THE SOCIAL GROUND FOR PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY...

THE SOCIAL GROUND FOR PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM

RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (2003-2011)

Elena V. Sirotkina, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. e-mail:

[email protected]

24th ECPR PhD Summer School on ‘Political Parties in New Democracies’September 7-13, 2014

mailto:[email protected]

Research Problem

• How can we measure party system institutionalization (in non-democratic states)?• Does limitation of competition promotes voters’ loyalty

to the continuous parties?• Is stability/volatility of voting preferences in Russia

rooted in the social cleavages (other stable determinants)?

Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

The literatureInstitutionalisation•What to measure?• Four dimensions (Huntington 1968) • Value dimension (Alexis de Tocqueville 1969), value infusion

(Levitsky 1998; Selznick 1957)• The mentioned dimensions might not exist simultaneously at

one system (Ben-Dor 1975) • Party institutionalisation is more about a party’s reification in

the public mind (Janda 1970) • Institutionalization and democratic consolidation emerge with

the stability in rules for party competition (Mainwaring and Scully 1995)• ‘Systemness’, ‘value infusion’, ‘decisional autonomy’ and

‘reification’ (Randall & Sväsand 2002)


Why stability (volatility) of electoral support?- a minimum satisfactory criterion for judging the level of

a party system institutionalization (within non-democracy)

- shows the level of voters’ persisting commitment to parties (voters’ status quo )

- catches the logic of parties in an non-democracy- implicitly takes into account other dimensions


What is specific about non-democratic states?The Russian caseRestrictions for participation

• 5-7% threshold• 200.000 signatures to collect or electoral deposit to pay• Obligatory regional party branches in the majority of the regions• Only parties not party associations or party blocs are to

participate• Not free and fair elections (reporting of falsifications, electoral

authoritarian practices)

The evolution of the competitors list (the ballot)• No ‘NOTA’ (against all) column


The Russian case

The evolution of the competitors list (ballot)

Parliamentary elections

Number of participants

Representation in the Duma

1993 13 8

1995 43 4

1999 26 6

2003 23 4

2007 15 4

2011 7 4


Hypotheses

• H1: Limited competition in non-democratic Russia promotes stable support for the continuous parties• H2: Voting stability/volatility is determined by stable

regional characteristics (voting cleavages)


Methods. Party system institutionalization measurementTwo-step party system institutionalisation measurement:

1) national-level stability: Average (Corr(p1(2003); p1(2007)); (Corr(p1(2007); p1(2011)); (Corr (p1(2003); p1(2011))….p4

2) regional-level stability (Average support changing): Sum ( mod(p1(2007) – p1(2003)); (p1(2011) – p1(2007))/av.p1*

Different from Volatility-Pedersen’s Index: takes into account the average result of a party in a region

* for every regionElena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014

Methods. ‘Social ground’ explanation Multiple linear regression (OLS)•Dependent: Changing of the average support•Independent:

• 1) Urban/rural population, • 2) Religion (Orthodoxy, Atheism, Islam)• 3) Personal wealth (Average per capita income (per month)• 4) Internet (share of internet users per 100 people)• 5) ‘Good governance’ • 6) Security level (Crime rate per 100,000 people)

•Case studies


Data description

1) Electoral data: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation

Excluded regions: • those, who changed the boundaries• those, reported to have high falsifications rate

2) Social-economic data: Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Moscow Carnegie Centre report


Results. Party system institutionalisation measurement. National level


Party2003-2007

2007-2011

2003-2011

Average

UR .219 -.008 .181 .20KPRF .051 .247* -.213 -.08LDPR .063 -.109 .024 -.00JR -.107 .034 -.071 -.04

Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Regional level


The overall level of parties’ support volatility

UR 74,40

KPRF 36,53

LDPR 41,19

SR 42,35


The effect of cleavages on volatility of electoral support

VARIABLES UR support volatility

KPRF support volatility

LDPR support volatility

JR support volatility

Personal wealth 1.664 (1.677) 2.201* (1,279) 20.217 (10.704)

20.693* (10.586)

Urban population -0.071 (0.206) -0.180 (0.157) 0.276 (0.209) 0.403** (0.194)

Religion: Orthodoxy -0.154 (0.192)

-0.178 (0.147)

-0.187 (0.195)

-0.126 (0.182)

Atheism -0.120 (0.137) -0.175* (0.104) 0.040 (0.139) -0.072 (0.129) Islam -0.054 (0.041) 0.064** (0.032) 0.056 (0.042) 0.004 (0.039)Internet 0.124 (0.168) 0.075 (0.128) -0.377**

(0.171)0.116 (0.159)

Democratic level 0.842** (0.288)

0.417* (0.220) -0.435 (0.292)

-0.008 (0.272)

Security level 0.302 (0.188) 0.027 (0.143) -0.007 (0.191)

-0.009 (0.178)

ConstantObservations

-9.560 (7.362)61

-8.964 (5.528)61

-7.639 (7.711)61

-13.534 (6.950)61

R-squared 0.319 0.227 0.189 0.172


Interpretation

• National level: no stability in parties’ support within moderated elections and limited competition (the only medium-volatile is KPRF in 2007-2011)• Fluid party system within stable number of participants• Regional level: UR has the most volatile support

(volatile voting twice higher than its average), KPRF has the most stable support• Voting stability/volatility in the Russian case is not

determined by the voting cleavages or stable socioeconomic characteristics of the territories


Case-studies

General trends: - UR electoral support decrease in the majority of the regions in

2011- Increase of absenteeism

Deviant cases (the most unstable):- ‘The personality factor’:

1) The ‘long-living’ governor factor (Kostroma Oblast, Tomsk Oblast)2) The opposition activity factor (Astrakhan Oblast)


Concluding remarks• Voting stability measurement – minimal requirement for

party system institutionalization• Limitation of competition does not promote voters to stick

to their choice and does not serve for party system institutionalisation• Voting stability/volatility is not determined by voting

cleavages and stable characteristics of the territories• The more sufficient is personality factor (the governors’

and the opposition activity) + general trends which highlight the overall changing of voters attitude• Is there any ground?


Thank you!

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