g., Rozin,1976). Viewed in terms of its phylogenetic his-tory, any behavior initially is an adaptive spe-cialization. Adaptive specialization refers toevolution’s specific solution to a specific prob-lem—that is, a behavior designed to deal with anarrowly circumscribed range of contingencies.For example, while certain species of honeybees have evolved the ability to communicatethe location of a food source to members of the

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hive, this navigational competence cannot beused for other purposes (e.g., von Frisch, 1967).Rozin proposes that intelligence is the extent towhich a specialization initially developed for aspecific response to a specific set of circum-stances has become accessible to other neuralsystems, thereby increasing the scope and flex-ibility of the organism’s ability to respond ef-fectively to its environment.

Unfortunately, system-accessibility is not un-ambiguously indicative of intelligence. Con-tinuing with the example of olfaction, considerthe number of neural systems that have accessto the adaptive specialization that initially en-abled dogs to identify an object by its smell—for example, navigation, fertility awareness, as-sessment of nutritional value. Yet, despiteavailability to these and other systems, mostwould argue that such olfactory-based behav-iors seem more like basic biological competen-cies than cognitively complex manifestations ofintelligence.

In summary, attempts to distinguish psycho-logical from biological activity of the brain invirtue of some neuro-structural property (e.g.,computational complexity) are easily subject tocounterexample. In addition, many fall victimto charges of tautology and post hoc stipulation.

Individuation based on properties extrin-sic to the enabling medium: A functionalanalysis. One problem with attempts to indi-viduate behavior on the basis of underlyingmechanism is that all brain-based behavior(whether regulative, motoric, or cognitive) isassumed to depend on the same mechanism—computation. And the way in which computa-tion is realized in its neural medium still is toopoorly understood (e.g., Piccinini & Scarantino,2011) to allow for unambiguous ascription ofbehavior-to-discipline.

But many things can be individuated withoutconsideration of property or mechanism. Forexample, although taxis and a hearses shareproperties (doors, tires, chassis, mirrors) andmechanism (internal combustion engine), noone would confuse the former for the latter.What makes one an acceptable mode of trans-porting one’s date to the senior prom, and theother morbidly inappropriate, is the functionthey serve. That is, despite many intrinsic sim-ilarities they have clear differences attributableto external purpose.

Perhaps examination of a neural structure inlight of its purpose might help identify activitiesof the brain that require psychological analysis.For example, behaviors designed to facilitatesocial function seem prime candidates for psy-chological treatment (psychology is, after all, asocial science). Indeed, some have argued thatthe major driving force in the evolution of psy-chological mechanisms was the advantage suchneural sophistication afforded in meeting thedemands of the social environment (e.g., Hum-phrey, 1976). Identifying behaviors possessingclear social relevance and examining their neu-ral enablers might provide a way of individuat-ing systems of the brain tasked with psycholog-ical functions from those with a purelybiological mission.

Although at first glance a functional analysisseems promising, problems quickly arise. Forexample, how does one classify a behavior associal? Communicative acts such as speech,grooming, and facial expressions seem clearexemplars (e.g., Dunbar, 1998). But what aboutbehaviors designed to maintain physical coor-dination? Incorrectly timed or awkward move-ments can have a significant impact on the qual-ity of a social exchange (imagine trying toconvey a positive first impression while you arelisting from side to side). Thus, while commu-nicative and motoric acts both can have socialrelevance, the former seem obvious candidatesfor psychological explanation while for the lat-ter a purely biological treatment seems morefitting. Considerations of function seem to offerno reliable route to individuation.

Summing Up

Regardless of whether investigative effortsare trained on internal or external criteria, thereappears to be no clear-cut way to identify whichneural activities are best seen as psychologicaland which are better classified as biological(i.e., “the individuation problem”). And, giventhe “authority of the biological” (section “Pre-commitments: Physicalism, Determinism, theUnconscious”), when faced with taxonomic un-certainty the latter would seem the default po-sition. The case can thus be made that the pre-commitments of modern psychology have theunintended consequence of calling into questionwhether psychological explanation is necessaryto understand the workings of the mind.


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Questioning the Precommitments

The fact that attempts at individuation failedto find a place for psychological explanation inthe treatment of mind does not mean that indi-viduation is impossible. A strictly biologicaltreatment mind is sanctioned in large part by theprecommitments discussed in sections “Physi-calism and Neural Computation,” “Determin-ism and Free Will,” and “The UnconsciousMind”. But, precommitments are not inviolablelaws: They are postulates that color how wethink about nature, rather than how nature itselfis constituted. As Rescher (1984) observes, theyare “a matter of the particular systematization ofknowledge we find it convenient [emphasisadded] to adopt.” (p. 11).

Although not formally part of science, pre-commitments are necessary for its conduct. Be-cause phenomena do not speak for themselves,it is difficult, if not impossible, to study anysubject without some precommitments to givedirection to how we think about and conceive ofthe topics under consideration (e.g., Hanson,1958). However, it is important to distinguishthe precommitments to which we ascribe fromthose that are available. Precommitments thatguide scientific inquiry reflect “our conceptualchoices and interests, but [their] truth or falsityis not simply determined by our conceptualchoices and our interests.” (Putnam, 1992, p.59). The job of metascientific analysis is toassess the legitimacy of our precommitments,and, when indicated, emend or replace thosefound to have less-than-solid footing.

In what follows, I undertake such an analysis.A science of mind that embraces the doctrinesof causal closure and completeness of physical-ism must assume that mind, being a physicalentity, obeys only the laws of physics. This hasthe consequence of reducing the mental aspectsof mind to causally inert epiphenomena, open-ing the door to a science of the mind in whichpsychological explanation is superseded by awholly biological account.

In this section I argue that neither conceptualnor empirical analyses offer clear support forthe precommitments that inform modern con-ceptions of mind. In section “The Need to MakeRoom for Mental Happenings in Our Inventoryof “What Is Real” and to Accord Them CausalPotency,” I propose that attributing causal po-tency to mental phenomena is (a) necessary to

understand human behavior and (b) offers abasis for legitimizing psychological treatmentof the mind. I conclude that both psychologicaland biological explanation are needed to under-stand the mind.

Physicalism Revisited

Physicalism is a metaphysical position, not ascientific fact. It is a presumption that helpsdetermine the formative background of thequestions we ask nature, rather than a fact wediscover in virtue of the answers we receive. Itsutility is thus stipulated, not demonstrated.

Modern science simultaneously is inclusiveand restrictive. It is inclusive in its belief thateverything falls within its theoretical jurisdic-tion, but it restricts what it allows to qualify as“everything.” Put another way, modern sciencetrades heavily on the assumptions that (a) thoseaspects of reality, as we currently understandthem, are exhaustive of the whole and (b) thelaws and constants of physics are universal intheir domain of applicability (e.g., Papa-Grimadli, 1998).

However, as Earle (1955) cautions, “We haveno way of surveying the whole of reality; wehave only a formal idea of it on one hand, andan infinitesimally small assortment of unclearobjects on the other . . . we must in other wordshold our theory in precisely that tension whichrepresents our honest position; we don’t knowwhat the entire character of reality is, and weshould not attempt to close our ignorancethrough impatience with the infinity of the ab-solute itself.” (p. 89). As discussed below, Ear-le’s cautionary message receives strong supportfrom an ironic source—the laws and principlesof modern science.

Although scientists assume that their lawsand constants remain unchanged at all times andin all places, contact with reality is, in fact,limited to what we can observe locally (e.g.,Wilczek, 1999). “To extend that knowledge re-quires both an act of faith in the uniformity ofnature and a compromise with truth, for knowl-edge has an inbuilt uncertainty to it [e.g.,Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy]”(Shallis, 1983, p. 32). To maintain that physi-calism (or any other monistic metaphysic) ex-hausts the nature of reality is to substitutedogma for demonstrable fact. Such a stanceforecloses what we allow to stand as reality by

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presuming we have license to assert that reality,in its fullness, can be captured by our currentconcepts, methods and instruments of measure-ment. To declare that the mind cannot exist(except in a physicalist incarnation) is a meta-physical conceit lying outside what can be epis-temologically or operationally justified.

Physicalism asserts that mental events arereducible to the activities of a material brain.This view is endorsed by a majority of psychol-ogists, neuroscientists, as well as (primarilyWestern) philosophers of mind (for review anddiscussion see Batthyany & Elitzur, 2006).However, limits to our ability to measure—andthus to what we can know (in the sense of true,justified belief) about—reality constitute a seri-ous drawback for advocates of the universalapplicability of a physicalist agenda.

Consider, for example, the “light cone” ofastrophysics—that is, the surface describing thetemporal evolution of a flash of light in space-time. Events outside the boundaries of the conecannot (because of the finite speed of light) senda signal that would have time to reach an ob-server (living or mechanical) and influence it inany way. A galaxy at a given distance fromearth is defined to lie within the observableuniverse if the signals it emits can reach us atsome time in the future. However, because ofthe universe’s continued expansion followingthe Big Bang, there are galaxies whose signalswill never reach us. Because the galaxies withinthe light cone likely represent only a tiny frac-tion of the galaxies in the universe (e.g., Guth,1997), there is a substantial portion of realitypermanently beyond our powers to know. Ittherefore remains a live possibility that aspectsof the universe are forever barred from incor-poration into our catalog of what is real. Inshort, our understanding of the physical param-eters of the universe is, by the laws of science,potentially incomplete.

Turning from large-scale indeterminacies touncertainty occasioned by the very small,Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle decreesthat nothing can be known about the propertiesor behavior of entities that occupy minute (i.e.,10�13 cm) regions of space (e.g., Heisenberg,1958/1999). For example, the Planck length isthe spatial interval within which the propertiesof entities cannot be measured simultaneouslyto an accuracy of greater than h/4� (i.e., �p�q � h/4�), where h is the Planck constant, and

�p and �q are the measurement uncertaintiesassociated with the location and momentum ofan entity (Planck, 1925/1993).5

These restrictions on our ability to “knowreality” follow from the basic structure of rela-tivity and quantum theory. Regardless ofwhether they ultimately are shown to reflectepistemological limitations on the scope of ourunderstanding, or ontological limitations stem-ming from the nature of reality, they warrant theconclusion that (at least at present) we have noway to detect what transpires at great distancesfrom our earth-bound reference points or withincertain minute regions of space. This being thecase, it is logically impossible to know whetherphsysicalist doctrine has universal applicability.In short, while they do not offer direct supportfor the reality of the mental (but see sections“An argument from the sensation,” “An argu-ment from knowledge,” “An argument fromevolution,” and “An argument from meaning”),these constraints on our ability to know imposeboundary conditions on all scientific inquiry.

There are other reasons to question the com-pleteness of physicalist doctrine. First, thescope of our ability to comprehend reality iscircumscribed by the limitations of our sensorycapacities and cognitive abilities (e.g., McGinn,1991). Thus, there not only are limits on whatcan be known imposed from without (i.e., the-oretical constraints on what can be measured);there also are limits from within (i.e., con-straints on our powers to perceive and concep-tualize). Second, our inability to situate a phe-nomenon within a physicalist scheme does notlicense its debarment from membership in “re-ality.” Thousands of years ago, humans learnedto extract energy from matter (e.g., the discov-ery of fire) despite lacking any plausible phys-icalist account of how such a transformationwas accomplished. If a credible physical expla-nation is a prerequisite for bestowing existenceon a phenomenon, the designation of fire as part

5 Although issues of quantum indeterminacy seem farafield from human-scale events (but see section “Energyconservation and free will”), quantum-level happenings canhave serious consequences at the macro-level. For example,the activities the subatomic particles might, via a feedforward sequence of causation, eventuate in feelings ofhatred which, in turn, result in a fist fight (or even a warbetween nations). The message is that all phenomena, re-gardless of physical dimension, are subject, in varying de-grees, to the effects of quantum uncertainty.


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of reality would have had to await develop-ments in chemical and physical theory takingplace in the 19th century.

In summary, theoretical, perceptual, and log-ical considerations suggest that we cannot ob-serve, much less know about, the behaviors,dispositions and properties of reality fallingwithin (or, in the case of the light cone, outside)the borders of these epistemological “black-boxes.” In light of these considerations, it seemsthat the ontological status of the mind is heldhostage to an unverifiable physicalist precom-mitment. The assertion that mental phenomenaare subsumed by purely physical events cannot,at present, either be proved or disproved.

This is not to say that physicalism is false, orthat mental aspects of reality always will remainbeyond its reach. A fully matured physics (seeFootnote 2) may be capable of explaining allthere is to explain (however, there are consid-erations—such as the Gödelian incompletenessof any formal system [see below]—that suggestsuch an expectation is, in principle, unrealiz-able; e.g., Strawson, 2006). But the importantcaveat here is “fully matured.” Historical induc-tion strongly suggests that adjustments to ourunderstanding of physical reality cannot be pre-dicted with certainty—that is, we cannot knowthe extent to which the future will resemble thepast, the unknown the known (e.g., the orderlyphysics of Newtonian mechanics could not an-ticipate, much less accommodate, the chaoticbehavior of quantum reality). Perhaps a “fin-ished” physicalism will be capable of explain-ing the mind without having to treat its subjec-tive aspects as epiphenomenal detritus (e.g.,Russell, 1921/1949). But we do not at presentknow what a fully matured physics might con-sist in. And, for a number of reasons (e.g.,Spencer Brown, 1957) we never may. Accord-ingly, tethering our understanding of mind to afuture version of physicalism requires we accepta promissory note with no way of envisagingthe conditions of the note.

Of course, one might argue that althoughmetaphysical positions, such as physicalism,cannot be directly confirmed or disconfirmed,such positions receive indirect support from thesuccess of the kinds of inquiry with which theyare associated. The extraordinary achievementsof physics therefore might be taken as providingsufficient reason to endorse a physicalist viewof mind.

But the authority of physicalism reaches onlyas far as those aspects of reality for which it hasbeen fitted. And, as we have seen, inductionsand prognostications about experiential realitybased on the precommitments of modern psy-chology are more a matter of stipulation thanthe principled importation of discovered facts ortheoretical prescriptions (e.g., Klein, 2014a).Accordingly, rejection of attempts to uncriti-cally extend scientific methodology to the do-main of experiential reality should not be takenas a revolt against science. Rather, it should beseen as a challenge to the assertion that knowl-edge obtained by scientific methodology is “theonly kind of knowledge that existed or evercould exist.” (Collingwood, 1946/2005, p. 134).

More, physicalist treatment renders the studyof experiential reality largely without a subjectmatter—that is, mental phenomena are treatedeither as epiphenomena or folk psychologicallinguistic convention (a fate not befalling as-pects of reality for which physicalism appearscanonical; for discussion see Footnote 8). Inshort, despite its undeniable achievements, theauthority of physicalism must be questionedwhen its applicability is extended to domainssignificantly different from those to which itsaccomplishments pertain.

Let me be very clear. I am not arguing wetherefore should endorse spiritualism, immate-rialism or other nonphysicalist approaches tomental phenomena. It may very well be the casethat a fully matured physicalism will fully ac-commodate phenomena that, under its currentrendition, are seen as the epiphenomenal resi-due of nature (but see Strawson, 2006). But wehave no way of knowing what such a reenvi-sioning might consist in. And until we do, it isunwise to tether our understanding of experien-tial reality to a metaphysics that has the effect ofassigning the single most undeniable aspect ofour existence to a lower grade of being (e.g.,Klein, 2015).

Determinism Revisited

The logic of physical determinism. Asnoted in section “Determinism and Free Will,”Laplace’s demon argument underpins most ver-sions of physical determinism. In this section Ihope to show that one of the premises of thedemon argument—that is, “we can know all the

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physically relevant laws”—is, by Gödel’s in-completeness theorem, demonstrably false.

First, from a practical standpoint we (cur-rently) cannot formulate laws that enable pre-cise prediction of future contingencies. Al-though the equations of physics can calculatethe exact (or, more accurately, correct to manydecimal places) causal history of two interactingobjects, prediction becomes progressively moreapproximate as the number of interacting ob-jects increases (this is referred to as the “n-bodyproblem”). Whether dealing in classical orquantum mechanics, the equations used to pre-dict the interactions of more than two bodiesyield only approximate solutions (such predic-tion often is based on analysis of a power seriesthat converges so slowly that getting its value toany useful precision is impractical; for reviewsee Valtonen & Karttunen, 2006).

Although this might seem a temporary set-back—one we can expect to be remedied by thedevelopment of more computationally sophisti-cated physical laws—there is a more fundamen-tal concern that cannot be resolved by mathe-matical refinement. According to Gödel’sincompleteness theorem, one cannot supplyproofs for all the laws that capture all the truthsabout any formal system from within that sys-tem. In other words, for any given set of axi-oms, there are true mathematical statements thatcannot be derived from the set itself. Therealways will be statements about the system thatcannot be proved within the system—hence thename “incompleteness theorem.”

Mathematical statements that are assumedtrue, but cannot be proved within their systemof origin, can, according to Gödel’s logic, beproved within larger systems which can beshown to be valid forms of reasoning. Thus, onealways can seek a metaformalization to captureall of the “truths” of any closed system. How-ever, these larger systems also are subject to theincompleteness theorem. Thus, the incomplete-ness is iterated infinitely: Because of infiniteregress, certain laws assumed true within a sys-tem of axioms cannot be proven within anyfinite time. So, neither you, nor I, nor Laplace’sdemon can know with mathematical certainty“all the laws.” And if that is the case, then thedeductive argument for determinism falls vic-tim to the falsity of one of its premises: “If weknow all the physically relevant laws.”

These considerations create serious problemsfor determinism by making it impossible toempirically verify its tenets. For example, todemonstrate that a person’s actions are whollydeterministic, one needs to show that preciseknowledge of the relevant initial conditions andlaws guarantees that a sufficiently sophisticatedbeing could predict exactly how she will be-have. But such knowledge—in virtue of episte-mological and mathematical limitations dis-cussed above—is forever beyond our reach.Although this does not necessarily entail thatdeterminism is false (or that free will is true), itdoes mean that we have no way to validatedeterminist accounts of human agency. Episte-mologically, human behavior will always con-tain an element of unpredictability. Whetherthis uncertainty results from limitations in ourunderstanding or is intrinsic property of natureis, and always will be, indeterminable. The up-shot is that the possibility of free will remains alive option (for a critique of Wegner’s argu-ments against free will see Nahmias, 2002).

Energy conservation and free will. An oftcited objection to free will is that its implemen-tation would violate the law of energy conser-vation (e.g., Ney, 2012). The physicalist versionof this critique begins with the assertion that aphysically existing entity with physical proper-ties acts on other physical entities to alter theirphysical properties. For one entity to influenceanother, they must be capable of exchangingenergy. Because energy is a property of thephysical world, any exchange between a purelymental event (e.g., an unreduced belief) and apurely physical entity (e.g., raising one’s arm)would result in a net increase in energy in theuniverse, thereby disobeying a fundamentallaws of physics.

Objections based on energy conservation aregrounded in the assumption that all causal in-teractions result in and from the exchange ofenergy. This assumption, however, does not en-joy universal agreement. For example, somerecent models of causality trade on the assump-tion that what is exchanged between things ininteraction is not energy, but information (e.g.,Fields, 2012). Accordingly, intentions, memo-ries, perceptions, beliefs, and other mentalstates can be granted causal potency if theireffects result in information rather energy beingexchanged between interacting participants


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(there is, to my knowledge, no generally ac-cepted law of information conservation).

Imagine, for example, that a person decidesto write a letter to a friend. In this scenario, agreat deal more than energy is exchanged be-tween cause (the writer) and effect (the target ofthe missive)—for example, interpreting themeaning the words are intended to convey.Mental state concepts such as interpretation,meaning, and intention refer to aspects of naturethat have causal potencies, albeit potencies thatare informational rather than energetic (for amore analytic treatment, see section “An argu-ment from meaning”).

Other problems with the energy conservationposition are worth brief mention. A number ofneuroscientists have proposed that interactionsbetween mind (construed in terms of its mentalproperties) and the brain are localized in activitytaking place in regions falling below the mi-crolimits of epistemological resolution (e.g.,events occurring within the paracrystallinestructure of the presynaptic vesicular grid; forreview see Smith, 2003). If these ideas havemerit, the law of energy conservation no longerhas uncontested applicability in the realm ofthings mental, because, by the principle ofquantum indeterminacy, activities taking placein the microstructure would be unknowable. AsMeixner (2005) points out, there is little, if any,empirical evidence for the applicability of con-servation laws to the mind. Accordingly, theuniversal applicability of such laws is an as-sumption of the physical sciences—not, as oftenpresented, an empirically defensible result.

Recent years have seen a number of chal-lenges to the principle of causal closure (theinterested reader is referred to Baker & Goetz,2011). These critiques—taken in conjunctionwith epistemological limits on our ability toknow about events occurring in very distant orvery small regions of space (see Section4.1.2)—suggest that, as currently configured,arguments from closure do not sanction anystrong position with respect to the mind’s causalpotencies. Free will remains a viable possibility(the question of whether mental states are epi-phenomena is treated more fully in section “TheNeed to Make Room for Mental Happenings inOur Inventory of “What Is Real” and to AccordThem Causal Potency”).

The unconscious mind. Even die-hardsupporters of conscious causality recognize that

the mind consists in both mental states and theirsubexperiential enablers (see Table 1). Accord-ingly, demonstrating that an unconscious pro-cesses can eventuate in a behavioral outcomedoes preclude a role for consciousness in therealization of that behavior. To think otherwiseis to engage in the fallacy of assuming thatbecause process X is necessary for function Y, italso is sufficient. Although the performance ofany particular behavior is made possible (inpart) by unconscious aspects of the mind (e.g.,neural computation), this does not, by itself,rule out a role for conscious processes in thebehavior’s realization (e.g., Newell & Shanks,2014).

Consider, for example, the phenomena of un-conscious social priming (e.g., Bargh, Chen, &Burrows, 1996). Unconscious social priming (afavorite “proving ground” for those who cham-pion the explanatory sufficiency of subexperi-ential processes) refers to a participant’s perfor-mance on tasks in which a stimulus—presentedin a manner falling outside the participant’sawareness—subsequently is found to affect hisor her behavior in a manner that rationally canbe tied to information embodied in the stimulus.Although such findings, if reliable (and therecurrently are big questions in this regard; e.g.,Klein, 2014b), suggest a role for subexperientialprocess in performance of behavior, they do notsanction the conclusion that consciousnessplays no part in its enactment (e.g., the claimthat “unconscious processes can carry out everyfundamental high–level function that consciousprocesses can perform”; Hassin, 2013, p. 195).I respectfully suggest that an insentient individ-ual would face insurmountable difficulties ei-ther in acquiring information presented in asocial priming study or displaying its effects onhis or her behavior.

In short, the most one can say about socialpriming demonstrations of subexperiential fac-tors in causation is that they are a necessarycondition for the performance of behavior.Whether they are sufficient (as is implied by theHassin quote) is not presently determinable—because an unconscious participant will be min-imally responsive (at best) to his or her milieu(for a recent critique of claims made by propo-nents of the sufficiency of unconscious menta-tion, see Hesselmann & Moors, 2015).

Other challenges to the presumed irrelevanceof consciousness in performance of behavior

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traditionally considered to require consciousmediation target case findings such as thosereported by Libet. Here too, careful conceptualanalysis has shown that the implications ofthese studies for conscious mentation are farfrom clear (e.g., Banks & Isham, 2009). Forexample, the claim that Libet studied spontane-ously generated acts appears at odds with thefact that participants were explicitly told to per-form the “spontaneous” acts! And, although weknow that a readiness potential appears before aparticipant’s avowed awareness of “intent tobehave,” what this potential is in readiness of isbased more on assertion than demonstration.Perhaps, for example, it is in the service ofpreparing the mind for a subsequent, con-sciously mediated, decision on whether to act(for discussion about the implications of Libet’sfindings for a volitionalist account of behavior,see Robinson, 2012).

As noted in section “The UnconsciousMind,” the phenomenon of blindsight has ledmany in psychology and the neurosciences toquestion whether our intuitions about the roleof consciousness in visually based behaviorneed to be revisited. This concern, I believe,is premature. Although discussion of concep-tual issues attending interpretation of thefindings generated by blindsight patientswould take us far afield, I refer the reader toHolt (2003) for an excellent treatment ofwhat, if anything, would require revision evenif it could be shown that performance of be-haviorally relevant visual function can occurabsent conscious experience.

Summing Up

In this section I questioned the advisability ofa largely uncritical acceptance of the precom-mitments of modern psychological science. Iconcluded that (a) our precommitments are notunequivocally sanctioned, and (b) by the lawsof physics, they are barred from attaining suchstanding. Although they may eventually beshown to be the best path to understanding howthe mind works, at present their applicability ismore a matter of assertion than nomothetic ne-cessity. Accordingly, the epistemological dooris left ajar for the explanatory relevance of apsychological treatment of mind.

The Need to Make Room for MentalHappenings in Our Inventory of “What IsReal” and to Accord Them Causal Potency

Thus far my approach has been largely neg-ative—I presented evidence and argumentagainst the idea that mental states can be un-ambiguously fitted to the physical-deterministagenda and, in so doing, reduced to epiphenom-ena. In this section, I take a positive approach—arguing for inclusion of mental happenings inour catalogue of causally efficacious aspects ofthe mind.

According to the precommitments of modernpsychology, mental properties, if they exist, doso as epiphenomena. Because, by stipulation, anonmaterial aspect of reality can have no causalrelations with the material world (the principleof causal closure under the physical), mentalevents are, by definitional fiat, stripped of anycapacity to interact with the world of physicalreality. In what follows, I argue that it makessense to accord ontological status and causalpotency to what is considered by many to be thesingle most ubiquitous aspect of our exis-tence—our subjective experience (e.g., Straw-son, 2009).

General Considerations: Savingthe Phenomena

In moving to a sub-personal level of explanation weare changing the subject matter, the target of explana-tion. (Wong, 2014, p. 96)

Reality, in its most general sense, is taken tomean everything that has being; that is, every-thing that exists. Although subject to consider-able discussion and emendation over the centu-ries, Western science currently holds the viewthat there is only one reality—physical reality.But arguments for the inclusion of another re-ality (mental reality) in addition to the physicalare beginning to undermine the existential he-gemony of physicalist doctrine. For example,Tulving and Szpunar (2012) maintain that “De-spite doubts that some thinkers, through theages, have suffered privately or expressed pub-lically, mental reality is as ‘real’ as physicalreality” (p. 257). The constituents of mental orpsychological reality include such things assights, sounds, thoughts, love, hate, jealousy,images, memories, ambition, suffering, happi-ness, beauty, ugliness, dreams, hopes, feelings,


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beliefs, doubts, wisdom, stupidity, the pull ofthe past, the anticipation of the future—that is,the processes and states that populate things“mental.”

The relation between physical reality andmental reality, as Tulving and Szpunar see it, iscomplicated. “Although mental reality is utterlydependent on physical reality, in the sense thatit could not exist in the absence of physicalreality, it also is independent of physical realityin the sense that what exists in mental realitydoes not exist in physical reality. . . . There areno thoughts, images, memories . . . experiences,dreams, feelings, hopes, fears . . . in physicalreality . . . there is neither personal past norpersonal future . . . there is no self.” Theycontinue, “The converse also is true, there is nota single thing that exists in physical reality thatalso exists in mental reality. There are no riversor mountains, tress or flowers, no brain, noblood, no neurons or synapses, no molecules ofatoms in mental reality” (p. 258).

Although this may sound like substance du-alism, the authors take strong objection to suchcategorization. “Like all other cognitive neuro-scientists we accept as axiomatic that mentalreality is fully dependent on the brain, is con-tinuous with the brain the rest of physical real-ity. The brain and the mind are made of the‘same stuff.’ We do not yet know what that‘stuff’ is but we have reason to believe thateventually it will be discovered. Contrary towhat some people like to declare, we know thatthe brain and mind are not identical. The brainand the mind are different entities constituted ofthe same basic ‘stuff’” (Tulving & Szpunar,2012, p. 258). (This position could still be char-acterized as a form of dualism, albeit a dualismof property rather than substance). I fully en-dorse these sentiments—that is, that mentalphenomena, though dependent (in some way)on properties of the physical, are neither reduc-ible to, nor fully explicable in terms of, purelyphysicalist considerations.

In light of its assignment by scientific pre-commitment to the realm of epiphenomena, it isironic that subjective experience is what makesthe pursuit of scientific knowledge possible.Telescopes, microscopes, timing devices, nu-clear accelerators, neuroimaging technology,and the host of modern means of obtainingobjective knowledge about reality are uselessabsent an experiencing subject to manipulate

these instruments, record their output, and in-terpret its meaning (e.g., Dewey, 1958). As Gal-lagher and Zahavi (2008) point out, “Science isperformed by somebody; it is a specific theo-retical stance towards the world . . . scientificobjectivity is something we strive for but it restson the observations of individuals” (p. 41). Tobelieve otherwise has the absurd consequenceof rendering our knowledge of reality depen-dent, in its entirety, on the provisions of anexperiential conduit stipulated to be causallyimpotent or nonexistent.

As I hope to show, we must, of both practicaland theoretical necessity, make a place for psy-chological reality in our inventory of “what is.”We also need to accord it participatory status.Our mental states are not passive, causally in-effectual observers; they are active agents. Be-low, I present several arguments for the treat-ment of mental happenings as causally relevantmembers of reality.

An argument from the sensation.Discussing the limitations of a reductive analy-sis designed to connect the level of neuro-biological events with events at the level ofmental experience, Antoietti (2008) observesthe following:

While in the scientific study of physical realities itmakes sense to move from appearance [e.g., water] toa “deeper” reality [e.g., the molecular structure ofwater—H2O], where the mind is concerned it is not aquestion of going to a deeper reality, because thesubjective appearance is the essence of the mind. . . .Painfulness is not a contingent property of pain, pain-fulness is the essence of pain; there is no appearancebeyond the pain itself; I feel pain, the sensation of thepain is all I feel; it is a non-sense to say the [experienceof] pain is actually a neural process. (p. 52).

It is “a non-sense” because although we un-derstand how the properties of water can beconnected to, and understood in terms of, theproperties and relations of their molecular con-stituents, we cannot understand how the expe-rience of pain can be derived from, or conceivedin terms, of the physical activity of neurons(e.g., Robinson, 2008).

In fact, the experience of pain and our re-sponse to that experience makes a case for thecausal potency of experiential reality. A personplaced under general anesthesia does not expe-rience pain (else anesthesiologists would be outof work), despite having his or her c-fibers fullyfunctional in the presence of pain inducing stim-

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uli (e.g., the physician’s scalpel). While theeffects of general anesthesia on central nervoussystem (CNS) activity result in both uncon-sciousness and lack of sensation, it is believedthat the unconscious state, rather than a deacti-vation of CNS mechanisms devoted to process-ing sensory stimuli, accounts for the absence ofpain during surgery. If this is the case (admit-tedly, there is some uncertainty concerning howgeneral anesthesia achieves its analgesic effect;e.g., Miller, Eriksson, Fleisher, Wiener-Kronish, & Young, 2010), then conscious ex-perience must play a causal role in pain-basedbehaviors. No consciousness, no pain, and nopain, no pain-relevant behavior (e.g., avoidance,grimaces, screams).

An argument from knowledge. Anotherargument for the need to accord mental statesa causal role comes from Jackson’s (1986)famous thought experiment about Mary, whois forced from birth to live in a black andwhite room. To ease any feelings of isolation,Mary is allowed to investigate the world via ablack and white monitor. Over time she be-comes a brilliant scientist who has learned allthe physical information there is to knowabout vision—for example, exactly whichwavelength combinations from a red tomatoreach the eye, how retinal information istransferred via the optic nerve to the occipitalcortex, and so forth.

The question Jackson poses is “if Mary wasreleased from her black and white room wouldthere be anything left for her to know that shehad not already acquired via her exhaustiveknowledge of the physical science of vision?”For Jackson the answer is “yes”: On releaseMary acquires knowledge that she did not pre-viously possess—that is, knowledge of the qua-lia associated with color (e.g., the redness of aripe tomato).6 These qualia previously had beeninaccessible to her because she had never expe-rienced color herself.

But, if this is the case, then her previousknowledge of color was incomplete. A personwho knows everything there is to know aboutthe science of color, but has never experiencedcolor, can describe the color experience in com-plete, analytic detail. But she cannot know whatthe subjective, qualitative experience of seeingcolor feels like (e.g., Nagel, 1974) until sheactually sees color. And if Mary has learnedsomething new about the world (via her color

experience), then physicalist claims about com-pleteness are subject to counterexample. If thereis more to reality than what can be captured bythe principles of physical science, physicalismnecessarily is false.

More, if Mary responds to her experienceof color (e.g., “Oh wow, so that’s what redlooks like!”), than her experience is having acausal influence on her behavior. If that is thecase, than the epiphenomenal status attributedto subjective experience also must be false(after all, prior to her exposure to the ripetomato she already possessed every physicalfact about the color red). So, not only has anew, qualitative fact entered her world, butthat fact enables a response unavailable to herfrom her preexposure, purely descriptiveknowledge of color.

An argument from evolution. Physicalistarguments in support of the epiphenomenal sta-tus of “things mental” also are contraindicatedby principles from within the physical sciencesthemselves. As many have noted, mental expe-rience is the thing of which we can be mostcertain (e.g., Klein, 2015). But how can a con-stituent of mind attain the status of existentialcertainty if its presence, by definition, is invis-ible to natural selection (i.e., they are epiphe-nomena)? Evolutionary processes cannot en-gage with aspects of reality that have nobehavioral signature: There simply is nothingon which natural selection can work.

The only scientifically sanctioned explana-tion available to a proponent of epiphenomenal-

6 It is worth noting that Jackson subsequently rejected theimplications he initially drew from his “Mary” thoughtexperiment (e.g., Jackson, 2003). His concern was that toknow that Mary has a new experience, she must commenton her experience. However, this means that Mary’s qualiahave caused her to comment. And because this contradictsthe attribution of epiphenomenal status to her mental states(i.e., it involves a quale causing speech behavior), Mary’sthought experiment presents a contradiction. Jackson con-cludes, therefore, that there must be something wrong withhis thought experiment.

However, this “contradiction” follows only if one is com-mitted, a priori, to the position that mental states are epi-phenomenal. And, as I hope to have shown in section “TheNeed to Make Room for Mental Happenings in Our Inven-tory of “What Is Real” and to Accord Them Causal Po-tency,” this is a highly questionable stance. Accordingly,the contradiction may be due to Jackson’s pre-commitmentto epiphenomenalism rather than the internal logic of hisargument.


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ism of mental states is to argue that they are anevolutionary by-product. But we know frompersonal experience that mental states can becomplex (e.g., rational thought) as well as phe-nomenologically preeminent. And because, asWilliams (1966) notes, complexity of mecha-nism is a hallmark of adaptive specialization,the by-product explanation is highly improba-ble. Either we reject evolution, find anotherexplanation for how we have come to possesscomplex mental states that are undetectable by,and thus not subject to, the workings of naturalselection, or grant causal status to mentalevents. I contend the third option makes themost sense (particularly in light of previousarguments offered in its support).

An argument from meaning. In an influ-ential paper on determinism, Sloman (1974)noted that mental causality cannot be simplytreated as a two-termed relation (X ¡ Y) be-tween a physical antecedent (X) and its physicalconsequence (Y). This is because meaning alsois a constituent of the relation between X and Y.The argument goes as follows (see also Dewey,1958).

If the physical acts of our bodies are fullydetermined by physical causes, then there is noplace within the physical-determinist agenda forsuch things as beliefs, intentions and meanings.But, if this the case, then how does one knowhow to respond when, for example, upon meet-ing your friend John, he raises his arm andforms a fist? The answer is that you know howto respond by giving meaning to the physicalevent (John’s clenched fist). That is, you useyour beliefs about John’s personality, memoriesof his past behavior, knowledge of the presentcontext, and so forth, to determine your re-sponse. Because you know that John is a kindperson and remember that he just got acceptedinto the college of his choice, you understandthat his raised his fist as an act of celebrationrather than aggression, and respond appropri-ately (e.g., you give him a pat on the back ratherthan punch him in the face).

In short, mental phenomena supply meaningto what, in purely physical terms, is ambiguousbehavior. On this view, mental causality is ac-tually a three-termed relation in which one’s“mode of interpretation” (M) provides meaningto the physical antecedent (X) as well as direc-tion to the action taken (Y). As Sloman notes,

the relation between mental and physical phe-nomena “is not a two-termed one, but involvesa third term, a mode of interpretation . . . [and]since different modes of interpretation may beappropriate in different circumstances, thereneed be no reliable inductive correlations be-tween physical phenomena and [mental states]”(Sloman, 1974, p. 293).

The key here, of course, is the introduction ofmeaning into the causal equation. Absent inter-pretation of what an antecedent event “isabout,” no informed or proportionate responsecan be offered in consequence. But meaning isnot something easily identified solely in refer-ence to states or properties of physical entities;for example, Wittgenstein, 1953/2009). It is partof the qualitative character of experience (e.g.,Strawson, 2009). In this way, mental statesmake a difference to how we interact with thephysical world.

Summing Up

Although each of the arguments presentedhas its share of critics (there is a reason themind/body problem has been subject to intensedebate for thousands of years), taken together Ibelieve they make a solid case for accordingcausal potency to the mental aspects of themind. And if that is so, then mental constructterms cannot legitimately be consigned to anepiphenomenal existence.

Conclusion

In his discussion of the Enlightenment, Col-lingwood (1946/2005) observes that philoso-phers based their treatment of mental reality onan analogy with established physical sciences.Unfortunately, Enlightenment philosophersfailed to notice an important difference betweenphysical and mental aspects of nature—one thatcalls into question the extent to which the anal-ogy holds. As we learn about a physical objects(via chemistry, physics, biology, etc.), we canuse these discoveries to better understand theobject’ nature and realize its potential (e.g., as araw material for manufactured goods, as asource of energy, etc.). But growth in ourknowledge does not alter the object: “Naturestays put, and is the same whether we under-

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stand it or not” (Collingwood, 1946/2005, p.84).7

However, growth in our understanding ofmental reality changes the object of inquiry:As the mind comes to better appreciate itself,this knowledge transforms its way of being inthe world and its mode of operation (comparethe workings of the superstitious mind ofantiquity with those of the rational mind ofthe Enlightenment). Mental states are notmerely knowable—the mind is capable of re-flecting on that which it knows, thereby en-riching the conscious mind and creating newthings for it to know.

Consequently, by accepting a false analogybetween knowledge of nature and knowledgeof mind, 18th century philosophers viewedthe mental happenings as though they werejust another part of physical nature, when inreality they are importantly different (for ad-ditional discussion see Klein, 2015). This dis-analogy, I have argued, characterizes much ofcontemporary approaches to experiential re-ality.

The questionable commitment to a parallel-ism between physical and mental aspects ofreality is underscored by the problem of sub-jectivity. Within the limits of current under-standing, there exists no viable, or even mod-erately convincing, explanation of hownonconscious physical matter gives rise tosubjective experience (e.g., Klein, 2014a;McGinn, 2004; Robinson, 2008; Strawson,2009). And, so long as concepts of neuralfunction have no explanatorily transparentlinks with mental constructs, there will be noconceptual bridge capable of spanning theconceptual gap in our understanding of mind/brain interaction. Accordingly, we must, ofboth practical and theoretical necessity, re-main open to the possibility that experientialreality merits inclusion in our inventory of“what is” and “what works.” And if this is thecase, then the mental construct terms willhave an explanatory relevance not fully sub-sumable under a bio-physical level of expla-nation.8,9

The alternative, fostered by the precommit-ments of contemporary psychological sci-ence, is to force reality—“all there is”—into a(currently) unverifiable physicalist metaphys-ics. If psychologists adopt this approach, weexpose psychological phenomena to a com-

plete makeover in terms of biological processand mechanism: There simply will be noroom for a science of psychology. Althoughmy proposal (that mental states need to beaccorded explanatory relevance in our treat-ment of mind) is not problem-free, it doesoffer a logical, phenomenological, and empir-ically defensible way to approach some of theproblems entailed by strictly physical-deterministic approach to the mind.

Indeed, understanding nature requires weaccord subjectivity a causally efficacious role

7 The “stasis of the real” here refers to ontological sim-ples (i.e., the basic constituents of nature). However, sciencedraws a distinction between ontological simples and theprocesses in which they participate. Whereas at the level ofsimples “nature stays put,” at the level of interaction be-tween simples change is inevitable (though even here stasisis pursued—the laws of science being attempts to freeze thenatural order into changeless formulae; e.g., SpencerBrown, 1957).

8 This conclusion obviously runs counter to the positiontaken by advocates of eliminative materialism (e.g.,Churchland, 1981). According to this metaphysical posi-tion, a fully matured neuroscience will have no need formental state constructs: Just as modern science has elimi-nated many posits once considered real entities (e.g., aether,vital forces, phlogiston), mental states will be discarded aswholly lacking any correspondence to objective phenom-ena.

A problem with this analogy, however, is that unlikephlogiston and aether, with which we have no direct ac-quaintance (they exist only as linguistic devices), subjectiveexperience is phenomenologically undeniable. Althoughour beliefs about our mental states, and the terms we use tolabel them, can (and have been) subject to intense debate(e.g., Uttal, 2001), these beliefs (unlike those directed to-ward, say, the aether) take as their object irrefutable, intro-spectively-given states whose characteristics are made vis-ible by the experience itself. More, the content of a mentalstate need not be arbitrary, ambiguous or inexpressible:Intra-subjective experience can be subjected to empiricalanalysis, providing descriptions and conclusions that attaininter-subjective consensus.

9 It might be objected that a great deal of psychologicalscience proceeds quite independently of any consider-ation or effect of the scientific pre-commitments dis-cussed herein. However, much of this work is demon-stration- rather than theory-driven (e.g., Klein, 2014b).Unless this facet of psychological inquiry wishes to besubsumed under social anthropology (e.g., people do Y inpresence of condition Z), increased effort is needed torelate observed effects to well-specified theories capableof enabling parametrically precise predictions (not sim-ply the binary outcome of “effect present/effect absent”).Accordingly, as demonstration-driven psychological em-piricism becomes a mature science it inevitably willcome into contact with the scientific pre-commitmentsdescribed herein (or their replacements).


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in our ontology (e.g., Klein, 2015). As Dewey(1958, p. 13) observes, “recognition of sub-jective minds having a special equipment ofpsychological abilities is a necessary factor insubjecting the energies of nature to use asinstrumentalities for ends.” Rather than sad-dling experiential aspects of reality with epi-phenomenal impotency, we are better servedby bestowing on subjectivity a full-fledgedparticipatory status in the natural order (e.g.,Valera, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993). Trainingour investigative efforts on the role played bysubjective processes in the workings of mindenriches our understanding of reality in thefullness with which it is given to experience.

I close with a quote from Dan Robinson(2002) who, with his characteristic combina-tion of precision, clarity, and insight, summa-rizes in a three sentences what I have strug-gled for pages to communicate: “What makesit [the brain] interesting is its non-accidentalassociation with those events, states and pro-cesses we refer to as psychological. Reducethese, eliminate them, trivialize them, and, injust that proportion, the brain sciences be-come reduced. Psychologists have an impor-tant service to perform vis a vis the BrainSciences; viz., supplying them with a psy-chology worth having” (p. 11).

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Accepted October 2, 2015 �


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AQ4—Author: Vygotsky (1980) is not in your references. Please add to the reference list or deletefrom the text.

AQ5—Author: Batthyany & Elitzur (2006) is not in your references. Please add to the reference listor delete from the text.

AQ6—Author: Single subordinate-level headings are not permitted in a section; please add asecond level-3 heading to the Physicalism Revisited section or delete heading ‘What can weknow about the mind via the physicalist doctrine?’

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