1953 Coup in Iran

8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

1/35

S&S Quarterly, Inc.

Guilford Press

The 1953 Coup in IranAuthor(s): Ervand AbrahamianSource: Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 182-215Published by: Guilford PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40403895.

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8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

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Science

Society,

ol.

65,

No.

2,

Summer

2001,

182-215

The 1953

Coup

in

Iran*

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN

ABSTRACT:

he

New

York

imes

ecently

eaked a CIA

report

n the

1953

American-British

verthrowf

Mossadeq,

ran'sPrimeMinis-

ter. t billed the

report

s

a

secret

history

f the secret

oup,

and

treated t as an invaluable ubstituteor he U. S.

files

hat

emain

inaccessible. ut a reconstructionf

the

coup

from ther

ources,

especially

rom

ie archives

f the

British

oreign

Office,

ndicates

that his

eport

s

highly

anitized.t

glosses

ver uch ensitivessues

as the

crucial

participation

f

the

U. S. ambassador

n

the

actual

overthrow;

heroleofU. S.

military

dvisers;

he

harnessing

f ocal

Nazis nd Muslim

errorists;

nd theuse of ssassinationsodestabil-

ize the

government.

hat s

more,

t

places

the

coup

in

the

context

the

Cold Warradier han hat f he

Anglo-Iranian

il crisis a clas-

sic

ase ofnationalism

lashing

ith

mperialism

n

theThirdWorld."

"Matters ame to a head

in

August

when,

or hree

days,

Mossadeq,

acked

y

he ommunist

arty,

eemed o be the

irresistibleictatorf ran.One senior

iplomat

ven dvised

thatwe hould

nuggle p

tohim . .but

fortunately,

he

oy-

alty

fthe

rmy

nd thefear f

communismaved

he

day."

-

Presidentisenhower

Sources

IS

EASIER

OR A CAMEL

o

pass hrough

he

ye

f

needle

than or

historiano

gain

ccess othe

CIA rchives

n

the1953

coup

n

ran.

hese rchivesemain

naccessibleven

hough

alf

*

I

would ike

to thank he

Professional taff

ongress

nd the

CityUniversity

f New York

for travel

rant

n

1982 to

carry

ut research n

London on the

Anglo-Iranian

il

crisis

of

1951-53.

1

would also

like to thankEric

Hooglund

for

omments,

nd

Hamid

Ahmadi,

Hedayatollah

Matin-Daiari nd

Sina Saidi

for

useful

ource materials.

182

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8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

3/35

THE

COUP IN IRAN

183

a

century

as

passed,

hePahlavi

ynasty

as

fallen,

heCold

Warhas

ended,

most

articipants

ave

died,

nd

materials

rom

ther overt

actions,

uchas

Guatemala,

ave

been

released.What s

more,

n

Executive

rder rom 995 nstructs

overnmentepartments

o

au-

tomatically"eclassify

ocumentsfter

5

years.

n

the

early

990s,

theCIA

ought

more ime

o release

he1953

documentsn

ran n

the

grounds

t ackedfunds

o

catalog

hese

ulky

iles.

n

the ate

1990s,however,

t claimed

hese ame files ould not be

released

because hey ad beendestroyedunknowingly''nthe arly 960s.1

The

mysteryeepened

n

April

000

when

CIA

report

n the

coup

inexplicably

urfaced

fter

ying

ormant

or 5

years.

t

ap-

peared

irst

n

summary

n

The

NewYork

imes

April

6,

2000);

then

in n

expurgated0-page

orm n theweb ite

f he ame

newspaper;

and then

n

a less

expurgated

69-page

orm

n another

web

site

(htt://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm.).

ntitled

Overthrowf

Pre-

mier

Mossadeq

f

ran,"

he

report

waswritten

n

1954

by

Donald

Wilber,

CIA

operative

nvolved

n

the

coup.

t

wascommissioned

by heCIA'sHistoricalivision,ndwasdesigneds a handbook or

future

oups.

ts ntended

udiencewas

enior fficials

ot

only

n

the

CIA,

but lso

n

the

Pentagon,

tate

Department,

hite

House,

and

Senate

Foreign

elations

ommittee.

Thisdocument

uickly

ttained he tature

fan authoritative

text.

he Times

illed t

as

"the ecret

istory"isclosingpivotal

n-

formation"

nd "the

nner

workings

fthe

oup" April

0

and

June

1

1

2000)

The London

Guardian

epicted

t s

the

very

irstetailed

U. S.

government

ccount

f he

pisode" April

7,

2000).

Similarly,

theNational ecurityrchive an NGO formedodeclassifyffi-

cial

documents

hailed

t s

"extremely

mportant,"

n "after-action

report

rom

gency

able

trafficnd interviews

ith

gents

n the

ground

n Iran"

www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv).

This ura

hould

aise

ome

uestions.

ruethe

report

aswrit-

ten

oon

fter

he

vent,

ut

he eal

rimary

ources

the

ispatches

between

Washington,

ondon,

nd Teheran

remain navailable.

True,

he

eport

aswritten

y

participants;

ut he ventsnd

pri-

mary

ources

re filtered

hrough

is

eyes.

hustheCold War ver-

1 For

discussions

oncerning

hese

documents ee

T.

Weiner,

CIA s Slow to Tell

Early

Cold

War

Secrets,"

New

York

imes,

pril,

, 1996;

"CIA

Destroyed

iles on 1953 ran

Coup,"

New

York

imes,

ay

29,

1997; "CIA,

Breaking

romises,

utsOff

Release of Cold War

Files,"

New

York

imes,

uly

5,

1998;

W.

Kimball,

Classified ,"

erspectives,

ebruary

997,

9-10,

22-23.


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

4/35

184

SCIENCE & SOCIETY

shadows heoil

crisis,

nd

the role

of theCIA dwarfshat f

MI6.

True,

he

report

as

confidential;

ut his

id notmeanWilber

id

not xercise

elf-censorship.

n

writing

commissioned

istory,

ilber

was areful ot o dwell n

the

Pentagon

nd

the tate

epartment.

It s

one

thing

ofocus n therole f he

CIA

n

the

oup

after

ll,

the

gency

s

supposed

o

carry

ut uch ctions.

t s another

hing

to

describe mbassadorsnd

military

dvisers

ctively

articipating

in

the

overthrow

f

their ost

overnments.imilarly,

t

s

one

thing

to dmit hat heCIAdistributedgreyropaganda,"unded emon-

strations,

layed

dirty

ricks,"

nd

urged

fficerso

arry

ut he

oup.

It s another

hing

o

admit hat heCIAworked

hrough

ocal

Nazis,

andhad

direct

ole n

kidnappings,

ssassinations,

orture,

ndmass

street

illings.

his

may

xplain

hy

he

CIA rchivesn ran unlike

those n

Guatemala remain

navailable.

n

Iran,

heU. S. role

was

direct;

n

places

ike

Guatemala,

t

was

mostly

ndirect.

Although

he

original

IA materials emain

naccessible,

he

main

pieces

of the 1953

puzzle

can

be

put together

rom iverse

sources: rom ritishoreign fficerchivesn thePublicRecord

Office

n

London

although

anitized,

hese rchives ontain

ver

1000files n

Iran,

ncluding

hotocopies

f

U.

S.

documents);

rom

memoirs ritten

y

ranians

after

he 1979 revolution umerous

nationalistnd

eftwing

fficersame orth ith heir

eminiscences)

from wo ral

history

rojects

one

with

eftists

Ahmadi, 985-95),

the

otherwithmembers f

theold elite

Ladjevardi,

993));

from

accounts ritten

y

he

wo

ey

oupplanners

Kermit

oosevelt

1

79)

theCIA head of

the

venture,

nd

Montague

Woodehouse,

is oun-

terpartntheBritish I6 (Woodehouse,982));and fromcraps f

information

ropped y

esser IA

and MI6

operatives,specially

o

academic

esearchersuch

s MarkGasiorowski

1979)

and

Stephen

Domi

(2000).

This

rticle

ntendsouse these ources

o

reconstruct

the

coup.

Origins f

he

Oil Crisis

1948-51)

The

origins

f

he

oup

go

back

o the

Anglo-Iranian

il crisis f

1951-53,which,nturn, oesbacktothe bortiveetroleum ego-

tiations

t the

nd

of

WorldWar

I.

In

1948,

he

majlis

parliament)

rejected

1945

oviet

roposal

or n

oil

concession

n

the

northern

provinces

ven

hough

he

greementave

ran

qual

shares

n

prof-


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

5/35

THE

COUP IN

IRAN

185

its,

management,

nddistribution.he

British

inistry

fFuelwarned

the

Foreign

ffice:

The

strength

f British il lies

in

the fact hatwe hold concessions ll over

the

world,

n whichwe are ourselves

eveloping

he oil

and

controlling

ts

distributionnd

disposal.

t

would weaken

our

position

f

countries

egan

to

develop

their wnoil.

If

Persia

began

to

develop

her ownoil in

the

north,

it

might

ot be

very ong

before he would

want o do this

n

the south lso.

We should notencouragethem to develop theirown oil. (FO 37i/Persia

1945/45443.)

Mohammad

Mossadeq, patrician

olitician

hohad

emerged

as the

incorruptible"

oice

of

national

spirations,

ehementlyp-

posed

the

Soviet

ffer n the

grounds

t would ncreaseMoscow's

influence

n

the

north

nd

trigger

ff

new

tampede

fWestern

concession-hunters

eeking

ontracts

n therest f the

country.

e

warned hat he

end

resultwouldbe the

dismemberment

f ran.

Evenmore mportant,hemajlis ejected Supplementothe

1933

Agreement

ith he

Anglo-Iranian

il

Company.

y

1949-50,

theAIOC

had

n

ran he

world's

argest

efinery,

he econd

argest

exporter

f crude

petroleum,

nd the

third

argest

il reserves.

t

provided

he

British

reasury

ith

4

million

ounds terling

n taxes

and

92

million

ounds

n

foreign

xchange; upplied

5%

of he

uel

needsofthe

British

avy;

nd

gave

AIOC

75%

of

ts nnual

profits.

Much f his

went

o hareholders

n

England

s well s

to

nvestments

in

Kuwait,

raq,

nd

Indonesia.

TheSupplementarygreement negotiatedn ecret offered

Iran oo

ittle,

oo

ate. toffered

o ncrease

ran's

oyalties

rom

our

to

ix

hillingser

on;

ran's hare

f he

ompany rofits

ould

ise

from

7 to

24%.

Iran,

iting

recent

merican-Venezuelan

gree-

ment,

ad

ought

0%.

The

company,

owever,

ook he

osition

hat

Iran should

be

grateful

or heAIOC's

"civilizing

ission."

t

had

invested

enerous

ums

n

ran,

onverted

deserts"

nto

lourishing

towns,

reated

5,000

obs

-

over

0,000

f hem

or ranians

and

had

provided

people

with

uch menities

s

swimming

ools"

FO

371 Persia 951/91604).Moreover,trefused o set deadlines n

earlier

romises

o

promote

ranians

o

technical-managerialosi-

tions n the

grounds

hat

ewhad the

"skills" eeded

for uch

re-

sponsible" ositions

FO

377/Persia

951/91449).


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

6/35

1

86 SCIENCE

f

SOCIETY

Furthermore,

he

ompany

ailed o ddress

many

f ran's ther

complaints:

he

duration f

the

ontract

it

ran

until

992);

the

pay-

ment f

royalties

n

pounds

this

ied

ranto the

terling

rea);

the

sale

of

oil

to

theBritish

avy

t substantial

iscounts;

he ale of

oil

to

ran

t worldmarket

rices

ather han

t ocal

production

osts

(they

iffered

ubstantially);

herefusal

o

open up

company

ooks

to ranian

uditors;

he

burning

f natural

as

nstead f

piping

t

for ocal

onsumption;

ndthe

unning

fAbadan s

a

company

own

where toresnd clubs outinelyiscriminatedgainsthe natives."

What s

more,

he

ompany

as

een

as

a

typical

olonial

ower

ma-

nipulating

hehost

overnment,ymaking

nd

unmaking

inisters

as well s

governors, ayors,rmy

ommanders,

olice

heads,

majlis

deputies,

nd,

of

course,

ocal tribal hiefs.

Max

Thornburg,

Standard il

executive

rought

n

as a

con-

sultant

o

the ranian

overnment,

ecommended

ejection

f

the

Supplementarygreement

n the

grounds

t

was

notbasedon the

50/50

principle

nd was"draftedo

obscurely

nd

so

ambiguously

that o oneintheworld" ouldpossiblynderstandt FO248/Per-

sia

1951/1530).

he AIOC

publicly

nsisted hat

he

50/50

ugges-

tionwas

mpractical

ecause twas

"extremely

ifficulto calculate

profits,"

ut

privately

old the British abinet hat uch

a division

wouldbe

"uneconomical,bsurd,

nd astronomical"

FO

371/Ver-

sia

1949/1531).

n

a blunt

onversationith

he ranian

remier,

he

British

mbassador,

ir

Francis

hepherd,

eclared hat

ran was

being greedy"

nd the

only hing

he

ompanymight

e

willing

o

add to

these oncessions

as

perhaps

hefreemedical

reatmentf

certain ystericaleputieswhocontinued o denounce heSupple-

mentarygreement"

FO

377/Persia

950/1512).

n

refusing

o

be

flexible,

he il

company

s well s the

British

overnment

xpected

Iran

o

giveway

or,

t

east,

o come

back

with

ew

proposals.

ew

in

London

expected

utright

ationalization,

ven

hough

horn-

burg,

n hisreturno

Washington,

arned hat ritish

ntransigence

was

fueling

he

campaign

or

uch

dangerous

akeover

FO

248/

Persia

951/1527).

In

rejecting

he

Supplementary

greement,

he

majlis

ational-

ized he il ndustryndelectedMossadeq spremiern thegrounds

he

wasthe

only

andidate

ager

to

mplement

hisnationalization

law.On

taking

ffice

n

April

951,

Mossadeq romised

air

ompen-

sation,

et

up

a

National

ranian

Oil

Company,

nd invited ritish


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

7/35

THE

COUP IN IRAN 187

employees

o

work or

he

new

uthority.

lthough ossadeq's

up-

porters,

he

National

ront,

umbered

nly

handful

n

the

majlis,

they

ould

way

heother

eputies

ecausefewwished o be identi-

fiedwith

heAIOC.

Shepherd

egrudgingly

dmittedhat

Mossadeq

ad

captured

he

imagination

fthe

people"

FO

24S/Persia

951/1514)

nd that the

National

ront

ere

laying

chord

whichwoke

trong

choes

mong

many

lasses f Persians"

FO

377/Persia

951/91521).

is

Charge

d'Affairesdded: "ThePremiersable to control arliamentarynd

public pinionmainly

ecause

fhis

personal

opularity"

FO

248/

Persia

951/1514).

arly

n

the

crisis

hen

Mossadeq aid

a visit o

theUnited

tates,

State

epartment

rief

nformedruman

hat

he

prime

ministeras

supported

y

he

majority

f he

population"

nd

was

alert,"

witty,"

affable,"honest,"

nd

"well

nformed"

Declassi-

fied

ocuments/

975

/White ouse/Doc.

80).

Truman

as dvised

o

stir

he onversationnto

generalities

bout

ommunism,

merican

"disinterest"

n

oil,

nd U. S.

goodwill

oward

ran. n

a

post-mortem

ofthewhole risis,heU. S. Embassydmitted ofcourse, nlyn

confidentialotes that

Mossadeq,

he

demi-god,"

till ad a

"hold

on

public pinion,"symbolized

henationalist

deal,"

nd cast

long

shadow ver is uccessors

FO

377/Persia

953/104573).

imilarly,

Foreign

ffice

ost-mortem

tated:

In

terms f class

warfare,

he

movemented

byMusaddiq

as

revolutionary

rive f he hreeower

classes

gainst

he

upper

lass nd

theBritish howere dentified

ith

that lass"

FO

377/Persia

957/127074).

Premierossadeq April 951-August953)

Although

heBritish ad beenslow o

see

the

oming

f

nation-

alization,

hey

ere

uick

odraw hree

ard-nosedutdown-to-earth

conclusions:

irst,

ossadeq

was erious bout

nationalization,

triv-

ing

or ull

ranian ontrol ver he il

ndustry;

econd,

ritain

ould

not

ermit

ran o ttain his

ontrol;hird,

he

nlyway

ritainould

safeguard

ts

italnterests as

hrough

ossadeq's

emoval. ondon

stuck o these onclusion

hrough

hick

nd

thin ntil

Mossadeq

was

overthrown8monthsater.

The Britishssessment as

hat

he

ore ssue or

Mossadeq

was

not ncreased

oyalties,

utnational

overeignty

i.e.,

ontrol ver

extraction,

roduction,

nd distributionf oil. For

Mossadeq,

ran


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

8/35

1

88

SCIENCE

f

SOCIETY

would

ttain eal

ndependence nly hrough

heremoval

fBritish

domination

ver ts il

ndustry.

revious

oliticians, ossadeq

ften

reminded he

public,

ad

undermined ational

overeigntyygiv-

ing

out

economic oncessionso the

Great owers.

e

would

make

Iran

ndependenty

denying

hem uch oncessions. e addedthat

theGreat

owers,

ssured heir ivals erenot

gettingdvantages,

would

espect

ranian

overeignty.

e termedhis the

olicy

f

nega-

tive

quilibrium,"

s

opposed

othat f

positivequilibrium"

avored

bypoliticiansllied oBritain, ussia, ermany,r theUnited tates

(Key-Ostovan,

950).

While he

British

overnment

ealizedranwanted

ontrol,

twas

adamant his

ontrol houldnot

be

relinquished

at

least,

ot

to

Iran. t

was

willing

o

pressure

IOC to

hare concession ith ther

companies

to

enter consortium

ith he o-calledseven isters."

But

underno

circumstancesas t

willing

o

give

ranfinal

ay

ver

how

much

il

to

produce,

hen o

produce

t,

nd

where

o

sell

t.

f

Iranhad this

ower,

t

could nfluence orld

rices

nd even

hoose

tokeep ilundergroundor utureenerations,elling nlywhatwas

needed o

buy

ssential

oods.

A

Foreign

ffice

memo tated

luntly:

"Whateverew

rrangements

e arrive

t,

they

hould e such hat

we

keep

ffective

ontrol

f

he ssets. . . We can be flexiblen

prof-

its,

dministration,

r

partnership,

utnot

n

the

ssue

of

control"

(PO

377/Persia

951/91470).

imilarly,

he

Ministry

f

Fuelwarned

theU. S.

State

Department:

Musaddiq

ould

e

content

o

eethe

ndustry

unning

t

low evel ith-

out oreignanagement.his aisesproblem:heecurityf he ree orld

is

dependent

n

arge uantities

f ilfrom

iddle astern

ources.

f

he

attituden ran

preads

o

SaudiArabia r

raq,

he

whole tructure

ay

break

own

long

with

ur

bility

o

defend

urselves.he

danger

f

buy-

ing

il

produced

na

reducedcale

as,

herefore,

otentialities

ith

an-

gerous

epercussions.

FO

372/Persia

951/98608.)

"Control"s the

recurring

heme n

Foreign

ffice

memos,

ven

though

heterm

arely

ppeared

n

publicpronouncements.

t

ap-

peared o rarelyhat heAmericansnteredhefrayhinkinghey

could

broker

more

equitable"

oncession.

ikewise,

any

istori-

ans of

the

crisis

ave

fallen nto

he

trap

f

thinking

compromise

could

havebeen

reached

f

one

side,

namely

Mossadeq,

ad been


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

9/35

THE COUP

IN

IRAN

189

more

forthcoming.2

ut the British

overnment

ever

fell nto this

trap.

t

realized

from

he

very

beginning

that thiswas a zero-sum

struggle.

ither ran obtained

control;

r

it

did not.

Mossadeq

knew

the same.

Shepherd

rivately

dmitted ritain ould

ccept

ven

60/40

deal

so

ong

s it retained ontrol"

R)37i/Persia 1951/91606).

He added:

"It seems

very

nlikely

e can do

anything

t all to meet him. . . We

must

keep

effectiveontrol.We have

explored

number

fdevices

y

whichwe coulddisguise hishardfact utfoundnothing hatwas not

either oo

dangerous

or too

transparent

or ven

the Persians o

ac-

cept"

FO

37i/Persia

1951/19606).

The

Treasuiy

Department

ecom-

mended

concessions n

peripheral

matters ut firmness f the

vital

issue

of "control":

Throughout

he crisis he PersianPrimeMinister

has been

absolutely

onsistent. here can be

no doubt

whatsoever

about hisfundamental

bjective.

.. He is firstnd foremost

Nation-

alist"

FO37i/Persia

1951/91606).

The

Foreign

Office

pelled

out the

core issue

n

thesewords

o the State

Department:

Thefirstffect

fnationalization

ould e

to

put

ontrol

nto

ersian

ands.

Seen

from heUnited

Kingdom oint

fview he

present roblem

asnot

solely

ne

ofthefate

f

major

sset.

t concerns

he

major

ssetwhichwe

hold

n

the

ield fraw

materials.ontrol

fthat sset

s of

upreme

mpor-

tance.

he

point

has

already

een madeof

the

mportance

fthat sset

o

our balance

of

payments

nd

to

our

rearmament

rogramme,

ut

n

the

sphere

fbilateral

egotiations

he

ossof

this,

ur

only

major

awmate-

rial,

would

ave umulativend

well-nigh

ncalculable

epercussions.

ore-

over,

t s false o

assume n

dentity

f nterests

etween heWestern

orld

and Persia ver owmuch ilshould eproducednd towhomtwould e

sold

nd

on what erms.

he Persians

ould

get

ll the

oil and

foreign

x-

change

hey

eed

frommuch educed

perations.

or ll these easons he

United

ingdom

asto

keep

ontrol f he

ealresources

nvolved.

inally,

there

s

the

onsideration

hat

arliamentary

nd

public eeling

n

England

would ot

readilyccept

position

herewe urrender

ffectiveontrol

f

an asset

f uch

magnitude.

FO

377/Persia

951/91471.)

The third

onclusion

the British rew

was thatthe crisis ould

end onlywith he removal fMossadeq from he scene. In thevery

firstweek

Mossadeq

was

elected

premier,

he British

government

2

The main works

re:

Elwell-Sutton, 955;

Lytle,

1987;

Bill and

Louis,

1988;

Elm, 1992;

Bamberg,

1994;

Farmanfarmaian, 997;

and

Heiss,

1997.


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

10/35

190

SCIENCE f SOCIETY

claimed hat e was

merely

iding

"temporary

ave"

nd that on-

cessions ould

nly

buttress"im

FO

248/Persia

951/38229)

The

Foreign

Minister

ssured ean

Acheson,

ruman's

ecretary

f

tate,

that

Mossadeq

wouldnot

ast

ong,

hat

weakening

im

would

not

risk

communist

akeover,

ndthat "bad

greement

ould

e worse

than

no

agreement"

FO

372/Persia

951/38229).

Ann

Lambton deanof

Persian tudies

n

England

nd former

press

ttach n

Teheran

spoke

tronglygainst

ettlement

nd

insteadecommendedhe ystematicundermining"fMossadeqFO

377/Persia

951/91609).

he

Foreign

ffice

eported

hat he

re-

peated

her

mphatic

no"to

the

uestion

whether e should

om-

promise."

he

nsisted

ossadeq

would

all

f

we

kept teady

erves,"

and

recommended

hat heAmericanshouldbe

persuaded

hat

settlement

as

mpossible.

he added

Americans

ad neither he

"experience"

or

he

psychologicalnsight"

ounderstandran. imi-

larly,

hepherd uggested

egotiations

hould

simmer"

or s

long

as

possible

ntil new

government

ppeared

n

Teheran

FO

371/

Persia 951/91606):Wecould eave heproposalsn thetable or

another

overnment

o

pick

p.

Wecould

promptly

ithdrawhe

taff

from

badan nd oil fields.

. . Thiswouldmean

his

downfall.he

Embassy

iew s that he

nlyway

o make

rogress

s to administer

severe hock

nd to muster firm

ront o

Mussadiq's egative

nd

feminine

actics"

FO

377/Persia

951/91580).

This ummed

p

British

olicy

oward

Mossadeq

with ome

improvizations.

t

first,

he

British

xpectedMossadeq

o

collapse

f

his

wn

ccord;

fter

ll,

recent dministrations

n

Teheran ad

typi-

callyasted nly enmonths.When his xpectationid notmateri-

alize,

hey ctivelyrged

he

hah,

he

majlis,

nd

the enate o re-

move

him.When

hese,

n

turn,

ailed,

hey

ried o

destabilize

im

-

through

conomic

ressures,

ropaganda

ampaigns,

nd

subsi-

dies

to the

opposition. inally,

hey

urned

o the

United tates nd

harnessed heCIA.

While

waiting ossadeq's

emise,

heBritish

nsisted ithmuch

fanfare

hey

weremore han

willing

o

accept

reasonable

ompro-

mise."

ut,

n

fact,

hey

ere

negotiating

n

bad

faith

hroughout

he

crisis: eginning ith heHarrimanMissionnJuly 951 Truman

sent

Averell arriman

s his

pecial

epresentative

o

broker

deal);

continuing

ith

he tokes

Missionn

August

Sir

Richard

tokes,

he

Lord

Privy

eal,

was

ent o

Teheran o

negotiate

n behalf fboth


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

11/35

THE

COUP

IN IRAN 191

AIOC and theLabour

overnment)continuing

urther

ith

he

dis-

cussions

n the

UN,

the

Hague,

nd

Washington

n

the

autumn

f

1951;

nd

ending

withmore iscussions

t the tate

epartment

nd

theWorld ank

n

1953.

Thosewho ook ritish

ress

eleases t

face

valuebelieved

he

negotiations

ailed ecause

of

ranian ntransi-

gence.

n

fact,

herecentNew

York imes over rticle

n

the

CIA

report

epeats

erbatim ilber's laim

hat hese

negotiations

ol-

lapsed

ntirely

ecause

f

Mossadeq April

6,

2000).

Confidentialritish emos, owever,eveal differenticture.

Stokes old he

Cabinet hat he

principle

fnationalizationould

be

accepted"

after

ll,

hisLabour

overnment

ad

ust

nationalized

series

f ndustries

n

England.

uthe stressedhat

n

"this

articular

case

it could

not be

genuine

nd

practical"

FO

377/Persia

951/

91596).

He addedthat

ritain

hould

ublicly

ccept

nationalization

but

nsist n

clauses

etaining

IOC control.

n

private

e admitted

he would

ccept

he

flavorr facade

fnationalization

hile etain-

ing

he

ubstance

f ontrol"

FO

371

Persia

951/91471).

uring

he

Harrimanalks,heBritishriedofudgehe ssue y oncedingau-

thority"

ii57i/Persia

951/1772).

uring

he

Washington

alks,

he

Foreign

ffice

ut

orward

roposals

t

knew he ther

idewould

eject

in

order

o

sabotage

"highly

mbarrassing"

ettlement

FO

377/Per-

sia

1951/91603).

ikewise,

he

Ministry

fFuel tated:

IfDr.

Musaddiq

esigns

r s

replaced,

t

s

ust ossible

hat e

hall e

able

to

get

way

rom

utright

ationalization

ndwork

ut

omething

ore

n

the

ines f

partnership.

twould

ertainly

e

dangerous

o

ffer

reater

real ontrolf iloperationsnPersia. lthoughomethingighte done

to

put

more f

facade

n the

etup,

e

must ot

orget

hat he ersians

are

not o far

wrong

hen

hey

ay

hat ur

proposals

re,

n

fact,

merely

dressingp

AIOC ontrol

nother

lothing.

FO

37i/Persia

951/91587.)

While

ragging

ut

the

negotiations,

he

Britishobbied

ggres-

sively

n

theUnited

tates.

hisdid not

require

much ffort

ith

he

oil

companies.

hese

companies

may

havefavored

he

50/50

prin-

ciple,

ut

certainly

bhorred

he

notion

f nationalization.

arly

n

thecrisis heBritishmbassadornWashingtoneportedhat he

American

ompanies

ere

oncernedbout

probable

epercussions

in

their

reas,

ncluding

atinAmerica

nd

Indonesia":

In these

circumstances,

heir

hinking

as

been

more n

the ines four

own


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

12/35

192

SCIENCE f SOCIETY

basic

ontention,.e.,

hat t s

necessary

or heUK to

maintainon-

trol"

FO

57i/Persia

951/91470).

he Ministeror uel

noted hat

Royal

utch hellwas s concerned

bout

he issue f control"

s

AIOC,

nd that

tandard

il of

New

ersey

nd

Socony

acuumwere

"doing

heir est o convince heState

Department

hat

f

national-

ization

ays

ff

n

Persia t

wouldhavedisastrous

ffectsn

their

concessions." e assuredAIOC that

he

"big

American

ompanies

do not

ee it

n

their nterestso

come to an

agreement

ith

ran"

(FO37i/Persia 951/91610).

The

British

epresentative

tthe

UN

reported

hat

arriman,

ven

before is

Teheran

mission,

adbeen

persuaded y

American

ompa-

nies that

oo

many

oncessions ouldbe

dangerous

o "other il

producing

ountries"

FO

377/Persia

951/91610).

n his return

Harriman

ssured heBritishhat an

agreement

ith

Musaddiq

was

not

possible,"

nd thetwo

owers

eeded

to work

ogether

o

bring

about

"change

f

government"

n

Teheran

FO

577/Persia

951/

91472/91591

n

high-level

iscussionsetweenhe

oreign

fficend

the tate epartment,he attereassuredhe ormerhatheyndorsed

their

olicy

f

maintaining

ontrol"

FO

577/Persia

951/91471).

n

follow-up

iscussions,

he wo oncluded

hat he situation

n

ranwas

becoming

ncreasingly

erious";

hat

Mossadeq

wouldnot

relinquish

"control";

hat

is

government

as

essentially

bad

government";

nd

that he

hah hould

e

"encouraged

o

replace

im

with

general."

The

meeting

et

up

a

oint

exploratoryroup

o

"appraise"

he

mili-

tary

ituationnd he

question

f he

oyalty

f he

enerals

o

he hah"

(/37i/Persia

952/98608).

his

meeting

asheld

n

February

952,

elevenmonthsefore isenhowereplaced ruman ut hreemonths

after

hurchill

upplanted

heLabour

overnment.

The

British

lso

waged

propaganda

ampaign. hey equested

theBBC

to

double ts

ersian-language

rograms,

nd

requested

he

replacement

f ts

uncooperative

eporter

n

Teheranwith

special

permanent

orrespondent,

ho,

nder

no

circumstances,

as o be

Professor

. P.

Elwell-Sutton,

former

ress

ttach

ow

perceived

as

being

ro-Iranian

FO 37J/Persia

951/91584/91536).

The Brit-

3 Throughoutthe 1950s,the

Foreign

Office

persuaded

the Iranian

government

o

keep

Professor

lwell-Sutton

ut of ran on the

grounds

he was

"anti-British,

nti-colonial,

nd

anti-Shah"

F.O.

577/Persia

1957/127074).

Soon

after he

coup,

Elwell-Sutton rotePer-

sian

Oil,

a

rare book in

that t

was

sympathetic

o

Mossadeq.

No

university

or commer-

cial

press

n

England

would touch t. t

was

published by

Lawrence and

Wishart.


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

13/35

THE COUP IN IRAN

193

ish lso

planted

rticles

n

major

Britishnd American

ewspapers.

Characteristically,

he Observer

rofiled ossadeq

s

a

"Robespierre

fanatic"

nd a

"tragic

rankenstein"ith

"gigantic

ead"

mpervi-

ous to "common

ense"but "obsessedwith ne

xenophobic

dea"

(May

10,

1951).

Time

escribe

im

s a "timid"manwhocouldbe-

come

dangerously

brave" hen

emotionally

roused"

y

his mar-

tyrdomomplex"

August

2,

1951).

A handwritten

ote nthe

oreign

ffice entions

n

passing

hat

theTeheran mbassyas endingo thepress ttachnWashington

"a

steadyupply

f uitable

oison

oovenomous

or

he

BBC."

t dded

that

Washington

as

making

ood

useof

his

oison"

FO

248/Persia

1951/

528)

4Drew earson

thevenerable ean ofAmerican

our-

nalism

claimed

alsely

n the

Washington

ost hatHossein

atemi,

Iran's

Foreign

Minister,

ad

been convicted

everal imes or

misap-

propriation

f

funds nd court

ampering.

o

Americans

ant,

e

asked

rhetorically,

uch a crook

to continue

masterminding

he

whole

Middle ast

ilcrisis?":

This

man

will

ventually

ecidewhether

we haveoilrationing orpossibly,hether egointoWorldWar

III"

(July

1,

1951).

The

press

ttach

n

Washington

as

empted

o

"horrify"

he

public

y preading

he umor

hat

Mossadeq

indulged

freely

n

opium"

FO

248/Persm

951/1527).

British

fficials

ssured

thers,

s well

s

themselves,

hat he

National

ront

as

nothing

ut

noisy

unch

f

malcontents";

hat

Mossadeq

a

"wily

riental"

was

"wild,"

erratic,"

eccentric,"

"crazy,"

gangster-like,"

fanatical,"

absurd,"

dictatorial,"

dema-

gogic,"

inflammatory,"

nd

"single-mindedly

bstinate";

nd that

Iranians ere ynaturechild-like,"tiresomendheadstrong,"un-

willing

o

accept

acts,"

volatile

nd

unstable,"

sentimentallyysti-

cal,"

unprepared

o

isten o

reason

ndcommon

ense,"

nd

swayed

by

motions

evoid

f

positive

ontent"

FO37//Persia

951/98593/

1772/1527)

In a

printed

ocument

ntitled

A

Comparison

etween

Persian

nd Asian

Nationalism

n

General,"

hepherd

nformed

e-

nior

fficials

n

the

ther

ministries

hat

ranian ationalism

as

not

"authentic"

nd

desperately

eeded

"guiding

and":

the alvation

of

Persiawould

e

a

twenty

ear

ccupation

y foreign

ower

rather

liketheoccupationfHaitiby heUnited tates)" FO371 Persia

4 For an

excellent

nalysis

f how the

American

media

portrayed

Mossadeq,

see W. Dormn

and

M.

Farhang,

1987.


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

14/35

1

4

SCIENCEf SOCIETY

1951/91464).

He added that

Mossadeq

was

"cunning," "slippery,"

"completely unscrupulous,"

"short with

bandy legs,"

"looks like a cab

horse,"

"diffuses

slight

reek

of

opium,"

and is

"clearly

unbalanced"

since he shuns

the title

Excellency,

refuses o use the ministerialmotor

car, and,

as final

clincher,

has a

"daughter

n

a mental home

in

Switzer-

land"

(FO

377/Persia

1951/91459)

. Another

printed

memo fromthe

British

Embassy

in

Teheran theorized:

Most ranians re introverts.heir maginationsstrongnd they aturally

turn o

the

agreeable

side of

things they

ove

poetry

nd

discussion,

ar-

ticularly

f

bstractdeas. Their

emotions re

strong

nd

easily

roused.

But

they ontinually

ailto test heir

maginations gainstreality

nd

to subor-

dinate

their motions o

reason.

They

ack common ense and the

ability

o

differentiate

motion from

acts.Their well-known

mendacity

s rather

carelessness o the

truth han a

deliberate hoice

of

falsehood.

This excess

of

magination

nd distaste or acts

eads

to an

inability

o

go

conscientiously

into detail.

Often,

not

finding

he worldto their

dreams,

hey

elapse

nto

indolence

and do not

persevere.

his

tendency

s

exaggerated y

the fatal-

ism of theirreligion.Theyare intenselyndividualistic, orein the sense

of

pursuing

heir

personal

nterest han

n

the noble one of

wishing

o do

things

n

their wn

without

elp. Nearly

ll

classes have a

passion

for

per-

sonal

gain

and are

ready

o do

most

hings

or

money.They

ack social con-

science nd are

unreadv

o

subordinate

ersonal

nterests

o communal nes.

They

re

vain nd

conceited,

nd

unwilling

o admit o

themselves hat

hey

can be

in

the

wrong. hey

re

always eady

o

blame other

people.

(FO

371/

Persia

1951/91460.)

Theseracial iatribeshouldnotbemistakens therealreason

for he

breakdown

n

negotiations,

s some

n

cultural

tudies ould

have t.

They

were

merely

he

reflection or the

ide

product

of

that

reakdown.

he root

easonwas he

Britishealization

hey

ad

fundamental

onflicts ith

ran

ver ontrol.

n

other

words,

he

m-

passe

amenot

because f

racial

rejudices

ut

because fthe

lash

of

economic

nterests

etween

mperialism

nd

nationalism.

While

waiting

ossadeq's

all,

he

British

ncreased conomic

pressures

n Iran.

They

roze ran's

terling

ssets n

London.

They

forbadehe xport foilequipmento ran.Theyobbied nWash-

ington

gainst

id to ran

especially

gainst

$25

millionoanfrom

the

Export-Import

ank.

They

persuaded

AIOC

employees

ot to

work

or

ran;

to

make

ure ll

resigned

hey

nformed

hem heir


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

15/35

THE

COUP

IN IRAN

195

salaries ould

ot

be convertible

nto

terling.

espite

he

oss f his

personnel,

ran

managed

o

keep

theAbadan

efinery

nd

themain

oil wells

unning.

he British

lso

persuaded

thers

ot

to

buy

his

oil,

threatenedo

sue

any

who

did,

nd

intercepted

hefew

ankers

that

ried

o

break

he

mbargo.

his

mbargo

as

asy

o

mplement

since he ast

majority

f heworld's ankers

eife

wned

y

he

major

oil

companies.5

ran, hus,

ad tosurvive

n

an "oil-less

conomy."

t

froze

evelopmentrojects;

orrowed

oney;

ut

government

ala-

ries; ndprinted apermoneyomeetmmediatexpenses.

The

struggle

etween

ritainnd ran

eached

n

mpasse y

mid-

1952.

For,

espite

ll

of

the

pressures,

ritain

ad

failed

o

engineer

Mossadeq's

ismissal,

ainly

ecause he

majlis

eputies,

s

well

s

the

senators

nd the

hah,

were

earfulf

openly

ntagonizing

he

public.

The British

made one more

ttempt

n

July

$52.

Seconded

by

he

United

tates,

hey rged

he hah nd their

upporters

n

thetwo

houses

f

parliament

o offer

he

premiership

o Ahmad

Qavam,

veteran

olitician,

ho,

or

years,

ad

opposelMossadeq's

oreign

policy.

The whole

cheme,

owever,

uickly

urned

nto

bloody

iasco

known s

Siyeh-e

ir

July

1).

Appealing

o

tjhe

ublic,

Mossadeq

charged

hat

heoil

industry

asabout to

bet

andedback

to the

Britishnd that

he hah

was

nterfering

n

politics

hrough

isma-

nipulation

f the

rmed

orces.

iting

he

constitution,

e

argued

that he

monarch

hould

eign

ot

rule,

nd

thjat

he

premier

hould

have he

power

o

appoint

he hiefs f

taffs well s

thewarminis-

ter.

arge

rowds,

irst

rom he

National

ront:

nd then

ventually

from he ommunistudehParty,ame nto he treets,lashedwith

the

rmy,

nd

afterhree

ays

f

bloodshed,

orced

he

hahnot

nly

to recall

Mossadeq

ut

lso to

give

him he

wa|r

ministryortfolio.

A

day

fter

he

crisis,

he

British

harge

D'Affaires

omplained

that he

hahhad

"lost erve"

ven

hough

he

rmy

ad

kept

disci-

pline"

nd the

casualties

ad

been fewer

han

0

dead

and

200

n

jured

FO

371

Persia

952/98602).

ut wo

aiys

ater,

he ame

dip-

lomat dmitted

hat he

disorders

n the

provinces

ere

muchmore

severe

hanwe

suspected,"

hat rowds

ad

taken

ver

sfahan,

nd

5

In 1951 heworld

ad 1500

ankers:95

were

American,J4

Norwegian,

nd

155Pana-

manian

almost ll

owned

y

he

big

oil

companies.

nly

10

were

wned

y

he oviets

and the

East

Europeans

F.O.

377/Persia

951/

1597).


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

16/35

1 6

SCIENCE &

SOCIETY

that hedead there

lone

reached

00

K)577/Persia

952/98602).

He

stressedhat

"coup

s now

necessary

ince

Musaddiq'smegalo-

mania s now

erging

n

mental

nstability

nd he hastobe humored

like

fractious

hild."He

furthertressedhat

oy

Henderson,

he

American

mbassador,

ow

oncurredhat

only coup

d'etat" ould

save

he ituation:

Musaddiq

as

so

flattered

hemob s the ource

ofhis

power

hat e

has,

fear,

made t

mpossible

or successoro

oust

him

by

normal

onstitutionalethods"

FO

37i/Persia 952/

98602).Until hen,Henderson,ikemuch ftheTruman dminis-

tration,

ad

favored

sing

conomic

pressures

nd constitutional

means

o remove

Mossadeq.

The

day

fter

he

uly

1,

1952

bloodshed,

he

British

arOffice

telegraphed

ts

military

ttach

n

Teheranwith he

following

rgent

inquiries:

hemood n

the rmed

orces;

heir

oyalty

n

the vent

f

"sharp

lash etweenhe

hah nd

Government";

heir

bility

o

carry

out

coup

d'etat;

ndtheir

ossible

oup

eaders

FO

371

Persia 952/

98602).

The

military

ttach ho

arlier ad

reported

hat niforms

were ounpopularhey erepat n nthe treetsfTeheran,romptly

replied

with

our

prospectiveoup

leaders

including

General

Fazlullah

ahedi.He noted

with elief hat

Mossadeq's

olicy

fcur-

tailing

ilitary

nfluence

nd

retiring

36 enior fficersad

lienated

the

op

brass

FO

377/Persia

952/98638).

He also

emphasized

hat he

coup

would ave o

be

in

the

name

oftheShah."

Those

familiar ith he

reports

f

the

military

ttach

did

notneed

further

laboration. ver ince

scending

he

throne,

the

hahhad

cultivated

he rmed orces

meticulously

much

s

hisfather addone. He hadtaken ersonalnterestnallmatters

military,

ncluding

nspections,

niforms,

arracks,

nd

maneuvers;

lobbied

ormore

military

xpenditures

nd modern

rms;

ealously

guarded

enior

ppointments

othewar

ministry,eneral

taff,

rmy,

gendarmerie,

olice,

nd

militaryntelligence;

nd,

most

mportant

of

all,

had

personally

etted

romotions

bove

the

rank

f

major,

especially

n

the

armored ank

rigades.

bviously,

uch

brigades

would

be

critical

n

any

oup attempt

either

gainst

r for

him.

The

American

mbassy

oted

hat fter he

July

952

bloodbath

he

Shahcontinued ohave hepersonalloyalty"fmany fficersven

though

e

had

ost he

power

o make

enior

ppointments

nd

no

longer

eceived

eekly

eports

rom he

hiefs

f

taff,

olice, endar-

merie,

nd

military

ntelligence

FO

377/Persia

953/104601).


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THE

COUP

IN

IRAN

197

Preparations

or

he

Coup

British

opes

or

coup

received

major

oostwith

isenhower's

election

n

November

952.

The new

dministration,

nlike ts

pre-

decessor,

howed o

compunction

n

overthrowing

overnments,

or

in

being

dentified ith he

oil

companies.

t also

began

with ome

personal

amiliarity

ith

he

risis ince

both

ohn

oster

ulles,

he

Secretary

f

State,

nd

his

brother

llen

Dulles,

irector f he

CIA,

wereong-timeartnersna lawfirmepresentingheAIOCin the

United

tates

Domi,

2000,

581).

Threeweeks fter

iselection nd fiveweeks

efore is

naugu-

ration,

isenhower

etwith

nthony

den,

Churchill's

oreign

ec-

retary,

o discuss he

Persian

uestion."

week

ater,

MI6

pursued

the

ame

question

n

Londonwith

ermit

oosevelt,

heCIA chief

for heMiddle ast.

oon after is

nauguration,

isenhower

nvited

Eden to theWhiteHouse

to "findmore

maginative

ays"

f

olving

the

problem

Ruehsen,

993,

74).

According

o theWilber

ocu-

ment,his ave heCIA and MI6 a greenightowage justwar." he

British

amewith

blueprint

amed

Operation

oot;

heAmericans

camewith

project

tarted

n

1948

gainst

heTudehnamed

edamn;

thetwo

lans

were onsolidatednd

expanded

nto

TRAJAX.

hey

set

p headquarters

irst

n

London,

hen

n

Cyprus

ith

ts

ood

om-

munication

inks o

England

nd Iran.

The final

lans

were

igned

by

Churchill

n

July

,

nd

by

Eisenhower

n

July

1.

Roosevelt,

ith

no

knowledge

fPersian

nd

ittle f

ran,

was

ppointed

field om-

mander";

e could travel

n

Iran without

eingrecognized;

s an

Americanehadeasy ccess o theU. S. embassy;nd asgrandson

of

Theodore

Roosevelt

nd

nephew

f

Franklin oosevelt e would

be listened

o

by

he hah s thevoice

oftheAmerican

resident.

The

British

rought

aluable ontributions

othewhole

enture.

First,

hey

ad

experienced

ran

hands.

hese ncluded ane

Payman,

thereclusive

iplomat

n

charge

fthe

randesk t the

Foreign

f-

fice ince he

ate

1930s.

n

1952

the hah

complained

hat

ayman

had

personally

ngineered

isfather's

941

bdication.

therswere

Norman

arbyshire,

n old

MI6

hand

luentn

Persian,

hohad

been

stationedn ran ormuch fWorldWar I;ColonelGeoffreyheeler

whohad

been

n

and out

of ran ince he

1920s

nd

had

served

s

themain

nterpreter

or herecent il

negotiations;

obin

Zaehner,

the

press

ttach

nd

expert

n

Islamic

mysticism

ho ater

ecame


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

18/35

198 SCIENCE f

SOCIETY

the

Oxford rofessor

f

Eastern

eligion

nd

Ethics; nd,

of

course,

Professorambton

n

Londonwho ontinuedo nsist

hat

Mossadeq

must e

overthrown.

oodehouse,

he

MI6chief

n

Teheran,

asnot

an Iran

xpert

ut

had

much

loak-and-dagger

xperience

rom he

GreekCivilWar.

Second,

he

British ad an informal etwork ithin he

rmed

forces.

ating

rom he

war,

his

etwork

asformed f onservative

officers

ostly

rom ristocraticamilies: eneral assan

Arfa,

riga-

dierTeimour akhtiyar,olonelHedayatollahilanshah,nd,most

important

f

ll,

ColonelHassan

Akhavi,

ho or

ears

adbeen hief

of

militaryntelligence.

his

network

mostly hrough

olonel

Akhavi

promoted

ts

wn

members,

idelinedeftistsrom ensi-

tive

osts,

nd

kept

heBritishnformedbout

military

atters,

ar-

ticularly

bout he

politicaleanings

ffellow fficers.

hus

the

MI6

had

compiled

n

impressive ilitary

Who's

Who,"

omethingorely

missed tthe

CIA.

According

o

Wilber,

uch

f

he

MI6-CIA

repa-

rations

n

London

nvolved

tudying

hese

ersonality

eports.

he

oneclear essonWilber rew romhewhole xperience asthatf

theCIA was o

pull

off

uch

oups

lsewhere,

t had to first

ompile

its wn

militaryiographies.

n

hisown

words,

t had to

collect

e-

tailed

ersonal

nformation,

however

rivial,"

o know

xactly

who

theofficer

s,

whatmakes

im

ick,

hohisfriends

re,

tc."

Third,

he

British ad "friends"

n

high

laces:

rnst

erron,

he

Shah's

hildhood riendrom

witzerland

Perron

ived

ermanently

in

the

royal alace);

Soleiman

ehbudi,

he

hief

fcourt

rotocol;

ShapourReporter,

Zoroastrianrom

elhi whoworked

n

Tehe-

ran sCounselorothe ndian mbassy,sspecial orrespondento

theLondon

Times,

nd as

English

utor

o

Queen

Soraya

soon

fter

the

coup

he

was

knighted);

yatollah

ohammad

ehbahani,

he

son ofa

famous leric

whohad led the

1905

Revolution;nd,

most

visible f

ll,

ayyidiya

abatabai,

he

headof he

penly

ro-British

National

Will

Party. ayyid iya

had started is

career s

an

Anglo-

phile ournalist

n

1919,

participated

n

the

1921

coup,

nd

served

briefly

s

prime

minister

efore

eing

xiled

by

Reza Shah.

Since

1941,

is

andidacy

othe

premiership

ften

adbeen

pushed

y

he

Britishmbassy,ut had beenblocked y he hahwhofeared is

ambitions.

y

1953,

owever,

he

hahhad

weekly eetings

ith

im

-

mainly

o

soundout

his

pro-British

iews.


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

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THE

COUP

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IRAN

199

Fourth,

heBritish ad

contacts

n lessvisible ut

equally

ital

positions.

hese ncluded

ome hiefs f

he

Bakhtiyari,

oir

Ahmadi,

Zolfoghari,

hamseh,

Moqaddam,

nd

Arab

ribes

the

Bakhtiyaris

alone could

mobilize ver

10,000

rmed

men).

These

contactslso

included

he

editors f

at

east hree ociferous

ewspapers

Dad

(Justice)

Atesh

Fire)

andForman

Order)

ami he hree ashidian

brothers

ho

mported

ritish

oods

nd

financed

he

NationalWill

Party

the

British

mbassy raised

hem

s

"loy&P

nd "true riends"

whokept keen eye or businesshance") FO371 Persia 955/

114811).

The Rashidians hemselves

ad

useful

ontacts

n

theba-

zaar:with ha'ban

Jafari,

icknamed ha'ban

Bimokh

Brainless),

the

most

angerous ang

eader;

with

uild

lders

mong

utchers,

bakers,

onfectioners,

nd

sugar

oaf-makers;

nd withmiddle-

ranking

lerics ssociated

with

heconservative

ojahedin-e

slam

and

the terroristic

edayyan-e

slam

FO

24S/Persia

952/38572).

Woodhouse

stimates

hat he

Rashidians

unrteled

very

month t

least

0,000

ounds

terling

o

these

lerics,

oliticians,

nd

newspa-

pereditors.

Finally,

he

British

ad been

approached

y

General

Zahedi,

Mossadeq's

irstnterior

inister,

s

early

s

October

951.Zahedi

presented

imself

s thebest

oup

candidate

y

boasting large

ol-

lowing

n

the

military.

lthough

his

roved

ollow,

e did have

few

militaryupporters,

ome

of

whom,

ike

himself,

ad been

n-

terned

uring

he

war

or

aving

inks oNazi

Germany.

e also

had

adherents

mong

he

Retired

fficers

ssociation,

ost

f

whose

members

ad been

recently

urged.

Zahedi'smain trength,owever,aynthereligious ing f he

National

ront:

yatollah

bul-Qassem

ashani,

he

eading

leric

in the

nationalist

ovement

Kashani

nd Zahedi

hadbeen

nterned

inthe ame

British

amp

uring

he

war)

Seyyid

hamseddin

onata-

badi,

headof

he

Mojahedin-e

slam;

nd

three ocal

eputies,

uzaf-

far

aqai,

Hossein

Makki,

nd

Abul-Hassan

aerizadeh.

n

1952,

he

relationship

etween

he

ecular nd

religious

vings

ftheNational

Front ad

strained

ver

host f

ensitive

ssues:

he

nterpretation

of

Quranic

aws,

women's

uffrage,

azaar

taxes,

ale

of alcoholic

beverages,ndappointmentsohigh ffices,speciallyotheminis-

tries f

ustice

ndeducation.

he British

mbassy,

hus,

ept

n

touch

with hese

nlikelyigures

hrough

ahedi

s well

s

Sayyid iya

nd


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

20/35

200

SCIENCE

&

SOCIETY

theRashidians

FO

248/Persm

951/1528;O37i/Persia

952/98602-

98603).

These ties ed

Zaehner o

equate

ran

to

Alice

hrough

he

Looking

lass

Woodehouse,

982,

114).

He could havenoted hat

the

British ad

found hemselves

trange

ed-fellows.

n

May

1952,

Zaehner

eported:6

The nterview

ndedwithn

mpassioned

efense

y

erron

f

he hah's

"astute"

olicy.

eclaimedhat

he

hah ad

ucceeded

n

detaching

ashani,

MakkindBaqai rom usaddiqnd hat hanksothe hah heNationalFront ad

practically

eased oexist. didnot

ispute

his utwould

ut

onrecordhat he

etaching

fKashani

nd

Makki

as ue o

uite

ther

factors,

ndthat hese actors

ere reatednddirected

y

he rothers

Rashidian.

FO

2^/Persia

952/38572.)

The

Americans,

eanwhile,

rought

othe

oupplans

heir wn

assets

themost

mportanteing

he

mbassyompound.

he em-

bassy

ecame rucial fter

ctober

952

when

Mossadeq,

iting

rit-

ish

nterference

n

ran,

roke

iplomatic

elations ith ondon. he

Foreign ffice alculated hat ersonnelwith iplomatictatusn

theU. S.

embassy

umbered

9,

compared

o

21

in

the

Soviet,

in

the

French,

nd

21

in

tsown

mbassy

efore he

diplomatic

reak

(FO

37i/Persia

952/98606).

he

compound bviously

ontained

CIA

officials ith he

usual overs s

cultural,

ress,

abor,

nd

com-

mercial

ttachs. he

Americanslso had

123

military

dvisers s-

signed

o

the ranian

rmy

nd

gendermerie

FO

377/Persia 952/

98638).

These

missions,

oth

tarted

n

1942,

were

ed

by

General

Robert

McClure,

n

expert

n

"psychological

arfare" ho

had re-

centlyeenrushed o ranfrom orea.These dvisers erendaily

contact ith

ield

fficers,

specially

ank

ommanders.ince

1946,

the

Pentagon

ad been

sending steady

tream f

tanks o ran.

n

1952

lone,

t

delivered

2

Shermans,

nd took o

America or rain-

ing

s

many

s

300 officers

FO

377/Persia

953/104572).

he

em-

bassy

was

happy

o

report

n

1952

that

venofficers

andpicked

y

the

Mossadeq

dministration

roved

amiable o

American

dvisers"

(FO

377/Persia

952/9859)

In

preparing

or he

oup,

McClure

nd

his

olleagues

ounded ut

key

fficers even

Brigadier

aqi Riyahi,

Mossadeq's rustedhief f taffNejati, 986, 71).

6 R.

Zaehner,

Meeting

ith

erron,

.O.

24S/Persia

952/38572.


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

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THE

COUP

IN IRAN

201

The CIA's main ran

expert

wasWilber.Often escribed s a

"gentleman

py,"

e

was,

n

fact,

professional

ecret

ervice

fficer

who

had

traveled

n

and

out

of he

Middle ast ince he1930s nder

various

isguises archaeologist,

rt

historian,

nd

expert

n

forged

manuscripts.

is

previous

uccess ad been

theneareliminationf

the

famous ersian

oet

Lahuti

iving

n

Moscow.Wilber

ad

forged

his

memoirs"nd

published

hem,

laiming

hey

ad

been

muggled

outof

Russia. ahuti ad been

ucky

o survivetalin's

aranoia.

The CIAalso had a young perativenTeheran amedRichard

Cottam.

Fulbright

ellownd

ater

rofessor

f

political

cience t

the

University

f

Pittsburgh,

ottam ollected

nformationot

only

on the

Tudeh

-

which

e

generously

haredwith heBritish

m-

bassy

but lsoon

Baqai's

Toilers

arty

ndthe

ar

right

rya

Aryan)

Party

ndSUMKA

National

ocialist

orkers

arty

f

ran)

FO

248/

Persia

952/1517)

These

wo

mini-parties

utdid achother

nmim-

icking

he

Nazis,

specially

n

denouncing

ews

nd communists.

Their eaders

ad been

nterned ith

ahedi

during

World

War

I.

Cottamlsowrote rticleshatwere lantednthe ubsidizedews-

papers.

One such

piece

claimed

atemiwas

convicted

mbezzler,

a

well-known

omosexual,

nd

a convert o

Christianity

s well s

Bahaism.

his

would

have arned

him t

east

hree eath

entences

in the

yes

ffundamentalists.

ot

urprisingly,

he

Fedayyan-e

slam

tried

o assassinate

im

FO

377/Persia

953/104566).

he CIAwas

also

nterested

n

finding

n

Mossadeq

ome

form f

Jewishncestry

(Gasiorowski,

987,

84).

The

CIA had

at east our

mportant

ocal

gents:

olonelAbbas

Farzanegan;hsam ankarani,ndthe o-calledBoscoeBrothers."

Colonel

arzanegan,

desk

fficer,

ad

ust

returnedrom

Washing-

tonwhere

e had received

crash

ourse n covert

perations.

om-

missioned

o

theGeneral

taff,

arzanegan

newmost ield fficers

in Teheran.

Lankarani

wasa

Tudeh activist

ith

drugproblem.

Although

ot

n

the

party

eadership,

e came

from

prominent

religious

amily

nd

enjoyed

he

eputation

f

being

daredevil

evo-

lutionary.

n

other

words,

e was

the

perfect gent rovocateur.

he

Boscoes,

named

by

Wilber

imply

s

Keyvani

nd

Jalali,

were

most

probablyarrukh eyvanindAliJalali. heformer as reporter

for

tteWat

nd a

stringer

or he

Daily elegraph

Bozorgmehr,

993,

188, 90,

09).

The

atter as he

ditor-publisher

f

hejournal

ran

Parastan.

hese

twohad

connections

o the

Taj

Sports

lub as

well


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

22/35

202 SCIENCE

&

SOCIETY

as

to

weight

ifters,

utis

thugs),

nd

chaqukeshan

knifewielders)

associated ith

raditionalurkhaneks

houses

f

trength).hey

un-

neled

CIA

funds

ot

nly

nto

heir wn

papers

ut lso

nto

Keyhan,

Mellat-e

ran,

Mellat-e

Ma,

Aram,

etareh-e

slam,

nd

Asiay-e

avanan.

Roosevelt

mentions hat he

CIA had

prompted

heBoscoes

o

at-

tack Tudeh

rally

n the

day

Harrimanrrived

n Teheran

n

July

1951.

Whathe does not

mention

s

that he ttack

esulted

n

heavy

casualtiesnd

was

nstigated

hrough

he ocal Nazis.

Finally,heCIAforgedinkswith hereligiouslementsf the

National

ront.

n

November

951,

he British

harge

D'Affaires

reported

hatKashani

ad

"put

utvarious eelers nd established

contactwith

heU. S.

embassy

s well s theShah"

FO

37i/Persia

1951/91465).

he

Foreign

Office eardfrom ther ources

hat

Baqai's

Toilers

art)

was

receiving

ecret unds rom heAmericans

CFO377/Persia

951/91609).

n

the

week

f he

oup,

heCIAchan-

neled o

much

hrough

he lerics

hat

he erm Behbahani ollars"

gained

urrency,

nd

theblackmarket alueofthedollar ell

y

s

much s thirdLove,1960, 0).

In

preparing

or he

coup,

the

CIA and MI6 worked

losely

o

stiffenhe

hah's

esolve.

hey

ent

op

missarieso

ssure

im

oth

that he

oup

was

feasible nd that wo

owers

ere

ully

ehind

t.

Colonel

Akhavi,

he

formerhief f

military

ntelligence,

ave

him

list

f

key

fficers

illing

o

participate.

rincess

shraf,

isforceful

sister,

eturned ome

from

witzerlandtAllenDulles'

behest,

on-

veying ersonal

messages

rom

ondon nd

Washington.

oosevelt

smuggled

imselfnto

he

alace

number

f

imes o

bring ersonal

assurances rom isenhower.imilarly,rigadier orman chwarz-

kopf,

ho

had

headed

he

American issionothe

endarmerie

rom

1942

until

949,

isited

eheran

n

early ugust

o

repeat

hese ame

assurances.

e also took

he

opportunity

o see

many

fhisformer

trainees,

o

doubt o

make

ure

hey

hrewheir

weight

ehind he

coup.

Although

heBritish

nd

theAmericansscribed

he

hah'shesi-

tation o

his

Hamlet-like"

ersonality,

e had reasons or esitation.

He

wanted ull

ssurances

hat

key

fficers ould

upport

im.

He

alsowanted irmommitmentshat he oupwould e followedp

with

arge-scale

merican

idand

face-saving

il

greement.

n

1949,

aftern

assassination

ttempt

n

him,

e had

carried ut

mini-coup

himself,

evising

he

onstitution,

olsteringoyal

rerogatives,

nd


8/12/2019 1953 Coup in Iran

23/35

THE COUP IN IRAN

203

arresting

uch

f

he

pposition,

nly

ofind he

Americans

ad

held

back n aid andtheBritish

ad

offeredhe

mbarrassingupplemen-

tary greement.

he

TRAJAXlans

ncluded ot

only

romises

f

"adequate

American

id,"

but lsowritten

uarantees

rom heBrit-

ishthat

hey

ould reach n

early

il

agreement

n a

spirit

f

good

will nd

equity."

inally,

he hahwantedssuranceshat ahediwould

not

1953 Coup in Iran

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