The London Gazette - ibiblio

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The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the 2Oth of AUGUST, 1946.

by flntfymtpRegistered as a newspaper.

WEDNESDAY, 21 AUGUST, 1946The War Office,

• August, 1946.OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 5 JULY 1941—31 OCTOBER 1941.The following despatch was submitted to the

Secretary of State for War on the 8th March1942 by GENERAL SIR CLAUDE J. E.AUCWNLECK, C.B., C.S.I., Q.S.O.,O.B.E., A:D.C., Commdnde>r-in-Ghiief theMiddle East Forces.

I. On taking over command of the MiddleEast Forces on the 5th July 1941 I found thegeneral position incomparably better than it hadbeen a year earlier on the collapse of France.This improvement was entirely due to theenergy of my predecessor, General SirArchibald Wavell, and to his vigour in seekingout the enemy wherever he was to be found.. The defeat and capture of the Italian armies

in East Africa had eliminated one seriousthreat to our ibases and communications, andthe winter offensive in Cyrenaica had resultedin the destruction, of another large Italian Army.Although the fresh forces brought up by theenemy had succeeded in recapturing most ofCyrenaica, they were unable to 'proceed muchfurther without first reducing Tobruk. More-over our operation in June, though unsuccess-ful, had robbed their 'armoured forces of muchof their offensive power. In the East, theoverthrow of the rebel government had clearedthe atmosphere in Iraq, while the operationsin Syria, though as yet unfinished, would denypotential air and land bases in that countryto the Axis.

Only in the North had recent events madeour position more difficult. The enemy occupa-tion of Greece and Crete increased the threatof aerial attacks on our bases and lines ofcommunication, and, -even more important,

tune moment for ourselves as it prevented theenemy from exploiting to toe full his successin the Balkans and the Aegean.

Although there was thus no immediate threatto our (base, there was every reason to believethat in time such a threat would materialiseon either flank, and il found preparations tomeet this well in hand'.

2. General Wavell's campaigns in Libya,Eritrea, Abyssinia,' Greece,' Crete, Iraq andSyria had followed each other with such t>e-•wildering rapidity and had .been undertakenwith such inadequate forces and equipment thata considerable degree of disorganisation in theArmy as a whole was inevitable. Brigades hadperforce become separated from their divisionsand units from their brigades, while someformations, especially those of the armouredforces, had practically ceased to exist. Thisentailed a comprehensive programme of re-organisation, improvization, re-equipment andtraining, which I found in progress on takingover.

In no sense do I wish to infer that I foundan unsatisfactory situation on my arrival—far from it. Not only was I greatly impressedby the solid foundations laid by my predeces-sor, but I was also able 'the better to appreciatethe vastness of the problems with which he -hadbeen confronted and the greatness of hisachievements, in a command in which some40 different languages are spoken by the Britishand Allied Forces.

3. '1 soon found that the work of the opera-tions, planning and intelligence branches of theGeneral Staff was good' and thorough, and that

mseriously restricted the movements of the Fleet a sound system existed for the administration of

,-i ^ -_ .L__I -K_JM. Ti— ^^^.TT'.O personnel, supplies, ordnance and medicalarrangements.

Liaison between the Navy, Army and AirForce was excellent and it may here be ^ofinterest to give some details of interservkeco-operation.

the Central Mediterranean. The enemy'shold on Cyrenaica greatly increased this restric-tion. The running of convoys with suppliesand reinforcements to Malta from Egypt thusbecame more difficult. The German attack onRussia, however, had! come at a very oppor-

4216 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 21 AUGUST, 1946

(a) On the highest level there is tihe MiddleEast War Council with the Minister of Statein the chair. This 'body is mainly concernedwith political matters affecting the Servicesand other problems of the Middle East.

(6) Then there is the (Middle East DefenceCommittee which met for the first time onthe 25th August. It consists of the Ministerof State, who presides, and the -threeGommanders-in-Ghief. It deals with majoroperations and plans.

•(c) Next comes the Commanders-in-Chiefs'Committee which is also attended by seniorStaff Officers and deals with all importantoperational and administrative questions.The above normally meet once a week.

(d) Daily liaison is maintained in GeneralHeadquarters by an Inter-Service IntelligenceStaff Conference and an Inter-Service Opera-tional Staff Conference and by individualofficers of all three Services.

(e) The Inter-Service Air Defence Com-mittee makes recommendations for the dis-posal of available anti-aircraft units andequipment, and has been of great value.

(/) Moreover I myself am in constant per-sonal touch with the Commander-in-ChiefMediterranean and the Air Officer Command-ing-in-chief.It will thus be seen that a firm foundation

exists to ensure that the efforts of the Navy,Army and Royal Air Force are co-ordinated.

4. I readily subscribed to my predecessor'spolicy of concentrating on reorganisation andtraining, as an essential part of the prepara-tions for driving the enemy out of Libya andfor meeting his eventual thrust in Asia. Thesewere my chief preoccupations during 'theperiod under review. The paragraphs whidhfollow are, therefore, chiefly concerned withlocal aspects of these preparations as theyarose in the various areas of the Middle East.

SYRIA AND PALESTINE.5. The Syrian Campaign was drawing to a

close when I assumed command. In the north-east the loth Indian Division, which formedpart of the forces under Lieutenant-GeneralE. P. Quinan in Iraq and which the Com-mander-in-Chief, India, had placed at GeneralWavell's disposal, had advanced along theRiver Euphrates as far as Deir ez Zor andalong the railway from Tel Kotchek towardsKamesthle. , lim itihe (Wes|t the enemy wereresisting stubbornly along the line of the RiverDamour, on the southern slopes of the Lebanonand on the southern and western slopes of theAnti-Lebanon.

lln -the Euphrates Province the loth IndianDivision made steady progress in the face ofheavy air attacks, and by the 8th July, withthe capture of Raqqa and Kameschle, they werein control of the key points of the Province.On the line Hama—Horns—Anti-Lebanon theVichy French were -thinning out, until on theloth July Horns was threatened by the 4thCavalry Brigade who had cut the railway tothe South and now stood before the town. Thecrossing of the River Damour by the iTthAustralian Infantry Brigade on the 7th July,and the capture of the town itself toy the 2istAustralian Infantry Brigade on the gth Julyremoved the chief obstacle to our advance onBeirut from the South. The town was alsothreatened from the direction of Damascus bythe i6th Infantry Brigade (6th Division), which

on the lotih July attacked the enemy holdingpositions astride the road near Dimas.

Having lost control of the Northern Desertand the Euphrates Province, and -beingthreatened with the imminent loss of BeirutGeneral Dentz decided to ask for an armistice.

6. On the evening of the nth July, I re-ceived a wireless message from General Dentz,proposing the suspension of hostilities six hourslater, at midnight, General Dentz declaredhimself ready to engage in talks on the basisof a memorandum presented to -him that morn-ing toy the United States Consul at Beirut onbehalf of the British Government. But hemade the reservation that he was empoweredby the French Government to treat only withthe British representatives to the exclusion ofthose of the Free French.

General Dentz's proposals were considered atonce by the Middle East War Council, whichalso took into account the opinion of theAmerican Consul at Beirut, that Dentz wasentirely insincere and might ibe playing fortime in the hope- of a last minute rescue by theGermans. Accordingly his conditions were re-jected and' he was called on to send hisplenipotentaries to the British outpost on theBeirut—Haifa Road at or before 0900 hrs. onthe I2th July, under threat of resowninghostilities at that hour.

The Vichy French Representatives dulyappeared and were conducted- to Acre, wherediscussions began at once. We were repre-sented by General Sir Henry Wilson, Air Com-modore L. O. Brown and Captain J. A. V.Morse, Royal Navy, the Free French byGeneral Catroux, and the Vichy French byGeneral de Verdillac. At 2200 hrs. on the I2thJuly the Convention was initialled and wasfinally signed by General Wilson and Generalde Verdillac at Acre on the I4th July 1941.

7. The Commission of Control, set up inaccordance with Article 21 to supervise theexecution .of tihe teims of the Convention,,assembled formally for the first time on thei6th July at Ain Sofar in the Lebanon underthe presidency of Major-General J. I. Chrystall/

The question of repatriation was difficult, asour desire to clear the country of Vichy Frenchtroops and! civilians at the earliest possiblemoment conflicted with the Free French wishto retain lihem as long as 'possible, in the hopethat after a prolonged period of propaganda alarger number of recruits would be obtained.Events proved the anticipations of the FreeFrench to be over-optimistic, for of 37,736 per-sonnel of the Troupes Frangais du Levant, whowere offered the choice, only 5,668 declared infavour of Free France.

In all eight convoys, three hospital ships andone " gleaner " ship sailed for France betweenthe 7th August and the 27th September 1941.The total number of persons repatriated, ibothcivilian and military was 37,563. It speakswell for the work of the Embarkation Boardthat these convoys were cleared without anyunfortunate incident. After the departure ofthese ships, nearly all personnel of the TroupesFrangais du Levant had been repatriated.

The return of British Prisoners of War whohad been evacuated from Syria and theLebanon placed the Troupes Frangais duLevant in an .unfortunate -position, particularlywhen it was established that a number of theseprisoners had been sent out of Syria after the

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 21 AUGUST, 1946 4217

Convention had ibeen initialled. The delay inobtaining the. return of prisoners .led to -thedetention in Palestine of GeneraT ,Dentz:i andtwenty-nine of his most senior officers. Theywere released in/ due course as the Britishprisoners were returned! to Syria.

The work of the Commission of Control 'andits twenty sub-committees deserves the 'highestpraise. In -the space of ten weeks they accom-plished the task of arranging the orderlyevacuation of an army 37,000 strong, ofchecking and handing over all its equipmentand of transferring the public services fromone administration to another, in conditionswhich the war -had rendered chaotic.

8. The capitulation of the Vichy Forces andthe occupation of Syria toy -the British and FreeFrench made it necessary to take a number

• of decisions, political and military. Generalde Gaulle considered that the Armistice termsdid not give the Free French enough facilitiesfor rallying the Vichy troops, and did notfully safeguard the position' of Free France.After discussions between <the Minister ofState and General de Gaulle in Cairo in thefirst week of July, agreements were reachedunder which the civil authority in Syria andthe Lebanon was to rest in •the hands of theFree French provided that our military securitywas not jeopardised. General de Gaulle recog-nised 'the unity of command and placed theFree Prendh Forces throughout the MiddleEast under the British Commander-in-Chief foroperational purposes. He also recognised thatin the British Military Zone the civil authoritymust carry out the requests of the militaryauthority where the security of the armed forceswas concerned.

Meanwhile the Free Frendh took over thecivflj administration of Syria under GeneralCatroux as Delegue General de la France, thetitle of High Commissioner being dropped.Unfortunately the French were short of ex-perienced -personnel. On the civilian side outof about 1,200 Frenchmen in Syria (excludingreligious orders and their dependents), aboutone-third rallied to the Free French, one-thirdwere allowed to remain in Syria on sufferancewithout rallying, and one-third returned toFrance. No douibt a number of those whorallied did .so as a matter of personalexpediency. In any case, the lack of first-ratemen with administrative ability was severelyfelt, and there were many complaints fromthe Syrians and Lebanese .that former Vichyofficials, who were corrupt or discredited, werebeing retained in their old positions. Thefirst weeks were also marked by a good dealof friction between the British and French,particularly in connection with the work ofthe Disarmament Commission. Mistakes weremade on both sides but obstacles were gradu-ally overcome. The Spears Mission, workingunder difficult conditions, established goodrelations with' their Free French colleagues. ABritish Security Mission was appointed underBrigadier A. S. Mavrogordato and a jointAnglo-French propaganda plan was agreedupon.

9. Early in September economic difficultiesled to a crisis. Stocks of essential commoditieswere short owing to the British blockade beforethe fall of the Vichy regime. The wheat cropwas below normal, and wheat was hoardedpartly in the hopes of- realising higher and

A 2

higher prices as the shortage increased, and.partly fronv^ear^ JCn certain,Qareas the.re washardship, arid minor 'bread "riots occurred.British assistance was given in ddstributingsupplies, and arrangements have now] beenmade for large quantities to be availablethroughout the winter.

10. A certain amount of political unrest was.inevitable. The necessity for safeguarding the.interests of France, whose special position wehad recognised, on the one hand, and the needfor setting up a friendly and stable govern-ment on the other were not easy to.reconcile. There was much disappointment thatGreat Britain had not taken over Syria andthe Lebanon herself. French administrationunder the mandate had never succeeded in re-conciling the Nationalist' opposition, or in.attracting popular support. The Free Frenchpromises of independence were not believed,and there was general fear that the old regimewould be perpetuated. Added to this was adesire to play off the British against the FreeFrench'.

Lateen September there was trouble amongthe tribes of the Euphrates and of .the SyrianDesert, who had always chafed under Frenchpolitical gontrol. Administrative shortcomingsand mistakes on the French side and failure bythe local Free French authorities to keep theBritish military commander of the district in-formed of their intentions led to tribal out-breaks in the Abu Kemal district. There wereseveral clashes between the Arabs and FreeFrench troops resulting in casualties to bothsides. Finally it became necessary for Britishtroops to intervene, but eventually an agree-ment was reached to cease hostilities and torefer the dispute to arbitration by a joint Anglo-French Commission.

The military security of this vital area wasdiscussed during October both in London withGeneral de Gaulle and in the Middle East withGeneral Catroux. General de Gaulle agreed inprinciple to the authority necessary to safeguardit being delegated in certain circumstances tothe British Command, and General Catrouxgave me an undertaking to proclaim Etat deSiege immediately, if troubles begin in anyarea and threaten to spread,.and in the theevent of threatened enemy attack.

ii. Pursuing the policy previously approvedI had already decided that as soon as the.Syrian campaign was successfully concluded,every effort should be concentrated on intensivepreparations for driving the enemy out of NorthAfrica. Consequently the North must be de-fended with a minimum of troops. Apart from- •the Free French forces, which for political ,reasons have been disposed in detachments allover Syria by their High Command, I have so ;far been unable to allot more than five divisionsat any one time to the defence of Syria andPalestine since the end of the campaign.

The ist Australian Corps and the skeletonHeadquarters of the loth Corps have alreadycarried out detailed reconnaissances of the de-fensive areas. Work on the defences has begunand is being pushed on as fast as the numberof troops and the amount of civilian labouravailable will permit.

CYPRUS.12. The Defence Committee considered it

essential to deny the enemy the use of Cyprusas a base for naval and air operations against

42i8 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 21 AUGUST, 1946

our sea communications in the Eastern. Mediter-ranean, and qur.Jand communipatie-ffs in Egypt,,.Palestine and "Syria. r „-., •/,

Hitherto the defence of the island had beenconsidered only on the basis of attack fromthe West, But now it was necessary to provideagainst a possible attack toy an enemy estab-lished in Turkey. In these changed circum-stances, General Wavell had determined to in-icrease the garrison of Cyprus, and I decided.to adhere to his plan by reinforcing the troopsthere as soon as possible by one division. TheMinister for Defence and the Chiefs of Staffapproved this plan accepting the principle thatmeasures to ensure the retention of Cyprus beingpart of the consolidation of our position inthe North, must come before the offensive inthe Western Desert.

Accordingly on the I2th July I decided tosend to Cyprus the 5oth Division (Major-GeneralW. H. Ramsden), just arriving from England,and also the 3rd Hussars (less one Squadron)to replace the 7th Australian Divisional CavalryRegiment as a mobile armoured reserve. Themove of these troops and 90 days reserves ofsupplies and munitions was completed by the29th August thanks to the efficient arrangementsmade by the Royal Navy.

Work on the construction of the defences be-gan at once and is now approaching completion.

At the end of October the 5th Indian Divisionrelieved the 50th Division in order to releasea British Division for service in the Caucasus.This relief took place without incident betweenthe 2nd and the 8th November, again owingto the efforts of the Royal Navy.

I wish to record my appreciation of the soundjudgment and energy shown by Major-GeneralRamsden in his direction of the preparation ofthese defences and of the excellent work doneby the 50th Division in their construction. Iwould also like to add my appreciation of theunfailing help and co-operation of the Governorof Cyprus, H.E. Sir William Battershffl,K.C.M.G., and of the acting Governor, CaptainJ. V. W. Shaw, both of whom did everythingin their power to assist the work.

IRAN.13. While the work of consolidation in Syria

was still in its initial stages, it was becomingincreasingly evident that it would be necessaryto eliminate German influence in Iran.

For some time past nationalist feeling in that.country had been rising against Great Britainand Russia and by the end of 1939 there was awell organised German community of aboutthree thousand, .almost every one of whom couldbe relied upon to give as much of his attentionto the designs of the Fatherland as to thetechnical work on which he was ostensibly en-gaged.

The expulsion of the Germans had been thesubject of an exchange of views between Londonand Moscow, and between the War Office, Com-mander-in-Chief, India, and myself for sometime, when on the 24th July, I received a cablefrom the Chiefs of Staff informing me that therewas general agreement that the Germans mustbe expelled as soon as possible. If joint Britishand Russian diplomatic pressure were unavail-ing, both Powers were intending to take jointmilitary action to enforce their demands.

The enterprise entailed the loan of troops fromthe Middle East as well as the release of the lothIndian Division from North-eastern Syria. On

the 29th July I arrived in England and had theopportunity, of discussing, among other matters,the fneasufe Jbf support the Middle East couldafford. I was reluctant to spare more troopsthan absolutely necessary because of the heavydemands for garrison duties and because itwould upset the re-organisation and re-equip-ment essential to the early resumption of theoffensive in the Western Desert. But the successof the operation was of the greatest importanceto the common defence of India and the MiddleEast.

The scale of assistance required from theMiddle East grew, in the first place becauseit was feared that trouble might develop inIraq and then because it was believed that theIranians were likely to offer considerable re-sistance. First I despatched the 9th ArmouredBrigade (late 4th Cavalry Brigade) stillorganised on a truck basis only. The 5th IndianDivision (less the 29th Indian Infantry BrigadeGroup and one field regiment) followed.

Fears of serious resistance .however provedgroundless, and the 5th Indian DivisionalColumn had only reached a point- about 50miles within Iraqi territory when the Iraniansgave in. The march of the column continued,however, as the Division was needed in Iraquntil another arrived from India.

At dawn on the 25th August Russian troopsentered Iran from the north and, occupyingTabriz, advanced along the south-western shoreof the Caspian, while our troops entered fromIraq in the Ahwaz-Abadan area and in twocolumns from Khaniqin. The 9th ArmouredBrigade formed part of the northern columnwhich rapidly overcame opposition in the PaitakPass and reached Shahbad on the morning ofthe 27th August. The Persians offered little realopposition either to the British or the Russianadvance, and on the 28th August the Shahordered all resistance to cease.

On the 8th October the 9th Armoured Brigadereturned from Teheran, and on the i8th Octoberthe last elements of the 5th Indian Divisionalso reached the Middle East.

TURKEY.14. Turkey's reactions to German threats had

always been of the greatest moment to our-selves, and now that we had a common frontierher attitude was of even greater consequence.The end of the Syrian campaign and the pacifi-cation of Iraq were causes of relief to Turkeybecause our forces were now in direct contactwith her southern frontiers. The outbreak ofthe Russo-German War, however, caused hermisgiving since our new ally was her traditionalenemy.

It was most important "that the Turks shouldoffer the utmost resistance to a German invasion.From a purely strategical point of view thecountry fell naturally into our defensive system,as in it the enemy's communications would bemost vulnerable to attack, and I was anxiousto be able to engage the enemy before 'heemerged from the mountains of Anatolia intothe plains of Syria and Iraq. I was thereforeglad when at the end of July, the Chief ofthe Turkish General Staff, on behalf of thePresident, made a tentative approach, havingas its object the renewal of staff talks on thelines of those held in the Spring. Unfortunatelythis step was abruptly revoked, the TurkishGeneral Staff having reason to believe that their


move had become known to the enemy. It was,however, agreed that -rnfpmal,staff, contacts'should take place through the" nfedi¥mfW ourservice attaches.

Material for these contacts was carefully com-piled in Cairo in consultation with the Com-mander-in-Chief, India. We were prepared tomake a firm offer to send British Forces toTurkey in the event of a German attack. Butwe stressed the importance of being allowedto build up supplies and stores in advance andto reconnoitre and improve maintenance facili-ties in Anatolia.

During the early part of the conversationsthe Turks proposed that we should concentratein north-western Anatolia; but latterly, withthe rapid German advance in South Russia andthe possibility that the eventual threat mightcome from the north-east rather than the north-west, the Turkish military authorities were lessavers^ than I had expected from consideringEastern Anatolia as the possible theatre of theGerman offensive. There was little doubt, how-ever, that the Turkish statesmen and, to alesser degree, the senior Turkish Generals, wereimpressed toy the rapidity of the German ad-vance in Russia, and uneasy at our associationwith the Soviet in the occupation of Iran.

Although I believe that the Turks aregenuine in their desire to exclude the Germansfrom their country and to side with us if thesituation is favourable, I cannot conceal frommyself the possibility of circumstances provingtoo strong for them, and I am making myplans accordingly.

CO-OPERATIVE PLANNING WITH INDIA.15. The problem of frustrating a German

thrust through Anatolia or the Caucasus orboth can only be. solved by the closest co-operation between India and the Middle East.Before General Wavell left the Middle East forIndia, we discussed the matter, and it was thesubject of an exchange of views between theWar Office, India and the Middle East. Tofacilitate liaison an officer from General Head-quarters, India, was posted to the Joint Plan-ning Staff, Middle East, during September.

At a conference at Baghdad on the 26th Sep-tember, attended iby the Commander-in-ChiefIndia and myself it was agreed that the JointPlanning Staff should study the problem ofdefending Persia, Iraq, Palestine and Syriaagainst invasion either through WesternAnatolia or the Caucasus or by both routes. Aplanning party visited those countries and at thebeginning of November representatives of theMiddle East Planning Staff went to India todiscuss the Northern Front. Since then planninghas -gone forward on the policy agreed to afterthe joint review of the problem.

EAST AFRICA.'i6. In East Africa operations have been very

nearly at a standstill during this period. Thebrilliant campaigns of Lieutenant General SirAlan Cunningham and Lieutenant General SirWilliam Platt during the previous six monthshad eliminated all but one centre of resistance,that in the Gondar area. Owing to the heavyrains, our troops could not at once attempt thetask of reducing this stronghold. During themonths of July, August, and September, there-fore, operations were confined to harassing raidscarried out by our Air'Forces.'

withdraw three divisions which had 'been-operating in this theatre. By thfe. beginningof July the ist South African and the 4thIndian^ Divisions had been withdrawn, andthe last brigade of the 5th Indian Division hadreceived orders to move. I carried on mypredecessor's policy of withdrawing every unitthat it was possible to release. Finally, thereremained, only the nth and I2th AfricanDivisions to carry out all the necessary internalsecurity duties in this vast stretch of .territory,.as1 well as to contain the Italian forces in theGondar area until these could be finallyliquidated, and also to enforce the landward(blockade of French Somaliland.

,18. The administration of the conqueredterritories presented a large number of prob-lems, wthich were ably handflted by Major-General Sir Philip Mitchell, Chief Political:Officer, who on the 27th June had becomeBritish Representative in Ethiopia. On thefirst of August by formal Proclamation I dele-gated to him the full legislative, judicial, ad-ministrative and financial authority which Iexercised in Eritrea and Somalia, and an-Administrative Instruction of the Secretaryof State for War entrusted to him supervisorypowers over the Military Governor of BritishSomalland. Although it was impossible ininternational law for me to divest myself ofthe authority which I held by right of con-quest in Somaliland and Eritrea, by theProclamation I was in fact released from all'but ultimate responsibility.

On the many problems involved in organisingand directing the administrations in the con-quered territories it is unnecessary for me toenlarge. Let it suffice to say that Sir PhilipMitchell lost no time and spared no effort inhandling these problems with the energy anddiscretion they demanded. The achievementsof Sir Philip and his assistants were re-markable, especially as, officers and policewere scarce and communications difficult.Although it Yfas far from complete when Irelinquished command of the areas, much pro-gress had been made in the task of pacification.

19. From both political and military stand-points the problem of French Somaliland waspressing and difficult. This territory, which iscontrolled iby a Government committed to col-laboration with the enemy, adjoins the Straitsof Bab el Mandeb and is therefore a potentialbase for hostile naval operations against us inthe Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Yet to•reduce it -by force might well lead to thedestruction of the port of Jibuti and the rail-way to Addis Ababa, making the evacuationof the numerous Italian civilians interned inthe Addis Ababa area difficult, if not impos-sible. The evacuation of these Italians, forsome time past the subject of negotiations withthe (Italian Government, was essential. Theircontinued presence constituted a menace tointernal security in that they might escape; amilitary liability, in that they must be pro-tected from the possible vengeance of theEthiopians; and a political stuirabling-Jblock inthat their protection involved a measure 'ofinterference in Ethiopian affairs which filled theEmperor and his subjects with suspicion andresentment.


To continue the 'blockade was the., only solu-tion. At the 'beginning of'July, prospects pfan early capitulation seemed good, but dhowsfrom the Yemen and French submarines fromMadagascar succeeded in running the blockade;and, in spite of a considerable tightening of theblockade, the colony was still holding out atthe time the East African Command took overand was seemingly no nearer capitulation.

20. It !had been suggested earlier that thedividing line between Europe and Africa wasnot the Mediterranean but the Saharaandl the Sudd, and that a secondCommand should be formed to includethe Sudan and all territories south of itas far as and including Southern Rhodesia.Apart from economic and political considera-tions, it was clearly not true from a strategicpoint of view, so long as there remained inEast Africa large enemy forces able to operateon interior lines against Kenya, Egypt and theSudan. The suggestion was therefore rejectedfor the time being.

With the defeat and capture of the greaterpart of the Italian forces in East Africa, thethreat to the Middle East was removed, andmilitary and all other considerations made itdesirable to remove the Central and EastAfrican areas from the Middle East command.The Belgian Congo as a " sphere of interest "had been transferred to the West African Com-mand on ist July, and the transfer of the re-mainder of the territories was considered by aConference which assembled at Nairobi on theist August under the presidency of Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham, G.O.C. EastAfrica.

Representatives of Air Headquarters EastAfrica, Middle East, the aosrd Mission, Southernand Northern Rhodesia, West African Com-mand and the Sudan attended. The repre-sentative of the Union of South Africa wasabsent, because the Conference was finally heldat very short notice. The recommendationsof the Conference, however, were submitted toField Marshal Smuts for approval.

The Conference recommended that the newCommand should come directly under the WarOffice and comprise Eritrea, Ethiopia, theSomalilands, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika,Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. It con-sidered that the Commander in the southernterritories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasa-land should advise the Southern RhodesianGovernor on defence matters, and co-ordinateplans in which the three territories and theUnion of South Africa were concerned; andthat in concerted operations he should commandnot only his own forces, but any forces SouthernRhodesia might contribute. The Conferenceagreed that Portuguese East Africa, the KatangaProvince of the Belgian Congo, and Angolashould be included in the Commander's spheresof influence in co-operation with the Union ofSouth Africa. The recommendations of theConference were accepted with a few modi-fications.

On the I5th September, 1941, all the terri-tories with the exception of Eritrea passed tothe East African Command. Eritrea passedunder command on the nth October, 1941.

21. 'Before the East African Command wasformed I had arranged for the transfer of con-siderable quantities of captured arms, ammuni-tion and other material. This arrangement was

confirmed and the equipment is being broughtto the Middle East as quickly as transportfacilities permit. Middle East have also retaineda lien on Eritrea for the purpose of siting certainbase installations and hospitals in a safe area.

SUDAN.•22. The Sudan was not included in the East

African Command for political and strategicreasons. The Anglo-Egyptian condominium inthe country made it desirable that the militaryauthority should be exercised <by the Com-mander-in-Chief in Cairo, as also did the im-portance of the Sudan as a base for operationsin the Western Desert from the south and forpossible operations in the Chad.

23. On the 4th October, 1941', Lieutenant-General Sir N. M. de la P. Beresford-Peirseassumed command in the Sudan in place ofLieutenant-General Sir William Platt, who be-came General Officer Commanding-in-'Ghief,East Africa Command.

WESTERN DESERT.24. While the other areas under my command

were the scenes of consolidation and reorgani-sation, the chief theatre of activity was theWestern Desert. Here my policy was dictatedby two main considerations. Advantage mustbe taken of the favourable conditions createdby the Russian campaign to resume the offen-sive at the earliest possible moment. Mean-while it was necessary to remain on the defen-sive, employing only a minimum of troops.The maximum effort could then be devoted toorganising, training and equipping the forcesdestined for the invasion of Cyrenaica and tocompleting the vast administrative preparations.This will receive full treatment in a later

'despatch.The situation in the Western Desert from

mid-June until mid-September corresponded tothat envisaged in my General Instructionof the 26th July laying down theprinciples of defence in areas in which theattackers might be expected to be considerablystronger in armoured force than the defenders.This was undoubtedly the case in the WesternDesert, where our armoured forces were appre-ciably inferior to those of the enemy. Moreoverthree of the areas essential to this system ofdefence already existed, namely, Tobruk,Matruh and Bagush; and General Wavell hadalready given the order to prepare a fourthsituated in the defile between the Qattara De-pression and the sea at El Alamein.

Accordingly, on the 2ist July, I issued anInstruction (Appendix " A ") to Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Beresford-Peirse, commandingthe Western Desert Forces, informing him ofmy decision that in the event of an enemy ad-vance his armoured forces were to be broughtto battle in the area south of Matruh, whitherthe Headquarters and Armoured Brigades ofthe 7th Armoured Division had already beenwithdrawn. This decision entailed the sur-render of our forward landing grounds in theSidi Barrani area, which would mean that ourability to provide fighter protection to ourshipping engaged in maintaining Tobruk wouldbe greatly impaired. As our armoured forceswere relatively weak, this risk had to beaccepted.

On the 30th July I issued a further Instruc-tion (Appendix " B ") to the Commanders ofthe Western Desert Forces and of the British


Troops in Egypt, elaborating my policy for thegeneral defence of Egypt against arpJenemy-ad-vance from the West.

As the armoured units were re-equipped andbecame more numerous a more offensive policywas gradually adopted. Finally, immediately fol-lowing an enemy reconnaissance in force on theI4'th September, it was possible to movearmoured troops, supported -by an infantrydivision, well in advance of Sidi Barrani tocover the preparations for the coming offensive,and to secure the advanced landing grounds ofthe Royal Air Force against attack.

25. On 'the I4th September the enemy ad-vanced to test our strength and dispositionsabove the escarpment. The force consisted oftwo columns. The northern column was com-posed of about 100 tanks, and the southerncontained chiefly lorried infantry and mainten-ance vehicles escorted by armoured cars. Ourreconnaissance elements and light columns with-drew, inflicting casualties on the enemy. Bynightfall the enemy tanks had reached the Rabiaarea, but during the night they withdrew. Byfirst light on the iyth September our troopshad returned to their original positions.

Our columns and aircraft inflicted greaterlosses on -the enemy than they received. Ourlosses were fifteen casualties, an armoured car,a bomber and six fighters destroyed andseveral trucks and one fighter damaged;against this the enemy suffered almost ahundred casualties and lost fourteen tanks,fifteen vehicles and twenty-two aircraft. Itwas fortunate that the test of our strength andintentions came at a time when our policy wasabout to be completely altered.

26. The enemy also undertook the re-organisation of his forces in North Africa duringthis period. On the igtb. July 'General EttoreBastico took over the Supreme Command inLibya from General Garibaldi. It is probablethat the appointment of General 'Bastico, a re-ported expert on mechanised warfare, was in-tended as much to show that Italian interestsin Libya were at least equal to Germaninterests in Libya as to reorganise the Italianforces and revive their morale.

There is little doubt - that General Basticomade progress in the work of reorganisation,although to what extent he was able to raiseItalian prestig^ and morale remained to be•seen. The much-battered Trento Division wasrelieved at Tobruk by the Bologna Division,and the almost extinct Sabarata Division wasreorganised and employed on garrison duties.The 2ist Corps Headquarters was reconstitutedto control the divisions about Tobruk. But themost important measure taken by GeneralBastico was the organisation of a mobile corpsin Cyrenaica. This corps comprises the Trentoand Ariete Divisions and also the Trieste Divi-sion, which reached Tripoli by the end ofAugust. Although this division probably lostmuch of its transport hi sea transit, it appearsto have refurnished itself from an Autocentrowhich arrived in Tripoli at about the same time.The Ariete Division was reorganised on a basisof three tank battalions with a total of 138tanks!

During the same period the German forceshad also undergone reorganisation. About mid-August the 5th Light (motorised) Division wasconverted into an armoured division and re-

numbered^-2au. -Units of a German positionaldivision were identified in Libyi,;?three batta-lions having taken the place of lorriedinfantry in the line at Tobruk. There wasevidence that the Germans were contemplatingthe despatch of such a division as early asMay, and the first units began to arrive inJuly. The main purpose in sending this divi-sion appeared to be the release of the lorriedinfantry for their proper mobile role. Boththe 5th and 8th Tank Regiments were rein-forced from June onwards on a new establish-ment totalling 136 tanks. Finally, Panzer-gruppe Afrika was formed, consisting of the15th and 2ist Panzer Divisions, commanded byGeneral Rommel.

Throughout the summer the enemy devotedmuch attention to building defences on thefrontier between Sollum and Sidi Omar. TheHalfaya position was completed, and Sidi Omarwas also fortified and surrounded by mine-fields. The enemy further attempted to linkthese two positions and the intervening postswith further minefields. The whole purposeof this position seemed to be to provide a strongpivot from the shelter of which the enemy couldmanoeuvre south and south-east of Sidi Omaror against British forces attempting to movefrom the frontier area towards Tobruk.

TOBRUK.27. Our freedom from embarrassment in the

frontier area for four and a half months is tobe ascribed largely to the defenders of Tobruk.Behaving not as a hardly pressed garrison ibutas a spirited force ready at any moment tolaunch an attack, they contained an enemyforce twice their strength. By keeping theenemy continually in a high state of tension,they held back four Italian divisions and threeGerman battalions from the frontier areafrom April until November.

The exploits of the garrison, which was com-manded from the first days of the siege -until22nd October 'by Major-General L. J.Morshead, are famous all over the world andare too numerous^b be recounted in detail here.In spite of continuous strain, the spirit ofthe British, Imperial and Allied troops wasmagnificent throughout. The infantry dis-played great stubbornness in defence and dashin attack, while the work of the field and anti-aircraft artillery and of the machine guns, -in-flicting many casualties on the enemy, was ofthe highest order. The exploits of the in-numerable patrols carried out almost nightly bythe cavalry and infantry units of the garrisondeserve the highest praise. Not only did thesepatrols collect most valuable information andnumerous prisoners, but they were in largepart responsible for making it possible to holda perimeter thirty miles long with only sevenbattalions and one cavalry regiment in the frontline.

Major-General L. J. Morshead organised thedefence with great ability and resourcefulness.He was assisted in his difficult task by hisG.S.O.I., Colonel C. E. M. Lloyd, whose in-dustry and cheerfulness were unfailing.

I also wish to commend especially the work ofthe anti-aircraft defences under Brigadier J. R.Slater. They formed the sole means of defenceagainst air attack, as our air bases were toodistant to allow fighter aircraft to operate overthis area. They performed their duties with


such efficiency that in spite of <jontinual raidsserious damage was rarefy1 inflicted by-enemyaircraft, of which several were shot down andmany damaged.

28. On the i8th July I received fromLieutenant General Sir Thomas Blarney, com-manding the Australian Imperial Forces, aletter, written at the instance of the AustralianGovernment, urging me to consider the relief*of the whole garrison as the health of all thetroops composing it showed signs of markeddeterioration. He represented to me that therelief of the Australian portion of the Garrisonwas particularly desirable hi view of the grow-ing feeling in Australia that the time had cometo fulfil the agreement made between their ownand the "British Government that the Australiantroops should be concentrated under one com-mand and serve as one force. He suggestedthat the lull in operations presented an oppor-tunity which should not be missed. This letterwas followed on the 23rd July by a telegramfrom the War Office repeating a message to thesame effect from the Australian Governmentand urging me to give full and sympatheticconsideration to the views of the AustralianGovernment.

I agreed in principle to the relief of thegarrison both for the sake of the troops and anorder to fulfil the undertaking given to theAustralian Government; but I was doubtfulwhether it would be practicable to relieve thewhole garrison. The Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean, however, believed that he wouldbe able to effect the relief and maintain thefortress by sea at the same time.

29. A complete plan was drawn up by whichthe Polish Independent Brigade should replacethe i8th Australian Infantry Brigade and thei8th Cavalry (Indian Army) during the moon-less period in August and the 7oth (6th) Divi-sion relieve the 9th Australian Division duringthe two succeeding moonless periods. The first

*In order that the conditions which necessitatedthis relief shall be clearly understood, comments of(i) the Commonwealth Government and (ii)General Blarney, are appended below:—

(i) (Commonwealth Government)" The relief of Australian troops in Tobruk was

supported by three successive Australian Govern-ments. It is in agreement with General Blarney'sobservations which iwere confirmed -by theInspector General of Medical Services of theAustralian Army ((Major-General R. M. Downes)wh^ on his return from a visit to the MiddleEas-w .eported in 1941:

" ' The [first A.I.F. troops transferred fromTobruk had suffered a considerable decline intheir physical powers. The men did not thinkthat they were tired but few of them would beable to march eight miles . .' "(ii) (General Blarney)" I concur with the statements except that I do

not think the first portion of paragraph 29accurately represents the position. It will be notedthat on 18th July I had made representations onthe great decline in the physical condition of thetroops who had been holding Tobruk. This declinecontinued and two months later when the Chiefsof Staff directed the relief on isth September thecondition of the troops was such that any strongattack by the enemy might have endangered thesafety of the fortress. Moreover, an offensive wascontemplated and plans included operations toy thedefenders at a later date, which I was certain•that they could not have maintained owing to theirloss of strength and physical condition. I opposedGeneral Aiuchinleck most strongly in his proposalsto retain these troops any longer in Tobruk. Ittook a considerable time for them to recover theirstrength after their (relief."

relief was carried out with complete successbetween the I9th and the 29th August, releasingthe i8th Australian Infantry Brigade to rejoinits Division in Syria, and the i8th Cavalry tojoin its formation, the 3rd Indian Motor Bri-gade, in Egypt.

It was then necessary to consider whetherfurther relief of the garrison was desirable orfeasible. The Commander-in-Cihief, Mediter-ranean, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chiefand myself were unanimous in recommendingtihat it was undesirable to continue the pro-gramme for the following reasons. The reliefeffected in August had not only proved a greatstrain on the Royal Navy and the Royal AirForce, but had inevitably limited the latter'soffensive action. To continue in the next twomoonless periods would again interfere withother important operational tasks and imposea further heavy strain on the two Services.This would be increased by having to continueto maintain the fortress by sea during moon-light periods and thus expose our valuableshipping to unjustifiable risks. It was impos-sible to defer the last phase until the Novem-ber moonless period, as this would have clashedwith the date provisionally set for the begin-ning of our new offensive. Furthermore, noalternative formation being available for thepurpose, the immediate employment of the 7othDivision -in Tobruk would prevent Indian unitsfrom Iraq being introduced into it in accordancewith a policy which will be explained later inthis Despatch. Finally the decline in thehealth of the garrison, which had been ad-vanced as a pressing reason for effecting relief,did not appear to be so great as to warrant itscontinuation in the face of so many importantobjections. I submitted these arguments in acable to London and stated that, subject to thePrime Minister's approval, I would reinforcethe garrison at once with an infantry tankbattalion instead of continuing the relief.

On the I5th September, however, I receiveda cable from the Chiefs of Staff informing methat, after careful consideration of the opinionof the Commanders in Chief, the AustralianGovernment felt compelled to request the with-drawal of the 9th Australian Division and therecoricentration of the Australian ImperialForce.

Accordingly the relief of most of the o,thAustralian -Division by the yoth Division wascompleted in the next two moonless periods,between the i8th and the 28th September andthe I2th and the 26th October. Only the 2/i3thInfantry Battalion now remains in Tobruk.

The 4th Battalion of the Royal Tank Regi-ment was despatched at the same time.

The withdrawal of the Australian Divisionnecessitated a change in command. On the22nd October, 1941, Major General R. MacK.Scobie, commanding the 70th Division, tookover command of the fortress.

30. I wish to acknowledge the services ren-dered in the siege of Tobruk by the RoyalNavy, the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal AiriForce. Not only did they enable the relief tobe carried out with negligible loss to armypersonnel, though at great strain and someloss to themselves, but by continuing to' main-tain the fortress for eight months in spite ofheavy risks and great difficulties they madeit possible to renew the offensive which other-wise would have been considerably delayed.


The services of the following 'officers were..particularly 'noteworthy:-— /,>--<vr artt iiSbWJG^

Royal Navy.Acting Rear Admiral G. H. Creswell, Rear

Admiral Alexandria, Captain A. L. Poland,Senior Naval Officer, Inshore Squadron; Cap-tain F. M. Smith, Naval Officer in charge,Tobruk, Acting Commander H. R. M. Nichollwho performed the duties of Naval Officer incharge, Tobruk, during the sickness of CaptainSmith, Lieutenant ' Commander J. W. Best,

• Naval Officer in charge Mersa Matruh.Royal Air Force.

Wing Commander E. R. E. Black, com-manding the Royal Air Force Detachment;Squadron Leader R. D. Williams commandingNo. 145 Squadron;. Acting Flight LieutenantC. W.- Morle, commanding the Air MinistryExperimental Station; and Pilot Officer W. C.Mackintosh and Pilot Officer H. M. Briscoe,Code and Ciphers Officers.

EGYPT.31. In Egypt certain problems vitally

affected the security of our base. These arosein part directly out of the war and in partout of ithe circumstance that Egypt herselfis not a belligerent.

Apart from political difficulties, the problemof telephonic communications has been pres-sing. The Egyptian State Telegraphs and Tele-phones Departments 'have always given usexcellent service, but 'the use of the civiliansystem manned by civilian personnel is pre-judicial to security. Holding the view that, solong as the country is not at war, military con-siderations cannot override civilian require-ments, the Departments have consistently re-fused to hand over any parl- of the system toBritish Control. Nor will they allow the infiltra-tion of British Military personnel to handle ourown traffic and become used to the system so asto be able to take over in an emergency; suchmight arise if heavy bombing attacks occurred.The difficulty became particularly acute inconnection with the projected offensive inCyrenaica; but in October I was able to arrangeto take over the working of the lines in theforward area.

32. There has also been an agitation forthe declaration of Cairo, as well as. otherEgyptian cities, as an " open city." As thebombing of Alexandria increased', so did theCairo " open city " movement gain impetus.In mid-September the Egyptian Prime Ministerwas handed a Memorandum stating that it wasentirely out of the question to move Britishtroops and military depots from Cairo: anend should, therefore, foe put to the agitation.The recent diminution of enemy air raidson Egyptian towns has automatically put thisquestion into the background1; but it is boundto reappear with its attendant dangers to in-ternal security as soon as heavy scale bombingis resumed. Against that day an elaborate airraid precautions scheme has been prepared,to which His Majesty's Government have givenconsiderable financial assistance.

33. The worst result of the air raids wasthat they seriously threatened shipping in -theSuez Canal and in the Gulf of Suez. Inci-dentally they also caused a reduction in theamount of Egyptian casual labour; but thiswas speedily remedied toy improving the

. arrangements ^..for. air . raid precautions and-•iinipaijtiiig laiKbiirvfiom UppeBBBgypt-jtC'^Thethreat to shipping demanded that immediateand "effective measures be taken, and theywere the more urgent in that air raids coincidedwith the arrival of important convoys carry-ing large numbers of men and vehicles. More-over it was essential to give adequate protec-tion to American ships which had just begunto arrive. I therefore took every possible pre-caution. Several anti-aircraft batteries weremoved from other areas to Suez during moon-light periods, and anti-aircraft crews wereplaced aboard American ships, while the RoyalNavy stationed an anti-aircraft cruiser in SuezRoads. In addition it was decided to providetwo defended anchorages in the Gulf of Suez,at Abu Zenima and at Ras Ghemsa, for usein the event of Port Tewfik (becoming unuse-able.

34. The help given us by the Egyptian'Army is an earnest of the friendly intentions ofthe Government. In addition to findinginternal security guards in the Delta and on theland, they found a garrison for Siwa at atime when it was necessary for us to leaveas few of our own troops as possible in theWestern Desert. The services of the EgyptianArmy have been particularly valuable. Pro-viding as they have a complete and efficientobserver system as well as searchlight andanti-aircraft units at Cairo, Alexandria and inthe Canal area, they have relieved the strainon our resources to a very great extent.

. PART II—ADMINISTRATION.35. During this period I was chiefly con-

cerned with the problems of administration.The comparatively peaceful conditions pre-vailing gave me the opportunity of carryingout the large amount of reorganisation anddevelopment rendered necessary by the in-creasing strength of the Middle East Forces.

GENERAL ORGANISATION.Formation of Eighth and Ninth Armies.

36. The conclusion of the Balkan and EastAfrican Campaigns caused our forces to beconcentrated in Egypt, Palestine and Syria,and narrowed the potential theatres of opera-tions. It was therefore certain that in futurethe strength of the forces engaged in operationscould >be reckoned, not in Brigades andDivisions as heretofore but in Corps. Theexisting small headquarters were obviously in-adequate to control operations on this scale.I therefore determined that the basic organisa-tion should comprise two Army Headquartersto command all the troops in the two prin-cipal theatres of operations, with two Baseand Line of Communication Areas directly ad-ministered by G.H.Q. relieving the armies ofthe administration of these areas.

Accordingly on the 26th September theHeadquarters of the Eighth Army, commandedby Lieutenant^General Sir Alan Cunningham,assumed command of all troops in the WesternDesert forward of Bahig, with the exceptionof those in Toibrak who came under commandon the 30th October. Headquarters, BritishTroops in Egypt, 'became in effect a large Baseand Lines of Communication Area Commandoperationally responsible only for the internalsecurity and anti-aircraft defence of theEgyptian base.


In Palestine and Syria .operational;command,was assigned in the same way to the Head-quarters of the Ninth Arany, commanded byGeneral Sir Henry Maitland Wilson/ andPalestine and Transjordan became a Base andLine of Communication Area.

Appointment of Lieutenant GeneralA dministration.

37. The great increase in the strength of theMiddle East Forces since the collapse of Franceproduced a corresponding increase in the volumeof routine administrative work, while thepromise of further growth of the forces andthe prospect of large-scale operations on twofronts presented a large number of problemsin administrative planning.

These matters had hitherto been dealt withby my Deputy Quartermaster General, MajorGeneral B. O. Hutchison and by my DeputyAdjutant General, 'Major General -N. W. NapierClavering. ! wish to pay the highest tributeto the industry, efficiency and foresight withwhich they carried out their work, of whichthe vast amount of reorganisation and develop-ment carried out during the period1 covered bythis Despatch and .before is the best testimony.

I realised that, well served as they were, theproblems confronting them were already toomultitudinous, and that in due course the grow-ing number of day-to-day questions must in-evitably usurp most of their time. I thereforedecided to ask the Chief of the Imperial GeneralStaff to sanction the appointment of a principaladministrative staff officer, who should relievethem of part of their burden, and whose func-tions should include co-ordinating the work ofthe Quartermaster General's and the AdjutantGeneral's Departments and directing adminis-trative planning.

On the i8th October Lieutenant-General T. S.Riddell Webster assumed -the appointment ofLieutenant-General Administration as myprincipal administrative staff officer.

Formation of Union Defence Force Administra-tive Headquarters.

38. 'When South African troops first came toEgypt it was intended that they should betreated in the same way as British troops,matters peculiar to South Africa being dealt withby staff officers attached to my General Head-quarters and provided with the necessary clericalstaff. The differences between South Africanand British administration, however, were pro-

.nounced; and many of the problems arising hada domestic political bearing. In order to over-come these and other lesser difficulties FieldMarshal Smuts decided1 to form a separate

.administrative headquarters. Accordingly onthe 25th September Major-General F. A. Theronwas appointed General Officer Administration,Union Defence Force, Middle East, with execu-tive powers.

MANPOWER.39. Of all the administrative problems of the

Middle East the shortage of manpower was themost urgent. It arose in a particularly acuteform in the British and South African elementsof the force.British.

40. The supply of British personnel wasnecessarily limited by the amount of shippingavailable and the 'great distance^they must travelto reach the Middle East. In order to save

British manpower every effort has been madeto provide substitutes. It is my policy to diluteBritish formations with Indian -units and an

•exchange of battalions between Iraq and theMiddle East has already taken place.

Men from Cyprus, India, Malta, Mauritius,Palestine, the Sudan, East Africa, and theSouth African Protectorate have entered theServices and are doing valuable work.

These services have also been tapped for theformation of Pioneer Corps units. By the endof October there were 69 such units in theMiddle East.

To supplement uniformed labour, civilianlabour has been used to the greatest extentpracticable. The number employed has risenfrom 101,000 in July to 144,000 at the beginningof October. Unfortunately local labour was notaltogether satisfactory when bombing firstoccurred. But confidence gradually returnedwith experience of the slight casualties inflictedwhen proper precautions are taken. Labourersenlisted from the Sudan and elsewhere showedthemselves better able to stand up to bombing.

I have also examined the practicability ofusing women in the place of men for non-com-batant duties. Appreciable numbers of Euro-pean women are to be found chiefly in SouthAfrica and Palestine. The Union has alreadysent 250 women to the Middle East and allare engaged in useful work in Egypt and theSudan. The Government of Palestine and theWar Office have agreed in principle to units ofthe Auxiliary Territorial Service being raised inPalestine.South African.

41. The South African contingent felt themanpower problem even more acutely, and theGovernment of the Union decided to employin all units as many Non-Europeans as possiblefor non-combatant work in order to releaseEuropeans for combatant service. This is tobe carried out on a very comprehensive scale,the new war establishment of a South AfricanDivision being 14,900 Europeans and 10,400Non-Europeans.

DEVELOPMENT OF BASES AND COMMUNICATIONS.42. The growth of the Middle East Forces

was naturally reflected in the tonnage to behandled at ports. To deal with the increasedvolume of traffic and to provide alternativeapproaches to the Base, as a precaution againstenemy action, extensive Transportation andWorks developments have been undertaken.

Much constructional work has been under-taken to meet both future operational require-ments and the general needs of the growingforce. A comprehensive programme for theexpansion of base installations is being carriedout. Many improvements to communicationsand harbours have been put in hand, and muchnew accommodation is being completed.Transportation.

43. The Movements Branch of the Staff andTransportation Services have been broughtunder one head in the person of my DeputyQuartermaster General, Movement and Trans-portation, Brigadier R. K. Hewer, and the neworganisation is working well.

Seventy-five miles of the extension to theWestern Desert Railway have been completedand the line between Suez and Ismailia has beendoubled during the period under review. TheTransportation Service has also been engaged

.SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 21 AUGUST, 1946 4225

in constructing some 390 miles of railway lineelsewhere in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria^ as.well as a Depot at Kantara East, a^ing.'bridgeover the Suez Canal, and two railway bridges inSyria.

Works Services.'44. The considerable achievements of the

Works Services are in no small measure dueto my Director of Works, Major General E. F.Tiokell.

Constructional work has proceeded steadily,though hampered somewhat by a certain short-age of materials on the sites. The rate ofdelivery of engineer stores has improved, butis still limited not only by the amount of ship-ping available but also by restricted transporta-tion facilities in Egypt. These could not beadequately supplemented by service transportbecause it was necessary to meet the deficienciesof operational and maintenance units. Thetransport problem will be considerably easierwhen these deficiencies have been made up.

Works Services have taken over responsibilityfor the construction of all docks and harbourworks.

Preliminary work has been put in hand fordeep water quays at Suez and Safaga. Thelighter wharf programme has been continuedand about one mile of additional wharf hasbeen completed since June.

A pipe line carrying .a thousand tons of oila day from Suez to Port Said has been laid.The Desert water pipe line has been completedas far as Matruh and is being extended. Alarge number of additional filtering plants havebeen built in the Delta. Well boring has beencontinued throughout the Middle (East andmany hundreds of miles of distribution pipehave been laid.

Work on a large number of roads in Egypt,the Western Desert, Syria and Palestine hascontinued, and much road maintenance hasbeen carried out in Syria, the Sudan, Eritreaand Abyssinia.

Many aerodromes and landing grounds havebeen constructed in the Western Desert andelsewhere. Work on a large number of othersis continuing. . ' ^

The programme for building hospitals, asoriginally planned, has been completed, andmany camps have been erected in Egypt andPalestine.

Increased local production has done muchto supplement shipments from abroad.

Vehicle Assembly.45. By far the greater number of wheeled

vehicles arriving from overseas come cased andpartly dismantled. The work of assembly hasbeen shared by the Royal Army Service Corpsand the (Royal Army Ordnance Corps withvaluable assistance from the South African per-sonnel sent up by the Union for this purpose.

Middle East Provision Office.46. This is now established under the Eastern

Group Supply system and provision forecastsfor (the period ist April to 3ist December, 1942,have been forwarded to the Central ProvisionOffice, New Delhi. A plan for co-ordinatingand stimulating local production is now beingprepared.

RE-EQUIPMENT AND REORGANISATION47. Large consignments of war material of

every description made it possible to carry out

re-equipment on a large scale. Various tablesshowing this^afcejse&'put in Appendix " C.-'

-*\?e"h-icles of all types came in a"steady streamfrom Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and theUnion of South Africa, and in July tanks andtrucks began to arrive in increasing volumefrom the United States of America. Betweenthe ist July and the 3ist October we receivedin all almost 34,000 trucks and lorries and 2,100armoured vehicles. Considerable consign-ments of artillery and small arms were alsoreceived. Among these were 600 field guns,206 anti-tank guns, 160 light and 80 heavyanti-aircraft guns. Shipments of small armsincluded approximately 3,700 GBren guns, 900mortars, and 80,000 rifles, and quantities ofammunition and equipment.

Yet, large as they were, these consignments,necessarily limited in quantity by the amountof shipping space available, were insufficientto replace all the wastage which had occurredor to enable reserves of many important items"of equipment to be built up.

48. Limitations of shipping space were muchmore severely felt in connection with personnel,making it necessary to choose between fightingtroops and administrative units, and betweencomplete formations or units and drafts. . Itseemed best to ask for the greater part of theavailable space to be allotted to fighting forma-tions, as this brought a greater increase infighting strength than would have resulted fromaccepting a preponderance of drafts. Against27,300 men arriving with units we received17,000 in drafts. However one half of thenumber arriving in drafts were absorbed bynew units which it was found* necessary to formin the Middle East.

A serious shortage of personnel andadministrative units had to be accepted as theinevitable consequence of this policy. Theshortage of personnel extended to every armof the Service but the rearward servicessuffered most. In many cases there were in-sufficient men to make even units in contactwith the enemy up to full establishment. Atthe beginning of July the overall deficit in per-sonnel, the deficit compared to war establish-ments plus first reinforcements, was 16 percent.; by the end of October, when the strainon reserves was increased by the number ofcomplete units received, the deficit was slightlylarger. Nevertheless, by disposing personnelto the best advantage and by increasing theirefforts all arms contrived to fulfil their func-tions with great efficiency, and I wish to recordmy appreciation of the manner in which theyovercame this serious handicap.Armoured Formations.

49. The armoured formations presented themost striking example of the extent to which itwas possible to carry out re-equipment and re-organisation. At the beginning of July I couldput into the field only two armoured car regi-ments and the 7th Armoured Division, whoserange and mobility was seriously restricted bythe fact that one Brigade was equipped withinfantry tanks owing to the shortage of cruisers.At the end of October I had at my disposal the7th Armoured Division, the 22nd ArmouredBrigade, the ist Army Tank Brigade complete,and the 32nd Army Tank Brigade complete ex-cept for one battalion. I was also able to re-equip a third British armoured car regimentand to complete' the equipment of two SouthAfrican armoured car regiments.


Infantry Formations.50. Smiilarl7miprovem'en&"tdGf& plate in the

condition of other formations. The intskiT ofunarmoured vehicles was sufficient- to .allow meto replace the transport of the ist South AfricanDivision and to complete that of the 4th IndianDivision which had seen much hard servicein East Africa and was unsuited to desert war-fare. It was also possible to fulfil the require-ments of the New Zealand Division, whosetransport had been lost in Greece. The equip-ping of the ist South African Division wasparticularly remarkable as the whole process ofissuing and delivering 1,300 vehicles from thebase to the desert occupied only six days. The7th Armoured Division, the ist Army TankBrigade, and the 22nd Armoured Brigade werealso brought up to full establishment in thesevehicles during the period. In addition therequirements of a number of divisional and non-divisional troops have been completed whilethe losses in Greece have been largely replaced.

Table B of Appendix " C " shows the hold-ings of formations in .unarmoured vehicles andequipment at the beginning and end of theperiod.Royal Artillery—Field Branch.

51. There was a great improvement in thegeneral state of equipment of the Royal Artil-lery Field Branch regiments as is shown inTable C of Appendix " C ".

In the case of Field Regiments, however, ashortage of personnel precluded our taking fulladvantage of all the equipment available.

In spite of the very considerable increasein the number of 2-pounder equipments avail-able, the situation was still unsatisfactory intwo respects. There were insufficient guns tobring all regiments up to the full establish-ment of 48 guns; and in order to equip fourof them on the new 64-gun basis, it was neces-sary to give them 16 eighteen-pounder gunsapiece. However, the added weight of theseguns may well prove to be an advantage.

More serious was the fact that three InfantryDivisions were without anti-tank regiments. Asthis weakness could not be tolerated in a terrainoffering few natural anti-tank obstacles, it wasnecessary to convert the I49th Field and the73rd Medium Regiments into anti-tank artillery,thereby setting highly trained personnel to aless skilled task.

Royal Artillery—Anti-Aircraft and CoastArtillery Branch.

52. Arrivals of Anti-Aircraft artillery in-creased the heavy anti-aircraft fire power by40 per cent, and the light anti-aircraft toy 75per cent. (Table D of Appendix " C ".) 106captured anti-aircraft guns were retained inuse in addition. Coast batteries provided forthe defence of additional ports were mainlyequipped with captured guns and searchlights.

The release of additional light anti-aircraftequipment and the arrival of fresh units madeit possible to put into practice plans for pro-viding divisional light anti-aircraft regiments.This involved re-organising one Australian andtwo South African regiments as divisional lightanti-aircraft regiments on British war estab-lishments. Five divisional light anti-aircraftregiments, all on a 36-gun basis, were providedfor the Eighth Army, and the equipping of twoAustralian divisional light anti-aircraft regimentsfor the ist Australian Corps was started.

Passive Air Defence.5§. Special attention has been paid to im-

proving'the "Passive Air Defence organisation,which now embraces all military fire fighting.

Royal Engineers.54. Unit equipment came forward fairly well

and most units are now up to scale in the moreimportant items, though there is still a shortageof certain essentials, and very few reserves.American equipment began to arrive, notablymobile compressor units and bridging equip-ment with special carrying vehicles.

A considerable number of new units weresent out from -the United Kingdom. SeveralSouth African Engineer units also arrived fromEast Africa and the Union, forming a very valu-able addition to our Engineer resources. Thereis still a chronic shortage of electrical andmechanical equipment operating units.

Royal Corps of Signals.55. Considerable supplies of signal stores were

received and the situation as regards lineequipment for forward areas is now satisfactory.Although now more plentiful than they usedto be, supplies of permanent line equipment,telephones and switchoards for lines of com-munications and back areas are still insufficientto provide a satisfactory reserve. Wirelessequipment is still short, but at the end ofJune it was shorter. The services of theR.jA.O.C. workshops and two mobile W'/Trepair sections have been particularly valuablein reconditioning existing wireless equipment.

Deficiencies in signal units Shave been veryserious. In spite of the arrival of two corpssignal units, we are still deficient of six com-plete non-divisional units and fifty-seven mis-cellaneous sections required to completeexisting non-divisional units—a total shortageof 6000 personnel.

Royal Army Service Corps.56. Apart from the lack of units the Royal

Army Service Corps experienced a 15 per cent,shortage of personnel for existing units.

The number of vehicles held by the Corpssteadily increased, reaching approximately 86per cent, of authorised strength by the end ofOctober. But it has -not yet been possible -toform a reserve of vehicles.

Improvements in bulk storage and distribu-tion of motor spirit resulted in a saving incost of tins of over £12,500 per month, andgreat economy in material, labour and trans-port. Further improvements now in handshould greatly increase these savings.

Medical Services.57. Like the other services, the Medical Ser-

vice suffered 'from shortages in units, storesand transport. Although the Royal ArmyMedijcal Corps had been very nearly com-pletely equipped by the end of October trans-port resources were still inadequate, as theauthorised scale of transport is scarcely suffi-cient to meet the highly mobile conditionsobtaining in the Middle East. Practical ex-perience of mobile warfare in Syria and theWestern Desert, where the absence of roadsand railways necessitates long evacuation byambulance cars, had shown the need for in-creasing the proportion of motor ambulanceconvoys to fighting troops. Motor ambulancesarrived slowly, and it is only recently thatdeliveries began to be adequate.


Most items of medical stores are now beingdelivered in satisfactory quantities,^j>aThe per-centage of hospital beds fell in arrears', owingto the exclusion from convoys of even theminimum number required. The number offield hygiene sections was, and still is, inade-quate to the needs of the force.

In previous campaigns the need for mobilecasualty clearing stations had been experienced.Three units were given sufficient transport tomove the complete light section together withhalf the heavy section in one shift.

It has also been found necessary to formmobile surgical (teams provided with their owntransport, so that major surgery can be per-formed as far forward as the main dressingstations.Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

58. The excellent example of ceaseless hardwork set by my Director of Ordnance Services,Brigadier W. O. Richards, has been emulatedby the whole Corps. Several measures havebeen taken to ensure even greater efficiency.

The Royal Army Ordnance Corps lacked anumber of essential units, of which only a fewarrived between the end of June and the endof October. On the other hand, deficienciesin equipment and vehicles except for reserveshave been largely made up, although there isstill a serious shortage of machine tools.

Reorganisation of tjhe Corps in accordancewith the latest' system designed by the WarOffice is now in progress, but it is not yetsufficiently far advanced to enable me to seewhether the system will need to be modifiedto suit the conditions in the Middle East. Somefive thousand additional personnel will berequired to complete the reorganisation andit is therefore unlikely to be completed beforenext August.

The swift movement and lengthy communi-cations' characteristic of mechanised warfaremade two innovations necessary.

Strict limits have been set to the scale ofrepairs to be undertaken by second line repairworkshops, recourse being had as far as pos-sible to the system of assembly exchanges.

It has also been found necessary to organisea system for the delivery of urgent spare partsand fighting stores. A special unit has beenformed to deliver such stores by road and afurther scheme has been prepared in conjunc-tion with the Royal Air Force for the deliveryof stores by air.

59. It was no easy task to re-equip and re-organise practically the whole of the MiddleEast Forces within the space of four months.Units had to be restored to their brigades,and brigades to their divisions. Equipmenthad to be distributed in such a way as tomeet operational needs and to permit a maxi-mum of training to be carried out. At thesame time Cyprus had to be reinforced, andTobruk relieved, units withdrawn from Syriaand East Africa and the concentration for theoffensive begun. The coordination of all theseactivities1 placed a great, strain on the StaffDuties Branch of the General Staff and of allsubordinate Headquarters. The smooth effici-ency with which it was all accomplished islargely due to the untiring efforts of my DeputyDirector of Staff Duties, Brigadier B. Temple.

TRAINING.60. Under the guidance of my Deputy Chief

of General Staff, Major General N. M. Ritchie,

every aspect of training in theory and practicehas received the+closest attention. ;jjr •* n?

Th*e lull in operations made it possible togive almost every fighting unit and formationthe opportunity of carrying out further train-ing, .although the scope of training was neces-sarily limited by deficiencies in equipment.Incoming units and formations put in a spell oftraining in desert warfare before being sent tothe operational zone, and particular attentionhas been paid .to desert movement of mechan-ised columns by day and night.

The Combined Training Centre at Kabrit wasemployed to capacity throughout. One Brigadeof the 5th Indian Division and two brigadegroups of the New Zealand Division underwenta complete course at the Centre.

Air Support.61. An Inter-Service Committee, consisting

of representatives of the Army and the RoyalAir Force, was formed late in July to studythe question of • air support for -the Aonmy.Experiments were carried out during August,and a system was finally evolved.

The first two air support controls in theMiddjle East were iformdd at Miena ion 8th;October, the Army complonenit of the firstbeing formed by the Australian Imperial Force,and of the second from British and. NewZealand personnel. The air component ofboth was provided by the Royal Air Force.Parachute Detachment.

62. A small parachute detachment knownas " L" Detachment, Special Air ServiceBrigade, was formed at Kabrit during July. Itwas composed of about 70 volunteers, recruitedmainly from the survivors of the CommandoForce.

Preliminary training .was carried out duringAugust and September, and the first live dropswere successfully made on the 4th October.

Captain A. D. Stirling, who commanded thedetachment directed all training without expertassistance. Great credit is due to him andto his officers and non-commissioned officers fortheir initiative in improvising equipment andinventing an entirely new type of training.

Schools.63. 'The Middle East Officers Cadet Training

Unit has been reorganised and expanded. Thespecialist wings have been abolished; and allcadets now follow the same eight weeks' basiccourse, specialists passing on to officers' wingsat the training school of the arm concerned.The annual capacity of the Training unit hasbeen thereby increased from thirteen hundredto two thousand and forty cadets.

Special stress has been laid on anti-aircraftaction at the Weapon Training School, movingtargets being employed. Experiments havebeen made with kites and drogues towed by atruck to produce a satisfactory target.

The School of Anti-Aircraft and CoastDefence moved to Haifa and reopened on theI4th September, as air raids had interferedwith instruction at Port Said.

A Royal Army Ordnance Corps School ofInstruction, having .general engineering andammunition wings, has been opened.

A school has been opened at the InfantryBase Depot for training regimental specialists.

Six Indian Wings have recently been openedat existing schools.


CAMOUFLAGE AND TACTICAL DECEPTION.64. The urgent need for general training in

the theory, practice and discipline of camou-flage has been met by creating small camouflagetraining units on the scale of one to each divi-sion and higher formation. In addition, theformation of a camouflage training and develop-ment centre, Royal Engineers,- has beenauthorised.

The 85th Camouflage Company, SouthAfrican Engineering Corps, joined the MiddleEast Forces on 22nd August. It was the firstand only complete camouflage and deceptionworks unit in the 'British and Dominion Forcesin the Middle East. It ds well equipped. Itprovides mobile detachments for work in for-ward areas, and a factory and experimentalsection capable of limited production of decep-tion equipment and of new devices.

The principal technical developments duringthe period under review have been improvedtypes of lorry hoods for use on tanks, mobiledummy tanks mounted on lorry chassis,collapsible static dummy tanks of improveddesign, and collapsible dummy guns.

Under the technical direction of the camou-flage staffs, defence lines on all commands havebeen extensively camouflaged. Much work hasbeen done on installations of all kinds.

Progress has been made with organised con-cealment and display in battle. Operations atTobruk provided the opportunity for carryingout local schemes of deception both in defenceand attack, schemes of misdirection, decoy andambush being employed with promising results.

Two battalions of dummy tanks using staticdummies and two battalions using mobiledummies have been provided.

HEALTH.65. The general health of the troops has been

very good with comparatively low percentageof cases of dysentery and a very low percentageof cases in the typhoid group. The lowincidence of Malaria has, in the circumstances,been satisfactory.

WELFARE AND EDUCATION.66. Considerable progress has been made in

catering for the welfare of the troops but thedemand for amenities of all kinds continuallyoutstrips the supply. To meet the growingdemand for welfare and educational facilitiesthroughout the Army it ha's become necessaryto provide additional Welfare and EducationOfficers.

PRISONERS OF WAR.67. The evacuation of prisoners of war from

Egypt and the Sudan has proceeded reasonablysatisfactorily, the number of Italian and Ger-man prisoners of war in Egypt having beenreduced from 58,000 to 27,000 and those in the-Sudan from 23,000 to 9,000.

Many schemes for employing prisoners of warhave been considered and tried, but the resultshave on the whole fallen short of expectations.This has been due to several causes, chiefamong them being the difficulty of finding thenumber of guards needed and the restrictionsimposed by the Geneva Convention.

CO-OPERATION OF OTHER SERVICES.68. I have referred to our great indebtedness

to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force

for enabling us to maintain and relieve Tobruk.This was but a small part of their contributionto the preparations of the Army. Both Serviceswere ceaselessly engaged in preventing theenemy from reinforcing and supplying hisforces. It was largely due to the conspicuoussuccess which attended their efforts that theenemy was compelled to allow us the respitewe so sorely needed. Moreover it is due totheir tireless devotion in organising and pro-tecting convoys that we received the reinforce-ments and vast quantities of stores whichenabled us to reorganise and re-equip thearmies of the Middle East. To the Royal Navyand the Royal Air Force and to Admiral SirAndrew Cunningham and Air Marshal A. W.Tedder in particular we owe a deep debt ofgratitude.

APPRECIATION OF SERVICES.

69. It must be clear that the manifold acti-vities related in this Despatch were not carriedon without the loyal co-operation of everyBranch of my own Staff and of Commandersand Staffs of subordinate Headquarters.

I wish to place on record my appreciationof the fighting spirit of all combatant units inthe Middle East Forces and of the conscientiousand efficient work of all ranks employed in baseareas, without whose loyal efforts the useful-ness of the battle formations would have beenimpaired.

APPENDIX " A " (see para. 24).

SUBJECT: Policy covering the defenceof the Western Desert.

G.H.Q., M.E.F.21 July, 1941.

Lieut.-General Sir Noel Beresford Peirse,K.B.E., D.S.O., Commanding W.D.F.

1. Intelligence appreciations indicate that theenemy will not be in a position .before Septem-ber 1941 to launch an attack with the Delta ashas first main objective. An enemy advance,before that date, with a series of limited objec-tives is, however, possible.

2. A comparison of relative strengths showsthat, while at present the enemy can put intothe field an appreciably superior force ofarmoured fighting vehicles, this situation should•have been considerably alleviated early inSeptember.

3. In view of these factors, the Commander-in-Chief has decided that in the event of anenemy advance, his armoured forces will bebrought to battle in the area South of Matruh.

4. In order to concentrate the maximumarmoured forces for the main battle South ofMatruh, no serviceable cruiser or " I " tanksshould be located prior to the battle in the" boxes " at Matruh or Bagush. This rulingwill be reviewed at a later date, when the totalnumber of tanks available has increased.

5. In order that as much assistance aspossible may be rendered by other formations to7 Armoured Division during this tank battle,you are authorised to proceed with thedevelopment of a position to the West andSouth of Matruh, ior occupation by not morethan two Infantry Brigades.


6. The question of W.D.F. coming under the the Matruh, and Bagush Boxes), G.O.C. andcommand of B.T.E. is receiving^ further con- units of W.'D.'F., on passing out of the Westernsideration at this H.Q.

7. Acknowledge.ARTHUR SMITH,

Lieut-General,Chief of the General Staff.

APPENDIX " B " (see para. 24).SUBJECT: Policy covering the defence

of the Western Desert.G.H.Q., M.E.F.

30 July, 1941G.O.C.-in-C., B.T.E.G.O.C., W.D.F.

In continuation of ^Instructiondated 2ist July, 1941.

i. In the event of the enemy launching an tables, traffic control and measures for rallyingattack in the Western Desert, the X Corps, unitscomprising 5 Ind. Division and 2 S.A. Division, 6. The fortresses of Matruh and Bagushunder command of G.O.C.-in-C., B.T.E., will: will come under command of G.H.Q. when

(a) Hold the El Alamein position, pro- W.D.F. comes under B.T.E., or earlier, shouldvided that a small Armoured Force can be G.O.C., W.D.F., consider such a course desir-made available. able.

(b) Hold a sector of the Delta Defences 7. Acknowledge.

Desert• area, will come under the" command ofB.T.E. for such duties as G.O.C.-in-C., B.T.E.,may decide.

3. The boundary' between W.D.F. andB.T.E. remains unaltered, i.e. (all includingW.D.F.) Daba-Bab el Qaud—Longitude 28°to Qaret Agnes-Sitra-Siwa-Jalo.

4. As a iguiding principle, troops of W.D.F.will rally on the El Alamein position, whetherthe position is held by X Corps or not.

5. G.O.C.-in-C., B.T.E., and G.O.C.,W.D.F., will make mutual arrangements toensure that units are withdrawn in such a wayas to fit in best with the B.T.E. Defence Plan.Such arrangements will include movement

if no Armoured Force is available.2. Should the enemy advance necessitate the

withdrawal of the W.D.F. (less the garrisons of

ARTHUR SMITH,Lieut.-General,

Chief of the General Staff.

APPENDIX " C " (see paras. 47-52)TABLES SHOWING COMPARATIVE STATES OF EQUIPMENT

A. Armoured Vehicles.

Formations

7 Armd. Div.7 Armd. Bde.4 Armd. Bde.

i o Armd. Div.8 Armd. Bde.9 Armd. Bde.i Armd. Bde.

22 Armd. Bde.i Army Tank Bde. ...

32 Army Tank Bde. ...

Armd. Car Regts.ii Hussars

K.D.G. ... 'Royals

4 S. African Armd. Car R. ...6 S. African Armd. Car R. ...

26th June, 1941

No. ofUnits

33

3 \.3 J4

Not arrivedNot arrived

i

A.F.V.

50%50%30%

Forming

Nil

30%

92%y* /o40%T^ /O

92%y^/o50%50%

23rd October, 1941

No. of•Units

33

33i332

A.F.V.

100%

82%100%

Training scaleNilNil

100%

85%67%

67%*/ /O

100%100%100%100%

* Remainder available, but being modified.

B. Other Equipment.

Formations

7 Armd. Div.10 Armd. Div.i Armd. Bde.

22 Armd. Bde.i Army Tank Bde. ...

50 Div.70 Div.6 Aust. Div. ...7 Aust. Div. ...9 Aust. Div. ...

N.Z. Divi S. African Div2 S. African Div.4 Ind. Div.5 Ind. Div. ...

22 Gds. Bde. ...3 Ind. Motor Bde. ...

Polish Bde. GpGreek Bde. Gp

ist July, 1941

M.T.

75%

50%

100%10%

100%30%30%90%*50%*30%50%

100%

10%Train

1

S.A. andEquipment

70%20%20%

90%

80%75%80%

100%

45%90%20%

90%75%65%45% '

100%ing scale

3ist October, 1941

M.T/

100%

10%10%

100%.100%60%

60%85%10%

100%100%

50%90%75%

100%100%

Trainin1

S.A. andEquipment

90%20%20%

100%

90%90%

100%80%80%50%90%90%70%

100%100%100%100%100%

g scale

* Non-desertworthy transport.


C. Artillery—Field Branch.

Field ArtyA.-Tk.Arty. *Medium Arty.

ist July, 1941

No. ofRegts.

35103

State oiEquipment

.' .57%58%

io'o%

4th November, 1941

No. ofRegts.

39n

' 5

State ofEquipment

9i%76%100%

Increase

60%86%40%

* Figures based on establishment of 36 guns for two regts. on both dates, with remainder on 48 gun basison ist July and 64 gun basis on 4th November.

D. Artillery—Anti-Air craft.

Heavy A. A.Light A.A.SearchlightG/LSets

4th July, 1941

No. ofBtys.

*

3i388

State of Equipt.

British

70%50%47%

25 sets

Total

7°%69%47%

3ist October, 1941

No. ofBtys.

3449

7

State of Equipt.

British

90%68%78%

32 sets

Tobal

t95%83%78%

IncreaseBritish

42%77%44%28%

* Does not include Free French or Egyptian Units,f Includes captured equipment.

E. Services

R.A.S.CR.A.M.CR.A.O.C

ist July, 1941

M.T.54%84%

3ist October, 1941

M.T.86%96%

IOO%

* Figures not available

NOTICE

The following Amendment should be made to the Despatch submitted by General Sir ArchibaldP. Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., Commander in Chief in the Middle East on Operations in EastAfrica, November 1940—July 1941, published on Wednesday, the loth of July, 1946, as aSupplement to the London Gazette of Tuesday, the gth of July, 1946.

Page 3572, Part III—General.Para. 106, Lines 20-21 for "impossible " substitute "possible".

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