The Practice of Theory Borrowing in Organizational Studies

8/9/2019 The Practice of Theory Borrowing in Organizational Studies

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The Practice of Theory Borrowing in

Organizational Studies: Current Issues

and Future Directions

David A. Whetten*Teppo Felin

Marriott School, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602

Brayden G. KingKellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Rd, Evanston, IL 60208

The borrowing and application of concepts and theories from underlying disciplines, such as

psychology and sociology, is commonplace in organization theory. This article critically reviews

this practice in organizational research. It discusses the borrowing of theoretical perspectives

across vertical (cross-level) and horizontal (cross-context) boundaries and makes an associated

distinction between theories in organizations and theories of organizations. It also explicates

several unintended consequences and metatheoretical challenges associated with theory bor-

rowing and highlights the legitimate reasons and ways for borrowing theories. By way of

example, this article reviews how theories and concepts have been borrowed and applied in

organizational research from two different literatures: individual identity and social movements.

Overall, it is argued that treating organizations as social actors is the key to appropriate hori-

zontal and vertical theory borrowing in organizational studies, in that it highlights the distinc-

tive features of the organizational social form and organizational social context.

Keywords: organization theory; concept and theory borrowing; interdisciplinary research

Organizational research relies heavily on borrowed concepts and theories from neighboring

disciplines such as psychology and sociology. Indeed, the practice of borrowing theories is

*Corresponding author: Tel.: 801-422-6400; fax: 801-422-0223.

E-mail address: [email protected]

Journal of Management, Vol. XX No. X, Month XXXX xx-xxDOI: 10.1177/0149206308330556

2009 Southern Management Association. All rights reserved.

Journal of Management OnlineFirst, published on January 23, 2009 as doi:10.1177/0149206308330556


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so prevalent in organizational studies that it has lead to what has been characterized as a

balance of trade deficit with the basic disciplines (Ilgen & Klein, 1989). Sometimes this

practice involves horizontal borrowing, in the sense that organizational scholars use con-

cepts that were developed for the study of phenomena in other types of social contexts. Forexample, insights from the social movement literature in sociology (Davis, McAdam, Scott,

& Zald, 2004), or market-related insights from economics (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997), have

been used extensively in organizational research. In other instances, organizational scholars

engage in vertical borrowing, wherein they borrow concepts that were developed at

different levels of analysis. Examples include several contemporary lines of organizational

research that are based on individual-level concepts, including organizational learning

(Argote, 1999), organizational decision making (Cyert & March, 1963), and organizational

identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985).

Both forms of theory borrowing have, of course, been extremely important and fruitful

for organizational studies. The practice of borrowing concepts and theories has helped therelatively young field of organizational studies develop credibility as a legitimate form of

scholarly inquiry, and it has fostered strong ties between the applied study of organizations

and the core social science disciplines (cf., Agarwal & Hoetker, 2007; Gordon & Howell,

1959). Furthermore, borrowing from neighboring disciplines has clearly enhanced the inter-

disciplinary richness of organizational scholarship.

Despite the prevalence and importance of concept and theory borrowing in organizational

studies, the basic premise of this article is that the manner in which concepts and theories

are typically borrowed is problematic. Our central concern is that, with few exceptions, this

practice ignores differences in organizational social contexts and levels of analysis. As a

consequence, borrowed theories and concepts too often remain largely unmodified when

used to study organizational phenomena, without regard for whether in their native form

these borrowed concepts or theories are suitable as organizationaltheories. We see this gen-

eral lack of organizational context and level sensitivity as symptomatic of a broader tendency

in organizational studies to generally ignore the distinctive features of organizations as social

actors and the associated distinctive features of the organizational social context (cf., Heath

& Sitkin, 2001; King, Felin, & Whetten, in press b).

Our examination of theory borrowing within the field of organizational scholarship

includes several elements. First, we discuss the general practicehow and why we borrow

and to what effect. In this discussion, we distinguish between borrowing across vertical andhorizontal boundaries and between borrowing that informs research within organizational

social contexts (theories in organizations) and research conducted at the organizational

level of analysis (theories of organizations). Thereafter, we highlight specific problems with

how theory borrowing is commonly practiced, stemming from the general neglect of

organizations as unique social entities and social contexts. We then examine the distin-

guishing attributes of organizational social actors and explore the implications for a more

organizational context- and level-sensitive approach to theory and concept borrowing. To

make our review and critique of theory borrowing less abstract, we examine in detail the

challenges and problems of organizational theory borrowing from two literatures: individ-

ual identity and social movements. Our ultimate goal and contribution is in offering importanttheoretical guidance for what it means to do organizational researchresearch that accounts

2 Journal of Management / Month XXXX


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for the organization as both a unique level of analysis and a unique social context (cf., Van de

Ven & Poole, 1995).

Theory Borrowing in Organization Studies

Reasons for Theory Borrowing

It is not difficult to explain why theory and concept borrowing is a widespread practice in

organizational studies. First, the study of things-organizational lends itself to inter- and

multidisciplinary investigation (e.g., see recent Academy of Management presidential

addresses: Huff, 1999; Mowday, 1997). Organizations, after all, are comprised of individuals

and thus knowledge about individual needs, identity, and personality, as well as judgment

biases and decision-making heuristics clearly is relevant for studying organizational behavior(e.g., Schneider, 1987). Furthermore, organizations also are embedded in larger environments,

including organizational populations, sociopolitical contexts and cultures, and markets, and

thus the study of organizations is scarcely imaginable without the aid of economic and socio-

logical theory (Scott, 2001). A second reason for borrowing theories from neighboring disci-

plines is that, generally speaking, organizational and management research is often seen as

an applieddiscipline (Zald, 1993: 514; also see Boulding, 1958; Van de Ven, 2007). The

fields applied focus is evident in the collective effort to demonstrate the utility of concepts

developed in basic disciplines as explanations of organizational practices and as guides for

improving managerial practice. The strong ties between organizational studies and the basic

disciplines can also be seen in the practice among highly ranked business schools of hiringscholars who are trained in core disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and economics

(Agarwal & Hoetker, 2007: 1318). A third reason for theory borrowing is not specific to this

or any other field of study. Ideally speaking, the practice of theory borrowing can improve the

quality of theory-based organizational scholarship (Whetten, in press). The process of system-

atically applying a theory in different settings improves the theorys explanatory power by

delineating its boundaries, or scope conditions. In addition, the in-depth understanding of

level effects and context effects required to make informed theory borrowing decisions

improves the borrowers ability to use these context and level effects to explain cross-level or

cross-context differences, such as why different kinds of organizations or the same kinds of

organizations in different contexts perform the same function differently.

An Overview of Theory Borrowing

We begin our examination of theory borrowing in organizational studies by defining

theory and briefly describing two types of theory. Theory can simply be defined as an

explanationan answer to the question of why (Sutton & Staw, 1995; Whetten, 1989).

Theories broadly fall into two categories: (a) Paradigmatic theories are constituted as broad

theoretical perspectives and they are typically used to explain a particular phenomenon, and

(b) propositional theories are constituted as one or more propositional arguments involvingthe use of one concept to explain another concept. As an example of paradigmatic theory use,

Whetten et al. / Theory Borrowing in Organizational Studies 3


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agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), behavioral theory (Simon & March, 1958), and equity

theory (Mowday, 1991) have all been used to explain differences in employee motivation. As

an example of propositional theory, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) used the level of environ-

mental uncertainty to explain the levels of integration and differentiation among organiza-tional units and functions. It is worth noting that authors writing about theory borrowing

often focus on one type of theory or the other (e.g., Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999, versus

Chen, Bliese, & Mathieu, 2005). Our analysis and recommendations apply equally to both

types of theories, to the point that, in some cases, we use theory borrowing and concept

borrowing interchangeably.

There are, broadly speaking, two types or kinds of theory borrowing observed in organiza-

tional studieswhat we refer to as vertical and horizontal borrowing. Vertical borrowing uses

concepts that were formulated at a different level of analysis, meaning a different level of

abstraction (Chen et al., 2005; Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999; Rousseau, 1985). Although it is

possible to engage in vertical borrowing from both higher and lower levels of analysis, we willfocus on the most common practice in organizational studies of borrowing: the borrowing of

individual-level concepts and theories. In contrast, horizontal borrowing involves the use of

concepts that were formulated in a different social context. Following Chen et al. (2005), we

assume that horizontal borrowing occurs within the same level of analysis and that vertical

borrowing takes place within a single social context. In our examination of these practices, we

further assume that social contexts and levels of analysis share a common property of internal

homogeneitythat is, there is greater within than between context/level homogeneity (Ragin,

1987). In other words, it is expected that the prototypic properties of one level or context are,

in general, different from those of another level or context. In accordance with this assumption,

the validity threat posed by both vertical and horizontal theory borrowing is that the borrowed

explanation might operate differently within the new organizational setting (Campbell &

Stanley, 1966; Cheng, 1994; Cook & Campbell, 1979; Tsang & Kwan, 1999).

The general standard governing appropriate theory borrowing is that the way in which

a theory functions should be roughly equivalent in the new and the old setting (Morgeson &

Hofmann, 1999; Rousseau, 1985; Tsui, Nifadkar, & Ou, 2007).1 In the case of paradigmatic

theory, we should expect to see similar things across settings, in the sense that the distinc-

tive insights that have characterized a particular theory in its native level or context should

hold true in the new setting. In a similar manner, it is expected that in the case of proposi-

tional theory, the predictive or explanatory utility of a concept, relative to other concepts,should be consistent across contexts or levelsthat is, a concepts nomological network

should not be significantly altered by a shift in context or level. Later in the article, we

explore some of the practical implications of this general standard for level- or context-ap-

propriate theory borrowing, including ways, when necessary, of modifying borrowed theo-

ries so as to account for the moderating effects of context or level differences.

Borrowed theories can also be classified on the basis of how, or where, they are applied

in organizational studies. Specifically, theories can and have been applied as theories of

organizations (explanations of organizational-level phenomena) or as theories in organiza-

tions (explanations of phenomena observed within organizations). To reduce the complexity

of our analysis, our examination of theory borrowing will be limited to vertical borrowing-as-theories of organizations and horizontal borrowing-as-theories in organizations. This choice



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of focus allows us to highlight the use of organizational to signify both a distinctive level

(vertical borrowing-as-theories of organizations) and a distinctive context (horizontal

borrowing-as-theories in organizations).

Critiquing Current Practice

Our critique of theory borrowing in organizational studies is inspired by related calls for

increased cross-level (Chen et al., 2005; Chen, Mathieu, & Bliese; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall,

1994; Klein, Canella, & Tosi, 1999; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000;

Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999; Rousseau,1958) and cross-context sensitivity (Griffin, 2007;

Heath & Sitkin, 2001; Johns, 2001, 2006; Mowday & Sutton, 1993; Rousseau & Fried,

2001). Indeed, some have argued that cross-level and cross-context effects are so central to

an understanding of organizational phenomena that they should be distinctive features oforganizational scholarship (House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995; Johns, 2006;

Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Rousseau, 1985).

However, our critique of theory borrowing extends current efforts to foster greater context

and level sensitivity in two important ways. First, our explicit emphasis is on the importance

of organizationallevel and context sensitivity. What, from our point of view, is noticeably

absent from current discussion of context sensitivity in the organizational behavior literature,

for example, is the lack of attention to the organization itself as a relevant and unique context

(cf., Johns, 2006). As a consequence, obvious differences between organizations and other

types of social entities, as well as between different kinds of organizations, such as universi-

ties and corporations, or large/old and small/new businesses, tend to be overlooked as poten-tially relevant contextual conditions for the study of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors

exhibited by members of organizations. The general lack of organizational level and context

sensitivity in our field is particularly evident in the practice of theory borrowing, where the

modifier organizational is too often added to a borrowed theory as though stamping the

organizational brand on something makes it so. In addition, the fact that theory borrowing

tends to be organizationalcontext and level blind suggests that it is possibly motivated by

the mistaken notion that introducing a new concept to the field of organizational studies in

and of itself constitutes a theoretical contribution. In contrast, a hallmark of level- and

context-sensitive theory borrowing is the presumption that what is being borrowed will

explain something better than it has been heretofore explained (Whetten, in press). A second

distinguishing feature of our call for greater context and level sensitivity is that it is explicitly

theoretical, in contrast to the (often) methods-driven treatment of this subject. At this point

in time, it appears that the current conversations strong research-design focus, while cer-

tainly important and legitimate, has tended to downplay the importance of construct validity

(Tsui et al., 2007). Recalling the adage a way of seeing is a way of not seeing, it is critical

that prior to designing an organizational research study, including sample and measurement

selection, organizational scholars first scrutinize the history of their theoretical perspectives

and concepts to determine if they will be applied in level- and context-appropriate ways

(e.g., Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Rousseau, 1985; Tsui et al., 2007).



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Not only does the failure to account for relevant organizational conditions constitute a

potential threat to validity, it also represents a significant opportunity cost, in terms of our

collective ability as organizational scholars to speak authoritatively about the unique proper-

ties of organizations and the organizational context. In the case of horizontal borrowing, alack of organizational context sensitivity leads borrowers to overlook organization context-

specific questions, such as To what extent is our understanding of subject X drawn from

research conducted in organizational settings different from the general understanding of

subject X within the disciplines of psychology, sociology, or economics? or To what extent

can the results from this study conducted in a particular type of organization/organizational

setting be generalized? It seems reasonable to assume that disciplinary and practitioner

readers interested in understanding organizational context effects would expect to find

answers to these kinds of questions in the organizational studies literature.

A similar concern about the opportunity costs associated with organizational-blind

research appears to have inspired Heath and Sitkins (2001) call for more Big O (Ob)research. In contrast to the prevailing Big B (oB) research, they argue that Big O research

explicitly accounts for the uniqueness of organizations and the organizational setting. The

authors propose two standards for assessing the extent to which a particular piece of research

has an organizational (Ob) focus. (a) Core Competence Test: Is this a topic about which

OB researchers have unique insights that are not likely to be shared by researchers in related

social science disciplines like psychology, sociology, political science, or economics?

(b) Organizational Centrality Test: How much would we understand about organizations if

we understood everything there was to know about ____? How easy is it to imagine an organi-

zation where ____ is not a central concern? With regard to the subject of theory borrowing,

the Core Competence Test speaks to the importance of organizational level and context

sensitivity, and the Organizational Centrality Test suggests a strategy for identifying the unique

features of organizations.

We see a parallel, opportunity-costs argument in recent calls in the cross-cultural litera-

ture for more indigenous (context-specific) scholarship. For example, some have expressed

concern about the heavy (nearly exclusive) reliance on Western organizational studies concepts

and theories in organizational scholarship conducted in non-Western contexts (e.g., Meyer,

2006; Tsui, 2006; Tsui, Schoonhoven, Meyer, Lau, & Milkovich, 2004; Von Glinow,

Shapiro, & Brett, 2004; White, 2002). In particular, Tsui (2006; Tsui et al., 2007) warns that

this practice has led Chinese organizational scholars to overlook Chinese context-specificorganizational problems and issues and to neglect the development of Chinese context-

specific organizational theory (see Whetten, in press, for a related discussion).

Infusing Theory Borrowing With Greater Organizational Sensitivity

Given our analysis to this point, it seems that efforts to make the practice of concept and

theory borrowing more level and context sensitive must first tackle the more fundamental

and difficult challenge of demonstrating that the label organizational truly signifies a

distinctive level of analysis and social context. One of the obstacles lying in the path of such



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an endeavor is a widely shared, legitimate fear among organizational scholars of using

anthropomorphic or reified conceptions of the organization (Simon, 1964). This concern is

reflected in Czarniawskas (1997) objection to studying organizations as if they are super

individuals. It is, thus, not surprising that the cross-level literature in organizational studies

has heavily focused on methodological (Dansereau, Yammarino, & Kohles, 1999) and theo-

retical (Felin & Foss, 2005) approaches to aggregating individual data and has tended to

characterize the organization as an emergent, shared phenomena (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).

Our view is that although this is certainly a valid fear, it appears to have distracted organiza-tional scholars from addressing an equally important challenge. Swanson (1971), a pioneer in

modern organizational sociology, urged those studying organizations to avoid two logical

perils, not one: (a) treating organizations as if they have the same properties as individuals

and (b) treating organizational outcomes as merely the aggregate product of individual

behaviors. It is our argument that a conception of organizations that avoids both pitfalls is

essential for level- and context-appropriate theory borrowing in organizational scholarship.

More specifically, inasmuch as context effects are defined as effects originating at a higher

level of analysis (Griffin, 2007), an understanding of the distinctive features of the organiza-

tional level of analysis (organizations) is necessary for both level- and context-appropriate

theory borrowing in organizational scholarship.


STATE

MARKETSSocial Entities ORGANIZATIONS

COMMUNITIES

INDIVIDUALS

Social Actors

Reproduced from King, Felin and Whetten, 2009, with permission.

Figure 1

The Social Landscape of Organizations


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Figure 1 visually depicts the distinctive features of the organizational social form, or level

of analysis, when the organization is viewed as a social actor rather than as a social aggregate.

In this figure, the organization is situated in a landscape of social entities and social actors

with which organizations interact and interface. The figure conveys similarities and differ-ences both horizontally, between different kinds of social entities, and vertically, between

different kinds of social actors (levels of analysis).

As we have discussed elsewhere (King et al., in press b), organizations are qualitatively

different from other types of social entities because of the fact that in modern society they

are granted the status of socialactor. Said differently, as depicted in the vertical dimension

of Figure 1, organizations and individuals are deemed by the state to occupy a comparable

social statusthat is, collective actors and individual actors, respectively (Coleman, 1982).

A distinguishing feature of social actors is that society or the state grants them some degree

of sovereignty and, in turn, holds them responsible for their actions. By implication, it is

presumed that organizational actors, like individual actors, possess a subjective, self-interestedpoint of reference and an associated capacity for intentional behavior and that society applies

roughly the same standards of accountability to both collective organizational action and

individual action. As a point of emphasis, the presumption that organizations, like individu-

als, should be held accountable to society requires a corollary presumption that organiza-

tions, like individuals, are capable of intentional, accountable, and self-regulated action.

As illustrated by the horizontal dimension in Figure 1, an important implication of the

social actor status granted to organizations is that, compared with other types of social enti-

ties, they are organized differently and thus influence individuals in a different fashion. For

example, unlike markets and communities, organizations can and must exercise a compara-

tively high degree of control over their members, including who qualifies as a member.

Organizations can exercise internal control because of their grant of limited sovereignty from

the state; organizations must exercise internal control because society holds them account-

able for the actions of their members. This distinctive feature of organizations is captured

nicely in Williamsons (1975) bookMarkets and Hierarchies. It is also reflected in various

attempts to delineate the distinctive features of the organizational social form (Bauman,

1990; King et al., in press b; Scott, 2003). Extant definitions of organization broadly capture

this intuition: Organizations are goal-directed, boundary-maintaining activity systems

(Aldrich, 1999: 2-5).

Thus, it is because organizations alone (within the realm of social entities) function ascollective social actors that organizational signifies both a distinctive level of analysis, for

purposes of vertical borrowing, andsocial context, for purposes of horizontal borrowing. In

other words, it is our contention that treating organizations as social actors is the key to both

context-sensitive and level-sensitive theory and concept borrowing in organizational studies,

because it specifies what is and isnt considered organizational in terms of a set of vertical

(level) and horizontal (context) boundary conditions. In addition, when ones focus is on

organizations-as-social actors, then horizontal context borrowing can be modeled after the

standard practices found in cross-context research (treating the organization as a unique

social context) and vertical borrowing can be modeled after the standard practices found in

cross-level research (treating the organization as a unique level of analysis).



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Table 1 summarizes the conceptualization of theory borrowing introduced in this section,

organized as four parallel distinctions. As shown in this table, vertical theory borrowinginvolves the application of a borrowed theory at a level other than the one in which it was

developed, and horizontal theory borrowing involves a parallel contextual difference between

where a borrowed theory was developed and where it is applied. The table also highlights

our decision to focus on the use of vertical borrowing in conjunction with theories of organ-

ization and the use of horizontal borrowing in conjunction with theories inorganizations. As

shown in the table, the judgment as to whether a borrowed theory can be used in an unmodi-

fied form is based on whether it functions, or performs (i.e., explains), the same way in the

old and new context or level. Finally, in line with the social actor view of organizations (King

et al., in press b) one of the key ways to improve the practice of theory borrowing is to make

it more organizational level and context sensitive.

Examples of Vertical and Horizontal Theory Borrowing

As a way of adding texture to our broad overview of theory borrowing, this section exam-

ines more closely two examples of this practice. In line with the immediately previous char-

acterization of the social view of organizations, our in-depth examination of these two cases

is intended to highlight both the challenges and the merits of explicitly accounting for the

distinctive features of the organizational level of analysis and the organizational context.

Vertical Theory Borrowing: The Case of Organizational Identity

As noted earlier, we presume that the purpose of vertical borrowing is to guide research

at the organizational level of analysis, functioning as explanations and theories of organiza-

tions (see Table 1). Thus, in this case, the organizational modifier signifies that the borrowed

concept is considered to be a property of the organization itself as a social actor. 2 Using the

language of Kozlowski and Klein (2000), the focus here is on the global properties of

organizations, as compared with the shared, emergent properties of their members. To date,

the literature on cross-level organizational analysis has heavily focused on the emergence ofcollective organizational properties via individual aggregation and individual interaction


Table 1

Theory Borrowing in Organizational Studies

Implications for

Type of Highlighted Standard for Appropriate

Theory Boundaries Application of Appropriate Organizational

Borrowing Crossed Borrowed Theories Theory Borrowing Theory Borrowing

Vertical Levels of Theories of Concept theories Organizational

analysis organizations similarly across levels level-effects sensitivity

Horizontal Types of Theories in Concept functions Organizational

contexts organizations similarly across contexts context-effects sensitivity


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(Dansereau et al., 1999; Felin & Hesterly, 2007; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Morgeson &

Hofmann, 1999). This important body of work directs attention to how organizational prop-

erties may emerge from activities occurring at lower levels of analysis. Although we

acknowledge the importance of this approach to cross-level theorizing, our focus is on cross-level theory borrowing. Said differently, rather than examining how to appropriately theorize

the emergence of higher level (in our case, organizational) phenomena, we will examine how

to appropriately borrow theory from a lower level of analysis with the global properties of

the organization in mind.

In their discussion of what they refer to as cross-level theories of homology, Chen et al.

(2005) describe a continuum ranging from metaphorical theories to identical theories.

Metaphorical theories use metaphors and analogies, such as biology and information

processing, to describe the similarities between individuals and organizations. This end of

the continuum is characterized by low precision and prediction and exploratory/theory

building. In contrast, identical theories more precisely predict that the phenomena of inter-est, and thus the magnitude and pattern of relationships manifesting the phenomena, remain

highly consistent or even identical across levels of analysis (Sutton & Staw, 1995: 381).

This end of the continuum is characterized by high precision of prediction and confirma-

tory/theory testing.

Coming at this subject from a different angle, Cornelissen and Kafouros (2008) provide

an extensive review of how individual-level concepts are used metaphorically in the study of

organizations, wherein the intent is to focus attention on learning-like, or identity-like, or

memory-like organizational components. In this manner, metaphors are used as linguistic

tools and explanations that help us more clearly visualize a particular feature of organiza-

tions by comparing it with an analogous feature commonly observed in individuals. As noted

earlier, the common justification for using an individual-level concept in only a metaphorical

manner at the organizational level of analysis is that it avoids concerns about anthropomor-

phism and reification (Simon, 1964). Metaphorical borrowing is illustrated by Nelson and

Winter (1982: chap. 4), whose oft-cited concept of an organizational routine was originally

developed via a metaphor to individual skills.

As these treatments of cross-level theory suggest, we can view the typology of cross-level

theories proposed by Chen et al. (2005) in two ways. From one perspective, it describes the

life cycle of borrowed theories, envisioning the possibility of a given theory moving, over

time, from metaphorical to identical. It can also be viewed as a set of categorical distinctions,linked to related differences in organizational scholars beliefs about the appropriateness of

borrowing individual-level theories, especially theories involving specific properties of indi-

viduals, such as identity, personality, or memory.

In the developmental sense of Chen et al.s (2005) continuum, the concept of organizational

identity is clearly in the metaphorical phase, especially considering that much of the empirical

research on this subject has focused on describing this property of organizations (e.g., how

organizations change their identities), rather than on applying the analogue of individual iden-

tity theory at the organizational level of analysis (i.e., using organizational identity to explain

organizational-level outcomes). In the categorical sense of their continuum, it also appears that

the widespread practice in this literature of scholars using organizational identity as a metaphorreflects a concern about borrowing individual-level concepts. When differences between levels



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are considered to be fundamentally incompatible, then cross-level borrowing is likely to be

limited to metaphorical applications. For example, Cornelissen (2002) and Gioia, Schultz, and

Corley (2000) argue against the practice of modeling organizational identity after individual

identity and in favor of more organizationally appropriate conceptionsin particular, ones thataccount for organizations as socially constructed collectives. In this section, we offer a friendly

amendment to this proposal, in the sense of proposing a both/and alternative. Specifically, we

will agree with the need to attune the concept of organizational identity to the distinctive fea-

tures of organizations and propose a way of borrowing individual identity theory that avoids

concerns about building the concept of organizational identity on an anthropomorphic view of

organizations. Said differently, we will explore the possibility of formulating an organization-

appropriate conception of identity and using individual identity as the prototype.

We begin with a brief overview of the identity concept and associated theory. Identity has

been used by generations of psychologists to explain individual behavior (Erikson, 1964;

James, 1890; Leary & Tangney, 2003). Within this intellectual tradition, identity is roughlyequated with a persons self-viewa reflexive, subjective sense of who I am (Leary &

Tangney, 2003). Identity theory has been characterized as an agentic alternative to behav-

iorism, because of its focus on motivated action. More specifically, it is posited that identity-

congruent choices contribute to the fulfillment of fundamental, existential human needs,

such as the needs for distinctiveness, self-approval, consistency, and coherence (Baumeister,

1998; Ryan & Deci, 2003). Identity has also been characterized as a persons distinctive

behavioral signature or identifying commitments (Leary & Tangney, 2003; Mischel &

Morf, 2003), reflecting and explaining a distinctive pattern of consequential choices over

long periods of time and across a variety of situations. Prospectively, when individuals face

particular fork-in-the-road choices, their identity, or self-view, is said to operate as a set of

boundary markers, signifying the perimeter of personally appropriate behavior (Baumeister

& Vohs, 2003; Brewer, 2003). In brief, identity theory is used to explain motivated choices

(versus reflexive responses) that are personally consequential (versus routine). As a theory

of appropriate, consequential choice, it is also generally more useful in predicting what a

person wont choose than exactly what a person will choose.

A significant social turn is evident in the identity literature during the past three dec-

ades. A hallmark of this period has been the emphasis on socialized identitythe imprint

that the surrounding culture and social structure places of an individuals self-concept

(Hogg, 2003; Hogg & Terry, 2000, 2001). This point of emphasis was a reaction to the strongindividual-differences treatment of identity in prior identity scholarship. Social identity

theory (SIT) and its derivative, social categorization theory, embeds individual identity in an

encompassing social structure and culture, especially the social expectations associated with

memberships in salient groups and social categories, referred to as social identities (Ashforth

& Mael, 1989; Brewer, 2003; Hogg & Terry, 2000, 2001; Pratt, 2001, 2003). The parallel

sociological form of identity theory has focused on role expectations (Gecas & Burke, 1995;

Stets & Burke, 2000, 2003). It follows that an individuals identity can be conceptualized as

a type of sociometric diagram, representing the individuals unique location in n-dimensional

space, constituted as a set of personally salient social groups, social categories, roles, and

relationships (Hogg & Terry, 2001). Within this intellectual tradition, the identity of a groupor social category (a persons social identities) is characterized as a collective identity,



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operationalized as a groups prototypical member or group stereotype, or intersubjectively

as a shared sense of we-ness, or oneness, among group members (Ashmore, Deaux, &

McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Cerulo, 1997; Pratt, 2003).

The net effect of the increased emphasis on social identities within identity theory hasbeen a more balanced view of individual identity, as encompassing both individuating traits

and shared expectations. Brewer (1991, 2003) refers to this as the principle of optimal dis-

tinctiveness, suggesting that a fundamental characteristic of identity is that it straddles the

equally compelling needs for distinctiveness (uniqueness) and assimilation (similarity with

others). It follows that one of the things that distinguishes identity theory from related expla-

nations of consequential choice (e.g., personality theory) is its focus on a persons internal-

ized understanding of similarities and differences and their implications for appropriate

behavior.

As suggested by this brief overview, the principle value of an organizational analogue of

individual identity theory is that it offers an alternative to the prevailing explanations ofconsequential organizational choice, borrowed from economics and sociology, which gener-

ally have strong overtones with behaviorism. Thus, it weighs in on the agency side of the

agency versus determinism divide within organizational theory (cf., Emirbayer & Mische,

1994). What it adds to current agentic explanations of organizational action is a coherent,

well-developed formulation, grounded in need fulfillment theory. Also, heretofore, agentic

explanations for organizational actions have generally focused on the agency of the indi-

viduals leading an organizationinterjecting individual choice as a mediator between

environmental conditions and organizational actions. In contrast, the concept of organiza-

tional identity can be used as an organizational agentic explanation, in which leaders act

on behalf of their organizationin accordance with the organizations self-interests, or self-

view, as reflected in past fork-in-the-road choices (Whetten, 2006).

In their recent assessment of the state of the organizational identity literature, Corley

et al. (2006) describe two broad perspectives, or approaches, linked to the level of analysis

from which organizational identity is conceptualized. First, numerous scholars have viewed

organizational identity from the perspective of individuals, most notably organizational

members (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Haslam & Ellemers, 2005; Hogg & Terry,

2000). This is a straightforward application of SIT to organizational contextstreating the

identity of an organization as the referent for a members individual identity (a type of social

identity). This is generally referred to as perceived or construed organizational identity, or asthe collective identity of an organizations members. Second, scholars preferring a more

macro-, social structure focus have viewed organizational identity in terms of an actors posi-

tion or role within an encompassing set of social categories and social tiesan organiza-

tions social identities (Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Polos, Hannan, & Carroll, 2002). For example,

Rao, Davis, and Ward (2000) observe that organizations acquire a social identity from the

industry to which they belong, the organizational form they use, and through membership in

accrediting bodies (p. 20). This treatment of organizational identity is typically written from

the perspective of the institutional level, or population level, focusing on what organizations

share in common. At the conclusion of their review, Corley et al. (2006) celebrate the diver-

sity of perspectives. They also emphasize the need for more dialogue and bridge buildingbetween these polar-opposite approaches.



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As suggested by Figure 1, the social actor view of organizations can serve as one such cross-

level bridge, in that it spans the individual-level and the institutional-level approaches to the

study of organizational identity. Specifically, although both of these approaches acknowledge

the organizational level of analysis, neither focuses on it. The individual-level (bottom-up)approach views the organization as a common experience that spawns a shared sense of we-

ness among its members; the institutional-level (outside-in) approach views the organization as

an expression of institutional social, economic, and political forces and forms.

In its bridge-building capacity, the social actor, organizational view adds conceptual

richness to both approaches to organizational identity. Recognition of the agentic aspect of

organizations enriches the institutional approach by encouraging greater attention to the

operational aspects of organizational identity, including how organizations choose and change

their identities (Corley & Gioia, 2004). Similarly, recognition of the interorganizational

dimension of organizational identity expands the reach of the individual approach by focusing

attention on the functions performed by an organizations identity, including its critical contri-bution to organizational legitimacy and classifiability (Zuckerman, 1999).

In this manner, a social-actor-focused approach to organizational identity invites exami-

nation of a host of organization-centric subjects, such as how organizations manage to oper-

ate in the face of sharply divided perceived identities; why founders make critical choices

between alternative identifying characteristics (social identities/social categories); the prac-

tice of mature organizations effecting real, substantive identity change (moving from one

social category to another); and the challenges that leaders in hybrid identity organizations

(e.g., family businesses) face under the constant and pressing realization that an operational

problem, sudden change in environmental conditions, or disagreements over alternative

strategic directions could escalate into a civil war. There are several examples in the

organizational identity literature that demonstrate the utility of using a social actor view of

organizations to study a variety of subjects, including studies of organizational identity

change following a corporate spinoff (Corley & Gioia, 2004), identity conflict in hybrid

identity organizations (Foreman & Whetten, 2002; Glynn, 2000; Golden-Biddle & Rao,

1997), and the use of an organizations identity as a decision guide during periods of tumultu-

ous environmental change (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006).

It appears that ontological concerns about positing a subjective organizational actor per-

spective have contributed to the reticence of organizational identity scholars, especially those

within the individual-level approach, to view identity from the organizational actors per-spective (see Gioia et al., 2000). More specifically, if one posits that only individuals are

capable of possessing a self-view, then it is clearly inappropriate to conceptualize organiza-

tional identity as a subjective property of organizations.

In response to this concern, we offer both a tempering observation and a potential worka-

round. First, as noted by Czarniawska (1997) in her treatment of organizational identity, it is

important to recognize that the individual-level subjective perspective is no less unobserva-

ble. Indeed, Baumeister (1998) attributes the strong functional flavor of individual-level

identity theory (i.e., identity is what identity does) to the fact that its core explanatory

mechanismthe self-conceptcannot be directly measured. Thus, although it is admittedly

more problematic to postulate an organizational (collective) self-view than an individualself-view, scholars studying identity at both levels of analysis are faced with essentially the

same black box problem.



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As for our proposed workaround, the fact that individual-level identity theory has adopted

a strong functional orientation provides a clue for how organizational-level scholarship

might approach this shared challenge, in line with the approach to cross-level theorizing

proposed by Morgeson and Hofmann (1999). A distinctive feature of their approach is itssystematic use of structural and functional comparisons and its insistence that organizational

constructs borrowed from the individual level of analysis need not exhibit the same structural

properties, only the same functions (i.e., comparable effects or consequences on other con-

cepts or phenomena). For example, although the functions associated with memory can be

observed in both individuals and organizations, the form it takes need not be the same (Walsh

& Ungson, 1991). Morgeson and Hofmann propose that once the comparable functions of

an individual-level construct have been identified at the organizational level of analysis, to

gain a fuller understanding of how the function operates in organizations, one needs to identify

the supporting organizational structures or forms. From a structural-functional view of cross-

level theorizing, the principal value of identifying the organizational-level structural compo-nents of organizational identity is that it avoids the possibility that a level-inappropriate view

of organizational-identity-structure might significantly alter the expected or predicted

organizational-identity-function. At the extreme, this apparent lack of cross-level consist-

ency in identity theorys function might lead to the mistaken conclusion that this explanation

should be limited to the individual level of analysis.

So what are the structural properties of an organization that can function as identifying

features and serve as the organizational actors self-view? According to Albert and Whettens

(1985) definition, these are the organizational features that are generally considered to be

central, enduring, and distinctive. This structural treatment of organizational identity has the

overtones of institutional theory, both the old and the new version, in organizational studies.

The old schools emphasis on institutionalization within organizations is reflected in

Whettens (2006) argument that an organizations institutionalized practices, policies, and

proceduresits deep structureserve as persistent reminders of past fork-in-the-road,

identity-defining organizational choices. The new schools emphasis on exogenous social

institutions is reflected in Hsu and Hannans (2005) characterization of organizational identity,

which emphasizes the social obligations associated with the adoption of social forms. What

is common to these characterizations of organizational identity is the notion of sticky

organizational features and practices (Aldrich, 1999; Bouchikhi & Kimberly, 2003; see also

Morgeson & Hofmanns, 1999, use of persistent structure). From an identity perspective,what accounts for the stickiness of fork-in-the-road organizational choices is the pressing

realization that this is who we are. This doesnt mean that an organizations identifying

features cant or dont change. It just means that relative to features that are significantly less

central, enduring, and distinctive, they are less likely to changeto think otherwise is to

operate outside of identity theorys core focus on the need for actors to avoid acting in

uncharacteristic, unrecognizable, inconsistent ways.

Lets look more closely at how the social actor treatment of organizations and organiza-

tional identity helps avoid concerns about anthropomorphism and reification. First, it posits

that members are capable of distinguishing between their interests and perspective and the

interests and perspective of the organizationthat is, they are capable of adopting the role ofmember-agent, especially when called on to act or speak on the organizations behalf when



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engaging in organizationally consequential activities. Thus, it is members consciously acting

as agents of their organization that constitutes organizational action. Second, it is assumed

that member-agents are cognizant of the fact that were they to commit their organization to

an uncharacteristic course of action, they would risk what Czarniawska (1997) refers to as thepotentially fatal flaw of mistaken organizational identity. Third, it is assumed that member-

agents follow the same process for avoiding uncharacteristic organizational decisions that

they use when making consequential individual choices: They reference the actors identifying

attributes (i.e., self-view) as guidelines for appropriate behavior (e.g., We should choose

Option A because Option B is inconsistent with who we are as an organization).

Returning to Gioia et al.s (2000) call for structural conceptions of organizational iden-

tity that reflect the fact that organizations are socially constructed collectives, it is worth

noting the potential that organization-appropriate conceptions of identity have for informing

current treatments of individual identity. It is noteworthy that the preponderance of research

on individual identity has focused on inherent or physical identities, principally gender,ethnicity, and social economic status (Ashmore et al., 2004). Hence, research on the acquisi-

tion and change of organizational identities can help broaden the treatment of choice

within the individual identity literature. Organizations provide an equally fortuitous oppor-

tunity to examine collective identity from the perspective of a purposive collectiveone

in which the collectives identity plays an essential role in self-governance. Thus, for exam-

ple, explorations of how organizations manage their multiple identities (Pratt & Foreman,

2000) can inform the study of multiple identities in individuals.

Thus far, we have largely focused on how the concept of organizational identity illustrates

cross-level borrowing. We will now broaden our focus to include organizational identity

theoryan agentic explanation for consequential organizational choice. Inasmuch as there

are relatively few examples of organizational identity being used in this manner, the distinc-

tion between borrowing a concept and borrowing a theory is both relevant and timely, in that

it suggests new directions for this body of scholarship. In this regard, it is worth noting that

a metaphorical treatment of the individual identity concept is an equally useful device for

describing a set of observations from an organization, community, or market. In contrast,

when one is interested in using identity theory to explain a particular organizational choice

or outcome, a metaphorical view underuses identity theorys unique capacity to explain

purposive, consequential action.

Our example involves the use of identity theory as a new explanation of corporate socialperformance. Heretofore, the most common reason offered for why corporations engage in

social practices has been that it is in their financial best interestsits a way of contributing to

their bottom line (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Scholars interested in theoretical explanations for

these practices often turn to distinctive competencies, a business strategy theory of competi-

tion. According to this theory, a subset of organizational competenciesthose that are valuable,

relatively unique, and difficult to imitateis a prime source of a firms sustainable competitive

advantage (Barney, 1991, 2001; Barney & Stewart, 2000). Within this literature, the conven-

tional view is that organizations acquire distinctive competencies as a consequence of either

managerial prescience or luck, good judgment or good fortune. By definition, this explanation

for the acquisition of persistent organizational features does not account for the adoption oforganizational practices that have no obvious market value, now or later. Hence, in cases where



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persistent corporate social practices arent improving a firms financial performance, distinctive

competencies theory is not a particularly useful explanation for those practices.

In contrast, an identity theory explanation of persistent virtuous behavior among individuals

would focus on how well these actions conform with, or reflect, a persons self-view (i.e.,Am I a virtuous person? Is virtuous behavior typical of me?). Thus, an organizational-

equivalent identity explanation would direct the search for the motivational roots of persistent

corporate social practices to historical accounts of who we are as an organization.

A test of these competing explanations of consistently high corporate social performance

ratings among SandP 500 firms, covering 15 years from 1991 to 2005, was recently reported

by Whetten and Mackey (2002). The results of that study show that firms who consistently

received high marks as corporate citizens experienced relatively little financial benefit from

their social practices. Instead, the best predictor in this study was whether a firms autobio-

graphical accounts highlighted previous adoptions of practices comparable to those used to

construct the dependent variable and whether the first adoption occurred while the founder wasactively involved in the organization. The most surprising result in the study was that the adop-

tion of social practices following the founders era did not predict the dependent variable. It is

also noteworthy that the authors report evidence suggesting both a founders effect and a

founding effect. That is, it appears that the firms who adopted social practices during the

founders era had founders with strong social values, and the stickiness of these practices

appears to stem from the fact that they were initiated soon after the company was formed

which is particularly significant given that many of these firms are more than 100 years old.

In summary, in this section, we have argued that, in line with Chen et al. (2005), meta-

phorical treatments of individual-level concepts have little explanatory utility at the organi-

zational level. We have also argued that inasmuch as individuals and organizations share a

common status as social actors, it is more appropriate to use individual-level theories when

constructing theories of organizations than when constructing theories of markets or com-

munities. In addition, we made a distinction between borrowing a concept and borrowing a

theory, and we provided examples of both. For organizational scholars engaged in the prac-

tice of borrowing individual-level concepts and theories, we have advocated the use of

Morgeson and Hofmanns (1999) approach as a way of avoiding the perils of anthropomor-

phism and reification. This approach is particularly relevant for concepts linked to individual

properties, like identity, that can be shown to perform comparable functions in organizations.

As a point of emphasis, this structural-functional approach to cross-level theorizing is a two-step process: First, the criterion of functional comparability is used to determine whether

cross-level theorizing is appropriate, and second, level-appropriate structural conceptions of

the concept or theory are formulated. Quite obviously, this approach does not mean that all

individual-level concepts can readily be used in a valid manner at the organizational level.

However, it does open the door to the direct application of those concepts and theories that

satisfy the test of functional comparability.

Horizontal Theory Borrowing: The Case of Social Movements

Horizontal theory borrowing involves taking a theory about one context and applying it

to another context, while maintaining a consistent level of analysis. Using Figure 1 as our



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frame of reference, and as noted earlier, our focus is on borrowed theories and concepts that

are used to explain behavior in communities or markets, for the purpose of explaining related

behaviors in organizations. Although Morgeson and Hofmann (1999) intended their func-

tional/structural duality to aid cross-level theorizing, it might also be used to provide insightsfor effective horizontal borrowing. Scholars tend to borrow theories from other contexts

when they see a similar kind of phenomenon in both contexts and when one context already

has a theory that has been shown to explain that phenomenon in some way. Thus, horizontal

borrowing is usually done because a theory or concept is seen as functionally similar across

contexts (i.e., a theory can explain the same phenomenon in two contexts).

In line with the above reasoning, we maintain that effective horizontal borrowing not only

identifies the functional similarities of a theory in both contexts but that it also seeks to

explore how contextual differences may lead to structural dissimilarities in the theory.

Failure to fully derive the structural dissimilarities of a theory may lead to incorrect diag-

noses of the theorys functional utility. That is, importing theories to a new context withouttaking into account the contextual differences may lead to a misapplication of the theory,

hollowing the theory of its original explanatory power. In contrast, effective horizontal

borrowing includes identifying the theorys limits to generalizability.

To illustrate conceptual borrowing on the horizontal dimension, we highlight how organ-

izational theorists have borrowed social movement theory. Although we used organizational

identity theory as an example of a theory oforganizations, we use social movement theory

as an example of borrowing a theory of phenomena in the organization (see Table 1). Thus,

rather than focus on the global properties of organizations, we specifically emphasize

research that draws on social movement theory to explain emergent, bottom-up processes

that occur within organizations.3

Borrowing concepts from social movement analysis to organizational theory has only

begun relatively recently (see Davis et al., 2004), especially when compared to borrowing in

the organizational identity literature. Because using social movement concepts in organiza-

tional research is still fairly novel, this instance of borrowing can give us perspective on

theory borrowing at an early stage of development. Overall, we argue that organizational

research that has borrowed social movement theory has struggled to move beyond the stage

of metaphorical use primarily because this research has not yet fully theorized how contex-

tual differences (i.e., organizations versus political settings) affect the structure of social

movement theory (i.e., how movements organize and take action).Organizational scholars drawing on social movement theory have been primarily inter-

ested in processes leading to organizational change (e.g., changes in corporate policies). The

shift reflects, in part, organizational theorists need to explain organizational changes that

emerge from bottom-up processes, instigated by actors who do not normally occupy posi-

tions of power or authoritative decision-making capability. Initially developed by political

sociologists, social movement theory analyzes collective action as a force for change in the

political sphere, emphasizing precisely those aspects of changepurposeful action and

bottom-up processesthat seem to be missing from most macrotheories (Davis et al., 2004).

Importing social movement theory has helped organizational theorists fill a functional gap

in their own theories of change.The synergy of the two theories has indeed proven to be fruitful. One vein of research at

the nexus of organizational and social movement theories looks at the impact of movements



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within organizations (Zald & Berger, 1978), specifically at those organizational agents

attempting social and organizational change efforts, such as shareholders, managers, and

employees (Briscoe & Safford, 2008; Davis & Thompson, 1994; Hoffman, 1999; Lounsbury,

2001; Raeburn, 2004; Scully & Segal, 2002). Another strand of research examines the roleof mass movements and their effect on organizational change, often focusing on the out-

comes of particular movement campaigns or tactics (Bartley, 2007; King, 2008; King &

Soule, 2007; Schurman, 2004).

Like organizational identity research, however, much organizational research drawing on

social movement analysis for inspiration is still in the metaphorical phase. Adopting the

concept metaphorically has caused organizational scholars to assert a much broader defini-

tion of movements than the one political sociologists apply (e.g., Davis & Thompson, 1994).

In fact, some scholars have hesitated to even label the phenomena as social movements,

instead referring to movement-like activities or behavior (Carroll, 1997; Fligstein, 1996;

Lounsbury & Carberry, 2005; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003). Often when organizationalscholars say that a movement has influenced an organization or field, they mean that actors

have mobilized a direct challenge to established firms or industries and that the challenge is

populated with individuals and organizations devoted to causes, lifestyles and visions of a

better future for all (rather than profit-maximizing entrepreneurs engaged in competitive

battles based primarily on self-interest) (Carroll, 1997: 129). Davis and McAdam (2000)

suggest that a social movement framework was applicable to organizational analysis to the

extent that economic action comes to look like contentious politics (p. 317).

According to these definitions, movement-like behavior can be observed in any economic

arena where collective action is present, economic interests are subjugated to change-oriented

values, boundaries are impermanent, institutions are contested, and collective action is mobi-

lized. Although this sort of organizational behavior certainly is functionally similar to move-

ment activity in the political realm, in the sense described by Morgeson and Hofmann (1999),

nonetheless, movement-like phenomena in organizational contexts are undertheorized at a

structural level. Specifically, the broad definition of social movements applied in organizational

analysis encompasses a wide variety of behavior, which may or may not correspond structur-

ally with the sorts of behavior observed in social movements in the political realm. Behavior

that is called a social movement in organizational analysis might not exactly look like the kinds

of social movements observed or studied by political sociologists in political settings.

One example of poor structural fit is the relationship of social movement actors to theirtarget of proposed change. Political sociologists usually see social movements as relatively

powerless outsiders, lacking direct access to the institutional resources needed to initiate

change. Movements, almost by definition, are outsiders to the institutions that they target for

change (McAdam & Snow, 1998). Their outsider status is often reflected in the kinds of tactics

that they use to instigate change processes and in their extra-institutional or anti-authoritarian

stance (King & Soule, 2007; Young, 2006). In contrast, a lot of organizational scholarship

portrays relative insiders, such as employees (e.g., Lounsbury, 2001) or shareholders (e.g.,

Davis & Thompson, 1994) as social movement like. Without questioning the usefulness of

social movement theory in explaining employee- or shareholder-led organizational changes,

it is worth noting that neither group could accurately be described as outsiders or even asanti-authoritarian.



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This lack of structural congruency may create some translation problems when importing

social movement concepts to organizational analysis. For example, researchers use social

movement as an explanatory concept but often fail to specify or operationalize the causal

mechanisms explicitly (as is true with much of the research in population ecology). As hasbeen the case with other kinds of borrowing, organizational scholars using social movement

concepts seem to be guilty, at least in part, of importing theory but without making any

genuine contributions to the subfield from which it was borrowed. For example, political

sociologists, although glad to have the extra citations, have not meaningfully engaged with

the new wave of research at the nexus of organizational theory and social movements. One

reason for this may be because the kinds of questions being asked by social movement schol-

ars now (e.g., What explains the effectiveness of a movements tactics or strategies?) are

of little interest to organizational scholars. In fact, this may be the most noticeable differ-

ence. Although movement scholars have often focused on mobilization processes, determi-

nation of movement tactics, and the creation of new frames and identities, organizationalscholars have either ignored those questions or have considered tactics, frames, and identi-

ties to be endogenous to market conditions. In the latter case, movements are relegated to the

status of epiphenomena in the organizational world. They are a link along the causal chain

but not central to the causal explanation.

The research that draws the most extensively from political sociology examines mass

movements and organizations, and thus, the translation problems tend to be less acute in this

research (Clemens, 1997; King, 2008; King & Soule, 2007; Rojas, 2006; Schneiberg, 1999;

Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008; Soule, 1997). Still, there are few studies looking at mass

movements that seek widespread social change but have a variety of targets (Van Dyke,

Soule, & Taylor, 2004).

Understanding the contextual variation of a theorys concepts seems key to successful

horizontal borrowing. For organizational scholars, this means being able to conceptualize

what is unique about the organizational setting as a context and thinking about how the

distinctiveness of the context will affect a theorys logical structure. Identifying the context-

specific aspects of organizations seems especially important when importing social move-

ment theory because so much of this theory is based on the premise that political context

shapes the possibilities for collective action and movement success. Contextual differences

may lead to important distinctions in the kinds of behaviors that movement actors may take

in each setting. Although the political sociology literature emphasizes the importance of thepolitical context (or political opportunities) as a determinant of movement effectiveness

and ability to mobilize (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004), the organizational literature has not suf-

ficiently revised the political opportunity concept to organizational settings (although, see

King, 2008; Schurman, 2004).

Another key practice for horizontal borrowing is comparison across contexts. Comparisons

allow the researcher to identify context-specific mechanisms. Returning to social movement

theory, if political opportunities really do matter to the outcome of movement efforts, we

should expect that developing a comparative typology of different organizational environ-

ments would be fundamental for refining the use of social movement concepts in organiza-

tional settings. The tendency has been for organizational scholars to focus on whatmovements do to organizations rather than how organizational context affects movements,



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even though there is likely a clear moderating relationship between organizational context

and a movements effectiveness in changing that context. The dearth of comparative research

of this kind is somewhat surprising given calls to examine how movements adapt their strat-

egies and resource use to fit the institutional climate of their targeted change (Amenta,2006). Walker, Martin, and McCarthys (2008) comparison of the kinds of tactics used

against corporations, universities, and the government is the exception. Thus, we know very

little about how social movements vary by context.

Failure to consider contextual differences in horizontal borrowing may lead to conceptu-

alizations that mischaracterize or fail to capture the richness of a theory. On the flip side,

theorizing contextual differences helps researchers identify the limits of a theorys generaliz-

ability. Both tendencies may plague current efforts at borrowing. Insensitivity to context

when borrowing social movement theory could lead to the perhaps mistaken notion that

politics and power operate similarly in very different sorts of institutions. The corporation,

in a sense, becomes reduced to a generic social organization in which interests are playedout in a political fashion. Although stylistically this may be a useful way to conceptualize

some problems (e.g., Davis & McAdam, 2000), the effect on organizational scholarship may

be to make important institutional distinctions more ambiguous and less analytically tracta-

ble. At the same time, it is possible that certain theoretical propositions developed in political

sociology about movements simply do not apply in an organizational setting. More attention

to context would reign in efforts to generalize too broadly.

In particular, when considering movements in organizations, we should address how the

uniqueness of the organizational context affects the ability of movement actors to initiate

change (see, for a positive example, Weber, Thomas, & Rao, in press). Consider how the

organization as an employment setting might affect a movement. Social movements seeking

to create legislative change adapt to specific institutional rules that outline how laws are

made and passed. Movements that want to take part in the policymaking process develop

lobbying arms or may try to use more open democratic means to shape public opinion and

put direct pressure on lawmakers to change policies. In contrast, movements in organizations

are often spearheaded by employees of the very organizations they seek to transform. As a

result, movements must adapt to the conditions of employment. Because of their position as

committed members of the organization and their commitment to the ideals of social change,

Meyerson and Scully (1995) refer to employee-led movements as tempered radicals.

Compared to mass movements, insider-led movements struggle to meet the twin commit-ments to ideals and employer, using their political and social savvy to initiate lines of com-

munication and win favor with top management. Rather than develop lobbies or using

disruptive tactics, employee-led movements may seek allies within the corporate structure

and develop rationales for supporting a particular social change that focuses on its financial

benefits (Lounsbury, 2001).

Although organizational researchers have often borrowed social movement theory meta-

phorically, future refinement of our theories should involve conceptualizing the structural

differences between organizational and political movements and theorizing how contextual

variation translates into different forms or mechanisms of influence. This effort would align with

recent calls from social movement theorists to consider movements in their multi-institutionalcontexts (Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008). Sensitizing social movement research to the uniqueness



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of the organizational setting would not only create a more nuanced depiction of social move-

ments, but the research would also be better positioned to make a meaningful contribution to

both fields, social movement studies and organization theory.

Keeping in mind our focus on using cross-context concept borrowing as theories in organ-izations, to enhance the context/organizational sensitivity of this practice, organizational

scholars would do well to emulate the growing practice within cross-cultural studies of

organizational behavior of explicitly accounting for theory-relevant, context-distinguishing

effects. In his examination of cross-context theory borrowing, Whetten (in press) highlights

two key ways in which contextual differences play a role, related to his distinction between

making a contribution of theory (theory application) and a contribution to theory (theory

improvement). When the intent is to borrow a theory from Context A as a new explanation

of phenomena in Context B, then relevant contextual differences should be controlled for in

studies using the borrowed theory. Alternatively, when a theory from Context A is borrowed

for purposes of testing its contextual reach, by observing how it performs in Context B, thenexplanation-altering contextual differences are added to the theory as moderators.

An obvious prerequisite for context-sensitive theory borrowing is a conceptualization of

contextual differences. Within the cross-cultural research domain, several context-effects

typologies have been developed for this purpose (Hofstede, 1980; House et al., 2004; Lytle

et al., 1995; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). By implication, and in line with Heath

and Sitkin (2001), a prerequisite for context-sensitive theory borrowing in organizational

studies is a parallel means of identifying the context effects that distinguishes organizational

from nonorganizational contexts (King, Felin, & Whetten, in press a). Key differences that

would be useful for understanding how social movements operate in the organizational

setting versus the political setting include the structural variations that shape how the two

types of actors (state or corporation) make decisions, allocate rights, and regulate their mem-

bers. For example, the state may be open to input from social movements but may have more

formalized, less flexible means for processing input, whereas corporations may be less open

to outsider input but more flexible in their ability to process that input and make changes

(King & Soule, 2007).

Conclusion

Our review and examination of theory borrowing in organizational studies has focused onthe reasons for this widespread practice, various types of theory borrowing, different ways

in which borrowed theories are used, and the general standard for appropriate cross-level and

cross-context borrowing. Our examination draws heavily on, and attempts to extend, recent

calls for greater context and level sensitivity in organizational scholarship. In line with our

treatment of the subject, we hope that the focus of this conversation will become more

explicitly organizational and theoretical.

Our examination of the practice of theory-borrowing reflects our broader interest in

exploring the implications of adopting a social actor view of organizations as a guide for

organizational scholarship. In this case, we see merit in the fact that this conception of

organizations provides a coherent, parsimonious understanding of the distinctive features of the



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organizational level of analysis and context. Said differently, the social actor view of organi-

zations helps specify both the vertical (cross-level) and horizontal (cross-context) boundaries

of what might be considered the organizational effect (compared with nonorganization

level or context effects). In turn, this conception of organizational boundaries can informjudgments regarding level- and context-appropriate theory borrowing in organizational stud-

ies. It is worth noting that although we have, on one hand, argued for a distinctive view of

the organizational level and context, we have not, on the other hand, called for the develop-

ment of organization-specific, indigenous theory. Instead of suggesting that every context

and level requires its own theory, our focus has been on improving the practice of cross-level

and cross-context theory borrowing.

Over the course of our examination of this topic, we have become more cognizant of the

similarities between vertical and horizontal theory borrowing. What is common to the effec-

tive practice of both forms of theory borrowing is an understanding of the context and level

limitations of each and every theory used in organizational scholarship. By implication, itwould be helpful for the developers of new theory to delineate the conditions under which

they expect their explanation to hold. More pertinent to the subject at hand, it would be

equally helpful if every application of an existing theory, regardless of its origins, was

informed by an historical analysis of past applications and was committed to documenting

whether (and if so, how) any differences between new and old context or level conditions

affected the theorys performance. By extension, an important implication of our examina-

tion of theory borrowing is the use of Morgeson and Hofmanns (1999) criteria of functional

equivalence as a standard for appropriate borrowing across levels and contexts. What we

would add, in conclusion, as a point of emphasis to this general call for greater context and

level sensitivity in our development and application of theory in organizational studies is an

urging to make organizational-level and organizational-context sensitivity a hallmark of

organizational scholarship.

Notes

1. Tsui et al. (2007) also describe a second standard for cross-context borrowing: equivalent meaning. This is

particularly relevant for theory borrowing involving significantly different cultural or linguistic contexts.

2. For a related discussion of how individual identity theory has been applied as theories in organizations, see

Whetten (2007).

3. Organizational scholars have sometimes used social movement concepts to describe differences between

incumbent and entrepreneurial organizations and to explain processes of form legitimation (Carroll & Swaminathan,

2000; Ruef, 2000; Swaminathan, 2001). When used in this fashion, social movement theory becomes a theory of

organizations. We do not assess this use of social movement theory so as to make a clean distinction between theory

borrowing that explains similar sorts of phenomena in different contexts.

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The Practice of Theory Borrowing in Organizational Studies

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