The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain

5/19/2018 The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain

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Hasan Tariq Alhasan

The Middle East Journal, Volume 65, Number 4, Autumn 2011, pp.

603-617 (Article)

DOI: 10.1353/mej.2011.0137

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Middle East Institute. This article is for personal research only and may not be copied ordistributed in any form without the permission of The Middle East Journal.

The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981:

The IFLB in Bahrain

Hasan Tariq Alhasan

In December 1981, a group baptized al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li Tahrir al-Bahrayn[The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain] unsuccessfully attempted to carryout a coup dtat in Bahrain. The group published newsletters and books in whichit described its attempts to overthrow the Al Khalifa ruling family and install Ira-nian-style Islamic rule instead. These documents provide evidence for the groupsinvolvement with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and of the support theIranian regime provided for their activities against the Bahraini government.

Between revolutionary propaganda on one hand and official government statementson the other, it has often been a difficult task to discern the role that the Islamic regimein Iran played in the political unrest that swept Bahrain between 1978 and 1996. While

the official position of the Iranian government was to deny any intervention in or med-

dling with Bahrains internal affairs, numerous statements issued by important figures

and high-ranking clerics in the Islamic Republic have pointed to the contrary. Such ac-

cusations have continued to the present day. A very recent example, wherein the former

Iranian Speaker of Parliament and high-ranking adviser Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri claimed

that Bahrain was Irans fourteenth province, stirred a diplomatic crisis as a result.1

The aim of this article is to offer indicators of the extent of Iranian influence andintervention in Bahrains internal political affairs through the analysis of the publications

of al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li Tahrir al-Bahrayn (the Islamic Front for the Liberation ofBahrain, or IFLB), a now-defunct group which sought to topple the ruling Al Khalifa

family and replace it with an Islamic regime similar to that of Iran.2The Bahraini gov-

ernment accused the group of attempting to stage a coup dtatin 1981, and hinted thatgroup members had been trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and

received support from the Iranian regime.3Analysis of the IFLBs own sources offers

the advantage of identifying the degree of Iranian intervention while hedging against the

problem of the Bahraini governments possible interest in exaggerating some aspects of

Hasan Tariq Alhasan is a recipient of Bahrains Crown Princes International Scholarship Program. He has

obtained an undergraduate degree in Political Science and a Masters in Finance from the Institut dEtudes

Politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris, France. Currently, he is pursuing a Masters in International Political

Economy at the London School of Economics, UK. His research interests include GCC-Iran relations, GCC

labor markets, and the transformation of public bureaucracy in the GCC. Many thanks to the American En-

terprise Institutes Dr. Michael Rubin for his personal supervision of this article, originally written for his

class, Understanding Contemporary Iran, taught at Johns Hopkins University. Many thanks to the Library

of Congress as well for kindly providing the documents used in the research.

1. Morocco Cuts Relations with Iran over Bahrain, Reuters Africa, March 7, 2009, http://af.reuters.

com/article/topNews/idAFJOE52601D20090307.2. These sources and publications were gathered by the author at the Library of Congress.

3. David B. Ottaway, Allegations of Iranian Plots Increase Gulf Concerns for Security, TheWashington Post, January 2, 1982, p. A10; Edward Cody, Iranian-Backed Coup Bid in Bahrain Re-verberates Throughout Persian Gulf, The Washington Post, March 31, 1982, p. A14.


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604 MMIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

the Iranian regimes role. Putting the Iranian governments recurrent denial aside, the

truth can arguably be said to lie somewhere between the Bahraini governments allega-

tions and the IFLBs propaganda on which this article attempts to shed some light.

However, it is necessary to first give a brief presentation of the political context

in Bahrain from the mid 1950s leading up to the failed coup of 1981. This will be fol-

lowed by an introduction to the IFLB and its main figureheads, as well as a discussionof the events in which the group is accused of taking part. It would then be of interest to

examine the five main areas in which the Iranian regime seems to play a role vis--vis

the IFLB, namely that of ideology, leadership or direction, media coverage, logistics

and support, and finally military training.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BAHRAIN

The year 1954 marks the birth of a significant instance of organized political

contestation in Bahrain that shaped the countrys political landscape for years to come.Following a series of protests led by taxi drivers after the government announcement

of an obligatory insurance scheme, a group of intellectuals, notably Abdel Rahman

al-Baker, decided to act against the status quo and declare their intent to create a so-

ciety representative of Bahraini laborers and workers of all ethnic and confessional

categories. Benefitting from the zeal of Arab nationalism and socialism at the time, the

society, baptized as the National Union Committee (NUC), was reportedly successful

in recruiting about 14,000 Bahraini workers, and its candidates largely won the elec-

tions to the commission that was supposed to draft the first labor code.4

The government nonetheless was successful in suppressing the movement. First, the

Bahraini leadership exploited the NUCs failure to rally Shia clerics to their cause and en-

couraged the latter to form a rival organization, the National Convention Committee (NCC),

in 1955 in an attempt to compromise any chance the NUC had of forging a national consen-

sus. Secondly, Bahrain, encouraged by the British, illegalized the NUC and in 1956 under-

took a massive campaign of arrests and deportations of the movements figureheads.5This,

it seems, proved successful in ending the movements formal presence in the country.

However, these measures backfired and forced opposition movements to reorganize

themselves as underground and clandestine groups that were increasingly radicalized by

the governments measures against them. By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of

the 1960s, these groups consolidated their popular base thanks to the mood created bythe ascendance of the Iraqi Bath party to power and to the Iraqi and Iranian activists

who came to Bahrain.6In 1965, following the dismissal of hundreds of workers from the

national oil company, Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), the clandestine groups

launched what they calledIntifada Maris[the March Uprising], crippling many sectorsof the economy throughout the year. Discontent was, to a degree, motivated by the British

colonial presence protests and demonstrations significantly decreased after Britains

announcement that it would end its presence in Bahrain. Between 1968 and 1972, the

4. Abdulhadi Khalaf, Contentious Politics in Bahrain: From Ethnic to National and Vice Versa (Sweden: University of Lund, 1998), http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/khalaf.html.

5. Khalaf, Contentious Politics in Bahrain.6. Khalaf, Contentious Politics in Bahrain.


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THE IFLB AND THE ROLE OF IRAN IN THE FAILED COUP OF 1981 M 605

government undertook significant efforts to create a national spirit and consensus, includ-

ing the establishment of an army as well as its withdrawal from a project to create a fed-

eration of states, alongside Qatar and the emirates of the resultant United Arab Emirates,

due to their refusal to adopt a system of proportional representation that would permit the

participation of the people. The results of a UN survey in 1970 showing that the vast ma-

jority of the islands inhabitants wished for Bahrain to become an independent state alsohelped to reinforce the mood. In a final attempt to stir antigovernment sentiment, several

underground movements unified their efforts and launched a second Intifada Maris in1972 that was quickly and effectively extinguished by the security forces.

Conscious of the challenges facing them, the Bahraini leadership accelerated their

efforts towards drafting the first constitution and establishing the first unicameral parlia-

ment elected by universal male suffrage in 1973. The experiment proved to be a failure, as

the parliament refused to pass bills, such as the State Security Law, that the government

saw as fundamental to national security. In addition, the regime believed that the parlia-

ment was determined to refuse the renewal of the contract permitting the operation of anAmerican naval base. The late Amir Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa therefore dissolved

parliament and suspended the constitution in 1975, only two years after its establishment.

INTRODUCING THE IFLB

In the meantime, many Shia Islamist organizations were flourishing in the re-

gion, particularly in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, the Eastern province of

Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.7Among these was the Islamic Front for the Liberation

of Bahrain, whose existence was announced on January 27, 1976 (25 thof Muharram

1396), although the Director of its Media Department, Isa Marhoun, stated in an inter-

view that This announcement came many years after the actual creation of the Front

for a number of reasons, as well as individual and contextual factors that prevented us

from announcing the existence of the Front as soon as it was established.8

The IFLBs goals, according to Marhoun, can be divided between the immediate

and the long-term. The immediate goals of the group were (1) the toppling of the Al

Khalifa regime, (2) establishing a free Islamic order, (3) obtaining true independence

for Bahrain, (4) achieving cultural and economic independence, (5) eradicating illit-

eracy and implementating mandatory education, and (6) the scientific and technologi-

cal advancement of the country. Its long-term objectives revolved around three axes,namely: the development of the individual as one educated in Islam, embodying its

morals, carrying its message, and being prepared to sacrifice himself in its defense;

building the believing community through a vanguard capable of leading it to glory;

and finally the erection of Islamic civilization which would be the end result of the

Islamic Revolution.

The figureheads of the IFLB included, first and foremost, Hojjat al-Islam Hadi

7. Falah al-Mdaires, Shiism and Political Protest in Bahrain,Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol. 11,No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 20, http://bahrain.wikia.com/wiki/Shiism_and_Political_Protest_in_Bahrain.

8. Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB),al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Qaada 1405 (JulyAugust 1985), p. 16. However, the IFLB celebrated its 11thanniversary on Muharram 25, 1407 (September

30, 1986) 11 years after the announcement of its existence on Muharram 25, 1396 (January 27, 1976).


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al-Modarresi.9Born in Iraq into a family of prominent Shia religious scholars in 1956

1957 (1376), Modarresi came to Bahrain for asylum due to his fear of being persecuted

by the Bathist regime under Saddam Husayn.10Following the success of the Islamic

Revolution in Iran, Hadi al-Modarresi began working along with his elder brother, Mo-

hammad Taqi al-Modarresi, to export the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf.11In Bahrain,

he began what was described by the IFLB as underground activity to lead and bringabout the revolution. In public, however, he continued to direct and educate the masses

through his many lectures, books, and appearances.12On August 27, 1979 (Shawwal 4,

1399) Bahraini security forces arrested Modarresi at his home, only to deport him short-

ly afterwards to the United Arab Emirates from where, according to the IFLB, he was to

be sent to Iraq for execution.13Modarresi was, however, not taken to Iraq and continued

to lead antigovernment activity from Iran. The Bahraini government accused him of be-

ing behind the failed 1981 coup dtat attempt, an allegation to which he responded by

stating, It is an accusation that I do not deny, and an honor that I do not claim.14

Other than Modarresi, other Shia clerics have been known to occupy important po-sitions in the IFLB, such as Shaykh Mohammad Ali al-Ikri who was arrested on August

21, 1979 (Ramadan 28, 1399) by Bahraini authorities following his return from a visit to

Iran,15an event that subsequently sparked a series of demonstrations and arrests in Bahrain.

Shaykh Jamal al-Usfur played an important role in this wave of protests, and was subse-

quently imprisoned in November 1979 (Ashura 1400) where he died six months later.

Another important cleric, Shaykh Abdul Azim al-Muhtadi al-Bahrayni, joined

the Hawza al-Ilmiyya (Shia religious school) in Najaf in 1974 and escaped Iraq toBahrain for fear of arrest in 1979. In NovemberDecember 1980(Muharram 1401),however, Abdul-Azim was arrested by Bahraini security forces and exiled to Iran

shortly after, where he continued his revolutionary efforts against the government in

Bahrain.16Shaykh Abbas al-Shair, educated in a religious school renowned for the

9. The title Hojjat al-Islamis granted to those who have completed their studies at a religiouscenter (such as those in Najaf or Qom) but who have not yet been formally recognized as a mujtahidand are not capable of issuing their own religious decisions.

10. His father, Ayatollah Mohammad Kathim al-Modarresi, was a prominent member of theHawzaof Mashhad and Najaf. His grandfather is Ayatollah Uzma Sayyid Mohammad Baqer al-Modarresi

and his elder brother is Ayatollah Uzma Sayyid Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi. On his mothers side,he belongs to the famous Shirazi family. His maternal grandfather is Ayatollah Uzma Sayyid Mahdi

al-Shirazi, and his uncles are Ayatollah Uzma Sayyid Mohammad al-Shirazi and Ayatollah Uzma

Sayyid Sadiq al-Shirazi. From Modarresis official biography published on his website (Arabic ver-

sion), http://www.modarresi.org/biography/index.html.

11. Laurence Lour, Chiisme et Politique au Moyen Orient: Iran, Irak, Liban, Monarchies duGolfe [Shiism and Politics in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf Monarchies] (Paris:Editions Autrement, 2008).

12. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403 (SeptemberOctober 1983), p. 11.13. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403, p. 12.14. Interview with Modarresi byAl Shiramagazine (Issue No. 5) quoted in: Rashid Hamadah, Asifah

fawq Miya al-Khalij: Qissat Awwal Inqilab Askari fi al-Bahrayn1981 [Storm over Gulf Waters: Storiesof the First Military Coup in Bahrain 1981] (London: Al-Safa li-al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi, 1990), p. 248.

15. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn[The Journey of the Islamic Revolutionin Bahrain] ([1980s?]), p. 87.

16. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403, p. 13.


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authenticity of its thought and its revolutionary approach,17was another prominent

figure in the movement who was also arrested in the month of JulyAugust 1981 (Ra-

madan 1401) and spent a substantial amount of time in prison.

THE FAILED 1981 COUP DTAT: THE IFLB UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT

In many ways, it was the failed 1981 coup dtat, which the government accused

the IFLB of orchestrating, that brought the group into the spotlight. On December 13,

1981, the Bahraini Ministry of Interior announced the arrest of 73 individuals of various

nationalities whom they accused of planning to overthrow the ruling family and install

an Islamic republic similar to that in Iran. These individuals, the government claimed,

had received training in Iran. Their plan was allegedly to attack theDar al-Hukuma(thegovernment offices) and take ministers as hostages, while simultaneously taking over

the building of the national radio and television stations. All of this was to take place on

December 16, Bahrains national day. Shortly after the arrests, the Bahraini governmentexpelled a number of Iranian diplomats, including Hassan Shushtari Zadeh, Irans top-

ranking diplomat in the country.18The government, moreover, revealed the groups pos-

session of weapons and accused Iran of providing the plotters, members of the Islamic

Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, with equipment ranging from radios to Israeli-made

Uzi submachine guns and even fake Bahraini police uniforms whose buttons had

made in Iran stamped on the back.19The high court sentenced all 73 to jail; three of

them received life sentences while the other 70 were given lighter jail terms.20

IDEOLOGICAL PROXIMITYThe IFLB, on numerous accounts and occasions, declared its complete fidelity to-

wards the Universal Islamic Revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini.21In

a conference held in Tehran on August 911, 1980 (Ramadan 2729, 1400), the IFLB

proclaimed four points central to its doctrine:

That Islam is our doctrine. Islam overthrew the Shahanshah empire and the Shah1.

policeman of the Gulf himself whose military arsenal was made up of some

of the most modern American and Israeli weapons available. Islam is therefore our

true path to salvation.That Imam Khomeini is the leader and axis around which our oppressed peoples2.

should rally if they truly seek freedom, since Imam Khomeini is the summit of jihad

and faith and the symbol of challenge and endurance. He is the hope of all the op-

pressed in the world.

That unity is the path to victory [] it is indispensable that all peoples collabo-3.

rate and unite in the face of regimes and their clients.

17. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403, p. 13.18. Ottaway, Allegations of Iranian Plots Increase Gulf Concerns for Security.

19. Cody, Iranian-Backed Coup Bid in Bahrain Reverberates Throughout Persian Gulf.20. 73 Jailed in Bahrain Plot, The Washington Post, May 23, 1982, p. A2121. Document issued by the IFLB on the occasion of the second anniversary of Yom al-Quds[Je-

rusalem Day] on August 8, 1980 (1400), appearing in: IFLB, Kifah Shab al-Bahrayn [The Struggleof the People of Bahrain] (1980), p. 213.


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That the way to liberate Jerusalem should be neither eastern nor western. A word of4.

advice to those who seek Jerusalems and others freedom: rid yourself of any depen-

dence on the criminal West and the disbelieving East and hold fast to the example of

the Iranian peoples slogans that embody independence (neither East nor West ).22

The IFLB also advocated the use of violent means to bring about its Islamic Revo-lution since, in its view, it was the only way in which Al Khalifa rule could be overturned

and revolution brought about. In an interview with the magazineRisalat al-Husaynpost-ed on Modarresis website, Modarresi explains that it is permissible, for the sake of re-

sistance against oppression, to undertake violent confrontation against the sword by the

sword, [against] force by force, and [against] oppression and tyranny by means that the

adversary understands [] even if this leads to bloodshed and killing of the believers.23

It is equally noteworthy that Modarresi is recognized as having obtained the trust

and wikala [delegated authority] to carry out matters in the name of Ayatollah Uzma[Grand Ayatollah] Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Uzma al-Sayyid Mohammad Hussaini

al-Shirazi, Ayatollah Uzma al-Sayyid al-Morishi al-Najafi, and Ayatollah Uzma al-

Sayyid Abd al-Ala al-Sabzawri,24and is often identified by IFLB sources as the rep-

resentative of Imam Khomeini in Bahrain.25

The IFLB also took the liberty of adopting some of the revolutionary slogans

inspired by the Islamic Revolution, such as the famous not Eastern, nor Western

Islamic Republican, our struggle, Hussaini; our leader, Khomeini, and others.

The groups sources mention that, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran,

Khomeinis name was systematically and overtly integrated into slogans that were both

chanted verbally and written on walls and banners.26

LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTION

Therefore, the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is the precursor to the approachof the regimes end in Bahrain. The people which lacked a coherent approach [] the

people which lacked a committed and aware leadership, began fulfilling these factorsthrough the guidance of Islam and under the banner of Imam Khomeini, the leader ofthe Islamic Nation and of the oppressed, and under the leadership of the guided IslamicFront which stood out on the field and led the masses, launching the slogan Allahu Ak-bar that toppled the buried Shah and shook the throne of the Al Khalifa in Bahrain.27

The publications of the IFLB offer several indicators of the sort of leadership that

prominent clerics of the Islamic Republic of Iran had over the group. Though these

indicators are most often implicit and do not necessarily imply the existence of a direct

relationship on the tactical or operational level, they point to a link that could be said to

22. IFLB, Kifah Shab al-Bahrayn, pp. 212, 214.23. Interview with the magazine Risalat al-Husayn[The Message of Husayn] posted on Modar-

resis website, http://www.modarresi.org/articles/articles_view_002.html.Risalat al-Husayn is a Ku-wait-based magazine published during the beginning of the month of Muharram.

24. Rashid Hamadah, Asifah fawq Miya al-Khalij, pp. 211212.25. IFLB, Kifah Shab al-Bahrayn,p. 199.26. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 91.27. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 81.


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have had an influence on the groups strategy and orientation.

First of all, IFLB sources point to a number of visits that their leading clerics paid to

prominent figures in the Islamic Republic. The previously mentioned Shaykh Mohammad

Ali al-Ikri, for instance, was arrested upon his arrival in Bahrain from a visit to Imam

Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution.28Modarresi, as already mentioned, was often de-

scribed as, the representative of Imam Khomeini in Bahrain. Ayatollah Khomeini alsohad another representative in Bahrain,HajjIsa Shareefi (his title refers to his completionof the pilgrimage to Mecca), whose task was to collect the Shia religious tax (the khums)on behalf of the Imam. Shareefi was also arrested by security forces.29However, Shareefis

representation of Khomeini was probably much less political than that of Modarresi, who

was viewed as the linkpar excellencebetween Ayatollah Khomeini and the IFLB.Moreover, it is noteworthy that most clerics affiliated with the IFLB, including Mo-

darresi and Abdul Azim, both of whom were exiled from Bahrain, ended up in Iran where,

according to IFLB sources, they continued their revolutionary activities against the Bah-

raini government. The Iranian regime did more, however, than simply offer safe asylumto activists working against the Bahraini government. As IFLB sources testify, the Iranian

regime allowed IFLB members to participate in the Iran-Iraq war on the Iranian front and

provided some favorable media coverage for their activities (see Figures 14). Furthermore,

Laurence Lour mentions that Hadi al-Modarresi and his elder brother Mohammad Taqi al-

Modarresi worked in conjunction with elements within the Iranian regime such as Mehdi

Hashemi, founder of thepasdaran(the armed body responsible for guarding the Revolu-tion), to export the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf at least up until the mid 1980s.30

Furthermore, the IFLB on several occasions referred to a direct correlation between

its activities and those of the pro-Khomeini public on one hand and statements or direc-

tions that Khomeini may have issued on the other. One of the earliest examples of this is

the series of demonstrations in support of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the protests

that took place last year [August 17, 1979] in response to Imam Khomeinis call wherein

he declared the last Friday of the month of Ramadanas Jerusalem Day.31This was repeat-ed the following year on August 8, 1980 (1400) when Imam Khomeini announced, The

Muslim peoples have to celebrate Jerusalem Day your demonstrations and protests at

the last Friday of the blessed month of Ramadan (Jerusalem Day) are the precursor to the

expulsion of these corruptive rulers and to the end of their manipulation of the Islamic

countries.32To this, the IFLB responded by issuing a statement urging the people of Bah-

rain to take to the streets to express their unequivocal support of the Islamic Revolution andImam Khomeini, in addition to closing their shops, congregating in mosques, etc.

Modarresi advocated using the matams [also known as a husayniyya a location forShia commemoration ceremonies, especially for the month of Muharram] and mosques as

centers for spreading their Islamic Revolution.33As he regretfully exclaimed, A look at the

28. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 87.29. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 58.30. Lour, Chiisme et Politique au Moyen Orient.31. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 86.32. IFLB, Kifah Shab al-Bahrayn, pp. 210211.33. Hadi al-Modarresi, Andama Tatahawwal Ashura ila Mashrou [When Ashura Becomes

a Plan],Risalat Ashura(newspaper), No. 2, Muharram 2, 1420 (April 18, 1999), http://www.mo-darresi.org/articles/articles_view_009.html.


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reality of the matamin our Shia world today reveals clearly the degree to which the matamis short of taking up its role as a religious-social-cultural establishment. He lists a number of

changes to place the mataminto this function, the most interesting of which are not very farfrom a partial takeover of the role of the state such as the creation of a committee within

the framework of the matamaimed at improving living standards and directing graduates

towards needed specializations, as well as offering academic scholarships for needy students.A striking resemblance can be seen between Modarresis thought and the IFLBs frequently

cited quotation, attributed to Imam Khomeini, wherein he describes places of worship as the

trenches of the revolution and the husayniyatas the fuel of the revolution.34

Indeed, the matams and places of worship did play an important role in the unrestreportedly stirred by the IFLB. Khawaja mosque, Momin mosque, and the husayni-yat of Madan and al-Gasaab are the places where most demonstrations that swept thestreets of Manama were launched, and in Muharraq as well as the villages of Draaz,

Bani Jamra, Damastaan, and Sitra, demonstrations would begin from mosques and

husayniyat in order to express the Islamic character of the revolution.35

Such politi-cization of Shii places of worship was quite characteristic of the less quietist and less

traditionalist version of Islam that Ayatollah Khomeini preached.

In an attempt to explain the enthusiasm with which people often took to the streets

and participated in demonstrations and riots, the IFLB explicitly mentions the rightly

guided leadership embodied by Imam Khomeini and the presence of an authentic and com-

mitted Islamic organization [that] gave the people faith in the inevitability of victory.36It is

thus undeniable that the IFLB looked up to Imam Khomeini as a leader, though the extent

to which this leader took an active role in leading the group and defining its orientation,

whether personally or through intermediaries (particularly through Modarresi), is unclear.

MEDIA COVERAGE

No one can deny the fact that the most important element that contributed to theapproach and speed of the Islamic Revolutions victory in Iran is the media. Whoknows how much longer Iran would have stayed under the rule of the Shah whowas served by the Zionist and global media which stood by him if not for the dis-

placement of Imam Khomeini to Paris and his direction of the people from there?!37

The media coverage and assistance that the Iranian regime provided for the IFLBwas perhaps the most apparent, and the area in which Iran provided most support. As can

be seen in Figure 1, Iran allowed the IFLB to set up media offices in the capital Tehran.

The IFLB was also called upon to participate and represent the people of Bahrain in

international Islamic conferences that were often organized in Iran, such as the Confer-

ence to Condemn American Interventions in the Affairs of the Islamic Republic and the

Conference on the Liberation of Jerusalem. The IFLB was even allowed to set up exhibi-

tions with pictures of American and Israeli planes that carry the Star of David landing in

Bahrains airport. They [i.e. visitors to the exhibitions] saw pictures illustrating the social

34. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 90.35. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn.36. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 98.37. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 104.


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injustice and poverty that many neighborhoods and villages go through in Bahrain. This

is apart from pictures of past and present demonstrations and pictures of burnt houses and

cars, in addition to the explosives that were used to set them on fire. Pictures of the corpse

of the martyr Jameel al-Ali, bearing signs of brutal torture, were also displayed.38

Furthermore, IFLB sources list the efforts to block the broadcast of the Iranian

Voice of the Islamic Republic radio station to Bahrain by the Bahraini governmentas one of the latters repressive policies.39Figure 1 illustrates that the Tehran-based

Voice of the Islamic Republic did indeed broadcast most of the songs of the Islamic

Front for the Liberation of Bahrain through radio and television at many times, since it

receives wide acceptance from listeners thanks to the Islamic Revolutionary ideals that

they contain. IFLB publications also refer with regret to the banning of even listen-

ing to a lecture by al-Modarresi on Radio Tehran40which most importantly indicates,

alongside the above-mentioned references, that Iranian media outlets did broadcast

IFLB propaganda and Modarresis lectures and talks.

Iranian newspapers also provided press coverage for many of the demonstrations thatIFLB activists organized in front of the Bahraini Embassy in Iran with a rather favorable

tone. More importantly, however, Iranian press published a news item announcing that sev-

eral IFLB members joined with the Iranian army to fight against the Iraqi Bathist regime.41

These media references point to Irans support of IFLB activities through favorable cover-

age of their activities, as well as the spread of the groups songs and propaganda material.

MILITARY TRAINING AND INVOLVEMENT

The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain did not suffice itself with [letters

of support] but rather announced its preparedness to participate in the ongoingwar on the Islamic Republics borders, calling upon other movements in the regionto push their peoples towards participating in this war in order to accomplish the

peoples Islamic unity in the face of the agent regimes in the region. The first batchof our prominent revolutionary mujahideenhas already left for the Islamic Repub-lic of Iran. There, five members of the front announced their allegiance to Islam,the Quran, and the great Imam Khomeini and set forth to participate in the battleagainst the Bathist, mercenary, and Jordanian [allies of Iraq in this war] enemies of

Islam and humanity who are armed with both Western and Eastern weapons alike.42

The above statement announced the participation of five members of the IFLB

in the Iran-Iraq war against the Iraqi Bathist regime.43This declaration, however, was

not the only indicator of involvement of the groups members with the Iranian military.

IFLB sources published a dossier on Husayn Ali Mohammad Taher (also known as

Abu Jihad) with pictures of him in army attire on the Iranian front. What is even more

intriguing are the conditions in which Abu Jihad died. Abu Jihad did not die on the

front against Iraqi forces as one might expect, but rather in his attempt to assassinate

38. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 105.39. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 57.40. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Dhu al-Hijja 1403, p. 12.41. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, pp. 111113 (Figure 2).42. IFLB,Masirat al-Thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-Bahrayn, p. 111.43. Refer to Figure 3.


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former officers of the Shahanshah regime and figures of the opposition to the Islamic

Republic in one of the Arab countries. Abu Jihad and his comrades failed, however, as

the bomb they had planted exploded earlier than scheduled, killing Abu Jihad and one

of his comrades while injuring a third who was taken to the hospital.44

In an interview with the father of Ismail Abbas Hassan, the first so-called Bah-

raini martyr against Saddam Husayns forces on the battlefield with Iran, the fathermakes explicit reference to the involvement of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps,

who came to his house in Iran (since both Ismail and his father were exiled from Bah-

rain) to inform him of his sons death.45

IFLB sources also published an account of the so-called martyrdom of Shaykh Musa

Jafar al-Babur and Shaykh Khalifa al-Haddad, both of whom were students at theHawza al-Ilmiyya in Qum. It comes as no surprise that a handful of Bahrainis travelled to theHawzainQum to receive their education. This, as well as the above-mentioned cases, present evidence

of past incidents wherein Bahrainis who travelled to Iran for different reasons were hired to

carry out assassinations in other countries, received training from the IRGC, or participatedwith the latter in its war against Bathist Iraq. It is also interesting to note that, in the court

statements of Mohammad Salman Ali, the lawyer of Sayyid Jafar al-Sayyid Kathim al-

Alawi (one of the defendants accused of plotting against the government in 1981), he did

not deny charges of his client having received training in Iran but rather said, With regards

to training in Iran, that is something simple and easily available not only to the defendant and

the others but to a number of individuals, and it is something that is not denied in Iran.46

CONCLUSION

The failed 1981 coup dtat helped bring the IFLB under the spotlight. It was also one

of the first instances when the Bahraini government publicly accused Iran of intervening in

its internal affairs. The Bahraini government has long accused Iran of meddling with its af-

fairs through the intermediary of the IFLB to which, Bahrain claims, it provided motivation,

incentive, direction, equipment, and training. Many Bahraini opposition members and Ira-

nian officials, however, dismiss this as nothing more than a pretext for the Bahraini govern-

ment to suppress opposition. Between these two positions, the analysis of IFLB sources has

allowed us to avoid the problems that the Bahraini and Iranian governments interests pose

in attempting to find the truth about Irans intervention in Bahrain. This study has revealed

a variety of factors, some of which can be seen as signs of Iranian intervention in the inter-nal affairs of Bahrain: the adoption by the IFLB of the Islamic Revolutionary ideology, the

proclamation of Khomeini as the leader, a number of ties that link the groups figureheads

to senior Shia clerics in the Islamic Republic, a significant amount of prominent Iranian,

often national, media coverage, and diffusion of IFLB activities and propaganda, and finally

strong evidence pointing to various forms of involvement of IFLB members with the Iranian

Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The series of arrests and deportations that the government carried out against IFLB

leadership and members in the early 1980s weakened the group almost to the point of

44. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya, Safar 1406 (OctoberNovember 1985), p. 11.45. IFLB, al-Thawra al-Risaliyya,Shawwal 1405 (JuneJuly 1985), p. 14. Refer to Figure 4.46. Hamadah, Asifah fawq Miya al-Khalij, p. 310.


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virtual disappearance from the political scene. Nevertheless, the government accused

other, newer groups of receiving support from Iran in order to stir unrest in the country.

Such was the case of the Bahraini branch of Hizbullah (or Hizbullah-Bahrain) whose

existence as a distinct group is not beyond doubt blamed in part for acts of vandalism

against businesses and attacks directed against security forces during the 1990s.

Today within the context of the Arab uprisings, the Bahraini as well as other GCCgovernments have continued to blame Iran for playing a role in stirring political unrest

in Bahrain. Iran has done very little to refute those claims, however. It has, through its

media arms such as the Iran-based al-Alam TV and Hizbullahs al-Manar TV channels,

shed much favorable light on revolutionary acts and acts of vengeance against the Al

Khalifa ruling family. The London and Karbala-based Shii Ahlulbayt TV founded by

Mahdi al-Modarresi, Hadi al-Modarresis son, broadcast Hadi himself encouraging dem-

onstrators to carry out their revolution and glorifying acts of violence committed against

the police, bringing back memories of his days as head of the IFLB. Reports have also

linked some prominent opposition activists, like the London-based Dr. Said al-Shehabi,to the Iranian regime.47Figures within the Iranian regime directly threatened the Bah-

raini government that Tehran would intervene unless it ceased repressing the protests at

once. Iranian lawmaker Hossein Naqavi was quoted as saying, Tehran will use all the

power and potentials at its disposal to halt the oppression of the people of Bahrain. 48In

April, the British navy repelled a speedboat off the coast of Bahrain suspected to have

come from Iran possibly with explosives on board in an alleged suicide mission.49

Conservative Iranian cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, chairman of the Guardian Council

that supervises the conformity of legislation passed by parliament with the constitution

as well as approves election candidates, went as far as to publicly call for Bahrain to be

conquered by Islam and the Muslims during his Friday sermon on July 8, 2011.50

Both the Bahraini government and the Iranian regime could have some vested

interest in exaggerating the part Iran plays in sparking unrest in Bahrain. Bahrain, on

one hand, uses the Iranian threat as a scapegoat for its political problems while Iran, on

the other hand, attempts to underscore its regional power and standing by championing

the cause of the Bahraini opposition all while avoiding direct military confrontation.

The case of the IFLB, offering the advantage of retrospect, suggests that accusations

of Iranian meddling in Bahrain have not been completely false. The question remains,

however, as to how exactly relations between the Iranian regime and Bahraini opposi-

tion groups have evolved within the wider context of Iranian foreign policy towards theGCC over the past 30 years and the extent to which they are in effect today.

47. Tom Harper, Files Link Activist to Iran Regime, London Evening Standard, August 30,2011, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23982103-files-link-activist-to-iran-regime.do.

48. Gus Lubin, Iran Warns it May Intervene in Bahrain,Business Insider, March 17, 2011, http://www.businessinsider.com/bahrain-thursday-march-17-2011-3.

49. Ian Drury, Royal Navy Warship Opens Fire on Speedboat of Iranian Suicide Bombers,Daily Mail, August 19, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2027872/Royal-Navy-war-ship-opens-speedboat-Iranian-suicide-bombers.html.

50. GCC Protests Iran Clerics Bahrain Comments, AlArabiya.net, July 19, 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/19/158398.html.


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Figure 1: Iran Allows IFLB to Set Up Media Offices in Tehran

APPENDIX


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Figure 2: Iranian Newspaper Coverage of IFLB Members

Fighting Alongside Iran against Iraq


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Figure 3: IFLB Announces that Five of its Members have Travelled to the Is-

lamic Republic of Iran, Pledging Allegiance to Khomeini to Fight against Iraq


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Figure 4: Father of Ismail Abbas Hassan Stating that the IRGC Soldier Came

to Inform him of his Sons Death

The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain

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