The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces (June 1980) DECLASSIFIED

8/12/2019 The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces (June 1980) DECLASSIFIED

1/28


2/28

I DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 4 3I:I lI'IIIiII

II 'I'II'

- .

- -

l--


3/28

6jI

. .

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 004003

l p ....

TH READINESS OF SOVIETN V l FORCES

Top Sec t


4/28

. ..

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 004003

BL NK P GE


5/28

I

II


Top ecret

PREF CE

This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was commissioned bythe Director of Central Intelligence in response to a request by theSecretary of Defense for an in-depth analysis of the readiness of theSoviet Navy. In some rest ects, the memorandum breaks new analyticalground in assessing a number of subjective issues, such as the quality ofpersonnel and the effectiveness of training, which do not lendthemselves readily to analysis by traditional methods. There is nospecific information cutoff date in this memorandum; informationthrough the end of 1979 has been used in most cases.

The memorandum was produced under the auspices of the NationalIntelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. I t was drafted by

[ JNational Foreign Assessment Center, CIA,with contributions by the Office of Naval Intelligence, the DefenseIntelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. The memoran] .dum was prepared under the chairmanship oAssistant National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. It- . - w s coordinated with the intelligence components of the Departmentsof State and Defense and within the National Foreign AssessmentCenter, CIA.

ll

TGS 8 65 8 Tsf


6/28

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 004003'

BL NK P GE


7/28

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 4 3

CONTENTS

Readiness viiAvailability .......................................................... .............................................. viiiCombat Effectiveness ...................................................................................... viiiThe Forces ........................................................................................................ xivThe Soviet avy in Wart ime ...................................................................... xviiOutlook .................................................................................. ............................ xxA Note on Intell igence Sources and Analysis .......................................... xxii

~ ~

ageEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................... ........... vii

IIj

1vTGS 8 JG 8 }


8/28


r

II{I

. -

- . ...

viTCS 865 r:J ep


9/28

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 4 3op ac ret

.. .. .. ' ,

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYIn the past 20 years, the Soviet Navy has acquired an impressive

inventory of modern materiel as it has evolved from a coastal defenseforce into a navy with global missions. Modern surface ships,submarines, and aircraft have significantly increased its capabilitiesover this period. Nevertheless, we have found personnel and materieldeficiencies that impair its readiness to fight a major war with NATO.'

he readiness policies of the Soviet Navy have a substantial impacton its ability to fight a major war, and for NATO's warning of war:

he Soviet Navy is operationally postured to fight a short,intense war, and its potential for "first salvo'' operations inwaters near the Sovie.t Union has been maximized at the expenseof its. capabilities for sustained operations.he Soviet Navy, consistent with the readiness policieS of theGeneral Staff, anticipates a "period of tension" before a majorconflict in which it would raise the readiness of its forces.Without such warning, the Soviet Navy would be ill prepared tofight a major war. Extensive and extraordinary predeployment

and other preparations of Soviet naval units would probablyprovide NATO with a wide range of indications that the USSRwas preparing for war.- Geography will continue to be a major factor in Soviet navaloperations. Forces at sea in the Atlantic, Pacific, andMediterranean risk isolation, and those in some home flee ts rtskbeing bottled up, causing the Soviets to emphasize predeploy

ment and early alert. Readiness

This assessment presents four perspectives on Soviet naval read iness :An analysis of the determinants of readiness.An examination . of the readiness of principal ship types.

1 The directors of the tn tdligence agencies of the Dt:r>tHtment of Dcf. nsc bclteve IMI the overall thnul- - . ~ this memorond11m is nega tive. Their oicws ore deta iled ot the end of th :ucut ive Summorv. on

P Jge n v.

VIITGp ~ ' ' '


10/28

: I


ep G sccet

A discussion of the readiness of the forces to accomplish themajor missions of the Navy in wartime.The outlook for naval readiness through the 1980s.

We have treated readiness as a function of the availability of ships andnaval aircraft to conduct combat operations under varying stages ofalert and of what the Soviets term combat effectiven ess-the aggregateof crew proficiency, adequacy of materiel, and quality of sup Qrt(including maintenance, other aspects of sustainability, and command,control, communications, and intelligence).Availability

The Soviet Navy s approach to readiness, consistent with that ofother Soviet armed forces, stresses conservation of resources to generatemaximum force for the initial phase of operations in a general war.Normally, about 1 percent of major surface combatants andsubmarines are immediately available[

\ summarizes our estimate t of availability,showing the number orsubmarines and surface -combatants that couldbe prepared for operations within specified periods after receiving analert notice. We believe that this sample is representative of the normalpeacetime availability of Soviet naval units.[

Combat EffectivenessWe can assess with confidence the performance potential of Sovietnaval ships or aircraft on the basis of what we know of their design. Butc 1

V

TG5 8t6 fJ Tep etfll l


11/28

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 004003' ilIII -I lep e e ~ *I

... .. -.- .I .I . ... ..

.Ij IIIIIIIi';

II:IIIIIIII - -III IiI'I .II -I :: : ...II IXTG 8 89 T eeretI .I


12/28

; TGS 8165 @


Tep 6eerel

whether the pote.ntial of that naval materiel would actually e realizedin wartime depends upon:

Personnel proficiency:Reliability and maintainability of the equipment.Sustainability.Command, control, communications, and intelligence.

Our judgments concerning these must . necessarily e less sure,depending as they do on more diffuse and ambiguous evidence. Toassess available evidence on the subject, we pursued an analyticalexamination of the above determinants. We also conducted a Delphisurvey ' of selected Intelligence Community analysts in order to gain adifferent perspective.In the survey we systematically polled analytical opinion on howeffective Soviet naval units would be in executing specific wartimemissions, given 25 days" alert of impending combat. There wasconsensus that the Soviet naval units available for use in the early stagesof a war could develop about 75 percent of their potential, performancebeing adversely affected chiefly by lack of training and operationalexperience, other personnel shortcomings, and equipment deficiencies.Whatever the merits of the Delphi survey, we placed greater weight onour more rigorous analytical assessment which presents a detailedinquiry into the determinants of readiness summarized below.

Personnel Readiness. Serious personnel problems have attractedthe attention of both the naval arid the national leadership. The Navyhas a large professional officer corps and a small cadre (about 8 percentof personnel) of warrant officers and extended-duty servicemen(volunteers who reenlist beyond the required three-year term), butdepends on conscription for about 75 percent of its manpower. Theconscript reenlistment rate is low probably less than 5 percent andperhaps as low as I or 2 percent and the continuous influx ofinexperienced personnel places a heavy burden on the Navy's trainingprograms. Because so few conscripts reenlist, there is always a shortageof experienced and skilled enlisted personnel for lower level supervisoryand technical positions. Soviet naval conscripts aboard ship serve threeyears, as opposed to two years for those serving ashore.

We have observed marked command concern about drunkenness,poor discipline, and other evidence of low morale, particularly at the

Far agcncv reseroaHons on the nature and use o the Dclplli su 'v. su: foot noll 3 of chapter IIand I. 2 and 3 of annez B

XTep ieee e l


13/28

DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 004003lop Geeo .

many Soviet naval bases located in remote and inhospitable areas. Many. of these problems would disappear in wartime, but they probablywould impact negatively on Soviet naval wartime performance,; i n c i p a l l y because of the loss of peacetime training opportunities.Some in the Intelligence o m m u n i ~ y have a different p e r ~ n e c t i v ehowever. They 4 believe that the Navy has achieved its peacetimetraining goals, and that Soviet naval performance in peacetimedemonstrates no appreciable impairments traceable to poor morale.

Although the Soviet Navy is accorded high priority for qualityrecruits, its increasingly complex equipment puts ever higher demandson its training system. Training for all enlisted ranks is overspecializedand often unrealistic. Individuals are typically trained to perform onetask in one set of circumstances; there is little opportunity for anindividual to perform any specialty but his own; and there is littleincentive to exceed ..book capabilities or applications. Soviet trainingevidently often fails to inculcate among officers and seamen alikeindependent thinking and tactical flexibility. Although naval leadersstress the requirement that officers develop initiative, flexibility, andresourcefulness, the development of these qualities is often impeded inpractice. For example, exercises at sea are usually stereotyped crewdrills in which command initiative is neither encouraged nornecessary.

Major exercises at fleet or combined-arms levels, on the other hand,recently have tended toward more complex and realistic scenarios.5These exercises remain, however, relatively infrequent, and most crewshave not been so trained.

There is disagreement in the Community over the impact of these_ P5 rsonnel shortcomings. Some 6 believe that personnel shortcomings willexacerbate equipment deficiencies, reducing the Navy s ability torespond to the unexpected and to perform even its initial wartime tasks.The holders of this view further believe that the Soviet Navy is not

The h o l d e ~ of this lllew are tht: Director, Defense lntelligenct: Agt:nc11: the Director of NaoolIntelligence, Departmt:nt of tht: Navu: the Dlrt:ctor, National Securitl Agencu: the Director ofJntt:lligence, Headquartt:rs . Marine Corps; the Assistant Chief of Staff /or Intelligence. Departme nt o/the t'\rm11: and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of tht: t'\ir Force.

1 The Director of Naool lntt:lligence, Departmt:nt o/tht: Navv. and the Director, Di /ense IntelligenceAgencv. note that a trend toward Increased complt:ritl and realism is also discernible, below the /Jutlevel, In exercises v forllJ(lrd-deploued Sovit:t naval forces . A prime exomp/e of this is the growth in thefle:rlbilitva nd diversitfl o tht: anticarrier e:rercises which are f requt:ntlu conducted in the Mediterran l anand have been o b s e r v e ~ e c t : n l l v In the Indian Ocean. These e.ercises involve multiple platforms[

in coordinated tactics directed at major US units. On the -scent US ol>ser.' 'rs .moreover, have judge them to be sophisticated and profeuionallu executed.

- The holders of this alew are the Direc tor of Central lntelltgence and the Director. National Forc1 11n- t'\uess ment Center. CIA.

XITC5 8166 81 Tep 6e rel


14/28

OECLA.SSIFIED Authority NN 004003

T S JGS fJ

I

manned or trained to fight - a lengthy war, and that personnelshortcomings seriously degrade Soviet capabilities for prolongedcombat. Others 7 believe that Soviet naval personnel are adequatelytrained to perform the Navy's wartime tasks, regardless of the length ofthe war, and, moreover, that commanding officers and crews havedemonstrated the ability to react quickly and effectively to unexpected,rapidly unfolding situations.

Soviet officers and sailors, when deployed away from home waters,do not eonduct high levels of extensive underway training regarded asessential for readiness in most NATO navies. However, there isdisagreement over how much underway training is conducted in homewaters, where the vast majority of naval units are at any one. ime. One view 1 is that the Soviets do not conduct underway training in homewaters sufficient to assure wartime readiness. The holders of this viewbelieve that the Soviet limitations on peacetime equipment use, whenconsidered on a unit-by-unit basis, apply to naval units in home waters.Others 9 believe that the evidence supports a judgment that in-areaunderway training . is extensive and adequate to provide both thereadiness and the level of ..combat effectiveness the Soviets require.

Materiel Reliabilitu and Maintainabilitv. Materiel reliability andmaintainability reflect a variety of factors, including design, materialsand method of manufacture, and the efficiency of personnel whomaintain and operate the equipment. Soviet equipment casualties-breakdown of materiel in service are due in many instances not onlyto bad design or manufacture, but also to inadequate, incorrect, ornonexistent performance of required maintenance. Although standardsas high s those applied in the most efficient Western naval units aremaintained aboard some Soviet ships, substandard units appear to bemore common and probably remain in worse condition longer. 10Moreover, we know that Soviet naval officers often tolerate evendisguise important shortcomings in materiel readiness: On the onehand, Soviet naval weapon system design stresses simplicity, speed,redundancy, and the achievement of maximum firepower. On the otherhand, we know that throughout the Soviet Navy there are equipmentdeficiencies that in some cases critically handicap successful missionperformance.

' The holders of this view are the Director. De/enu lnte/Jigena l gencv ond the Dirutor of NoiXllIntelligence. Deportment of the Naov.

' The laoldcu of this oiew are the Director o/ untral lntelligenu ond the Oirutor Notionol ForeignAuessment Center CIA

' The holders o/ this ulew are the Director. De/enu Intelligence Agencv. and the l ;r;:ctor of NaiXJIlntdligence . Deportment of the Naov.

The Direc tor. Defense /rlldligence Agencv. and the Director o f Naoal lntd/igencc. c p o r t m n ~ t o/the Nauv. arc awore of no anolvsis which defines ubstandard ships in the Soviet Nauv or com-pores anvsuch ships wit/, those of Western un.iiS in terms eitht:r of their condition or t l t of i n t ~ it ~ r s i s t s

xuTep beerel


15/28


Top e181

The Soviet Navy's policies on maintenance and training do little toredress difficulties occasioned by human interface.with m a t e r i e l : s i ~ q ethe Soviets construe readiness of materiel to mean new or freshly : ; ;f>verhauled, they limit operations at sea. Ships of the Soviet fleetnormally spend much of their time in port, many undergoing majormaintenance.

Most major maintenance is shore based, and complicated underwayrepair aboard ship generally is not done in the Soviet Navy. Hence, thismaintenance system would function best at the outset of a major war,but would probably impose significant operational limitations in theevent of protracted conflict.

Sustainabilitv. The Soviet Navy is not well designed to support itsfleets in an extended conflicl Its ability to sustain combat operationsdistant from its shore bases is limited. even for relatively close maritimetheaters such as the Norwegian Sea. Most participants in this studybelieve that the Soviet Navy's sustainability probably is adequate formost of the tasks for which the Navy is designed. One participant 11believes, however, that sustainability could be a serious problem forSoviet naval forces even during a short war. All agree that limitations insustainability would, however, e a key vulnerability in an extendedconflict.

While Soviet doctrine holds that protracted warfare is possible, theSoviets evidently have not regarded a long campaign at sea as likely.They have provided few naval ships for afloat logistic support beyondthose required for peacetime operations. For example, there is littlecapability for underway replenishment of munitions. Most large Sovietsurface combatants have fuel capacity for about seven days, andthereafter would be dependent on support from oilers. Soviet longrange submarines can cruise for two months or longer, but would, incombat, probably require munitions resupply much sooner. Should a- protracted campaign become necessary, the Soviet Navy would bedependent on use of merchant ships and improvised logist ics. The lackof extensive preparations by the Soviet Navy for fighting a protractedwar would be a serious, and potentially critical, liability if the warshould extend beyond the relatively short period for which the Navy isoptimally designed.11

The holder of this otew Is the Director, National Foreign 1\uessmen t Center, C li\ .The following comment Is mtJde bv the Dtrector of NaiXll Intell igence. Department of the Navv: the

Dlrt:e1-or, Defense Intelligence 1\gencv: and the Director o Intelligence , Ht:lldQ


16/28


Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. Sovietnaval doctrine for these functions, s well as the equipment andorganizational structtiiefsupporting them, appears generally to enhancethe readiness of the Navy_to earry out its mission. This would beparticularly true in the case o f . .J a period of threat (international tension) lasting a few days toa few weeks, leading to a conventional war, followed by a sudden,massive nuclear strike against the NATO navies [ . _

JThe v i e t Navy's channels of communicationfrom fleet headquarters to operational forces in wartime probably couldbe kept open. However, the Soviet Navy's stereotyped peacetimeexercises and command rigidity would no doubt create wartimecommand and control problems on a tactical level: commanders are notoften exercised in coping with the unexpected. If a war were to beginsuddenly, supporting command and control structures would eseverely strained and could suffer breakdowns.One part of the Soviet command structure that could be the key toSoviet performance in a war is the afloat officer-in-tactical-command(OTC), the on-scene commander whose judgment could be critical inany combat operation.There is disagreement within the Intelligence Community over thedegree of freedom of authority allowed the OTC in c t ~ l practice byhigher headquarters. According to one view,13 the afloat Soviet OTC has

limited authority to begin with, and he tends to lose rather than gaintactical command and control responsibilities s an operation unfolds.[ JOthers 14 believe that there is a large body of evidence that indicatesSoviet Navy OTCs have a great deal more authority and responsibilitythan indicated above, and that the Soviet command and control systemis very flexible. They believe that the position on the OTC's lack offreedom fails to take into account the magnitude of coordinationrequired to execute a naval combat operation and of the fact thatcertain control functions can e performed only by the on-scene, afloatOTC.

TCS 3185 8 )

The ForcesSubmarine Force. The Soviets consider their large submarine forcetheir prime naval arm. Their nuclear-powered ballistic missile

The hclder of this view s the Director. Natanal Foreign Assessment Center. CIA.The holders of thu uicw are the Director, Defenu lnteUigenu Agencu: the Director of Naool

lntdligencc. Department of the Naou: and thl Director. National Securi/11 Agcncv

XIV


17/28


==iop Sec I

submarines SSBNs) are the Navy's contribution to the Soviets' overallstrategic strike mission and they are supported and protected by others u b m a r i ~ e s In addition, the submarine force has a role in nearly all

~ t h e r naval tasks antisubmarine warfare {ASW), anticarrier warfare,protection of amphibious operations and supply lines, interdiction ofenemy supply lines, and similar functions. Several limitations impair thereadiness of the submarine force:- Most Soviet submarines are noisy, a distinct disadvantagerelative to most of their Western counterparts.- Long-range submarine-launched cruise missiles need externaltargeting assistance.- Submarine-mounted ASW sensors have substantially less range

than those of their Western opponents, and the submarines insome areas are vulnerable to detection by the US SOSUS (broadarea sound surveillance system).- Soviet nuclear submarine propulsion systems have serious designfaults, including relatively short reactor core life and high noiselevels.- Geographic constraints force submarines to undertake long

transits to or from some wartime stations, or vulnerable transitsthrough narrow passages.

JOn the other hand:

T S Bl6 B

- The Soviets have the largest submarine force in the world.- The performance characteristics of some types of units makethem formidable threats: for example, the high speed of Sovietsubmarines, particularly the V and A classes, the apparent deep

diving reach of the A class, and the relatively Quiet submergedoperations (on battery power) of the F-class, T-class, or J-classdiesel units.- Some submarine weapon systems, such as the SS-N-3 or SS-N-12antiship missiles, are without peer in terms of range and

destructive power.[- Soviet nuclear submarine propulsion systems attain a high shafthorsepower. allowing higher speed with less volume.

XVTep eeret


18/28

I


p 6coet

Surface Force The surface fleet, which includes some 270 activema)or combatants (half over 3 ,000 tons) and about a hundredamphibious ships, is the most visible arm of the Soviet Navy, and carriesthe peacetime burden of Soviet ''show the flag operations throughout

; the world. The surface navy contributes directly to all wartime navaltasks except strategic strike. Certain weaknesses, however, impair thereadiness of the surface fleet:

~. . .TC 8166 8

- The Soviets' design philosophy, operational practices, andmaintenance system severely limit ability to perform maintenance at sea, impairing the availability of in-port units as well asthe serviceability of deployed units.

- Seaborne tactical air support is limited.The fleet cannot be defended against a substantial hostile airthreat when operating beyond Soviet coastal waters.

- ASW sensors are poor, rendering surface units vulnerable tosubmarine attack and limiting offensive ASW and the ability toprotect Soviet SSBNs.Most surface force exercises are canned and simplistic.Design and training inadequacies render surface warshipsespecially vuln.erable to battle damage.Few units carry reloads of cruise missiles, their most effectiveweapon systems, and the fleet has inadequately provided andtrained for at-sea ordnance replenishment.

On the other hand, Soviet surface units demonstrate the followingstrengthsThey have good speed, good sea-keeping abilities, and reliableengineering systems.They are equipped with a number of potentially effectiveweapon systems, such as antiship cruise missiles and torpedoes,and they often carry redundant weapon systems.The units are well designed for electronic warfare and foroperating in a CBR (chemical, biological , and radiological)warfare environment.

Naval Aviation The naval air force, with some 1,100 combataircra ft, contributes to all Soviet naval tasks . Naval air units, in theevent of war, are to provide reconnaissance, to conduct antiship andanti submarine strikes, to mine ports a nd a pproaches, and to strike landbased facilities (such as radar stations), in support of a va riety of

xviTop Sec l


19/28


military objectives. The primary readiness problems of Soviet navalaviation are: "". . Maintenance practices, which reduce capability to sustain highaircraft availability for more than a f e ~ days of combatoperations.

Limited flight experience among Soviet naval pilots, who flyannually only about half the training hours of their Westerncounterparts.The age of the .Badger-the backbone of the naval bomberforce-which is no longer competitive with modern airdefenses.

- ASW sensors inadequate to cope with the quietness of Westernsubmarines.To the credit of the naval air force:

- Naval a ircraft maintain high availability.- Some naval aircraft, primarily the Bear D and Bear F, have long

ranges, enabling them to cover sea transit lanes .far from theSoviet landmass, and to approach targets indirectly.Modern antiship_ ruise missiles (ASCMs) effectively extend theuseful life of the Badger bombers.

- The Backfire, a modern supersonic strike aircraft with both airto-surface missile (ASM) and bombing and minelaying capabilities, provides longer range and better performance, including asupersonic dash capability, than other naval strike aircraft.Design of new aircraft s excellent, emphasizing simplicity andruggedness.With the advent of the Kiev-class carrier Soviet Naval Aviationhas become seaborne with fixed-wing aircraft.

The Soviet Navy in WartimeThe Soviet Navy, as we have pointed out, has wartime missions of

strategic strike and deterrence, sea control, sea denial, and powerprojection. We have examined these missions as they affect operationsof the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea , and Pacific Fleets, and that of theMediterranean Squadron, as well as the Navy s mual peacetime posture).n the Indian Ocean, off West Africa, and in the Caribbean. We findthat the most important implications for readiness are ;1s follows.

xvtiTC 8 65 89 op Scc et


20/28


.,

res a es e

Strategic Strike. The Soviet Navy s 84 ballistic missile submarinesare its most effective arm, constituting a major part of the Sovietstrategic arsenal. Sixty-two are modern boats carrying 12 to 16 missiles.The Soviet SSBN force-considering both crews and weaponsprobably can achieve the [ . ]available force level the Sovietsdesire with two weeks notice. The overall system reliability-thesubmarines and missiles combined-we estimate to be 65 to 75 percent.

About 20 percent of the modern SSBN force is kept at sea oncontinuous patrols or en route to or from such patrols. The 32 D-classunits are capable of striking US targets from home port areas, however,and an increasing number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBMs) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles(MIRVs) are entering the force, permitting the Soviets greaterintercontinental strategic firepower without the long transits reQuiredby Y class units. Soviet SSBNs, like other Soviet submarines, arerelatively noisy and are vulnerable to ASW forces, particularly in a longconventional phase of a war.

Antisubmarine Warfare. Soviet ASW operations for sea control orsea denial are severely h a m p e r ~ g by lack of sensors capable of detectingmost Western submarines. Detection by any Soviet naval unit of aforeign submarine in the open ocean is unlikely because of the USSR slack of a long:..range detection system such as the United States SOSUS,and because of the technical limitations of other Soviet sensors andassociated equipment. In wartime, the most l_kely cause for Sovietdetection of a Western submarine would be either chance encounter, oran attack or other operational action by the target submarine thatrevealed its presence. Once the presence of an enemy submarine wererevealed, the Soviets would then attempt to conduct more refinedlocalization, the next phase of ASW

There is disagreement over Soviet proficiency in this aspect ofASW One view 16 is that the limited range and sensitivity of Sovietsensors, plus the lack of skill demonstrated [ - , in pastchance encounters, indicate that the Soviets have a low level Qt abilityto localize a target well enough to achieve a reasonably accuratetargeting solution. Others 11 believe that , once the Soviets detect a targetsubmarine, they have demonstrated a credible capability to localize thetargets sufficiently to launch their ASW weapons. All agree that thelocalization phase of ASW is a complicated process the success of which

The holder of thu uicw is the Directo. National ForeiJ n losscssment Centa .The holders of tlru uicw ore titc Director. Defense lntclliccnce logcncv: the / irC cl o of NaVtll

/ntr.lligcnu. Department of titc Navv: and the Director. National Suuritv lo c q1

xvTop e ~ o l


21/28

....DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 004003

is dependent on a number of environmental factors, on the compositionof the prosecuting force, and on the time required for that force to

~ ~ r r i v e on the scene of adetection. If a targeting solution were achieved,. .however, Soviet ASW weapons would be effective.Anticarrier War/are Because of the e n o r m o ~ s firepower of largemodern attack carriers, their destruction is a principal task of Soviet

naval forces assigned sea control or sea denial missions. This is reflectedin the continued emphasis on anticarrier warfare (ACW) in the Sovietsnaval exercises, tactics, and doctrine, and the improvement in somefacets of their ACW capabilities. The Soviet Navy has developed asubstantial capability to counter carriers. The I>rimary difficulty facingSoviet forces is getting within weapons range of the carrier. Theprincipal forces the Soviets intend to use against carriers are missilecarrying Soviet Naval Aviation strike aircraft and cruise-missilelaunching surface units or submarines.

Given the number of available missile-configured Badgers andBackfires, and the newer, long-range ASMs the SNA strike force 1>0se5 aserious threat to surface forces operating within its combat radius.Although the Soviets have no rigid set of tactics for antiship airstrikes,their writings and exercises indicate that, whenever possible, they wouldmount large-scale attacks against such important targets as aircraftcarriers. The airstrikes would be coordinated, whenever possible, withattacks by submarines and surface ships.

However, from what we have observed of their exercises,identifying the locations of carrier targets remains a problem. Webelieve that aircrewmen generally are unable to discriminate amongindividual ships in a target group at the time of missile launch. Only- through visual acquisition can a reconnaissance or strike aircraftpositively identify each ship in a target group. The effectiveness ofantiship strikes by naval aircraft, and other platforms as well, woulddepend critically on how well the Soviets could solve such reconnaissance and targeting problems, as well as on the defensive capabilitiesand actions of the opposing force.

Soviet cruise missile submarines can be effective against carriers.but generally would require multiple hits to put a carrier out of action,unless nuclear weapons were used. These units would be vulnerable toNATO ASW forces, although some carry missiles with ranges of 200nautical miles. or more, making ASW defense difficult.

7 The newer Soviet antiship cruise missiles. because of their range,rlight profile, warhead size and sometimes their speed. probably will be

X IXTGS 316 Q ep eeret


22/28


effective, provided the Soviets can solve the p r ~ b l e m of targetingcarriers. The shorter range submarine-carried systems have theadditional advantage of being launched from submerged submarinesThese ACSM systems require externally provided targeting information,particularly in situations where over-the-horizon capabilities at longrange are involved[ JAmvhibious Overations The Soviets maintain small and geographically dispersed amphibious assault and iift forces. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, major landings would likely be spearheaded by theseforces, with army units making up the bulk of the followup forces. Wedo not foresee ~ change occurring in the basic wartime or peacetimetasks of the USSR's amphibious warfare forces assaults on theperiphery of the land theaters. However, these forces could eeffectively employed in areas where modern defenses do not exist orwhere opposing forces could not be brought to bear in time to make adifference.Outlook

The outlook for Soviet riaval readiness through the 1980s is mixed.On the one hand, the Soviets continue to introduce new platforms andweapon systems that will enhance their Navy's war-fighting capabilities.On the other hand, the new systems will require more professionalismand flexibility by naval personnel if this equipment is to be used andmaintained at its full potential. The factors impairing naval readiness inthe USSR are deeply rooted, and the Soviet-Navy's state of readiness is amatter of serious concern to the Soviet leaders. Soviet literaturedemonstrates a concern over the often serious shortcomings in trainingand maintenance, and new programs aimed at improving personnel andequipment performance are under way.

The Soviets probably believe that these programs will contribute toincreasing the readiness of their naval forces. Nevertheless, much ofwhat we observe of their operations and training suggests that the stepsthey have taken thus far have not had a significant impact on manylongstanding deficiencies.

Some of us believe that the overall readiness of the Soviet Navy tocarry out its primary missions is unlikely to improve significantly.Although the introduction of new equipment promises grad ualimprovements in some areas, the potential value of such eQuipment is

The holders of this view ore the Director of Central Intelligence: tlo Director Notional Fort:ignAuessmenr ~ n t e CIA: ond rhe Director Bureau of Intelligence ond llescorch Deparrn nt of Sla te

XXTep Seerat


23/28

I II

i

IIIi


likely to be largely nullified by increased complexities in operation,maintenanee, and training, compounded by personnel deficiencies, as~ e l l as by more demanding missions. They note that, although more:;::.S,dvanced materiel has been steadily introduced over the past 20 years,the Soviet Navy s readiness-its availability and basic level ofeffectiveness-has not improved dramatically. They further note that,although more realistic training has frequently been forecast, it has notappeared to any great extent. There is therefore, no good reason tobelieve that the Soviets will radicaiJy change their past practices in thenear future.

Others 1 disagree with this conclusion. They believe not only thatthe Soviet Navy s missions and tasks will continue to grow but that itsreadiness for, and effectiveness in. an expanded range of missions willalso increase gradual ly and steadily-just as has been evident over thepast 20 or so years. In that time the quality of the Navy s materiel,maintenance, and personnel has improved, its command and controlhave been more responsive and survivable, its operational procedureshave been tightened. and its experience in open-ocean operations hasrisen manyfold, so that today the Soviet Navy more effectivelyperforms a much wider range of t s k ~ than it did in the 1950s.Moreover. they believe there is little prospect of a halt in the trendtoward further improvement of the Soviet Navy s overall readiness inthe 1980s. On the contrary, evidence of (a) further expansion ofmaintenance and support facilities and capabilities, (b) advances insurveillance systems and greater redundancy and hardening ofcommand, control, and communications systems, and (c) increasinglyrealistic training and high levels of out-of-area operations all portend acontinuing improvement in the professionalism, maturity, and proficiency of the Soviet Navy.

For the foreseeable future, there is little if any evidence to suggestthat Soviet naval readiness practices will undergo appreciable change.Therefore, any improvement in naval readiness is likely to occur principally as the result of the introduction of new classes of ships andaircraft and accompanying improvements in sensor and weaponstechnology and capability. The ability of the Soviets to absorb this newequipment and maintain it at a high level of efficiency is problematical,but on balance we believe they should be ab le to ach ieve about the samedegree of availability with the new generations of wa rships as they havewith those now in service.

T h ~ holders of this tJiew the Dirutor of Naool ln tellil enu Oem>rtment of Nn


24/28

I .I

IIII ..:i

LFCS 8165


op eecet

xxop S c ~ r c t

j


25/28

. DECL SSIFIED Authority NND 4 3II lop Sec ctiI IIII:I -' .Jr:

II.

II

I;III

IIIIIIIIII - -II

IIIII

III --,.'( -

> Xj j jfCS 8165 fop Soc ot

l


26/28

. DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 004003 ... - . -a--. ........... .... .

Top aeree

., -'I'II:

""' " "4

''III

'it .IIItIIi'

I'II

I'II - -I';I

1-- __ J( )( V

r ~ 8 } ep li u el


27/28


- . " ".

* *The f o l l o w i n ~ t tJmp/tflc4ticnl of footnou l D the be6inninc of this ucutioe S u m t r n ~ r vThe follocDinr u the oiew of the l) recor of Naual lnulllgence Department of the NGOI/: the

Director. NatloruJI Securttv .Arencv: the D


28/28

lI DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 004003I < t OP Setl r

t . ; .I

op Secret

The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces (June 1980) DECLASSIFIED

Documents

Transcript of The Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces (June 1980) DECLASSIFIED