This article was downloaded by: [Simon Fraser University]On: 20 November 2014, At: 15:18Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Royal United ServicesInstitution. JournalPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19

The United States and theirNavyIgnatius PhayrePublished online: 12 Nov 2009.

To cite this article: Ignatius Phayre (1933) The United States and theirNavy, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 78:512, 767-772, DOI:10.1080/03071843309433838

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071843309433838

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and viewsexpressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of theContent should not be relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of theContent.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,

sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone isexpressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

15:

18 2

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR NAVY

BY IGNATIUS PHAYRE.

N the days when American commerce was being harried both by England and Napoleon, President Jefferson wrote “ Our passion is I Peace.” Ever since then, peace has been professed in Washington,

whilst in the interval the United States’ territory has expanded from 892,135 square miles to a present area of 3,738,395 square miles. More- over, the so-called Monroe Doctrine of 1823 has, pavipasszi, been estended to cover the entire Western world, with a nebulous political “sovereignty” which the twenty Iberian Rebublics, from the Caribbean down to the great “ A.B.C.” Powers of the South, have never yet acknowledged. Indeed, Argentina, when entering the League of Nations, expressly repudiated that Doctrine.

If, however, they are to uphold their claims, especially in the delicate matter of the mastery of the Pacific, it is clear that the United States need a powerful navy. Yet lack of tradition and experience, coupled with inveterate hindrance from the civilian side, have led to continual vacil- ation and inefficiency, even though money has been poured out like water upon somewhat spasmodic programmes of construction, varied with blind experiments. In 1916, President Wilson, like Jefferson, found his country’s shipping harassed between the sea raids of a ruthless belligerent, our own “ hovering cruisers,” and the “ so-called blockade,” about which his foreign ministers-first Bryan and then Lansing+om- plained so bitterly in those memorable Notes of protest to Sir Edward Grey. National pride and resentment led to a demand for a great scheme of ‘naval construction, and the prime mover in this “ big navy ” project was hIr. Franklin D. Roosevelt-Assistant-Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson Administration, and the U.S. President of to:day. He called for no less than 400 new vessels, including 14 battleships, 288 destroyers, and 120 submarines ; the total cost was to have been over $966,000,000. But America’s entry into the War on 6th April, 1917, put an end to that ambitious plan, and, incidentally, transformed her protests against interference with neutral shipping into the most whole-hearted co-oper- ation to prevent supplies reaching the enemy.

In view of this change in outlook, it was all the more strange to see the vexed question of the “ Freedom of the Seas ” hotly debated at the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

15:

18 2

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

768 THE UXITED STATES AXD THEIR XAVT

Paris Peace-sessions by Mr. Wilson and his alter ego, Colonel B. 11. House. But even veiled threats failed to move hIr. Lloyd George ; and accord- ingly, Number Two of the famous Wilsonian “ Fourteen Points ” dropped with the rest of them into the limbo of forgotten things.

When Woodrow IWson went down, broken and repudiated by his Congress and people for his alleged betrayal of America’s interests in Paris, Warren Harding took his place. Then it was that the Great Republic swung back to “ normalcy ” and to her old ideal of independence, or, as Mr. Neville Chamberlain put it the other day, of ‘‘ living on her own tail.” Thereafter naval disarmament was the new slogan. President Harding called the IVashington Conference of 1921-2. This was foIIowed by A h . Coolidge’s (Geneva) conclave of 1927, which broke up in acrimon- ious confusion.

As a Quaker President, hIr. Hoover frowned upon all the symbols of force by sea, land and air-especially after the “ Great Gamble ” of 1929 had left his nation stricken with that very poverty which he had hoped to see banished for ever from the United States, in view of the specious prosperity of the Coolidge era, which he had just inherited. So Mr. Hoover prompted the London Naval Conference of 1930, and all his messages to Congress now deplored expenditure upon armaments. How was it possible to cancel Europe’s war debts, while such waste went on unchecked ?

He took over an America which, he said, he found ‘‘ dying by inches,” with a huge Budget deficit which he personally assessed at not less than .$ j,OOO,ooo,ooo. Thereupon the new Chief Executive embarked upon his “ untrodden path,” for which last spring, a dociIe Congress equipped him with quite revolutionary powers. A h . Roosevelt also urged the way of Jeffersonian peace. But suddenly his naval minister, bIr. Claude A. Swanson, announced a new ship-and-shore constructive programme, upon which $361,000,000 is to be spent.1 This, it was stated, would help to bring the U.S. fleet up to the strength allowed under the Washington and London Treaties.’

It is paradoxes such as these which mark. America’s policy for a hundred and fifty years. It would fill a volume to explain them, and, for the moment, we must confine ourselves to this present unexpected gesture in naval affairs. It is not aimed a t Great Britain, as the 1916 proposal was; rather is it, in the main, a reply to the new military policy of Japan, which became conspicuous in 1931, with her advance

Then came President Roosevelt.

1 See XAVY A’OTES, p. ~ ~ ~ . - - E D I T O R . * Alr. Swanson does not consider that even this huge programme will bring

For that purpose a further IOI vessels of . the US. Navy up to full strength. varying types \rould be required.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

15:

18 2

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR NAVY 769

into Manchuria. Th’e great Naval Review by the Emperor in August, 1933, wasa demonstration of her naval strength which provided the U.S. Navy Board with an object lesson for the American nation, of ivhich they were not sIow to take advantage. Japan of to-day is seen as a naval and military Power of the first magnitude ; and it is plainly her aim to be mistress of Asia, and therefore supreme in the Pacific. So America is anxious over that “ open door ” in China, which she proclaimed as far back as 1869, and has decreed again and again-notably in 1900, through Secretary of State John Hay.

Here, then, we see a situation of high interest and importance for us all. The United States’ general policy was enunciated in 1914 by Mr. Franklin Roosevelt as follow : “ Our naval defence must estend all over the Western Hemisphere. It must go out for thousands of miles, as far as the Philippines, and wherever our far-flung commerce floats. To hold the Panama Canal ; with Alaska in the North ; American Samoa, Porto Rico and our naval bases in Guam, in the Ladrones, and Manila in the Far East-we must have capital ships. So we must create a navy, not only to protect our own shores and our possessions abroad, but also to safeguard our merchant ships in time of war, wheresoever they may choose to trade.”

On 29th June last, Secretary Swanson confirmed these views. “ The object is now,” said hIr. Swanson, ‘‘ to create, maintain and operate a navy second to none, and in conformity with Treaty provisions.”

It is quite obvious that the two rivals envisaged-not to put it more strongly-are Great Britain and Japan. All naval moves appertaining to those Powers are canvassed with almost a naive frankness in Con- gressional Committees, as well as by the Navy Board, and in the service clubs.

\Var with the United States is ruled out of reckoning by our own statesmen, in accordance with the “ Castlereagh ” policy of the post- Napoleon era. Our newspapers, too, consider such a conflict “ unthink- able.” But, as an American wit has put it, “ these ‘ unthinkable ’ wars are the ones we’re always thinking about ! ” The vriter was present on one occasion when Admiral Hughes, then America’s ‘‘ First Sea Lord,” was called before the House Committee on Naval Affairs for the customary questioning. Xr. RIcClintic, of Oklahoma, dwelt upon Japanese Press criticisms of yet another naval programme which would run to jtjjOO,OOO,OOO. In his opinion “ other nations felt the United States was going ahead, so that we can, if necessary, fight the whole world.’’ Rleanwhile, how would their naval chief propose to act--“ if we were in trouble with England? ” “ If we could send our fleet over there,!’ Admiral Hughes replied, “ and bring on a major engagement, and defeat

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

15:

18 2

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR NA\‘Y 770

the British fleet, then we could protect that route.” It was evident that the speaker thought such a discussion improper, because he added: You put those words in my mouth-I would not use them myself.”

In the United States, both civilian and professional chiefs of the navy are summoned to these curious sknnces ; and the problems posed and suggestions made are often quite fantastic. Thus one member asks : “ what are destroyer-leaders ” ? Representative Bitten, growing caustic over those huge and I ‘ mistaken ” aircraft-carriers, the ‘ I Saratoga ” and “ Lexington ” which cost $40,000,000 apiece, remarks to the late Admiral Rloffat, ‘‘ you do know that we got stung,” and a Congressman from a very primitive oil-and-cotton State in the South-West, puts ,forward his view that the ideal method of using naval aeroplanes is to build platforms just above the gun-turrets of the battleships ! One after another, the Admirals of the Board try to enlighten this well-meaning critic. Surely, he urges, folding partitions could be made to be raised and lowered like a drawbridge, and thus enable the guns to be fired after the bombers have been launched at the enemy ships ? In vain Admirals Moffatt and Leahy point out how blasts from the salvoes would wreck such flimsy flight-decks, quite apart from the problem of how the air- craft were to return to their battleship-mothers while the latter were in action.

There is no secrecy observed about these singular conclaves. In fact, reports of them are issued as Parliamentary pamphlets to show the Sovereign People-to whom the U.S. Constitution (in theory) accords supreme rule-how the “ navalists ” are kept in jealous check. So it has been since President Jefferson sought to do away with I ‘ the ruinous folly of a navy,” and ‘‘ dry-land gunboats,” were evolved and kept ashore under sheds along the Potoniac, to be manned at need by a sort of amphibious “ militia.” This it was thought, would effect large savings of public funds ; but both Jefferson and his successor, James hladison, were to have a rude awakening from this economic dream.

To-day America considers herself a “ poor third ” amongst the leading naval Powers. ‘ I Either other nations must stop kyilding,” says Secretary Swanson, ‘‘ or we must build up to our full authorised strength.” His Board has accordingly asked for thirty-two new ships ; plus $77,ooo,ooo for modernising major units of the existing battle fleet, $37,ooo,ooo for shore stations, and $g,ooo,ooo more for aircraft of improved design. Here, at least, is no “ paper fleet ” of the usual Senate and House parleys. Appropriations have been voted, and the contracts placed ; half of them in Government yards, and half in private establishments, like the Bethlehem, Newport News, and BroLvn-Boveri Corporations. Among new types most favoured is the Io,ooo-ton cruiser, with 6-inch guns, high

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

15:

18 2

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

771

speed and special aeck-amour. These vessels are specially designed for warfare in the Pacific. They do not infringe Treaty stipulations, but they do run counter to our own scaling down of standards, and may well lead to “ replies,” especially in 1936 when the battleship “holiday ” terminates.

Japan’s inspired Press calls this U.S. programme “ provocative,” and says it is “ leading the two Powers into a race that may have serious consequences. The Nichi-Nicki of Tokio views it as “ a distinct challenge, due to our withdrawal from the League.” Japan now claims that she was coerced ” into a j-5-3 ratio, which must now be adjusted, if only in view of America’s recent concentration in Pacific waters, and her very “ eloquent ” manceuvres, from the Canal out to Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, and thence on to Manila. This, it is alleged, is her main base in Far Eastern seas, and a eoint d’appui which U.S. strategists consider as “ far stronger than Gallipoli.”

The Atlantic is considered by America to be safe. Britain’s immense New IVorld possessions in both continents, and also in that American iliare clniiszrnt, the Caribbean, may, it is thought, now be regarded as “hostages.” But in the Pacific, the situation is reversed, since the United States themselves have possessions there, apart from the fact that one-fourth of all their exports are now trans-Pacific ; moreover, there are limitless possibilities of future expansion among Asia’s teeming millions.

American naval writers refute the thesis that she is a completely seIf-sufficing sub-continent. Rather, they assert, is she a huge “ mid- oceanic island,” with her main industries dependent upon vital sea-borne supplies, such as rubber, jute, tin, manganese and nitrates. And at least thirty other foreign commodities are needed to make her munitions of war. “Even in the telephone on every business man’s desk are materials from sixteen non-American countries.” Her own cotton and grain, her myriad machines and motors, must all find new, and ever wider markets in these complex and difficult days. So run the arguments for sea power on a larger scale. The Great War laid bare glaring weaknesses, The steady increase of Japanese naval strength since 1918 also seems to threaten that the “ open door ” in Asia might one day be closed by a janitor who has already brought doIvn that Colossus of the North which was Russia, and led a greatly sobered Theodore Roosevelt to press for a peace between victor and vanquished, to be signed on American soil at Portsmouth, N.H.

The Washington Navy League now urges that mere parity in fleet units with Britain is not enough ; true naval strength must take account of well-chosen bases for fuel, refits and repairs throughout the Seven Seas ; and these America conspicuously lacks. In fact, it is contended

THE UNITED STATES AND TIIEIK KAVY

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

15:

18 2

0 N

ovem

ber

2014

772 THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR SAVY

that, if true naval parity is to be the goal, then the United States,-whose sea-borne commerce in normal times equals our own,-ought to possess a Navy half as large again as that of Great Britain ! Secretary Swanson’s new programme is, therefore, looked upon as a sound and useful stage along that desirable road. Money for it can be taken out of President Roosevelt’s vast Public Works project, which is to cost ~660,000,000. ;\loreover, this new construction, it is pointed out, will give work to thousands of idle hands ; there are still IZ,OOO,OOO unemployed facing a rigorous winter. The Chief of Naval Operations reviewing the essentials for “ war-efficiency ” in both oceans, has laid special stress upon control- cruisers of great range and power, and as a niilitary ausiliary, a new mercantile marine organised by the Subsidy Act of 192s.

This rebirth of the US. navy is represented to the people as being an insurance-policy on the $320,000,000,000 of their national wealth. After all, is not more money spent upon cigarettes than upon America’s “ right arm of defence ? ” Yet a senior officer like Admiral \V. R. Sexton, although he controls S300,000,000 worth of battleships, and 18,000 highly-trained officers and men, is only paid $5,286 a year.

All this propaganda is spread with the President’s eager concurrence. “ Your Commander-in-Chief,”I Nr. Roosevelt told the Cadets at Annapolis last June, “can say that he loves the naval branch of our defensive service better than any other-loves it from the bottom of his heart ! ”

l The President of the United States is es-officio Commander-in-Chief of t h e Kavp and Army.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

15:

18 2

0 N

ovem

ber

2014