Declassified CIA: The Soviet History of World War II

8/14/2019 Declassified CIA: The Soviet History of World War II

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28 October 1959OCI No. 5321/59Copy No. . . . .

, :APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: JUN 2007

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY - EO 1 2 9 5 8' 3 . 3 ' t b ) (1) 25Yr sTH&OVIET HJSTORY OF ~ O R L D AR 11 HR70-14

(U)Reference T it l e : Cae sar X-59)

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Office of Current Inte l l igence '

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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OCI No. 5321/59 SINO-SOVIET BLOC AREAOFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCEReference T i t l e : CAESAR X-59

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

The 'Sovie t Hi s tory of World War I1

This is a working paper, t h e second t o be published byth e Sino-Soviet Stu di es Group, a merger of t he CAESAR, POLOand ESAU pr oj ec ts . The group would welcome e i t h e r w r i t t e n o ro r a l comment on t h i s pape r , add re s sed t o Matthew G al l agher ,who wrote t h e p a p e r , or t o W. P. Sou tha rd, t he ac t i n g coo rdi -n a t o r of t he group .

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THE SOVIET HISTORY OF WORLD W A R I1This paper seeks to answer questions posed by the recentincreased attention to the history of the war in the SovietOnion.on the war? What interpretations are being promoted? Whatare the political and military implications?This is essentially a fact-finding study. Despite theimportance of the war in Soviet history, and the politicallysensitive nature of this topic in the Soviet Union, Sovietwriting on the war has not been systematically examined inthe West, and ingeneral it has not been of such immediatepolitical significance as to attract the continuing attentionof intelligence.

study.

Why is the regime now encouraging historical writing

This gap defines the scope of the presentThe paper identifies the issues which postwar propagandacreated in this field and traces the evolution of Soviet views. on these issues from the immediate postwar period to the pres-ent.

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SUblMARY AND CONCLUSIONSU n t i l r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e So v ie t l e a d e r s h ip w a s c o n s i s t e n ti n r e ga r di n g t h e h i s t o r y of t h e war as an Ins t rument f o r i n -f l ue n ci n g s o c i a l a t t i t u d e s r a t h e rt r u t h f u l e v al u at i on in i t s own r i g h t .t h e S o v i et o f f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e war re f l ec ted t h e c u r-r e n t p o l i c i e s of t h e regime.The S t a l i n i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e war w a s d e v i se d t o c on-cea l t h e t races of t h e w a r t i m e d r i f t of t h e So v ie t Union f r o mi t s h i s t o r i c a l c o u r s e o f d ev elop me nt , an d t o co nv in ce t h e So v i e tpeop le t h a t no th ing had in te rqene d which would j u s t i f y . a changei n p as t p o l i c i e s . Thus t h e h i s t o r y of t h e w a r became a paeant o S t a l in ' s p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y genius , a t e s tamen t to t h e

wisdom of p a r t y p o l i c i e s , an indic tment of t h e p e r f i d y of t h ec a p i t a l i s t w o r l d , a proof of t h e soundness of t h e Sov ie t sys tem.The S t a l i n i s t v e r si o n o f t h e w a r d i s t o r t e d t h e h i s t o r i c a l f a c t sin a t l e a s t f o u r m ajor r e s p e c t s :I t p r e s e n t e d t h e catas t rophic defea ts of t h e firsty e a r of t h e war a s a p r ep l an n ed an d s k i l l f u l l y e xe c ut e dmaneuver design ed t o se t t h e c o n d i t i o n s for a s u c c e s s f u lc o u n t e r o f f e n s iv e .

than as a s u b j e c t d e s e r v i n gB e fo re a nd a f t e r S ' t a l i n ,

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I t m ag ni fi ed t h e r o l e s of S t a l i n a nd t h e p a r t y i nt h e achievement of v ic to r y , and d imin is h ed t h e r o l e s oft h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s and t h e ord ina ry peop le .I t depreciated t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e A l l i e s , ands ou gh t t o t r a n s f o r m t h e i r image i n t h e p u b l i c m ind f ro mp a r t n e r s i n t h e a n t i - H i t l e r c o a l i t i o n i n t o c ry pt o- en em ie so f t h e So v i e t Union a n d v i r t u a l a l l i e s of H i t l e r .

t h e defeat of t h e Kwantung army, ra ther than Americanm i l i t a r y s u c c e s s e s , had played t h e d e c is i v e r o l e i n b r in g-ing about t h e d e f e a t of Japan.It claimed t h a t t h e So v ie t d e c l a r a t i o n of war and

Varying degrees of r e s i s t a n ce t o t h e impos i t ion of t h i sv e r s io n of t h e warwereman i fes ted by those e lements of t h e So-v ie t popu la t ion mos t d i r e c t l y affected by i t - - t h e m i l i t a r y ,t h e h i s t o r i a n s , and t h e w r i t e r s . M i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s i n d i c a t e dd i s da i n f o r t h e c o n c ep t s d ev elop ed t o i d e a l i z e t h e m i l i t a r ye v e n t s of t h e war. H i s t o r i a n s d em on st ra te d i n e r t i a l r e s i s t a n c e -thepostwar propaganda a ss au l t on t h e West and i t s a t t e n d a n t d i s -t o r t i o n s o f t h e A l l i e d role i n t h e war, and be fo re succumbing

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t o o f f i c i a l pr es su re i n di c at e d t h e i r d i s t a s t e for t h e p o l i t i -c a l cons ide ra t ions which mot iva ted i t . The writers demon-s t r a t e d outspoken o pp os it i on t o t h e o f f i c i a l l i n e .The reac t ions of a l l t h r e e g ro up s were based not on po-l i t i c a l oppos i t ion t o th e regime, but on t h e i n h e r e n t c o n f l i c tbetween propaganda demands and t h e i r own p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d -a rds . A marked tendency of t h e p r o f e s s io n a l m i l i t a r y was ap r e f e r e n c e f o r f a c t s over theory , an a t t i t u d e which seemed t or e f l e c t a c o n c e r n t h a t t h e e x ce s si v e i d e a l i z a t i o n of m i l i t a r yevents would prevent a p r o p e r e v a lu a t i o n a n d a p p l i c a t i o n oft h e l e s s o n s i n h e r en t i n them. The h i s to r i a n s a p p e a r e d t of e e l t h a t h i s t o r i c a l q u e s t io n s ought t o be s e t t l e d by h i s t o r i -c a l r a t h e r tha n p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i a , and by t h e h i s t o r i a n sthemselves. Writers who remained t r u e t o t h e i r a r t were un-w i l l i n g , and in any case u na b le , t o p r e s e n t what t h e y con-c e iv ed t o be t h e epic of t h e war i n t h e shal low terms of ap o l i t i c a l t r a c t .A f t e r S t a l i n ' s d e a t h , t h e o f f i c i a l i n t e rp r e t at i o n of t h ewar underwent important changes, These changes r e f l e c t e d t h eSov ie t l ead e rs ' app rehens ion t h a t t h e Sovie t people and t h eSovie t m i l i t a r y es tab l ishment were being poorly prepared, byt h e u n r e a l i s t i c p o r t r a y a l of t h e l a s t war, f o r t h e k i n d of w a rwhich t h e y now foresaw a s p o s s ib l e . The S t a l i n i s t l i n e , t he yf e l t , encouraged th e d a n g e r o u s i l l u s io n t h a t war was easy, andit condi t ioned m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s to f e e l t h a t r e t r e a t s a nds lo w a t t r i t i o n a l m ethods were normal means of conducting war.Th e main content of t h e new version of the war which emergedfrom these cons ideraq ions i n 1955 was tha t t h e e a r l y p e r io d

of the war had been a defea t f o r t h e S o vi e t army, r a t h e r t h a na pre lude to v i c t o r y .As t h e Twe ntiet h Pa rt y Congress approached, new tenden-c i e s toward a break w i t h t h e p a s t appeared, g iv in g f r e s h im-petus t o t h i s r e c o n s id e r a t i o n of t h e h i s t o r y of t h e war. Thec e n t r a l f e a t u r e of t h e new movement was t h e break w i t h S t a l i nwhich was dramatized a t the Congress .speech, which p o r t r a y e d S t a l i n a s i g n o r a n t o f m i l i t a r y mattersand a s c r i m i n a l l y r e s p o n si b l e f o r t h e i n i t i a l u np re pa re dn es sof t h e Sov iet Union, c le ar ed t h e way f o r removing t h e manyd i s t o r t i o n s of h i s t o r y which derived from exaggeration ofS t a l i n ' s r o l e i n t h e war. The e a r l y d e f e a ts of t h e S o v i e tarmy were i n t e r p r e t e d now a s due not only t o t h e s u r p r i s e oft h e German at t a c k, a s had been emphasized i n 1955, bu t t o t h enegl igence of S t a l i n i n f a i l i n g t o t ak e t h e p r e c a u t i o n a r ymeasures which elementary prudence and ample i n t e l l i ge nc e warn-

Khrushchev's secret

\, i n g s had ind ica ted were necessa ry . A more generous appra isa l '

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of t h e r o l e of t h e A l l i e s i n t h e war was a l so f o s t e r e d a tt h i s t i m e .Afte r th e Twent i e th Par t y Congress, t h e need t o h a l tt h e d e t e r i o r at i o n of p o l i t i c a l a u t ho r i ty r e s u l t i ng from t h ea n t i - S t a l i n campaign t h r e a t e n e d t o h a l t a l s o t h e p r o g re s stoward hones t m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y . In t h e l a t t e r p a r t of 1956and in 1 9 5 7 , ' t h e p a r t y faced t h e c h o ic e of c u r t a i l i n g t h e

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r e v i s i o n a r y h i s t o r i o g r a p h y of t h e war t o p r o t e c t its-imme-d i a t e p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s , o r of s u s ta i n in g t h i s h i s t o r io -graphy t o encourage th e profess iona l i sm and realism of m i l i -t a r y thought which i t expressed and nourished.Over t h e p a s t y e ar or more, Sov i e t po l i cy in t h i s s ph er eh a s been c a r e f u l l y c a l c u l a t e d . I t has sought t o r e t a i n t h eg a i n s i n h i s t o r i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y a ch ie ve d i n 1955 a nd 1 956,

bu t no t a t t h e c o s t o f r e f l e c t i n g u nf av o ra bl y on t h e p a r t yi t s e l f . The formula has been: t o admit Soviet r e v e r s e s i nt h e e a r l y days of t h e w a r , but t o emphasize Soviet achieve-ments--and th e pa r t y ' s l ead ing ro le - - in recover ing f rom thos erev erse s . The formula has a l s o min imized th e co nt r ibu t io nof t h e USSR's a l l i e s t o t h e v i c t o r y .The evolut ion of t h e h i s t o r i o g r a p h y of t h e war toward amore accu r a t e app ra i sa l of m i l i t a r y r e a l i t i e s i s of someimportance, a s i n t h i s area t h e regime has gradua l l y accep t edt h e co nc ep t of t h e u t i l i t y of t r u t h . T hi s v i c t o r y . f o r t h et r u t h i s a l i m i t e d one, a s t h e t r u t h i s surrounded by p o l i -t i c a l propaganda wi th which t h e p a r ty j u s t i f i e s i t s e l f andi t s p o l i c i e s . N e ve r th e le s s, t h i s d ev elo pm en t I l l u s t r a t e s a

tendency which has appeared in o t h e r a r e a s of S o v i e t a c t i v i t yas w e l l , and t h i s t endency is l i k e l y t o grow.- . ......

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I . TliE HISTORICAL ISSUES AND THE POSTWAR INTERPRETATION

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The I n i t i a l P e ri o d of the Soviet German Wari n t h e So v i e t h i st o r i o g r ap h yof the .war w a s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e g r e a t d e f e a t s s u f -fe red by t h e Sov ie t a r m y d u r i n g t h e f i r s t per iod of t h e w a r ; . ,The immense mater ia l losses and inc a l cul abl e human su ff er - ,i n g s w hich t h e c o l l a p s e of Sov ie t de fenses en ta i led wou ld ,have been embarrassing for any government t o e x p l a in , b u t .for a regime which staked i t s a u t h o r i t y o n i t s claim toforesee t h e f u t u r e t h e y were c a t a s tr o p h ic i n t h e i r i m p l i -c a t i o n s .im p l i c a t i o n s by denying t h a t any rea l defea t s had t aken p lace .

-The most c r i t i c a l i s s u e

Soviet postwar propaganda sought t o smother t h e s eThe f i r s t problem fo r Soviet propaganda w a s t o e x p l a i n 1t h e S o vi et f a i l u r e t o a n t i c i p a t e a nd p r ep a r e f o r t he i n i t i a lGerman as s a ul t . There is ample e v id e n c e t h a t t h e Soviet gov-ernment was f u l l y informed of t he German in te n t io n t o a t t ackw e l l before t h e i n v a s io n t o o k p l a c e . C h u r c h i l l h a s d e s c r ibe dt h e c a r e f u l p e r s o n a l e f f o r t s he made t o b r i ng t h e s e r i o u s n e s s

of t h e s i t u a t i o n t o S t a l i n ' s a t t e n t i o n . H e has a l s o t o l d ofother warnings conveyed t o t h e Soviet government by subordi-n a t e B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s and t h e American government. In ve st i-g a t i o n s of Sov ie t spy n etwo rk s i n A u s t r i a a nd J ap an a f t e r t h ew a r revealed t h a t S o v ie t i n t e l l i g e n c e had a l s o uncovered ad -vance informat ion on th e German invas ion p la ns . Fi na l ly ,Khrushchev i n h i s sec'ret speech t o the Twent ie th Par ty Con-gre6s c i t e d many add i t iona l ind ica t ions t h a t had been madea v a i l a b l e t o t h e Soviet government through i t s own diplomatica n d m i l i t a r y s o u r c e s .

Soviet postwar propaganda made no acknowledgment ofthese advance warnings of t h e German i n t e n t i o n t o a t t a c k .I n s t e a d , it sought t o t u r n t o advantage the blunder whicht h e Soviet government had committed i n d i s co u nt i n g thesewarnings. I t depic ted the Sovie t Unidn as t h e v ic t im ofGerman "perfidy," it s t r e s s e d t h e "suddenness" of t h e Germana t t a c k .t h e n a tu r a l d i s a d v a n t a g e s u f f e r e d by a peace-loving s t a t e i nt h e face of a r u t h l e s s a g g r e s s o r , A t t h e same t i m e , t h e pre-war po l ic ies of t h e Soviet Union, i t s i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n pro-grams, and i t s d ip lomat ic and mi l i t a r y encroachments i n east-ern Europe , were presen ted as c a l c u l a t e d a g a i n s t a n e v e n t u a lGerman attack, and thus a s r e s p o n s ib l e f o r t h e c o u n t r y ' sa b i l i t y t o withstand the shock when t h e a t t ack came.

T h e i n i t i a l defeats were presented as f lowing from

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Secondly, So vi et propaganda had t o e x p l a i n t h e c o n t i n -uous defeats of t h e Soviet army during 1941, and t h e aban-donment of huge t e r r i t o r i e s and much of t h e p o p u la t io n of't h e Balt ic rep ub l i cs , Leningrad province , Byelorus s i a , andt h e Ukraine. In t h e l i g h t of these re su l t s , i t was obvioust h a t t h e Soviet army had not shown t o advantage dur ing t h ef i r s t months of t h e war. The operational command, w h i c h 'a t t h a t time w a s - i n t h e hands of t h e p o l i t i c a l marshals;Voroshilov, Timoshenko, and Budennyy, on t h e Northwestern,Wes te rn , and Sou thw es t ern f r on t s r e spe c t i ve l y , showed l i t t l ecapaci ty to cope w i t h t h e mobile c o n d i t i o n s of w ar fa re cre-a ted by deep German pen et ra t i on s of prepared de fense posi-t i o n s . D e pr i ve d 'o f l a r g e mobile r e s e r v e s a n d a i r suppor t ,and bound by t h e 'Supreme Command s t r a t e g y of defending "eachi nch of n a t i v e 6oi1J" t h e army re pea ted ly permi t t ed largeforces t o be enc i r c l ed where a more f l e x i b l e s t ra t eg y mighthave saved them. To mention only t h e larges t o p e r a t i o n s , ap-proximate ly a hal f -mi l l ion men, accord ing t o German f igu res ,were lost i n each of t h e huge en ci r cle men ts around Kiev andVyazma .

I n e x p l a i n in g these d i s a s t e r s , Soviet propaganda soughtt o have i t b o t h ways--to enhance t h e dimensions of t h e f i n a lSo vie t achievement in s t o p p i n g t h e German offensive, w h i l eminimizing t h e mistakes which made grea t achievements neces-s a r y . I t w a s acknowledged t h a t . a " d i f f i c u l t s i t u a t i o n " hadbeen created, t h a t ' a "mortal danger hung over t h e S o v i e tcount ry , " and ye t a p i c t u r e w a s p r e s e n t e d of t h e Soviet Su-preme Command a s be i ng i n m a s t e r l y c o n t r o l o f t h e s i t u a t i o na t a l l t i m e s , and as i n f l u e n c i n g t h e c o u r s e of e v e n t q t o w a r dits . f i n a l su cc es sf ul consummat ion. Th e s t r a t e g y of t h eSupreme Command, i t was s a i d , was t o g i v e space for t i m e ,and by "exhaust ing and bleeding w h i t e t h e enemy," t o preparet h e grounds f o r a c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e .

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There were t w o f o rm u la s i n S o v i e t postwar propagandawhich were very importan t i n t h e o f f i c i a l account of t h i sper iod , and which express t h e whole t e n o r of this account .The f i r s t was t h e so -ca l l ed s t r a t e g y of "ac t i ve de fense , "which w a s r e p r e s e n t e d a s a Supreme Command p l a n em brac ingno t on l y t h e t a c t i c a l methods of a g g r e s s i v e c o u n t e r a c ti o nin defense , bu t the whole s t r a t eg i c concep t i on of t h e e a r l y

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I .

p e r io d of Sov ie t ope ra t ions .* The second and more importantformula was t h e s o - ca l l e d s t r a t e g i c " c o un t e r of f e ns iv e ,"which a l s o was s a i d t o embrace, as p a r t s of a preconceivedp l a n , t h e whole complex of d e f e n s iv e actions conducted byt h e So v ie t army p r e l i m i n a r y t o t h e launching of t h e a c t u a lcoun te ro f fens ive .* The ef fec t of both formula s, of c o u r s e ,w a s t o em be l l i sh t he r e p u t a t i o n of t h e So v i e t l e a d e r s h ip ' b yp r e s e n t i n g t h e e a r l y defeats as n e c e s s a r y p r e l im in a r y s t a g e st o t h e u l t i p a t e v i c t o r y .

Fi nal ly , Sovi e t propaganda ha d t o i n te r p re t th e u l t i m a t es topp ing o f t h e German advance and t h e saving of Moscow. Thef a c t s concerning these e v e n t s were as fo ll ow s. The German ,armies on t h e cent ra l f r o n t , a f t e r r a p i d i n i t i a l progress,reached t h e v i c i n i t y of Smolensk by mid-July, 1941. H e r e t h eadvance on Moscow paused, not only because of Russian resist-ance , but because of cross purposes in t h e German High Com-mand. H i t l e r wished t o d i v e r t t h e tank armies from t h e Moscow

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* The t e r m " a c t i v e defense" had two meanings. Its f i r s tmeaning, which i t g e n e r a l l y car r i ed in t h e w r i t i n g s oft h e wartime per iod , expressed t h e idea t h a t t h e defea-sive a c t i o n s of t h e So v ie t t r o o p s were designed not o n l yt o stop th e enemy, but t o keep up t h e morale of t h e So v ie tt roops themselves , t o " temper t h e i r regiments" f o r a sub-s eq ue nt t r a n s i t i o n t o o f f e n s i v e a c ti o n . This meaning de-r i v e d f r o m S ta l i n ' s Order of t h e Day No. 308, of September18, 1941, which created t h e f i r s t g u a r ds u n i t s . I ts secondmeaning, which it assumed in postwar propaganda, expressedt h e idea t h a t t h e d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s of th e So v ie t t r o o p swere preplanned t o hold back t h e p r o g r e s s of t h e enemy un-t i l th e pe rmanent ly ope r a t in g f ac t o r s of w a r could bebrought i n t o play. The d i r e c t s o u r c e of t h e postwarf l o u r i s h i n g of t h i s concept was S t a l i n ' s e l e c t o r a l s pe ec hof February 9, 1946.** The d o c t r i n e of t h e "coun te ro f fens ive" w a s f i r s t p u b l i -cized i n S t a l i n ' s l e t t e r t o Colonel Razin of February ,1947. S t a l i n d er iv ed t h e ideas expressed in t h i s l e t t e rfrom a n a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "The St r a t e g i c C o u n te r o f f e n s iv e , "by.Major General N. Talenskiy , which was pub l i shed inM i l i t a r y Thought, No. 6 , 1946.-

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d i r e c t i o n t o assist i n t h e f l a n k a t t a cks on Leningrad andKiev, w h i l e t h e German generals wished t o c o n t i n u e t h e a d -vance on t h e c e n t r a l f r o n t . While t h e g e n e r a l s v a i n l y tem-p o r i z e d , a n d i n t h e end acquiesced t o H i t l e r ' s d e c i s i o n ,many weeks of t h e best campaigning weather were allowed t of r i t t e r away. F i na l l y , on 2 October, t h e advance on Moscoww a s resumed, but by t h e t i m e t h e f i r s t s u c c e ss e s a ro und 'Vyazma had been con so l i da t ed t h e f a l l s l u s h had s e t i n .Slowed t o a crawl by t h e weather and t h e s t i f f e n i n g R us sia nr e s i s t a n c e , t h e a d v a n c e f i n a l l y petered o u t a f e w m i l e s fromMoscow, and w a s th en mauled back by t h e Sov i e t coun t e rof fen -s i v e which began on 6 December.The reasons fo r t h e f a i l e of t h e German offensive aremany, an d i n large part of German origin. An impor tan t fac-tor has been mentioned, t h e c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n H i t l e r and theg e n e r a l s , which in t u r n re f lec ted t h e e x c e s s i v e n e s s of t h edemands which H i t l e r had imposed u p o n , h i s f o r c e s. By t h et i m e of t h e f i n a l German advance on Moscow, German forceswere overex tended , both i n terms of l o g i s t i c communicationsa nd i n t h e r a t i o of o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s t o committed forces.Men and machines were exhausted from t h e long summer cam-p a ig n s a nd t h e s h i f t i n g of armies from o n e f r o n t t o a n o t h e ro v e r a g r e a t t e r r i t o r i a l expanse, G e r m a n d i v i s i o n s had beent h i n ne d o u t before t h e beginning of t h e Russ ian campaign t ospread t h e a v a i l a b l e manpower and armor among t h e 146 d i v i -s i o n s which p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e i n v a s i o n . While t h e y mayhave enjoyed a br i e f r e l a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y d ur in g t h e e a r l yperiod of t h e war a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l s ur re nd er s of S o v i e tt roops, t h i s was c e r t a i n l y l o s t by t h e end of t h e y e a r ,F i n a l l y , t h e cold weather which came on e a r l y an d r a p id l y i n1941 caught t h e Germans unprepared , s i nc e i n an t i c i p a t i o n ofa l i g h t n i n g v i c t o r y t h e y had no t p rov i ded w i n t e r c l o t h i n gf o r t h e t roops.Sovie t pos twar propaganda d i scounted a l l these acci-d e n t a l f a c t o r s as having p l a y e d a n y e f f e c t i v e role in t h ef i n a l outcome, German l o g i s t i c problems and leadersh ip con-f l i c t s , w h i l e m entioned occas i ona l l y i n gene r a l disparage-m e n t s of German s t r a t e gy and m i l i t a r y s c i en ce , were nevera d m i t t e d as d e c i s i v e f a c t o r s . The weather was mentioned i nSov i e t accoun t s , bu t on l y as i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h S o v i e t opera-t i o n s . The manpower relat ionship was always claimed t o bei n t h e German favor, and t h e number of 170 German and 38s a t e l l i t e d i v i s i o n s a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e German invasion forceby t h e R uss i ans du r i ng t h e war w a s r e t a i n e d i n s ub s eq u en taccoun t s . In s h o r t , any f ac t o r which tended t o reduce t h ec r e d i t due t h e S o v i e t leadership and armed forces f o r s t o p p i n g 't h e German invasion w a s i gn o re d i n S o v i e t postwar propaganda.

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In postwar propaganda, however , Sta l in was t r ans formedi n t o t h e "greatest commander of a l l t h e ages." A l l m i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o n s were s a i d t o have been carried o u t a c c o r d i n g t oh i s p l a n s a nd u n de r h i s i m m e d i a t e d i r e c t i o n . H e w a s s a i d tohave "worked o u t anew" and , f o r t h e f i rs t time in h i s t o r y ,a p p l i e d w i t h f u l l e f f e c t t h e " s t r a t e g i c c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e , "which c o n s t i t u t e d t h e greates t c o n t r i b u t i o n in t h e a n n a l s ofm i l i t a r y s c i e n c e . ! *he army suffered most d i r e c t l y from t h e postwar i n f l a -t i o n of t h e S t a l i n image , The record of t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l' m i l i t a r y l eaders d u r in g t h e war was good. Whatever t h e i rmerits when compared w i t h t h e i r opposi te numbers i n t h e West,and there are d i f f e r e n c e s of o p in io n on t h i s scoreJ t h e y weret h e men who stood a t t h e h ea d of t h e t roops when victory wasachieved. Moreover. t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n was dramatic. It was

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a f t e r Zhukov took oGer from t h e o l d Bols hevi k Timoshenko, asCommander-in-Chief of t h e Western Front, t h a t Moscow w a s savedand the f i r s t S o v i e t c o u n t e ro f f e n s i ve s u c c e s s f u l l y carriedo u t . I t was a l so a f t e r Zhukov took over as overall commander'of t h e s o u t h e r n f r o n t s , a nd a f t e r t h e commissar system hadbeen abol ished in t h e army, t h a t S t a l i n g r a d w a s saved, andt h e se r i e s of o p e r a t i o n s l a u n c h e d t h a t l ed t o u l t i m a t e v i c -t o r y . The f i g u r e of Zhukov in these key even ts of t h e w a rwas symbol i c of t h e p r o f e s si o n a l m i l i t a r y ' s role i n r e s c u in gt h e regime from t h e consequences of i t s own incompetence.th e background. Zhukov's f a l l from honor h as o f t e n b ee nnoted. I t w a s so s w i f t and complete t h a t t h e S o v i e t pressobserved the f i r s t a n n iv e r s a r y of t h e f a l l of B e r l i n withoutmentioning h i s name. No o t h e r m i l i t a r y figure was named i nPravda on t h a t day e i t h e r , nor on t h e o ther major anniver-of t h e nex t f e w years . The a r t i c l e s p u b l i s h e d on t h eo c c a s io n of S t a l i n ' s s e v e n t i e t h b i rt h da y, i n 1949, performedt h e e q u a l l y remarkable f ea t of reviewing t h e whole c o u r s e oft h e war without naming a s i n g l e S o vi et g e n e r a l o f f i c e r .

T h e p a r ty ' s role i n t h e war is perhaps t h e most d i f f i -c u l t t o eva lua te because i t w a s so cl os el y woven i n t o t h ef a b r i c o f S o v ie t s o c i e t y t h a t it is hard now t o d i s t i n g u i s h ,th rough t h e smokescreen of propaganda ra ised on i t s b e h a l f ,where p a r t y i n s p i r a t i o n l e f t o f f , and p u b l i c i n i t i a t i v e be-g an i n t h e great s o c i a l and m i l i t a r y achievements of t h e w a r .Unquestionably, t h e p a r t y ' s t r a d i t i o n a l ro le as t h e leaderand coord ina to r of n a t i o n a l e n e r g i e s was dimin ished dur jngt h e war, as i n c r e a si n g r e l i a n c e came to be placed on non-p a r ty c h a n n e l s of p u b l i c c o n t r o l , and a s e x t r a o r d i n a r y

In postwar propaganda, t h e m a rs h al s r a p i d l y faded i n t o

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g ov er nm en ta l a n d m i l i t a r y b o d i e s a r o s e t o t a k e o v e r direc-t i o n of t h e war e f f o r t . To name merely t h e a c t i v i t y whicht h e p a rt y l a t e r most vigorous ly c la imed fo r i t s own credi t ,t h e artisan movement, t h e f a c t s s e e m to be t h a t t h e p a r t yhad f i t t l e t o do w i t h o r g a n i z in g t h e movement, and es ta bl is he dc o n tr o l l a t e r o nl y p a r t i a l l y and w i t h d i f f i c u l t y . In g e n e r a l ,t h e conc lus ion seems s a f e t h a t among t h e ins t ruments a v a 3 l a b l et o t h e S ov ie t l eadersh ip f o r c o nd u ct i ng t h e war e f f o r t t h ep a r ty a p p a r a tu s pe rf or me d a n a u x i l i a r y f u n c t i o n .cided a f t e r t h e war t o r e t u r n t o t h e c o u r s e of developmentt h a t t h e war had in te r rup ted , an important e lemen t i n t h a treac t ion was t h e r e a s s e r t i o n of the. p a rt y 's , t r a d i t i o n a l p l a c eIn S o v ie t l i f e . T h i s n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o lv e d a r e c a s t i n g o f t h eh i s t o r y o f t h e w a r t o show t h e p a r t y ' s r o l e i n a more bef i t -ting l i g h t . A v e r y im po r t a nt f e a t u r e of t h e p os tw ar h i s t o r ywas t h e c l a im th a t t h e party had "always and everywhere" in-s p i r e d and l e d t h e p e o p l e ' s r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e Germans. T h i sc la im was advanced pa r t i c u l a r ly , bu t by no means exclus ively ,w i t h respect t o t h e c i v i l i a n a s p e c t s of t h e w art im e ac h ie v e-ments--the eyacuation of i n d u s t r y , to t h e e a s t , t h e f e a t sof lab or heroism performed a t t h e r e a r , t h e p a r t i s a n war c a r -r i e d on beh ind enemy l i n e s . As Pravda put it, i n c r i t i c i z i n gFadeyev's The Young C u a r d , i n 1947: "The p a r t y everywhere an dalways i n t ro duce d an org ani z in g bas is . Communists d i d n o t f o ra minute l os e th e leadl lng rol e . "

F i n a l l y , it i s n e c e s s a r y t o mention t h e r o l e of t h e peo-p l e i n the war . T h e i r co nt r i bu t i on had been so massive, andso c l e a r l y a f fi r me d by t h e regime dur ing t he war, that i ts too d i n th e way of any o t h e r c l a im a n t f o r e x c lu s iv e h o n o rs .I f t h i s record w e r e a ll ow ed t o s t a n d, t h e regime's own c la imst o i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y , b as ed on t h e s up po se d p o l i t i c a l imma-t u r i t y of t h e masses, m i g h t w e l l be open t o ques t ion . Thus,a fact which would be t aken f o r g ran ted under any o t h e r re-gime--that th e -w a r had been won by t h e s a c r i f i c e s and a c h ie v e -ments of t h e people-- in Sov iet con di t ion s became Ina dmi ss i ble .In Sovi et postwar propaganda, th e record of t h e p e o p l e ' s ro l ei n t h e war was not openly contes ted , i t was s i m p l y d i s p l a c e d .

Thus it is unders tandab le why, when t h e leadership de-

The Role of t h e A l l i e sThe role of t h e A l l i e s i n t h e war po sed a p a r t i c u l a r l yembarrassing problem for Soviet postwar propaganda, s i n c e any

acknowledgment of t h e real contributions t h e A l l i e s had madewould t e n d t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e image of a corrupt and host i leWest which i t was s e e k in g t o c r e a t e . The t .ask of S ov ie t

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propaganda, thus, was t o b l o t o u t a s f a r a s p o ss i b le t h ef r i e n d l y memories of t h e w a r t i m e a l l i an ce , by besmirching 1the motives f o r which t h e a l l i e d s ta te s fought , and by di s-parag ing t h e i r achievements.

The response of t h e Western A l l i e s t o R u s s i a ' s p l i g h t ' Ii n 1941 w a s prompt and gen erou s, and t h e material a nd m i l i t a r yc o n t r i b u t i o n w hic h t h e West made t o t h e f i n a l v i c t o r y was v e r ygr e a t . A l l i e d mater i a l a i d w a s extended a t a t i m e , and un-der c o n d i t i o n s , which imposed a v e r y r e a l s ac r i f i c e on t h eA l l i e s ' own war e f f o r t . In a d d i t i o n , as t h e war progressed,t h e A l l i e s brought t o bear a m i l i t a r y p r e s s u r e on Germanywhich c o n t r i b u t e d m a t e r i a l l y t o speeding ; the c o l l a p s e of t h eGerman w a r machine..According t o American sources, t h e va lue of AmericanLend-Lease shipments t o Russ ia dur ing th e war to ta le d over .

$11,000,000,000. B r i t i s h shipments and American private re-l i e f added c o n s id e r a b ly t o t h i s t o t a l . W a l t e r Kerr, i n h i sbook The Russian A rm% p r e s e n t s a d d i t i o n a l f i g u r e s which b r i n go u t i n a graphic way t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s a i d t o t h e So-v i e t army. During th e f i r s t year of d e l i v e r i e s a l o n e, he s a y s ,Washington and Iondon sh ipped t o R u s si a 3 ,0 52 p l a n e s , 4,084t a n k s , 30,031 ve hi cl es , and 831,000 ton s of miscel la neous sup-p l i e s , of which t h e major pa r t go t th rough . As K e r r p o i n t so u t , t h e r e l a t i v e v al ue of these f i g u r e s can be grasped i ft h e y a re compared w i t h t h e numbers of 1,136 planes and 2,091tanks which, a c c o rd in g t o R u s si an claims, t h e Germans l o s td u r i n g 52 days of t h e h e a v i e s t f i g h t i n g i n t he f i r s t y e a r oft h e w a r . There are many ind ic at io ns from Russian sou rce s , too ,of t h e v a lu e t h e y placed on t h i s a id during t h e war.anger a t de lays i n t h e a r r i v a l of American equipment was in-d i c a t i v e i n t h i s connect ion. The impress which A l l i e d a i dmade on t h e S o v ie t p o p u l a t i o n , i n d i c a t i o n s of which are scat-tered t hr ou gh ou t S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e , i s a n o the r s i g n o f i t ss c o p e a n d s i g n i f i c a n c e . Even t h e language has recorded t h edimensions of American w a r t i m e a i d fn i t s t r a n s f o r m a t io n oft h e name "Wil lys** i n t o a Russian household word.As f o r t h e r e s t , t h e A l l i e d m i l i t a r y r o l e i n t h e w a r , t h es t o r y i s f a mi l i a r enough t o need no d e t a i l here. Beginning inAfr ica , i n 1942, t h e A l l i e s began t o bu i l d up a s t e a d i l y mount-i n g p r e s s u r e on Germany which engaged and wasted t h e dwindl-i n g r e s o u r c e s which were despera t e ly needed on t h e e a s t e r n .f r on t . Sov ie t p ropaganda made much of t h e c l a i m l a t e r t h a tno German u n i t s were withdrawn from t h e e a s te r n f r o n t a s a re-s u l t of A l l i e d o p e r a t i o n s ( i n f a c t , a t l e a s t two SS d i v i s i o n swere withdrawn t o m e e t t h e Normandy invasion), but t h i s i s

S t a l i n ' s

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beside t h e poin t . The r e a l c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e A l l i e s w a smeasured no t i n t h e j u g g l i n g of German divisions which itproduced, b ut i n t h e German energies absorbed by a se r i e s ofAll ied s ec on d f r o n t s , i n Afr ica , S i c i l y , I t a l y , an d P r an c e.

Soviet postwar propaganda was not c ontent merely t ominimize t h e A l l i e d r o l e i n t h e w a r , b u t sought a c t i v e l y ' t ot rans form tbe . image of t h e A l l i e s fro m p a r t n e r s i n the a n t i -H i t l e r c o a l ' i t i o n i n t o c ry p to -e n em ie s o f t h e S o v ie t Union,and v i r t u a l a l l i e s of H i t l e r . T h e p r in c ip a l d e v i c e used t oachieve t h i s end was t o hammer home t h e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t t h er e a l aim of Weste rn po l icy before t h e war had been t o i so -l a t e t h e USSR, and, i n t h e f i n a l a c co un t, t o em br oi l it i nw a r w i t h Germany,. . . . . In i t s b r oa d es t a p p l i c a t i o n t h i s charge a f f e c t e d t h eS o v ie t o f f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the whole prewar per iod .Beginning w i t h t h e Paris Peace Conference, a t which it w a sasserted t h e "Russian qu es t ion" occup ied th e p rimary p la ce ,almost ever y major event of European diplomacy af fe c t i n g th eUSSR was made t o f i t i n t o t h i s framework. The Dawes P l a nwhich loosed a "go lden r a i n o f American do l l a r s " i n t o G e r -man war industry, th e Four Power Pact which s i g n i f i e d A nglo-F re nc h w i l l i n g n e s s t o come t o terms w i t h fascism, t h e P o l i s h -German nonaggression pact of 1934 which s e t a p r e c e d e n t f o rr e p l a c i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y by a s y s t e m ofb i l a t e r a l pac t s , the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935which proc laimed Br i t a i n ' s d i savowal o f t h e p r i n c i p l e of re-s t r i c t i n g German r e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n - - w e r e a l l seen in t h e So-v ie t a c c o u n t a s stage's i n t h e c o n s i s t e n t W estern p o l i c y ofi s o l a t i n g t h e USSR and encouraging German aggression.The major event a f f ec t ed b y t h i s l i n e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o nwas, of co urs e, t h e Munich agreement. The f a c t s sur roundingt h i s ep isode were such a s t o l end themselves t o a lmos t anyindic tment of t h e s t r a t e g y a nd m o r a l i t y o f Weste rn p o l i c y t h a tt h e Sovi et Union would wish t o make. The agreement was i nf a c t s t r a t e g i c a l l y d e f e c t i v e i n t h a t it excluded t h e S o v i e tUnion f rom the jo in t ac t ion of t h e d i r e c t i n g n a t io n s , andm o r a l l y d e f e c t i v e i n t h a t it l e g a l i z e d v i o l en c e . B u t theseindic tments , recognized as v a l i d i n Western l i t e r a t u r e , wereno t broad enough f o r t h e purposes of Sov iet postwar prop-a ga nd a. I n s t e a d , S t a l i n ' s p h r a s e oft 1939, that t h e Munichagreement was t h e " p r i c e of an under taking (by Germany) t o

launch war on t h e Soviet Union" was resurrected a s t h e b a s i sof t h e S ov ie t h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The Western lead-e rs were p o r t r a y e d as a c t i v e p l o t t e r s w i t h H i t l e r f o r w a r . I n

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Sovie t pos twar h i s to r io grap hy t h e word '?deal1' (sgovo r) be-came t h e o f f i c i a l cachet of Munich, and hi s to r i an s who hads e e n i n t h e Western behavior a t Munich simply a concess ionor c a p i t u l a ti o n t o Nazi t h r e a t s were made t o see t h e i r e r r o r .A second i s su e f o r So v ie t postwar p ropaganda on t h eA l l i e d r o l e i n t h e war was t h e matter of A l l i e d mate r ia l ' a id .Fo r So vi et postwar propaganda, any acknowledment of t h e mag->ni tude and use fu lness of t h i s a i d cou ld se rve no p o l i t i c a lpurpose, a s i t would document t h e ind ebt edn ess of t h e S o v ie tUnion t o a f o r e i g n s t a t e , which t h e Sovie t Union would bel o a t h t o admit i n any event , and l e a s t of a l l t o t h e "bul-w a r k of world c a p i t a l i s m . " ' Moreover, i t would d i m i n i s h t osome degree t h e lus te r of t h e S o vi et Union's own i n d u s t r i a lachievements, which were c l aim ed t o r e s t on t h e f a r - s igh tedi n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n programs ca r r ied o u t by t h e regime d u r i n gt h e f i r s t f i v e y e a r p l a n s . T hu s, t h e m a t t e r o f A l l i e d sup-p l i e s was ment ioned very spar ing ly in Soviet postwar accountsof t h e war, and where mentioned was always presented as anexchange f o r Sov i e t r a w mater ia ls , o r as a paltry recompensef o r t h e R u s s i a n c o n t r i b u t i o n s of blood and t i m e .The most publicized of t h e i s s u e s a f f e c t i ng t h e A l l i e dr o l e i n t h e war was t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e second f ron t . TheS o v i et a t t i t u d e tow ard t h i s q u e s t i o n assumed approximatelyits permanent form du ri ng 1942, when it m u s t have seemed t ot h e Sovie t leaders t h a t n o th i ng b u t t h e crumbling defensesof Sta l ingrad s tood be tween them and f i n a l d i s a s t e r . I t isunders tandable t h a t i n these d e s p e r a t e h o ur s t h e y w e r e l i t t l ed i s po s e d t o apprec ia te A l l i e d l o g i s t i c problems and were b i t -t e r about t h e f a i l u r e of t h e needed m i l i t a r y r e l i e f t o m a -t e r i a l i z e . But even a f t e r t h e p a s s i o n s of the moment cooled,t h e s ec on d f r o n t i s s u e a p p a re n t l y appeared t o t h e S o v ie t l ead-ers a s t o o u s e f u l a d e v i c e t o abandon. During t h e w a r it con-t r i b u t e d a c e r t a i n ps y c h ol o g ic a l l e v e r ag e t o t h e Soviet Unionin d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e A l l i e s , and probably went a long waytoward cance l l ing ou t wha tever sense of indebtedness t h e A l -l i e d sup p l i es may have ca r r i ed w i t h them. A f t e r t h e w ar , i ts e r v e d a s a p r o p f o r t h e c la im tha t the Soviet Union hadborne th e b run t of t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t H i t l e r .The b a s i s of t h e Sovie t pos twar charge t h a t t h e A l l i e shad shown bad f a i t h i n t h i s matter was t h e joint communiqu6pu bl is he d i n London and Washington a f t e r t h e Molotov v i s i t i nt h e sp r i ng of 1942. The communiqu6 s a i d in p a r t t h a t "in t h ec o u r s e of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s f u l l u n de r st a nd ing was reachedw i t h r e g a rd t o t h e u r ge n t t a s k o f c r e a t i n g a s e c o n d f r o n t i nEurope i n 1942." C h u r c h i l l has e x p l a in e d t h a t t h e pu r po s e of

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t h e communiqu6wasto make t h e Germans app rehensi ve and holdas many of t h e i r t r o o p s i n t h e w e s t a s p o s s i b l e . So a s n ott o m i sl e ad t h e R us si an s, h e t o o k care t o gi ve Molotov an a i dememoire, s t a t i n g t h a t h e c o u ld " g iv e no p ro mise i n t h e mat-ter ." In postwar comment on t h e su bj ec t , So vie t propagandaignored the , aide memoire. Instead, it b en t e ve ry e f f o r t t oshow t h a t t h n l i e s had gone back on t h e i r word, and haddone so, m oreo ver, w i th t h e d e l i b e r a t e a i m of dragg ing ou tt h e war a n 4 ex h a u s ti n g t h e R u ss i an s .

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A fo ur th i ss ue was t h e Normandy inva sion . S o v i e t p o s t -I t w a s s t a t e d t h a t t h e A l l i e s un-

w a r pro paga nda i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s e v en t i n su c h a way as t op l a c e A l l i e d p o l i t i c a l m o ti ve s and m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s i nt h e wo rs t p o s s ib l e l i g h t .der took t h e Normandy i nv as io n only t o f o r e s t a l l t h e i n e v i t -able s ing le-handed t r iumph of t h e Sov ie t Union. Moreover,i t was c h a r g e d t h a t t h e A l l i e s d e l i b e r a t e l y d e l a y e d t h e i rbreak out from t h e Normandy.beachhead f o r two and a half months,while watching developments on t h e Soviet-German f r on t , andp l ay i ng w i th t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a compromise peace. In a l lo f t h i s , Sov ie t pos twar p ropaganda p laced g re a t stress on thea l l e g e d i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l r e s i s t a n c e p u t u p by t h e Germans t ot h e A l l i e d invas ion . I t w a s c la imed th a t t he German d iv i s i on si n Europe were not of f i r s t combat qu al i t y . During t h e wholeper iod o f t h e Normandy inv as ion , acco rdin g t o t h e Sovie t pos t -war propaganda account, not a s i ng l e German d iv i s io n wast r a n s f e r r e d from t h e S o v ie t f r o n t . C o ns eq ue n tl y, no s i g n i f -i cance cou ld be a t t a c h e d t o the Normandy invasion as e a s i n gt h e s i t u a t i on i n a n y s u b s t a n t i a l degree on t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t .A h i g h ly d e ro g at o ry a p p r a i s a l o f A l l i e d m i l i t a r y c ap-a b i l i t i e s w a s a l so given i n connec t ion wi th th e Ardennesb a t t l e and th e f i n a l advance thro ugh Germany. The former w a sp r e s e n t e d as a m ajor c o l l a p s e o f t h e A l l i e d m i l i t a r y p os i -t i o n which would have been f a t a l had not S t a l i n , i n re sp on set o C h u r c h i l l ' s u rg en t p l e a , a dv an ce d t h e date o f t h e S ov i e tw in t e r o f f e n s iv e , and t hu s f or ce d t h e Germans t o abandont h e i r a t t a c k and withdraw t h e i r f o r c e s t o t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t .T h e f i n a l A l l i e d advance through Germany w a s a l s o e x pl a in e da s t h e r e s u l t of t h e German p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n t o conc en-t r a t e a l l f o r c e s a g a in s t t h e - R u s s i a n s a nd t o l e a v e t h e wayopen f o r t h e A l l i e s t o reach B e rl i n f i r s t .

m he Pa c i f i c WarT h e p r i n c ip a l i s s u e ra i sed by t h e S o v i e t a c c o u nt of t h ePa c i f i c War w a s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e J ap an es e s u rr e n d er .The Soviet Union from t h e beginning mainta ined t h a t it was t h e '

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S o v i e t d e c l a r a t i o n of war and the defea t of t h e Kwantungarmy, r a t h e r than th e atomic bomb, which force d t h e Jap-anese t o ca p i tu la te , The Sovi e t a rgument was b a se d p r i n -c i p a l l y on t h r e e a s s e r t i o n s : (1) t h a t t h e Allies had achievedn o s i g n i f i c a n t m i l i t a r y s u c c e s s e s a g a i n s t t h e J a p an e s e d u r i n gt h e c o u r s e of t h e P a c i f i c War, (2) t h a t t h e main m i l i t a r ys t r e n g t h of Japan remained throughout the war untouched i nManchuria, and (3) t h a t i n 1945 Japarl was s t i l l capable ofc o n t i n u in g t h e war f o r a n o t h e r t w o y e a r s a t l e a s t . T h i sl a t t e r a s s e r t i o n was based on American mili tary estimates,made i n 1944, and 1945, of t h e requir emen ts f o r t h e i n v a -s i on o f th e Japanese home i s la nd s .The ro le of t h e atomic bomb was u s u a l l y i g n o r e d , orsummari ly dismissed, i n Soviet accounts of t h e J a p a n e s e s u r -render . The mos t c i rc um st an t i a l Sov ie t a rgument on t h i sp o i n t was offered by V. Avar in i n h i s second book on t h eP a c i f i c war, p u b l i s h e d i n 1 95 2. I t was based on t h e da tap r e se n t ed i n t h e U n i t e d St a t es S t ra te g i c Bombing Survey re-g a r d in g t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n t h e J a p a n e se Government d u r in gt h e l a s t days b e f or e t h e d e c i s i o n t o s u r r e n d e r was t a k e n .P a r t of Avarin's argument was based on t h e t i m i n g of t h e s ee v e n t s , The atomic bomb, he observed , was dropped on 6August, and r e s u l t e d i n no p a r t i c u l a r r e a c t i o n i n J a pa n es eo f f i c i a l c i r c l e s . The Spvie t de c l a r a t io n of war reachedTokyo on t h e morning of 9 August, and w a s followed by af r a n t i c s e r i e s o f o f f i c i a l m ee ti n gs , c o nc l ud in g w i t h t h eImpe ria l Conference in t h e n i g h t of 9-10 August. P a r t ofh i s argument was b as ed a l s o on t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h e d i s c u s -s i on s . The key elemeht here was t h e s t a te m e nt of t h e e m -p e r o r a nn ou nc in g h i s d e c i s i o n t o a c c e p t s u r r e n d e r . In it,he d i d not mention t h e at om ic bomb, b u t s a i d i n p a r t (ac-cord ing t o A v a r l n ' s t r a n s l a t i o n ) : "To c o n t i n u e t h e w a r i nt h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n which h a s a r i s e n , and g iv e n t h es i t u a t i o n w i th in J a pa n, would mean t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h ewhole nat ion.I1* This , ac cordi ng t o Avarin, proved t h a t t h ep o in t a t i s s u e w a s "not t h e atomic bomb o r s t r a t e g i c bomb-i n g , b u t ' t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n which had a r i s e n , 'i . e . , t h e e n t ra n c e of t h e S o v i e t Union i n to t h e w a r a g a i n s tJapan. . . . 1

* The emperor's words a s g i v e n i n t h e St r a t e g i c BombingSurvey a r e as fo l lows : "Thinking about th e world s i t u a -t i o n and t h e i n t e r n a l J ap an es e s i t u a t i o n , t o c o n t i n u e t h ewar means no th ing bu t t he d es t r uc t i on of the whole na t ion ;"A v a r in o b v io u s ly s h a d e d h i s t r a n s l a t i o n t o s u p p o r t h i s a r -gument.

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Unlike many of t h e o t h e r i s s u e s d i sc u ss e d i n t h i s chap-t e r , there was very l i t t l e development or change in t h e S o v ie ti n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e J a pa n es e s u r r e n d e r d u r in g t h e p o s tw a rp e r io d . According t o Max Beloff, i n h i s book S o v i et P o l i cy i nt h e Far-East , 1944-1951, t h e a t t r i b u t i o n of t h e Japanese col-l a p s e e x c l u s i v e l y t o S o v i e t v i c t o r i e s i n M anchuria r em ai ne da c o n s t a n t of Soviet comment on t h i s s u b j e c t from t h e ena oft h e war on.p r e s e n t in t h e e a r l i e s t a n a l ys e s of t h i s even t no ted . Colone lM. Tolchenov, a prominen t mi l i t a ry wi-iter, s e t o u t t h e mainl i n e s of t h i s argument in 1945, alt hou gh i n somewhat lessc a t e g o r i c a l terms than l a t e r became customary.A l l i e d m i l i t a r y est imates as proof t h a t Japan was s t i l l cap-a b l e of r e s i s t a n ' c e a t th e end, and claimed t h a t m o s t f o r e i g nnewspapers recognized t h a t Sovie t in te r ve n t i on was "one oft h e d e c i s i v e f a c to r s " c o mp e ll in g t h e enemy t o l a y down h i sarms.t h e atomic bomb, ex pre ss ing some ca ut io us optimism a s to i t sf u t u r e p e ac e tim e im p l i c a t i o n s , but concluding t h a t it was i r -r e l e v a n t t o t h e f ina l ou tcome of t h e P a c i f i c War and invokingt h e a u t h o r i t y of Generals Arnold and Chennault in supporf, oft h i s conclusion.

A l l t h e major elements of t h i s account were

H e c i t e d._

An accompanying a r t i c l e assessed t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of

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11. INTERNAL RESISTANCE TO THE POSTWAR LINE ON THE WARDuring i t s development in t h e p os tw ar p e r io d , t h e s o v i e to f f i c i a l i n t e r pr e t a t io n o f t h e w a r evoked varying degrees ofresistance f rom e lements -of th e popula t ion most d i r e c t l y af- ,fected-the p r o f e s si o n a l m i l i t a r y , t h e h i s t o r i a n s , and t h ewri ters .

The Profess iona l M i l i t a r yAlthough mi l i t a ry wri ters played a key ro l e in develop-i ng t h e o f f i c i a l version of t h e w a r , t h e y d id not a b d i c a t et h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l i n t e g r i t y e n t i r e l y t o propaganda c r i t e r i a ,a n d , . . i n t h e i r w a r t i m e w r i t i n g s a t l e a s t , prov ided sna tchesof d i r e c t tes t imony on t h e r e a l n a t u r e of w a r t i m e e v e n t s .Some fa int s igns of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w it h e le me nt s of t h e of-f i c i a l l i n e also appeared among m i l i t a r y writers d u r i n g t h epostwar period. This expressed i t s e l f no t i n any open Op-p o s i t i o n t o t h e o f f i c i a l l i n e , b u t in i n d i c a ti o n s t h a t t h ep r o fe s s io n a l m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s were exper ienc ing tens ionbetween t h e i r d i r ec t exper ience of t h e m i l i t a r y e v e n t s oft h e w a r and t h e t h e o r e t i c a l f or mu la s i n which t h e y were re-qui red t o express them.I n t h e summer of 1945, a s m a l l unsigned a r t i c l e i n M i l -i t a r y T hou gh t, t h e t h e o r e t i c a l o r ga n o f t h e Genera l S t a f r?i rs t drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s l a t t e r phenomenon. I t t oo k t ot a s k a number of s p e c i a l i z e d m i l i t a r y j o u r n a l s f o r e x a gg e ra t -ing t h e r o l e s of t h e i r own s e r v i c e s i n t h e w a r , and fo rneg lec t ing t h e S o v ie t d o c t r i n e on t h e c o o r d in a te d a c t i o n ofa l l a r m s . T he se j o u r n a l s , s a i d t h e a r t i c l e , " r a i s e t h ebasic ques t ion o f t h e military employment of t h e i r ownf o r c e s in combined a r m s b a t t l e poorly o r no t a t a l l , andsometimes, in i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e m i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o n s o f t h e i r f o r ce s , a t t r i b u t e t o them an Independents ign i f icance ." The Air F o r c e s j o u r n a l came in f o r p a r t i c u l a rcr i t i c i sm in t h i s regard .A m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g case was a c r u s t y a r t i c l e by MajorGeneral A. Penchevskiy , "Concerning Operat ions f o r Enci rc le -

m e n t and Operational Terminology," in M i l i t a r y Thought, No.6 / 7 , 1945, which dispu ted t h e concept of " i b t e r n a l and ex-t e r n a l f r o n t s " i n an enc i rc lement opera t ion . This concept

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was a l r e a d y b ecoming p a r t o f t h e l e g en d o f t h e S t a l i n g r a d op-e r a t i o n , where, it w a s claimed, a n " e x t e r n a l f r o n t " h ad b ee nformed on t h e e n c i r c l i n g r i n g t o preven t a breakin by Man-s t e i n ' s r e l i e f column, as w e l l as a n " i n t e r n a l f r o n t " t d p r e -v e n t a bre ak ou t by von Pa ul us ' army. The use of t h i s con-c e p t t o b u t t r e ss t h e claim t h a t S t a l i n a lw ay s b e a t t h e enemy" f o r s u r e , " f o r e s e e i n g on a l a r g e scale a l l t h e counte rmeas-u r e s t h a t t h e enemy m ig h t p o s s ib ly u n de r ta k e, g a v e it a po-l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . "In t h e p l a n ni n g of an o p e r a t i o n , "s a i d Penchevskiy , " t h e f o r c e s an d means of an army and f ron t( f r o n t s ) are never under any c i rcumstances divided betweeni n t e r n a l an d e x t e r n a l f r o n t s ( l i n e s ) . They are d i v i d e d ac-c o r d in g t o o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s , and tasks are e s t a b l i s h e db y d e f in e d l i n e s . " H e concluded with a b l u n t d i s m i s a l o f ., t h e t h e o r y . "Our s t a f f s n e v e r u se d s u ch c o n c e p t s as ' i n t e r -n a l and e x t e r n a l f r o n t s ' ; t h e y are use less s i n c e t h e y do n o te x p l a i n t h e e s s e n c e of t h e operat ional maneuver ."A s t i l l more i n t e r e s t i n g case was an a r t i c l e by Generalof t h e Army Eremenko, e n t i t l e d "Counterblows i n a Contempo-r a r y Defensive Operat io n," which appeared in M i l i t a r y T ho ug ht ,No. 3,1949. This was a n o t a b l e a r t i c l e i f f o r no o ther r e a s o nth a n t h a t , a t t h e he i g h t o f t h e S t a l i n a po t h eo s i s, i t men-t i o ne d S t a l i n on l y o nc e, i n t h e opening paragraph, and t h ea d j e c t i v e " S t a l i n i s t " o nc e, in t h e l a s t . Moreover, it d e a l tw i th t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e c o u n t e r of f e ns i v e in s u c h a way ast o o b s c ur e t h e r o l e of t h e Supreme Commander in t h e di rec-t i o n o f t h i s o p e r a t i o n and t o enhance the r o l e of army andfront commanders. T h i s r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t Eremenkoa t t r i b u te d t o t h e counterblow ( i . e . , a n o p e r a t i o n of a n armyor f r o n t , l a r g e r t h a n a c o u n t e r a t t a c k , b u t smaller t h a n ac o un t er o ff e ns i ve ) t h e c r u c i a l r o l e in t r i g g e r i n g t h e c o u n t e r -o f f en s i ve , s p e c i f i c a l l y w it h r ef e r en c e t o Moscow and Kursk.H e spoke o f t h e counte rb lows i n t h e s e t w o . b a t t l e s as " tu r n -ing i n t o " c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e s . T h i s p hr as eo lo gy was, in i t -s e l f , no t unortho dox, bu t Eremenko made it a p p e a r t h a t t h earmy or f r o n t commander who made t h e d e c i s i o n f o r a c o u n t e r -blow was, i n e f f e c t , t h e a g e n t r e s p o n s ib l e f o r t h e c o u n t e r -o f f e n s i v e . T h i s , i n t h e a tm os ph er e of 1949, was p e r i l o u s l yc l o s e to lese m a je s ty .There i s e v id e n c e t h a t t h e unorthodoxy of t h i s a r t i c l ew a s t h e r e s u l t n o t o f careless w r i t i n g b u t of b l un t m i l i t a r yhones ty . Time a n d again, Eremenko missed t h e obvious op-p o r t u n i t i e s t o throw i n a s o p t o S t a l i n ' s v a n i ty . R e pe a te d ly ,

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he spoke of t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e as "growing ou t of ," or"developing from, I' t h e counterblows launched by "our t roops ,withou t ment ion ing tha t i t was "organized" by S ta l in , asgood propaganda pract ice r e q u i r e d . I n o n e p l a c e he w en te ve n f u r t h e r , a nd im p l i c i t l y c r e d i t e d Zhukov w i th p r e p a r i n gt h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s iv e u n d er Moscow.The i d e o l o g i c a l l a p s e s o f t h i s a r t i c l e were t h r o w n in tos t r on g e r r e l i e f by a vigorous ly o r thodox a r t i c l e o n t h ec o u n t e r o f f e n s iv e w h i c h Eremenko published two y e a r s l a t e r .I t provided a whole ca t a log ue of t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m u la sp r a i s i n g S t a l i n as t h e g e n iu s e xp on en t of t h i s s t r a t e g y .The s p i r i t of t h i s a r t i c l e c o n t r a s t e d so s h a r p l y w i t h t h ee a r l i e r one t h a t t h e c o n c lu s io n seems i n e s c a p a b l e t h a t con-

s i d e r a t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l d i s c r e t i o n had propmted i t .The His tor ians

T h e p r o f e s s i o n a l h i s t o r i a n s were blocked o f f f r o m t h em i l i t a r y h i s t o r y of t h e war by p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s t a k e n a twar's end, and th enc efo r th r e s t r i c t e d themselves t o t h ed ip lo m a t i c h i s t o r y of t h e wartime p er i od . I n t h i s f i e l d ,a s i g n i f i c a n t number of them d i s p l a y e d a r e l a t i v e l y objec-t i v e a t t i t u d e toward t h e West up through 1947, and somebeyond t h a t d a t e .One work of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t was t h e f i r s t volume

of a s e r i e s , Works on Modern and Contemporary Kistroy, whichvolume was s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d l a t e r f o r many departuresfrom ide o lo g ic a l o r thodoxy. One a r t i c l e i n i t , "The German-Fascist Drang nach Osten a f t e r Munich," by F. I . Notovich,i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of t h e g e n e ra l s c h ol a r s hi p s and p o l i t i c a ldetachment of t h e volume. The main c r i t i c i s m l a t e r d i r e c t e da g a i n s t t h i s a r t i c l e w a s t h a t it descr ibed t h e Munich agree-ment as a " c a p i t u l a t i o n , " r a th e r t h a n as a "deal" o r "bar-g a in . " The v e ry f i r s t words of t h e a r t i c l e were "The Munichc a p i t u l a t i o n , " a n d t h i s p h r a s e w a s u s e d r e g u l a r l y t h r o u g h o u t .I t was, moreover, dev oid of t h e u s u a l r e f e r e n c e s t o Marxista u th o r i t i e s . A l th o u g h i t car r i ed a h e a v y s c h o l a r l y a p p a r a tu s ,i n a c l o s e t e x t o f f i f t y pag es, o n ly two or t h r e e p u r e l y f a c -t u a l r e f e r e n c es t o Sovie t sources appeared .

was brought out by t h e H i s t or y I n s t i t u t e i n 1948. This

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Another example of p o s t w a r unorthodoxy in S o v i e t h i s -' t o r ipgraphy was a book p u b l i s h e d i n 1 94 7, b y P r o f e s s o r G.D eb or in , e n t i t l e d " I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s a nd t h e F or e i gnP o l i c y of t h e USSR, 1917-1945," I V : The Years o f t h e GreatP a t r i o t i c War. This book was apparent ly wi thdrawn from c l r -' cu la t ion ' somet i rne'in 1949, and is not now ava i l ab le . Accord-

_ >

in g t o t h e S o v i e t p r e s s , t h e book w a s publ i shed by t h e High-. er Diplomatic School as an inform al s tud ent manual and en-' jo ye d c i r c u l a t i o n i n e d u c a ti o n al i n s t i t u t i o n s in t h i s c a p ac i ty .O f f i c i a l a t t e n t i o n was drawn t o t h e book, ap pa re nt ly , whenth e contemporary h i s t o r y sec tor of t h e H is to ry I n s t i t u t e a t -tempted t o r e p u b l i s h i t under t h e s ea l of t h e Academy ofSciences .The s u b s t a n t i v e cr i t i c i sm of the book was f o c u s e d oni t s alleged pro-American b i a s . I t was s a i d t h a t t h e bo okp r e s e n t e d US f o r e i g n p o l i c y d u r i n g t h e Second World War " j u s tas Amer ican imper ia l i s t s themse lves a t t empt t o p o r t r a y it."T h is i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , it w a s s a i d , conveyed t h e im p r e s s io nt h a t t h e US government w a s opposed t o t h e a n t i - S o v i e t p o l -i c i e s of Chur ch i l l and th e American im pe r i a l i s t s , t h a t i tw a s a s t a u n c h f r i e n d of t h e S o v i e t Union throughout t h es t rugg le . Thus t h e book concealed t h e " s t r u g g l e w i t h i n t h ea n t i - H i t le r c o a l i t i o n " d u r in g t h e w a r , and ignored t h e "funda-menta l oppo s i t io n be tween th e fo r e ig n po l icy of t h e USSR, ont h e o n e hand, and of t h e USA and G r e a t B r i t a i n , on t h e o t h-er." On a more s p e c i f i c i s s u e , t h e s e c o n d f r o n t , t he bookalso was s a i d t o have given a d i s t o r t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h eWes te rn de lay i n open ing a s e c o n d f r o n t w a s a t t r i b u t e d ' t ot h e i n a b i l i t y o f US and B r i t i s h leaders t o e v a lu a t e t h e de-v e l o p i n g s i t u a t i o n in 19 42 c o r r e c t l y , t o t h e i r o v e r e s t i m a t i o nof t h e H i t l e r forces . Thus, th e p ro longed de lay i n open ingt h e s e c o n d f r o n t was ascribed t o " s h o rt s i gh t e d" US and B r i t -i s h l eaders . F i n a l l y , t h e o f f i c i a l c r i t i c s h i n t e d d a r k l y a timproper mot ives i n the p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e book.

. .. .... .. ...

As t h e c r i t i c s were c l e a r t o p o i n t out, h i s t o r i a n s wereh e l d r e s p o n s i b l e n o t o n l y f o r w hat t h e y p u b li s h ed , bu t a l s of o r what t h e y s a i d . A s t a t e m e n t made i n a c l a s s r o o m l e c t u r ew i l l s e r v e as a l a s t i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e l a g g a r d n e s s of t h eS o v ie t h i s t o r i c a l c ommunity in a c c ep t i ng t h e p o st wa r o f f i -c i a l l i n e on t h e w a r . The case i n p o i nt was t h a t of P r o f e s s o rZvavich, a s p e c i a l i s t on B r i t i s h h i s t o r y . The m o s t s t a r t l i n gof t h e words h e w a s a l l e g e d t o h a v e u t t e r e d were d e s c r i b e das f o l l o w s :

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. ...

. .. ..: ,

........-... . . :..

L

..,., % . ,..... ..

.,.....u....

I n t h e l e c t u r e c o u r se g i v en a t t h e Higher DiplomaticSchool, Zvavich committed a d i r e c t f a l s i f i c a t i o n ofh i s t o r y , a s s e r t i n g t h a t a t u r n i n g p o i n t in t h e c o u r seo f t h e war t o o k place as a r e s u l t o f t h e l an di ng o f 't h e Americans i n I t a l y . (Voprosy P s t o r i i No. 2, 1949, 156)The f u l l f u r y of t h e i d e o 1 o g ic a l " r e a c t i o n f e l l on t h eh i s t o r i c a l community dur i ng t h e ye ars 1948 and 1949, when,under the goad of t h e p a r t y p re ss , a s e r i e s of meetings w a sh e l d t o p lace o ne h i s t o r i a n a f t e r a n o th e r on t h e r a c k ofp u b l i c cr i t ic ism f o r t h e e d i f i c a t i o n of h i s fel lows. Thec l i m a x of t h i s campa ign came in t h e s p r in g of 1949, whenth e s e c o n d i s s u e of Quest ions of His tory f o r t h a t year was

h e ld u p f o r f i v e m on th s, w h i l e a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h ee d i t o r i a l board was e f f e c t e d . The r e s i s t a n c e w hich t h eh i s t o r i a n s d i s p l a y e d was evoked not by c l a s h e s o v er par-,titular i s s u e s , b u t b y p r o f e s s io n a l d i s d a in f o r t h e p o l i t -i c a l c r i t e r i a w hich d e f i n e d t h e p a r t y ' s demands. The mosts t r i k i n g f e a t u r e of t h e i r performance was t h e i n d i s p u ta b l eevidence it provided t h a t t h e h i s t o r i a n s u nd er st oo d t h e na-t u r e of t h e c a p i t u l a t i o n s t h e y were forced t o make.

There were s i g n s , f i r s t of a l l , t h a t t h e h i s t o r i a n s a t -tempted t o d e f l e c t , o r b l u n t , or even t o s h i e l d each otherfrom t h e s h a r p edge of p a r t y c r i t i c i s m . The behav io r o ft h e e d i t o r i a l board of Q u e s t i o n s of H i s t o r y i t s e l f w a s re-markable i n t h i s respect . I t d i s p l a y e d t a c t and forebear-ance i n t h e case of N. Rubinshteyn, f o r example, t h e au tho rof a book on Russ ian h i s t o r io g raph y , and t h e f i r s t v i c t i mof t h e i d e o l o g i c a l r e a c t i o n , b y a l lowing h i m t o i n i t i a t et h e d i s c u ss i o n o f h i s c r i t i c i zed book, r a th e r t h a n s u b j e c t -ing him t o immediate a t tack by o t h e r s . I ts a c ti on i n t h ecase of I . I . M i n t s , a s p e c i a l i s t i n t h e e a r l y Soviet per i -od, was even bolder. A t a t i m e when Mints had become t h emain t a r g e t of t h e p a r t y a t t a c k , t h e e d i t o r i a l board allowedhim t o p u b l i s h a lead a r t i c l e , i n t h e f i r s t i s s ue of 1949,which in e f f e c t c o n s t i tu t e d a n apologia f o r t h e h i s t o r i c a lcommunity. This a r t i c l e l i s t e d a l l t h e names of t h e lead-i n g S o v i e t h i s t o r i a n s , proclaimed t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t oSo v ie t h i s t o r i c a l sc ience , and (pe rhaps by a s l i p of t h epen, becuase h i s a r t i c l e w a s o t h e r w i s e ve ry d u t i f u l i n t h i srespect ) a t t r i b u t e d t o h i s own co l leag ues , r a t h e r t h a n t oS t a l i n , t h e c r e d i t f o r l a y in g t h e "bas is f o r t h e s t u d y oft h e So v ie t p e r i o d of t h e h i s t o r y of our coun t ry . "

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In a d d i t i o n t o Q u e st io n s of H i s t o r y i t s e l f , i nd i vi du a lh i s t o r i a n s also made ef for t s t o s t e m t h e c o u r se o f p a r t yr e a c t i o n . A t t h e b e gi n ni n g of t h e c r i t i c a l campaign, f o rexample, there was a t l e a s t o ne h i s t o r i a n (K. V az i l ev i ch )who s to od openly aga in s t t h e basic chauv i n i s t t endency oft h e o f f i c i a l l i n e . "We &e n o t i n c l i n e d t o g rove l b e f o r et h e West." h e s a i d , "We c a r ry o u r c u l t ur ' e w i t h d i g n i t y . , ,, . . .

, . . ., ... ..... ..

But t o t e a r o f f t h e h i s t o r y 0 3 R u s s ia from t h e h i s t o r y ofot he r cou nt r ies -- thi s would mean t o r e t u r n t o a pas t whichhas been condemned, and it would hardly be r i g h t to s t a r tof f on such a path . " In t h e f i r s t d is cu ss io n of Mints' bookon t h e f i r s t y ea r s of t h e S o v ie t r eg im e, i t was r e p o r t e dt h a t one speake r (A. I . Gukovskiy) attempted to impugn Mints'l oy a l t y . The subsequent spea ker s , it was noted, "unanimouslyre jected" t h i s i n s i nua t i on . A ga i n , in t h e d i s c u s s i o n o fWorks on Modern and Contemporary History it w a s r e p o r t e d :A tte mp ts t o s o f t e n t h e s h a r p n e s s of t h e cr i t ic ism appeared ,fo r example, i n t h e speech of A. 2. Manfred, who accompaniedhis adknowledgment of t he m i s t aken character of E gge r t s ' ar-t i c l e w i t h ambiguous compl iments regarding the author ' s" g r e a t s k i l l , ' ' a b i l i t y t o master t h e mater ia l , ' etc ."

I n d i v i d u a l a u t h o r s , not i n f r e q u e n t l y , showed cons i de r -ab le s tubbornness in r e f u s i n g t o bow meekly t o o f f i c i a lc r i t i c i s m . I . M. Lemin, f o r example, t he auth or 02 The For-e i gn Po l i cy o f Great B r i t a i n f r o m Versai l les t o Locarno, W a sr e po r te d s t i c k i n g t o - h i s gu ns a t t h e e nd of t h e c r i t i c a l ses-s i o n on h i s book.I t is neces sa ry t o n o t e , a t t h e same t i m e , t h e un-s e r i o u s and i r r e s p o n s i b l e a t t i t u d e which t h e a u t ho rof t h e book him;el f displayed toward t h e d i s c u s s i o n .Admitt ing, in g e n e r a l terms, t h a t c e r t a i n l y " t h er eare many shortcomings in t h e book," t h a t " the re arec e r t a i n bad sound ing words," and t h a t " t h e t o n e isi n a p p r o p r i a te i n a number of cases," I . M. Lemin a tt h e same t i m e a t t empted , wi thout any proof , t o denya l l t he concre te and a rgued compla in t s and observa-t ions about the book made by t h e speake r s . As ar e s u l t of t h e f a l s e p o s i t i o n t a k en by him, I . M.Lemin i n f a c t re jec ted t h e c r i t i c a l review of hisbook, i n t h e l i g h t of t h e crit icism t o which i t wass u b j e c t e d a t t h e d i s cuss i on , and h i s concl ud ing wordsf a i l e d c o mp l et e ly t o s a t i s f y t h o s e p r e s e n t . (VoprosyI s t o r i i , No. 6, 1948, 139)

. .

! ... .

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The occas iona l cynica l remarks which some h i s t o r i a n smade during t h e s e c r i t i c a l s e s s i o n s r e v e a l ed , more e l oquen t -l y t h a n any d i s q u i s t i o n , t h e i r f u l l aw ar en es s o f t h e p u r e l yp o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which mo ti va te d t h e o f f i c i a l reac-t i o n . P r o f e s s o r L u ta k iy , f o r e xa mp le , i n a t t e m p t i n g t o wardo f f attacks on h i s sec tor o f t h e H i st o ry I n s t i t u t e , r e f e r r e dt o t he op in ion which , he s a i d , was commonly he l d i n h i s t o r i c a lcircles , " t h at t h e h i s t o r y of S o v i et s o c i e t y is n o t h i s t o r y ,b u t c u r r e n t p o l i t i c s . " A s i m i l a r theme i n t h e d e f e n s i v e re -marks o f t h e c r i t i c i z e d h i s t o r i a n s was t h e c o mp la in t t h a tt hey had been v i c t i m i zed by t h e sw i f t change In t h e o f f i c i a ll i n e a f t e r t h e war.F. I . Notovich, f o r example, t h e a u t h o r of t h e a r t i c l eon German post-Munich po li cy , co ns id er ed above, used t h i sde fense .S t i l l more u n s a t i s f a c t o r y w a s t h e speech of F. I .Notovich, who a t f i r s t r ef us ed t o r ecogn i ze anys u b s t a n t i a l mistakes a t a l l i n h i s unde r s t and i ngo r e v a l u a t i o n of t h e Munich p o l i cy i n his a r t i c l e .O nly i n h i s s econd speech , which fo ll owed t he deci-s i v e c r i t i c i s m of h i s first, d i d Comrade Notovichacknowledge t h a t he had p e r m i t t e d " fa l se n o te s " i nit , and t h a t h i s a r t i c l e d i d n o t c o r re s po n d t o t h edemands of m i l i t a n t p a r t y h i s t o r i c a l s c i e n c e . How-e v e r , e ve n i n h i s s e co n d s p e e c h , F. l. Notovich in-s i n u a t e d f a l s e n o t e s . H e e x p l a i n e d t h e errors o fh i s a r t i c l e n o t as arising f r o m a misunders t andingof t h e es sence of t h e Munich agreement, but as a re -s u l t o f t h e f ac t t h a t h e h ad " p r i n t e d i n 1 948 a n ar-t i c l e w r i t t e n i n 19 45 .. . ." (Vopmsy Is tor i i , No. 12,1948,177.)Pe rhaps more s i g n i f i ca n t t han t he s e d i s p l a y s o f i n d i v i d -u a l c o ur a ge o r s t ubbornness were t h e s i g n s ( n a t u r a l l y h e a v i l yv e i l e d i n S o v i e t s o u r c e s) o f s om e th in g l i k e an o rgan i zed re-s i s t an ce by t h e h i s t o r i c a l community t o t h e p a r t y ' s ideo-l og ica l campaign . T h i s appea red most c l e a r l y i n t h e v i r t u a lboyco t t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n of Rubinsh teyn ' s t e x t book he ldby t h e Mi nis t ry of Higher Educat ion, i n March, 1948. Oft h e s p e a k er s r e p o r t ed h t t h e m ee t in g , o n l y t h r e e a p p e a re dt o be h i s t o r i a n s o f i m p or ta n ce (S. A. Pokrovskiy, A, L.Sidorov, and Y e . N. G o r o d e ts k i y ) , t h e o t h e r s b ei n g m a in l ydocen t s , or pro fes sor s from ou t s id e Moscow. The ab s t en t io n

Of t h e f i r s t - r a t e h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s from t h e meet ing w a s

. ...'.... *. .:.. .

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a l l t h e more s t r i k i n g in v ie w o f t h e h ig h s p o n s o r s h ip o f t h ea f f a i r ; and t h e i m po rt an ce which t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o b v i o u s lya t t a c h e d t o it . Both Sidorov and Gorodetskiy, a t t h e meet-i n g , r e f e r r e d t o t h e a bs e nc e o f t h e major p r o f e s s o r s i n ' t e r m s ,which suggested that a " f e a t o f s i l e n ce " was being performed,Complaining t h a t t h e i n i t i a t i v e f o r t h e crit icism had comef rom ou ts ide the h i s to r ica l communi ty , 'S idorov s t a t e d : "Evennow, a t t h i s p r e s en t co n fe r en c e, t h e m a j o r it y of t h e membersof t h e depar tment (of Moscow S t a t e Un iv er si ty ) a re absen t . . . .A c e r t a in i n w a r d n e s s on t h e p a r t o f these i n s t i t u t i o n s ( t h e. . H i s t o r y I n s t i t u t e , and t h e Academy of So c i a l Sc iences ) , andt h e absence o f p rominen t h i s t o r ia ns a t t h e p r e s e n t m e et i ng ,c h a r a c t e r i z e s , t o a s i g n i f i c a n t degree, t h e g e n e r a l p o s i t i o non t h e h i s t o r i c a l f r on t . .. . " G or od et sk iy r e f e r r e d sarcast ical-l y t o th e "absence of t h e s o- c al le d p i l l a r s of h i s t o r i c a ls c i e n c e f r o m t h e d i s c u s s io n...." L a t e r , on s e v e r a l o c c as i o ns ,i t was impl ied t h a t t h i s a b s t e n t i o n of t h e Moscow h i s t o r i c a lcommunity from t h e meet ing had been a del ibera t e ac t .

. ..

Later cri t icism r e v e a l ed o t h e r cases o f g r ou p o p p o s i t i o nt o t h e p a r ty ' s i d e o lo g i c a l c am paign . A lead a r t i c l e inQ u e s t i o n s o f H i s to r y , a t t h e end of 1948, f o r example , as-s e r t e d : "There were cases when t h e c r i t i c i s m of m i s t akes( r e c e n t l y made i n t h e p r e s s , e t c . ) were m e t w i t h h o s t i l i t yin t h e I n s t i t u t e . " Also: " T h e I n s t i t u t e d i d n o t o r g a n i z ework on t h e e x po s ur e o f f o r e ig n b ou r g e o i s h i s t o r i o g r a p h y ,and d i d not conduc t ' an a t t a c k on f o r e i g n f a l s i f i e r s of h i s -t o r y . T h i s w ork, u n t i l r e c e n t l y , h a s be en c o n s id e re d I n t h eI n s t i t u t e as ' o u t s i d e an d p l a n ' , a nd t h e workers of t h eI n s t i t u t e shunned it."The Writers.. -.... The w p i t e r s ' community, as a whole, demonstrated a c d o n i ci n d i s c i p l i n e a f t e r t h e w a r which was unmatched by any othersegment o f Sov ie t soc ie ty . The s o u r c e s of t h i s I n d i s c i p l i n ewere no d ou bt v a r i o u s , b u t t h e r e were t w o common factors--t h e n at ur e o f l i t e r a t u r e i t s e l f , and t h e reg ime ' s imper fec tc o n t r o l o f i t .

Writers had t o dea l w i t h human beings and t h e i r r e l a t i o n -s h i p s , in terms comprehensible t o themselves and acceptableto t h e i r readers . This meant t h a t t h e s u b j e c t of t h e w r i t e r ' swork w a s man--man, n o t S o v i e t man--and human v a lu e s whic h t h es h a ll o w p o l i t i c a l p h il o so p hy h e was r e q u i r e d t o s e r v e f a i l e dt o exp la in o r even to .acknowledge .- 2 1 -

. :..1. .

1


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S ec on dly, t h e q u a l i f i e d e d i t o r i a l i n de pe nd en ce e n jo y edby l i t e r a r y j o u r n a l s e n co ur ag ed writers t o probe f o r t h eo u t e r l i m i t s of o f f i c i a l t o le r a n c e . T h is h el pe d t o ke epa l i v e t h e s e n s e o f a share d p roblem, and con t r i bu t ed to ' afe e l in g of g roup id en t i ty among th e writers.The most dramatic e p i s o d e in t h e p os tw ar c o l l i s i o n b e-tween propaganda policy on t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e war andth e tes t imony of t h e wri te r s w a s t h e a r t i c l e "Crocks andP o t sh e r ds , " which a p pe a re d i n t h e l i t e r a r y j o u r n a l O ktya br ,i n 1946, from the pen of i t s e d i t o r , F. Panferov. Thisa r t i c l e was a p l a i n t i v e de n un c ia t io n o f t h e l i t e r a r ybureaucracy (and inescapab ly , though impl ic i t ly , of t h e po-

l i t i c a l powers which suppor ted it) for promoting a f a l s e ,p r e t t i f i e d v er s io n o f t h e s u f f e r i n g s , t e r ro r s , and majesticachievements of the w a r .

I .

The substance of Panfe rov ' s a r t i c l e w a s the compla in tt h a t t h e c r i t i c s opposed any por t r ay a l o f th e w a r whichconveyed a t r u e measure of t h e enormous s a c r i f i c e s i t hadc o s t . I n his a r t i c l e h e descr ibed how he had ques t ionedt h e genera l s d u r in g t h e l a s t days of t h e w a r , and askedthem t o e x pl ai n t o h i m t h e n a t u r e of t h e v i c t o r y t h a t hadbeen won. They cou ld no t answ er, he s a i d . Even they, t h ege ne ra ls who had won t h e vi c t o r y , were f o r ce d t o admit t h a tthey d i d n o t f u l l y u nd e r st a n d t h e mo ra l f o r c e s t h a t hadmoved t h e i r a r m i e s . * T h ey s t o o d b e f o r e a puzzle , th e sphynxo f v i c t o r i e s . Only t h e c r i t i c s , sneered Panferov, t h e"crocks and potsherds," as h e ca l l ed them, were able t o un-ders tand t h i s great imponderable .For t h e "crocks and potsherds" a l l t h i s is c l e a r ."Retreat? There w a s no r e t r ea t . This was a plannedwithdrawal which exhaus ted t h e enemy.""But," responds t h e - w r i t e r , "what ki nd of a plannedwithdrawal was t h i s , when t he f a t e o f our coun t ry a tone t i m e hung by a h a i r . Indeed , Comrade Stalin andh i s fe l lo w workers spoke t o u s a b o u t t h i s . ""Forget it! I t is n e ce s sa r y t o f o r g e t t h i s , " answert h e "crocks and potsherds . ''"How f o r g e t ?the Germans were a t S t a l i n g r a d , a t Mozdok, a t Moscow?How i s i t p o s s ib l e t o fo rg e t t h e burdens which ourpeop le shou ldered dur ing t h e w a r ? Indeed , sometimesou t shou lders c racked f rom these burdens.

Perhaps it i s p o s s i b l e t o f o rg e t t h a t

, ...

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P a nf e ro v t h e n r e c a l l e d t h e t e r r i b l e h a r ds h ip s s u f f e r e dby thedworking people in s e t t i n g u p t h e e v ac ua te d i n d u s t r i e sin t h e r ea r , H e d e s c r i b e d t h e h a r d l i v i n g co n d i t i o n s , t h er i g o r s o f w i n t e r work in t h e Urals , t h e c o l d which f r o z e t h epalms of t h e workers' hands to t h e s t e e l .t h e ' c rocks and po t she rds ' " , he wrote, " a n d i n s i s t e n t l yde c la re : 'Nonsense , no th ing l i k e t h i s happened in ourcoun t ry . ' The writer s p r e a d s h i s hands in p e r p l e x i t y . "R e t u rn ing t o t h e m i l i t a r y a s p e ct o f t h e w a r , Panferov

"But here come

. ". ' conc luded his a r t i c l e w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c h a r a c t e r oft h e enemy, and of t h e proper way of por t ray ing th e enemyi n l i t e r a t u r e . H e d i sp u te d t h e o f f i c i a l t en de nc y t o d e p r e c a t et h e m i l i t a ry q u a l i t i e s of t h e Germans. Thi s , he argue d,d i d n o - c r e d i t t o t h e Sov i e t army, and in f a c t m in im iz ed t h e .s i g n i f i c a n c e ,of t h e v i c t o r y it had achieved.po t she rds , " he s a i d , i n s i s t t h a t t h e enemy s h o u l d b e p o r t r ay e das s t u p i d , cow ard ly , i gno ran t of m i l i t a r y matters--as a "wodenhead w i t h eyes."

.....

The "crocks and

,. . . . .

But, i f you w i l l , why minimize the s t rength of t h eenemy, h i s r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s , h i s r apac i ousness , hiscunning, h i s m i l i t a r y skill, h i s s t e a d i n e s s in ba t -t l e , h i s a b i l i t y t o de fend h i m se l f , t o a t t a c k , a n df i n a l l y , t o f i g h t ? I nd ee d, in depic t ing the enemyas a wooden head w i t h eyes, w e minimize t h e heroismof t h e R e d Army.bea t en a wooden head w i t h eyes? N o , t h e enemy w a ss t r o n g , in h i s own way, able , cunning , and s t ea dyin b a t t l e . Indeed, no wooden head w i t h e y e s c o u l dhave seized , i f on l y t em pora r i l y , t h e whole o f Eur-ope , and moved in t o ou r c oun t ry hundreds of d i v i -sions armed from head t o t oe . No. And how e x p l a i nt h e power of the enemy, h i s psychology--why millionsw e n t o v e r t o the f a s c i s t s , if o n l y fo r a t i m e ? Tos o lv e t h i s is a n e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y c o m p l ic a te d andneces sa ry matter.. .

What kind of heroi sm is i t t o have

There can be no d ou bt t h a t P a n f e r ov p a s s i o n a t e l y be-l ie v ed i n t h e p o s i t i o n h e defended. Moreover, he seemd t of e e l t h a t h i s v i ewpo in t m igh t p r ev a i l ove r t h e oppos ingview o f t h e l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s . H e reminded his r e a d e r s oft h e w a r t i m e words of S t a l i n and t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s ; h ei nvoked t he au t ho r i t y o f t h e pa r t y wh ich "never concea l ed . "A t t h e t i m e he pub l i shed t h e a r t i c l e , Panferov seemed t o

- 23 -, .\


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regard t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e war as n o t y e t a com pl e t e l yclosed i s s u e . The o b j e c t i v e o f h i s a r t i c l e , a p p a r e n t l y , wast 6 b u l l y t h e c r i t i c s , a n d i n f l u e n c e t h e pol i t i ca l a u t h o r i t i e sb eh in d them, i n t o a c c e p t i n g h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e r o l e

' and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f l i t e r a t u r e i n p o rt ra y in g t h e h i s t o r yof t h e w a r . N o d o u b t , a c t i v e debates on t h i s s u b j e ct hadbeen s t i m u l a t ed t h roughou t t h e l i t e r a r y community by S t a l i n ' se lec tora l speech ea r l i e r in t h e yea r .The l a s t i n g s i g n i f i a n c e of P a nf e ro v 's a r t i c l e rests i nt h e t e s ta m e n t i t gave of R u s s i a ' s w a r t i m e exper i ence . On t h eeve of t h e p o s t w a r campaign of f a l s i f i c a t i o n s and h a l f - t r u t h s ,which the regime hoped would b l o t ou t t h e unhappy memories of

t h e w a r , one c lea r v o i c e b o r e w i t n e ss t o t h e s u f f e r i n g s a ndsacr if ices i t had cos t . I t s p ok e n o t o n l y f o r P a n f er o v b u tf o r many of his c o l l e a g u e s as w e l l , and i ndeed f o r t h e R uss i anpeople .Echoes of t h i s t es ti mo ny t o t h e t r u t h a bo ut t h e w a r wereI n t h e last two is-o be h e a r d a g a i n i n t h e postwar period.s u e s of t h e l i t e r a r y j ou rn a l Znamya, i n 1947, t he re appea reda work e n t i t l e d "Motherland and Foreignland: Pages from aNotebook," by A. Tvardovskiy, in which t h e poet a t t emptedt o recreate i m pres s i ons from a l o s t w a r t i m e d i a r y , I t w a sa c o l l e c t i o n of v i g n e t t e s of his w a r t i m e expe r i ences . Ast h e pe r sona l record o f a s e n s i t i v e o b s e r v e r , w hich w a s in-t e n d e d o r i g i n a l l y f o r h i s own us e r a t h e r t h a n fo r p u b l i c a t i o n ,it presen t ed a remarkably c l e a r view of t h e human f ea tu re sof t h e S o v i e t p e o pl e in t h e w a r .Tvardovskiy was p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t r a c t e d by t he ha rd i n es s ,t h e s h ee r s u r v i v a l a b i l i t y ,

Declassified CIA: The Soviet History of World War II

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