The Rising Tide of Maritime Financial Sanctions Risk

Vol. 19, No. 2 • Second Quarter 2021

Joshua S. Force, Editor-in-ChiefRobert J. Zapf, Managing Editor

The Rising Tide of Maritime

Financial Sanctions RiskBy Tahlia Townsend*

The global maritime community—including U.S. and non-U.S. ship owners, management companies, charterers, commodity traders, ships officers, crewing companies, financial institutions, and insurance companies—is facing an unprecedented level of regulatory risk related to U.S. economic sanctions. The surge in risk has three primary sources: (1) increased U.S. sanctions targeting Iran and Venezuela, as well as ongoing sanctions on Cuba, Syria, North Korea, and the Crimea region; (2) increased efforts by U.S. sanctions targets to obtain goods and services notwithstanding the U.S. embargoes; and (3) a robust intention on the part of U.S. government enforcement authorities to crack down on maritime sanctions evasion and to punish those who—whether intentionally or unintentionally— facilitate it. As a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State put it last year, “[t]he maritime industry is the key artery for sanctions evasion globally … [W]e are looking at [a] very broad range of all evasive behavior, whether that is [by] a shipowner or a port operator or a terminal operator or refinery, anybody basically in the supply chain … and holding everybody in that chain responsible.”1

* Tahlia Townsend is co-chair of the International Trade Compliance Practice at Wiggin and Dana LLP. A version of the material discussed in this article was presented to a meeting of the Maritime Law Association of the United States (“MLA”) Marine Insurance & General Average Committee in November 2020.1 Then-U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Peyman speaking at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (March 9, 2020), available at https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Transcript_Peyman_Sanctions_March2020.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021).

Inside This issue

The Rising Tide of Maritime Financial Sanctions Risk

By Tahlia Townsend ............................................73

Managing Editor’s Introductory Note

Robert J. Zapf ......................................................75

Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Seaman Employment Contracts

By Brian McEwing...............................................82

Window on Washington

Home for the HolidaysBryant E. Gardner.................................................86

Recent Developments ..................................90

Table of Cases ..............................................100

Benedict’s Maritime Bulletin Editorial

Board................................................................102

Contributing Authors to this Issue......103

(Continued on page 76)

https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Transcript_Peyman_Sanctions_March2020.pdf



19 Benedict’s Maritime Bulletin

Copyright © 2021 LexisNexis Matthew Bender. LexisNexis, the knowledge burst logo, and Michie are trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., used under license. Matthew Bender is a registered trademark of Matthew Bender Properties.

EDITORIAL BOARDJoshua S. ForceRobert J. ZapfBruce A. King

Dr. James C. KraskaDr. Norman A. Martinez-

GutiérrezFrancis X. Nolan, IIIAnthony J. Pruzinsky

Dr. Frank L. Wiswall, Jr.,Editor Emeritus

RECENTDEVELOPMENTSCONTRIBUTORSAlena A. Eckhardt

Jeffrey A. YarbroughJoni Alexis Poitier

Shea Michael Moser

COLUMNISTBryant E. Gardner

EDITORIAL STAFFJames Codella

Editorial DirectorCathy Seidenberg

Legal Editor

A NOTE ON CITATION:The correct citation form for this publication is:19 BENEDICT’S MAR. BULL. [73] (Second Quarter 2021)

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

From the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations.

Matthew Bender®

Second Quarter 202174

19 Benedict’s Maritime Bulletin Second Quarter 202175

Managing Editor’s Introductory NoteWe begin this edition with an article by Tahlia Townsend on U.S. sanctions laws. She describes the risk of running afoul of these laws arising from three primary sources: (1) increased U.S. sanctions targeting Iran and Venezuela, as well as ongoing sanctions on Cuba, Syria, North Korea, and the Crimea region; (2) increased efforts by U.S. sanctions targets to obtain goods and services notwithstanding the U.S. embargoes; and (3) a robust intention on the part of U.S. government enforcement authorities to crack down on maritime sanctions evasion and to punish those who—whether intentionally or unintentionally— facilitate it. She explains why the maritime community should be paying attention to sanctions risk, and what actions the U.S. government expects maritime actors to take to avoid participating in maritime sanctions evasion. She advises that all actors in the maritime supply chain review the May 2020 joint advisory by the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury and the U.S. Coast Guard entitled “Guidance to Address Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices” and the United Kingdom’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation providing similar guidance, assess the level of sanctions risk across their business activities, and carefully consider implementing controls of the kind identified in the Advisory, as necessary.

We follow with a note by Brian McEwing on the subject of arbitration of seaman personal injury claims based on arbitration clauses contained in employment contracts. In a decision by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Kozur v. F/V Atlantic Bounty, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-cv-08750 slip op., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148633 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2020), appeal docketed (No. 20-2911 3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2020), the court ordered the claim to be arbitrated. An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was taken and the matter is still pending there as of the time of this writing. Brian analyzes the background of the case, the law applied, and other decisions dealing with the same issue. The ultimate decision of the Court of Appeals will undoubtedly have a great impact on other cases on this issue.

Next, in his regular column, Window on Washington, Bryant Gardner discusses how the global pandemic sparked by COVID-19 has placed strains upon U.S. ocean and intermodal supply chains and how it is beginning to show. Dislocations among various U.S. economic sectors, especially agricultural exporters, are translating into rising political pressure and calls for action.

We conclude with the Recent Development case summaries. We are grateful to all those who take the time and effort to bring us these summaries of developments in maritime law.

We urge our readers who may have summer associates or interns from law schools working for them to encourage them to submit articles for publication in our Future Proctors section.

As always, we hope you find this edition interesting and informative, and ask you to consider contributing an article or note for publication to educate, enlighten, and entertain us.

Robert J. Zapf


In this article, we explain why the maritime community should be paying attention to sanctions risk, and what actions the U.S. government expects maritime actors to take to avoid participating in maritime sanctions evasion.

I. Why maritime actors should care about U.S. sanctions risk.

All maritime industry stakeholders should take seriously the U.S. government’s plainly articulated intention to act against those who facilitate transfers of goods from, to, or for the benefit of, targets of U.S. sanctions. U.S. sanctions programs have broad application to transactions occurring outside the United States, and the U.S. government has a long history of aggressive enforcement of its sanctions programs. As a reminder, when a transaction has a nexus to the U.S., the U.S. government can impose administrative penalties of up to $311,562 for each violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEPPA”),2 even if inadvertent, with criminal penalties of up to $1,000,000 and 20 years in jail for willful violations.3 Even if a transaction has no U.S. nexus, the U.S. government can enforce its sanctions regimes by imposing financial sanctions on participants. Such sanctions may range from barring vessels from entering the United States for a period after visiting a prohibited port, to imposing visa restrictions on company executives, to designating participating vessels or parties as Specially Designated Nationals (“SDNs”). The latter results in comprehensive asset freezing and inability to engage in any transaction that has a U.S. nexus: in short, designation as an SDN results in global economic pariah status. 2 The IEPPA provides statutory authority for most U.S. sanctions regimes, but certain programs (such as the Cuban Asset Control Regulations and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations) are authorized under other statutes that provide for different maximum penalties. 3 The U.S. government takes a broad view of what constitutes a nexus to the U.S. sufficient to create jurisdiction, asserting the right to impose penalties in connection with transactions that involve U.S.-origin goods, U.S. dollar payments, parties or equipment (including telecommunications routers or data servers) in the U.S., or U.S. persons (i.e., entities organized under U.S. law and their foreign branch offices, U.S. citizens, and lawful permanent residents) wherever located.

These risks are not theoretical. In the past three years, the U.S. government has imposed financial sanctions on hundreds of vessels involved in illicit movement of goods, as well as shipowners, management companies, and even a port services company, for activities including transporting Venezuelan oil to Cuba and China, shipping Iranian oil, petrochemicals, and steel to China, transporting petroleum to Syria, and providing port services to North Korean vessels. Headline-grabbing examples include the September 2019 imposition of financial sanctions on COSCO subsidiaries COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co. and COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman & Ship Management,4 and the spring 2020 designations of Rosneft Oil Company subsidiaries Rosneft Trading S.A. and Trading International S.A. as SDNs.5 The designations of the COSCO subsidiaries were based on management of a shipping company that owned/operated vessels that transported Iranian oil to China (a pattern of activity that, interestingly, was published by Lloyd’s List Intelligence in June 2019, several months before the designation).6 The designations of the Rosneft subsidiaries were based on purchasing and brokering the sale and transport of Venezuelan oil.

In contrast to the plethora of maritime sanctions-evasion-related SDN designations, few civil penalties specifically related to maritime sanctions evasion have been announced to date. However, civil enforcement actions typically take several years to come to fruition, 4 See Department of State, Press Statement (Sept. 25, 2019), available at https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-imposes-sanctions-on-chinese-companies-for-transporting-iranian-oil/index.html (last visited April 20, 2021). Notably, sanctions on COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Co. were lifted in January 2020 based on significant compliance commitments. However, COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman & Ship Management remains under sanctions.5 See Department of Treasury, Press Statements (Feb. 18, 2020 and March 12, 2020) available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm909 (last visited April 20, 2021), and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm937 (last visited April 20, 2021). 6 See Michelle Wiese Bockmann, “China’s Kunlun Shipping linked to imports of sanctioned Iranian LPG,” at https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL1128085/Chinas-Kunlun-Shipping-linked-to-imports-of-sanctioned-Iranian-LPG (last visited April 20, 2021).

The Rising Tide of Maritime Financial Sanctions RiskBy Tahlia Townsend

(Continued from page 73)

https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-imposes-sanctions-on-chinese-companies-for-transporting-iranian-oil/index.html




with public announcements of penalties frequently occurring two, three, four or even five years or more after the transactions occurred, so a lack of public announcements does not mean that there are no companies under U.S. government investigation.

A case in point is the May 2019 announcement of an $871,837 settlement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and New York shipbroker Mid-Ship Group LLC. This action was based on transactions that occurred in 2011, eight years before the settlement. The Mid-Ship settlement also illustrates the significant risk of even attenuated participation in transactions involving SDN vessels – a risk that has increased substantially in the last two years due to the U.S. government’s imposition of sanctions on scores of new vessels.

The origins of Mid-Ship’s troubles were third-party charter agreements negotiated by Mid-Ship’s subsidiaries in China and Turkey in early 2010. None of the parties to the agreements, nor the origin or destination ports, were subject to U.S. sanctions. However, the vessels that the third parties selected were owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”), and therefore subject to U.S. sanctions under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 544. When MidShip’s New York entity initiated commission payments, via U.S. banks, to the third-party brokers who had arranged for use of those vessels, it “dealt in blocked property or interests in blocked property,” because the fund transfers “pertained to payments associated with blocked vessels.”7 In imposing the penalty, OFAC noted that Mid-Ship possessed, but failed to act on, multiple documents that identified the vessels by their International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) numbers (which would have permitted identification of the sanctions risk) and linked the vessels to Iran.8 OFAC also noted as aggravating factors internal emails indicating that the company knew about restrictions on transactions involving sanctioned vessels, but failed to implement appropriate compliance controls, as well as evidence that company personnel took steps to evade U.S. sanctions by causing wire transfers to be resubmitted without previously included vessel 7 See Settlement Agreement between OFAC and Mid-Ship Group (May 2019), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20190502_midship.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021). 8 Relevant documents included a Lloyd’s Register Safety Management Certificate, a Lloyd’s Register International Ship Security Certificate, a Lloyd’s Register Document of Compliance, a Det Norske Veritas Classification Certificate, a Det Norske Veritas International Ship Security Certificate, and a Det Norske Veritas Safety Management Certificate. Id.

names, after U.S. financial institutions raised sanctions concerns.

Two older enforcement actions against insurance companies for issuing policies and paying claims for maritime incidents involving sanctioned countries are also worth recalling here, as precedent for future actions now that OFAC has turned the spotlight back on maritime sanctions compliance.

In 2015, Navigators Insurance paid $271,815 to settle allegations that, between 2008 and 2011, its U.K. branch: (a) issued, and paid claims under, global protection and indemnity policies that covered North Korean-flagged vessels; and (b) paid claims for incidents that occurred in, or involved interests of, Iran, Sudan, and Cuba.9 Similarly, in 2017, American International Group (“AIG”) paid $148,698 after voluntarily disclosing to OFAC that it had extended insurance coverage to and in some cases paid claims arising from voyages, shipments, or transshipments to, from, or through Iran, Sudan, or Cuba, or aboard blocked IRISL vessels.10

According to OFAC’s web posting regarding the AIG settlement, the violations occurred in part because AIG’s single shipment policies and some of its open cargo or worldwide master policies did not include a sanctions exclusion clause, and because sanctions exclusion clauses included in other policies “were too narrow in their scope and application to be effective.” However, it is important for marine insurers to recognize that screening of beneficiaries and incorporation of sanctions exclusion clauses, even when appropriately scoped, may not be enough to ward off liability for facilitating sanctions evasion. Rather, as discussed further below, the U.S. government now expects marine insurers and other maritime actors to implement significant additional internal controls with respect to transactions that present an elevated risk of sanctions evasion.

II. What the U.S. government expects maritime actors to do.

What exactly does the U.S. government expect maritime industry stakeholders to do to comply with U.S. sanctions? The answer to that question lies in a May 2020 joint advisory by the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury and the U.S. Coast Guard to the maritime industry, energy and metals sectors, and related communities entitled “Guidance to Address

9 See OFAC Web Notice (Aug. 6, 2016) at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20150806_navigators.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021). 10 See OFAC Web Notice (June 26, 2017) at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20170626_aig.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021).


Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices” (“the Advisory”). In it, the U.S. government identified common deceptive shipping practices and made specific suggestions for compliance measures that maritime actors should consider implementing with respect to high-risk areas of maritime activity. Indeed, the Advisory included separate lists of potential sanctions compliance measures for each of the following groups of actors: (i) maritime insurance companies (page 9); (ii) flag registry managers (page 11); (iii) port state control authorities (page 13); (iv) shipping industry associations (page 14); (v) regional and global commodity trading, supplier, and brokering companies (page 15); (vi) financial institutions (page 17); (vii) ship owners, operators, and charterers (page 18); (viii) classification societies (page 20); (ix) vessel captains (page 22); and (x) crewing companies (page 23).

A complete recitation of the content of the Advisory is beyond the scope of this article, but in the paragraphs below we summarize: (1) factors that maritime industry participants should consider in evaluating business lines, counterparties, and transactions for sanctions risk, in order to identify situations in which enhanced compliance measures are warranted; and (2) the top eight compliance suggestions from the Advisory for the following parties: marine insurers, ship owners, operators, and charterers, and commodity trading, supplier, and brokering companies.

A. Risk factors warranting increased compliance controls.

The U.S. government supports a risk-based approach to compliance, where the scope of compliance controls is calibrated to the level of sanctions risk presented by a proposed activity. In assessing where enhanced controls may be necessary to avoid becoming embroiled in maritime sanctions evasion, maritime industry participants should consider a range of factors, including the following (which are drawn from the Advisory and from three related prior advisories addressing maritime sanctions risk11):

11 See OFAC Advisory to the Maritime Petroleum Shipping Community (Sept. 4, 2019), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/iran_advisory_09032019.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021); OFAC’s Updated Guidance on Addressing North Korea’s Illicit Shipping Practices (March 21, 2019), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/dprk_vessel_advisory_03212019.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021); and OFAC’s Sanctions Risks Related to North Korea’s Shipping Practices, (Feb. 23, 2018), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/dprk_vessel_advisory_02232018.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021).

• Geographic risk: (a) Waters: Mediterranean Sea around Syria, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East Sea/Sea of Japan, East China Sea, Gulf of Tonkin; (b) Ports: Vladivostok and Nakhodka ports in Russia; Luhuashan, Zhoushan, Luoyuan, Taichung ports in China; Busan, Yosu, Gwangyang ports in South Korea; Keelung, Taipei, Kaohsiung ports in Taiwan; Hong Kong; Singapore.

• Sector / cargo risk: Petroleum, petrochemicals, coal, metals, sand, luxury goods.

• Vessel type risk: Ship-to-ship transfer capable vessels, tankers, older vessels.

• Vessel behavior risk: Sailing under a false flag; frequently switching flag registries; complex chains of ownership or management, or frequent changes of ownership or management; physical alteration of IMO number; frequent visits to sanctioned country ports; inconsistencies, errors, or misrepresentations in documentation; voyage irregularities such as loitering in high risk waters, taking indirect routes, taking longer than necessary to reach a destination, taking unexplained detours; history of Automatic Identification System (“AIS”) interruption or manipulation inconsistent with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”); history of involvement in sanctions evasion, as identified in OFAC advisories or U.N. reports.12

B. Primary compliance controls suggested in the advisory for insurers, ship owners/operators/ charterers, and commodity trading/ supplier/brokering companies.

1. Know your vessel due diligence.

The Advisory suggests that, as appropriate to their risk, insurers, ship owners, operators, managers, charterers, and trading/supplier/brokering companies implement due diligence procedures that incorporate review of historical ship location/AIS data, ship registry, and ship 12 For example, OFAC’s 2018 Advisory related to Syria included an appendix identifying numerous vessels that were not SDNs, and would therefore not trigger an alert in standard screening processes, but that OFAC asserted had been involved in delivering oil to Syria. Doing business with such vessels would not be prohibited, unless the vessel is later added to the SDN List or otherwise becomes subject to sanctions. However, OFAC’s identification of a vessel’s prior Syria-related activities would be a red flag requiring careful attention.


flagging data. The Advisory further suggests that these parties terminate (or decline to begin) relationships with vessels that, within a two-year lookback period, have a pattern of AIS transmission that is not consistent with the SOLAS.

The U.S. government’s focus on AIS data analysis as a critical compliance tool presents significant practical challenges. While AIS data can reveal suspicious patterns of activity, the volume of data involved is vast and continuously evolving, and reliably distinguishing innocent AIS interruptions from actual red-flag behaviors requires contextual analysis of numerous other factors, such as: vessel attributes (type, age, history of safety or environmental violations); geography (was transmission interrupted in high-risk waters?); behavioral patterns (has the vessel’s conduct suddenly changed, has it recently changed its name or flag, does it have a complex ownership or management structure or frequent changes thereto?); and the common practices of similar vessels in the region, to name a few.

Performing such analysis manually, on the timelines necessary to support normal business operations, is generally not feasible. However, vendors, such as Windward Ltd., which is an IUMI Professional Partner, offer platforms that use Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) to analyze a broad range of available information about vessel behavior, predict sanctions related risk, and generate decision-ready outputs. Such tools are increasingly being adopted by government entities, financial institutions, and others.13

2. AIS transmission monitoring.

In addition to assessing a vessel’s AIS history, the Advisory suggests that insurers, ship owners, operators, managers, charterers, and trading/supplier/brokering companies consider continuously monitoring AIS for those vessels that, based on their routes, cargo, or capabilities (e.g., ability to transport cargoes of concern, such as oil or to conduct ship-to-ship transfers) present an elevated risk of being used for sanctions evasion. According to the Advisory, incidents such as significant periods of AIS interruption, suspicious deviations in route or other voyage irregularities (loitering in waters of concern, unduly long voyage times, etc.), and ship-to-ship transfers with vessels not transmitting AIS would warrant investigation.

13 For example, according to its website, Winward’s maritime risk intelligence tool has been used by the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea, Danse Bank, Gard, Generali, Société Générale, and others. See www.wnwd.com.

For owners, operators, managers, and charterers, the Advisory also suggests supplementing AIS monitoring with longrange identification and tracking (“LRIT”) for high risk vessels.

As with historical AIS review, continuous AIS monitoring requires significant contextual analysis to reliably identify suspicious behavior, and may require use of sophisticated third-party software to generate actionable intelligence.

3. AIS manipulation clause.

The Advisory suggests that insurers, ship owners, operators, managers, charterers, and trading/supplier/brokering companies consider implementing contract clauses providing that intentional disabling or manipulation of AIS for illegitimate reasons will be grounds for investigation and contract termination.

It’s worth noting that this recommendation generated significant controversy. Before and after the official release of the Advisory, the maritime industry raised substantial concerns, including that AIS is routinely switched off for legitimate security reasons, and sent signals are often interrupted or not received due to dense traffic, weather, and other factors beyond the vessel’s control. Moreover, there are significant practical difficulties with terminating and potentially reinstating insurance cover mid-risk (including the risk of disputes over intervening losses occurring during breaks in insurance coverage occasioned by AIS-related investigations), and the fact that existing standard clauses already make it clear that breach of sanctions and other illegal acts will result in no cover being given and no claims being payable. Despite these and other objections, however, the U.S. government continued to press the position that AIS manipulation clauses are important compliance tools, and included the recommendation in the Advisory.

Generali was an early adopter among insurance companies, implementing the following clause:

“The policy shall not provide any coverage for any vessel that is operating in a manner designed to preclude, disguise or otherwise impede the detection of its identity or location, including but not limited to deactivation of its Automatic Identification System (“AIS”) or manipulation of AIS data. In case of precluded, impeded or disguised identity or locations in conjunction with activities or locations that may be prohibited by any applicable economic sanctions, laws or rules, including those administered by the EU, US


or UN, Generali has the right to unilaterally terminate this coverage immediately by giving notice to the policyholder. This exclusion and termination shall not apply where such inability to detect the vessel’s identity and location is due to a demonstrable malfunction or other similar demonstrable external event beyond the control of the owners or operators of the vessel. In cases where the inability to detect the vessel’s identity or location is due to demonstrable malfunction or an external event, the policyholder must notify Generali, and Generali will confirm in writing to the policyholder whether: (i) cover for that vessel will continue; or (ii) cover for that vessel will cease from such date as is specified by Generali.14

In December 2020, the United Kingdom’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (“OFSI”) issued its own guidance to the maritime community, in which it suggested that “[i]ndustry may wish to consider any benefits in AIS screening and the inclusion of ‘AIS switch off’ clauses in contracts.”15 Subsequently, in January 2021, the Lloyd’s Market Association Joint Hull Committee released a model clause entitled “Automatic Identification System (AIS) Operation,” which reads as follows:

1. As required by Chapter V, Regulation 19 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 as amended and any modification thereof, the vessel’s AIS shall, in so far as the Assured can control the matter: (a) always be in operation when the vessel is underway or at anchor; (b) be in operation in accordance with the requirements of the port, when in port.

2. In the event of breach of clause (1), Underwriters shall not be liable for any loss, damage, liability or expense arising out of or resulting from an accident or occurrence during the period of breach, unless the Assured satisfies Underwriters that the AIS was switched off because the Master believed that the continual operation of AIS might have compromised the safety or security of the vessel, or that the AIS was not in operation for reasons beyond the control of the Assured.

14 See Generali Switzerland website, at https://www.generali.ch/en/allgemein/footnote/sanktionen (last visited April 20, 2021). 15 See HM Treasury Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Financial Sanctions Guidance for Entities and Individuals Operating within the Maritime Shipping Sector, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/948299/OFSI_Guidance_-_Maritime_.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021).

3. The Assured shall, if requested by Underwriters, permit the inspection of the vessel’s AIS installation, maintenance, and operational records as well as the vessel’s logbook.16

With respect to parties other than insurers, in February 2021, industry group BIMCO announced that it is working on a charter party clause to address AIS abuse. BIMCO expressed concern that parties may adopt clauses that expose owners to contract termination for innocent AIS interruption. BIMCO’s clause will address use of AIS before and during a charter party, and will recognize that there may be legitimate reasons for AIS interruption. BIMCO expects to publish the AIS clause in May 2021.17

4. Ship-to-ship transfer clause and diligence.

The Advisory suggests that, on a risk basis, insurers, ship owners, operators, managers, charterers, and trading/supplier/brokering companies consider implementing contract clauses that: (i) prohibit ship-to-ship transfers to vessels that are not broadcasting AIS consistent with SOLAS; and (ii) require verification of the recipient vessel’s name, IMO number, flag, AIS broadcast status, cargo certificate of origin and vessel log (to confirm cargo chain of custody) before conducting the ship-to-ship transfer.

Notably, the Advisory’s list of suggested compliance mechanisms for captains also includes the suggestion that, where sanctions risk is present, captains verify the recipient vessel name, IMO number, flag, etc. before completing a ship-to-ship transfer.

5. Transaction verification.

The Advisory suggests that, on a risk basis, trading/supplier/brokering companies consider implementing contract clauses that “incorporate[] a mechanism to monitor whether commodity transactions occur as outlined under the original contract and any addenda.” Where there is an elevated risk of sanctions evasion (based on geography, commodity type, or other factors), the Advisory suggests proactive review of shipping documentation, including bills of lading, to ensure accurate identification of vessel(s), cargo, origin, destination, and parties, and to investigate any sign of

16 See LMA Joint Committee Circular JH2021-008 (Jan. 25, 2021) at https://www.lmalloyds.com/LMA/Underwriting/Marine/JHC/jhc_circulars.aspx (last visited April 20, 2021). 17 See BIMCO website, at https://www.bimco.org/news/contracts-and-clauses/20210202-new-bimco-clause-aims-to-curb-ais-abuse.

https://www.generali.ch/en/allgemein/footnote/sanktionen

https://www.generali.ch/en/allgemein/footnote/sanktionen


manipulated documentation before continuing with the transaction.

Relatedly, the Advisory suggests that, where sanctions risk exists, ship owners, operators, managers, and charterers should conduct end-use verifications, including by requiring and analyzing photographs of delivery and recipient vessels.

6. Communicating sanctions obligations.

The Advisory suggests that ship owners, operators, managers, and charterers should consider several steps related to communication of sanctions obligations to partners and other third parties in the maritime supply chain, including: (i) explaining U.S. and U.N. sanctions requirements to international partners who may operate under other legal systems, including sharing copies of the Advisory; (ii) circulating regular cases studies and updates regarding illicit activity; and (iii) communicating an expectation that third parties have appropriate sanctions compliance programs, including adequate resources and internal controls to monitor AIS, assess authenticity of bills of lading, and to verify loading and discharging of cargo.

For insurers, traders, suppliers, and brokers, the Advisory also suggests sensitizing clients to potential sanctions risk, including through regular dissemination of case studies and updates, and sharing of the Advisory, but does not go so far as to suggest communicating expectations about third party compliance programs (although all parties may wish to consider such inquiries as part of assessing how much sanctions risk a potential counterparty may bring to an activity).

Relatedly, the Advisory suggests that captains should ensure that they are aware of, and crewing companies should ensure that crews are aware of, guidance issued by the IMO regarding illicit shipping and deceptive practices.

7. Sharing incident information.

The Advisory suggests that insurers should consider “[i]nforming legal regulators/ competent authorities, other insurers, commercial databases, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and, when relevant, … the UN DPRK Panel of Experts, in the event of insurance denial or cancellation of services of a vessel in relation to illicit activity.” Relatedly, the Advisory suggests that insurance companies notify insureds that, to the extent permitted by applicable law, they may provide personally identifiable information and due diligence documents to government or UN bodies in case of unlawful activity.

8. Reporting procedures.

The Advisory also emphasizes the need for traders, suppliers, brokers, ship owners, operators, charterers, and crewing companies to: (i) implement procedures by which employees may report sanctions-related concerns, (ii) encourage employees to submit such reports, and (iii) implement and enforce parallel anti-retaliation mechanisms, to protect those who report in good faith.

Relatedly, the advisory suggests that ship owners, operators, charterers, and crewing companies should consider circulating information about U.S. “Rewards for Justice” programs, which provide financial awards for reporting certain information of interest to the U.S. government, including information that leads to: (i) disruption of financial mechanisms of persons engaged in certain activities that support North Korea, including money laundering, sanctions evasion, cyber-crime, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation; or (ii) dismantling of a system used to finance U.S.designated foreign terrorist organizations, including Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.18

III. Conclusion.

All actors in the maritime supply chain should review the Advisory and OFSI’s similar guidance, assess the level of sanctions risk across their business activities, and carefully consider implementing controls of the kind identified in the Advisory, as necessary. U.S. regulators have made it clear that they want the maritime industry to do a better job of preventing sanctions evasion, and will take action against parties who fail to do their part. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Peyman put it:

“We are going to continue to aggressively enforce sanctions … and to look towards enforcing them in a strategic way, much like the designation with COSCO, which was … designed to send a message across an industry. … [T]here needs to be a greater appreciation of the immense economic risks to those that … do not have the infrastructure to protect themselves against sanctions violations and ensure they’re being proactive in complying … The maritime advisory is intended to … get people started on the hard work that they must do to get to where … they need to be.”19

18 See United States Department of State, Rewards for Justice program description at https://www.state.gov/rewards-for-justice/ (last visited April 20, 2021). 19 Then-U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Peyman speaking at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (March 9, 2020), available at https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Transcript_Peyman_Sanctions_March2020.pdf (last visited April 20, 2021).





Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in Seaman Employment Contracts

By Brian McEwing*

This article outlines a recent decision from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Camden Vicinage, compelling arbitration of a seaman’s Jones Act and general maritime law claims pursuant to the terms of his employment contract.

I. Procedural Background

A crewmember on a commercial fishing vessel, Anthony Kozur, filed a Complaint on May 3, 2018 in the District Court alleging Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and a claim for maintenance and cure, arising out of an August 28, 2017 slip, alleged to have caused a back injury.1

In response, the vessel owner, and Kozur’s employer, filed a motion to dismiss or stay the action and compel arbitration pursuant to the crewmember’s employment agreement, which contained an arbitration clause.2

The motion was fully briefed by August 29, 2018, and a hearing on the motion was held on September 30, 2019. As a result of the hearing, the Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez issued an Order and Opinion wherein he denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice, allowed the parties to conduct limited discovery and set an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Kozur agreed to arbitrate his claims. The evidentiary hearing was held on January 9, 2020, and supplemental briefs were filed by the end of January 2020.

Thereafter, the District Court issued an Order and Opinion on August 18, 2020, compelling arbitration, staying the matter and administratively terminating the matter pending completion of arbitration. Plaintiff filed

* Brian McEwing is a partner in Reeves McEwing LLP, which handles maritime and transportation issues in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and beyond.1 Kozur v. F/V Atlantic Bounty, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-cv-08750 slip op., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148633 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2020), appeal docketed (No. 20-2911 3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2020).2 A related entity was also named in the Complaint and filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to also compel arbitration. The related entity’s motion dismiss was granted.

an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on September 17, 2020.

The Third Circuit issued an Order sua sponte, questioning whether the District Court’s Order was a final decision or was otherwise appealable, and sought responses from both parties. Both parties, albeit on differing grounds, requested that the Third Circuit hear the appeal.

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff has been a commercial fisherman since at least 1989. Plaintiff began working for the defendant in 2009. Immediately before sailing on each fishing trip, the crewmembers sign the trip’s manifest. Plaintiff understood that the manifests he signed were employment agreements, in which he was agreeing to be a seaman on the vessel and work on the vessel. All of the crew would sign their name and fill out the medical history.

On the trip during which Plaintiff was allegedly injured, the manifest was on “the galley table open to the signature page.” Plaintiff testified that he had never read through the document and never saw any arbitration clause. None of the captains had explained or directed him to read the clause. Plaintiff has never read the manifest, and never asked to read it or that a copy be provided. Plaintiff knew that there were terms within the manifest’s pages, and proceeded to sign the “signature page” knowing that there were other pages within the document.

The arbitration clause contained in the manifest is set forth below:3

Arbitration: I understand and agree that any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of 3 Plaintiff conceded, for the sole purpose of the Appeal, that a third page was attached to the manifest that he signed which included text stating that he waived his right to have a jury trial in a court of his choice, but if he had an injury claim assertable under the Jones Act, he would have to bring it in an arbitration under state law before an individual arbitrator at a specified commercial company located in Philadelphia.


my work as a crewmember, including but not limited to statutory Jones Act claims, negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and wage claims, and whether such claim or controversy be brought against the vessel, vessel owner[s] or vessel operator/employer, or any combination of them; or disputes relating to this Agreement, or the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof, including the determination of the scope or applicability of this arbitration clause, shall be determined by one arbitrator sitting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The arbitration shall be administered by JAMS pursuant to its Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures. If this agreement to arbitrate is determined to be exempt from enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act, the laws of the State of New York shall be applied in determining the validity and enforceability of this agreement.

ARBITRATION SHALL BE MY EXCLUSIVE REMEDY AND I UNDERSTAND THAT I GIVE UP MY RIGHT TO SUE. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT I GIVE UP MY RIGHT TO SELECT THE VENUE FOR ANY CLAIM OR CONTROVERSY AND THAT I GIVE UP MY RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JUDGE OR JURY FOR ANY AND ALL CLAIMS, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO STATUTORY JONES ACT, NEGLIGENCE, MAINTENANCE AND CURE, UNSEAWORTHINESS, AND WAGES.

The fee for arbitration, except the cost of any dispute concerning the enforceability of this Agreement or appeal of the arbitrator’s decision, shall be borne by the Vessel’s owner or Operator/employer as they may amongst themselves decide. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorney fees and costs and lay and expert witness fees and costs, unless contrary to law. Judgment on the Arbitration Award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. This clause shall not preclude parties from seeking provisional remedies in aid of arbitration from a court of appropriate jurisdiction; however, each party shall bear its own costs in pursuing such remedies.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Defendants’ Argument

Defendant argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not preclude enforcement of an arbitration agreement contained in a seaman’s employment contract

under state law. The manifest contained a provision that if the arbitration clause was not enforceable under the FAA, it was otherwise enforceable under New York law. Defendant therefore argued that the arbitration clause was enforceable under either New York law [pursuant to the manifest’s terms] or New Jersey law [where the contract was signed, the plaintiff resided, and the location of the employer’s principle place of business].

B. Plaintiff’s Argument

Plaintiff contended that the manifest page containing the arbitration clause was not attached to the document he signed prior to the trip in which he was allegedly injured. Plaintiff also argued that there was no meeting of the minds, and the FAA prohibits enforcement of arbitration clauses against seamen under state law. More specifically, Plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause is unenforceable under state law because: (1) the FAA preempts state arbitration related laws; (2) N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-12.7 prohibits the pre-incident waiver of statutory or case law rights; (3) state law cannot compel arbitration of a seaman’s claim because admiralty law requires uniform application; and (4) the contract was unenforceable because it was defectively vague as to essential terms.

IV. Application of the New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA) N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36

The District Court found that the arbitration clause is undeniably a written provision in a seaman’s employment contract, and therefore, exempt from enforcement under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The parties did not dispute that the FAA did not apply in this case. Therefore, the issue before the District Court was whether this seaman’s agreement to arbitrate is enforceable as a matter of state law.

While a decision in this matter was pending, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided two companion cases concerning the enforceability of arbitration clauses under the NJAA where the employment contracts of purported interstate transportation workers called for arbitration under the FAA.4

In Colon v. Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC, plaintiff’s employer was a licensed freight forwarder and broker. Colon was lead plaintiff in a class action suit alleging her employer violated New Jersey wage and hour and wage

4 Arafa v Health Express Corp., and Colon v. Strategic Delivery Solutions, LLC, 243 N.J. 147 (2020).


payment laws. The trial court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the employment agreement signed by Colon and the other class members, and the Appellate Division affirmed.5

One day later, in Arafa v. Health Express Corporation, a different Appellate panel reversed the trial court’s decision compelling arbitration of class claims pursuant to the terms of the employment agreement signed by Arafa and the other class members. Arafa was a delivery driver for his pharmaceutical employer. Arafa, like Colon, was the lead plaintiff in a class action suit also alleging that the employer violated New Jersey wage and hour and wage payment laws.6

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in Arafa and Colon was, “[W]hether the disputed arbitration agreements would be enforceable under the NJAA if they are exempt from the FAA?”

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that, “the NJAA applies in the absence of the FAA and that the arbitration agreements at issue are enforceable under the NJAA if the FAA does not apply.” In so holding, the Court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ., 7 which found that “[t]he FAA contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.” Notably, neither the arbitration clause in Colon nor the arbitration clause in Arafa contained an alternative law to be applied in the event the employees were exempt under the FAA; however, the Court pointed out that the NJAA automatically applies as a matter of law to all non-exempt arbitration agreements.8

5 Colon v. Strategic Delivery Sols., LLC, 459 N.J. Super. 349, 360 (App. Div. 2019). 6 Arafa v. Health Express Corporation, 239 N.J. 516 (2019).7 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).8 By contrast, in two recent decisions, Waithaka v, Amazon, Inc., 966 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020), and Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020), the employer’s motion to compel arbitration was denied where the employees were exempt under the FAA, and the employment agreement did not contain an alternative choice of law.

V. The Kozur Court’s Decision

The District Court found that Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing established that he can read and understand a contract, has regularly dealt with contracts in prior employment, and has the mental capacity to knowingly and voluntarily enter into a contractual agreement. The Court also noted that Plaintiff conceded that he signed the manifest at issue, that he knew the manifest acted as an employment contract, but that he did not read the document.

The District Court further found that there is nothing in the record to support Plaintiff’s argument that the page containing the arbitration clause was not attached to the manifest he signed on the trip in question. Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that the arbitration clause was not included in the document he signed and agreed to, rather he has only proved he did not know what the document contained because he failed to read it. As such, Plaintiff is still bound by the terms of that manifest.9

The District Court further found that defendants were under no obligation to alert plaintiff to the arbitration clause and the language of the arbitration clause in Plaintiff’s manifest is clear and unambiguous — it provides in bold font, in all capital letters, that arbitration shall be Plaintiff’s only remedy and that he was giving up his right to a trial by judge or jury. The clause further states that Plaintiff was agreeing to arbitrate any dispute arising from his work as a crewmember.

Finally, the District Court found that the parties have an agreement to arbitrate under both New York and New Jersey law, which both hold that the failure to read a contract alone does not excuse performance.10

VI. The Notice of Appeal

Plaintiff’s response to the Court of Appeals’ Order as to jurisdiction claimed that; (1) the contractual provision

9 Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875) (“It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained.”).10 Mildworm v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 171, 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“a person who signs a contract is presumed to know its contents and to assent to them.”); Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786 A.2d 886, 894 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).


the District Court ordered enforced violates the Jones Act 46 USC § 30104; (2) that a seaman’s Jones Act court case, where a jury has been demanded, which is premised in federal law, cannot be abrogated by a pre-dispute employment contract arbitration clause enforced under state law where it could not be so enforced under federal law; and (3) state law must be considered preempted by the Supremacy Clause via Sections 55 and 56 of Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA), 45 USC § 51, and the text of the Jones Act. Plaintiff asserted that has the right, in general, to request appellate review of the District Court’s order compelling the arbitration, pursuant to 28 USC § 1292(a)(3).

Defendant’s response to the Court of Appeals’ Order as to jurisdiction cited the need to have the appeal heard

on the grounds that the underlying claims, Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness and denial of maintenance and cure all arise from the same set of underlying facts, and the enforcement of the arbitration agreement under New Jersey law is intertwined with the FAA exemption, such that only the Court of Appeals could provide a meaningful global review of the District Court’s Order. The defendants noted that the Court of Appeals had reviewed a prior District Court decision that was procedurally identical.11

No decision has been reached on the jurisdictional issue to date.

Stay tuned . . .

11 See Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d. Cir. 2004).



Like so much in life, the true impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the maritime industry will likely only become clear in retrospect. At the outset of the pandemic, industry stakeholders gathered on and off Capitol Hill, and with key Federal agencies, to discuss what kinds of assistance would be needed and when. As the cherry blossoms around D.C.’s famed Tidal Basin swung into full bloom, it became clear that the pandemic was going to impact different industry segments in very different and unique ways. The cruise and passenger industry quickly came under a paralyzing “no sail” order, but because the majority of those vessels and operators are flagged outside the U.S., it became apparent that any kind of Federal aid would be controversial. With people staying home and travel at a standstill, both the roll-on, roll-off and tanker sectors discussed applying for Federal aid, as did some bulk carriers. Container carriers, however, expressed hesitation and began to question the optics surrounding any request for relief.

Early signs suggested that things might not be all that bad in the box sector. Locked at home on the couch with a limitless diet of streaming home video, American

consumers took to their phones and bought stuff. Lots of stuff. Stuff that came to them in containers. They bought PPE. They hoarded the sensible and the bizarre. Spending more time at home, many concluded that it was time to spruce up the place, upgrade the kitchen, take out a wall. Many built new outdoor and partially outdoor spaces, which became increasingly necessary for socially-distanced interaction. Sales at big box stores took off, supply chains strained, and shippers started complaining. Larger importers with sliding volume requirements service contracts were able to demand more and more volume under their agreements, in some cases more than doubling their demands for space. They still could not get enough. As they consumed more volume, even less space was available for smaller contract and uncommitted spot rate shippers. Rates eastbound from China climbed from $1500 a box to $4000 a box, and in some cases higher, within one service contract season. Smaller shippers complained carriers were walking away from commitments under service contracts with $1000 liquidated damages penalties and doubling their profit, even if the liquidated damages were recovered.

Containers, it was said, were out of place. Because of the pandemic, they had gone to odd destinations and not returned, or were tied up in port congestion, or there just were not enough. Whatever the reason, a growing chorus of reports said that ocean carriers were sending

Container CrunchBryant E. Gardner**

* Bryant E. Gardner is a Partner at Winston & Strawn, LLP, Washington, D.C. B.A., summa cum laude 1996, Tulane University of Louisiana; J.D. cum laude 2000, Tulane Law School.


shipping containers back westbound to China empty as soon as possible, rather than waiting for them to reposition to the interior to be filled up with exports to Asia. The few things East Asian nations still imported from the U.S.A.—scrap metal and animal feed, other agricultural products—had been moving westward at around $500 to $700 a box—not enough, it seems, to warrant sending the boxes to the American heartland to load farm products. American farmers began to feel they were being boxed out of the Asian markets by foreign ocean carriers.

When I first came to Washington two decades ago, one of the older lawyers at my firm, a genteel fellow from Mississippi, told me that America’s farmers might look like straight shooting country folks, but in the Halls of Congress, they are God’s chosen children. The family farm is the stuff of American legend, country life, the backbone of a great nation. And of course, much of agriculture’s stakeholder base comes from relatively sparsely populated states—each with two Senators intensely focused upon and attuned to the needs of agriculture. I used to joke with the agricultural lobbyists that we have the U.S. Maritime Administration, a small (but valiant!) promotional agency trapped inside a regulatory department, but they have an entire promotional department in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Well, it was not really a joke. They also have two powerful congressional committees dedicated only to agriculture, and their own subcommittees on the Appropriations Committees in both chambers of Congress. All these folks want to know why the soybeans are not getting loaded into the boxes.

Facing inquiry from Congress and regulators, carriers increasingly concentrated their efforts with the World Shipping Council, the container carriers’ D.C.-based association. In December 2020, Federal Maritime Commissioners Carl W. Bentzel and Daniel B. Maffei wrote to the World Shipping Council to express growing concern about reports that ocean carriers are refusing the carriage of U.S. exports. In the letter, the Commissioners cited 46 U.S.C. § 41104 for the proposition that “common carriers may not ‘unreasonably refuse to deal or negotiate’” and § 41105 for prohibitions against concerted actions by common carriers to “boycott or take any other concerted action resulting in an unreasonable refusal to deal” or “engage in conduct that unreasonably restricts the use of intermodal services or technological innovations.”1 In 1 Letter from Carl W. Bentzel, Federal Maritime Commissioner and Daniel B. Maffei, Federal Maritime Commissioner, to John Butler, President & CEO, World Shipping Council (Dec. 2020).

public remarks before the Global Maritime Conference, Commission Chairman Michael A. Khouri stated:

Some ocean carriers—not all—have stated that they will no longer de-ploy—that is—reposition empty con-tainers to the U.S. interior agricultur-al areas. Instead, they are expediting empties back to Asia. This aban-donment of a significant U.S. export industry—the American agricultural industry—is shutting them out of global markets. We are looking into all potential—repeat—all potential responsive actions, including a re-view of whether such ocean carriers’ actions are in full compliance with the Shipping Act and more specifical-ly the various “Prohibited Acts” sec-tions of the Act.2

Furthermore, Chairman Khouri indicated that Fact Finding 29, led by Commissioner Rebecca F. Dye, would be looking at “detention and demurrage, container return and container availability for U.S. export cargoes.”3 In February 2021, Commissioner Dye issued “information demand orders” to ocean carriers and marine terminal operators, requiring information “on their policies and practices related to container returns and container availability for exporters.”4

Agriculture stakeholders engaged. A broad coalition of 73 agricultural associations wrote to President Biden on February 24, 2021, with copies to Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors Cecilia Rouse, and Chairman Khouri, to express their concern:

According to their own public re-ports, the ocean carriers are enjoying their most profitable period in three decades by controlling capacity and charging unprecedented freight rates, imposing draconian fees on our ex-porters and importers, and frequent-ly refusing to carry U.S. agricultural

2 FMC Chairman Addresses Export Container Availability (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://www.fmc.gov/fmc-chairman-addresses-export-container-availability/ (last visited April 20, 2021). 3 Id.4 Federal Maritime Commission, Information Demand on Detention and Demurrage Practices to be Issued (Feb. 17, 2021).


exports… . The international ocean carriers which carry over 99% of our foreign commerce, are headquartered over-seas—perhaps unaware of the injury their actions are causing to the U.S. economy as they profit from the pan-demic… . The Shipping Act provides the FMC with the authority to prohibit unrea-sonable, unjust practices, and to “pro-mote the growth and development of U.S. exports through competitive and efficient ocean transportation…” Given the urgency of this situation in commerce, we ask these tools and any others available to our government be immediately applied to stem the cur-rent ocean carrier practices that are so damaging our agricultural exports.

The Agriculture Transportation Coalition, which bills itself as “the principal voice of agriculture exporters in transportation policy,” engaged on the issue. The Coalition opined that twenty-five years ago, there were approximately twenty container carriers for transpacific exports, several U.S.-owned, crewed, headquartered and managed—but now there are nine companies all wholly foreign controlled, leaving U.S. exporters with few choices and total dependence upon foreign carriers to get exports abroad. In its position papers, the Coalition called for the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) to initiate enforcement action and called upon Congress to strengthen the Shipping Act to strengthen protections for consumers of shipping services including an improved private right of action.

Congressional discontent began bubbling over in late February. On February 25, 2021, Senators Roger Wicker (R-MS) and John Boozman (R-AR), the Ranking Members on the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, respectively, wrote to the FMC supporting “swift action” by Commissioner Dye and inquiry into “practices relating to container returns and container availability for exporters,” through Fact Finding 29. On March 2, 2021, Rep. Kim Schrier (D-WA), representing the 8th Washington Congressional District to the east of Seattle, wrote to the FMC expressing grave concerns “about reports that foreign-owned ocean carriers are unfairly prioritizing importation of foreign goods over U.S. exports.” The same day, a broad and bipartisan group of 25 U.S. Senators wrote to the FMC expressing concern about ocean carriers’ denial of

carriage for agricultural commodities, supporting the Commission’s investigation under Fact Finding 29, and calling upon the Commission to quickly resolve the matter. Shortly thereafter, on March 8, 2021, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Sam Graves (R-MO), Chairman and Ranking Member of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, together with Salud Carbajal (D-CA) and Bob Gibbs (R-OH), the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, wrote to Chairman Khouri to express concerns about the situation and asking the Commission to “take immediate action” to ensure ocean carriers are complying with the Shipping Act.

Concurrently, on March 2, 2021, Federal Maritime Commissioners Maffei and Sola, two of the five on the Commission, published an op-ed in Supply Chain Drive addressing the situation. The Commissioners observed that “U.S. companies are facing limited access to containers and space on vessels to ship exports abroad. Faced with paying high premiums that eliminate profit and the risks of loads not getting to customers on time, agricultural customers, most notably those in America’s heartland, are struggling.” Moreover, they noted that “containers are not where they need to be” and expressed support for increased container manufacturing in China and increased collaboration with their regulatory peers in China and the European Union in order to help resolve a complex situation wrought by the unprecedented market disruptions of COVID-19. They also noted that potentially “the FMC can contribute by increasing monitoring and enforcement with an eye toward protecting the public from those who exacerbate and profit from the current situation.”5

The container carriers deferred inquiries and calls for congressional action to the ongoing investigation by the Commission, pledging cooperation with the Commission.

Opening a hearing on top infrastructure priorities on March 24, 2021, Senator Maria Cantwell, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation observed: “We also need to help the serious congestion at our ports with containers. There are currently 26 ships anchored, idle, off the Port of L.A./ Long Beach, because they are not able to get to port. When ships are unable to get to port, too often foreign-owned carriers offload goods at American ports and then load up empty containers to go back to Asia, leaving U.S. exports behind. A recent investigation

5 Statement of Federal Maritime Commissioners Maffei and Sola, Supply Chain Drive (Mar. 2, 2021).


found between July and December of 2020, carriers rejected at least 1.3 billion in U.S. agricultural exports.”6

In keeping with its proactive, hands-on approach to national issues, the newly minted and still assembling Biden Administration has signaled plans to intervene in these supply chain issues. At his first hearing since confirmation, on March 25, 2021, Secretary of Transportation Buttigieg vowed to help U.S. exporters resolve their supply chain challenges by bringing a “whole of government” approach to bear on the matter which “reached a new level of urgency given some of the backups that we’ve seen, especially in the Northwest but really impacting the whole U.S. economy.”7 The Secretary further indicated that “this is a priority for the President” and that the Department of Transportation would be working together with the FMC to tackle the issue. Upon being selected as Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission by President Biden on March 29, 2021, Commissioner Maffei shed light on his plans

for the Commission’s agenda: “Due to the effects of COVID-19 and an unprecedented import boom, we are dealing with serious challenges to America’s international ocean transportation system—challenges that the FMC has a vital role in addressing, both on its own as an independent agency and in cooperation with other agencies.”8

The global pandemic sparked by COVID-19 has placed strain upon U.S. ocean and intermodal supply chains and it is beginning to show. Dislocations among various U.S. economic sectors, especially agricultural exporters, are translating into rising political pressure and calls for action. Moreover, recent events such as the grounding of the M/V EVER GIVEN in the Suez Canal and in-depth Washington Post articles about the crew-change crisis have placed critical public focus on an industry that usually only gets press when something goes wrong, unfortunately.

6 Press Release, Office of Senator Maria Cantwell, Cantwell Identifies Top Transportation Infrastructure Priorities; Calls for Robust Investment at Commerce Hearing (Mar. 24, 2021).7 Statement of Secretary Buttigieg, The Administration’s Priorities for Transportation Infrastructure, Hearing before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Mar. 25, 2021.

8 Daniel B. Maffei Designated as the Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission (Mar. 20, 2021), available at https://www.fmc.gov/daniel-b-maffei-designated-as-the-chaiman-of-the-federal-maritime-commission/ (last visited April 20, 2021)

https://www.fmc.gov/daniel-b-maffei-designated-as-the-chairman-of-the-federal-maritime-commission/




Corporate Veil

Pacific Gulf Shipping Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9058 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2021)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the charterer of a vessel could not pierce the corporate veil of a family enterprise to enforce the arbitration award against a severely undercapitalized company outside of the arbitration proceeding.

Pacific Gulf chartered the M/V ADAMASTOS, operated by brothers George and Efstathios Gourdomichalis through their company Phoenix Shipping, from Adamastos Shipping, in which the brothers were also officers. After a number of problems were discovered in the M/V ADAMASTOS, Phoenix Shipping canceled the insurance on the vessel and abandoned her and her cargo in Brazil. Liability traveled up the charterparty chain and Pacific Gulf (or rather its insurer and subrogee) was left holding the bag. Pacific Gulf initiated arbitration in England and won an award after Adamastos Shipping failed to respond. Unable to collect from the severely undercapitalized Adamastos Shipping, Pacific Gulf sought to enforce its award against other entities owned by the brothers Gourdomichalis, including Blue Wall and M/V VIGOROUS on the grounds that the brothers dominate and control Blue Wall and M/V VIGOROUS as part of a single enterprise that includes Adamastos Shipping.

After extensive discovery by Pacific Gulf, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Blue Wall and M/V VIGOROUS, observing that Pacific Gulf had “come back largely empty handed” from its extensive discovery expedition with respect to its effort to pierce the corporate veil. Pacific Gulf appealed. Sitting in admiralty, the Ninth Circuit applied federal common law in examining the two corporate identity arguments.

Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Sixth Circuit Judge Danny J. Boggs first addressed the argument that one of the entities was a successor business entity of Adamastos Shipping. The court agreed with the decisions of the other circuit courts requiring a transfer of all or substantially all of the predecessor’s assets in order for

there to be successor liability. As Pacific Gulf failed to plead this essential fact, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly dismissed the successor liability claim.

The court also agreed with the district court on the issue of the alter-ego theory. Pacific Gulf argued that it was entitled to pierce the corporate veil of the brothers Gourdomichalis companies because it had established that the corporate form of the defendants’ entities was being dominated and controlled by the brothers. The Ninth Circuit noted that while the Second Circuit allows the plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil by proving either domination and control or fraud, the Ninth Circuit employs a conjunctive test that requires domination and control and injustice from failing to pierce the veil and ill intent on the part of the dominating entity. The court reasoned that although there was evidence of the control and domination, there was insufficient evidence to show fraud to support a finding that the Gourdomichalis brothers operated either Blue Wall or M/V Vigorous as an alter-ego of Adamastos Shipping. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment against Pacific Shipping.

Submitted by AAE

Damages

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Int’l Marine Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24006 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2021)

In 2014, a vessel owned by Robert Falk (M/Y CHAIRMAN) was damaged and towed to Rolly Marine Services, Inc. The vessel’s damage was caused by the negligent work of CMAC System. Plaintiff National Union Fire Insurance Co. (Plaintiff), the insurer of the vessel, and Defendant International Marine Corporation (IMC) sued CMAC System and recovered $850,000 in settlement proceeds. Due to disputes as to how to distribute the settlement proceeds and as to what costs were covered by insurance, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida assigned a Special Master at the parties’ request to resolve the disputes.

Recent Developments


The Special Master determined that (1) admiralty jurisdiction governed the dispute and thus “loss of use” damages were not recoverable,” and (2) that equitable consideration should be given to some damages claimed by IMC that were generally not compensable as they were for the “betterment” of the vessel. The Special Master determined that Defendants would receive $23,000 (deductible), $41,033.10 (reimbursement of expenses), and $281,240 (money Falk paid for some repairs).

Both parties objected to the Special Master’s findings: Plaintiff objected to the $281,240 being awarded to Falk and IMC objected that Florida law applied and thus “loss of use” damages should have been awarded. As to IMC’s objection, the Court determined that federal maritime jurisdiction existed as the vessel was disabled in a navigable waterway and could have affected maritime commerce. As to Plaintiff’s objection, the court held that the repairs in question were incidental to the incident and not for the betterment of the vessel. Therefore, the Court adopted the Special Master’s findings and overruled the parties’ objections to those findings.

Submitted by JAY

Demurrage

Shelter Forest International Acquisition, Inc. v. Cosco Shipping (USA) Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1941 (D. Ore. Jan. 6, 2021)

A consignee brought an Oregon state court action against a carrier in a dispute over the shipments, alleging state law claims based on parties’ maritime service contract and bills of lading. Following removal, the carrier counterclaimed for breach of contract, seeking demurrage charges arising from consignee’s refusal to take delivery of damaged shipment. The district court ruled that the consignee’s obligation to pay demurrage was independent of the carrier’s obligation to deliver the cargo in good order, but the amount owed to the carrier was reduced for the carrier’s failure to mitigate.

The consignee, an Oregon corporation, contracted with the carrier, a Chinese shipping company, to transport cargo in containers from China to the United States. A dispute arose when the cargo and the carrier’s container were damaged in a rollover accident—whether the cause was negligent driving by the carrier’s agent or the consignee’s improper loading of the container. The carrier held the cargo in its container yard while the

parties were trying to resolve the issue of fault for the damage to the cargo and container, and the carrier began charging demurrage in accordance with its terms and conditions that were on the back of its bill of lading, on its website, and published as part of the tariff of general applicability on file with the Federal Maritime Commission.

Magistrate Judge Russo held that the authorities cited by the consignee were not applicable in this case where the bill of lading provided for demurrage and a lien on the goods without regard to setoff (and regardless of whether the consignee had its own claim for damages). Magistrate Judge Russo further noted that evidence existed that the damage was caused by improper loading, which gave the carrier a basis to withhold delivery of the cargo. Judge Russo did reduce the carrier’s recovery from $160,930 to $78,705, however, for failure to mitigate damages because it refused to deliver the cargo when the consignee was ready and willing to pay the disputed charges to retrieve its cargo.

Submitted by AAE

Forum Selection Clause

Campbell v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4080 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021)

The district court granted a cruise-ship owners’ motion to transfer an action by the estate of a deceased passenger to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, enforcing the forum-selection clause in the contract of passage.

A passenger died of COVID-19 that he allegedly contracted during a voyage on the defendants’ cruise ship. His estate asserted several tort claims in the district court, arguing that the forum-selection clause setting jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the for the Central District of California was too vague to be enforceable and was voided by the fraud on the part of the defendants for minimizing the danger from COVID-19 and making false promises of the safety of the cruise.

The court held that general maritime law governs a cruise line passage contract. After finding the forum selection clause to be clear, Judge Gilliam addressed the fraud exception to the enforceability of forum-selection clauses. The court reasoned that the party seeking to invalidate a forum selection clause must show that the forum selection clause itself was fraudulently included


in the agreement, not that the entire agreement was the product of fraud. The court found that the estate did not identify any fraud related to the forum selection clause (rather that defendants failed to disclose the risk of COVID-19). The court also found that there were no exceptional hardships (i.e., any travel distance between the Northern District and Central District was negligible for Pennsylvania based plaintiff) that would render the enforcement of the clause unreasonable or unfair. Accordingly, the court transferred the case to the Central District of California.

Submitted by AAE

W. Star Yacht, LLC v. Seattle Lakes Cruises, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32198 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2021)

This action arose when Plaintiff, purchaser of the M/V Harbor Lady (“Vessel”), filed suit against Defendant in Collier County, Florida pursuant to a valid forum-selection clause. Defendant, a Washington company with its principal place of business in Washington state moved to change the venue to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Plaintiff opposed Defendant’s motion based on the forum-selection clause.

Plaintiff purchased the vessel from Bikini Yacht Club (BYC) who had entered into a bareboat charter agreement with Defendant. Defendant moved the Vessel to Washington where it was operating same. When Plaintiff purchased the vessel from BYC, it assumed BYC’s rights and interests under the bareboat charter. At issue was the charter’s forum-selection clause, which stated that “the parties agree that any legal proceeding may be held in state or federal courts in Collier County, Florida and expressly consent to the personal jurisdiction of such courts.” After the USCG declared the Vessel unseaworthy, Plaintiff spent $480,000 to repair the Vessel and lost a month charter hire income.

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court has broad discretion regarding transfer under § 1404(a). Brown v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 1991). Courts employ a two-step process to determine whether transfer is appropriate. Osgood v. Discount Auto Parts, LLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2013). The Court determines whether the action could have been filed in the venue to which transfer is sought, and then analyzes “whether convenience and the interest of justice require transfer

to the requested forum.” Id. The court stated several factors are relevant to this determination:

(1) the convenience of the witness-es; (2) the location of relevant docu-ments and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the conve-nience of the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) a forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (9) trial efficien-cy and the interests of justice, based on the totality of the circumstances.

Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005).

In regard to convenience of the witnesses, because more non-party witnesses are located in Washington, this factor weighed in favor of transfer. The locus-of-operative-facts factor militates toward transfer since the Vessel was located in and operated in Washington at all times relevant. In regard to Plaintiff’s choice of forum, the court found that it is accorded less weight when “there is no material connection between the forum and the events underlying the cause of action.” Summers-Wood L.P. v. Wolf, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108827 (N.D. Fla. May 23 2008) (quotation omitted). The court found this factor neutral at best. Finally, the court found that the citizens of the Middle District of Florida do not have a meaningful interest in this lawsuit. The court also pointed out that the forum-selection clause at issue was permissive, not mandatory.

The Middle District of Florida held, based on the totality of the circumstances, that transferring the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington was appropriate.

Submitted by SMM

Jones Act

Butts v. ALN Grp., LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4259 (S.D. Fla. Jan 8, 2021)

Plaintiff Stephanie Butts (Plaintiff) filed suit against Defendants, including ALN Group LLC (Defendants), in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for injuries she sustained while


working as a chef aboard Defendants’ yacht, M/Y REVIVE. While fishing aboard a vessel with Defendant Allen, Plaintiff claims that she was injured due to Allen’s reckless operation of the vessel. Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants alleging negligence under the Jones Act, failure to pay maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness, and false imprisonment. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging various grounds, including that Plaintiff was a guest on the vessel and thus not a “seaman,” and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim as to any allegation in the Complaint.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. First, the court determined whether Plaintiff had sufficiently pled that she was a “seaman.” In applying the two-element test for a “seaman” in Chandris, (1) the employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel and (2) the employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation, the court held that Plaintiff pled sufficient facts that she was a “seaman.” The court noted that Defendants could file a summary judgment motion on this issue depending on what facts developed in discovery. Plaintiff’s sufficient pleading that she was a seaman defeated Defendants’ arguments as to failing to state proper claims of maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness. The court also held that Plaintiff could make a Jones Act negligence claim in the alternative against multiple employers at the pleading stage and that a false imprisonment claim can be made under general maritime law, which Plaintiff sufficiently pled in her Complaint.

Submitted by JAY

Limitation of Liability

In re Ocean Angel V, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45178 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2021)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted claimant’s motion to increase the limitation fund to reflect the value of both the fishing boat and its skiff involved in the accident under the flotilla doctrine.

The claimant sustained an injury during a squid fishing voyage involving the fishing boat and its skiff in Monterey Bay. Plaintiff-in-Limitation owned the fishing boat and its skiff, which was utilized to tow and help control the fishing boat as it seined for squid.

Plaintiff-in-Limitation filed a complaint in admiralty seeking limitation of liability to the value of the skiff and its freight, valued at $50,000. The claimant moved to increase the limitation fund to $1,055,000 to reflect the value of both the skiff and the fishing boat under the flotilla doctrine.

The court considered two tests developed by federal courts to determine whether the flotilla doctrine applies in a limitation action. Under the test in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the doctrine applies where vessels are owned by the same person, engaged in a common enterprise, and under a single command. Under the test in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, all vessels that are necessary to the performance of the relevant contract are considered to be engaged in a common venture with the offending vessel, thereby triggering the flotilla doctrine. Judge Davila applied the Fifth Circuit test as more appropriate under the circumstances of the case, finding that the skiff’s functional purpose was to assist the fishing boat in squid fishing and the captain of the fishing boat was in command of both. Applying the flotilla rule, the court granted the claimant’s motion to increase the limitation fund.

Submitted by AAE

In re Plimsoll Marine, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51295 (M.D. La. March 17, 2021)

On January 19, 2019, while working on the Mississippi River in the vicinity of Darrow, Louisiana, David Lewis allegedly slipped and fell while on the M/V MARGARET and was injured. On August 20, 2019, Lewis filed suit in Texas state court to recover damages attributable to the incident. The suit brought claims of negligence and gross negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness of the vessel against four entities: Cooper/Ports America, LLC, Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc., Cooper Marine & Timberlands Corp., and Cooper Timberlands Inc (hereinafter the “Texas Defendants”).

Plimsoll Marine, Inc. (“Plimsoll”) asserted that, at all relevant times, it was the owner and operator of the M/V MARGARET, as well as Lewis’s Jones Act employer. While Plimsoll was not directly named as a defendant in the Texas litigation, as the owner of the M/V MARGARET it decided to avail itself of its rights under the Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 30511, and filed a Complaint for Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability.


On the same day, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims & Asset Forfeiture Actions, Plimsoll also filed an Ex-Parte Motion and Incorporated Memorandum for Order Approving Petitioners-in-Limitation’s Bond, Affidavit of Valuation, and Ad Interim Stipulation and Directing Issuance of Notice to Claimants and Restraining Prosecution of Claims. When the Court granted this Motion, it instituted a stay on all pending actions against Plimsoll and the M/V MARGARET. In recognition of this Stay, the Texas Defendants filed a Notice of Stay seeking to enjoin Lewis’s Texas state court action. On January 27, 2020 the Court issued a Notice requiring that all prospective claimants file claims, in writing, with the Court on or before April 15, 2020, or be defaulted. As of that date, claims had been filed on behalf of David Lewis, Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc., and Cooper Marine & Timberlands Corp.

Before proceedings could begin, Lewis filed a Motion to lift the stay, asserting that the stay should only apply to Plimsoll, the vessel’s owner, and not extend to the four defendants in the Texas litigation. Lewis requested that the Court lift the stay to prohibit “gamesmanship.”

n requesting that the stay be lifted, Lewis asserted that because Plimsoll was not a party to the state court action, the Court could not enjoin the Texas litigation. Lewis argued that the Texas Defendants were improperly benefitting from the stay instituted by the Court, and that “there was a simple solution” if the Texas Defendants wished to avail themselves of the protections of the Act—”join with Plimsoll as a petitioner in this case.”

However, the Texas Defendants did not have that option. The Limitation Act only permits the “owner” of a vessel to bring a limitation of liability action. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30511(a). Plimsoll Marine had alleged that it was the owner of the M/V MARGARET, as well as Lewis’s Jones Act employer, and therefore that its property was at issue here. Therefore, upon receiving notice that its property was subject to a claim, Plimsoll—not the Texas Defendants—was the only entity legally entitled to file a limitation action.

Given that the state court litigation was properly stayed, the Court then had to whether there was a valid reason to lift the stay. Here, Plimsoll could be exposed to liability in excess of the limitation fund. The value of the M/V MARGARET was $324,305.55. Lewis sought “monetary relief over $1,000,000.” Therefore, his damages could exceed the limitation fund. However, he had not made any stipulation to assure the Court and Plimsoll that his claims would not exceed the limitation

fund. Therefore, Plimsoll’s right to limitation would not be adequately protected if the stay were lifted. As such, the Court properly maintained jurisdiction and would proceed to adjudicate the merits of Plimsoll’s petition.

The Court found that if, after the completion of discovery, Lewis could demonstrate either that the value of his claims was less than the value of the limitation fund or that neither Plimsoll nor its property was implicated in the underlying Texas litigation, Lewis could re-urge his motion. The Court denied David Lewis’s Motion to Lift Stay.

Submitted by JAP

Maintenance & Cure

Davis v. Brunsman, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16348 (D. Ore. Jan. 28, 2021)

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied a seaman’s motion to compel cure because such motion had to be determined under a summary-judgment standard and genuine issues of material fact existed as to seaman’s initial entitlement to cure.

Seaman, a deckhand aboard the fishing vessel, sued the owner of the vessel for injuries he allegedly suffered when the vessel sank in a storm. Eventually he requested authority for the cervical spine fusion surgery, which was denied by the owner based on the lack of evidence that seaman’s cervical condition was causally related to the subject incident. Seaman moved to compel surgery under the owner’s cure obligation. Seaman contended that once a shipowner initiates payment for maintenance and cure, the shipowner must produce unequivocal medical evidence to terminate such benefits, with any doubts to be resolved in the seaman’s favor. The owner contended that a seaman bears the burden to prove the injury “occurred, was aggravated by, or became manifest in service of the vessel” and because a motion to compel cure essentially allows a party to obtain a pre-trial judgment, a motion to compel cure should be decided under a summary judgment standard.

In deciding the applicable legal standard, Magistrate Judge Acosta reviewed the authorities, including the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC., 889 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2018), and concluded that seaman’s initial entitlement to cure had to be decided under a summary judgment standard. Under that standard, there


were significant issues of causation and relatedness: (1) the proper diagnosis of the cause for seaman’s neck and radiating arm pain; (2) whether that condition occurred or became aggravated during his service on the vessel; and (3) whether the surgery was a necessary and proper cure, which precluded summary determination. However, Magistrate Judge Acosta indicated that the court would be willing to address these issues in an expedited, bifurcated trial, which the vessel owner did not oppose.

Submitted by AAE

Maritime Liens

Moore v. M/V Sunny United States, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4505 (11th Cir. Feb. 17, 2021)

This action arose in 2018 when Plaintiff Edward Moore filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the M/V SUNNY USA (the “Vessel”), a 73-foot motor yacht, seeking to foreclose on a maritime lien for necessaries provided to the Vessel while it was docked at Plaintiff’s private dock. He also alleged breach of maritime contract based on unpaid docking fees and other expenses, and negligence based on the Vessel owner’s failure to prepare and moor the Vessel properly, which damaged the dock during a hurricane.

The district court issued an arrest warrant for Vessel under Supplemental Rule C. John Dong, the owner of the Vessel (the “Owner”), appeared pro se as an interested party and moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it was a fraud upon the Court and that it was part of Plaintiff’s extortion scheme to collect for grossly over charged services provided to the Vessel or for services that were never rendered to the Vessel. However, the Owner did not file a statement of right or interest.

Plaintiff moved for an interlocutory sale of the Vessel under Supplemental Rule E(9)(a), asserting that: (1) the Vessel was deteriorating while docked pending the resolution of the action; (2) the cost of keeping the Vessel docked was disproportionate to any remaining equity in it; and (3) no one had come forward asserting a claim to the Vessel since it was arrested. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion and ordered the Vessel be sold at auction. The court also granted a default judgment against Owner.

The Owner filed a supplemental statement of interest in the Vessel along with several motions. He moved for

reconsideration of the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss, arguing that he had already identified himself as the Vessel’s owner and that the district court thus erred in denying his motion for lack of standing. He also moved to stay the case because of criminal proceedings pending against him. Finally, he moved to stay the interlocutory sale pending his appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and asked the court to set a bond for the Vessel in an amount no more than the amount of the necessaries that Plaintiff had allegedly provided.

The district court granted Owner’s motions, in part. The district court set aside its earlier default and reinstated Owner’s motion to dismiss finding that it would be manifestly unjust to deny Owner standing to contest the sale of the Vessel merely because he failed to comply with Supplemental Rule C and construed Owner’s motion to dismiss as a verified and timely filed statement of interest in the Vessel. The district court ultimately denied Owner’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that his claims were unsupported, denied Owner’s motions to stay the case and interlocutory sale. However, the court did set a bond to release the Vessel and instructed Owner to deposit a $60,000.00 security bond with the court by a date certain. Owner failed to deposit the bond and the Vessel was sold at auction.

After an untimely attempt to post a bond and unsuccessfully attempting to invoke the “mailbox rule” to toll case deadlines based on his incarceration at the time of several relevant deadlines, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact in the case because Owner had breached the dockage contract and the arrest and sale of the Vessel had been proper. Owner responded with a myriad of unsupported claims of fraud and extortion in his defense.

The district court granted Plaintiff’s summary judgment finding that Owner failed to timely post the required bond, the Vessel had already been sold, and that Plaintiff had established an entitlement to both a maritime lien and the sale proceeds from the auction. Not detoured, Owner timely appealed.

On appeal, Owner argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff because Plaintiff failed to establish the elements of a maritime lien.

The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that


the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and properly asserted in rem jurisdiction, explaining that the provision of necessaries to the Vessel in a manner satisfying the Lien Act provided the district court with admiralty jurisdiction. Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2010). It also found that the district court properly asserted in rem jurisdiction through the maritime lien because Plaintiff set out the elements of a maritime lien.

Owner argued that the district court’s entry of summary judgment was improper because disputed issues of material fact still existed as to the propriety of the maritime lien. However, the Eleventh Circuit again affirmed the district court’s ruling noting that based on Plaintiff’s dockage lease and his sworn declaration, the following facts were undisputed and established the basis for a maritime lien: (1) there was a docking agreement between Plaintiff and Owner, that (2) involved the Vessel. Owner did not dispute those facts in the district court case or on appeal.

Submitted by SMM

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Shivers v. BP, P.L.C. (In re Deepwater Horizon), 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 645 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2021)

Plaintiffs Bradley Shivers, Scott Russell and Mark Mead (Plaintiffs) filed suit against BP and other defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of performing rescue operations in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon explosion. The lower court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a cause of action as to negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit claiming that they raised a plausible cause of action both under the physical-injury test and the zone of danger test.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the action. The Fifth Circuit analyzed the physical-injury test, which allows a plaintiff to recover for an emotional injury provided there is some physical contact. Plaintiffs did not plead that they sustained physical injuries significant enough to meet the physical-injury test. More importantly, Plaintiff did not plead that their emotional injuries were caused from any physical injury; instead such injuries were caused by observing the explosion and resulting devastation. Further, Plaintiffs were not within the objective zone

of danger, which requires a plaintiff to be in the same location as the accident and face immediate risk of harm. Here, Plaintiffs were never closer than 100 to 200 feet from the rig that exploded. Additionally, Plaintiffs were able to leave the dangerous area and did so when they determined that they could be of no further help. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Submitted by JAY

Practice and Procedure

In re Lohengrin, Ltd., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31312 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2021)

This action arose out of a vessel fire while the subject vessel, the M/Y Lohengin (“Vessel”), was docked in the water at the Universal Marine Center (UMC) located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida while undergoing extensive repairs. The fire and efforts to fight same resulted in significant damages to UMC. Petitioner filed a complaint for exoneration or limitation of liability. UMC responded by filing an answer and a claim to Petitioner’s complaint alleging breach of contract and negligence. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the claim arguing that Respondent failed to state claims for breach of contract because the claim did not allege a nexus between the alleged breach and Respondent’s purported damages. Petitioner also sought dismissal of the negligence claim arguing Respondent improperly commingled multiple theories of liability into a single count.

Petitioner first argued that Respondent failed to allege that the purported breach of the agreement caused the fire aboard the Vessel. In response, Respondent argued that it is not required to prove why the fire occurred but only that Petitioner was required to indemnify Respondent for damages caused by the fire pursuant to the Agreement. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida found for Respondent stating that it had alleged sufficient facts showing how Petitioner had failed to indemnify Respondent for damages resulting from the fire to the Vessel, pursuant to the Agreement.

Petitioners also argued that Respondent alleged three different and distinct legal theories sounding in negligence, gross negligence, and negligence per se, all of which must be pled as separate claims. Respondent admitted alleging three theories but did not address


Petitioner’s argument that they must be pled separately. The Southern District of Florida held in favor of Petitioner and dismissed Respondent’s negligence claims without prejudice with leave to amend.

Submitted by SMM

In re Martinez, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40534 (S.D. Fla. March 4, 2021)

This matter arose from a two-boat collision on December 30, 2019 involving a 22-foot Cape Horn vessel owned and operated by Petitioner Michael Martinez, and a 32-foot Contender vessel owned and operated by Claimant Eric Reynolds. Both Martinez and Reynolds suffered injuries and pursued injury claims against each other. On January 24, 2019, Reynolds filed a Petition for Limitation of Liability. Martinez filed his injury claim against Reynolds in that Limitation action, and Reynolds filed his injury claim against Martinez as a compulsory counterclaim to Martinez’s claim in the Limitation action.

A settlement agreement was entered whereby Reynolds’ insurer, tendered Reynolds’ policy limits to Martinez and the injured passengers on Martinez’s vessel, in exchange for a release of all actions and causes of action that could or should have been brought against him in connection with the subject boat crash. On September 21, 2020, Martinez signed a release which released Reynolds from all future actions of any manner, related in any way to the collision.

The Notice of Settlement was thereafter filed, and the Court entered an Order on the Notice of Settlement on October 22, 2020. Martinez did not dispute that he signed the release at issue and accepted the settlement funds from Reynolds. The issue was whether Martinez’s Petition for Exoneration or Limitation of Liability was barred by the settlement agreement and release Martinez signed weeks prior to filing his Petition. Martinez released Reynolds from “all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action” that could have been brought by Martinez in connection with the subject boating collision. The Court had to decide whether Limitation of Liability is a manner of action and/or cause of action, encompassed by the plain language of the release Martinez signed.

An action for Exoneration or Limitation of Liability, such as the Petition Martinez filed, is a civil action arising in admiralty law. The unambiguous language of the release clearly established the parties’ assent to release Reynolds from “all manner of action” and

“causes of action,” arising “in admiralty,” and “which might arise in the future,” in connection with the subject boating collision. Martinez’s Petition was exactly the kind of action that Martinez expressly released. As such, Martinez’s Petition was barred by the release and the action was dismissed with prejudice.

In the case at hand, Martinez had filed a petition/complaint for limitation of liability despite having signed a release whereby he agreed not to bring any future action or causes of action, in any manner, arising in admiralty or law, stemming from the subject boat collision. Martinez could not circumvent the purpose and effect of the settlement agreement and release, which was to ensure that Reynolds would have no further legal action instigated against him in any way in connection with the accident, by claiming that his petition was merely a “defense.”

Martinez’s Petition for Limitation of Liability was a civil action in admiralty and was specifically released by Martinez in the settlement of his claim against Reynolds. Thus, the Court found that the Petition at issue was filed in breach of the binding settlement and release. Accordingly, the Court granted Claimant Eric Reynolds’ Motion to Dismiss or Strike Martinez’s Petition and dismissed Petitioner Michael Martinez’s Petition for Exoneration or Limitation of Liability with prejudice.

Submitted by JAP

Seamen

Adams v. All Coast, L.L.C., 988 F.3d 203 (5th Cir 2021)

All Coast hired William Adams as an able-bodied seaman to work on its fleet of liftboats that serviced offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Despite his job title, Adams maintained that his main duty had nothing to do with maritime work. Instead, Adams spent much of his time operating a hydraulic crane to move personnel and equipment between the liftboat and the dock, offshore worksite platforms, and other vessels, as well as on the liftboat itself. Adams claimed that because he was really a crane operator and not a seaman, All Coast owed him unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).

Adams filed a collective action on behalf of himself and other similarly-situated All Coast mates, deckhands, ordinary seamen, and able-bodied seamen, who all claimed that their job titles hid their true task: crane operator. Adams and the other crew member plaintiffs


claimed that they spent no less than 80 percent of their time in the jacked-up, stationary position. Indeed, for some jobs or “hitches,” the boats were jacked up 100 percent of the time. Regardless of the duration of the hitch, they never used the cranes when the boats were underway. All told, the district court found that the plaintiffs “spent between 25% and 90% of their day operating the crane.” The plaintiffs all ate, slept, and worked aboard a boat. Further, when they weren’t operating the cranes, they performed traditional maritime functions under the command of the boat’s captain.

All Coast did not pay the crew and cooks overtime because it classified them as exempt seamen under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6). All Coast first filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court converted to summary judgment and then denied as premature. But the district court later granted summary judgment for All Coast. The court found that the cooks were exempt seamen because All Coast crew members ate at every meal the cooks prepared. And although the crew spent as much as 90 percent of their time operating the cranes, they too were exempt seamen because the liftboat crane operation was a “service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of such vessel as a means of transportation.” 29 C.F.R. § 783.31. Plaintiffs appealed.

In a dispute about an FLSA exemption, the employer has the burden of establishing that the exemption applies by a preponderance of the evidence. Faludi v. U.S. Shale Sols., L.L.C., 950 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 2020).

The FLSA’s baseline requirement is that any employee who works “longer than forty hours” in a workweek must be compensated “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). “An employee is not protected by this broad prohibition, however, if he falls within an exemption.” Coffin v. Blessey Marine Servs., Inc., 771 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2014). Among the exemptions is “any employee employed as a seaman.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6). The Court looks primarily to the Department of Labor’s regulations to determine the definition of seaman. According to those criteria, an employee is a seaman if: “(1) the employee is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master; and (2) the employee’s service is primarily offered to aid the vessel as a means of transportation, provided that the employee does not perform a substantial amount of different work.” Coffin, 771 F.3d at 281 (citing 29 C.F.R.

§ 783.31). The dispute in this case revolved around the second prong, particularly whether using a crane aids in a liftboat’s operation as a means of transportation.

The appellate court found that the plaintiffs were engaged in seaman’s work when they performed their nautical duties, but not when using the hydraulic cranes. Here, the plaintiffs were not doing seamen’s work when they were operating the cranes. The disputed question is whether their service operating the cranes was “offered to aid the vessel as a means of transportation.” 29 C.F.R. § 783.31. It was not. The plaintiffs’ loading and unloading duties were not “integrated with their many other duties.” Instead, once they finished their duties as the boat’s crew, the plaintiffs turned their attention exclusively to operating the cranes. It was as though they were performing two discrete jobs: upkeep of the boat and operation of the crane.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for All Coast. As the district court said, because of the substantial amount of time the plaintiffs spent operating the cranes, “if crane operation—in this context—is not seaman’s work[,] then Plaintiffs . . . cannot qualify as seamen.” The Appellate Court held that it was not seamen’s work, and they could not qualify as seamen—not while they were operating the cranes. The Appellate Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with their holding.

The Appellate Court also stated that All Coast was not entitled to summary judgment as to the cooks either. Like any other crew member, a cook is a seaman “if, as is the usual case, [his] service is” “rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of such vessel as a means of transportation, provided he performs no substantial amount of work of a different character.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 783.31, 32. The Court found that fact questions precluded summary judgment for All Coast. The Appellate Court stated that on remand, the district court would need to determine how much time the cooks spent preparing food for the crew when they were not performing seamen’s work, and how much time they spent preparing food for non-crew members. If that adds up to a “substantial” amount, then they, like the crane-operating crew members, were not doing seamen’s work.

Submitted by JAP


ContributorsAAE

JAY

JAP

SMM

Alena A. EckhardtHinshaw & Culbertson, [email protected]

Jeffrey A. YarbroughMoseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & [email protected]

Joni Alexis PoitierMoseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & [email protected]

Shea Michael MoserMoseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]





Adams v. All Coast, L.L.C., 988 F.3d 203 (5th Cir 2021)...................................................97

Arafa v. Health Express Corporation, 239 N.J. 516 (2019).........................................84

Barnes v. Sea Hawaii Rafting, LLC., 889 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2018)....................................94

Brown v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1991)........................92

Butts v. ALN Grp., LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4259 (S.D. Fla. Jan 8, 2021).........92

Campbell v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4080 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021).........................................................91

Coffin v. Blessey Marine Servs., Inc., 771 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2014)....................................98

Colon v. Strategic Delivery Sols., LLC, 459 N.J. Super. 349 (App. Div. 2019).............84

Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d 864 (11th Cir. 2010)...................96

Davis v. Brunsman, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16348 (D. Ore. Jan. 28, 2021)...................94

Faludi v. U.S. Shale Sols., L.L.C., 950 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2020)....................................98

Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)........84

In re Lohengrin, Ltd., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31312 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2021)...............96

In re Martinez, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40534 (S.D. Fla. March 4, 2021).........................97

In re Ocean Angel V, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45178 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2021).........................................................93

In re Plimsoll Marine, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51295 (M.D. La. March 17, 2021).........................................................93

Kozur v. F/V Atlantic Bounty, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-cv-08750 slip op., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148633 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2020), appeal docketed (No. 20-2911 3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2020)...................................82

Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2005).........................................92

Mildworm v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)........................................84

Moore v. M/V Sunny United States, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4505 (11th Cir. Feb. 17, 2021).........................................................95

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Int’l Marine Corp., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24006 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2021)......................................90

Osgood v. Discount Auto Parts, LLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Fla. 2013).................92

Pacific Gulf Shipping Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9058 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2021).......90

Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d. Cir. 2004)....................................85

Rittman v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020)...........................................84

Table of Cases


Shelter Forest International Acquisition, Inc. v. Cosco Shipping (USA) Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1941 (D. Ore. Jan. 6, 2021).........................................................91

Shivers v. BP, P.L.C. (In re Deepwater Horizon), 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 645 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2021).....................................96

Summers-Wood L.P. v. Wolf, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108827 (N.D. Fla. May 23 2008).........................................................92

Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875)........84

Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)........................................................84

Waithaka v, Amazon, Inc., 966 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020)..................................................84

W. Star Yacht, LLC v. Seattle Lakes Cruises, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32198 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2021)....................................92


BENEDICT’S MARITIME BULLETIN EDITORIAL BOARDContact Information

Joshua S. Force(Editor-in-Chief)

Sher Garner Cahill Richter Klein & Hilbert, L.L.C.New Orleans, LA

[email protected]

Robert J. Zapf(Managing Editor)

Rancho Mirage, [email protected]

Bruce A. King(Past Chairperson MarineFinancing Committee)Maritime Law [email protected]

Dr. James C. KraskaHoward S. Levie Professor of International LawThe Stockton Center for the Study of International LawUnited States Naval War College686 Cushing RoadNewport, Rhode Island [email protected]

Dr. Norman A. Martinez-Gutiérrez(International Maritime Law; Scholarly Notes and Papers)IMO International Maritime Law InstituteP.O. Box 31, Msida MSD 01 [email protected]

Francis X. Nolan, III(President, Maritime Law Association)Vedder Price P.C.1633 Broadway, 47th FloorNew York, NY [email protected]

Anthony J. PruzinskyHill Rivkins LLP45 Broadway, Suite 1500New York, NY [email protected]









CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS TO THIS ISSUE

Contact Information

Tahlia TownsendWiggin and Dana LLP, Washington, DC & New Haven, [email protected]

Brian McEwing, Reeves McEwing LLP, Philadelphia, PA & Dorchester, NJ [email protected]


Bryant E. GardnerWinston & Strawn LLPWashington, [email protected]



SUBSCRIPTION QUESTIONS?

If you have any questions about the status of your subscription, please call your Matthew Bender representative, or call our Customer Service line at 1-800-833-9844.

ATTENTION READERS

Any reader interested in sharing information of interest to the admiralty bar, including notices of upcoming seminars, newsworthy events, ‘‘war stories,’’ copies of advisory opinions, or relevant correspondence should direct this information to the Managing Editor, Robert Zapf, [email protected], or Cathy Seidenberg, Legal Editor, [email protected].

If you are interested in writing for the BULLETIN, please contact Cathy Seidenberg at [email protected].

The articles in this BULLETIN represent the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of theEditorial Board or Editorial Staff of this BULLETIN or of LexisNexis Matthew Bender.



mailto:Cathy.J.Seidenberg@ lexisnexis.com

mailto:Cathy.J.Seidenberg@ lexisnexis.com


BENEDICT’S MARITIME BULLETIN is now available online at Lexis.com and can be found by selecting the ‘‘Area of Law – By Topic’’ tab and then selecting ‘‘Admiralty’’, and is available on Lexis Advance and can be found by ‘‘Browse’’ > ‘‘By Practice Area’’ > ‘‘Admiralty & Maritime Law’’.

The Rising Tide of Maritime Financial Sanctions Risk

Documents

Transcript of The Rising Tide of Maritime Financial Sanctions Risk