SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette - ibiblio

fiumb. 39171 1349

SUPPLEMENT TO

The London GazetteOF TUESDAY, i3th MARCH, 1951

bp gutftortQ>Registered as a Newspaper

MONDAY, 19 MARCH, 1951

OPERATIONS IN BURMA AND NORTH-EAST INDIA FROM16th NOVEMBER, 1943 TO 22nd JUNE, 1944.

NOTE.—A set of maps for this Despatch is on separate sale at Is. Od. net. This set ofmaps also covers the operations described in the other Army and Air Despatches of the

Burma Campaign from 16th November, 1943 to 12th September, 1945.

The following Despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for War on the 19th June,1945, by GENERAL SIR GEORGE J.GIFFARD, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.,Commander-in-Chief, 11 Army Group,South-East Asia Command.

PART I.—INTRODUCTION.1. This Despatch covers the operations in

Burma and North-East India between the 16thNovember, 1943, the date on which theSupreme Allied Commander,* South-East Asia,assumed responsibility from the India Com-mand, and the 22nd June, 1944, the date onwhich our lines of. communication fromManipur Road (Dimapur) to Imphal were re-opened, after the defeat of the Japanese forcesat Kohima. By this date, also, the .enemy hadbeen cleared from the area north of Kamaing,Mogaung and Myitkyina by the Chinese-American forces under General Stilwell.f anda re-adjustment of our dispositions to meetmonsoon conditions had been made in Arakan.Thus a definite phase of the campaign maybe said to have ended. The Despatch alsogives an account of the administrative situationand certain major changes in our organizationduring the period.Forces allotted and assigned to South-East

Asia Command (S.E.A.C.).2. The formation of the South-East Asia

Command necessitated a reorganization of thesystem of command of the land forces. Untilthen, the Eastern Army had been under thecommand of the Commander-in-Chief, India,t

* Now Vice-Admiral The Earl Mountbatten ofBurma, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O.,K.C.B., D.S.O.

t The late Lieut-General Joseph W. Stilwell, UnitedStates Army.

t General (now Field-Marshal) Sir Claude J. E.Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E.

who was responsible for the conduct of opera-tions in Burma and Assam. The assumption ofcommand by the Supreme Allied Commanderentailed the formation of 11 Army GroupHeadquarters and of Fourteenth Army Head-quarters, which then assumed command of theoperations which had, up to then, been directedby me as G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Army.

I was appointed to command 11 ArmyGroup and Lieut.-General W. J. Slim,* wasselected for command of Fourteenth Army.

The undermentioned formations, etc., previ-ously under India Command, were allotted toSouth-East Asia Command: —

FOURTEENTH ARMY.4 Corps.

Lieut.-General G. A. P. Scoones.f17 Indian Light Division.20 Indian Division (less 32 Brigade—

joined end of November).23 Indian Division.

15 Indian Corps.Lieut.-General A. F. P. Christison.J

5 Indian Division (less 9 Brigade—joinedin December).

7 Indian Division.26 Indian Division (less 4 Brigade—joined

in February, 1944).81 (West African) Division (less 3 Brigade,

allotted to Special Force).

* Now Field-Marshal Sir William J. Slim, G.B.E.,K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

t Now General Sir Geoffry A. P. Scoones, K.C.B.,K.B.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C.

J Now General Sir A. F. Philip Christison, Bart.,G.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

1350 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

CEYLON ARMY COMMAND.Lieut-General H. E. de R. Wetherall.*11 (East African) Division.

99 Indian Infantry Brigade.Royal Marine Group, Mobile Naval Base

Defence Organization (less one A.A.Brigade assigned to S.E.A.C. inSouthern India).

INDIAN OCEAN BASES.Addu Atoll ~\ ContainingDiego Garcia > smallCocos Islands J garrisons.

In addition, the following troops in Indiawere assigned to South-East Asia Command,being allotted later:—

Headquarters 33 Indian Corps (Lieut.-General M. G. N. Stopford).f

2 British Division.19 Indian Division (Did not arrive until

October, 1944; in the interim 25 IndianDivision was substituted for it).

36 Indian Division (This consisted of twoBritish brigades, and of divisional troops,some of which were Indian ; but it was called"Indian" for deception purposes. It wasrenamed 36 British Division in July, 1944,and I shall refer to it as such throughout thisDespatch).

3 Indian Division (Cover name of Major-General Wingate'sJ "Special Force": con-sisting of six Long-Range PenetrationBrigades; 14, 16 and 23 British InfantryBrigades; 77 and 111 Indian InfantryBrigades and 3 (West African) InfantryBrigade. It contained Gurkha but no Indianunits. I shall refer to it hereafter as"Special Force").

50 Indian Tank Brigade.3 Special Service Brigade (consisting of

No. 5 Commando and No. 44 Royal MarineCommando).Details showing when these " assigned"

formations were actually transferred to mycommand, and allotted to Fourteenth Army,will be given later in this Despatch.

In November, 1943, 15 Corps, consisting of7 Indian Division and 36 Brigade of 26 IndianDivision and 81 (West African) Division (whichwas just moving in), was holding a line inArakan approximately from Teknaf to TaungBazaar facing 55 Japanese Division. Theenemy Division had its Headquarters in Akyab,its 143 Regiment was on a line from Maungdawto Buthidaung, with 112 and 213 Regimentsdisposed in depth behind this line, in reserve.

4 Corps, composed of 17 Indian Light Divi-sion and 20 and 23 Indian Divisions, was re-sponsible for the defence of the Imphal andTiddim areas of the Central front. The LightDivision (48 and 63 Indian Infantry Brigades)was holding the Fort White—Tiddim areaagainst 214 and 215 Regiments of 33 JapaneseDivision, which was disposed generally alongthe line of ,the Chindwin River as far north asMawlaik. 23 Indian Division was in theImphal Plain, and had under command 80Indian Infantry Brigade of 20 Indian Divisionwhich was coming forward in relief of 23Indian Division.

* Now Lieut-General Sir H. Edward de R.Wetherall, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

t Now General Sir Montagu G. N. Stopford, G.C.B.,K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

J The late Major-General O. C. Wingate.

In the north of Burma (designated NorthernCombat Area Command—N.C.A.C.) theAmerican-trained and equipped Chinese 22 and38 Divisions under the command of GeneralStilwell were in the general area betweenLedo and Maingkwan towards which theywere advancing. They were opposed by 18Japanese Division, with 114 Regiment betweenMyitkyina and Sumprabum, 56 Regimentaround Katha and Rail Indaw, and 55 Regi-ment between Wuntho and Shwebo.

In no sector was there close contact but we,and the Japanese, were patrolling to gain con-tact ; and in Arakan we were preparing foran offensive. The Headquarters of FourteenthArmy was at Barrackpore (later at Comilla)and of 15 Japanese Army at Maymyo.

Geography and Topography.3. Before discussing the numerous plans

which were made and discarded for variousreasons and describing the operations whichactually took place, it is essential to appreciatethe extent to which all operations for the cap-ture of Burma are affected by peculiar topo-graphical and climatic conditions such as existin few other parts of the world.

4. The Indo-Burmese frontier, from whereit leaves the sea in Arakan, near Maungdaw,until it joins the. Sino-Thibetan frontier on theSalween. River north of Myitkyina, follows1 aseries of mountain ranges, the general axes ofwhich run from north to south. The mamfeatures of these mountain ranges are then*precipitous sides and the fast flowing rivers inthe deep valleys. These mountains are at theirmaximum heights at the north-east end of thefrontier, where they rise to heights of ten totwelve thousand feet and more. Their heightgradually declines as the ranges run south-wards, though in the Naga and Chin Hills thereare many peaks of 9,000 feet, until they reachthe lesser ranges in Arakan where the maxi-mum heights are seldom over 2,000 feet. Themain spine, however, of this range continuessouthwards, parallel to the coast, towards themouth of the Irrawaddy and finally disappearsjust north of the town of Bassein. Throughoutthese ranges the hillsides are for the most partcovered with jungle so dense that it is notpossible to move without cutting paths. Inthe whole length of this mountain system thereare only three roads, none of them of goodquality, over which wheels can pass. Theseare the Ledo—Myitkyina road, the Dimapur—Imphal—Tamu road and the Taungup—Promeroad, none of which has been completed to astandard which will carry heavy traffic all theyear round.

5. East and south of this great mountainsystem lies the main river basin of theIrrawaddy with its principal tributary theChindwin to the west and almost parallel to ituntil it joins the Irrawaddy at Myingyan. TheIrrawaddy forms a delta which begins justnorth of Henzada, but the main mouth reachesthe sea just south of Rangoon. The Irrawaddyis navigable by various craft, according to thetime of the year, as far north as Myitkyina;and the Chindwin can be navigated up toTamanthi. These two great rivers provide,therefore, first class lines of communicationthroughout the year. The valley of theIrrawaddy and other tributary valleys provideaccess for a system of railways which, starting

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1351

at Rangoon, pass through Mandalay toMyitkyina. There are various branches suchas that from Rangoon to Prome and fromSagaing to Ye-U. The road system in Burmais reasonably good, especially from Ye-Usouthwards. Communications, therefore, inBurma, may be said to be adequate for themaintenance and movement of large forces. Itis clear, therefore, that it should always bepossible for the Japanese with these communi-cations to concentrate superior forces to meetany advance by us over the three indifferentroads over the mountains.

6. In Arakan the " chaungs " (or waterways)with which the coastal strip is intersected arealmost as great an obstacle as the hills and thejungle. In dry weather they can be fordedby infantry at low water, but at other timesa six-foot tide makes them difficult to cross. Inthe rains of the South-West monsoon they areswollen by flood water which makes themgreater obstacles. The banks are usually muddyand crumbling. Bridging presents considerabledifficulties and special arrangements have to bemade at each for the passage of tanks andmechanical transport.

7. There are other difficulties also for ourforces operating southwards in Arakan. Thetwo main rivers, the Mayu and the Kaladan,with their tributaries, converge on the mainJapanese base at Akyab. By his command ofthe entrance to these two waterways, theenemy was able to make use of excellent watercommunications which were denied to us.

Climatic Conditions.8. The climate of Burma is affected by the

two monsoons, the North-East in the winterand the South-West in the summer. The in-fluence of .the former produces fine dry weatherwith little cloud and conditions are good foroperations both on land and in the air. TheSouth-West monsoon on 'the other hand, blow-ing as it does across the Bay of Bengal, isheavily charged with moisture which it dis-charges over Burma and Eastern Bengal duringthe months of May to October. Precipitationof rain, especially on the Arakan coast, isextremely 'high, reaching in places as much as200 inches. The climate varies too, accordingto -the altitude, the temperatures above 3,000feet being reasonably low and above 5,000 feetcool and invigorating. In the lowlands alongthe coast, the temperatures are high, with ahigh humidity which makes campaigning inthose areas exhausting.

9. Malaria is endemic throughout thecountry below 3,000 feet but it is worse in someareas than others; for instance, the KabawValley is reputed to be one of the worstmalarial valleys in the world. There are twoseasonal increases in the rate of infection, oneat the beginning of the monsoon in May, andthe other at the end of the monsoon in Octoberand November. Much has been done to re-duce the casualties from malaria during thepast two years and the ineffective rate amongstall troops has fallen very considerably. Thisis due to much improved personal discipline,efficient draining of bad areas on the lines ofcommunication, training and various medicalprophylactic measures which have been intro-duced. In such a climate there are other

A2

diseases which are products of the conditions ;dysentry, the worst effects of which have beenreduced by discipline .and good hygienemeasures, skin diseases of various types,especially during the rainy season, and scrubtyphus which is endemic in various areas.

10. While the South-West monsoon has abad effect upon the health of troops andcauses them also acute discomfort from wet, itsreally worst effect is upon the communicationsin the country. The heavy rain turns Arakan,.a rice growing area, into a muddy swamp quiteimpassable to wheeled vehicles unless the roadshave proper foundations and surfaces capableof withstanding heavy rain. In Assam andBurma there is very b'ttle stone, most of thehills, which are clothed in forest or bamboo,being composed of a soft shale quite uselessfor road making. The making of roads is,therefore, very difficult as; they have to bebuilt to a high standard in order to stand upto the torrential rains which fall between Mayand October. The heavy rains also make theordinary native tracks very nearly impassableas they get so slippery on the steep hillsidesthat neither man nor beast can stand up onthem. Finally, as can be imagined, these heavyrains make the rivers and streams into veryformidable obstacles, all of which have to bebridged to allow the passage of troops andtransport.

Indeed, campaigning in the monsoon inBurma may be said to be one of the mostarduous operations anywhere in the worldtoday.

The Japanese Soldier.11. The Japanese soldier is fanatically brave

when ordered to succeed or die, yet he is liableto panic when surprised or in doubt. His plan-ning is bold yet he is at a loss if plans gowrong. Although most secretive and careful,he will go into action carrying diaries and mili-tary papers. He takes infinite pains to concealhis positions and then nullifies the result bytalking in them at night. An expert in theuse of ground and in silent movement, yethis patrol work is frequently bad. Althoughbold at infiltrating into, and then rushing aposition from an unexpected direction, he be-comes easily nonplussed by determined resist-ance. He is good at laying fixed lines of fireand skilful in the use of snipers, yet he is abad shot,

12. Our successes in the fighting have, inno small measure, been due to the fact that wehave taken full advantage of the enemy's weakpoints. The results have been gratifying, notonly tactically, but also psychologically: signsare not lacking that the blind obedience, fana-tical courage and determination to die ratherthan surrender, which the Japanese soldier hashitherto displayed, may not withstand the con-tinuous reverses which he is now sufferingand will suffer in the future. That this facthas been recognised by the Japanese HighCommand, and is causing some misgiving, hasbeen seen in captured orders.

This must not be taken to mean, however,that the Japanese soldier now surrenders easily.His whole up-bringing and outlook make himregard capture as the worst disgrace. Conse-


quently, even when cornered, he not only sellshis life dearly, but will frequently commitsuicide rather than surrender. The mopping-up of captured enemy positions is, therefore,a slow process, as every Japanese officer andman has usually to be ferreted out and killed.Since the crushing defeat inflicted on theenemy in the Imphal battle, and the failureof his lines of communication, there havebeen a few surrenders of unwounded men,but they are still rare.

13. To sum up, I would say that, althoughhis discipline and training are good, theJapanese soldier has shown himself lacking ininitiative and self-reliance when his leadershave been killed and he is faced with the un-expected. The very fact that surrender hasnow made its appearance, though on a verysmall scale, in an army where such a thing wasundreamt of, is not without significance.

The Outlook in November, 1943.14. Strategically, Burma is important for

three reasons: —(a) The only way in which we can, either

now or in the immediate future, send helpto China is through or over Burma.

(b) Burma is the principal area in whichwe can contain and destroy considerableJapanese forces.

(c) In our hands Burma provides a step-ping stone for operations further east orsouth. In Japanese hands it is a base foroperations against the eastern frontier ofIndia.

15. As a result of decisions reached at theQuebec Conference, the Chiefs of Staff directedthe Supreme Allied Commander to undertakeoperations in Burma with two objects: —

(a) The security and improvement of theair ferry route to China and the establish-ment of land communications with China.

(b) The close and continuous engagementof Japanese land and air forces, so as tocause attrition and diversion from the PacificTheatre.

To execute these orders meant, of course,offensive operations whenever and whereverpossible; but it was obvious that the mainoperations to secure Northern Burma, withoutwhich complete security of the China air routecould not be ensured, would have to belaunched from Imphal, Yunnan and Ledo.

16. As our resources were limited, it wasessential to decide on the southern limits ofsuch an offensive. Examination showed thatonly the capture of the Shwebo—Mandalayarea would fulfil the instructions of the Chiefsof Staff but this was beyond our resources,either in troops or transport aircraft. Plans ofa less ambitious nature which would obey thespirit of the instructions to the Supreme AlliedCommander had, therefore, to be considered.

17. The plan generally approved at Quebec•was:—

(a) The capture by Long-Range Penetra-tion Forces of the Katha—Indaw area whichwould be then held by a division, flown inor moved overland across the Chindwin withlight equipment.

(b) The capture of Mogaung—Myitkyinaby Chinese-American forces from Ledo withpossible exploitation southwards.

(c) An advance on Bhamo—Lashio byChinese forces from Yunnan.The plan which I had thought gave the best

chance of success was made in September 1943,when the Commander-in-Chief, India, was stillin command of the operations and I wasG.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Army. This plan aimedat forcing a crossing of the Chindwin on theImphal Front, and the introduction with theaid of airborne troops of a force of all arms,including tanks and medium artillery, into theCentral Burma plain in the Ye-U area. A de-tailed examination of the many problems whichsuch a plan created, among them the capacityof the Assam lines of communication, and thedelays in the concentration programme causedby the breaching of the main railway line toCalcutta from the west by the Damodar River,showed that the launching of such an offensivebefore early March was not possible.

This plan was submitted to the British Chiefsof Staff, who preferred an airborne operationagainst Katha—Indaw 'because there would becloser support and co-operation with Chineseforces advancing south from Ledo and acrossthe Salween. This plan, approved at the Cairoconference in November 1943, had eventuallyto be abandoned as the necessary transport air-craft were not forthcoming. It becamenecessary, therefore, to make a less ambitiousplan.

18. It was not easy, within the means at ourdisposal, even partially to achieve the objectsgiven by the Chiefs of Staff. After severalalternatives had been examined and rejected,I submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander,in December, the following plan.

(a) An advance down the Kabaw Valleytowards Kalewa—Kalemyo; the construc-tion of an all-weather road, via Tamu, as faras possible towards Yuwa and Kalewa on theChindwin.

(ft) The use (initially) of three Long-RangePenetration Brigades in the Katha—Indawarea.The objects I had in mind were:—

(i) To achieve a greater, though not com-plete measure of security for the China airroute, by forcing the enemy further south.

(ii) To obtain greater freedom of actionfor offensive operations in 1944-45, whenmore resources might be expected.

(iii) To destroy the maximum possiblenumber of Japanese land and air forces.

(iv) To gain some control of Upper Burmaby the employment, in conjunction with ourmam forces and those of the Chinese Armyin India (C.A.I.), of Long-Range Penetra-tion Troops to confuse the enemy and inflictcasualties.

19. This plan was approved by the SupremeAllied Commander and was referred by him tothe Chiefs of Staff early in December. Itdepended for success not only on overcomingstrong enemy defences in the Tiddim area, butalso on progress in road construction. At theend of January, the Chiefs of Staff were toldthat we did not anticipate reaching the Kalewa—Kalemyo area before the monsoon. Actuallythe all-weather road of a two-way standard


had only reached a point ten miles south ofPalel, though it was all-weather one-way fora good many miles south of that point, whenthe enemy launched their March offensive.

20. Concurrently with planning for opera-tions on the Imphal Front, planning for opera-tions in Arakan was, of course, in progress.Several plans, which included amphibiousoperations against Akyab in conjunction withan advance down the Mayu Peninsula, wereexamined, but all were eventually abandonedeither for lack of resources or for other reasons,and I was thrown back on a plan for an ad-vance with the limited objective of the Maung-daw—Buthidaung road, and the mouth of theNaf River. Once the latter was captured,supplies could be brought in by sea, not onlyto Maungdaw but also to Teknaf.

21. Other plans for amphibious operations,among them one for the capture of theAndamans, were also examined, but all werein the end rejected as the resources for themwere needed for more important operationsin other theatres of war.

I was finally compelled, therefore, to limitthe operations of the Army to a short advancein Arakan and advances down the Tiddim roadand Kabaw Valley with the object of captur-ing the Kalewa—Kalemyo area.

PART n—OPERATIONS.Operations by 15 Indian Corps in Arakan.

22. In November, 1943, we were in contactwith the Japanese in Arakan, the Imphal Frontand in North Burma (N.C.A.C.).

The situation in Arakan at the end of themonsoon of 1943, was that we held positionscovering Cox's Bazaar with 26 Indian Divisionon the general line Teknaf—Taung Bazaar,while the enemy held the Maungdaw—Buthidaung road. The advance to close con-tact started in the middle of October.

23. Between October and the end ofDecember other changes were made in our dis-positions :—

(a) 26 Indian Division was relieved by 7and 5 Indian Divisions.

(b) 7 Indian Division moved across theMayu Range, complete with all its guns andlorries. A fair-weather road was built overthe Ngakyedauk Pass, which lies north-westof the village of that name, to provide thenecessary communications.

(c) 5 Indian Division took over thewestern sector of the front.

(d) Our rear areas were re-adjus'ted.(e) Finally we drove in the enemy's out-

post line.At the end of December, 5 Indian Division

held from the sea to the crest of the MayuRange, while 7 Indian Division, had movedover complete into the Kalapanzin Valley. Thestage was set for an attack on the main enemyposition.

24. Early in January, I issued an Opera-tional Instruction to the Commander,Fourteenth Army, Lieut-General W. J. Slim,directing him to secure the mouth of the NafRiver; Maungdaw—Buthidaung; and exploitsuccess to the maximum. These instructionswere based on an Operational Directive issued

by the Supreme Allied Commander. Myobjects were, first, to improve our generalsituation in Arakan, and, second, to containand destroy Japanese forces.

25. A period during which certain sub-sidiary operations were undertaken to secure.the necessary jumping-off places for our offen-sive then followed. The enemy defended thesepositions stubbornly.

On the 15th January, the dispositions ofthe forward elements of 15 Indian Corps(Lieut-General A. F. P. Christison), were asfollows:—

5 Indian Division: Maungdaw—MagyiChaung—Rehkat Chaung—Point 1619, witha brigade in reserve west of the MayuRange.

7 Indian Division: One brigade in thehills north and north-east of Htindaw. Onebrigade Tatmakhali to Sinohbyin, with for-ward troops on the Letwedet Chaung. Onebrigade Kyaukit massif—Pyinshe—Windwin,.with a detachment on the Saingdin Chaung.

81 (West African) Division: Daletme—Satpaung area, in the Kaladan Valley.

Tanks: One regiment, in support of 5Indian Division.

Medium Artillery: One battery in sup-port of each division.

26. The enemy had turned the area aboutthe Tunnels, through which the road runs inits passage through the highest portion of theMayu Range between Maungdaw andButhidaung, into a fortress with two strongbuttresses—Razabil on the west and Letwedeton the east.

The general plan of attack was framed tocapture these two buttresses in turn and sur-round the garrison of the Tunnels fortress.5 Indian Division was to take Razabil and7 Indian Division Buthidaung, thus cutting inbehind the Letwedet buttress. 81 (WestAfrican) Division was to advance down theKaladan River to capture Kyauktaw, withthe ultimate object of cutting the Kanzauk—Htizwe road, which was the enemy's mainlateral line of communication between theKaladan and Kalapanzin Valleys.

27. The main offensive was launched on the19th January, and, despite strong opposition,our preliminary operations against the enemy'soutposts were very successful. The originalplan had included a sea landing by 2 BritishDivision further south down the Mayu Penin-sula. As we did not wish to drive the Japaneseinto the toe of the Peninsula until 2 BritishDivision had effected a firm lodgement, ourattack on the main enemy positions was de-ferred to synchronize with the sea landing, thedate of which could not be put forward as itwas governed by the state of the tide andmoon. Unfortunately, the craft required forthe amphibious operation were taken awayand, therefore, this "right hook" had to becancelled. Thus our land offensive had beenheld up to no purpose. By the 4th February,however, the attack on Razabil had achieveda measure of success, but the main positionstill held out. Progress elsewhere had beensteady, but slow.

28. It was at this moment that the enemylaunched his counter-attack and our offensive


iad to be delayed until the enemy attack had•been defeated. This took some four weeks,but when it was finished the attack on ouroriginal objectives was continued.

29. This Japanese counter-attack meritsattention, both on, account of the boldness ofits conception and also on account of the firmstand made by 7 Indian Division which wassurrounded and attacked from all sides. TheDivision was supplied by air and thus didnot -have to uetire when its lines of com-munication were cut. This was the main causeof the defeat of the Japanese counter-attack.

30. In the last week of January, identifica-tion of a fresh enemy regiment was obtained.On the 1st February, documents ordering theJ.I.Fs. (Indians fighting for the Japanese) toconcentrate east of the Mayu Range at once foran operation were captured. I was in Four-teenth Army area at that time and discussedthe position with the Army Commander. Weconcluded that these moves indicated acounter-attack by the Japanese, but were un-able to decide upon the exact form it waslikely to take, though it seemed probable thatan attempt to outflank 15 Indian Corps wasthe most probable. We agreed that if 5 and 7Indian Divisions held their positions against afrontal attack, while at the same time pre-paring an all-round defence to meet attacksfrom the flank or rear, it would be possible todestroy any Japanese outflanking detachmentwith the reserves. I placed 36 British Division,which had arrived at Chittagong for anotheroperation, at General Slim's disposal and heordered one brigade of this Division, togetherwith 26 Indian Division, which was in Four-teenth Army reserve in the Comilla area, tomove south at once. He ordered all forma-tions in the forward areas to hold their ground.He made arrangements for the packing for airtransport of three days' rations, ammunitionand medical stores and with the R.A.F. fortheir delivery by air to 7 Indian Division, ifcalled for. These preparations had a far-reaching effect on the battle.

31. When the enemy's blow actually fell onthe 4th February, it so happened that prepara-tions for transferring our offensive from thewest to the east of the Mayu Range were inprogress. One infantry brigade of 5 IndianDivision had moved over to the east of therange to free one brigade of 7 Indian Divisionfor this operation; thus 15 Indian Corps hadavailable at that time a reserve infantry brigadeand a tank regiment east of the range, whichwas the flank menaced by the Japanese threat.

32. The Japanese plan, captured early inthe battle, was to pass through and round theleft flank of 7 Indian Division, take TaungBazaar from the east, and cut the BawliBazaar—Razabil road. This move completed,the Japanese intended to attack 7 IndianDivision from the rear and drive it through theNgakyedauk Pass. This would isolate 5 IndianDivision which would in turn be mopped upand the remnants driven over the Naf River.-So certain were they of success, that the Tokyoradio announced victories at the appropriatetimes, according to their pre-arranged time-table, regardless that this time-table bore norelation to the facts.

33. The attack against 7 Indian Division beganwith the appearance in rear of its left flank

at Taung Bazaar of an enemy regiment, withelements from two others, which had passedpartly round our left flank through the jungleand partly through the positions held by 114Brigade. Almost simultaneously, strong fron-tal attacks were made by two regiments in thearea north and north-west of Buthidaung. Abrigade of 7 Indian Division, which had beenrelieved by 5 Indian Division, but had not yetbeen committed to their new task, was sentnorth to check the enemy advance south-wards from Taung Bazaar. In this it partiallysucceeded, but, owing to the closeness of thecountry and the enemy's numerical superiority,was outflanked by a party of the enemy whichoverran the Headquarters of 7 Indian Divisionin the early morning. The Divisional Com-mander, however, regained control of theoperations that evening. Brigades and divi-sional troops had been ordered to preparepositions capable of all round defence as soonas the enemy's presence in Taung Bazaar hadbeen discovered. 9, 33 and 114 Brigades,therefore, dug in on their positions, whileanother defended area which contained Divi-sional H.Q., part of 89 Brigade and DivisionalTroops was hastily .prepared in the area ofAwlanbyin and Sinzweya. These areas werecalled " boxes " during the battle.

34. The enemy cut the Ngakyedauk Passand closely invested these boxes. OneJapanese battalion also crossed by theMaunghnama Pass further north and 'beganto harass 15 Indian Corps Headquarters andthe rear of 5 Indian. Division from a positionin the hills on the east of the road. But theymade no further headway, although on the 9thFebruary the situation in 7 Indian Division'sdefended area {Sinzweya) was difficult and con-tinued so for several days. 26 Indian Division,which had been moved up to Bawli Bazaarby 15 Indian Corps, now began to make itspresence felt, but it was evident that its opera-tions, in conjunction with those of 5 IndianDivision from the west to clear the Ngakye-dauk Pass, would take tune.

35. Supply dropping to the various boxesbegan on the 9th February, and an airstrip forthe evacuation of casualties was ready by the12th at Taung Bazaar, which had by thenbeen cleared of the enemy.

36. In spite of continuous attacks, supportedby the fire of 150-mm guns and by fighterbombers, the enemy were unable to reduce anyof our strongholds. On the 12th the Com-mander, 7 Indian Division issued orders to takethe offensive to prevent any further hostileinfiltration and the escape of any enemyalready in his rear. The enemy was now " inthe bag" and it was the task of 7 IndianDivision to keep him there until destroyed.

37. Severe fighting continued with theJapanese trying to stem the advance of 26 and5 Indian Divisions and overcome what theirorders described as "the hysterical defence"of the areas of 7 Indian Division. Hystericalor not, it may one day be called historical asit was the first successful f^ply to Japaneselarge-scale infiltration tactics in jungle country.The bitterness of the fighting is illustrated bythe remark made by a veteran of Dunkirk,who spent two days on the beaches ; he statedhe would willingly have spent a fortnight atDunkirk if he could have been let off withtwo days in 7 Indian Divisional defended area.


38. On the 16th February, 36 British Divi-sion began to relieve 26 Indian Division toenable it to concentrate east of the MayuRange.

39. By the 20th February, the shortage offood and ammunition, severe casualties andlack of any tactical success began to have theireffect upon the Japanese forces, and theybegan to try to escape, at first in dribletsand then in larger parties. Many of themfailed to run the gauntlet and were wiped out.By the 24th February the Ngakyedauk Passhad been re-opened and the Japanese offen-sive, heralded as the beginning of the marchon Delhi, had been defeated.

40. It is convenient at this stage to examinethe enemy's plan and analyse the cause of itsfailure.

The Japanese have always supported thedoctrine that the best defence is the attack.They proved it to their satisfaction inArakan in the Spring of 1943 and they confi-dently expected to prove it again in 1944. Theirattacks have usually taken the form of anenveloping movement combined with infiltra-tion and frontal attacks.

These tactics achieved success in 1943, partlyowing to the lack of training of our forces andpartly owing to the fact that it was not pos-sible, for lack of supplies, for forward troopsto hold out when their lines of communica-tion were cut.

41. The Japanese plan was bold, typical oftheir readiness to take risks, and its executionwent smoothly for the first thirty-six hours.It then began to fail, at first slowly but withincreasing momentum until disaster overtookit. The main reasons for this failure were: —

(a) The Japanese conviction that weshould retire if our rear was threatened, aswe had done in 1943. His whole plan wasbased on this assumption. A captured direc-tive, by the Commander of 55 DivisionalInfantry Group, ended with this significantphrase: —" As they have previously suffereddefeat, should a portion of the enemy waverthe whole of them will at once get confusedand victory is thus certain ".

(£>) The fine fighting spirit of all rankswho, in this the first large encounter withthe Japanese this year, showed theirsuperiority in jungle-fighting when welltrained and adequately equipped.

(c) The ability to supply forward troopsby air.Contributory factors to its failure were our

successful use of tanks over ground much ofwhich was regarded as " untankable ", the useof medium artillery, and our continual harass-ing from the air of the enemy's water-borneand road communications. The Japaneseunder-estimation of their enemy and their con-viction that they would capture large quantitiesof supplies in the first few days, led them toneglect their arrangements for the supply offood and ammunition and their troops carriedonly five days' food. We defeated all theirattempts to bring food or ammunition forward.In consequence, their troops soon began tosuffer from hunger and starvation and short-age of ammunition. Their casualties amountedto 4,500 killed and wounded out of a total of7,000 men.

The basic reason for our victory was, how-ever, the refusal of our troops, or any portionof them, to waver, and their unflinchingcourage in exceptionally trying circumstances.

42. Mopping up in the thick mountainousjungle was a difficult and necessarily slowoperation, and it was not until the 5th Marchthat we were able to resume the interruptedcourse of our offensive. Razabil was capturedby 5 Indian Division on the 12th March. Itwas found to be a position of great strength,complete with underground rooms, etc. TheTunnels position was surrounded by the 19thMarch, and was finally captured by 36 BritishDivision some days later. Meanwhile, 7Indian Division had taken Buthidaung andhad also captured the outer ring of the Kyaukitdefences. These defences were evacuated bythe enemy on the 23rd March and considerableequipment fell into our hands. On the 25th,about 500 enemy again infiltrated to theNgakyedauk area, but were dealt with expedi-tiously.

43. At the end of March, 25 Indian Divisionbegan to take over from 5 Indian Division andthe latter was transferred 'by air to 4 Corps'front.

44. Fighting to improve our positions con-tinued throughout April against strong opposi-tion. As a result of successful actions by 26Indian Division in the Buthidaung area in thefirst week in May, we withdrew from Buthi-daung, as planned, to positions more suitablefor the monsoon; forward brigades of 15Indian Corps taking up positions on thegeneral line Godusara—Tunnels Area—TaungBazaar.

45. 36 British Division was withdrawn toShUlong in Assam to rest and refit, with a viewto its being transferred to General StilwelTscommand in North Burma at a later date. 7Indian Division, two brigades moving by air,also left Arakan in April for 4 Corps' front.

By the end of May, therefore, we wereholding Arakan with 15 Indian Corps, com-prising three divisions. Our monsoon disposi-tions being: —

25 Indian Division: In the Tunnels Area,covering the Maungdaw—Buthidaung road,up to and including, the East Tunnel.

26 Indian Division: One brigade in theBawli—Goppe—Taung Bazaars area. Onebrigade at Taungbro and the third at Cox'sBazaar.

81 (West African) Division: Concentratingat Chiringa.We also had detachments on the Sangu

River as flank protection against a smallJapanese force which had infiltrated into thatarea.

46. The term " monsoon dispositions " doesnot imply static defence. We occupied positionsof our own choice, selected for their strengthand to preserve tEe health of our troops byavoiding the worst malarial areas. Thenecessity, during the monsoon in Arakan, toevacuate certain flooded districts and take uppositions which are defensively strong andaccessible for supplies, did not mean that everyopportunity for local offensive action was nottaken.


Results of the Arakan Campaign.47. As already mentioned (paragraph 24),

the objects of the Arakan campaign were toimprove our general situation and engage anddestroy Japanese forces. Our success had ledme to hope that we could clear the whole ofthe Mayu Peninsula, but the need for providingreinforcements (5 and 7 Indian Divisions) forthe Imphal Front frustrated this.

Although this further advance was notpossible, the objects of the campaign had beengenerally achieved. Maungdaw had beenfirmly established as a base ; the Mayu Range,including the important Tunnels area, togetherwith the eastern foothills, was firmly in ourhands ; and the lateral road was in daily use.

55 Japanese Division, despite reinforcements,had been outfought and was weak and tired.In spite of the reduction in the strength of 15Indian Corps by three divisions (the 5th, 7thand 36th), operations after their withdrawalwent according to plan. To sum up, the Japan-ese offensive, from which they confidently ex-pected great results, had been defeated, andwe had captured our objectives. Last, but notleast, we had established a moral ascendencyover the enemy which promised well for thefuture.Operations in the Kaladan Valley.

48. The Japanese threatened our left flankduring the previous year's operations by ad-vancing up the Kaladan River, and I was deter-mined that this should not happen again. 81(West African) Division was, in consequence,moved across into the Kaladan Valley to pro-tect the left flank of 15 Indian Corps.

Our ability to supply troops by air made itpossible for a division to operate down thisvalley, but the physical difficulties of movinginto the valley were great. A jeep track 73miles long had to be built from Chiringa toDaletme across four mountain ranges. It wasbegun on the 18th November and finished onthe 17th January—an engineering feat whichreflected the greatest credit on all ranks.

49. 81 (West African) Division concentratedin the Satpaung—Daletme area in January andstarted its move down the Kaladan at the endof that month. They captured Kyauktaw bythe 3rd March and were then advancing onApaukwa when a strong Japanese counter-attack developed from the south-east. The ad-vance had to be stopped in order to meet it.The enemy captured our position nearKyauktaw and the Division withdrew topositions south of Kaladan Village. There-after, it continued its r61e of flank protectionin the Paletwa area.

50. In April, this Division (less one battalionleft at Paletwa, where it was joined by twobattalions of Indian troops, one of which waswithdrawn later) was moved westwards acrossIthe Arakan Yomas to the east of theKalapanzin River, to provide closer protectionto the left flank of 15 Indian Corps. Subse-quently, it was withdrawn via Buthidaung—Taung Bazaar to the neighbourhood ofChiringa.

51. The battalion left in the Kaladan waslater reinforced by Headquarters 6 (WestAfrican) Brigade and another battalion. OneIndian battalion also remained in the area.The role of this force was to frustrate attempts

which the Japanese were making to in-filtrate across the hills into the Sangu Valley.It was later withdrawn into this valley and, inJune, was providing detachments along theSangu River, which were successful in drivingback, with considerable losses, small enemyforces which had penetrated this area.

The Chin Hills.52. The link between Arakan and the Imphal

Front is the Chin Hills; the strategic import-ance of which lies in the fact that it coversthe approaches to Chittagong and Aijal, viaLungleh. It also flanks the Japanese lines ofcommunication through Gangaw to Kalemyo.

53. The Chin Hills and the Lushai Hillslying west of them, were garrisoned by twodetachments of Levies, each with a stiffeningof one regular battalion; Headquarters beingat Aijal. The role of these detachments wasto interrupt the enemy's communications andto hamper his movements in the area Aijal—Champai—Falam—Haka. Early in November1943, however, just before the assumption ofcommand by Admiral The Lord Louis Mount-batten, the enemy advancing in some strength,had, though they suffered severe casualties higaining these minor successes, driven ourIrregulars out of Falam and Haka and causedour regular troops to withdraw from FortWhite.

54. Early in April, another battalion wasadded to the Chin Hills detachment, which thenbecame the Lushai Brigade. This force hasperformed its task very satisfactorily, layingambushes, obtaining information, and inflictingconsiderable losses. It was reinforced by anadditional battalion in June, and ordered tointerfere with the Japanese communicationsalong the Imphal—Tiddim road.

The Chindwin.55. 4 Corps (Lieut-General G. A. P. Scoones),

with Headquarters at Imphal, had been respon-sible for the defence of the Indian frontier eastand south of Manipur since 1942. The areafor which the Corps was responsible extendedfrom its boundary with Northern Combat AreaCommand (N.C.A.C.) on the line Mawlu—Taro—Wakening (40 miles east of Jorhat)down to and inclusive of the Chin Hills. InNovember 1943, 23 Indian Division had itsHeadquarters at Tamu, and 17 Indian LightDivision with its Headquarters was on theImphal—Tiddim road at Milestone 102. 20Indian Division, with its Headquarters atShenam, about 10 miles south-east of Palel,was engaged in patrolling across the Chindwin.At the end of December the whole of this Divi-sion had been concentrated in the Tamu area,its Headquarters having moved forward toSibong. This Division relieved 23 Indian Divi-sion which was withdrawn from the ImphalPlain for rest and 'training ; having been in theforward area without relief since June 1942.

56. The task which I had allotted FourteenthArmy on this sector of the front was to carryout offensive operations with the objects of:—

(a) Clearing the Chin Hills as far as thefoothills south-east of Tiddim.

(b) Dominating the area between the Yuand Chindwin Rivers, south of the Tamu—Sittaung road.


(c) Containing and killing Japanese in theKabaw Valley and Atwin Yomas.

(d) Pushing forces across the Chindwin,if the Long-Range Penetration Brigadescreated a favourable situation.

57. On the 13th January, patrols reportedconsiderable enemy activity east of the Chind-win, between Sittaung and Paungbyin, and alsoeast of Homalin, .some forty miles further upthe river. This information, which supple-mented previous air reconnaissance reports, in-dicated that the enemy might be preparing foran offensive.

58. On the 17th January, we attacked enemypositions at Kyaukchaw, eighteeen miles south-east of Tamu in the Atwin Yomas, and therewere other small operations in the same areaduring the month.

59. Throughout January and February, 17Indian Light Division was continually engagedwith the enemy in the Tiddim area; attackand counter-attack following each other inquick succession.

The Japanese Offensive against Imphal andKohima.

60. During February, it became steadily moreevident that the Japanese were preparing foran offensive across the Chindwin and from thearea about Fort White against 17 Indian LightDivision. The general situation remained un-changed until the 8th March, when the antici-pated Japanese offensive was launched. Thisbegan with two main advances, one up thewest bank of -the Manipur River, the othernorthwards up the Kabaw Valley, from whichJapanese columns moved westwards to cut theImphal—Tiddim road. It was also apparent,from the enemy's dispositions, that he wouldprobably launch an offensive farther northfrom the Thaungdut—Homalin area againstTamu, Ukhrul and Kohima.

61. Our dispositions at the beginning ofMarch were:—

50 Indian Parachute Brigade: Kohima.This Brigade (less one battalion) had beenflown in from India as a reinforcement to4 Corps early in March.

23 Indian Division: One brigade in theUkhrul area ; the remainder south and south-east of Imphal.

20 Indian Division: On the Tamu roadand in the Kabaw Valley.

17 Indian Light Division (two brigadesonly): Tiddim area.

62. On the 7th March, I had sent an instruc-tion to the Commander, Fourteenth Army, ofwhich the following were the main points:—

(a) A warning that the impendingJapanese offensive against 4 Corps' areawould probably be on a considerably largerscale than anything the enemy had yetattempted in Burma.

(6) An indication of the tactical difficultiesof the situation, due to the fundamentalweakness of our line of communicationbeing parallel to the enemy's front alongthe Chindwin River.

(c) The strategical importance of theImphal Plain: (i) as a base for the main-tenance and operation of our air and land

forces, and (ii) its value to the Japanese asa base for attacks against the 'Surma Valleyin Eastern Bengal and our Assam lines ofcommunication. Attacks against Bengalwould have an adverse and widespread moraleffect; while interruption of the Assam linesof communication would seriously jeopard-ise both the Sino-American operations basedon Ledo and the air ferry route to China.I pointed out that the enemy's effort with-out control of the Imphal Plain, would prob-ably have to be confined to raids, owingto the indifferent communications and thepaucity of food supplies in the hill tracts.

(d) The security of the Imphal Plain washis primary task.

(e) A confirmation of the authority I hadrecently given General Slim verbally thathe might, if necessary, give ground in theChin Hills and the Kabaw Valley. In thisevent, I stated he would be justified in usingLong-Range Penetration forces to operateboldly against the enemy's flanks and com-munications.

(/) I stated that,. apart from 25 IndianDivision, Long-Range Penetration Brigades,and 50 Indian Parachute Brigade, immediatereinforcements for 4 Corps must come fromFourteenth Army sources, and that, there-fore, preparations should be made for thequickest possible moves of troops to rein-force 4 Corps, although this might (i) limitthe depth of our advance in Arakan, (ii)cause troops to be retained in Arakan longerthan desirable and (iii) interfere with in-tended reliefs. 77 and 111 Long-RangePenetration Brigades were already in theFourteenth Army area; 16 Long-RangePenetration Brigade was marching into NorthBurma, 14 and 23 LongiRange Penetration^Brigades, and 3 (West African) Long-RangePenetration Brigade, were about to moveinto Fourteenth Army's area from India.I promised to investigate whether the pro-jected moves of 14 and 23 Long-RangePenetration Brigades could be accelerated.63. The relative dispositions of our own

troops and those of the enemy and the topo-graphy of the country all combined to facilitateinfiltration, which is the basis of Japanesetactics in fighting in close country. GeneralSlim, therefore, decided very rightly, that toleave 17 Indian Light Division at Tiddim, and20 Indian Division east and south of Tamuwould not only give the Japanese excellentopportunities of cutting off these two Divisions,but would imperil the defence of the ImphalPlain which was his primary task.

He also appreciated that, if he could engagethe Japanese forces in the neighbourhood ofthe Imphal Plain, he would impose upon themall the difficulties and disadvantages of a longline of communication over difficult countryand preserve to himself the advantages of ashort line of communication.

64. The G.O.C-in-C. 4 Corps gave instruc-tions to Commander, 17 Indian Light Division,that he was to withdraw if his line of com-munication was seriously threatened. TheCommander, 17 Indian Light Division, not find-ing himself unduly pressed frontally, and notrealising the extent to which the enemy wereinfiltrating behind him, postponed his retire-ment somewhat too long. 17 Indian Light


Division, therefore, became so closely involvedthat the Commander, 4 Corps had to makeuse of the greater portion of 23 Indian Divi-sion, his only reserve, to assist in extricatingit. This had serious results as the forces de-fending Ukhrul were so reduced that the enemywas able to capture the place.

65. I had for many months been anxiousto increase the strength of 4 Corps by anotherdivision; but the low capacity of the line ofcommunication had prevented its maintenancein that area and I had to be content, therefore,with one extra brigade, 50 Indian ParachuteBrigade, which was brought in early in March.

66. With the start of the Japanese offensive,administrative risks had to be -taken andGeneral Slim decided to move 5 Indian Divi-sion from Arakan to the Jmphal—Kohimaarea. Its move by train and air began on the19th March. Divisional H.Q., 9 and 123Indian Infantry Brigades, were moved toImphal and 161 Indian Infantry Brigade wasmoved to Dimapur. The move was finished onthe 12th April.

The Army Commander also transferred 3Commando Brigade from Arakan to Silcharearly in April, with the rdle of operatingalong the track to Bishenpur.

Shortly after this, General Slim moved 7Indian Division from Arakan (two brigades byair and one by rail): one brigade joining 4Corps by the 18th April, whilst the Divisionless this brigade was allotted to 33 Corps,the Headquarters of which had been flownfrom India to the Dimapur area. 2 BritishDivision was moved by air and train fromBombay to Dimapur, the move being com-pleted between the 25th April and the 2ndMay. 33 Corps then comprised 2 British Divi-sion, 7 Indian Division (less one brigade), onebrigade of 5 Indian Division, 23 Long-RangePenetration Brigade, which had been broughtforward from India by that time, and theequivalent of a regiment of tanks. It was laterreinforced by a lorried infantry brigade.

67. The situation caused me some anxietyduring this time and I was very grateful forthe valuable assistance which was given meboth by the Cpmmander-in-Chief, India, andby General Stilwell. The former, with thatunfailing readiness to help which he has alwaysdisplayed, had put H.Q. 33 Corps, 2 BritishDivision, H.Q. 21 Indian Division (late H.Q.44 Indian Armoured Division), 268 IndianLorried Infantry Brigade, two regiment oftanks and other troops at my disposal. GeneralStilwell undertook the defence of aerodromesand communications in an area agreed on be-tween him and General Slim, deflecting Chinesetroops for this purpose.

68. 17 Indian Light Division pulled out ofTiddim on the 17th March and, after hardfighting, in which the enemy suffered heavylosses, succeeded in cutting its way through toImphal early in April. This Division in spiteof many difficulties had succeeded in bringingthrough most of its transport and vital stores,together with its wounded during the with-drawal up the Tiddim road. The Silchar—Bishenpur track was cut by the enemy'sadvance.

On the 15th March, 15 Japanese Divisioncrossed the Chindwin at Thaungdut and their31 Division at Homalin and Tamanthi. 20Indian Division was withdrawn to better posi-tions north-west of Tamu, astride the roadleading to Imphal.

A few days later, the enemy attacked 50Indian Parachute Brigade at Ukhrul in forceand after heavy fighting it was forced to with-draw fighting towards Imphal.

69. Early in April, we were forced to evacu-ate Kanglatongbi, astride the Dimapur road,about 15 miles north of Imphal, and thus lostthe use of our lines of communication betweenthe railhead at Dimapur and Imphal.

4 Corps Operations on the Imphal Front.70. The plan of the Commander, 4 Corps

on the 10th April was as follows:—(a) To prevent the enemy gaining access

to the Imphal Plain by either the Palel—Imphal or Tiddim—Imphal roads.

(6) To re-establish a force in the Ukhrularea and cut the enemy's line of communi-cation from the east.

(c) To use the largest possible forceoffensively against either 15 or 33 JapaneseDivisions in succession.

71. The successful withdrawal of 17 IndianLight Division and 20 Indian Division hi theface of heavy pressure has already been men-tioned. 20 Indian Division was now holdingpositions in depth along the Palel—Tamu road.The gallant delaying action of 50 Indian Para-chute Brigade near Ukhrul had proved mostuseful, as -it held up the Japanese advancedown the Ukhrul—Imphal road for severaldays and thus gave time for the recently arrived5 Indian Division to concentrate in this area.

20 Indian Division was now still furtherwithdrawn hi order to release troops for acounter-attack against the Japanese 15 Divi-sion, north-east of Imphal.

72. Determined enemy attempts againstImphal from the south and south-east con-tinued, but were successfully withstood by 20Indian Division. At the end of April, 23 IndianDivision on the right, 5 Indian Division flessone brigade) in the centre, and a brigade of17 Indian Light Division on the left wereadvancing north and north-east from Imphal,and had moved twenty-three miles up the trackrunning north-east to Ukhrul and ten milesup the mam road north to Kohima. (Imphalto Ukhrul is sixty-seven miles as the trackgoes and Imphal to Kohima is eighty-fourmiles.)

73. It was apparent from the enemy'sefforts that he considered the capture ofImphal to be essential before the monsoon setin. By the first week in May, however, hisadvance had not only been checked, but forcedback in all sectors, except in that of 20 IndianDivision. This division had had to giveground slightly in the face of heavy attacks bythe Japanese Yamamoto Fof£e, composed ofparts of 33 and 15 Japanese Divisions, up thePalel road.

74. Heavy fighting had been hi progress inthe area of Bishenpur, south-west of Imphal,for some time, and 33 Japanese Division hadbeen pressing strongly against 17 Indian Light


Division. It was decided that the situationmust be cleared up, as any further Japaneseadvance here would endanger not only Imphalitself but the neighbouring aerodromes uponwhich the air supply of 4 Corps entirely de-pended.

The Commander, 17 Indian Light Divisiondecided, therefore, to engage the enemy closelysouth of Bishenpur, and simultaneously tomake a flank movement with two battalionswest of the Imphal—Tiddim road. These batta-lion's cut the road behind the enemy positionswhich they then attacked from the rear. Thisattack, coming as it did simultaneously fromthe north and the south, took 33 JapaneseDivision by surprise and inflicted heavycasualties, though the nature of the country,lack of sufficient reserves and maintenancedifficulties prevented decisive results.

75. While these actions were in progress23 Indian Division had relieved 20 IndianDivision on the Palel—Tamu road, south-east of Imphal, and had thrown back con-tinuous enemy attacks. 20 Indian Divisionwas •transferred to the area east and north-east of Imphal, whence operating in twocolumns it continued the advance on Ukhrul.5 Indian Division made slow progress north-wards, astride the main road, and by the firstweek in June, had cleared the strong enemyposition at Kanglatongbi, fifteen miles northof Imphal. During the succeeding fortnight,this Division advanced slowly in the face ofstrong opposition in difficult country and undermost adverse weather conditions.Operations by 33 Corps in the Kohima Sector.

76. Early in April, my main preoccupationhad been the Japanese advance on Kohimawhich, if successful, would have threatened theAssam Railway, our main line communicationwith North-Eastern Assam, upon whichGeneral StilwelTs forces operating in NorthBurma and the air ferry route to China wereboth based.

77. When the scale of the Japanese offen-sive was disclosed and it was apparent thatthere was a threat to Kohima and that theroad to Imphal was likely to be cut, it wasclear that 4 Corps could no longer controloperations in this area in addition to those tothe south and north of Imphal. As a tempor-ary measure, therefore, Kohima was placedunder the Commander, 202 Line of Com-munication Area*, and an extemporised head-quarters was set up at Kohima under ColonelRichards f, who had formerly commanded aninfantry brigade in 81 (West African) Division.Headquarters 33 Corps was meanwhile flownto Jorhat from India and moved forward fromthere to Manipur Road, where it arrived on the8th April.

The Siege of Kohima.78. The strength of the Japanese advancing

on Kohima was originally estimated at threebattalions, with possibly one more in reserve,and the orders given to Colonel Richards wereto hold Kohima and to deny the area Jessami—Kharasom—Kohima to the enemy. It wasthought unlikely that the Japanese could movea force greater than this through the Naga

* Major-General R. P. L. Ranking, C.B., C.B.E.,M.C.

t Now Brigadier H. U. Richards, C.B.E., D.S.O.

Hills, whose tracks were narrow, steep andscarce.

On the 29th March, however, it had becomeevident that 31 Japanese Division was mov-ing against the Kohima area.

79. Jessami and Kharasom cover the tracksleading to Kohima and Tuphema, the latter ison the main road some fifteen miles due southof Kohima. The enemy attacked Kharasomon the 27th March and Jessami the next day.The garrisons of these two posts, found by1 Assam Regiment, put up a most spiriteddefence for several days and then made agallant fighting withdrawal, which gainedvaluable time for the preparation of the de-fences of Kohima.

80. 161 Brigade of 5 Indian Divisiori~~hadconcentrated at Manipur Road on the 30thMarch, and was sent to reinforce the Kohimagarrison, but it was withdrawn to meet a re-ported enemy threat further north whichmenaced the Dimapur base. As the enemyclosed in on Kohima, however, the Com-mander, 202 Line of Communication Area,sent back the 4th Battalion, The Queen'sOwn Royal West Kent Regiment of thatbrigade to assist in its defence, and it arrivedon the day on which the Japanese openedtheir attack. When it became apparent thatthe threat to Manipur Road from the east wasnot serious, and that, moreover, the enemywere making no attempt to cut the railway,although it would have been easy for themto do so by sending forward small demolitionparties by forest tracks, the remainder of 161Brigade less one battalion already in Kohimawas again ordered forward towards Kohima.It advanced into the hills to within four milesof Kohima on the west, but, being itself en-gaged, was unable to reach the garrison,although two companies actually succeeded infighting then- way in on the 18th and proveda welcome reinforcement in the bitter fightingwhich occurred on that date.

81. The Japanese launched their attack onKohima itself on the night 4th-5th April, usingtwo regiments (the equivalent of two of ourbrigade groups) and pressed it incessantly forfourteen days. It was gallantly held by thegarrison consisting of the 4th Battalion, TheQueen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, theAssam Regiment, the Shere Regiment of theMaharaja of Nepal's Troops and a number ofadministrative units and men collected fromthe convalescent camp.

82. Ammunition and food were adequate,but the water ration had to be reduced to half-a-pint a man for some days as the enemy gotastride the water pipeline on the 5th Apriland it was not till the 13th that a new sourceof water was fortunately discovered.

83. On the llth, the Air Force was askedto drop water and mortar ammunition.Boxes of three-inch mortar bombs weredropped, some of which were delivered hi errorto the enemy. When the Japanese used themagainst the garrison it was reported that theyhad started using a new and most effective typeof bomb.

84. On the 15th, and again on the 18th, theenemy made determined assaults, but wereejected from the footings they gained; theair support given to the defenders on these


dates by bombing and cannon fire provingmost helpful.

85. Kohima was relieved by 6 Brigade of 2British Division on the 20th April. ThisDivision had hard fighting before it was ableto break through the defences which the enemyheld astride the Dimapur—Kohima road andgain touch with the garrison which by thattime had been driven on to one small hillcalled Summer Hill in the centre of the area.

86. I have dealt with this comparativelysmall operation in some detail, not only injustice to a gallant defence, but because theholding of Kohima was of great importance,and its successful defence proved to be theturning point in the campaign.

The Relief of Imphal.87. H.Q. 33 Corps reached Dimapur on the

8th April. The general outline of the Com-mander's plan was as follows:—

(a) Cover the Manipur Road base.(6) Capture Kohima area as a starting

point for offensive operations.(c) Operate offensively on the general axis

of the Dimapur—Imphal road, as soon as theconcentration of his forces permitted.

88. The Japanese held the Kohima areain strength except for Summer Hill. Theirstrongpoints were nearly, although as it provednot quite, inaccessible to our tanks: butKohima was cleared of the enemy by the 2ndJune by 2 British and 7 Indian Divisions, aftersome weeks of severe hand-to-hand fighting inwhich the Japanese lost heavily. Our casual-ties were not light. By the 6th June, we hadcaptured the Aradura Spur, which covered theroad some two miles south of Kohima.

89. While these operations were in progress,columns of 23 Long-Range Penetration Brigadeof Special Force were clearing the countrynorth-east and east of Kohima, and movingsouthwards by the jungle tracks on Jessami.

90. The capture of Kohima and the clearingof the difficult and hilly country which liesimmediately to the east and south of it,marked the first step in our counter-offensive.The Japanese offensive against our base atManipur Road had been driven back with veryheavy losses to the enemy, and the threat toour road and rail communications in North-East Assam had been removed. There re-mained the urgent task of re-opening the roadto Imphal.

91. Our dispositions at this time were:—268 Indian Lorried Infantry Brigade (33

Corps)'. Holding Kohima.23 Long-Range Penetration Brigade :

Clearing Jessami area and moving south-wards parallel to the Kohima—Imphalroad.

2 British Division: Advancing south downthe Imphal road from Kohima in pursuit ofthe retreating enemy.

7 Indian Division: Less 89 Brigade (stillunder 4 Corps), but with 161 Brigade (5Indian Division) under command, operatingon the left flank of 2 British Division.

92. The advance south from the AraduraSpur entailed severe fighting and our progress,especially that of our tanks, was hindered by

minefields covered by Japanese artillery; but,by the 21st June, the leading elements of 2British Division had reached Milestone 102.As forward troops of 5 Indian Division from4 Corps at this time were in the vicinity ofMilestone 111, the gap between the two Corpshad been reduced to nine miles.

93. 7 Indian Division, which had beenoperating through very difficult country eastof the road, had naturally been unable to keeplevel with 2 British Division astride the road;but they had contributed greatly to its advanceby capturing several enemy positions on theJapanese lines of communication leading eastfrom the Imphal road, and had thus compelledthe enemy to retire.

23 Long-Range Penetration Brigade operat-ing further east, wide on the left flank of 7Indian Division, caused further interferencewith the enemy's communications by cuttingthe Kharasom—Ukhrul track and other tracksto the southward.

94. At about 1245 hours on the 22nd June,2 British and 5 Indian Divisions met at Mile-stone 109 from Dimapur (twenty-nine milesfrom Imphal) and the road to Imphal wasopen. 31 Japanese Division, which had beenallotted the task of capturing Kohima and thebase at Dimapur. had been severely defeated,and was shortly to meet with virtual annihila-tion.

95. I think the somewhat confused fightingmay be more easily followed if I here brieflysummarise the phases of the battle for theImphal Plain. The main stages were: —

(a) The fighting withdrawal of 17 IndianLight Division and 20 Indian Division.

(b) The Japanese attack on Kohima.(c) The rearguard action by 50 Indian

Parachute Brigade from Ukhrul, and themaking of a defensive position north-east ofImphal by 5 Indian Division.

(d) The further withdrawal by 20 IndianDivision to shortern the southern front andthus enable troops to be released for theattack on 15 Japanese Division north-east ofImphal.

(e) The transfer of effort to the south todeal with 33 Japanese Division, and thus toclear the threat to Imphal from that quarterbefore launching a major offensive north-wards, in co-ordination with the drive southby 33 Corps, to clear the Imphal—Kohimaroad.

(/) The operations to open the road, com-bined with the subsidiary operations tocapture Ukhrul, which was the vital pointon the lines of communication of 15 and31 Japanese Divisions.

96. The elimination of the threat to our linesof communication in North-East Assam andthe opening of the road from Kohima toImphal ended a definite phase of the campaign.31 Japanese Division had been so roughlyhandled that it had practically lost all fightingvalue. Similarly, the offensive value of theenemy's 15 and 33 Divisions had beengreatly reduced by the very heavy losses theyhad incurred. A conservative estimate of theenemy's casualties in killed alone amounted to13,500, which excluded losses by our air action.To this, of course, must be added their wounded


and the toll taken by disease, from which, ontheir own admission, they suffered severely.The total Japanese casualties on this front,after they crossed the Chindwin in March uptill the middle of June, may safely be put atnot less than 30,000. Against this, our ownlosses in killed, wounded and missing, from the4th March to the -17th June totalled 12,525,of whom only 2,669 were killed. We captureda large amount of equipment, including nearly100 guns.

97. The results achieved had been due to thedetermination and skill shown by all Com-manders hi surmounting difficulties and the finefighting spirit displayed by the troops who hadshown a marked superiority over the Japanese.4 Corps was entirely dependent on suppliesbrought in by air and in spite of the splendidwork of Air Transport Command, which ismentioned later in this Despatch, there wereoccasions when our stocks of ammunition randangerously low. Rations too had to be cutalthough the numbers of mouths to be fed hadbeen greatly reduced by the movement out ofImphal, by road, before the Japanese cut it,and subsequently by air, of every man whosepresence was unnecessary. In spite of thesehandicaps the spirit of 4 Corps remained ashigh as ever and officers and men foughtsplendidly throughout the long battle. This,coupled with the determination and vigour dis-played by 33 Corps, led, in the words of theSupreme Allied Commander, to the JapaneseArmy suffering a defeat greater than everbefore in its history.

Fort Hertz.98. This isolated outpost, in the extreme

north of Burma, was originally occupied by asmall detachment in September 1942, in orderto protect the landing ground and to raise andsupport Kachin Levies to operate towardsMyitkyina. These Levies have carried outmany very successful operations and, indeed, atone time, became such a thorn in the side ofthe enemy that the Japanese made a directthreat against Fort Hertz. To counter this,the 4th Battalion, The Burma Regiment wasflown there from India at the end of November1943.

99. In November 1943, the Americans agreedto maintain the Fort Hertz garrison by ah", asthere was no road link with India. Commandof this detachment was transferred to GeneralStilwell in February 1944.

100. These troops, including the Levies, aftermany skirmishes, subsequently made a steadyadvance down the Mali Hka Valley (which con-stitutes the headwaters of the Irrawaddy), inconjunction with General StilwelTs forcesmoving south from Ledo. They did most use-ful work, inflicting many casualties on smallenemy parties, and by the 19th March they hadoccupied Sumprabumv From the beginning ofJune they co-operated with the Chinese-American troops in the Myitkyina area.

Northern Burma-Ledo-Myitkyina.101. The role allotted to the Chinese troops

which were under -the command of GeneralStilwell in India, in January, was to advanceon Mogaung and Myitkyina with the objectof covering the construction of an overland

route to China via Ledo and Myitkyina and ofsecuring the air route from Assam to China.

This force, known originally as the ChineseArmy in India (C.A.I.), which had been trainedwith the help of American officers andequipped with American material, comprisedinitially 22 and 38 Chinese Divisions, and wasjoined later by 30 Chinese Division. Thesethree divisions were subsequently -reinforcedby 50 and 14 Chinese Divisions, which wereflown from China in April and May respec-tively. The force was completed by the addi-tion of U.S. 5307 Provisional Regiment, con-sisting of three battalions of Long-RangePenetration troops which had trained withMajor-General Wingate's Special Force inIndia and were now being used as medium-range penetration battalions. Known officiallyby the code name "Galahad Force", theywere more usually referred to—after the nameof their commander—as Merrill's Marauders.

102. General Stilwell, the Deputy SupremeAllied Commander, South-East Asia Com-mand, personally assumed command of thesetroops in the Field. They never formed partof my Army Group, but General Stilwellagreed, until C.A.I. forces had capturedKamaing, to accept instructions from GeneralSlim, who was, of course, under my command.

103. On the 17th May, C.A.I. had reachedthe outskirts of Myitkyina and captured theairfield, Galahad Force having contributedmuch to this very notable advance. Kamaingwas captured on the 16th June and Mogaunginvested. The situation in the Mogaung Valleyon the 22nd June was that the Japanese inthe Kamaing area were being forced into thesouthern end of the valley; while SpecialForce was attacking their supply lines in thearea north of Indaw. Special Force also hada detachment, known as " Morrisf orce",blocking the Myitkyina—Bhamo road.

104. Supply of all forces was largely by air,as owing to the weather the construction ofthe Ledo Road did not keep pace with theadvance of the troops.

Special Force.105. I have already mentioned Special

Force. This Force consisted of six Long-Range Penetration Brigades, which werespecially selected, trained, organised andequipped by the late Major-General Wingateto give them the maximum mobility in junglefighting. The plan was to concentrate thisForce within a circle of forty miles radius fromIndaw, with the objects of: —

(a) Assisting the advance of the Chinese-American forces on Myitkyina by drawingoff and harassing the Japanese forces op-posing them, and by preventing reinforce-ments reaching them.

(b) Creating a situation which would en-able the Chinese forces to advance fromYunnan.

(c) Causing confusion, damage and loss tothe enemy forces hi North Burma.I hoped that General Wingate's operations

might also interfere with the Japanese advanceagainst Imphal.

106. The operations of both Special Forceand the Sino-American forces moving southfrom Ledo were co-ordinated by the Com-mander, Fourteenth Army.


107. The operations of Special Force beganon the night of the 5th-6th March, and be-tween then and the night of the lOth-llthMarch nearly six hundred Dakota and one hun-dred glider sorties carried 77 and 111 L.R.P.Brigades, totalling 9,500 troops and 1,100animals, into the heart of Japanese-occupiedBurma. The initial role of these glider-borneforces was to secure sites for and to preparelanding strips west of the Irrawaddy. Lastminute air reconnaissance disclosed that one ofthe two [potential strips selected, thirty-five milesnorth-east of Katha (called " Piccadilly ") hadbeen deliberately obstructed. General Sim, whowas present at the starting point when thisnews was received, was faced with the difficultdecision whether to launch the operation, sinceit appeared that the enemy had got wind ofit, or to postpone it until fresh plans couldbe made. Ke decided to let the operation goforward and on the first night the landingswere confined to one strip only, called " Broad-way ", which was some twenty-seven miles south-east of Hopin on the Myitkyina—Mandalayrailway.

108. The landings at Broadway, and subse-quently on another strip (" Chowringhee")some twenty miles south-south-east of Katha,achieved complete surprise and until the 12thMarch no ground opposition was met. Airattacks did not begin until the 10th and weredirected against the Chowringhee strip which,by that tune, had fulfilled its purpose and hadbeen abandoned. The Broadway strip was notattacked until the 13th March, when ourfighters were present and A.A. defences hadbeen established. The Japanese lost about50 per cent, of their attacking aircraft.

109. Our losses during the initial fly-inamounted to only one per cent, of the totalpersonnel transported. The only animal casualtywas one mule. The smallness of these losses isremarkable in view of the fact that, at thepeak period of the fly-in, double the plannedeffort was achieved, and aircraft were comingin and taking off at the rate of one " landing "and one " take-o^f" every three minutes.

110. A special American air force, calledNo. 1 Air Commando, had been formed toco-operate both tactically and administrativelywith Special Force. It was a composite forcecomprising some 250 aircraft—long- and short-range fighters, light bombers, Dakotas andgliders. This force carried out the hazardousand difficult glider-borne operations, flying fullyladen gliders, some in double tow, over 9,000foot mountains by night, a distance of 300 milesto the selected area. Equally important wasthe action of the fighters and bombers of thisforce, before, during, and after the actuallandings, against targets which it was vital toattack. No. 221 Group, R.A.F., also did splen-did work in these operations. I wish to ex-press my appreciation of the work carried outby these air forces, without whose assistanceSpecial Force could not have operated.

111. 77 and 111 L.R.P. Brigades were followedby 14 L.R.P. Brigade, whose fly-in was com-pleted by the 4th April. 3 (West African)Brigade, which formed part of Special Force,

was to have operated in the same way as theother brigades of the Force. But before theoperations actually started, it was decided tosplit up title brigade and attach one battalionto each of the 77, 111 and 14 Brigades, to act asa garrison for the stronghold which was toform the base of each of the three above-men-tioned brigades. 3 (West African) Brigade com-pleted its fly-in by the 12th April. These for-mations used airstrips established near Man'hton(" Aberdeen "), twenty-seven miles north-north-west of Indaw; Mawlu (" White City ")»twenty,miles north of Katha, and in the Hopin area.During this second phase some 6,000 troops,850 animals and 550,000 Ibs. of stores weretransported with the very slight casualties of15 killed (all in one aircraft) and six injured.

112. General Wingate originally estimatedthat about twelve weeks would be the maximumperiod which troops would be able to with-stand the rigorous conditions under which theywould be called upon to operate. His originalplan, therefore, was (i) to march in 16 L.R.P.Brigade from Ledo, because the route wasknown to be practicable and this formationwould be able to co-operate more closely withGeneral Stilwell's forces advancing in the samearea, and (ii) later to fly in 77 and 111 L.R.P.Brigades, retaining the other brigades as a" second wave " which might, or might not,be used to operate during the monsoon, in reliefof the three brigades sent in initially. Thisplan was later modified, however, as GeneralSlim decided to fly in 14 and 3 (West African)Brigades early in April. On the 5th February16 Brigade marched in from Ledo as planned,via Singkaling Hkamti, after a long inarchduring which it had a few minor engagements,and began operations in the Indaw area inMarch. 23 L.R.P. Brigade was sent intoBurma, but was subsequently employed bythe Army Commander in the Naga Hills andManipur area hi co-operation with 33 Corps.

113. It is impossible, in a report of thisnature, to give a detailed summary of thevaried activities of the five brigades of SpecialForce which operated independently in NorthBurma. The damage they inflicted on theenemy, both human and material, was con-siderable, comprising, at it did, the laying ofmany ambushes, the destruction or blocking ofrail and road communications, and the destruc-tion of supply dumps and other military instal-lations.. The operations carried out by thesecolumns, combined with the story of howAmerican aircraft released their gliders, filledwith British troops and American engineers,to make their landings hi jungle clearings inpitch darkness, forms one of the outstandingepisodes of the war, but an account of theoperations will not be given until a subsequentDespatch.

114. I have nothing but praise for the organi-zation of the initial landings, and the gallantryand endurance displayed by all ranks in theoperations which followed. Events have shown,however, that these operations had less effectupon the enemy than I hoped for. The enemydid not divert troops from his forward areas,nor did he alter his main strategical plan.In fact, the. results achieved did not prove to


be commensurate with the expenditure in man-power and material which had been employed.These operations: —

(a) Did not affect the launching of theJapanese offensive against Assam.

(6) Had but little effect on the enemy'slines of communication, to Assam. Theydelayed for one month up to three batta-lions of 15 Japanese Division, which mightotherwise have reached the Imphal Frontearlier.

(c) Although they severed the rail com-munications of 18 Japanese Division forabout three months, only one battalion (fromthe 18 Divisional Reserve) was actuallydiverted from the front of General StilwelTsforces and that only for about a month.

(d) On the other hand, the Japanese werecompelled to collect troops to meet thethreat but they did not amount to more thantwelve battalions at any one time, althoughthe number of enemy battalions which wereemployed at one time or another added upto sixteen. The concentration of twelvebattalions was not complete until two monthsafter the original landings.115. 16 L.R.P. Brigade, which had originally

marched in from Ledo, was evacuated by airearly in May. On the 17th May, the threeremaining brigades of Special Force cameunder the command of General Stilwell in theNorthern Combat Area Command and subse-quently operated, in a normal infantry role,in tihe Kamaing—Mogaung—Myitkyina sector.

" Dahforce'", which was composed of KachinLevies, was flown in with Special Force andlater amalgamated with three columns of 111Brigade, the whole being re-named "Morris-force " (already briefly mentioned in paragraph103).

Before leaving the subject of Special Force,I wish to pay tribute to its gallant commander,Major-General Wingate, whose death occurredin a flying accident late in March. He was thatrare combination of the dreamer and the manof action and his example and spirit will remainan inspiration to the men he trained. He wassucceeded by his Second-in-Command, Major-General W. D. A. Lentaigne, C.B., C.B.E.,D.S.O.Lessons of the Campaign.

116. The following important facts emergefrom a study of the operations undertakenduring the first six months of 1944: —

. (a) The reinforcements received were welltrained, thanks to the training arrangementsmade by the Commander-in-Chief, India,and our troops, both individually and collec-tively, were able to engage the Japanesewith confidence.

(6) Our ability to make full use of airsupply by virtue of our air superiority hasfundamentally altered the tactical picture,and enabled our troops not only to operatein country hitherto considered impassableand so attack the enemy, but also to holdpositions when the enemy has cut theirlines of communication.

(c) The operations have shown that ordin-ary formations can be transported quickly•by air." They have also shown the need, forfighting under Far Eastern conditions, of a" Standard Infantry Division " which can bereadily transported by rail, sea, M.T. or air.

(d) The urgent need for plenty of infantryin this theatre of war has again beenemphasised. All divisions, except 19 IndianDivision which was the only reserve at thedisposal of the Commander-in-Chief, India,were engaged in the course of the fightingand no proper relief of formations was pos-sible. The relief of tired troops is mostimportant and it was not solved satisfactorilyowing to shortage of troops.Some of my divisions had, by last June, been

in the forward areas for twenty-eight months.I need not stress the mental and physical strainwhich jungle warfare, under adverse climaticconditions, imposes on the soldier.

Naval Operations.117. I wish to acknowledge the assistance

given by coastal forces in the Arakan opera-tions, which carried out valuable raids againstvulnerable points on the coast, and were pro-tection against possible small sea-borne raidsby the enemy.

In March, 3 Commando Brigade (No. 5Commando and No. 44 Royal Marine Com-mando) carried out successfully a small am-phibious operation in the Alethangyaw areafrom St. Martin's Island, with the object ofcontaining the enemy in that area and prevent-ing the movement north of reinforcementsduring our main attack on the Maungdaw—Buthidaung road.

Although there was no large-scale navalactivity^ in conjunction with land forces dur-ing the" period under review, it was the everpresent threat of amphibious operations whichtied nearly two Japanese divisions to coastalareas.

Air Co-operation.118. Tasks. The general tasks performed by

Eastern Air Command during the first sixmonths of the year were as follows: —

(d) Strategic air offensive to destroyenemy forces, transportation, and mainten-ance installations.

(to) Support of Fourteenth Army opera-tions.

(c) Air defence of Calcutta and theadjacent industrial areas and, also, of theairfields used by the American Air Trans-port Command in North-East Assam for theChina ferry service.

(d) Ah- transportation for airborne and airtransit forces.

(e) Photographic reconnaissance.

119. Strategic Air Force. I am, of course,chiefly, concerned with the air transport andtactical support given to Fourteenth Army,but I wish to acknowledge the assistance ren-dered by the Strategic Air Force. Their attackson Rangoon and Bangkok, and, also, those onSaigon by 14 ILS.A.A.F. from China, havegreatly impeded the flow of Japanese reinforce-ments and material into Burma. In fact, -up tillthe time when monsoon conditions reduced airactivity, Rangoon was practically denied to theenemy as a port. Operations against enemy-held ports have been supplemented by constantattacks against coastal shipping and, most im-portant from my point of view, against railcommunications and military installations. On


several occasions, also, elements of the StrategicAir Force have acted in a tactical r61e andfurnished most valuable close support both bybombing and by ferrying supplies.

120. Tactical Air Force. The successful pro-vision of ground support in this Theatre,although facilitated by our complete airsupremacy, is faced by two difficulties: —

(a) the problem of target recognition indense jungle (enhanced, as it is, by theenemy's skill hi camouflaging his positionsand dumps), and

(b) the Japanese skill in building field de-fences which require direct hits from heavy<bombs to neutralise them.The difficulty of target recognition was, to

a great extent, overcome by use of smoke andwireless.

121. The occasions when air support hasbeen called for and most effectively providedare too numerous to mention but it has notalways been easy to assess the resultsachieved. I have no hesitation hi stating, how-ever, that neither in offence nor defence couldthe Army have achieved the success it did,had it not been for the casualties inflictedon the enemy, and the disruption in forwardareas of both their land and water communica-tions by Eastern Air Command. Further,the effect produced on the morale of our troopsby the obvious evidence of our air superiorityhas been most inspiring. Conversely, its dis-heartening effect on the enemy is evidenced bythe statements of prisoners and from captureddocuments.

122. Air Transport Operations. In November1943, only one R.A.F. Transport Squadron wasavailable for operations with Fourteenth Army,but two Troop Carrier Squadrons, U.S.AA.F.,were working with General StilwelTs forces inthe Northern Sector, .and other squadrons, bothBritish and American, were on their way <asreinforcements. Other reinforcements were sentsubsequently from the Mediterranean and else-where.

Unified operational control of these forceswas effected hi December by the formation ofTroop Carrier Command, Eastern Air Com-mand, under Brigadier-General W. D. Old ofthe U.S.A.A.F., with Headquarters at Comilla,where were situated the Headquarters of bothFourteenth Army and 3 Tactical Air Force, aswell as the main supply bases. On the 1st May,in order further to integrate air transport witharmy operations, Troop Carrier Command wasplaced under the control of the Air Com-mander, 3 Tactical Air Force, until it was dis-solved on the 4th June—a measure renderednecessary by the increasing dispersal of theoperational areas and the growing intensity ofGeneral Stilwell's operations in North Burma.

123. It is only possible for me here brieflyto mention the major air transport operationscarried out during this period. These were, inchronological order: —

(a) The routine supply-dropping missionsto our detachments in the Chin Hills, whichI mention because of the hazardous flyingconditions.

(6) The maintenance of 81 (West African)Division in the Kaladan, which was entirelydependent on air supply.

(c) The maintenance of the Chinesedivisions advancing south-east from Ledo,which included supplies for our Fort Hertzgarrison and the Levies operating in thatarea.

(d) The delivery by air of some 2,000 tonsof supplies of all kinds to 7 Indian Divisionduring the fighting between the 8th Februaryand the 6th March.

(e) The fly-in of the Brigades of SpecialForce to the centre of Burma.

(/) The move by air of 50 Indian Para-chute Brigade from Northern India to theImphal area, followed by the transfer of thepersonnel of 5 Indian Division, two brigadesof 7 Indian Division, together with a pro-portion of their heavy equipment, includingartillery, from Arakan to the same area. Aninfantry brigade of 2 British Division wasflown from the Calcutta area to Jorhat inNorth-Eastern Assam.

(g) The air supply, on an unprecedentedscale, of 4 Corps during the period that theline of communication to Imphal was cut.

(K) The evacuation by ah* of 16 Brigadeof Special Force from the Hopin area toIndia.

(0 Concurrently with all the above, theevacuation of casualties from Arakan, NorthBurma and Imphal, which had a mostbeneficial effect on the morale of the troopsengaged.

124. It is not within the scope of this De-spatch to give a detailed account of the opera-tions, but I wish to comment on two of them:the maintenance by air of 7 Indian Division,when cut off in the Arakan, and that of 4 Corpswhen surrounded in Imphal. The former wasthe first occasion, in this theatre of war, whena large formation was supplied by ah*, andwas thus able to maintain its positions afterits land communications had been severed.This allowed us to inflict a crushing defeaton the enemy. The latter—the air supply of4 Corps—deserves a more detailed account:

The magnitude of the effort involved hi keep-ing an Army Corps of four divisions and theah- forces based at Imphal supplied, wasenormous, when it is regarded hi relation tothe number of aircraft available.

Calculations showed that the Army required323 tons per diem, and the supporting R.A.F.squadrons 75 tons, if we were to hold Imphal.This target figure was, generally speaking,maintained, though we had anxious periodswhen a shortage of aircraft seemed probableand when bad weather restricted flying. Thereis no doubt that, if we had not had air supply,we should have lost the Imphal Plain and theposition on the eastern frontier of India wouldhave been grave.

125. It is with gratitude and admiration thatI acknowledge the immense debt which theArmy owes to the Ah*. No one who, Dke my-self, has watched them, is likely to forget thecourage, determination and skill of pilots andcrews who have flown through some of theworst weather in the world, and over appallingcountry in performing their allotted tasks.

Enemy Strengths and Dispositions.126. To trace the Japanese build-up in

Burma, it is necessary to go back to July, 1943,when then* total strength consisted of four


divisions, disposed as follows:—Arakan, 55Division; Kale and Kabaw Valleys and LowerChindwin, 33 Division; Upper Chindwin andHukawng Valley, 18 Division; Salween River,56 Division. By November, 31 Division, a newone raised from formations in Central Chinaand elsewhere, and, also, 24 IndependentMixed Brigade (four battalions) had arrived.54 Division from Java followed in February.Reinforcements during February and earlyMarch amounted to two more divisions, the15th coming from Central China, and the 2nd,originally destroyed in Guadalcanal, but re-formed in the Philippines in June 1943. InFebruary, also, a second Army Headquarters,the 28th, was created to control the forces inSouth Burma.

127. The strength of the Japanese army inBurma at the beginning of March was, there-fore, eight divisions and one independent mixedbrigade, giving a total of seventy-six infantrybattalions. These forces were under the con-:trol of two Army Headquarters: the Southern(Twenty-Eighth) Army containing thirty-twobattalions and the Northern (Fifteenth) Armyforty-four.

128. In May, a fresh division made itsappearance : the 53rd, coming from Japan, viaMalaya. It was located in the Mogaung area.Thus the total Japanese strength in Burma hadgradually been augmented from four divisionsto nine in the twelve months ending June 1944.

Japanese Subversive Agencies.129. There are certain non-Japanese forces

which the enemy raised to oppose us in Burma,the most prominent being:—

(a) The Japanese-inspired Indian FifthColumn.

(b) The so-called Indian National Army(I.N.A.).

(c) Forces of disaffected Burmans.The first-named are known as J:LFs., a term

which, strictly speaking, should only be appliedto Indians working for the enemy, who are notmembers of the I.N.A. These J.LFs. havebeen used in an intelligence offensive againstIndia and the Indian Army since the outbreakof the Japanese war, mainly on propagandaand espionage tasks. Some have been landedin India by submarine or parachute, and con-siderable numbers have infiltrated across theIndo-Burman border. This movement, whichhas been in the main a matter for India Com-mand to counter, was largely defeated. Itseffects on the troops under my command havebeen negligible.

130. The I.N.A. is principally composed ofIndian prisoners of war taken in Singapore,though civilians are now also being recruited.This army, which had a rather ill-starredbeginning in 1942—at the end of wihich year itwas disbanded by the Japanese—was re-formedby Subhas Chandra Bose, the Bengali revolu-tionary, soon after his arrival in the East fromGermany in 1943. It is now organised in threedivisions, of which two are afieged to be fitto take the field. Its headquarters was atMaymyo, with a rear headquarters at Singa-pore. A strength of 13,000, including No. 1Division, has been moved up into Burma sincelast November, while No. 2 Division (approxi-mately 7,000) is prepared to follow.

B

131. Elements of the I.N.A. first appearedin a fighting role in the Arakan operations inFebruary, but the main body was concentratedon the Chindwin front, and was generally em-ployed on foraging and fatigue duties. Theydid no fighting on either front beyondoccasional company actions, in which theirmorale was not high. Special parties, attachedto Japanese units, have been used to try tosuborn our Indian troops, but all attempts havebeen met with fire. Reports show that theJapanese have been disillusioned regarding thevalue of these troops, the great majority ofwhom are not really traitors; most of themonly accepted service under the Japanese toescape inhuman treatment and in the hope ofgetting back to India.

132. The activities of the J.LFs. and theI.N.A. are directed by an organization com-posed of Japanese officers and men, under alieutenant-general, which has its headquartersin Burma and is known as the Hikari Kikan(Rising Sun Organization). Liaison betweenI.N.A. brigades and the Japanese Army iscarried out toy Hikari personnel. This organiza-tion also controls Bose's " Provisional Govern-ment " and the " Indian Independence League "into which Indians in the Far East have beenenrolled.

In addition to the Hikari Kikan, there is theJapanese Nishi Kikan (Western Organization)which is trying to organize the peoples ofNorthern and Western Burma into units some-what analogous to our own Chin and KachioLevies.

133. It is difficult to estimate the strengthand fighting value of the force of disaffectedBurmans. It has done little fighting, and has,up to date, been employed chiefly on linesof communication duties. It contains somedefinitely anti-British elements who, when theJapanese are being evicted from Burma, maybe expected to try to interfere with ourpacification of the country. Other elementshave, however, probably been forced into theorganization by "voluntary compulsion"methods and will leave it as soon as they can.

134. I wish to pay a tribute to the tribes-men of the Naga, Chin and Kachin Hills, whohave remained staunchly loyal to us, in spiteof all the enemy's efforts to suborn them.

135. Casualties. The following table showsthe 'battle casualties inflicted on the enemy be-tween November, 1943, and June, 1944, bothmonths inclusive:—

By Fourteenth Army By C.A.I.Killed 26,203 13,232Wounded 39,305 19,848Prisoners 288 57

Total 98,933

This proportion of killed to wounded iscalculated from captured returns and may beassumed to be reasonably accurate.

This estimate does not include the lossesthe enemy has suffered from our sustained airattacks or from disease, the incidence ofwhich captured documents have shown to behigh. There is of course, always a tendencyto over-estimate enemy casualties but I thinkit would be no exaggeration to assume thatthe total Japanese losses, on all counts, duringthe eight months under review amounted toat least one hundred thousand.


PART in—ORGANIZATION.136. I have already given a summary of the

land forces transferred to me from India Com-mand with effect from midnight on the 15th-16th November 1943 when the Supreme AlliedCommander assumed command. In addition,the following formations passed to my com-mand between November 1943 and June1944: —

9 Indian Infantry Brigade (5 IndianDivision). (December.)

32 Indian Infantry Brigade (20 IndianDivision). (Late November.)

254 Indian Tank Brigade Qess 45thCavalry, but plus 3 Dragoon Guards).(December.)

25 Indian Division. (February andMarch.)

14 and 16 L.R.P. Brigades. (In Marchand January respectively.)

77 and 111 L.R.P. Brigades. (January.)36 British Division. (Between late

January and early March.)23 L.R.P. Brigade. (Early April.)Advance H.Q., 3 Special Service Brigade

(with No. 5 Commando and No. 44 RoyalMarine Commando). (February.)

50 Indian Parachute Brigade. (EarlyMarch.)

2 British Division, which moved to Assamas follows:—

5 Brigade. (End of March.)H.Q., 2 British Division and 6 Brigade.

(Early April.)4 Brigade. (Mid-April.)

Also a cavalry regiment, a medium regi-ment R.A., and two Indian battalions.

28 (East African) Brigade arrived inFebruary and replaced 99 Infantry Brigade inCeylon, which reverted to India Command.

Headquarters, 21 Indian Division, consistingof a proportion of the H.Q. Staff and a fewancillary units of the late 44 Indian ArmouredDivision, arrived in Jorhat (Assam) on the5th March.

268 Indian Lorried Infantry Brigade waslent by India Command early in May (videparagraph 67).

137. A skeleton Order of Battle of theundermentioned formations will be found inthe appendices:—

Appendix " A "—Skeleton Order of Battleof 15 Indian Corps on the 1st January 1944,at the commencement of our offensive inthe Arakan.

Appendix " B "—Skeleton Order of Battleof 4 Corps on the 8th March 1944, thedate the Japanese launched their offensiveacross the Chindwin.

Appendix " C "—Skeleton Order of Battle33 Indian Corps on the 31st May 1944, whenthat formation was engaged in driving theenemy from the Kohima area.

Appendix " D "—Skeleton Order of Battle11 Army Group on the 22nd June 1944, thedate on which this Despatch closes.

138. The major re-organizations, which werefinished, or which were begun; during theperiod covered by this Despatch were: —

11 (East African) Division.81 and 82 (West African) Divisions.

Standard Organizations for:—A Corps Headquarters.An Infantry Division.

Armoured Formations (re-organization ofTank Brigades).

Organization for the movement and main-tenance of Air Transported Formations.

Assumption of full contol by 11 ArmyGroup of Fourteenth Army and Land Forces,Ceylon.The principal changes involved, together with

my reasons for effecting them, are summarizedin the succeeding paragraphs:—

139. 11 (East African) Division. At a con-ference held in Ceylon in January, at whichthe G.O.C.-in-iC, East African Command waspresent, I decided to increase the artillery ofthis formation up to the scale of that in anAnimal and Motor Transport (A. and M.T.)Division on the Indian Establishment.

I also decided to reduce the scale of bothunit and 2nd line motor transport, and to pro-vide an element within the infantry battalionsfor carrying fighting equipment under con-ditions when M.T. could not operate.

140. 81 and 82 (West African) Divisions. InMay, at a conference attended by the G.O.C.-in-C., West Africa, I considered the advis-ability of amalgamating these two divisions;for 81 Division, which had given up one ofits brigades to Special Force, consisted onlyof two brigades. Owing, however, to the short-age of formations with which to carry outreliefs, I decided to retain both divisions, butto effect certain changes in their organization.These included:—

(a) The divisional artillery to consist ofone light regiment (three batteries of3.7-inch howitzers and one battery of 3-inchmortars) and one anti-tank regiment (threebatteries, each of twelve six-pounder guns).Field regiments could not be formed, butwould be attached when required.

(b) A reconnaissance battalion to be in-cluded in each division.

(c) A proportion (25 per cent.) of the un-armed soldiers, who act as porters, to bearmed.West African resources did not, unfortun-

ately, admit of certain other desirable increases,such as the .inclusion of a Divisional Head-quarters battalion.

I also decided that 3 (West African) Brigadeof 81 (West African) Division should continueto be employed with Special Force.

I intended to bring these two West Africandivisions and the East African division, intoline with the standard divisional organization(vide paragraph 142) in due course.

141. Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops.In order to secure uniformity, a standardisedWar Establishment for a Corps Headquartersand, also, a standard Order of Battle for CorpsTroops, is to be adopted.

142. Standard Organization for Infantry Divi-sions. I have already briefly referred to thedesirability of having one standard organiza-tion for all infantry divisions operating in thistheatre of war, and for some time past I hadbeen examining the possibility of this. Ex-perience had shown that, with our limited


resources, it was not practical to have a num-ber of specialised formations such as Airborne,Assault, Armoured, Light, M.T., and Animaland M.T. Divisions. Such a policy was notonly uneconomical, but circumstances inevi-tably forced their use sooner or later in rolesfor which they had not been trained ororganized.

Early in May, I recommended to theSupreme Allied Commander that the policy ofhaving a Standard Division should be accepted,such a division to be capable of fulfilling allthe rdles which it might be called upon toperform within South-East Asia Command,viz.: —

(fl) Normal jungle fighting.(ft) Operations involving transportation

by air.(c) Amphibious operations (though, for

this role, special training and the attachmentof certain special units such as beach groups,would of course be necessary).

The Supreme Allied Commander gave hisapproval to my proposals and they have sincebeen accepted by the War Office and GeneralHeadquarters, India. In addition the forma-tion of an airborne division has been agreedto.

Action to put this new policy into force isbeing taken in order to bring the maximumnumber of divisions on to the standard organi-zation before the end of 1944. This organiza-tion will include three infantry battalions perbrigade (to be increased to four when practic-able, as is the case in the War Office Light-Scale Division for Far Eastern Theatres), twoartillery regiments of 25-pounders (in place ofthe existing one 25-pounder and one junglefield regiment in A. and M.T. divisions),one 3.7-inch howitzer mountain regiment ofthree batteries (instead of the present four-battery regiment), and one anti-tank regi-ment having an alternative armament of 3-inchmortars (instead of the existing anti-aircraftcum anti-tank regiment). The division willalso include a reconnaissance battalionorganized on similar lines to the normal infan-try battalion, but with extra signal equipment,and, as soon as the manpower situation per-mits, a medium machine gun battalion.

A major feature of the new StandardDivision is the reduction in the number oflorries, both in unit 1st line transport and in2nd line M.T. companies, and the introductionof a large number of jeeps. Eventually it ishoped to have two types of vehicles only; thejeep and the 3-ton four-wheel-drive lorry(apart, of course, from a limited number ofspecialist vehicles).

143. Re-organization of Armoured Forma-tions. A review of the role required of tankbrigades operating in this Theatre led me tothe conclusion that certain major changes intheir organization were necessary. I consideredthat the value of these brigades would begreatly enhanced if (a) all regiments were re-equipped with medium tanks, (ft) a troop offlame-thrower tanks was included in eachsquadron, and (c) an infantry battalion wasincluded in each brigade. By making certainreductions in the existing establishment, itwould, I decided, be possible to adopt thisre-organization of the armoured units, while

B 2

at the same tune, effecting a saving in man-power.

This matter is still being discussed with theCommander-in-Chief, India, and will be re-ferred to again in my next Despatch.*

144. Organization for the Movement andMaintenance of Air Transported Formations.Recent experience has shown that there is anurgent need for a permanent organization tohandle the movement and maintenance offorces by air, instead of the improvisation thathas hitherto existed.

Such an organization must, obviously, be de-signed to ensure the closest co-operation be-tween the staffs at the headquarters of the airforce and the army concerned and, also, thestaffs at the airfields affected. To achieve this,four elements are required: —

(a) An Army Link with the R.A.F. Head-quarters dealing with air transport.

(ft) Joint Army and R.A.F. Air Despatchand Delivery Units at airfields.

(c) An Airfield Maintenance Organizationto ensure that maintenance requirements atairfields are met.

(d) Air Supply and Maintenance Com-panies to deal with the packing, loading andejection of supplies.My proposals for an organization, which

will produce the necessary continuity and flexi-bility, are under consideration by Head-quarters, Air Command, S.E.A.C., and GeneralHeadquarters, India.

145. Assumption of Full Control by 11Army Group. As I have already stated inthe opening paragraphs of this Despatch, Four-teenth Army, together with Ceylon Army Com-mand and the Indian Ocean bases of AdduAtoll, Diego Garcia and Cocos, came undermy command from the 16th November 1943,but certain administrative matters continuedto be dealt with by General Headquarters,India, until more staff became available for11 Army Group. My Headquarters, however,assumed full control with effect from the1st May, 1944, with the exception of someadministrative matters which were more con-veniently handled by G.H.Q. India.

PART IV—ADMINISTRATION.146. In order to view the administrative

problem which confronted us in this Theatrein its correct perspective, it is necessary tounderstand the background against which thepresent organization developed. EasternArmy, the forerunner of Fourteenth Army,came into being at a time of reverses in Burmaand unpreparedness in Eastern India. Thewhole of that rear organization, on which thesuccess or failure of an army depends, hadtherefore to be built up from nothing, underthe most difficult conditions. While the earlystages of this build-up have already beendescribed in Despatches from the India Com-mand, a brief recapitulation of the facts maybe opportune here.

147. Our strategy, in 1942, was defensive andour advanced bases were selected accordingly..The area of operations was, and still is, dividedadministratively into two fronts—Arakan and

* Operations in Assam and Burma from 23rd June,1944 to 12th November, 1944.


Assam—each of which is served by a separateline of communication, connected by poorlateral communications (though air supply isnow an important factor which can be, andhas been, used to unite these separate lines).

The natural advanced base for the Arakanfront is Chittagong. This port was preparedfor demolition in 1942 and many "denial"measures were actually carried out.. It onlynarrowly escaped being occupied by theJapanese in the summer of that year; and infact, our subsequent advance in October 1942,when we passed from the defensive to theoffensive, began while Chittagong was stillunder sentence of death. Both the port andadvanced base at Chittagong had then to bedeveloped while active operations were in pro-gress, and while they were both having toperform their administrative functions to theforces in the field. These forces rose to astrength of two divisions, and, incidentally, hada sick rate of over 6 per 1,000 per diem. Notonly was there no all-weather road in Arakan,but no road at all worthy of the name. Wewere, therefore, compelled to rely largely oncoastal shipping and inland water transportand, for many months, there was a seriousshortage of both types of vessels. The diffi-culty was eventually overcome to some extentby the construction of a road which had to besurfaced with bricks, the coal for which hadto be imported from India. Ordinary metallingwas impossible, owing to the absence of stone.

148. While we were on the defensive, Mymen-singh was being prepared as an advanced base,but was only about hah* finished when ourstrategy changed. We were not sufficientlycertain of success to discontinue constructionand, in the light of subsequent events, it isfortunate that we continued to build.

149. On the Imphal Front, we had to con-struct a large advanced base in virgin jungle,under the most adverse climatic and weatherconditions. This base at Manipur Road, orDimapur as it is sometimes called, had tostart work while its construction was yet in-complete.

As a site for a base, Dimapur possessedalmost every conceivable disadvantage: heavyrainfall; unhealthy climate; and uneven ground(which did not become apparent until the densejungle had been cleared). Moreover, it lies ona narrow tongue of land between two rivers,both of which are liable to overflow during themonsoon. To these local topographical dis-advantages must be added the further one ofthe liability to interruption of the railway toAssam by the rivers and streams which pourdown from the huge catchment area of theHimalayas, the foothills of which the railwayskirts. In 1942, the railway was cut by floodsfrom the 24th June till the 30th November.

150. The railway system, which is metregauge, had never previously had to tackle morethan a moderately heavy seasonal load of•cereals and tea. It now had to undertake amuch increased load of civil traffic and had tobe further pressed to meet the needs not onlyof the large Imperial forces operating on theNorthern and Southern Fronts, but also of theSino-American forces based on Ledo and, lastbut not least, the air ferry service to China.Concurrently, road and river transportationhad been developed to take some of the strain.

151. The Northern and Southern Lines ofCommunication areas are divided by the Garpand Jaintia Hills and the only lateral communi-cation connecting them is the hill section ofthe Bengal and Assam Railway.

152. The whole area was without airfieldsand so low-lying as to render airfield construc-tion difficult. It entailed, not only the trans-portation of heavy tonnages of engineer stores,but also of coal, since much surfacing had tobe done with burnt brick.

The move and maintenance of forces by ah*,as well as our probable future commitments,have necessitated a large increase in airfieldconstruction, but I shall deal with this subjectin greater detail later on.

153. I propose to deal with the work of myAdministrative Services under the followingmain headings: —

(a) Adjutant-General questions.(b) The Lines of Communication.(c) Supply and Maintenance.(d) The Engineering Effort.(e) The Civil Affairs Service, Burma.

Adjutant-General Questions.154. Manpower. The '* divisional slice *' in

this Theatre has averaged 56,000, excludingcivil labour, and 70,000 including it, whereas,I believe, the " divisional slice " in Normandyis 40,000. The high figure in the Burma cam-paign is mainly due to the large administrative"tail", comprising numerous engineer andlabour units, which are needed to overcomethe physical difficulties on our lines of com-munication.

155. Reinforcements. The demand for rein-forcements is heavy, owing to the high sickrate which is, however, much lower than anti-cipated, and to the tune lag between demandand arrival, due to the distances which rein-forcements have to cover over a long and in-different transportation system.

Reinforcement has been below wastage; but,apart from, British infantry, in which tjieshortage is most acute, it has not been soserious as to impair fighting efficiency. Broadlyspeaking, the numbers available have been inexcess of battle casualties, but 'they have notbeen sufficient to meet the total wastage andthus keep reinforcement camps full.

156. British reinforcements for FourteenthArmy are provided by General Headquarters,India, from (a) the British Base ReinforcementCamp at Deolali, (&) personnel freed by thedisbandment of units, e.g. A.A. Brigades, and(c) returning sick from hospitals in India.Except for (c), who go direct to reinforcementcamps in the Fourteenth Army area, draftspass through 52 Training Brigade, where theycarry out a two months course of hardeningand jungle training. Indian reinforcements,from Regimental Centres and Depots, passthrough either 14 or 39 Indian TrainingDivisions to Fourteenth Army reinforcementcamps. There are twelve such camps in theArmy area, consisting each of two British andeight Indian Sections. Each Section is 300strong, and the total capacity of each campis thus 3,000. Training staffs are available ineach camp to keep reinforcements at a properstate of efficiency.


157. The Medical Aspect—A. Organization,(a) The medical organization in FourteenthArmy was originally based on the assump-tion that the main operations would beforward of Imphal. Hospitals were conse-quently, largely concentrated in the north and,in order to avoid evacuation down a long lineof communication, they were sited well for-ward. The Japanese thrust against Imphalhowever, necessitated their removal, and asituation arose in which about twenty-five percent, of our hospitals became temporarily non-effective. This would have been serious had itnot been for two saying factors: firstly, airtransport provided a link between our northernand southern lines of communication,enabling casualties to be rapidly cleared tohospitals serving the Arakan Front; andsecondly, the sick rate on both fronts fell farshort of the estimate for which provision hadbeen made.

(b) In the south, where extensive operationshad not been originally contemplated, andwhere the forces engaged were smaller, ourhospitals had not been concentrated so farforward.

Considerable discussion took place early inthe year between 11 Army Group and GeneralHeadquarters, India, regarding the adequacyor otherwise of the hospitals.

The decisions then taken proved to be soundon the whole, in spite of our forecasts beingwrong and of radical alterations in the lines ofevacuation. Although there is still a decidedshortage of medical officers, and a seriousshortage of nurses and nursing personnel, therehas been no general shortage of hospitalaccommodation, but anxiety is always presentin an unhealthy tropical theatre of war.

158. At the beginning of the year, facilitiesfor evacuation were reviewed, and as a resultof representations made by me to the SupremeAllied Commander, six hospital ships wereallotted to Fourteenth Army.

Further, a co-ordinating committee, investedwith executive authority, which includes repre-sentatives of 11 Army Group and GeneralHeadquarters, India, and of the many servicesaffected, has been set up to deal in detail withthe complicated problem of medical evacua-tion. Its measures have so fair proved effec-tive, notwithstanding the many problems whichhave arisen.

159. One interesting feature of the recentfighting is that the medical units have foundthemselves on occasions called upon to under-take part of the responsibility for their owndefence. That medical personnel had to fightproved to be a necessity—it was not a questionas to whether -they should defend themselves,but how best they could do so.

160. (a) The complicated problem ofmedical evacuation from Arakan involvedthe use of almost every conceivable form oftransport. Hand carriages, mules, jeeps, ambu-lances, D.U.K.Ws., sampans, flats, paddlesteamers, hospital ships, ambulance trains, andlight and heavy aircraft have all had to beemployed over one stage or another of thejourney.

(b) To and from 81 (West African) Divisionoperating in the Kaladan Valley, medical

supply and evacuation has had to be entirelyby air. That the arrangements workedsmoothly is due both to the medical officersconcerned and to the skilful co-operation ofthe R.A.F.

(c) I have already mentioned how the evacu-ation of casualties by air from the ImphalFront prevented a serious situation developingwhen certain hospitals had to be closed down.This air evacuation continued throughout theoperations about Imphal and was instrumentalin saving many, lives. In addition to casualties,two large General Hospitals were flown outwith all their valuable equipment.

(d) The total number of casualties evacuatedby ah- during the first half of 1944, from allfronts, was over 24,000. Rapid and adequateair transport facilities abolish at one strokethe unsatisfactory and difficult clearance ofcasualties down long surface lines of com-munication, with all their attendant disadvan-tages. This method of moving the woundedhas a most beneficial effect on the morale ofthe fighting soldier.

161. The Medical Aspect—B. Sick Rate.The most satisfactory feature on the medicalside has been the surprisingly low sick rateduring the first six months of the year. Theexpected rise to 5 or 6 per 1,000 per diem hasnot happened and the rate in May was as lowas 3.1 per 1,000 including battle casualties.This is an almost incredibly low figure com-pared with that for 1943, which was 6 per1,000 per diem; and, in spite of the seasonalincrease of malaria, it has since dropped to2.9.

Since November 1943, food supply greatlyimproved, and more fresh meat, fruit and vege-tables became available. It is probable thatthis improvement in rations has been a majorcause in keeping down the sick rate.

162. The most serious menace we have toface, where disease is concerned, is of coursemalaria, and this can only be overcome byunremitting effort and vigilance. The malariarate, up till the end of June, has remained con-sistently low compared with last year. This isremarkable, since operations have beencarried out on a greatly extended scale, andmany more troops have been exposed to therisk of infection. If the same rate had obtainedin Arakan and at Imphal from March to Juneas in the same months of 1943, the effect onoperations would have been serious.

I attribute this satisfactory state of affairsto four factors—firstly, better anti-malarial dis-cipline ; secondly, the improved anti-malarialorganization which, under medical control andaided by the engineers, has freed certain areasfrom the mosquito ; thirdly, the ample flow ofanti-malarial supplies of all kinds; and last,but not least, improved morale, since troopsin good fettle look after themselves better inevery way than when they are depressed.

The efficacy of D.D.T. as an anti-mosquitospray is shortly being tested in the KabawValley.

163. The Medical Aspect—C. MiscellaneousMedical Points, (a) There has been no notice-able change in the physical standard of Britishreinforcements, which can only be classed asaverage.


(6) The physical standard of young soldiersin the Indian Army has improved during theperiod under review, particularly in combatantunits.

164. The Army Pathological Service suffers,in this Theatre, from the lack of laboratories.The importance of accurate laboratorydiagnosis requires no stressing.

165. Dental facilities are altogether in-adequate. The accepted ratio of dental officersto troops is one per 1,000 for British and oneper 10,000 for Indian. The present ratio isone per 7,000 and 30,000 respectively.

166. The present standard of training ofmedical personnel in this Theatre does notcompare altogether favourably with that inothers, but, taking into consideration the ex-pansion which the Medical Services have under-gone, and the acute shortage of medical officersin India, it is, I am sure, as good as can beexpected. Training is, I know, continuous andintensive in the India Command and the situa-tion is improving.

167. The supply of medical stores, includingdrugs, has been most satisfactory. The con-sumption of mepacrine in Fourteenth Army asa malaria suppressive has reached twelvemillion tablets a month.

168. The problem of providing adequatemedical supervision for the large amount ofcivilian labour employed in the FourteenthArmy area is being met at present, but it maybecome more difficult when civilian labourforces have to be moved into re-conqueredterritory as our troops advance.

169. The thirteen convalescent depots in 11Army Group have proved their value as anessential link between hospital and reinforce-ment camp. The "patients" in the BritishDepot at Kohima played a notable part in thedefence of that place during the siege, thoughsuch strenuous work had hardly been recom-mended as part of their convalescence.

Miscellaneous A.G. Points.170. Legal and Judicial, (a) As a result of

the Supreme Allied Commander's ProclamationNo. 1 of 1944, under which he assumed controlof re-occupied territory, British MilitaryAdministration Courts have been set up inBurma.

(&) Arrangements have been made withGeneral Headquarters, India, for assistance tobe given to Fourteenth Army in the prosecutionof those suspected to be military traitors whofall into our hands. More detailed interroga-tion is now to be carried out at ForwardInterrogation Centres and the majority ofprisoners will be dealt with in forward areas.

171. Leave, (a) All British personnel havehad to be restricted to fourteen days leaveduring 1944, owing to the lack of accommoda-tion in suitable areas, and to transportationdifficulties which can only be solved by theprovision of more aircraft.

(£) Representations were made that BritishService officers, both with British units andthose seconded to the Indian Army, who werewilling, should be granted home leave in lieuof repatriation. Many such officers havevaluable experience in jungle warfare and theirretention is most desirable.

(c) Transportation difficulties originally pre-cluded the achievement of the target of twenty-eight days leave per annum for Indian ranks,but these have since been overcome.

172. Morale and Welfare. The largenumber of itroops who have taken part inoperations have gained confidence from theircontact with the enemy. It is universally feltthat the Japanese soldier, although a good in-fantryman, is no match for our well-trainedand well-equipped troops, supported by apowerful air force.

173. The still inadequate but increased and,I may add, well deserved publicity now beinggiven to this theatre of war, coupled withthe introduction of more amenities such asmobile canteens, cinemas, wireless sets, sportsequipment, a daily newspaper ("SEAC"),and also visits from " Ensa", have all con-tributed to the improvement in morale. Menare beginning to feel that they do not belongto " The Forgotten Army ".

In all my efforts to improve the lot of theBritish rank and file, I am closely in touchwith the Commander-in-Chief, India, whosetroops share with mine in the severe handicapsof climate, homesickness, and the feeling thatthe Burma Border is not, at present, the de-cisive Theatre. In spite of all the steps thathave been, and are being taken, the under-current of feeling against service hi the Eaststill persists, and many " grouses " are still inevidence, though the spirit of the troops inforward units is magnificent.

Among British troops, the most burningquestion has been, and is, that of repatriation.In particular, the disparity in the terms ofoverseas service between the Army and theR.A.F. is a continual source of grievance. Themeasures recently taken to improve this will,it is hoped, allay some of the feeling that hasundoubtedly existed.

174. The chief anxiety of Indian troops, asalways, is the welfare during their absence oftheir families, but the leave situation is nowsatisfactory. The effect of enemy propagandaon the Indian soldier has been negligible.

175. The work of philanthropic bodies suchas the Red Cross, the Y.M.C.A. and Toe Hhas been most valuable and I am very gratefulindeed to the large body of voluntary workerswho have contributed so much to the welfareof the troops, both British and Indian.

The Lines of Communication.176. I have already referred to the Northern

and Southern Lines of Communication Areas,but there are in fact three lines of communi-cation supplying Fourteenth Army:—

(a) The Assam Line of Communication,which has three railheads: that at ManipurRoad, also called Dimapur, supplying theImphal Front; and those at Ledo andChabua which supply the Chinese-Americanforces operating in Northern Burma, andthe air ferry route to China.

(ft) The Eastern Bengal Line of Com-munication, which serves our bases inEastern Bengal and the airfields in the SurmaValley, which are extensively used for airsupply.

Some flexibility between the EasternBengal and Assam lines of communication


is provided by the rail link between Lum-ding and Badarpur, but the capacity of thislink is limited owing to the gradients.

(c) The Arakan Line of Communication,which supplies IS Indian Corps southwardsfrom Chittagong.The following paragraphs give a brief general

description of these lines of communication,the difficulties which have been encounteredand the measures taken to overcome them.

177. The Assam Line of Communication.This line of communication has four mainroutes:—

(a) The metre gauge rail route fromMokameh Ghat* to Amingaon, across theBrahmaputra by wagon ferry, and onwardsto Dimapur and the American bases in theLedo area. Stores arrive at Mokameh Ghatby broad gauge railway from depots inNorthern and Central India.

(b) The broad gauge route from Calcuttato river ghats on the lower Brahmaputra andto transhipment stations of the metre gaugeroute. The stores carried come from theCalcutta Base Area and from Southern andWestern India.

(c) The river route. This includes an allwater route up the Brahmaputra fromCalcutta and, also, lifts between intermediaterail-served ghats on the Ganges and Brahma-putra.

(d) A road, known as the Assam accessroad, from Siliguri where it connects withthe broad gauge railway, to Bongaigaon onthe metre gauge route.The control of the Assam line of communi-

cation rests with General Headquarters, India.

178. Communications in Assam are compli-cated and rendered unreliable, by 'both operat--ing and physical difficulties. The operatingdifficulties are due to the fact that a far greaterload has been imposed on the railway thancould be handled by the normal civil organiza-tion. The physical difficulties are due to theseasonal liability of both road and rail com-munications to serious flooding, and also tothe vagaries of the Brahmaputra. At someplaces, sudden rises in the river will wash awayghats, with all their connected installations,completely; while at others, sand banks willform and render them unapproachable by rivercraft.

The operating difficulties have been over-come to a great extent by the employment ofmilitary transportation units to assist the civilstaff. The control of a considerable sectionof the metre gauge main line has been takenover by the United States Transportation Corpswhich has resulted in a great increase intraffic. The physical difficulties are being metby the provision, where possible, of alternativemeans of communication.

179. Very extensive measures have been, andare being, taken to improve the capacity of .thisline of communication. They include thedoubling of certain sections on both the broadand metre gauge lines, the conversion of onesection from narrow gauge to metre gauge,the construction of additional ghats and ferries,the improvement of existing facilities, and theprovision of more river craft

* " Ghat" means a landing stage.

A proposal to erect a railway bridge acrossthe Brahmaputra at Amingaon was rejected onthe grounds that it would take too long to build.The alternative was to increase the capacityof the Amingaon—Pandu ferry, and this hasbeen done.

180. The Eastern Bengal Line of Communication. This line consists of three mainroutes: —

(d) The sea route from Calcutta and Viza-gapatam to Chittagong.

(b) From the Calcutta area -to the EasternBengal metre gauge railway system, eitherby rail (via the Tistamukh wagon ferry), orby inland water transport, or by a combina-tion of both. This railway system convergeson Akhaura, and from there divides into twobranches. The northern branch serves theSurma Valley airfields joining up withthe Assam line of communication across thehill section of the railway between Badarpurand Lumding, and the southern supplies theChittagong area.

(c) The road running south from theAssam trunk road, through Shillong, Sylhetand Comilla, to Chittagong.

181. The difficulties encountered on this lineof communication are, as regards the rail-ways:—

(d) The Eastern Bengal system is unableadequately to cope with the increased lift toairfields used for air supply.

(b) The capacity of the hill rail link be-tween Badarpur and Lumding, which is.limited to only nine trains a day each way,with a nett load of 140 tons each.

182. The principal developments of therailways in Eastern Bengal have been madewith a view to providing a supplementary railroute for the Assam line of communication.These include: —

(i) The provision of additional crossingstations between the wagon ferry terminalat Bahadurabad and Badapur.

(ii) Re-laying the hill section betweenBadarpur and Lumding to permit of the useof more powerful locomotives and longertrains.In June, an investigation was carried out

by representatives of 11 Army Group; GeneralHeadquarters, India; Headquarters, SupremeAllied Commander, South-East Asia Com-mand ; and the United States forces. Theirrecommendations, which are already beingadopted, will increase line and terminal capa-city throughout the whole system.

183. Chittagong Port. The limited capacityof this port originally restricted the use of thedirect sea route, but steady increase has beenobtained by improving the railway serving thewharves, providing additional moorings andjetties, building more storage accommodation,re-erecting equipment dismantled and removedunder the denial scheme and by the supply ofmore lighters.

The working of the port has also improvedas a result of its reorganization when Four-teenth Army assumed control on the 1stFebruary.

The stores imported have increased by 150per cent, since November 1943.


Further development is still going on andby March 1945, the port will have been ex-panded to the maximum practicable extent.

184. The Arakan Line of Communication.This line supplies the area to the south ofChittagong, and the lack of all-weather roadscauses the burden to fall mainly on sea andriver transport. There are two main routes: —

(a) By road, from Chittagong, via Ramu,to Tumbru at the head of the Naf River,and thence on to Bawli Bazaar and Maimg-daw. The road is all-weather up to Tum-bru, with the exception of the section be-tween Chittagong and Dohazari.

(b) By water, from Chittagong to Cox'sBazaar and Utakhali; from Chittagong toMaungdaw direct; and by the Naf Riverfrom Tumbru to Maungdaw.In addition to the above, there were two

subsidiary sections of the line of communi-cation :—

(i) On the Sangu and Kaladan Rivers,to support 81 (West African) Division.

(ii) On the Mayu River, to support the leftflank of 15 Indian Corps.

185. The main difficulties met with on thisline of communication are the physical diffi-culties of road contraction in an area whichis either mountainous or liable to inundation inthe monsoons and where no stone exists; thelimited capacity of Chittagong and the veryrestricted capacities of Cox's Bazaar, Utakhaliand Maungdaw ; and the shortage of craft onrivers, the mouths of which are under enemycontrol.

The diversity in the types of rivercraft em-ployed is another factor which causes addeddifficulties ; small coasters, ordinary tugs, " D "type diesel driven tugs of wooden construction,cargo flats, ramped cargo lighters, Eureka towboats, Higgins barges, a variety of country craftfitted with outboard motors (with a horse-powerranging from 9.8 to 22), and last, but not least,the sampan.

186. As on the other lines of communica-tion, very considerable development has takenplace in Arakan. The road southwards fromDohazari has been converted to a fair weathertwo-way road as far as Maungdaw and an all-weather one-way one as far as Tumbru. Thedevelopment of the road to Tumbru to two-way all-weather standard is in progress.

Our water communications have been im-proved by increasing the capacity of the portsin the Cox's Bazaar area from 400 to 1,000tons a day. Tumbru Ghat is also now cap-able of handling 1,000 tons daily ; and as soonas Maungdaw was captured, TransportationConstruction Units raised its daily capacity to600 tons.

Perhaps the most creditable feat, however,was the way in which much needed reinforce-ments of rivercraft were sailed into the NafRiver. In spite of the fact that the mouth ofthe river was held by the enemy, Inland WaterTransportation Imits, during the early stages ofthe winter operations, ran craft down the coastand up into the river—air cover being pro-vided—to supplement the water transport whichhad been used the previous season. The riverfleet in the Naf was thus increased until itwas capable of handling 1,000 tons a day

between Tumbru and the numerous jettieswhich have been constructed between this ghatand Maungdaw

187. Oil Pipelines. Oil pipelines are underconstruction which will, of course, relieve theload on other forms of transport. An American6-inch pipeline has been completed fromCalcutta to North Assam and work on a simi-lar line from Chittagong to the same area hasbeen started. We are laying 4-inch pipelinefrom Chittagong to Imphal, via Manipur Road,which is nearly finished. The American linefrom Ledo to the Myitkyina area is beingextended, and a British line from Imphal toKalewa will probably be built.

188. Summary of Developments on our Linesof Communication. The main features havebeen:—

(a) The increase in the capacity of theAssam line of communication.

(b) The increase in the capacity ofChittagong.

(c) The development of the capacity of.the sea and river line of communicationsouthwards from Chittagong, from 400 tonsto 1,000 tons a day.

(d) The increase in air supply due to thedevelopment of the airfields in the SurmaValley and the lines of communicationleading to them.

(e) The construction of oil pipelines.

Supply and Maintenance.189. The base for our operations in Burma

is, of course, India, and all imported or indi-genous stores pass through the Indian ReserveBase Depots.

The stocks of stores which we intended tohold on both the northern and southernlines were sixty days' working stock plusthirty days' reserve.

Stores from the Indian Reserve Bases aredelivered to Advanced Bases in the Four-teenth Army area, which, for Arakan, arelocated about Chittagong and Mymensingh,and, for the northern line, at Gauhati andManipur Road.

190. Arakan Front: During the last sixmonths, ail average of some 64,000 tons monthlyhas been moved through the port qf Chitta-gong. A further 4,600 tons is shipped directfrom Calcutta to the small ports south ofChittagong. The railway "lift" in this area,ex India, has averaged, over the same period,19,000 tons monthly.

The northern part of East Bengal is servedby Mymensingh from which the requirementsof the air force, reserve formations in thedistrict, and the air supply base airfields aremet.

The Chittagong depots supply the Arakan,using road, sea and inland water transport.

191. Assam Front: For the first three monthsof the year, the line of communication onthis front was unable to meet in full theheavy demands of both the British and UnitedStates forces. From the beginning of April1944, however, its capacity has been notablyimproved and it can now lift the full require-ments of the Allies; the tonnage having risen,in the last six months, from some 3,800 tonsper diem to 5,200.


From our railhead at Dimapur, a long roadline of communication leads up to. andbeyond, Imphal. Before the Japaneseadvance in March, a division was fighting be-yond Tamu, which is 195 miles from rail-head, and another was engaged south of Tid-dim. 300 miles from railhead. Imphal is 135miles from Dimapur.

192. The maintenance of Special Force wasentirely by air. For this purpose, bases atairfields in East Bengal were originallyorganized and stocked, but at a later stagein the planning, the base was transferred to theSurma Valley, and from the airfields theremaintenance by supply-dropping and -landinghas been carried out throughout the operations.

193. The building up of stocks on boththe northern and southern lines was a matterof some anxiety during the earlier part of theperiod. On the southern line, the capacityof the port of Chittagong, in spite of progres-sive expansion, barely kept pace with theneeds of the forces, while on the northernline of communication, the total capacityavailable until April was only just sufficientjfor maintenance. Reserve stocks of manycommodities, especially petrol, fell to dan-gerously low levels.

194. A supply difficulty which exists in bothAssam and Arakan is that, with the excep-tion of the rice crop which barely meets theneeds of the civil population, no foodstuffsare obtainable in either area. In Bengal lastyear, this caused famine; and in parts ofAssam the local inhabitants can barely sup-port themselves. This imposed on the Armythe need for importing fresh meat, vegetables,fruit, etc., from distant areas over difficult,lines of communication; and of having tosupply large quantities of tinned and de-hydrated substitutes to rectify deficiencies inthe fresh ration.

195. I have already mentioned the extentto which air supply has developed, but thesubject is of such outstanding importance thatthe following figures are of interest. Fromthe 8th to the 21st February, when theJapanese attack severed the communications of7 Indian Division, a total of 923 tons of sup-plies of all types was dropped on the sur-rounded elements of that division. Themonth's total for February of air-dropped sup-plies in Arakan was 2,710 tons. In April,the total tonnage dropped was: —

Arakan, 1,316 (for 81 (West African) Divi-sion in the Kaladan Valley).

Special Force, 1,073.

From the 16th April to the 22nd June (thedate of the re-opening of the Kohima—Imphal road), the amount flown into Imphalfor 4 Corps was 13,155 tons. Nearly 10,000casualties were evacuated by air from Imphalbetween these dates.

196. The operation of road transport be-tween railhead (Dimapur) and Imphal, andforward thereof, is also of interest. A " roundthe clock" or L.G.O.C.* system has been

* L.G.O.C. = London General Omnibus Company(which was absorbed into the London PassengerTransport Board).

adopted which works throughout the twenty-four hours. Vehicles run independently,drivers being changed at intervals which givethem adequate rest. The following figurescover the month of January:—

Number of task vehicles ... 1,321Tonnage delivered 47J304Total mileage run 4,463,454Average daily mileage per

vehicle 110Casualties:

(a) Miles per accident ... 19,239(b) Vehicles evacuated ... 103

At this tune, as already mentioned, divi-sions had to be supplied up to 300 miles fromrailhead. Much of this is narrow and dangerousmountain road and I think the above figuresdemonstrate the efficiency of Indian lorrydrivers.

197. The importance of labour in an un-developed Eastern Theatre cannot be over-stated. The construction of hundreds of milesof railways, roads, and pipelines; the prepara-tion of new airfields and the expansion ofexisting ones; transportation works on thelines of communication, including port de-velopment; the expansion of hospitals,depots and camps in rear areas, etc., all meanan unending demand for more and morelabour.

On the 1st May, the figure of organizedlabour employed by Fourteenth Army wasover 178,000, while demands for a further18,600 were under examination. In additionto this, some 200,000 civilian (contractor)labour was employed on Army projects. Thesefigures include labour supplied to the UnitedStates forces. In spite of this total of nearly400,000, the deficit on this date was 31.400.

198. As regards supplies, the two mostpressing problems have been the provision offresh foodstuffs, and of petrol.

I have already mentioned that dehydratedmeat and vegetables were being supplied tomeet the inadequacy of fresh supplies. I mayadd that every encouragement and assistanceis given to units to grow their own vegetableswhere this is practicable.

A Local Resources branch of the staff,assisted by an agricultural expert borrowedfrom the Government of Assam, which isbringing some 18,000 acres under vegetablecultivation, was established. Pig breeding,goat rearing, and chicken farming have alsobeen planned on an extensive scale.

199. The supply of petrol and lubricants,including those for aviation, has caused someanxiety. The monthly quantities, to be suppliedthrough Army channels, were estimated lastMay to exceed eleven and a quarter milliongallons, of which nearly half was high gradeaviation spirit.

In spite of the progressive improvement inthe capacity of our lines of communication,which has been more than doubled sinceDecember 1943, it has not been found possibleas yet to do more than provide the quantitiesfor maintenance. The ever increasing demandsof our Allies in Upper Assam have continuedto tax our oil resources. I do not foreseemuch improvement in the situation until morepipelines have been finished.


200. Before leaving the subject of supply andmaintenance, there are two matters whichdeserve notice.

The first is the projected reorganization ofmechanical transport in the Royal IndianArmy Service Corps. At present, there are noless than eight types of M.T. units—an organi-zation which is both wasteful in manpower,and insufficiently flexible, as well as possessingother disadvantages. My recommendation toGeneral Headquarters, India, that the existingeight types should be reduced to three, hasbeen accepted, and the new reorganization isbeing adopted.

The second point of interest affects the Veteri-nary Service. In order that animals with SpecialForce should not betray the position of ourtroops in operations behind the enemy's lines,a muting operation was performed. This hasachieved its object and there has been no lossof efficiency.

The Engineering Effort.201. I have already described (with one ex-

ception—the Ledo Road) development of therailways, roads and pipelines and I have alsomentioned airfield construction. The latter,however, merits more detailed description. Ipropose, too, to touch on bridging, which is soimportant in this Theatre, and, also, to discussbriefly the general problem of rapid road con-struction across mountain barriers or throughthick jungle tracts, for on its solution thesuccess of future operations will largely depend.

202. The Ledo Road. This road, which, inconjunction with air supply, is the line of com-munication of General Stilwell's Chinese-American forces operating in Northern Burma,has not been described because it does notform part of Fourteenth Army's northern lineof communication. It is, of course, entirelyunder American control and, begun by British,is being 'built by American engineers.

It is now " all-weather two-way" to justnorth of Shaduzup and the intention is to com-plete it through to Myitkyina in another threemonths. Roadhead and railhead are to be atNamti, six miles north-east of Mogaung.

203. Airfields. Airfield construction in thearea under my control can be divided intothree categories: construction in the Four-teenth Army area; construction in North-EastAssam for the United States Army Au: Force,which is primarily in connection with the air-lift to China; and construction in Ceylon.

There were eighteen main airfields in theFourteenth Army area last November. Sincethat date, three more large fields have beenbegun and the others have been made up to anall-weather standard.

For future operations, .as outlined by theChiefs of Staff at the end of March, it becamenecessary to build airfields adequate to allowadditional transport to operate during the mon-soon. In consultation with Air Command,South-Hast Asia, it was decided to increasethe capacity of fifteen of the existing twenty-one airfields and to raise the standard toadmit of their use by Dakotas and certain typesof bombers.

204. On the 1st April 1944, the respon-sibility for the completion and upkeep of theAmerican airfields in North-East Assam was

transferred from General Headquarters, India,to 11 Army Group. There are eleven mainairfields in this area, all of which have nowbeen completed to all-weather standard, withthe exception of two which have been allotteda low priority by the Commanding General,United States Air Forces, China-Burma-IndiaTheatre.

205. Airfields in Ceylon are built by theAir Ministry Works Department, but theyremain the responsibility of the Chief Engineer,Ceylon Army Command. There are nine mainairfields on the island, work on the improve-ment and extension of which continues.

206. It would have been quite impossible toattain the target dates fixed for the completionof this large-scale expansion by using normalmaterials such as concrete. Use has, there-fore, been made of the new (and hitherto un-tried) bitumenized hessian (" Bithess ") processfor the provision of all-weather standings andrunways. This material prevents water pene-trating the ground which accordingly retainsits full bearing capacity in wet weather. Theexperiment has already proved a success andmay be of great value in future operationsin a Theatre where monsoon rainfall is soheavy.

The magnitude of the engineering effort in-volved in airfield construction may be judgedfrom .the fact that, for the American airfieldsin North-East Assam alone, some 16,000British military officers and men and 45,000civil labour under British military supervision,are employed.

207. River Crossings, (a) The problem hithis Theatre is complicated by the width ofobstacles (the Chindwin and Myittha Riversat Kalewa are some 330 yards and 200 yardsacross respectively in the .'dry season); thespeed of current; the great seasonal variationin water levels; and the presence of floatingdebris. Wide rivers can, of course, only bebridged quickly by using floating equipment, asthe construction of piers is a major engineeringtask, but the factors mentioned above,especially fast currents, render the anchoringof floating bridges precarious.

To overcome these difficulties, a bridge(known as the Falls bridge) has recently beendesigned and satisfactorily tested. It is com-posed of steel pontoons—widely spaced toadmit of the passage of debris—with a Baileysuperstructure, and with a large gantry at eachend to control the landing ibay during themarked variations which occur in water level.

Other measures, which are under investiga-tion, include a proposal that only assault equip-ment should be carried in divisions, bridgingcompanies to be Army or Corps Troops. Ex-periments .are also being undertaken to pro-duce a standard type of vehicle capable ofcarrying all bridging loads.

(V) The alternative method of crossing riversby ferry assumes a special significance in thisTheatre owing, not only to the width of gaps,but to the fact that the water level is liable tosuch sudden changes.

Ferrying is largely resorted to on the linesof communication, especially on theBrahmaputra.


Speeding-up Communications.208. The rate of building all-weather roads

in mountainous or thick jungle country hasnever -amounted to more than one third of amile a day. This is not fast enough to supporta major land operation. The methods by whichmovement can be accelerated, particularlyacross physical barriers, are:—

(a) By the carriage of formations withweapons and M.T. in aircraft and gliders.

(6) By cutting jeep tracks in advance ofthe all-weather main road axis.

(c) By the deployment of the maximumpossible engineer force and equipment, withthe <aid of aircraft, along the proposed align-ment.Both (a) and (b) restrict the size of modern

transport. The only way in which largervehicles can be transported by air is by sodesigning them that they can be broken downfor air transport and re-assembled quickly onlanding.

As regards (c), the deployment of an engineerforce along a road alignment can only be doneif no interference by the enemy is likely.

209. This presupposes the extensive use ofairborne troops in an initial operation, tosecure focal areas on the line of advance fromwhich engineers and their machines can workin several directions simultaneously and thusrapidly provide <a road artery. Without suchan artery, operations for permanent occupa-tion will be seriously hampered.

Assuming that aircraft and landing fieldsfor gliders are available for such operations,there remains the necessity for designing typesof mechanical equipment which can be brokendown for transportation by air and re-assembledquickly -after landing. The mechanical equip-ment at present transportable by air is eithertoo small or, in the larger types, takes too longto assemble.

210. The crossing of mountain and junglebarriers can be accelerated by the use of air-borne engineers, and airborne engineermachinery and bridging equipment.

The emplacing of engineer detachmentsalong a proposed alignment is a tactical opera-tion.

The provision of engineer equipment for airtravel designed for rapid breakdown and re-assembly, is essential.

Research has reached an advanced stage.Steps are also being taken to strengthen theallotment of engineer units under Corps control,to facilitate reinforcement of forwarddivisions or, alternatively, to reduce thedivisional task.

The Civil Affairs Service, Burma.211. The Civil Affairs Service (Burma)

(C.A.S.B.) came into being in February 1943,with the 'appointment of a Chief Civil AffairsOfficer (C.C.A.O.). Originally under the controlof the Commander-in-Chief, India, it wastransferred to the South-East Asia Command,as part of 11 Army Group, on the 1st January1944.

On the 1st January 1944, the SupremeAllied Commander. South-East Asia Com-

mand, assumed full judicial, legislative,executive and administrative responsibility forall the territories of Burma which were thenoccupied, or might at any future time beoccupied, by the forces under his command,and he delegated to the Chief Civil AffairsOfficer full authority to conduct on his behalfthe military administration of the civil popula-tion in these territories.

212. Administration, (a) In the Fort Hertzand Sumprabum Sub-Divisions of theMyitkyina District, the zone of military ad-ministration began to expand in March 1944,Sumprabum itself being re-occupied on the19th March. By the end of that month, thenumber of freed inhabitants had reached 80,000and the administration was in charge of aSenior Civil Affairs Officer, responsible to theDeputy C.C.A.O. at Headquarters, FourteenthArmy.

(b) In the Kamaing Sub-Division the wholeHukawng Valley had been liberated by the31st March, and was similarly in charge of aSenior Civil Affairs Officer.

The number of inhabitants under adminis-tration was 9,000.

(c) The Japanese offensive in March onlyleft some 25,000 tribesmen of the Chin andNaga Hills and Upper Chindwin under theBritish Military Administration, but the situa-tion since that date has changed and the figurehas risen to 186,000.

(d) In Arakan, the line has fluctuated duringthe past six months. At the end of March,the administered civil population was 100,000.

213. Supplies. The replacement of the Gov-ernment of Burma Directorate of Supply by aC.A.S.B. Lines of Communication organizationbecame effective in November 1943. Only inexceptional cases is this organization allowedto purchase locally in the open market;normally, it obtains its requirements fromArmy depots.

214. Police. Early in 1944, the InspectorGeneral of Police, Burma, joined the C.A.S.B.as Chief of Police, bringing with him a largepart of the organization he had built up sincethe evacuation. The Intelligence Bureau,established for the collection of informationconcerning civilians on conditions in enemy-occupied territory, was absorbed into theC.A.S.B., but the Burma Police Depot (inIndia) remains for the time being under theGovernment of Burma.

215. Public Health. A controller of MedicalServices was appointed to the C.A.S.B. inFebruary, from the Government of Burma.

The frontier fringes are served by smallhospitals and dispensaries.

216. Welfare. The C.A.S.B. WelfareOrganization, under a Staff Officer, CivilAffairs, began work in January, when the

'recruitment of field staff began.Plans for this organization to work in the

Hukawng Valley, and in 4 Corps' area (NagaHills, Upper Chindwin and Chin Hills), werenot put into effect. The Commanding Generalof the Sino-American forces operating in theHukawng Valley decided that he did not re-quire its services, and the Japanese offensivenullified plans for 4 Corps' area. These planshave not been prepared in vain.


In Arakan, there was the problem of villagersrendered homeless by military operations, and,at present some 50,000 civilians are beingaccommodated, supervised, and supplied underthe auspices of the welfare organization.

217. Representation in China. In November1943, an officer of the C.A.S.B. was, with theapproval of the War Office, attached to thestaff of our Assistant Military Attache atKunming (China) to advise on Civil Affairsmatters generally and, in particular, on politicalquestions arising out of the operations of theChinese forces over the Burma border fromYunnan.

218. Future Commitments. While adminis-tering the relatively small area of Burmawhich is at present under our control, we havealso to look forward to the future, when thewhole of Burma is re-occupied and returnsunder British Military Administration.

With this in view, it has recently beendecided to combine into a single team theC.A.S.B. planning team and the Governmentof Burma planning team, for the preparationof a two-year plan covering, from every aspect,the re-establishment of the administrative andeconomic life of Burma. This will, I hope,ensure continuity, and a fair start for theAdministration when conditions permit of theGovernment of Burma taking over the countryfrom the C.A.S.B.

Tribute.219. I referred in my introductory remarks

on administration to the well known fact thatthe success or failure of an army is largelydependent on the efficiency of rear organiza-tion. It follows, therefore, that the successeswhich the Fourteenth Army has achieved areattributable, in no small measure, to the mag-nificent work of the rearward services. I havegiven some indication of the size and com-plexity of the problems which have had to betackled. That they have been, or are being,solved, is due to the skill and determinationdisplayed both by the Administrative Staff andServices of 11 Army Group and its subordinateformations, and the Commander-in-Chief,India, and his staff who not only laid thefoundations on which we have built, but onwhose administrative support we continue todepend.

Location of Headquarters.220. I cannot finish this Despatch without

referring to the difficulties by which I wascontinually hampered in commanding and ad-ministering 11 Army Group by the decisionof the Supreme Allied Commander to movehis H.Q. to Kandy in Ceylon in April 1944.*

Before South-East Asia Command was setup in October 1943, the Commander-in-Chief,India, commanded the land forces operatingagainst the Japanese and the roots of theArmy, which was predominantly Indian, weredeeply embedded in India. It was obviousthat, even after the transfer of command to

• War Office footnote—The views of the SupremeAllied Commander and his reasons for the move toCeylon are set out in Part A., paragraphs 12-14 of hisReport, " South-East Asia, 1943-1945."

the Supreme Allied Commander, very closeadministrative connection between the twoCommands would be necessary and indeedorders were issued by the Chiefs of Staff thatthe forces of S.E.A.C. would be based uponIndia. It was clear that the relationship be-tween G.H.Q. India and 11 Army Group whichwas formed to command and administer theBritish land forces of S.E.A.C. would have tobe very intimate.

The formation of H.Q. 11 Army Group wasslow, for while it was possible for the Com-mander-in-Chief, India, to provide some ofthe officers and clerks required, it was clearthat the majority of both would have to comefrom outside India; and as the needs of othertheatres of war were urgent many monthselapsed before these officers and men could besent. It was, in consequence, impossible forH.Q. 11 Army Group to move with H.Q.S.E.A.C. in April owing to shortage of staff,much of whose work had still to be done byG.H.Q., India.

The decision of the Supreme Allied Com-mander to move his H.Q. in April, therefore,entailed the splitting—difficult for any staffhowever efficient—of H.Q. 11 Army Groupbefore it was fully formed, because it wasnecessary for me to be represented at Kandy.I had to send my M.G. G.S., the most seniorofficer on my staff, as I had no other officerof adequate experience. This was a gravehandicap to the efficient formation and train-ing of the staff and to me. I had in addition tosend with him some 40 officers and the neces-sary clerks. As no, telephone communicationsexisted—the highest' priority telegrams tookseveral hours and letters not less than 3 days—consultation between my main H.Q. atDelhi and the Advanced H.Q. at Kandy wasslow and difficult.

In addition to the work at Delhi, I had ofcourse continually to visit the forward troopsand the Commander, Fourteenth Army, tocontrol operations. I could only makeoccasional visits to Kandy, a journey to whichfrom Delhi or Calcutta took more than 12hours, except in the fastest aircraft. I wascompelled to do much unnecessary travelling.

I pointed out on several occasions the veryserious disadvantages of trying to controloperations in Assam and Arakan from a H.Q.more than 1,500 miles from either area, with-out telephones, with slow telegraphic and long,and at certain times of the year unreliableair communication; further that the Air Com-Imander responsible for the support of theArmy would not be at Kandy. I continuedto press for the establishment of H.Q. 11 ArmyGroup at Calcutta. In August it was at lastagreed that H.Q. 11 Army Group should moveto the Calcutta area but much time had beenlost and the move could not be completed untilthe beginning of December, at which momentoperations would be in progress.

Acknowledgements.221. My thanks are due to many officers for

their ungrudging assistance, but it is not pos-sible to mention more than a few of them.


To General Sir Claude Auchinleck myprincipal thanks are due, because without hiswholehearted and generous support and wiseadvice, 11 Army Group could not haveachieved success. I can never adequatelyexpress my gratitude for all he has done.

I should also like to include in my thanksto him my gratitude to his staff for their un-selfish help during many months.

I wish also to thank Air Chief Marshal SirRichard Peirse, and the R.A.F. and theU.S.A.A.F. for their magnificent support dur-ing the fighting in Arakan, Assam and inCentral and Northern Burma.

Admiral Sir James Somerville gave everyassistance possible to the Army, though re-sources did not permit of a major combinedoperation.

Upon Lieut.-General Slim, Commander,Fourteenth Army, fell the brunt of operationsand well and truly did he stand up to thestrain of the continuous and heavy fightingwhich began in February and ended in August.He remained unshaken during the Japaneseoffensive and was quick to take advantage ofopportunities to counter-attack. To him is duethe resounding victory achieved by FourteenthArmy this year.

Lieut.-General Scoones greatly distinguishedhimself in command of 4 Corps upon whichthe principal strain of the fighting fell duringthe operations round Imphal between Februaryand June. Lieut.-General Christison in com-mand of 15 Indian Corps in Arakan first de-feated the Japanese in Burma. He has shownfine qualities of leadership.

Lieut.-General Stopford, Commander, 33Corps, showed great staying power, professionalknowledge and dash in the operations whichresulted finally in opening the Kohima—Imphalroad.

To my own staff; officers, N.C.Os. and men ;I owe the greatest debt of gratitude for theirsplendid support and their fine team work.Always shorthanded, split into two with onedetachment 1,500 miles from the other, theyhave never failed to do the work which hascontinued steadily to increase.

It is difficult to single out from so many first-rate officers and men, many individuals forspecial praise, but I must mention particularlymy two principal Staff Officers upon whom feflspecial responsibility.

Major-General I. S. O. Playfair, M.G., G.S.,has been the greatest help to me throughout,but especially after the staff was split in Aprilwhen he went to Kandy as my representative.There, the whole responsibility for represent-ing my point of view to the Supreme AlliedCommander fell upon him. I relied entirelyupon his unfailing judgment, strength ofcharacter and tact and he never failed me.

Major-General E. N. Goddard, M.G.A.,II Army Group, must have carried one of theheaviest administrative loads in any theatre ofwar. No man could have discharged his dutieswith more unsparing devotion and no opera-tions could have succeeded if his work had notbeen of the highest standard.

APPENDIX "A"Skeleton Order of Battle, 15 Indian Corps,

1st January 1944.

5 Indian Division.9 Indian Infantry Brigade.123 Indian Infantry Brigade.161 Indian Infantry Brigade.



81 (West African) Division.5 (West African) Infantry Brigade.6 (West African) Infantry Brigade.

Note: 3 (West African) Brigade formed partof Special Force.

APPENDIX " B "

Skeleton Order of Battle, 4 Corps,8th March 1944.

17 Indian Light Division.48 Indian Infantry Brigade.63 Indian Infantry Brigade.

Note: This formation comprised only twobrigades, but it included a Divisional Head-quarters Battalion, a Divisional Signals Bat-talion, and a Divisional ReconnaissanceBattalion.



50 Indian Parachute Brigade (less one Bat-talion).

254 Indian Tank Brigade.

Note: For comparison with the Order ofBattle of 33 Corps at the end of May (videAppendix "C"), the following formationsmust be added to those shown above: —

5 Indian Division (less 161 Brigade).89 Indian Infantry Brigade (7 Indian

Division).

APPENDIX "C"

Skeleton Order of Battle, 33 Indian Corps,31st May 1944.

2 British Division.4 Infantry Brigade.5 Infantry Brigade.6 Infantry Brigade.

7 Indian Division.33 Indian Infantry Brigade.161 Indian Infantry Brigade (from 5

Indian Division).Note: 89 Brigade was under 4 Corps, and

114 Brigade en route from the Arakan Front.


268 Indian Infantry Brigade (Lorried).

Lushai Brigade.3 Special Service Brigade (two Commandos).

Corps Troops:149 Regiment, R.A.C.7 K.O.Y.L.I. (less one squadron).11 Cavalry.

Headquarters 21 Indian Division.(late H.Q., 44 Indian Armoured Division).

Note: This Headquarters, which had be-come available on the disbandment of 44Indian Armoured Division in India, assumedoperational control of the lines of communica-tion of 33 Corps.

APPENDIX "D"Skeleton Order of Battle, 11 Army Group,

South-East Asia Command, 22nd June 1944.FOURTEENTH ARMY.

Special Force.36 British Division.

4 Corps.5 Indian Division (less 151 Brigade).7 Indian Division (less 33 Brigade).17 Indian Light Division.

20 Indian Division.23 Indian Division.50 Indian Parachute Brigade.

33 Corps.2 British Division.21 Indian Division.161 Brigade, 5 Indian Division.33 Brigade. 7 Indian Division.

15 Indian Corps.25 Indian Division.26 Indian Division.81 (West African) Division.

CEYLON ARMY COMMAND.11 (East African) Division.Garrisons of the Indian Ocean bases at

Addu Atoll, Diego Garcia and CocosIslands.Note: i. 82 (West African) Division was

about to arrive.Note: ii. The strength of forces in Northern

Burma not under the operational control of11 Army Group was:—

Fort Hertz area 2,012American forces 65,784Chinese forces 147,396


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100° I2C"

LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1951

Price 2s. Qd. net

P R I N T E D I N G R E A T B R I T A I N

S.O. Code No. 65-39171

SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette - ibiblio

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