SUPPLEMENT - ibiblio

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SUPPLEMENTTO

Of TUESDAY, the $th of NOVEMBER, 1946

byRegistered as a newspaper

WEDNESDAY, 6 NOVEMBER, 1946The War 'Office,

November, 1946.

OPERATIONS IN NORTH WEST AFRICA FROM 8th NOVEMBER 1942TO i3th MAY 1943.

PREFACE BY THE WAR OFFICE.The Anglo-American expedition to French

North Africa, discussed from the time of theUnited States entry into the war and finallyapproved in July, 1942, had as its main objectsthe securing of French Morocco and Algeriawith a view to the earliest possible occupationof Tunisia. >It was also' hoped to secure com-munications through the Mediterranean. For itssuccess it depended partly on surprise andpartly upon the degree of opposition or assist-ance which might be offered by the Frenchforces in North Africa.

The forces available for this operation werepartly British and it was advisable that these,with their more recent operational experience,should play a leading part in the early stagesof the campaign. On the other hand, the UnitedStates had maintained relations with the VichyGovernment, whereas the British Governmenthad recognised the movement headed byGeneral De Gaulle. It was thought that, forthis and other reasons, a United States expedi-tion would find more local support in NorthAfrica than an expedition in which Britishtroops were foremost. Accordingly, anAmerican officer, Lieutenant - GeneralEisenhower, was appointed Commander-in-Chief, with a British officer, Lieutenant-GeneralAnderson, as Commander of the Eastern TaskForce on which the burden of the initial fightingwas likely to fall. It was planned, furthermore,that American troops should participate largelyin the assault phase including the eastern land-ing, and that Lieutenant-General Andersonshould not assume command until after thatphase should be ended. His despatch com-mences, therefore, some two days after theoperation began.

The landings in North Africa extended over awide front from Casablanca to Algiers. TheWestern and Central Task Forces met littlesustained opposition, but the move of the

Eastern Task Force into Tunisia was counteredby the simultaneous, and practically unopposed,arrival of German troops, many of whom cameby air. General Anderson's force, after initialfailure to reach Tunis and Bizerta, was thenreinforced, partly by sea and partly by troopsmoving overland from Casablanca and Oran.By this process First British Army was formedtogether with 2 U.S. Corps.

Eighth Army, meanwhile, was making pro-gress in Tripolitania, and it was decided, at aConference held in Casablanca in January,1943, that this Army would come under GeneralEisenhower's command when it crossed theborder into Tunisia. This actually occurred inFebruary, the forces then uniting to form18 Army Group, immediately under the controlof General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief.

This despatch covers, therefore, the opera-tions of First Army up to the conclusion of thecampaign. It also covers the operations of2 U.S. Corps and 19 French Corps during aperiod (ending i8th'February, 1943), in whichthey were co-ordinated, and finally commanded,by General Anderson.

The fallowing despatch was submitted to theSecretary of State for War on 'jth June, 1943, •by LIEUTENANT GENERAL K. A. N.ANDERSON, C.B., M.C., GENERALOFFICER COMMAN DING-IN-CHIEF,FIRST ARMY.

8th November, 1942-13̂ May, 1943.

INTRODUCTION.The initial assault landings in ^orth Africa

on night 7th/8th November, 1942, were under-taken entirely by United States troops, except atAlgiers. There, the British n Infantry BrigadeGroup and two Commandos (all on assaultscale) landed simultaneously with the troops ofUnited States 34 Infantry Division, while »

5450 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 6 NOVEMBER, 1946

second Brigade Group of 78 Division was infloating reserve. The whole operation wasunder command of Major-General Ryder,United States 34 Infantry Division.

Although nominal opposition was offered insome quarters the landing was on the wholeunopposed, and by 1600 hours envoys werereceived to discuss terms: after that time onlysporadic fighting continued. On Qth NovemberAlgiers harbour was opened and the unloadingof ships began.

Once this landing had been completed underAmerican auspices, the r61e allotted to FirstArmy was to establish a base at Algiers and tooccupy Eastern Algeria and Tunisia as speedilyas possible.

So, on gth November, si left Gibraltar by air,landed at Maison Blanche airfield with a verysmall skeleton staff and took over command,immediately directing Major-General Evelegh('Commander British' 78 Division) to carry outthe prearranged plan for the capture of Bougieport and Djidjelli airfield with 36 InfantryBrigade Group, assisted by naval forces undercommand of Captain N. V. Dickinson, D.S.C.,R.N.

And, on the final cessation of French opposi-tion on loth November, it became possible toredispose the forces available for the advanceeast. Orders were therefore given for alltroops of 78 Division and the two Commandosto revert to command of 78 Division, while allother British troops were placed temporarilyunder command of 34 United States Division,which was charged with the security of the portof Algiers and the vital airfields at MaisonBlanche and Blida.

If I was to forestall the Axis hi Tunis andBizerta, speed was quite vital.

Previous to leaving the United Kingdom Ihad prepared three alternative plans to meetthe case of:—

(«) French resistance on a considerablescale.

(b) Short-lived resistance followed by non-co-operation or at least a period of confusion,or

(c) Active collaboration.The same governing principles held good in

each case—namely, seizure of coastal airfieldsand immediate installation of fighters, as a pre-liminary to the successive capture of the portsof Bougie, Philippeville, Bone and La Calle;together with the most rapid advance of myland forces by motor transport, landing craftand troop-carrying aircraft.

I must state here that when in the planningstage it was decided that no assault landingshould be made East of Algiers, then, in myopinion, my chance disappeared of reachingTunis before the Germans, unless the Frenchput up a stout resistance to Axis entry intoTunisia.* In actual fact, the French resisted

* General Anderson refers, in this (passage, toplans which were discussed, but eventually aban-doned, for landings at Bone and Philippeville in addi-tion to that at Algiers. The principal argumentsagainst landing so far to the eastwards were basedupon—

(a) The need to concentrate the relatively smallforces which could be landed; and

(b) The danger of venturing without air coverinto ports which the German bombers could reach.The reality of the .bombing danger was proved

•by the shipping losses incurred at Bougie. Furtherto the east still heavier losses might have beenexpected, with proportionately serious results.

us in Algiers (feeble though their resistance-was, yet its consequent repercussions causeddelay and doubt) and did not resist the Axisin Tunisia. The first German landings at ElAouana airport on gth November were notopposed.

36 Brigade landed unopposed at Bougieon nth November and took over the port.The battalion destined to seize the airfield atDjidjelli and stock it with petrol was, 'however,unable to land by sea owing to the swell andwent on by road from Bougie, not reachingDjidjelli until I3th November. This delayunfortunately prevented our fighters operatingfrom the airfield and, as a result, the enemybombers sank several ships in Bougie harbourbefore air cover could be provided. Losses inpersonnel were not high but in equipment wereconsiderable, and the infantry were, for sometime to come, operating only with what theycould carry and in the clothes they wore whenthey left their ships.

The distances covered and the feats achievedby the brigades of 78 Division (in particular 36Brigade) operating with a very reduced scale offirst and second line transport, and with nothird line, were one of the features of theearly stages of 'the campaign. Similarly, owingto convoy limitations, aggravated by losses atsea, it was not possible to provide adequatetransport for port clearance and other line ofcommunication duties. This had serious reper-cussion on maintenance; ships could not becleared, congestion occurred on the quays, anddepots could not be kept filled to meetdemands. Furthermore, an immensely longline of communication was created by the rapidadvance eastwards, with very meagre railwayresources that could not be properly co-ordinated or developed owing to limitations ofstaff. All these factors contributed to a situa-tion that gave rise to great anxiety for sometime.

The campaign can henceforth be dividedinto three main phases: —

(a) A race for Tunis and Bizerta, under-taken by a small force on assault or lightscales and consequently much understrengthin men and equipment.

We just failed to win this race, aftersome bitter fighting in bad weather whichgave us our first experience of Tunisian mud.This phase ended soon after Christmas, 1942.

(b) The period 28th December, 1942, to27th March, 1943, during which both sideswere building up their forces and attemptingto hold on to or seize ground important forthe future, while we also struggled incessantlyto improve our immensely long communica-tions. We were mainly on the defensive,suffered from an acute shortage of infantry,and were often very hard pressed in the

• mountainous country. I was forced to usethe infantry battalions of 6 Armoured Divi-sion on ordinary infantry tasks of holding asector of the front, away from the armouredbrigade; and this misuse of the armoureddivisional infantry continued up to the endof February, 1943. It is some consolationto know that the Germans had to do exactlythe same with the infantry of 10 PanzerDivision. Our greatest asset was our pre-ponderance in artillery, and the frontseemed at times largely held by artillery firealone. The term " front " is deceptive. We

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 6 NOVEMBER, 1946 5451

covered the main passes through the moun-tains with small forces of up to a brigadegroup; the gaps between these defendedareas varied from 10-18 miles as the crowflies. These spaces . were inadequatelypatrolled by both sides.

(c) An offensive period, starting with ourcounter-attack at Djebel Abiod on 28thMarch,, and ending with the final destructionof the Axis forces in Africa on i3th May,1943-But before narrating the march of events,

I must refer to certain factors which intimatelyaffected my decisions and actions on manyoccasions. They form the background to theadventure on which First Army was embarked.

(a) First and foremost was the matter ofCommand.* In the early days, when myforces were weak, General Eisenhower gaveme every atom of help in his power by order-ing up units of the United States Forces from'Oran and Casablanca to help my advancedtroops in their forward rash. • These UnitedStates units arrived piecemeal, as fast as the"very limited road and rail facilities could carrythem, and had perforce to be employed aspart and parcel of the British forces underBritish brigade or divisional -commanders, andnot independently as all of us would havewished. That the resulting friction was sosmall speaks volumes for the real desire to pulltogether which animated all parties. As soon aspossible, United States units were concentrated

' under United States formation commanders,and continued for many weeks to co-operateclosely and happily with*our officers and menunder command of 78 Division and 5 Corps.But it was long before our total Allied strengthreached a point at which each nation could bemade entirely responsible for its own particularsector.

The advent of the French as our active alliesproduced fresh complications in commandwhich grew as the front increased. In thenorth were six battalions under General Barre,operating with, but not at first under commandof, 5 Corps; in the centre the main Frenchforces were concentrating in the Le Kef-Teboursouk area; in the south another forceof about eight battalions was in the area Gafsa-Tebessa working with the small mobile UnitedStates force operating there, who were nomi-nally under command of the French.

British mobile units were also, later, in thesouth under United States command for recon-naissance duties, while for several months FirstArmy had to co-ordinate, and in most casesprovide, the entire movement and supplyorganisation and most of the signal communica-tions for all three nationalities.

The more the campaign progressed the moreobvious it became that unified command wasquite essential to avoid a chaotic muddle. ButGeneral Giraud would not agree to placingFrench troops under British command, whilehis manifold other responsibilities preventedGeneral Eisenhower personally exercising thecommand himself from a forward headquarters.

* The difficulties about command which GeneralAnderson describes arose, in part, from political con-siderations, and especially from the need to con-ciliate the Fxench Command. At this stage in thewar, however, much had still to be learnt about thecommand of allied armies in the field. It was as aresult of the lessons learnt in this compaign thatlater organisation was so greatly improved.

A v

So a series of compromises and makeshifts wasadopted in the course of which I', graduallyand as commander of the only formationequipped and able to undertake the task,became in turn adviser, co-ordinator and,finally, commander of the whole Tunisian front.None of these steps was satisfactory, and evenas commander I lacked the physical means tocontrol efficiently so large a front of well over200 miles.

The situation was not righted until 18 ArmyGroup was formed later under GeneralAlexander, who then took 2 United StatesCorps directly under his own control, leavingme with the British and French forces only—covering at the time a front of 120 miles.

(b) Another constant hindrance, already re-.ferred to, was closely related to the problemof command—the inter-mingling of units ofthe three Allied Armies. Obviously it is hope-lessly unsound both for tactical and adminis-trative reasons to mix troops in this way, butthe chain of events as the campaign unfoldedforced it upon me. It was my constant pre-occupation to tidy up the mess, and give eachnation its own sector, but this was not finallyaccomplished until mid-March when the steadily.increasing Allied strength at last enabled thefinal transfers to be arranged—always except-ing the retention of a considerable amount of'British artillery with French 19 Corps rightup to the end of hostilities and the use any-where on the front, in the mountains, of thespecialised Goums from Morocco.*

(c) The state of the French Army and feelingthroughout the country.—I have no intentionof touching on politics except in so far as theyinfluenced operations. But in the early days ofthis campaign, politics intruded everywhere.The loyalties of all French officers were sharplydivided, and many, even of those who hadtaken the plunge and sided with the Allies, werestill openly expressing loyalty to the Marshal.Even while I was pressing forward with allvigour General Barre was still negotiating withGeneral von Arnim in Tunis. This may havebeen a clever move to gain time, and I am nowinclined to this view; but at the moment it didnot inspire me with confidence. Many mayors,station- and post-masters and other key officialswith whom we had dealings as we advanced(for instance, the civil telephone was, at first,my chief means of communicating with myforward units and with Allied Force Head-quarters) were lukewarm in their sympathiesand hesitant to commit themselves openly,while a 'few were hostile. I can safelygeneralise by saying that at first, in the Army,the senior officers were ihesitant and afraid tocommit themselves, the junior officers weremainly in favour of aiding the Allies, the menwould obey orders; amongst the people, theArabs were indifferent or inclined to be hostile,the French were in our favour but apathetic,the civil authorities were antagonistic as awhole. The resulting impression on my mindwas not one of much confidence as to thesafety of my small isolated force should I suffera severe set-back.

But from the moment General Barre refusedthe final German ultimatum on igth November,the situation began to change. We met hence-forth with increasing assistance and courtesy

* Goums are Moroccan troops trained in MountainWarfare.


and our relations with the Army and civilianshave grown closer and better every day. AFrench Army, under General Juin, amountingto a nominal thirty-two battalions of infantryand some hundred and twenty guns (when allwas assembled), was ordered to mobilise. Itsmission in November 1942 was to cover theright flank of the Allied Forces while they de-ployed. Later, the main body gradually movedeastward, with only minor contact with Italianpatrols, to the line of the Eastern Dorsale byearly January 1943. While six battalions re-mained in the British area around Oued Zarga-Medjez and several battalions continued to workwith the Americans in the south.

The French mobilisation plan was preparedonly for a campaign of 6-8 weeks. The equip-ment of the Army was lamentable; no anti-aircraft or .anti-tank weapons, rifles and gunsdating back to the period 1880-1914, no signalequipment or motor transport, no boots orproper clothing, staffs inadequate and not up todate, et cetera. Only in spirit was the Armyformidable, and this spirit was carefully fosteredby Generals Juin and Koeltz and a fine bodyof junior commanders. Co-operation andmutual trust between British and Frenchreached a high level by the end of the cam-paign, but, even to the end, French units werenot capable of offensive action against Germantroops, and could only operate safely in themountainous sectors of the front.

It must be remembered that the FrenchArmy in Africa is largely a native army.

(d) The Line of Communication Adminis-trative difficulties and the build-up of FirstArmy.—Administrative matters are dealt withseparately, but to understand correctly thebackground of this campaign it is essential tobear the following major facts in mind: —

(i) The huge distances. From Algiers toTunis by road is over 560 miles.

(ii) The extremely mountainous nature ofthe country, and that at first only two roadsand an inefficient railway were availableeastwards.

(iii) That the Army was entirely dependenton what it brought overseas with it, in theway of transport, fuel, supplies, &c. Nothingwhatever was available locally; indeed, wehad to supply the railway with coal, andour Allies, out of our none too plentifulstocks, with rations, petrol and other supplies.

First Army did not spring from the seafull-formed like Aphrodite, but grew instature painfully slowly as convoys arrived atfortnightly intervals. The initial rush onTunis was made by a force, at its strongest,equivalent only to one infantry division andone tank regiment on light scales. The lead-ing infantry division (78th) was not completeuntil ist December; ithe next division (6Armoured) was not complete until i5thDecember; 46 Division reached the front bythe first week of February 1943, i Divisionby 22nd March and 4 Division was not fullyassembled until the end of the second weekof April 1943.

For me it was an exasperating period in whichI saw chance after chance disappear for lackof sufficient strength to seize them, and whenreinforcements did arrive the enemy in his turnhad also increased his strength. Always theneed was for more infantry.

(e) Air Support.—In the early stages thiswas bad for obvious and I think mainly un-avoidable reasons. All aircraft had to be flownin from Gibraltar or the United Kingdom; allstores, services, bombs, &c., came by convoy;airfields were few and far between—the nearestserviceable airfield to the forward troops atTebourba in December 1942 being at Bone, 114miles away; the Air Officer Commanding hadto ireet naval demands for protection and hadother calls, in addition to supporting the Army,which tied him to Algiers while I was goingever further eastwards. As the situationstabilised so did our co-operation grow closer;but it was a slow growth and did not reachmaturity until the reorganisation carried out inMarch 1943.* Again, in the early days, thegreat distances, poor means of intercommuni-cation, and the inevitable early troubles whicharise when the forces of two nations are begin-ning to work together all contributed to theundoubted lack of efficient co-operation betweenArmy and Air Forces.

Goodwill there was in plenty, and with in-creasing experience and, above all, improvedmeans of inter-communication the situationimproved. By mid-March 1943, liaison wasexcellent; we were working as one team and,•under Air Commodore Cross, the air supportgiven to First Army in the last stages was in-timate, immediate and intensely powerful.

(/) Weather and the country.—Beforearrival I had imagined North Africa was a drycountry. Although I knew that the winter wasthe wet season in North Africa, none the less,the extent of the rains in the Coastal belt andtheir effect on the roads, on cross-country move-ment, and on the airfields, came as a veryunpleasant surprise. In the northern zone,in which First Army operated, the rains beganin early December and continued until earlyApril. March was the wettest month. Rain,mist and a peculiarly glutinous mud formedthe background to all our operations duringthis period.

Northern Tunisia is a country of highmountains, narrow plains between the ranges,and few roads, with very limited scope forarmoured action. In the south it becomesmuch more open and desert-like, but rockyhills occur 'everywhere.

FIRST PHASE.—THE RACE FOR TUNIS.As I have already stated, on gth November

the first Germans landed at El Aouana airport,Tunis. By ijtih November I had occupiedBougie and Djidjelli.

Every effort was now directed towardsgetting troops east as fast as possible, and anearlier proposal (which was not put into effect)was repeated for a landing at Soiusse by a forcefrom Malta.

The first troops to occupy Bone were twocompanies of 3 Parachute Battalion droppedby air to hold the airfield and 6 Commando,landed by sea on I2th November to seize theport. On nth November a small column ofall arms from n Infantry Brigade Group(known as Hart Force and made mobile by

* Additional factors which, reduced the efficiencyof air support were: —

(a) Lack of all-weather airfields, which couldnot be constructed during the first few months ofthe campaign; and

(6) Lack of line communications iduring a .periodwhen headquarters were frequently moved.


pooling all the available Brigade transport) leftAlgiers by road for Bone, where it arrived onI5th November. By I3th November the moveof 36 Brigade main1 body had started, and onebattalion had arrived at Setif by rail andanother battalion by sea at Bone, where it wasjoined by some artillery and servicing units.The carriers and motor transport of thisbrigade, however, were at this stage still unableto land.

36 Brigade, still on assault scales, lost notime in getting forward. By I5th Novembertheir advance guard had occupied Tabarka,and on i8th November .their leading battalionrepulsed an enemy attack at Djebel Abiod,destroying n tanks and armoured cars. Theother battalions of this Brigade were followingup quickly, and Hart Force, which had ledthe advance all .the way, was operating to theeast of Djebel Abiod. 78 Division had estab-lished their Headquarters at Bone.

On I5th November I Parachute Battalionattempted to drop at Souk el Arba landingground, but was unable to do so until thefollowing day owing to weather conditions.The appearance: of this battalion had a stimu-lating effect on the local French troops. Thebattalion lost no time in getting forward (onfoot and using local transport), and, by iythNovember, was operating north-east fromBeja and in contact with German troops.

While this general move forward was in pro-gress, the follow-up convoy arrived on I3thNovember bringing the 17/21 Lancers Regi-mental Group (later known .:as Blade Force),i Parachute Brigade '(less one battalion) andthe balance to light scales of the transport of78 Division (less one brigade group). Unitsand sub-units of 78 Division and Blade Forcewere moved east as fast as transport was un-loaded, ii Brigade Group being finally con-centrated in the Beja area by 22nd Novemberand Blade Force in the Souk el Arba area by2oth November. Advance Headquarters, FirstArmy, also arrived by the follow-up convoyand, on I3th November, opened up at HotelAlbert, Algiers.

Simultaneously with the advance in thenorth, steps were taken to secure the earlyoccupation of important airfields further south.On I5th November 503 United States ParachuteBattalion dropped at Youks-les-Bains withoutopposition, with a view to making the air-field available for our use. This battalion,under the command of Colonel Raff,operated most energetically from its baseat Youks. On I7th November detachmentsoccupied Gafsa airfield, and mobile patrols inrequisitioned transport roamed widely over thewhole of the southern area, meeting smallItalian forces. Contact was also made andgood relations established with ,the Frenchgarrison at Tebessa, who co-operated in manypatrols.

On i6th November arrangements were madefor my force to be supplemented by the addi-tion of two American tank battalions (onemedium, one light), some armoured infantryand supporting arms, and steps were taken toget these troops up to the forward areas assoon as possible.

By I7th November the enemy strength wasestimated at 500-1,000 fighting personnel in thearea of Tunis and 4,000 at Bizerta, with sometanks in each case; in addition, a considerable

number of- aircraft had been flown in. Theenemy had occupied Mateur and had pushedout west and south-west, in contact with 36Infantry Brigade's advanced troops west ofDjebel Abiod and with the French at Sidi Nsirand Medjez.

On i7th November orders were issued for78 Division (still less one brigade group), aftercompleting its forward concentration in the areaTabarka-Souk el Arba-Ghardimaou, to advanceon Tunis and destroy the Axis forces. TheFrench Command had agreed that they would,to the best of their ability, cover the concen-tration of 78 Division and the right flank oftheir subsequent advance, and it seemed pos-sible that French itroops would also activelyassist in the northern sector. Further souththe attitude of the French forces was veryuncertain.

Subsequent operations took place on threeclearly defined axes. These were: —

(a) The main road B6ja-Medjez-Tebourba-Tunis.

(6) The road B<§ja-Sidi Nsir.(c) The road Tabarka - Djebel Abiod-

Mateur.

OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD 17x11 NOVEMBER-25TH DECEMBER, 1942.

Northern Sector.36 Brigade was in contact with- the enemy

positions at Djebel Abiod. The carriers andreconnaissance cars of Hart Force, which hadbeen pushed far forward and were then cut offby the German advance, made their way backto 36 Brigade by igth November, but theinfantry transport was lost. The infantrycompany took to the hills and did not rejoin36 Brigade until 2ist November, having con-ducted a successful guerilla campaign againstthe enemy's rear. The brigade advancedslowly against slight opposition and manymines and booby traps to Jefna, where theenemy occupied a very 'Strong position on com-manding ground. Several attempts to dislodgehim from these heights failed. Losses wereheavy. I Commando landed 14 miles west ofBizerta and worked south in an endeavour toget behind and dislodge the enemy at Jefna.They did considerable damage but failed intheir object and rejoined 36 Brigade on 3rdDecember.

Southern Sector.On igth November French troops under

command General Barre rejected the Germanultimatum, at Medjez. The two German attackswhich followed were lepulsed. Persistentdemands for air and tank support were madeby the French and it was evident that theywould not long be able to resist. In fact theywithdrew from Medjez during the followingnight, leaving forward elements of Blade Forceholding Oued Zarga and i Parachute Battalionholding Beja. At this time n Brigade and theremainder of Blade Force were completingconcentration at B6ja and Souk el Arbarespectively.

On 21 st November the enemy withdrew tothe east bank of the river at Medjez. 'It was,however, evident that 78 Division were not yetstrong enough to press the advance and orderswere issued for it to delay (any move forwardtemporarily until the build-up of forces andsupplies was sufficient to give it a reasonablechance in the assault on Tunis.


Time was also required to clarify the con-fused situation existing with the French. Theintention was that all French troops in 78Division area should be relieved as soon aspossible so that, under the command of GeneralBarre, all the French forces could concentrateon the protection of .the right flank on the lineLe Kef-Teboursouk-Testour.

By 23rd November a preliminary verbalagreement had been reached that all troops ofwhatever nationality north of the line Le Kef-Zaghouan should be under command FirstArmy and that all troops southof this lineshould be under French command.

By 24th November the forward concentrationof 78 Division and Blade Force, reinforced bylight tanks from the United States i ArmouredDivision, was completed and orders were issuedfor the immediate resumption of the advancewith, as a first objective, the line Tebourba-Mateur.

On 25th November the advance was resumedand ii Brigade attacked .the enemy at Medjez,seizing the village and establishing crossingsover the river.

On 27th November n Brigade occupiedTebourba and repulsed enemy counter-attacks

• supported by tanks and dive-bombers, destroy-ing several .tanks. On 28th November 11Brigade and 2/13 Armoured Regiment were onthe outskirts of Djedeida.

We had attained the nearest point to Tunisthat was reached until the final stage of thecampaign.

At the same time that 11 Brigade wasoperating up the Medjerda Valley, Blade Forcewith i Parachute Battalion and the i Battalionof the i Armoured Regiment, United States iArmoured Division, moved into the plain southof Mateur, not without considerable supply diffi-culties enhanced by the beginning of the rains.Here Blade Force was involved in its first suc-cessful armoured engagement on 26th Novem-ber, an action which continued on and off forseveral days. A successful raid by the UnitedStates light tank battalion resulted in thedestruction of approximately 40 Stukas on theground at Djedeida airfield.

It was now evident that the enemy intendedto _£tand and fight along the entire front andwas" present in considerable strength—seeAppendix " C."

The following week saw hard fighting followedby the start' of our withdrawal. This weekwas notable for the heavy scale of enemy airattack, particularly by dive-bombers, to whichthe leading troops were subjected, and whichour own air forces were at this stage unable toprevent.* They were still operating from Boneaerodrome, with an unreliable (owing to themud) advanced landing ground at Souk elArba.

ii Brigade were never able to occupyDjedeida, but remained in contact with theenemy on 2Qth and 30th November, with BladeForce concentrated in the area of Chouigui.

By 30th November Combat Command " B,"United States i Armoured Division, was conrcentrated forward, and an attack on Tunis,with Combat Command " B " and BladeForce working to the east of the Med-

* By the standards of later campaigns this enemyair activity was not on a serious scale. Its moraleffect at thertime, however, -was increased by theinexperience of the troops and by the scarcity of lightA.A. weapons.

jerda, was ordered for 2nd December, and inconjunction with this i Parachute Battalionwas to drop at I)epienne and threaten Tunisfrom the south. The drop was successfullymade and the parachutists reached Oudna, butthe main attack did not take place, ior onist and 2nd December the enemy counter-attacked with tanks and infantry towardsTebourba from the north and Blade Force washeavily engaged, suffering considerable casual-ties in tanks.

By the evening of 2nd December Blade Forcewas withdrawn west and the defence of theforward areas was left to ii Brigade and thearmoured infantry of Combat Command " B "who had to be ordered forward in a defensiver61e. Our tank losses up to date amountedto approximately 40. Many enemy tanks weredestroyed, but as he was left in possession ofthe battlefield most of these were no doubtrecovered. The survivors of i ParachuteBattalion rejoined 78 Division on 3rdDecember.

On this date the enemy again attackedii Brigade in strength at Tebourba and pene-trated their positions at several places. TheBrigade was cut off and had difficulty dn with-drawing during the night: 2 Hampshires, whofailed to get the order to withdraw, sufferedheavily but fought magnificently. Losses ofequipment were considerable and enemy dive-bombing all day was on a heavy scale.

On 3rd December a series of enemy attackson our positions at El Guessa developed fromthe south-east and tank and infantry battlestook place all day between Combat Command" B " and the enemy, while ii Brigade with-drew to more favourable positions north ofMedjez.

During the period of the actions described,the administrative situation was precarious inthe extreme. Dispatches of stores from Bone,which was intended as the main supply basefor the forward area, were seriously affectedby enemy bombing. An acute shortage oflocomotives and rolling-stock, coupled with de-mands arising from the French mobilisationand the transfer of United States formationsfrom the west, made compensating stores liftsfrom Algiers by rail impossible. There wasno reserve pool of motor transport to fall backon. All resources were strained to the utmost.

It was clear to me that the offensive againstTunis would have to be postponed to givetime to build up resources and to refit thetroops who had been engaged for the pastmonth. Several battalions of 78 Division wereunder three hundred and fifty strong and thestrain of -persistent dive-bombing was begin-ning to tell. The heavy rain had also put allmy airfields out of action and movement offthe main roads was becoming impossible. Idid not consider that a further offensive couldin any case be undertaken until at least oneweek's reserves of supplies of all kinds hadbeen accumulated at railhead.

Meanwhile my Tafctical Headquarters hadmoved in succession to Jemmapes, Constantineand Ain Seynour, while Main Army Head-quarters opened at Constantine on 29thNovember.

By loth December the garrison at Medjez,which included four French battalions, has beenreinforced by i Guards Brigade less a battalion,preparatory to the temporary withdrawalof ii Brigade and Combat Command " B "


for refit. Enemy attacks on Medjez withinfantry and tanks on loth and nth Decem-ber were repulsed.

Although .the withdrawal of n Brigade wascarried out according to plan, that of CombatCommand " B " was only accomplished atthe expense of the majority of their vehicles.Owing to a mistaken order by a battalioncommander of Combat Command " B," theroute which had been ordered was notfollowed, with the result that all units werebogged and forced to abandon in the mud avery large number of tanks and transportvehicles. It was indeed a crippling loss.Combat Command " B " reverted to com-mand 5 Corps and later the personnel whocould not be re-equipped were ordered backto Guelma-

6 Armoured Division who had been orderedto operate offensively from Teboursouk were incontact with light enemy forces east andsouth-east of Medjez. The components ofBlade Force returned to their parent forma-tions on I2th December.

On I3th December I issued to 5 Corps awarning order - ;to prepare to resume theadvance on Tunis. The plan adopted by5 Corps was as follows: —

' As a preliminary, to capture Djebel el Ahmera(afterwards known as Longstop), a hill whichcompletely dominated the exits from Medjez.Thereafter, 78 Division with 18 Regimental;Combat Team, United States i Infantry Divi-sion were to advance north-east to Tebourba-El Bathan' either side of'iflre river Medjerda,while 6 Armoured Division moved direct onto the high ground at Massicault. Thence,both 78 and 6 Armoured Divisions were todrive straight on to Tunis. Combat Com-mand " B " to be in Corps reserve. Four-fifths of my strength was allotted to this con-centrated attack, which I consider had a verygood chance of success.

While this major operation was in progress36 Brigade were to attempt to get behind therear of the German position at Jefna andadvance on Mateur. Four French 'battalionsand one Commando were to hold the enemyin the area north-east of Be] a.

Apart from planning and the regrouping offorces for the attack, the period from I3th-22nd December was one of patrol activity only,contact with the enemy being made all alongthe front. Enemy reinforcements were arriv-ing fast.

The rain and the state of the ground gaveme much cause for anxiety, and repeated trialsshowed that cross-country .movement for anytype of vehicle was becoming more and moredifficult.

However, I decided to take the risk andordered 5 Corps to proceed with the openingattack on Longstop on night 22nd-23rd Decem-ber. This was earned out successfully iby2 Coldstream Guards, after severe and con-fused "fighting: the Battalion was, on 23rdDecember, relieved by i Battalion, 18 Regimen-tal Combat Team, United States i InfantryDivision. With the dawn on 23rd Decembercame torrential rain which went on for threedays: the ground became a quagmire.

The attack on Tunis had to be postponed.Meanwhile 18 Combat Team had been

heavily counter-attacked on 23rd December on

Longstop and, mistaking their orders, withdrewfrom the crest: it was cleared again by i GuardsBrigade on 24th December, lost again on Christ-mas Day and, owing to the mud, was then leftin enemy hands. The fighting was bitter.

Our troops returned to their original posi-tions around Medjez, and there decisively re-pelled an enemy attack on the 27th.

Owing to failure of communications, theorder cancelling the operation did not reach5 Northants of n Infantry Brigade, who hadbeen detailed to work through the hills toseize the pass west of Tebourba. Thebattalion pushed through the very difl&cultcountry in dense fog right up to the DjebelLanserine before the commander, realising whathad happened, halted his battalion and broughtit back after some minor' clashes with theenemy. This exploit was accomplished withonly mule transport on a limited scale borrowedfrom the French. >,

At a conference held at 5 Corps Headquarterson Christmas Eve between General Eisen-hower, General Allfrey and myself, it wasfinally decided to abandon any hope of a majorattack on Tunis until the rainy season had'ended. The Commander-in-Chief decided, inits place, to stage an attack in the south againstSfax by United States 2 Corps (which was nowforming in the Tebessa area). This entailedthe immediate removal from 5 Corps front ofCombat Command " B " as .weill as otherUnited States elements, leaving temporarilyonly 18 Combat Team in the Medjez area.

Thus ended my hopes of capturing Tunis bystorm, and it now was clear that when the timecame later to launch a new attack it wouldhave to be on. a much heavier scale againstgreatly-increased opposition.

It was a sad decision, but inevitable owingto the weather. And so began the nextphase of the campaign, in which the battlefront extended right down to Gafsa.

At about this time General Eisenhower againattempted to get the French to agree to unifiedcommand under myself as General Officer Com-manding-in-Chief, First Army. But althoughGeneral Juin agreed to this, General Giraudrefused—on the ground that the state of feel-ing amongst his troops was still too delicateto permit him placing them under a BritishGeneral. So the United States troops in thesouthern sector as well as the French in thecentre sector remained direct under AlliedForce Headquarters.

The boundary^ between First Army and theFrench Sector was to be (all inclusive to> FirstArmy) Souk Ahras—thence road to Le Kef—thence railway to Pont du Fahs—Zaghouan.All troops of any nationality north of this linewere to be under my command.

At about this time certain officers of pro-Axissympathies were removed from the Staff ofGeneral Barre, thus easing a delicate situation.

At frequent %itervals' during the whole ofthis period I met Air Marshal Sir William Welshin-'constant and mutual endeavour to improvethe air support.. Work was pressed on new air-fields at Souk El Arba and Souk El Khemis,that at Bone was improved. Air CommodoreLawson was appointed as commander of allaircraft available to support 5 Corps and heplaced his Headquarters next to Corps Head-quarters.


SECOND PHASE—PERIOD 26x11 DECEM-BER, 1942—27TH MARCH, 1943.

On ist January, 1943, I outlined to 5 Corpsits future policy as under: —

(a.) To contain the enemy by constant pres-sure and, by limited attacks, to seize groundrequired to facilitate a later offensive; plansfor which were to be prepared. All attacksto have maximum artillery support. To beready to advance, even without armour, ifthe enemy moved troops away southwards.

(b) To help the French as far south asPont du Fahs in every way possible.

(c) To push on with the construction ofairfields.Widespread enemy parachute activities

against my lines of communication duringDecember accomplished little damage. On istJanuary, 1943, Allied Force Headquartersassumed control of the lines of communicationup to inclusive Bone—exclusive Constantino,thereby affording much needed relief to myadministrative staff.

In the early stages of preparation for theUnited States 2 Corps operation against SfaxI took no active part, though First Army hadto assume full responsibility for all mainten-ance arrangements, dumping programmes, &c.The attack was, however, eventually cancelledby the Commander-in-Chief, about the middleof January.

Meanwhile, on 3rd January, an attack by 36Infantry Brigade to capture the dominatingenemy positions on Djebel Azzag and DjebelAjred was not .very successful and by 5thJanuary after severe fighting in heavy rain,we withdrew to our original front. Losses onboth sides were relatively heavy. Again on 3rdJanuary 6 Armoured Division made a recon-naissance in force in the Goubellat plain; andon nth January followed this by a successfullocal attack north of Bou Arada.

On i8th January a strong German attackwas launched against 6 Armoured Divisiondown the Bou Arada Valley by infantry and atleast fifty tanks of 10 Panzer Division, followedthe same afternoon by an attack against theFrench 19 Corps. This was made by newly-landed mountain troops supported by 501Panzer Abteilung, in which the new Mark VI" Tiger " tank made its debut. The attackwas directed against the mountain area at thenorthern hinge of ,the two Dorsale ranges.

The attack against 6 Armoured Division wasstopped dead after heavy fighting, with con-siderable enemy tank losses. 38 (Irish) Brigadeparticularly distinguished itself. But Frenchresistance was overwhelmed; the enemy reachedRobaa and Ousseltia on the 20th and theequivalent of seven battalions of infantry werecut off in the mountains; also many field gunstogether with nearly all their few anti-tankguns were lost. I went to see General Juin andfound him personally courageous, but tired andnot hopeful. I had in the meantime ordered 5Corps to send 36 Infantry Brigade Group tothe Robaa Valley and requested 2 United StatesCorps to send a Combat Command of UnitedStates i Armoured Division to the Ousseltiaarea—both to come under General Juin's orderson arrival. These reinforcements stabilised thesituation on the general line Bou Arada—Djebel Bargou—Djebel Bou Dabouss, afterfighting lasting until 23rd January.

Meanwhile, as a result of the obvious lack ofco-operation and control between the British,French "and American commanders, I wasappointed by General Eisenhower, at a meetingwith him on 2ist January at Constantine, to" co-ordinate " the whole front in future, withone executive air commander (General Kuter,United States Air Corps) for the whole front.This, especially the appointment of GeneralKuter, was a big step forward but that it didnot go far enough soon became evident, and ata further meeting at Thelergma airfield on 24thJanuary, the Commander-in-Chief made me" responsible for the employment of Americantroops," though not yet in control of the FrenchCorps. After a long conference with me thatnight General Juin agreed to place his Corpsunder my command, and next day this decisionwas confirmed by General Giraud.

If chaos were to foe avoided, some one personhad to command the whole front. As anexample of the difficulties experienced at thistime, I had to motor over 1,000 miles in fourdays to visit the various corps commanders.Distances were too great for radio telephony,ordinary telephone was most unreliable, airtravel was impossible owing to weather. " Co-ordination " demanded discussion and oftencompromise and this could only be done bypersonal visits.

At the end of this period the Frenchwere beginning to feel the strain. Thecampaign did not look too rosy to them,supplies and equipment were nearly exhausted,motor transport was worn out and scarce andthe troops were unable to face the German tanksowing to entire lack of anti-tank weapons.

At the end of January the enemy attack onRobaa was renewed, " Tigers " again beingused, this time against 36 Infantry Brigade.The 5 Buffs stood their ground, five tanks (in-cluding two " Tigers ") being destroyed, andthe enemy withdrew with heavy loss. This localbut successful action had an electric effect onthe Tirailleurs, who were also deeply impressedby the efficiency of the British artillery. Fromthis time on to the end of the campaign I gaveFrench 19 Corps strong artillery support undera Commander Army Group, Royal Artillery,loaned, and also gave them 6-pounders andother equipment, which, with other Americanhelp, greatly raised morale. Thereafter theywithstood remarkably well the effects of theKasserine battle and the consequent withdrawalto the Western Dorsale, under the energeticleadership of General Koeltz.

Having been made responsible for the em-ployment of all Allied Forces in Tunisia on 25thJanuary, I spent the next week visiting theFrench and American sectors, meeting com-manders and generally getting into the widerpicture.

Two things seemed obvious to me: first, themixture of nationalities had again become worseas a result of the recent fighting and musturgently be straightened out; second, our dis-positions were too widely stretched in thesouth. In the early days, when forces on bothsides were weak, it had been right to seize allwe could in the attempt to hem the enemy intoa narrow corridor. But a new situation hadarisen. Apart from the large enemy reinforce-ments brought overseas into Tunisia, a freshflow was now arriving from Tripolitania. Theapproach of Rommel's Army was beginning tobe felt; many uninvited guests from opposite


Eighth Army were entering my southern par-lour, and it was clear that several weeks wouldelapse before Eighth Army was in a positionto help to entertain them or sufficient UnitedStates reinforcements could arrive.

In addition, the French had seriously over-strained themselves and were insistentlydemanding relief of their tired troops; though atthe same time General Giraud strongly urgedthat it was essential to preserve under Frenchcommand a definite sector of the front, eventhough this sector contained American andBritish troops. So in the centre I formed aFrench Corps (19 Corps) under a commanderto be appointed by General Juin (GeneralKoeltz was selected) to hold a firm central pivotin the mountain area on the flanks of which theAmerican 2 Corps and British 5 Corps couldoperate.

Owing to the peculiar circumstances prevail-ing in the French Corps area, I arranged for itto be divided into two divisional sectors, thaton the right under command of United Statesi Division and that on the left under commandof a French divisional commander to beappointed. Under command of the Frenchdivision were to be I Parachute Brigade in thearea of Djebel Mansour and, until relieved byre-equipped French units, 36 Infantry Brigadein the Robaa area. Combat Command " B,"United States i Armoured Division, were toremain in the Ousseltia Valley under the com-mand of General Koeltz until the situation'stabilised, as a reserve.

It was decided in. principle to withdrawFrench units from the line for re-equipment,and that, as soon as possible, they would returnto relieve the British and United States unitsin the French ;Corps area. And all Frenchtroops still in the American and British sectorswere to be returned to French 19 Corps.

On 3oth/3ist January the enemy attackedFaid and destroyed the French garrison beforehelp from United States i Armoured Divisionat Sbeitla reached them. This defeat againseriously upset the French and they repeatedtheir requests for early relief of tired troops.

I ordered the following steps to be takenduring the first ten days of February: —

United States 18 Regimental Combat Team toreturn from 5 Corps and rejoin United States iDivision, to strengthen French 19 Corps and re-lieve the most tired French units in the Pichonarea.

United States 2 Corps to complete the raidbeing planned against Sened; to postpone theattack to retake Faid until stronger forces wereavailable; to hold on to the Sidi Bou Zid posi-tion and form a strong mobile reserve in theSbeitla area; to continue to hold Gafsa unlessstrongly threatened, when the garrison wouldbe withdrawn on my order; the general taskgiven to United States 2 Corps still being toprotect the right flank of the Allies.

In. addition, I formed for the first time anArmy Reserve in the Kesra area, consisting atfirst of a reinforced Combat Command of twotank battalions from United States i ArmouredDivision. This to be reduced to one battalionas soon as the leading Combat Team of UnitedStates 34 Division (now coming up from thelines of communication) had taken over thePichon area from French 19 Corps.

I warned General Koeltz to foe ready at shortnotice to evacuate the Eastern Dorsale, as there

were signs that a German attack was pendingin the Pichon-Faid area.

Early on I4th February the enemy attackedstrongly at Sidi Bou Zid and, after three daysof heavy fighting during which it was most diffi-cult to get a clear picture of the situation, brokethrough and captured Sbeitla on nightI7th/i8th February. During this period I re--leased the Army Reserve to revert under ordersof United States 2 Corps.

As a result of the loss of Sbeitla, United States2 Corps fell back to the line Dernaia-KasserineGap-Sbiba, French 19 Corps conforming on theNorth and withdrawing from the Eastern Dor-sale without loss. I sent up i Guards Brigadefrom 5 Corps to reinforce United States 34Division at Sbiba.

After a short pause the enemy renewed hisattacks. He was held at Sbiba but brokethrough the Kasserine Pass on 20th Februaryand sent his armoured forces (15, 21 and partsof 10 Panzer Divisions were all identified)northwards towards Thala and westwardstowards Tebessa. I ordered U.S. 2 Corps tomove their only remaining reserve (CombatCommand " B ") to meet the westward threat,and at the same time despatched a compositeforce from 6 Armoured Division in the Kesraarea, consisting of 26 Armoured Brigade Group,2/5 Leicesters and some extra field and anti-aircraft artillery, all under Brigadier C. G. G.Nicholson, D.S.O., M.C., and known as" Nickforce," to Thala. This force wasaugmented on 2ist February by two field artil-lery battalions of United States 9 Division andby 2 Hampshires. Combat Command " B "and " Nickforce" both were placed underorders of U.S. 2 Corps. During 2ist/22nd Feb-ruary '' Nickforce '' only just managed to holdon, but the German attack was halted finallyby 1400 hours 23rd) February. It had been aclose shave. I then ordered i Guards Brigadeacross from Sbiba to Thala, but by the time itarrived the enemy had begun to withdraw.

I think the enemy took advantage of hisinitial easy success and decided to exploit it bya raid' to cut our lines of communication atLe Kef, where he could have done muchdamage. I do not believe he intended at theoutset to do more than hit U.S. 2 Corps a severeblow, in order to gain time and space forRommel, who was himself in command of thisoperation.

British and American units pressed theenemy and followed his withdrawal backthrough Kasserine slowly, owing to the hugequantity of mines.

This was the last enemy attack against U.S. 2Corps in the south: henceforth he was .on thedefensive.

A decision to re-equip 6 Armoured Divisionwas taken at the end of December, and theconvoy arriving on 20th January brought twohundred and forty-one Shermans. Courses ofinstruction were organised and the first regi-ment was due to take over its new tanks on I5thFebruary. Operations, in the Kasserine Gap,however, retarded the programme, and its wasnot until 25th February that re-equipmentstarted. The whole Armoured Brigade was re-equipped by 20th March, and after two weeks'training went into action for the first time withSherman tanks in the Pichon-Kairouan area on8th April, The Valentine tanks thus releasedwere handed over to the French, who receivedthem with much satisfaction.


18 Army Group shortly afterwards took overcommand of all forces in Tunisia, taking "UnitedStates 2 Corps directly under their orders, andleaving me in command of the British andFrench corps. Once again the various nation-alities had perforce become very badly mixed.

By the end of February, 5 Corps consistedof 78, 46 and 6 Armoured Divisions; Headquar-ters 9 Corps had come out, and I Division wasbeginning to arrive at the ports.

I had -got the greater part of 6 ArmouredDivision at last into Army Reserve, butGeneral Alexander ordered it, with 9 CorpsHeadquarters and the Corps Troops, into ArmyGroup Reserve almost immediately, thoughevents delayed the completion of this move asthe infantry brigade of 6 Armoured Divisioncould not be spared at once.

For on 26th February von Arnim started anattack against 5 'Corps on a wide front atGoubellat, at Medjez, at Sidi Nsir and at Jefna.

At Medjez it was defeated with heavy losswithin a few hours, although German infantrypenetrated deep into our gun lines in places.Further south a strong party of infantry andtanks also penetrated several miles behind ourfront dirough the wide gap at Tally Ho Cornerand was only smashed just north of El Aroussaby Churchill tanks, which arrived in the nick oftime -to save a divisional headquarters. Mean-while 38 Infantry Brigade had heavily defeatedan attack north of Bou Arada, and stood firmdespite the threat far to their rear.

At Sidi Nsir an isolated detachment, of 5Hampshires with 155/170 Field Battery, RoyalArtillery, placed out as a delaying force, wasoverwhelmed by a heavy attack supported bytanks; but its very gallant fight gained a pre-cious 24 hours, and enabled 46 Division tooccupy the Hunt's Gap position, covering Be" ja,with 128 Infantry Brigade Group. The enemyabandoned his attack in the south, but con-tinued to press strongly at Hunt's Gap, whereheavy fighting in terrible -weather continued fora week. 46 Division fought splendidly, butsuffered very heavy losses in infantry. How-ever, over 30 enemy tanks, including five" Tigers," were blown up by our sappers,many more were damaged, and heavy casual-ties were inflicted. By 3rd March the situationwas in hand, though spasmodic fighting con-tinued for several days.

Despite his first failure, the enemy on 2ndMarch renewed his attack near Jefna andgained a considerable local success, forcing 139Brigade to fall back to Sedjenane. Tostrengthen the front there, I moved up theParachute Brigade from the Robaa area, re-placing them temporarily by the 26 RegimentalCombat Team, United States i Infantry Divi-sion, which Army Group sent up to me.

Between 2nd and 24th March, the enemy per-sistently pressed his attacks in the northernsector, slowly driving 46 Division back to CapNegro-Djebel Abiod line, and dominating theessential lateral road Djebel Abiod-Beja. Itwas not a happy period; things went wrong too'often and we lost some most important ground'.But this was the limit of his gains.

Meanwhile, owing to the final withdrawal offour French battalions from the Medjez areato rejoin French 19 Corps, the enemy had withlittle opposition been able to move forward andoccupy all the high ground overlooking theOued Zar£a-Medjez road, including the villages

of Toukabeur and Chaouach. They thus com-pletely dominated Medjez, which was left in adangerous salient.

The rain fell unceasingly in the norththroughout this period.

The German objectives were Medjez andBeja, both of which they failed to attain.During their attacks they lost 2,200 Germanprisoners between 26th February and 24thMarch. But they had put 5 Corps into a diffi-cult position, which demanded early righting.

THIRD PHASE.—THE OFFENSIVEPERIOD.

With the enemy at Djebel Abipd, on i8thMarch I ordered 5 Corps that there must beno further withdrawal whatever: that imme-diate preparations must be made to use 46Division to drive back the enemy at least toSedjenane-Cap Serrat in the north, and ifpossible to restore in its entirety our formerposition there, east of El Aouana: thereafterthat the road Beja-Medjez and Medjez areaitself must be completely freed from enemydomination by the recapture of -the hillycountry up to the Djebel el Ang and Heidous:and that plans were to be .prepared at once forthe capture "of the high ground west of theSebkret el Kourzia north of Bou Arada. Thesewere all essential preliminaries to the launchingof a major, assault towards Tunis and Bizerta.To help 5 Corps I placed i Parachute Brigade,the Corps Franc and one Tabor of FrenchGoumiers under .their orders.

The country in the region Djebel Abiod-Sedjenane-Cap Berraf is extremely difficult;mountains strewn with boulders and coveredwith a dense scrub up to eight feet high,limiting visibility often to a few feet and oftenrequiring axes and knives to cut a path throughcountry where tracks are few and bad.

The attack of 46 Division and attachedtroops under Major-General H. Freeman-Attwood was begun in the darkness early on28th March, with heavy artillery support fromthe artillery of two divisions plus army re-sources. At the same time the rain beganagain with redoubled violence and continuedalmost without pause for a week. Despite this36 Brigade, 138 Brigade, i Parachute Brigade,the Corps Franc and the Tabor all reachedtheir first objectives, taking over 750 prisoners.By a double flanking movement directed to-wards the rear of the enemy positions Sedjenanewas retaken on the 30th March; Cap Serrat,El Aouana and the hills to north and south onthe 3ist. Pack-mule transport had to be em-ployed onja large scale. An advance of someeighteen miles was made in four days, with atotal of over 850 prisoners, half German, halfItalian.

The Germans had taken three weeks tocapture the same area, and a captured order ofthe day, issued by Major-General Manteuffelafter reaching Abiod, showed that he was highlypleased with that result.

46 Division had now been continuously inheavy fighting since 26th February, hadsuffered much, absorbed large replacementdrafts while still in close contact with the enemyand had then made this successful and swiftcounter-attack.

As all objectives Ihad been reached a haltwas called, and 5 Corps at once began prepara-tions for the attack to clear the B6ja-Medjezroad.


78 Division, under Major - General V.Evelegh, undertook the task, again supportedby heavy artillery concentrations throughoutthe whole operation.

This mountain land is a vast tract of country,every hill in which is large enough to swallowup a brigade of infantry, where consolidationon the rocky slopes is very difficult, in whichtanks can only operate in small numbers,where movement of guns and vehicles is veryrestricted, and where the division had to relyon pack mules for its supplies and to carrywireless telegraphy sets, tools and mortars.

The general impression is one of widespaciousness—a kind of Dartmoor or CentralSutherlandshire, but with deeper valleys andsteeper hills.

In 'the early darkness of 7th .April 78 Divi-sion started its attack north of Oued Zarga,gaining all objectives and taking over 400prisoners, all German. For the next nine days,until i6th April,< 78 Division methodicallyadvanced on a front of about 10 miles to anultimate depth of 10 miles, taking in turn eachkey position—the Mahdi, Hills 512, 667, Djebelel Ang, Tanngoucha and. the mountain villagesof Toukabeur, Chaouach and Heidous—withconcentrated artillery fire and splendidly helpedby the Royal Air Force with close supportbombing. But it was chiefly an infantry battle,fought by units who had been in continuouscontact with the enemy without a break sinceNovember, 1942. In all, during these ninedays i,080 German prisoners were captured ina series of extremely fierce hand to hand fights,including much night work:

The performance of the Churchill tanks of25 Army Tank Brigade under Brigadier R. H.Maxwell was very good: mechanically theystood well up to very heavy strain, while thecourage and initiative shown by the crews wereadmirable. Though the tactical handling inclose co-operation with infantry was at timesat fault.'

I consider the 78 Division deserves highpraise for as tough and prolonged a bit offighting as has ever been undertaken by theBritish soldier.

In close conjunction with 78 Division, 4Division'.pressed the enemy hard to the northof Hunt's Gap, and by I4th April had reachedthe hills just south-west of Sidi Nsir aftermuch hard fighting and against many counter-attacks. This was the first appearance of4 Division in action.

5 Corps had now secured positions whichcompletely freed .Medjez and enabled me tobegin dumping and other preparations for -alarge-scale attack in that area, while in thenorth I had cleared the vital lateral road andhad re-established my advanced troops inpositions suitable as bases for a further ad-vance, and in time to -hand these positions overto United States 2 Corps, which now startedarriving from the far south—being transferredfrom the Gafsa-Maknassy area by or4ej of 18Army Group.

On i8th April United States 2 Corps (underLieutenant-General O. N. Bradley) relieved 4and 46 Divisions of 5 Corps and assumed com-mand of- the area north of the line OuedZarga - Djebel Lanserine - Tebourba, havingunder command Ignited States T. land 9 InfantryDivisions, with a few days later United Stares34. Infantry Division and i Armoured Division.

On 20th April I moved Main First ArmyHeadquarters to near Thibar.

Meanwhile, further south, 9 Corps (consistingof 6 Armoured Division, 34 U.S. Division,128 Infantry Brigade Group from 46 Divisionand Corps Artillery, &c., under Lieutenant-General J. T. Crocker, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.),had on 8th April started an attack under ordersof 18 Army Group to break through the Germanflank defences at Pichon-Fondouk, captureKairouan and strike the Axis forces retreatingin front of Eighth Army.

I ordered French 19 Corps to aid this attackon the north by seizing the Djebel Ousselatand the ridge of the Eastern Dorsale. Thisthey did with the greatest elan, taking severalhundred prisoners. By i8th April the enemyhad withdrawn northwards, and French 19Corps was holding the line Karachoum-DjebelEdjehaf-west of Djebel Mansour, in touch withpatrols of Eighth Army on the right. Duringthis fighting General Welwert, commanding theFrench Constantino Division was killed.

THE FINAL OFFENSIVE, 22ND APRIL-ISTH MAY.On I2th April I was ordered by General

Alexander to prepare a large-scale offensive tocar>"ture Tunis and also to co-operate withUnited States 2 Corps in the capture of Bizerta,the target date being "22nd April. For thisattack 9 Corps was placed under my orders,together with i British Armoured Division fromEighth Army.

United States 2 Corps remained under 18Army Group, but I was made responsible forco-ordinating its action in the attack with thatof First Army, and for issuing all the necessaryorders and instructions direct. Eighth Armywas also to attack on 20th April at Enfidaville,in order to draw enemy forces off First Army.

Enemy resistance was still formidable andhe held strong positions. These had to be over-come and his strength exhausted before a realbreak through could be effected.

Although I had a big total superiority innumbers and material, a limiting factor wasthe division of my army (including 2 U.S.Corps) into three national sectors; this naturallyrestricted the full freedom of movement ofreserves which otherwise I would have enjoyedwith a homogeneous army.

There are three entrances into the Tunisplain: —

In the south—the Bou Arada gap. Thiswas blocked by the strongly held Pont du Fahsdefile and the hills on the southern edge of theBou Arada valley were in enemy hands.

In the centre—across the Goubellat plain.There is a belt of broken country from north-east of the Sebkret el Kourzia to Ksar Tyrwhich blocks the eastern exits from the plainand is easily defended against tanks. But thisarea was weakly held by the enemy.

An essential preliminary to the use of eitherof the above passages is to capture the highground west of the Sebkret el Kourzia.

In the north—along the axis Medjez-Massicault. This is the most direct way andthe best tank country. • But it was protected byvery strong enemy positions which barred theway and prevented deployment of large forcesacross the River Medjerda. I expected veryheavy fighting here before I could breakthrough.


None the less, I decided my plan asfollows: —

5 Corps to make the main attack fromMedjez and to break into the enemy's maindefensive system between Peter's Corner andLongstop.

9 Corps to capture the high ground west ofSebkret and then to push its armoured divi-sions across the Goubellat plain, in 'the hopethat by speed of movement they might getthrough the hills to the east, swing north to-wards Massicault and in that area engage 'anddestroy the enemy's armoured reserves andact against the rear of the defenders opposite5 Corps. If the armour did not progressquickly north of the Sebkret I was not pre-pared to press -home this attack; but insteadto keep the armour to break through on 5 Corpsfront, after the enemy there had been foughtto exhaustion. 46 Division to revert, in anycase, to Army Reserve after the initial attack.

United States 2 Corps to make its main efforteastwards, to seize the high ground east andwest of Chouigui and cover the left flank of 5Corps. United States 2 Corps also to advanceon Bizerta via the Sedjenane-Jefna and theOued Sedjenane Valleys.

French 19 Corps to advance on the axisRobaa-Pont du Fahs. But this was not to startuntil I considered the attacks by 9 Corps (andby Eighth Army near Enfidaville) had softenedthe resistance opposite French 19 Corps.

My attack to be supported by 242 GroupRoyal Air Force, 12 Air Support Cpmmandand the Tactical Bomber Force, all workingunder Air Commodore K. B. B. Cross, D.S.O.,D.F.C. Western Desert Air Force was alsoavailable by mutual arrangement.

The composition of the Army and UnitedStates 2 Corps is given in Appendix "A."

The attacks were timed to start as under:0400 hrs. 22nd April ... 9 Corps.2000 hrs. 22nd April ... 5 Corps.0400 hrs. 23rd April ... 2 U.S. Corps.

Not surprisingly, the enemy apparently wasaware that trouble was brewing and on night20th-2ist April he launched a strong spoilingattack between Medjez and Goubellat and alsoagainst 9 Corps, using his Hermann GoeringDivision with tanks of 10 Panzer Division. Helost heavily, including 33 tanks destroyed byus and over 450 prisoners. That he did notsucceed in seriously disorganising our finaldeployment for the big attack was a tribute toall units concerned, as naturally the confusionat one time was considerable when enemy tanksappeared in the dark amid our batteries, beingdeployed ahead even of our Forward DefendedLocalities. But the fighting against 46 Divisionon 9 Corps front did delay the launching ofthe attack there for four hours and createdsome confusion and fatigue amongst the troopsof 138 Infantry Brigade forming up for theassault.

Without going into details of the very fiercefighting which developed all along the frontfrom 22nd to 30th April, I can summarise thestory as follows: —9 Corps.

46 Division attack north of Bou Arada failedon the right, but on the left succeededsufficiently to allow 6 Armoured Division to passthrough by nightfall, 22nd April. During2'3rd-)24th (April, 6 AVmoured Division wasfollowed -by I Armoured Division, and both.

moved eastwards, meeting opposition butdestroying many enemy tanks. However, wewere not quick enough, and a strong enemyanti-tank gun screen in the broken countrynorth-east- and north of the Sebkret elKourzia and near Djebel Kournine preventedeventually all further advance, despite manyattempts. The enemy withdrew from theSeba Argout position opposite (the right of-46 Division. Seeing that no further progresswas likely, on 26th April I ordered 9 Corpsto stand fast and to return 6 Armoured Divisionand 46 Division (less one Infantry BrigadeGroup) to Army Reserve. This attack by9 Corps only just failed to achieve its object.It did, however, inflict severe tank losses onthe enemy, drew his armoured reserves to thesouth and (based on subsequent statements bycaptured senior officers) seriously frightenedhim. It also had -the effect of leaving theenemy opposite 19 Corps in a pronouncedsalient, from which they hurriedly withdrew on25th April. Our losses were not severe.19 Corps.

The enemy withdrawal just forestalled anattack by 19 Corps, which therefore followedup rapidly, and by 28th April had again comeup against stiff resistance and strong artilleryfire on the general line Djebel Derhalfa-roadEnfidaville to Pont du Fahs-Station de Thibica.An advance of 18 miles.5 Corps.

In a series of grim hand-to-hand attacks andcounter-attacks against the Hermann Goering,334 and 15 Panzer: Divisions, the British T,4 and 78 Divisions with Army tank supportadvanced between 22nd and 30th April to adepth of about six miles and captured most ofthe enemy's main defensive positions facingMedjez in a semi-circle from Peter's Corner toLongstop. Every attack was given very heavyand concentrated artillery support. Losseswere heavy, especially in commanding officers,but by the end of April I felt the enemy wasnearly ripe for the break through. Almostthe fiercest fighting of all took place on 2QihApril. On ist May, Hermann Goering Divisionasked for an armistice to bury its dead. Thiswas refused.

For the break-through I had then in ArmyReserve 6 Armoured Division and 46 Division(less one brigade group), while 5 Corps hadstill in hand one infantry brigade of 4 Divisionand the best part of an Army Tank Brigade.And at last I had room to deploy armouredforces east of the river Medjerda, over whichtwo more bridges were built.2 U.S. Corps.

As the result of constant pressure and properuse of the big numerical preponderance theyenjoyed to outflank the enemy defences,2 U.S. Corps by 2nd May had cleared theenemy from Hills 609 and 612 north and eastof Sidi Nsir and from the strong Djebel Ajredand Azag positions: Goums and the CorpsFranc had reached the hills north of LakeGaraet Achkel. The capture of Point 609 byUnited States 34 Division was a particularlyfine piece of work, against fierce oppositionfrom the formidable Barenthin Regiment.

On 3rd and 4th May the enemy withdrew allalong the front under heavy pressure to theline of hills west of Bizer-ta-east of Mateur-east of Oued Tine valley. Mateur was occu-pied by United States i Armoured Division.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 6 NOVEMBER, 1946

The very big movement of United States2 Corps from Gafsa area to the north, rightacross the lines of supply of First Army, theprovision of all the necessary American typesof ammunition, supplies and rations, and thedumping of huge quantities of ammunition forthe guns of 2, 5 and 9 Corps within such ashort period were great feats which the Staffsconcerned have every right to be proud.

Meanwhile, on 30th April, General Alexandertold me thai in view of the difficult countryopposite Eighth Army he had decided to trans-fer formations across to strengthen First Armyfor the final blow.

My first task was still to capture Tunis; there-after to exploit eastwards to prevent the enemyestablishing himself in the Cap Bon area.Eighth Army to co-operate in this phase asbest it could. 7 Armoured Division, 4 IndianDivision, 201 Guards Brigade, with thenecessary divisional and administrative troops,were to be transferred at once to my com-mand, with Lieutenant-General B. G. Horrocks,M.C., from 10 Corps (to succeed Lieutenant-General J. T. Crocker, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.,9 Corps, who had been wounded).

This, of course, was a big reinforcement tothe forces I already had in hand for my break-through.

The .transfer and regrouping of formationsbegan immediately, as did also the dumpingof 450 rounds a gun for over 400 guns. Againan enormous task was accomplished by myStaff without a hitch, and by nightfall of 5thMay all was completed andjthe Army regrouped•ready for the assault. Thercomposition of thevarious Corps is given in Appendix " B."

My orders in outline were as under: —5 Corps to hold a firm base on their present

line and, as a preliminary operation, to capturethe dominating Djebel Bou Aoukaz on after-noon 5th May, so as to cover the left flankof 9 Corps in its subsequent attack.

9 Corps during night 5th-6tih May to breakinto the enemy's position on a very narrowfront with 4 British and 4 Indian Divisions.This to be followed up immediately by break-ing out through the breach with 6 and 7Armoured Divisions, with the object of seiz-ing and holding the high ground 6 miles duewest of Tunis and so breaching the inner de-fences of Tunis, before the enemy had time toman these defences.

5 Corps thereafter to keep open the corri-dor and to be ready to use one or more infantrydivisions to sustain the attack of 9 Corps.

I emphasised that speed was vital.United States 2 Corps to continue their attacks

on Chouigui (and then to exploit towardsDjedeida) and Bizerta.

French 19 Corps to attack on 4th May to cap-ture the Djebel Zaghouan—a most formidablemountain massif.

i British Armoured Division to be in ArmyReserve in area Sebkret el Kourzia.

In the hope of confusing the enemy, fromwhom I could scarcely hope to conceal thecolossal traffic movement (reminiscent of DerbyDay) and the dust around Medjez, .1 arranged

-for a large dummy concentration of tanks andtransport (with the usual movement) to beinstalled near Bou Arada. While making noattempt to conceal i Armoured Division nearthe Sebkret I hoped to make the enemy thinkI had moved 6 Armoured Division to the Bou

Arada area, and to conceal altogether the arrivalof 7 Armoured Division west of Medjez.

Subsequent events proved that this stratagemhad a considerable measure of success, as theenemy did not suspect the heavy concentra-tion of armour at Medjez and kept his 21Panzer Division near Zaghouan to cover theimagined threat to Pont du Fahs. Capturedstaff officers from .German General Head-quarters later stated that although they had, infact, seen tanks in laager south-west of Medjezyet they thought they were only a portion ofi Armoured Division, and they placed 6Armoured Division at Bou Arada. Thus,thinking that I had split my armour, they wereunder no particular apprehension of animmediate attack. I rather stress this point,as it emphasises first, the ease with which onecan deceive the air reconnaissance: second,perhaps it explains in some way the later com-plete surprise which otherwise is almost incom-prehensible. But, of course, the primaryreason for the enemy's failure to detect our con-centration was our overwhelming air superioritywhich practically kept the enemy out of the airexcept for a few isolated sorties. In the sameconnection, it is interesting to recall that I hadusually failed to find warning signs of Germanattacks against me throughout the campaign,despite most active air reconnaissance.

Of the final assault there is little to narrate.5 Corps' attack on the Bou was successful and

it was held against counter-attack.1'he attack by 4 British and 4 Indian

Divisions in the dark at 0330 hours on 6th Mayon a front of 3,000 yards went smoothly.Scorpions and four battalions of Churchill tankscame up at dawn on 6th May. The final objec-tives, to a depth:-of 5,000 yards, were all takenby 1100 hours with very small losses, under aterrific artillery concentration—deepened by anunprecedentedly intense air bombardment. Inthe later stages German infantrymen broke andran, throwing away their rifles. The prolongedand heavy fighting from 22nd April had wellprepared the way for this hammer blow.

The two armoured divisions passed throughthe gap at once and after 6 Armoured Divisionhad engaged enemy tanks (including" Tigers ") south of the Tunis road, Furna wascleared and by nightfall Massicault was in ourhands, pockets of resistance being by-passed.

On 7th May, at 1540 hours, the DerbyshireYeomanry and n Hussars entered Tunis. On8th May 7 Armoured Division moved north-wards of Tunis and cleared the country towardsProtville, while 6 Armoured Division movedsouth-east towards Hammam Lif—where itmet fierce resistance in the strong and narrowpass. On roth May 6 Armoured Division hadbroken through, captured Soliman and that•night reached Hammamet and at once pushedsouth towards Bou Ficha.

Meanwhile I had moved up 4 British Divisionand placed it once more under orders of 9Corps. This Division was moved rapidly upto Soliman and, in a lightning sweep, cleared

- the Cap Bon peninsula.At the same time I also placed i British

Armoured Division from Army Reserve under9 Corps, ordering it to move northwards viaAin el Asker and Mohammedia. On o,th andzoth May it advanced via Creteville onGrombalia.


I also ordered 5 Corps to move eastwardswith 4 Indian Division and i Division, and, inco-operation with the left wing of French 19Corps, to complete the encirclement of theenemy.

The final attack of 6 Armoured Division wasmade southwards from Bou Ficha covered byheavy artillery fire and an air bombardmentby Western Desert Air Force on I2th May,while 56 Division, of Eighth Army shelled trietrapped enemy from the south. The fire planwas mutually arranged by wireless. Afterthe bombardment a sea of white flags markedthe end of all organised resistance.

In all cases the pursuit was pressed ruthlesslyand without pause by night or day by 6Armoured Division and 4 British Division.

On the American front events moved withequal swiftness, Ferryville and Bizerta beingentered on afternoon 7th May by United Statesi Armoured Division and at noo hours on gthMay the Commander United States 2 Corpsaccepted the unconditional surrender of hisopponents.

French 19 Corps attacked on 6th May andentered Pont du Fahs on the yth. During the8th-uth, after an initial withdrawal, the enemy,on the whole, stood firm in the mountains andany attempt by the French to advance was veryheavity shelled. But on the nth, after a suc-cessful attack with tanks and infantry, Germanofficers came in under a white flag and on the12-th resistance ceased, with many thousands ofprisoners coming in. It must have been amoment of peculiar satisfaction for the French19 Corps.

The scenes in the Cap Bon peninsula areaand to the south-west during the last threedays were amazing. The rout of the Germanarmy was complete; prisoners 'swamped theircaptors and drove in their own transport look-ing for the cages. Thousands surrendered with-out attempting to resist further, while othersfired their remaining stocks of ammunition atany target before giving themselves up.

On I2th May Colonel-General J. von Arnim,General Officer Commanding-in-Chief ArmyGroup Afrika, surrendered with his staff to 4Indian Division and was brought to .me atHeadquarters First Army.

The disaster was complete.The total of prisoners eventually reached

over a quarter of a million, if the 4,000 oddcaptured since ist March are included; of theseover half were Germans.

The booty was immense.Dunkirk was amply revenged.

' It was an amazing finish to a fascinating andunique campaign, which highly tested thequalities of the British soldier and proved himstill -to be as tough, resolute and good humouredas ever before in our long history.

In the later stages the co-operation betweenArmy and Air Forces was excellent and friction-less, despite the 'difficulties always inherent inoperations conducted with forces of differentnations.

In the final phase the weight of air supportplayed a very great part in ensuring the over-whelming victory; Army and Air Forces workedas one.

And no man in First Army ever forgot thatwe owed our daily life and being to thevigilance of the Royal Navy.

Right throughout the campaign we were allof us, in varying degree, thrown into intimate

touch with the armies of our American andFrench allies, usually under conditions of stressand danger demanding instant decision and theclosest collaboration. I say without hesitationthat the mutual goodwill, tolerance, under-standing, and above all the confidence whicheach of us had in the other was quite remark-able. Not only senior officers but also allranks of our three armies soon realised thatdespite differences of language, customs andprocesses of thought the other fellow was alsogiving his best without reservation and that hewas to be trusted. Even between British andFrench the initial and very understandabledoubts very soon disappeared in mutual openrespect and admiration.

Herein lies much hope for the future.It has been for me an exhilarating experience.I count myself indeed fortunate to have had

under my orders such loyal and gallant men asGeneral Koeltz and his soldiers of the French 19Corps: while always my relations with UnitedStates commanders and men have been entirelyfrank, cordial and understanding. I owe muchto General Eisenhower for his valient wisdomand encouragement, and to those of his com-manders who served under me or with me withsuch loyal friendship.

The total British losses of First Armythroughout the whole campaign amountedto:—

Killed^ Wounded. Missing. Total.Officers... 382 833 307 I>522OtherRanks ... 4,061 11,792 6,235 22,088

4,443 12,625 6,542 23,610Of the above, 13,240 occurred during the

period ist April to end of hostilities.A feature of the campaign has been the highly

successful results achieved 'by early forwardsurgery. Throughout, the work of the MedicalServices, in the care and treatment of woundedand sick and in the prevention of disease, isdeserving of the highest praise.

When all have done so much, it is perhapsinvidious to select particular services for men-tion, but I must pay tribute to all ranks of theRoyal Army Service Corps and the RoyalArmy Ordnance Corps, who, despite everydifficulty of climate, terrain and enemy action,understaffed and overworked, neverthelessnever failed to deliver the goods.

APPENDIX " A."OUTLINE ORDER OF BATTLE ON 20TH APRIL,

1943, OF FIRST ARMY AND 2 UNITED STATESCORPS.

5 Corps—i (British) Infantry Division.4 (British) Division.78 Infantry Division.25 Tank Brigade (less 51 Royal Tank Regi-

menl).9 Corps—

i (British) Armoured Division.6 Armoured Division.46 Infantry Division.51 Royal Tank Regiment.

French 19 Corps—Division d'Alger (Conne).Division du Maroc (Mathenet).Division d'Oran (Boisseau).Tank Group (Le Coulteux).i Kings Dragoon Guards.


United States 2 Corps—i United States Armoured Division (less one

Armoured Regiment).i United States Infantry Division.9 United States Infantry Division.34 United States Infantry Division.Corps Franc d'Afrique (three battalions).One Tabor.

APPENDIX " B."OUTLINE ORDER OF BATTLE ON 4x11 MAY, 1943,

OF FIRST ARMY AND 2 UNITED STATES CORPS.5 Corps—

i (British) Infantry Division.• 46 Infantry Division (less 139 Infantry

Brigade Group).78 Infantry Division,i North Irish Horse.1 Army Group Royal Artillery.7 Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens (less one

battalion).9 Corps—

6 Armoured Division.7 Armoured Division.4 (British) Division.4 (Indian) Division.25 Tank Brigade (less two battalions).201 Guards Brigade.2 Army Group Royal Artillery.

French 19 Corps—Division du Maroc.Division d'Alger.Division d'Oran.One Tank Battalion.

Army Reserve— ±

i British Armoured Division.139 Infantry Brigade Group.i Kings Dragoon Guards.51 Royal Tank Regiment.

United States 2 Corps—i United States Armoured Division (less one

Armoured Regiment).i United States Infantry Division.9 United States Infantry Division.34 United States Infantry Division.13 United States Field Artillery Brigade.2626 United States Coast Artillery Brigade

(A.A.).Corps Franc d'Afrique.One Tabor.

APPENDIX " C."BUILD-UP OF Axis FORCES.

When the Allied forces landed in Algeria,there were no Axis troops in French NorthAfrica; in Tripolitania there was one Italiandivision (Spezia) and a substantial number ofL of C troops. The German and Italian Armis-tice Commissions, however, were spreadthroughout French North Africa, and main-tained a considerable measure of control overeconomic affairs and were very ready to inter-fere in other matters. The immediate reactionto our landing was the formation of a mainlyGerman force to secure Tunis and Bizerta.This force was formed of units most readilyavailable at that moment, and its impromptuformation is clearly shown in its composition.It began to arrive on the loth November, per-sonnel and light equipment being brought byair and heavy equipment by sea. The landingof this force was not opposed by the French,who were subsequently disarmed and theircoastal and A.A. batteries taken over. Havingseized the ports, and the important aerodromes

of El Aouina (Tunis) and Sidi Ahmed (Bizerta),this force moved out with the intention ofsecuring the high and mountainous country onthe Tunisian-Algerian frontier and preventingthe Allies debouching into the Tunisian plains.It made contact with Allied forces to whoma proportion of the French troops in Tunisiahad rallied, on the general line Djebel Abiod-B6ja-Medjez on the 26th Novemer, 1942. Bythis date the Axis forces in Tunisia consistedof the following units: —German—

Storm Regiment Koch (Air Force troops).Barenthin Regiment (Air Force troops).Marsch Battalions 17, 18, 20 and 21.Parachute Engineer Battalion Witzig.190 Tank Battalion (69 tanks).Advance elements of 10 Armoured Division.Miscellaneous Artillery and Anti-tank units.

Italian—10 Bersaglieri Regiment.Elements of Superga Division, including four

infantry battalions.Some of these units had been intended for

Rommel's army; 190 Tank Battalion, forexample, had been formed for 90 LightDivision; one company, of Witzig's Battalionhad already joined the Ramcke Brigade, and

.£he Marsch Battalions had been destined to bereinforcement drafts but were in fact sent toTunisia and put into the line, where they foughtas infantry battalions. Regiment Koch of theGerman Air Force was. brought from Franceby air for which move it was readily availableand trained, having been formed originally as5 Parachute Regiment.

Barenthin Regiment was also formed of AirForce personnel, bein'g chiefly composed of thestaff and pupils of the Parachute School atWdtstock and the Glider School at Posen.

Thus by the end of November, 1942, the Axisforces which had arrived in Tunisia, exclusiveof Services, amounted to approximately 15,500fighting troops, 130 tanks, 60 field guns and 30anti-tank guns.

During the first half of December, theremainder of 10 Armoured Division and theItalian Superga Division were brought over,but in transit each division lost a substantialproportion of' its heavy equipment transportedby sea. As a result, 10 Armoured Divisionnever could muster its full establishment oftanks, and both divisions were short of artillery.In addition to these two formations, furtherGerman Marsch battalions were brought overat regular intervals, some of which continuedto be employed as independent infantrybattalions, and were not broken' up as rein-forcements. These independent battalions wereused either to bring up the original impromptuforce to the strength of a division, which wasoriginally called Division Broich and latterlyDivision Manteuffel after its commanders, orwere used to reinforce the Italian SupergaDivision which had been stationed on theenemy's left flank in mountainous countrysouth of Zaghouan. In addition, the Bafile andGrado Battalions of the Italian San MarcoMarine Regiment and a Bersaglieri Battalionwere also brought over. The most significantarrival at this time was 501 Heavy TankBattalion with 43 tanks, of which 20 were thenew Mark VH, which first went into actionagainst the French 19 Corps on the i8thJanuary, 1943.


In the second half of December, 1942, theGerman 334 Infantry Division began to makeits appearance. This was a newly createdformation of rather low quality. The divisionremained in northern Tunisia, and was com-pleted by the arrival of its artillery in thesecond week in January.

On the ist January, 1943, the estimated totalof Axis troops in Tunisia, excluding air crewsand ground staffs, was 55,900. The enemytank strength was about 160 German tanks within addition some (Italian Medium and Lighttanks, and by imid-January there were 1412-gun batteries of artillery.

Enemy losses at sea in transports and cargoships were very heavy, and it is reported thatHitler himself gave orders that personnel shouldtravel only by destroyer or by air. The dailyintake of reinforcements varied greatly, as theregular service of transport aeroplanes carriedsupplies as well as troops; at this period thedaily average was between 700 and 1,000 men,some of whom were destined for Rommel'sarmy.

In the last week of January, the HermannGoering Flak Regiment—the original HermannGoering unit—sent two of its batteries, thethird remaining in Germany in its usual roleas bodyguard to the Reichsmarschall. Thisproved to be the forerunner of the HermannGoering Armoured Division which was builtup in Tunisia on a most lavish establishment,though it was never completed to strength. Itabsorbed Parachute Regiment Koch which be-came Jaeger Regiment Hermann Goering andtwo Grenadier Regiments were formed in Ger-many and commenced to make their appear-ance in Tunisia in February.

'Elements only of the Tank Reconnaissance,Artillery and Engineer units reached Tunisiaby the end of the campaign, and a battalion of2 Hermann Goering Grenadier Regimentarrived as late as the 24th April:, but theDivision was never completed.

On the ist February the estimated total oftroops had risen to 84,000, of whom 55,000 wereGermans and 29,000 Italians. The tank statewas about 380—280 German and 100 Italian,21 Armoured Division having moved west intoTunisia with approximately 80 tanks; and therewere 26 to 28 12-gun batteries.

During February Rommel's army had with-drawn to the Mareth area and became apotential—and later an actual—opponent ofFirst Army. The German troops consisted of15 Armoured Division, 90 and 164 LightDivisions, Panzer Grenadier Regiment Afrika,and the remnants of the Ramcke Brigade, withfour reconnaissance units, six mobile batteries

of 88-mm. guns, and many supply and L. of C.troops.

The Italians were composed of Spezia, Pistoiaand the Young Fascists Divisions, part ofCentauro Division, and the remnants of Italiandivisions from El Alamein grouped underTrieste Division, together with a considerableamount of corps and garrison artillery, and alarge and miscellaneous collection of Cara-binieri, Frontier Guards and L. of C. troops.The figure for the estimated total of enemystrength in Tunisia on the ist March thereforeincludes this large addition from Tripolitaniaand is increased to 190,500, including 116,500Germans and 74,000 Italians.

Only one more formation was sent to Africa.This was 999 Division, which began to arriveat the end of March. It consisted only of 961and 962 Infantry Regiments each of two bat-talions with artillery support. Its morale waslow, the rank and file being partly drawn frompersonnel serving sentences for political ormilitary offences.

The flow of Marsch Battalions continued, thehighest known number being 57, though someof the intervening numbers were never identi-fied; but these battalions and all other rein-forcements were absorbed into units already hithe country. After reaching Mareth the original'German Libyan Army began at last to receiveits share, and it was a large one. After theNew Year the intake of men apart from thosebelonging to the Hermann Goering and 999Divisions, was in fact, mainly devoted to thereplacement of battle casualties and the build-ing up of the depleted formations from Libya.

The estimated enemy strength on the istApril was 196,700—124,300 Germans and72,400 Italians.

During the later stages of the campaign,efforts were made to raise volunteer battalionslocally. Their fighting value was low, as thevolunteer element was noticeably lacking, andmany men with Allied sympathies only joinedbecause of the opportunity thus offered of cross-ing to our lines. One such native Algerian unitwas formed, and two Tunisian ItalianBattalions, as well as the Phalange Franchise,a French unit into which only 150 men couldbe attracted.

Enemy reinforcements continued to arriveuntil the last week in April. The final estimateon the ist May, 1943, showed 48,700 Axisinfantry, 120 infantry guns, 402 field guns,180 88 mm. guns and 443 anti-tank guns, withabout 100 tank runners. The total strength,excluding the air component, was approxi-mately 220,000.

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