SUPPLEMENT The London Gazette - ibiblio and the assistance of the French authori-ties the Force was...

IRumb. 35305

SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf FRIDAY, the 10th of OCTOBER, 1941

by

Registered as a newspaper

FRIDAY, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 .

March* 1941. -. .The following Despatches have been received by the Secretary of State for //

War from General the Viscount GORT, V.C., K.C.B., C.B.E./D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., *Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Force. (France and Belgium 1939-40.)

FIRST DESPATCH

(Covering the period from 3rd September, 1939, to 3ist January, 1940).

General Headquarters,-British Expeditionary Force,

2$th April, 1940.

Sir,1. I have the honour to submit a report on the

employment of the British Expeditionary Forcein France from 3rd September, 1939, the date Iassumed command, until 3ist January, 1940.

2. The move of the Force to France began asa whole on loth September, although smalladvanced parties and technical personnel hadbeen arriving since 4th September. The successof the initial operation was due primarily to themany detailed and complex plans carefullyprepared under conditions of absolute secrecyin peace time. The perfection of these plans, theready co-operation of the Board of Trade, thecomplete arrangements made by the Admiraltyfor the safety of ships while at sea, and thewilling help of the French Naval, Military, andCivil authorities all combined to ensure thesuccessful landing of the British Troops inFrance.

3. The plans for the despatch of the Forcediffered in two important respects from those ofAugust, 1914.

The possibility of attack by sea and air madeit necessary to use the Western ports of Franceinstead of the Channel ports, while the totalreplacement of animals by mechanical vehicles,which had been completed by 1939, presenteda new problem in transportation.

The troops were landed at Cherbourg 'andtheir stores and vehicles were despatched toNantes, St. Nazaire, and Brest.

This plan entailed the early despatch of staffwith the proper complement of units of theDocks and other Transportation Services. Thepersonnel of these Services were in the mainrecruited from the Port Authorities in GreatBritain at the outbreak of war.

These units were operating to full capacity theberths allotted to the Force, within forty-eighthours of landing, and the programme w?.scarried out according to the time table through-out the whole period of the disembarkation ofist and 2nd Corps. This I regard as a feat

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

4. On landing the fighting troops were passedrapidly through transit camps and their vehicleswere cleared at once to Vehicle MarshallingParks, whence they were despatched in convoys,while troops left by rail on the same day asthey landed.

Since the troops and their vehicles werelanded at different ports they had to be collectedin an assembly area which had been chosenin the vicinity of Le Mans and Laval. Theassembling of troops by rail and vehicles byroad took about six days. The resource ofindividual drivers was tested by changes ofprogramme, inevitable in an operation of thiskind, by the damage which some vehicles hadsustained during the sea passage and bymechanical failures. Drivers and vehicles wereon the road for long periods, but their duty waslightened by the hospitality of the Frenchinhabitants, which all ranks will recall withgratitude.

5. On i3th September I moved my head-quarters from the War Office to Camberley,where General Headquarters was forming. Onthe following day, accompanied by Lieutenant-General (now General) Sir John Dill, Commanderof ist Corps, and by my personal staff, Iembarked in H.M.S. " Skate," and, landing atCherbourg, left by motor car for the Chateau dela Blanchardiere, Le Mans, which the FrenchGovernment had kindly placed at my disposal.

6. On 2ist September the concentration ofthe General Headquarters Staff and of theessential Lines of Communication units wascomplete. The next day the advanced elementsof ist Corps and of General Headquarters Troopsarrived, the former moving to an area aroundLaval and the latter to an area around LeMans. Units were given a minimum of oneweek in which to assemble and reorganise andalthough some of the units of ist Corps were stillincomplete, the limited accommodation availablein the assembly area made it essential to beginthe move forward before 26th September whenthe leading units of 2nd Corps were due to arrive.

7. During these early weeks the maintenanceof the Force presented a problem which calledfor the greatest resource and initiative on thepart of my Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant-General W. G. Lindsell, his Staff and Services.

In the units of the Royal Army Service Corpswere many officers and men fresh from civillife who were constantly called upon to surmountunforeseen difficulties. By their unflaggingenergy and the assistance of the French authori-ties the Force was maintained without anyfailure of supplies. It should be added that withthe exception of eleven regular officers, thepersonnel of the Movement Control organisationwas built up from Supplementary Reserveofficers and men.

The administrative staff were obliged to dealwith the day-to-day work of landing troops,their vehicles and current supplies, and toundertake the equally important task of buildingup reserves of ammunition, supplies, andordnance stores. Covered accommodation wasdifficult to obtain and temporary dumps of non-perishable stores had to be established whereverthe necessary space could be found in the vicinityof the ports of entry.

8. In these early days the Staff met for thefirst time the problem arising from the widedispersion imposed by the necessity to guardagainst air at.ta.gk,

The towns of Le Mans and- Laval werefifty miles apart, and the base ports were on anaverage one hundred and fifty miles from theassembly area. Helpful though the Frenchauthorities were, the unfamiliar conditions madetelephone communication difficult, apart fromthe danger of breach of security which it entailed.Since many despatch riders spoke no French itwas often found that control could only beproperly maintained by personal visits; Com-manders and their staffs were therefore forcedto spend many hours on the road.

The dispersion dictated by the possibility ofaerial bombardment greatly increases demandsupon signal communications and transport andthus lengthens the time which must elapsebetween the issue of orders and their execution.

The Move to the Belgian Frontier.9. On 22nd September, I left Le Mans for

Amiens. Arriving at Mantes-sur-Saine, I washanded a telegram from General Georges, Com-mander of the French Front of the North-East,which read as follows :—

" Pour General Commandant, B.E.F." Limite envisaged prevoit front de B.E.F.

droite a MAULDE gauche a MENIN ougauche a AUTRYCHE - SUR - ESCAUT.Ge"n6ral GEORGES d6sirerait avoir accord22 Septembre."In the meantime, however, General Gamelin

had proceeded to London to discuss with HisMajesty's Government the frontage which was tobe held by the British Expeditionary Force.

After I had made a reconnaissance on 24thand 25th September of the sector which it wasproposed to allot to the British ExpeditionaryForce I visited General Georges at GrandQuartier General on 26th September, in thecompany of my Chief of the General Staff,Lieutenant-General H. R. Pownall. I thenagreed to accept the sector offered by GeneralGeorges to the British Expeditionary Force.This sector was from Maulde exclusive toHalluin inclusive, and thence a defensive flankalong river Lys/Armentieres. General Georgesplaced 5ist French Division (Ge'ne'ral deBrigade Gillard) under my command, and Idecided to employ it in my left sector, coveringthe towns of Roubaix and Tourcoing.

10. It had been originally intended thatformations, as soon as they had completed theirreorganisation in the assembly area, shouldmove to a concentration area in the North ofFrance, and remain there in readiness to occupythe line not earlier than 5th October. GeneralGeorges decided, however, that it was inadvisableto await the arrival of the whole British Expe-ditionary Force in 'the concentration area andexpressed a wish that ist Corps should movewithout delay into the sector north of Maulde.I accordingly informed General Georges thatist Corps would take over its sector on 3rd Octoberand that 2nd Corps would be able to^o into theline about I2th October.

ist Corps began the two hundred and fifty-milemove from the assembly area on 26th September.

Tanks, tracked vehicles, and slow movingartillery proceeded by train and the remainderof the force advanced on three parallel routes.

Three days were allotted for the move of eachformation. Two staging areas were arranged oneach road, south of the rivers Seine andSomme respectively, and anti-aircraft defence

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 ^5901

was provided at these river crossings. Theweather was fine throughout the whole period ofthe move.

The first stage was one hundred andtwenty miles. An average of five hundredvehicles moved daily over each stage of the route,maintaining a distance of one hundred yardsbetween each vehicle as a precaution againstair attack. A halt of one day for maintenancepurposes was made after the first day's move.

In the initial stages of the move, the Provostservice were responsible for the regulation oftraffic, but on entering the French Zone desArmees, columns came under the direction ofthe French road control (Regulatrice Routiere)organisation, which gave valuable help inmarking detours and in directing traffic throughtowns. A French-speaking British officer wasestablished in Amiens to ensure liaison betweenmy headquarters and the French authorities.

Breakdowns and accidents were few, whichreflects great credit on the drivers, who wereunaccustomed to long hours at the wheel andto driving on the right-hand side of the road.Among the many important lessons which werelearnt during the largest road movement everundertaken with motor transport by any BritishArmy were the need for early reconnaissance ofstaging areas, for control at the dispersal points,and for allowance for unforeseen delays.

11. The move forward continued withoutincident or interruption, and on the agreed date,3rd October, ist Corps took over from theFrench the sector Maulde-Gruson on the Belgianfrontier. This sector lay between that of theist French Army and of the i6th French Corps,with 2nd Division (Major-General H. C. Loyd)on the right and ist Division (Major-GeneralHon. H. R. L. G. Alexander) on the left.

General Headquarters opened in and aroundHabarcq (8 miles west of Arras) on 2ndOctober.

On I2th October, 3rd Division of 2nd Corps(Major-General B. L. Montgomery) movedinto the line between Bouvines and Lannoy,relieving the left brigade of ist Corps and theright regiment of the French 5ist Division.4th Division of the same Corps (Major-GeneralD. G. Johnson, V.C.) was located in GeneralHeadquarters reserve.

The initial occupation of the line by the BritishExpeditionary Force was thus completed aridthe organisation of the position was undertakenat once.

The Organisation of the British Positions.12. In allotting sectors the geographical fea-

tures of the pronounced salient occupied by theBritish Expeditionary Force had to be con-sidered. East of the Tournai-Orchies roadthe country is flat, much wooded and inter-sected by small streams. Further to the northlies open and undulating agricultural land whichlends itself to artillery observation and to themovement of armoured fighting vehicles.Further north again the sector is for the mostpart on the fringe of a highly industrial andmining district.

When ist Corps arrived in the sector assignedto the British Expeditionary Force in the firstweek in October, an almost continuous anti-tank obstacle already existed in the form of aditch covered by concrete blockhouses built tomount anti-tank guns and machine guns. Inaccordance with plans prepared in peace time

certain French technical troops continued towork in the sector under the command of theFrench Commander of the Defensive Sectorof Lille, Colonel (now General de Brigade)Bertschi.

While defences continued to develop on thelines of the original plan, based on the closedefence of the frontier, it was also necessary toorganise the position.

The priority of work envisaged the eventualconstruction of three positions in the forwardarea, and a Corps reserve position was sitedacross the base of the Lille salient formed bythe frontier. Further in rear, a second positionhad been sited, following the line of the HauteDeule, Sense"e and La Basse"e canals.

The whole scheme involved the immediateconstruction of field defences and the duplica-tion of the anti-tank obstacle in the forwardzone.

It was consequently necessary to constructat an early stage reinforced concrete " pill-boxes " to afford protection to those weaponswhich formed the backbone of the fire defencethroughout the whole depth of the position.In order to save time standard designs wereprepared to accommodate both British andFrench weapons.

13. Work on these " pill-boxes " was begun bythe Royal Engineers, assisted by other arms.Early in November a specially constituted forcecomposed of twelve field companies of theRoyal Engineers drawn from Territorial Army.Divisions at home, and known as " X Force,"arrived in the British Expeditionary Forcearea. This force had its own transport andspecial plant for the construction of reinforcedconcrete " pill-boxes" by mass productionmethods. It was accompanied by companies ofthe Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps.

A special Excavator Company, equipped withmechanical excavators of various types, arrivedat the same time as X Force. It has beenemployed in digging anti-tank ditches, buryingsignal cables, constructing breastworks, andother tasks.

A creation of such a defensive systemdemanded a quantity and variety of engineerstores far exceeding pre-war anticipations.

Bad weather in October and November, anda succession of frosts later, considerably delayedthe work, but by the end of the period coveredby this despatch the position had been developedin considerable depth. A large number of con-crete " pill-boxes" had been completed andmany others were under construction ; new wirehad been erected and existing wire strengthened,buildings had been reinforced, and many milesof anti-tank ditch dug.The Saar Detachment.

14. In November, 1939, I arranged withGeneral Georges that a British infantry brigadeshould take its place in the line on the Saarfront, under the command of a French Division.

The brigade took over the sector from theFrench 42nd Division on the 4th Decemberwithout enemy interference and during theperiod under review conditions were quiet.

Since that date infantry brigades of theBritish Expeditionary Force have successivelycompleted short tours of duty in this sector, andjunior leaders have thus had valuable trainingin their day to day duties when in contact withthe enemy.

5902 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

The fortifications of the Maginot Line in thesector concerned continued to be manned byFrench fortress troops, the British battalionsbeing disposed in depth in advance of thefortified line. The enemy positions were on theaverage one thousand five hundred yards distantfrom our foremost posts.

The British Army contains to-day very fewregimental officers and other ranks who foughtin the last war; much that was common know-ledge and accepted practice then, must thereforebe learned again. Nevertheless, events on theSaar front have proved beyond doubt thatthe young officer and his men, once they havehad experience of active service, will be in everyway worthy of their predecessors.

The Completion of the First Contingent.15. During October and November, i5th and

I7th Infantry Brigades were sent from home,and placed under command of ist and 2ndCorps respectively. i3th Infantry Brigade wasalso relieved on the Lines of Communicationby 25th Infantry Brigade.

On ist and 2nd December, the French5 ist Division was relieved by 4th Division andi7th Infantry Brigade, and withdrawn from mycommand : I was sorry to part with them andwith their commander, who at all times gaveme loyal support.

The plans for the despatch of the Force hadenvisaged that two divisions of the TerritorialArmy would be sent from home as soon as theywere sufficiently trained. Since three regularinfantry brigades had by now arrived, however,I decided on 27th October to form the 5thDivision under the command of Major-GeneralH. E. Franklyn. On the night of 2gth-3othDecember the division took over a sector on theleft of the 4th Division.

At this time the five divisions of the BritishExpeditionary Force were all in the line.

During the month of January the 48thDivision (Major-General A. F. A. N. Thome)arrived in France, and by 23rd January hadcompleted its move forward. It was placedunder ist Corps, but held in G.H.Q. reserve.

By the end of January the Force, therefore,consisted of two corps, each of three divisions,with corps and army troops. The first stagein the development of the Force was thusconcluded.

The strength of the British ExpeditionaryForce at the end of January stood at twohundred and twenty-two thousand two hundred,all ranks, not including the men of the AirComponent and of other units of the Royal AirForce for whose maintenance I am responsible.

Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence.16. Although development of the Air Forces

and of the Air Defence organisations proceededsimultaneously with the despatch of the Forceand with its subsequent moves, I have thoughtit convenient to describe this developmentseparately.

The composition of the Force included aComponent of the Royal Air Force under thecommand of Air Vice-Marshal C. H. B. Blount,Royal Air Force, consisting of two ArmyCo-operation Wings, one Fighter Wing and oneBomber Reconnaissance Wing.

The aircraft were flown to France accordingto plan at the outbreak of hostilities and came

under my command from the dates of the dis-embarkation of their ground units. Later otherunits were added, and the Air Component nowcomprises, in addition to Headquarters, oneFighter Group Headquarters, eight Wings, aCommunication Squadron, and certain adminis-trative and other detachments.

The ground echelons were moved in advanceof ist and 2nd Corps to the aerodromes in theregion to be occupied. In the early stages theywere largely dependent on the assistance given tothem by the French Region Aerienne under thecommand successively of General Jeauneaudand General Armengeaud.

On I4th and 15th September, the anti-aircraftunits disembarked at the base ports and, inconjunction with fighter units of the RoyalAir Force, undertook the task of protectingthe disembarkation of the two Corps and theirforward moves.

Once the concentration was complete, theavailable anti-aircraft resources were dividedbetween forward defences and Lines of Com-munication. Besides the normal provision forthe defence of headquarters and railheads,arrangements were made to protect certainimportant French installations in the Britishzone and a searchlight zone was also establishedas a protection against enemy night bombing.

On all occasions, the Air Officer Commandinghas been greatly helped by General d'Astier,commanding the French Air Forces with thenorthern group of French Armies.

During the period under review, enemy airactivity has been almost entirely confined toreconnaissance flights at great heights.

Air Reconnaissance.17. The strategical plans for air reconnais-

sance were worked out in conjunction with theAir Ministry and with General Mouchard,commanding the Air Forces with the FrenchArmies of the North East.

In accordance with these plans many recon-naissances have been carried out both by dayand night. Much photography has beenundertaken with useful results, both in informa-tion obtained and in experience gained inphotographic and survey methods.

The work of the units of the Royal Air Forceengaged in air reconnaissance deserves thehighest praise, since it has been performed, as arule, in the face of enemy opposition. Pilotshave often been called on to carry out flights tothe full limit of the range of their aircraft,flying over long and circuitous routes to avoidneutral territory; this rigorous duty has beenboldly and cheerfully undertaken.

The preparation of Aerodromes.18. It had been decided, before mobilisation,

that the maintenance and construction of allaerodromes used by the Royal Air Force inFrance, as well as their signal communications,should be the responsibility of the BritishExpeditionary Force.

Many aerodromes and landing grounds hadbeen placed at our disposal by the Frenchauthorities, but it soon became evident that theproblems of construction and maintenancewere far greater than had been contemplatedbefore the war. A new policy had, therefore,to be formulated and comprehensive plansprepared. In most parts of France, permanentpasture does not exist, and this fact, in view of

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5903

the weight of modern aircraft, has made it neces-sary to construct concrete runways, often ofconsiderable extent, on the principal aero-dromes in use. A number of special units ofthe Royal Engineers had consequently to beraised, and a large amount of plant, grass seedand materials had to be provided.

Frontier Control.19. The sector of the frontier occupied by the

British Expeditionary Force presented a verydifficult control problem. There were initiallyover ten thousand Belgians working on thebeet harvest in the British zone and on theaverage considerably more than twenty thousandlocal inhabitants passed the frontier daily ontheir normal business.

The strength of the frontier organisationscharged with the control of the frontier traffichad been seriously reduced on mobilisation. Itwas therefore essential to supplement the normalmachinery of control.

The system devised in co-operation with theist French Region and the commander of thefortified sector of Lille included a primarycontrol on the frontier proper and a secondarycontrol on the line of the foremost anti-tankobstacle wherever the latter did not coincidewith the frontier.

Co-operation with the French authoritieshas been close and harmonious throughout.The Field Security Police have played animportant role in this unusual and difficulttask and have contributed largely to the successof the organisation.

Intelligence.20. Conditions on the operational side of

intelligence work in the field have naturallybeen abnormal. Much valuable preliminarywork and re-organisation has been carried outand full advantage has been taken of the unusualsituation, to complete the training of theIntelligence staffs. Co-operation with the FrenchIntelligence service has been close and cordial.

It became apparent at an early date that thestaff and organisation provided for dealing withwireless intelligence were inadequate for thisincreasingly important branch of operationalintelligence. The expansion of the wirelessintelligence units is now, therefore, in progress.Closest co-operation has been maintained withthe French Wireless Intelligence Service.

It has been necessary to increase the air intelli-gence section of the Intelligence branch atGeneral Headquarters, which has performedvaluable work in the collection and distributionof information.

The problem of security has presented manyunusual difficulties. This has been largely dueto the long period of inactivity, the geographicalposition of the Force, the length of the Lines ofCommunication, and the congestion in the rearareas owing to the presence of evacuees. TheFrench authorities have co-operated mostclosely in the matter of civil security and havethroughout given all the assistance in theirpower.

Censorship.The postal censorship discipline of the British

Expeditionary Force is on the whole good.Very considerable increases in personnel havebeen found necessary in order to impose the

requisite selective censorship on the abnormallylarge number of letters now despatched daily.Extremely useful reports on the outlook of theBritish Expeditionary Force as a whole and onits relations with the local French inhabitantsare produced periodically. These are basedlargely on information supplied by the censorshiporganisation supplemented by reports from theField Security Police.

Publicity and Propaganda.The section of the Intelligence branch dealing

with publicity and propaganda has worked inclose co-operation with the organisations con-cerned both in England and France, and hasfulfilled a r61e which has assumed far moreimportance than in previous campaigns. Muchhas been done to counter German propaganda.Material has been provided for the MiniformCommittee in Paris in this connection, andinformation bulletins are issued periodically to allunits of the British Expeditionary Force.

Cipher Personnel.Up to date the whole of the cipher work in the

Force has been carried out most efficientlyby Army Educational Corps personnel. Thispersonnel is now required to revert to its normalduties in the United Kingdom and is beingreplaced.

Press.21. The significance and requirements of the

Press and of the press and cinematographicpublicity in the field in modern war have provedgreater than was appreciated prior to the out-break of hostilities. Shortly after mobilisationa Public Relations unit was hastily formed andincorporated in the Intelligence branch ofGeneral Headquarters.

Since its formation in October this unit hasadministered and arranged facilities for a totalof some fifty-five War Correspondents perma-nently accredited to the British ExpeditionaryForce, besides representatives of the principalnews-reel companies. Some sixty visitingeditors, correspondents, broadcasters and cine-matographers, in addition to selected repre-sentatives of the neutral Press, have been givenfacilities for visiting the Force.

There has also been a small unit of the BritishBroadcasting Corporation with the Force sinceOctober, and facilities have been provided forselected official photographers to meet therequirements of the British Press.

The Newspaper Proprietors Association gener-ously makes a large supply of papers availablefree daily for the Force. In the matter ofdistribution, close touch has been kept withthem and with the "Continental Daily Mail,"which supplies the troops with their latest news.

The Press and photographic censorship is nowworking efficiently and co-operation with theFrench is close and harmonious.

Development of the Rearward Services.22. The work of the administrative staffs

and services in back areas has in many respectsbeen fully as heavy as it would have been iffighting had been in progress. It was theirduty, while maintaining a continually growingforce, to make and put into execution long termplans in preparation for the arrival of futurecontingents.


The initial scheme provided for the formationof temporary maintenance dep&ts near the portsof Brest and Nantes, but it was soon evidentthat, with so long a line of communication,an advanced base was required.

The use of the port of Havre had at firstbeen considered undesirable owing to certaingeographical and technical difficulties in theair defence of the docks. These were, however,overcome in mid-November, and an AdvancedBase area is now being established near thisport with the co-operation of the Frenchauthorities, while Field Supply Depdts are beingset up further forward. By mid-December,the staff of the Movement Control were workingsome ninety stations, while fourteen ports werein use for landing personnel, animals and stores.Through these ports, a quarter of a million men,forty-five thousand mechanical vehicles and amonthly tonnage varying from sixty to onehundred thousand tons of stores of all kindswere imported and distributed to their variousareas and reserve dep6ts.

Works projects of great magnitude have beenin progress from the outset, and the problemsof accommodation have been many and complex.An extensive programme of building and huttingfor depdts, hospitals and reinforcement campswas put in hand, together with installations forelectric light and power, the bulk storage ofpetrol and so on. A vast amount of minorwork in connection with accommodation hasbeen carried out by the Royal Engineers.

Railway construction at depdts and aero-dromes has been undertaken by the Trans-portation Services under very adverse weatherconditions.

The complicated nature of modern militaryequipment has added greatly to the work of theRoyal Army Ordnance Corps, as regards bothstoreholding and repair. Great difficulty hasbeen experienced in finding suitable accommo-dation for depdts and workshops at the bases,more especially since the whole of the resourcesof France are engaged at high pressure on herown war industries. New installations havetherefore been planned and are now underconstruction.

The maintenance of mechanical vehicles hasreceived constant attention and the number ofroad accidents, and consequently of repairs,has been greatly reduced through measurestaken by the Provost Service to enforce roaddiscipline.

The labour problem bids fair to become oneof great magnitude, and its solution may bedifficult. As no adequate labour force wasavailable on mobilisation, the gap was filledby the temporary use of cavalry and infantryreservists. Later, the Auxiliary Military PioneerCorps absorbed the various labour units alreadyin France. This Corps has carried out cheer-fully and efficiently the important, but oftenunexciting tasks allotted to its units.

I am grateful to the Government of Indiafor the high standard of the animal transportunits sent to France, which have proved theirusefulness on many occasions.

Major General P. de Fonblanque, GeneralOfficer Commanding, Lines of CommunicationArea, has under his command the greatest partof the undertakings described above. Theynow cover almost one third of France, stretchingfrom Dunkirk to Brest and from Cherbourg toMarseilles.

The Welfare of the Force23. The health of the Force has been good

and the number of troops in the care of medicalunits has never exceeded 2-8 per cent, of thestrength of the Force, despite the unusuallysevere weather conditions in December andJanuary.

I wish to express my appreciation of the workof the Royal Army Medical Corps under myDirector of Medical Services, Major GeneralJ. W. L. Scott.

The arrangements for leave came into forceon i8th December. The numbers permittedto be absent on leave at any one time are basedon the percentage of strength which can be sparedfrom the Force. By the end of January tendays' leave home had been granted to some sixtythousand of all ranks and compassionate leavehad also been granted in deserving cases.

The question of leave was worked out ingreat detail by the Adjutant General, LieutenantGeneral Sir Douglas Brownrigg, and the membersof his staff.

The Expeditionary Force Institutes have nowestablished some ninety institutes open on theLines of Communication and bulk stores havebeen established in forward areas to enable unitsto replenish their own canteens. The sameorganisation is providing concert parties andmobile cinemas, and a proportion of the troopsare able to visit each week one of the enter-tainments provided by the EntertainmentsNational Services Association.

I am likewise grateful to those organisationswhich have co-operated so whole-heartedly withthe Royal Army Chaplains Department inattending to the welfare of the troops.

Amongst these are the Catholic Women'sGuild, The Army Scripture Readers' Association,The Church Army, The Church of Scotland,Toe H, The Salvation Army, The Young Men'sChristian Association, and the Young Women'sChristian Association.

The despatch and delivery of mails takes placewith regularity, and more than nine thousandbags of mail have been handled in one day bythe Postal Service. The necessity for censor-ship is fully realized, but there has been nodelay in the time taken in the transit of mailfor an ever increasing force.

The great distances between forward troopsand the base made it necessary to depart fromthe old established procedure whereby the 2ndEchelon of the Adjutant General's Branch hasalways been located in the theatre of war.This office is now established in Margate,and the move has been fully justified by theincreased speed with which matters are nowhandled.

Training and Organisation.24. The absence of fighting has -afforded

opportunities to continue the training of theForce. Weapon training has been possible foralmost every unit, and thanks to the co-opera-tion of the French Army, artillery practicecamps have been held and other trainingfacilities provided. Exercises with troops in-volving road movement on a large scale havebeen held and much progress has been madein the technique of co-operation with the RoyalAir Force.

About eight hundred and fifty officers andnon-commissioned officers have been sent home

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 59<>5

as instructors to assist in the training of newformations, while an equal number have beenattached to the Force, for instruction, fromunits at home.

Despite the almost complete absence of battlecasualties the supply of officers has caused meconcern. Over four hundred candidates havebeen sent home for training as officers, while afurther four hundred have been recommendedfor immediate commissions.

These have been drawn to a large extent fromWarrant Officers Class III.

A large number of War Establishments, par-ticularly for the Intelligence Corps and for unitson the Lines of Communication, were found toneed adjustment and steps have been taken tothis end.

The existing War Establishment of an infantrybattalion, which was not designed for Continentalwarfare, has called for modification and I amgrateful that my recommendations for an in-crease have been accepted.

The Royal Corps of Signals has been put togreat strain in providing communications notonly for the Army, but for the whole of the AirForces in France. The degree of dispersionrequired in modern warfare has materiallyadded to their difficulties.

The success with which these demands havebeen met is due not only to the spirit in whichthe personnel of that Corps have faced andovercome difficulties, but to the successfularrangements for co-operation with the Frenchmilitary and civil organisations, and with theGeneral Post Office. The Wireless IntelligenceStaff have done valuable work, and the cipherduties of the Force have been most efficientlyperformed by personnel of the Army EducationalCorps.

The Survey Directorate has been called uponto carry out a great deal of work under difficultconditions and has fulfilled all the demandsmade upon it.

Liaison with the French.25. On the arrival of the British Expeditionary

Force in France a French Military Mission wasestablished at my headquarters to deal withFrench military and civil authorities and to actas a link with Grand Quartier General. Inaddition, officers and non-commissioned officersof the French Army are attached for liaisonduties to the headquarters of each formationand unit as it arrives.

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to thechief of the Mission, General de Division Voruz,and to all his staff for their ever ready help tothe-British Army on all occasions.

Thanks to their efforts, matters relating tobilleting, hire of land, and local purchase ofmaterial have been handled without friction.To them is due, in large measure, the friendlinessof the relations which exist between the Frenchpopulation and the troops, and also as betweenFrench and British staffs and regiments.

A British Military Mission under BrigadierJ. G. des R. Swayne was established with theHeadquarters of General Georges under whoseimmediate command the British ExpeditionaryForce is serving.

Distinguished Visitors.26. On 4th December His Majesty The King

visited his troops in France and was received-everywhere with enthusiasm. During the threedays tour His Majesty was able to make adetailed inspection of forward and rear areas.On his return to England, His Majesty wasgraciously pleased to send a message to hisArmy which was warmly appreciated by allranks.

The President of the French Republic hasspent a day with the British ExpeditionaryForce.

The Prime Minister and other members of theWar Cabinet, the Ministers from the Dominions,many members of the Army Council and sevenField Marshals are amongst those who havevisited my Headquarters at various times.

Honours and Awards.27. I am submitting separately the names

of officers and other ranks whom I wish torecommend for reward or to bring to your noticefor gallant or distinguished service.

I have the honour to be,Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

GORT.

General,Commander-in-Chief,

British Expeditionary Force.


SECOND DESPATCH f

(Covering the period from ist February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, with an Appendixcovering operations of ist Corps from 6 p.m. 3ist May, to midnight 2nd/3rd June).

| i. The narrative portions of this despatch have been compiled from the war diaries and otherrecords of the General Staff at G.H.Q. These have been supplemented by war diaries, includingthose of the Swayne Mission, and by diaries, notes and records made by various commandersand staff officers at the time, or within a few days of their arrival in England. The records of theGeneral Staff at G.H.Q. are only partially complete for the period loth—i8th May, owing to somepapers having been destroyed at Boulogne, and a portion of the records for 3ist May lost at sea.Some records of less importance were burnt at Hazebrouck to avoid possible capture and otherswere destroyed in a lorry which caught fire near Cassel on or about 24th May.

2. The Appendix contains an account of the operations at Dunkirk from 6 p.m., 3ist May, tomidnight 2nd/3rd June, which may conveniently be appended to this despatch, though they werenot carried out under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. It has been compiled by the GeneralStaff at G.H.Q., from sources similar to those used for the despatch itself.

London,

Sir,25 July, 1940.

1. I have the honour to submit a report onthe employment of the British ExpeditionaryForce, and on the part which it played inoperations in France and -Belgium from istFebruary, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, on whichdate I gave up Command of the Force.

The period under review may be divided intotwo distinct and sharply contrasting phases,namely, before and after loth May, on whichdate active operations began. The activeoperations themselves can be divided geo-graphically into two distinct parts ; on the east,the advance to the River Dyle, and the with-drawal to the frontier; on the west, the defenceof Arras and the organisation of the Canal line.Later, the two parts merged into one whole inthe final phase of the withdrawal and embarka-tion of the Force.

No such clear definition can be made in termsof time; furthermore, the two operations, onthe east and on the west, were closely inter-dependent, and the same reserves had to servefor both. For this reason the accounts of theoperations on the two fronts cannot but beintermingled at certain points in the narrative.Broadly speaking, however, three distinct phasescan be distinguished. First, the advance to theDyle from ioth-i6th May; then from i7th-26thMay the withdrawal from the Dyle to theEscaut, the defence of the Belgian frontier andof the southern and western flanks ; and finallythe withdrawal and embarkation of the Forcefrom 27th-3ist May.

2. The narrative in my first despatch dated25th April, 1940, concluded with the completionof the first contingent of the Force.

I had been informed that the expansion of theForce was to be continued by the despatch of3rd Corps during the early months of 1940;the Armoured Division was to follow in May,and a fourth Corps, with ist CanadianDivision, during the late Summer ; furthermore,it had been decided that the Force should bedivided into two Annies, as soon as the numberof divisions in the field, excluding the ArmouredDivision, rose above eleven.

Preparation for this expansion, which hadbeen proceeding since the previous autumn,continued steadily until loth May.

Arrival of yd Corps in France.3. 3rd Corps (Lt.-General Sir Ronald F.

Adam, Bt.), consisting of 42nd Division (Major-General W. G. Holmes), 44th Division (Major-General E. A. Osborne) and 5ist Division(Major-General V. M. Fortune) was due fordespatch to France in February and March, and5 ist Division arrived during early February.The 5oth (Motor) Division (Major-General G. leQ. Martel) arrived in France at the same timeand was allotted to 2nd Corps. It had beenarranged that the front of the B.E.F. should beextended northwards to Croix de Poperinghe onthe Belgian frontier, two miles north-east ofBailleul, and that 3rd Corps should go into theline on the left of the B.E.F. taking over 5thDivision from 2nd Corps, and relieving 53rdFrench Division, between Armentieres and Croixde Poperinghe, with 5ist Division. The Com-mand of the new sector had passed to theB.E.F. at midnight 3ist Jan./ist February, andthe relief of the French troops was to takeplace about I2th February.

At this time, however, owing to the situationelsewhere in Europe His Majesty's Governmentfound it necessary to postpone the despatch of3rd Corps (excepting 5 ist Division) and also ofcertain anti-aircraft, administrative and labourunits. I was also instructed to earmark onedivision for withdrawal from the B.E.F. ifrequired ; for this I selected 5th Division. Itwas evident that the programme of shipments ofammunition and other war material to France,on which I had counted to make up the seriousdeficiencies in stocks, would be severely curtailedin February and March.

4. These changes entailed a delay in thedevelopment of the Force which was naturallydisappointing; moreover, it became impossiblefor me to take over the new sector to Bailleul,and at the same time to retain a proper propor-tion of divisions in reserve. I was, therefore,obliged to obtain the consent of the French tothe indefinite postponement of the relief, and toaccept the resulting congestion in the area ofthe B.E.F.

5oth Division was temporarily accommodatedin an area south-west of Amiens in G.H.Q.reserve.

At the end of March, however, the 3rd Corpswas finally despatched to France ; 5ist Divisionduly relieved the French in the new sector on


28th March; 44th Division, on disembarkation,moved into 3rd Corps reserve in the St. Pol area,and 50th Division into 2nd Corps reserve, south-west of Lille ; 42nd Division, on arrival, movedto the area south-west of Amiens, in G.H.Q.reserve.

5. The German invasion of Denmark andNorway on gth April created a new situation;leave was stopped in the British and FrenchArmies on loth April, and i5th Infantry Brigadeof 5th Division was despatched to England,en route for Norway, on I5th April; certainunits of 42nd Division were also retained athome, but with a few exceptions despatchedlater. The remainder of 5th Division was leftin France, but in War Office reserve, and wasaccordingly relieved in 3rd Corps by 42ndDivision. Reports of enemy intentions to invadeHolland and Belgium were received fromdifferent sources and at different times, andbetween the nth and 22nd April certain troopswere placed under short notice to move. Intensi-fied air reconnaissance .was ordered in the zoneallotted to the Air Component which includedpart of the Ruhr and the area to the west of it,but apart from small bridging activity nopositive results were observed.

o

The Soar Front.6. During this period the detachment of one

infantry brigade on the Saar front was main-tained ; at the outset the severe cold interferedconsiderably with the work of improving thedefences in the forward area. Much required tobe done, as regards increased protection, pro-vision of alternative fire positions, coveredapproaches and improved communications ; thewire required thickening and its tactical lay-outimproving; the thaw, when it set in, was rapidand energetic steps had to be taken to maintaina proper standard of sanitation.

The tour of duty of each infantry brigade wasraised in March to three weeks, and a pioneerbattalion was included in the detachment.

At the end of March it was decided to increasethe Saar force to a total of one division, withattached troops, including cavalry, machineguns, and pioneers. 5ist Division was selected.The Division had concentrated in the Metz areaby 30th April and by 7th May had relieved7th French Division, thus extending theBritish front on the Saar on either side of thefront originally held to a total of 12,000 yardsfrom Guerstling exclusive to Remeling inclusive.

5ist Division remained in the Saar area andtook no part in the operations in NorthernFrance. From loth May therefore, it ceasedto be under my effective command; the SaarForce was later moved to the Rouen area,where it took part in subsequent operations.

Patrolling, both by our own troops and bythe enemy, grew steadily more active duringthis period; early on the morning of the 5thMarch, the enemy carried out a successful raid,supported with a box barrage of a type familiarin the war of 1914-18, on one of our front linepositions in a wood known as the Hartebusch,then held by a battalion of the 4th Division(2nd D.C.L.I.). In this and subsequentencounters the enemy regularly suffered casual-ties, many of them at the hands of battalionsof the I44th Infantry Brigade of the 48thDivision, the first Territorial Army formationto meet the enemy in.this campaign.

The sub-machine gun was taken into experi-mental use by patrols in the Saar front: itsvalue had already been recognised and I trustthat a weapon of this type will be permanentlyincluded in the armament of the infantry.

Preparation for Further Expansion.7. In the meantime I had been preparing for

the arrival of further troops, and, in particular,for the formation of Army Headquarters whichwere due to arrive in the latter part of June.On the assumption that the positions held bythe B.E.F. were to remain the same, a lay-outhad been prepared involving a move of G.H.Q.The construction of the new G.H.Q. and ofthe two Army headquarters.was put in hand;this involved the laying of about 150 routemiles of heavy armoured cable. Negotiationswere in progress regarding the extension of thefront of the B.E.F. on arrival of a fourth Corps,the French being anxious that this shouldbe southwards rather than northwards.

Development of the Defensive Positions..8. The development of the successive defen-

sive positions and switch lines behind theBelgian frontier was continued steadily tillloth May. By this date over 400 concrete" pill-boxes " of varying size had been com-pleted with over ibo more under construction,while work on the improvement of field defences,wire and other obstacles proceeded continuouslyon the original front and in the sector north ofArmentieres recently taken over from theFrench.

Chiefly by the use of excavator machineryover 40 miles of revetted anti-tank ditch hadbeen added to that prepared by the Frencharmy in time of peace. Machines had also beenused to assist the troops in constructing earth-work defences, mixing concrete and buryingsignal cables.

Training.9. Training areas were being prepared to

accommodate the Armoured Division and otherformations; base reinforcement depdts wererapidly taking shape in their new locations nearRouen, and their training staffs had assembled.Corps schools had been established, principallyfor the training of junior leaders, and a snipingschool had been set up. Practice camps, bothfor field and anti-aircraft artillery had beendeveloped with the help of the French and stepstaken to continue the weapon training ofselected units.

The practice undertaken with anti-tankweapons, to which special attention was given,was amply to prove its value when the time came.

The Equipment Situation.10. The situation as regards equipment,

though there was latterly some improvement incertain directions, caused me serious misgivings,even before men and material began to bediverted by the needs of operations elsewhere.I had on several occasions called the attentionof the War Office to the shortage of almost everynature of ammunition of which the stocks inFrance were not nearly large enough to permitof the rates of expenditure laid down for sus-tained operations before the War.

There was a shortage of guns in some of theanti-tank regiments of the Royal Artillery,while armour-piercing shells for field guns hadnot, by loth May, been provided.


There were also deficiencies in technicalapparatus for light anti-aircraft requirements,such as Kenison Predictors, signal lights,technical and specialised vehicles of manytypes and a number of smaller items. The samedifficulties in provision of equipment were nodoubt the cause of delays in the despatch of newunits to the B.E.F., particularly armoured andanti-aircraft units, and while it is to some extenttrue that the shortness of the campaign pre-vented the full effect of the shortages being felt,it is I think, justifiable to assume that thepresence of the Armoured Division and of acomplete Army Tank Brigade would have beenan invaluable aid in the difficulties with whichwe were faced in meeting enemy armouredformations.

The Administrative Situation.11. The development of the rearward installa-

tions had been proceeding systematically.The medical base installations had been

extended and a hospital area was in course ofrapid development near Boulogne in additionto the original medical base sub-area at Dieppe.

The British Army requirements in the port ofBrest, a French naval base, had been sub-stantially reduced by the use of other portssuch as St. Malo and Caen ; by May, seventeenports in all were being operated and 2,500 tonsof stores were being despatched to railheadsdaily.

At the same time, the construction of semi-permanent dep6ts of all kinds in the neighbour-hood of Nantes, Rennes and Rouen was inprogress; this would later on have led to moreefficient and economical working than waspossible in the temporary accommodation,taken up in September, 1939. By loth May,seven ammunition depdts were open, in additionto railhead dumps ; all these were intended, intime, to be rail served; while the construction ofthe regulating station at Abancourt, by Frenchrailway troops on behalf of the B.E.F., was welladvanced. It opened on a limited scale in thefirst week of May. A supply dep6t was beingconstructed close by so as to relieve thedangerous congestion at the ports of Rouenand Havre.

The progress of all these undertakings wasadversely affected by the shortage of labour, towhich I referred in my first despatch, and itwas decided, in March, to send three Divisionsto France to undertake labour duties andat the same time continue their training, albeitslowly. The Divisions selected were I2th(Major-General R. L. Petre), 23rd (Major-General W. N. Herbert) and 46th (Major-General H. O. Curtis). These arrived in April;23rd Division was allotted for work on aero-dromes in the forward area, and the remainingtwo to the Lines of Communication area.

Organisation.12. The absence of actual operations up to

loth May gave opportunities to make a numberof changes in organisation.

Divisional cavalry regiments were groupedinto Armoured Reconnaissance Brigades and theLines of Communication area was re-organisedinto two districts.

Infantry battalions were filled up to the newand higher establishments, and action wasinitiated to raise the establishment of artillery

units, including anti-aircraft. My Adjutant-General's branch, in conjunction with theAdjutant-General's branch at the War Office,had in hand plans for the more economical useof man-power, the elimination of fit men fromsedentary or base duties and the reduction oftradesmen in War Establishments. Investiga-tions made by the War Office, which had myfull co-operation, were directed towards a moreeconomical and more flexible system of replace-ment and repair of vehicles and equipment inthe Force.

The Royal Air Force.13. On I5th January, 1940, Air Marshal A. S.

Barratt had assumed command of the BritishAh- Force in France, including the Air Com-ponent which, however, was to remain under myoperational control. Under this arrangement,in my opinion, the control of available air forceswas better allocated to meet the needs not onlyof the British but also of the French Army forwhom considerable aerial reconnaissance wasbeing carried out. The development of theAllied Central Air Bureau and of its communica-tions to the headquarters of higher formationsin France and to the Royal Air Force at home,was likewise to prove its worth in the 4^ys tocome as an organisation for co-ordinatinginformation and requests for air action.

At the same time I felt that the resources ofthe Air Component would prove insufficient forthe requirements of the Force during operations ;so long, therefore, as this state of affairs existedit was of prime importance that the machineryfor obtaining the allotment of additional bomberand fighter support should be as simple and asswift in operation as it could be made.

Throughout the period, construction of newaerodromes, landing grounds and communica-tions for the British Air Force in France wasproceeding as fast as resources would permit,concrete runways being constructed in theearly part of the year until the season allowedfor the sowing of grass. Upwards of 10,000 menwere employed on this work, and forty-sevenaerodromes and satellites (including 19 newaerodromes) were under development or con-struction. By I5th May eight of the nineteennew aerodromes were capable of use, and atleast 50,000 tons of concrete had been laid.Constructional work was also undertaken onbehalf of the Air Ministry at other R.A.F.installations in central France.

The Dyle and Escaut Plans.14. Very shortly after the arrival of the B.E.F.

in their positions on the Belgian frontier I hadbeen invited by General Georges, commandingthe French Front of the North East, underwhose Command I was, to study the part to beplayed by the B.E.F. in the event of an advanceinto Holland and Belgium, or into Belgiumalone. The question of such an advance wasone of high policy with a political as well as amilitary aspect; it was therefore not for me tocomment on it. My responsibilities were con-fined to ensuring that the orders issued by theFrench for the employment of the BritishExpeditionary Force were capable of beingcarried out; and indeed events proved that theorders issued for this operation were well withinthe capacity of the Force.

The subject presented difficulties greatlycomplicated by the policy of neutrality to which


the Belgian Government were wedded. TheFrench authorities were never in a position toobtain reliable and accurate details of the plansof the Belgian General Staff for the defence oftheir country in the event of an invasion byGermany; staff conversations were out of thequestion, yet plans had to be framed in such away that they could be put into instant opera-tion in the event of Belgium asking for militaryassistance from France or Great Britain wheninvasion had taken place or was imminent.

Such slender contact as existed between theBritish and Belgian Military authorities wasmaintained through the Military Attach^ at HisMajesty's Embassy at Brussels and GeneralVan Overstraeten, Military Adviser to the Kingof the Belgians.

15. Three alternative plans were decided onby the French High Command during Octoberand November 1939, and I had agreed withGeneral Georges on the part to be played ineach of them by the B.E.F.

The first alternative was to occupy the frontierdefences, pushing forward mobile troops to theline of the Escaut, while the French 7th Armyon my left were to delay the enemy on the lineof the Messines Ridge and the Yser Canal.This plan was soon discarded in favour of thesecond alternative, which was to secure andhold the line of the Escaut itself, from the pointat which it crosses the frontier at Mauldenorthwards to the neighbourhood of Ghentwhere it was intended to effect a junction withBelgian forces.

Later, however, as information became avail-able regarding the defences of the Belgian Army,

* and its readiness for war, the French HighCommand formed the opinion that it would besafe to count on the Belgian defence holdingout for some days oh the Eastern frontier, andthe Albert Canal. It was also ascertained thatthe Belgians were preparing a de Cointet anti-tank obstacle running southwards from Wavretowards Namur.

The line of the river Dyle was from the militarypoint of view a better one than that of the Escaut.It was shorter, it afforded greater depth and itsnorthern portion was inundated. In addition,it represented smaller enemy occupation ofBelgian territory.

On the other hand, it involved the B.E.F.in a forward move of some sixty miles againsttime, while it also necessitated the holding bythe French on our right of the Gembloux gapwhich contains no natural anti-tank obstacle.This plan was twice discussed by General Georgeswith me on I3th October at my headquartersat Le Cauroy and again on i6th November atFolembray the headquarters of the French FirstGroup of Armies; on this occasion there werealso present General Billotte, who commandedthe Army Group, and Generals Blanchard andCorap, Commanding the French ist and gthArmies. At this conference it was agreed thatthe frontage of the B.E.F. on the Dyle positionwas to be from Wavre to Louvain, both placesinclusive, and a formal instruction to this effectwas issued to me by General Georges on thefollowing day. From this time onward, Com-manders and Staffs were studying simultaneouslytwo alternative plans for advances to the Dyleor the Escaut; these became known as plansDandE.

Both these plans were worked out in thegreatest detail, and orders and instructionskept up to date as new divisions arrived andthe role of divisions changed.

The Escaut plan was by far the simpler ofthe two; it involved sending armoured carreconnaissances to the river Dendre to berelieved by divisional cavalry, who were later,if necessary, to fight a delaying action back-wards to the Escaut; demolitions were providedfor on both rivers; for the remainder of theforce, however, the advance appeared likelyto be an easy one, well within a day's marchon foot. The Dyle plan, on the other hand,involved an advance of some sixty miles, carriedout at a time when every moment was of valueover roads not previously reconnoitred, perhapscrowded with refugees moving counter to theallied armies. Much, too, depended on theresistance which the Belgians, and perhaps theDutch, were able to offer to the enemy, who atsuch a time would certainly be making everyeffort to pierce the line of the Meuse and theAlbert Canal.

16. The plans made in advance for the advanceto the Dyle position actually worked to schedulein almost all respects. It may therefore beconvenient to summarise them here.

The Allied forces were to advance to the lineNamur—Wavre—Louvain—Antwerp, of whichthe B.E.F. Sector extended from Wavre toLouvain, both inclusive. On our right was tobe the French ist Army (General d'ArmeeBlanchard) under whose command was theFrench Cavalry Corps, and whose task it wasto delay the arrival of the enemy on the Dyleposition and to block with its main forces theGembloux gap, with the Cavalry Corps pushedforward to the line Eghezee (8 miles north ofNamur)—Tirlemont. On our left the French7th Army (General d'Armee Giraud) was toadvance to the general area Antwerp-Ghent,with the object of supporting Belgian resistancenorth of Louvain. The plans of this Armyincluded a possible advance into Holland asfar as the line Turnhout-Breda, and this wasactually carried out. It had been ascertainedthat a portion of the Belgian Army, if forced towithdraw from their frontier defences wouldcome into line on the left of the B.E.F. on thegeneral line from Louvain exclusive, thencenorthward to the fortified area of Antwerp,known as the National Redoubt.

The British front was to be occupied initiallywith ist Corps (Lieutenant-General M. G. H.Barker, who had recently taken over commandfrom General Sir John Dill), on a two-divisionfront, on the right, and 2nd Corps (Lieutenant-General A. F. Brooke, now Sir Alan Brooke)on the left, on a front initially of one division.

The advance was to be made in four periods.In the first, i2th Royal Lancers (ArmouredCars) were to move to a general line some eightmiles beyond the Dyle in observation of theapproaches from the east; they were to berelieved by cavalry regiments of ist and 2ndCorps when they arrived.

Behind them were to come, from right to left,2nd Division (Major-General H. C. Loyd) andist Division (Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G.Alexander) of ist Corps, and 3rd Division(Maj01-General B. L. Montgomery) of 2ndCorps. The whole of the move of these threedivisions was to be made by motor transport,


and troop carrying companies were allotted toCorps in such a way as to complete the movein 90 hours.

At the same time 44th Division was to marchto an area north-west of Audenarde, with aview to organising the defence of the Escaut inthis area.

Movement in the first phase was to be con-tinuous by day and night. The French haddecided to restrict the movements of their mainbodies to the hours of darkness, but I judgedthe time factor to be of paramount importanceand accepted the risk that our air support mightbe insufficient to prevent enemy interferencewith the move. Events proved that the riskwas justifiable.

In the second period, to be completed by theend of the sixth day, 48th Division (Major-General A. F. A. N. Thorne) and 4th Division(Major-General D. G. Johnson, V.C.) were tomove by march route and motor transport intoist and 2nd Corps reserve respectively, whileist Army Tank Brigade consisting of twobattalions was to move chiefly by rail intoist Corps area.

The third period was to be completed by thetenth day, and included the movement of sothDivision to 2nd Corps reserve, while 4th Divisionmoved into the line on the right of 3rd Division.

The fourth period included the forwardmovement of 3rd Corps. 5th Division (Major-General H. E. Franklyn) was to move topositions in G.H.Q. reserve, along the riverDendre, north and south of Grammont; 42ndand 44th Divisions to the line of the riverEscaut around Tournai and to the south ofAudenarde respectively, to organise bridgeheadpositions pending orders for a further advance.

Detailed instructions had also been issuedfor the preparation of defences on the threeriver lines of the Dyle, Dendre and Escaut, asalso for the necessary demolitions and inunda-tions. Special arrangements had been madefor the control of traffic, including refugees forwhom routes had been allotted; definite bodiesof troops were detailed for these tasks.

The Belgian Anti-Tank obstacle17. Late in April and early in May, I received

reports regarding the siting of the Belgiananti-tank obstacle; it appeared that, withoutinforming either the French High Command ormyself, they had sited the obstacle muchfurther to the east than had originally beenplanned, namely on the line Namur-Perwez-Louvain: furthermore the obstacle was notas yet by any means completed. The matterwas discussed with General Georges.

On the British front, the river Dyle was sofar superior as an anti-tank obstacle to anyartificial work further east which the Belgiansmight be preparing that I had no hesitation inurging adherence to the existing plan for thedefence of the Dyle position.

On the front of the French ist Army thesituation was different: the absence of a naturalobstacle forced them to rely on.that preparedby the Belgians. To clear the matter up,information was demanded as to the true siteof the artificial obstacle. These negotiationswere begun through our Military Attache1 on8th May, but they were not destined to beconcluded.

OPERATIONS—FIRST PHASE(ioth-i6th MAY)

Belgium calls on Allies for assistance: advanceto the River Dyle by British and FrenchArmies: the Belgian anti-tank obstacle isfound to be sited further forward than hadbeen expected. The enemy penetrates the frontof French gth Army and crosses the Meuse.Action by Royal Air Force. General Billotteappointed to co-ordinate action of British,French and Belgians. The Dutch lay down

arms.

loth May—The enemy invades Holland andBelgium.

18. The tension which had been increasingduring April had lessened somewhat during theearly days of May; during this period I hadreceived reports of enemy activity from severalsources of varying degrees of reliability, culmin-ating in a report from the Hague, but it was notuntil the night of 9th-ioth May that informationwas received of exceptional activity on thefrontiers of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland.The weather was set fair, and with the exceptionof some heavy thunderstorms which had noeffect on operations, remained so to the end ofthe month. At about 4.30 a.m. on loth May,enemy aircraft appeared over my headquartersat Arras and bombs were dropped on aero-dromes hi the neighbourhood and on a numberof towns including Doullens and Abbeville.At 5.30 a.m., a message was received from mymission with General Georges ordering " Alertesi, 2 and 3," namely, instant readiness to moveinto Belgium. I at once sought, and obtained,the release of the 5th Division from War Officereserve, and henceforward it was employedunder my orders. At about 6.15 a.m. I receivedinstructions to put Plan D into effect.

It was ascertained that I2th Royal Lancerscould be ready to cross the frontier at i p.m.,and accordingly I laid down this time as zerohour.

At i p.m. I opened my command post atWahagnies, midway between Douai and Lille.

ist and 2nd Corps experienced some delayin moving, due largely to the fact that owingto the short notice received, preliminary movesof transport had not taken place; apart fromthis, moves on this day proceeded according toplan; very little interference was experiencedeither from enemy aircrait or refugees andi2th Lancers reached the Dyle unopposed at10.30 p.m.

The French armies on our light and left werereported as advancing on time.

The Belgian population received the alliedarmies in the most cordial manner, and inparticular the leading troops were loudly cheered.

Operations between nth and i$th May.19. On nth May, enemy air action increased

somewhat, but did not interfere with the forwardmovement of troops, and during the afternoonand evening, the leading infantry brigadesreached the Dyle, refugee traffic beinghandled successfully. The original arrange-ments, of which the Belgian Government wereaware, included the use by the B.E.F. of roads

'passing through the northern and southernoutskirts of Brussels, but not through thecentre of the city. A series of requests washowever received to discontinue the use of theseroads on the ground that Brussels had been


declared an open town and that British troopmovements would prejudice its safety, but noadequate alternative routes to the Dyle wereavailable and I was therefore compelled toadhere to the original plan of using the outskirtsof the city.

The 3rd Division, on arrival, reported that aBelgian division was holding the bridgehead atLouvain, although I had assumed that thisshould be a British responsibility. 2nd Corpstherefore took up a narrow front on their rightwith a strong reserve in rear of Louvain.

5th Division, which was training in the areasouth-west of Amiens, was ordered to proceedby march route so as to shorten the move bymotor transport in a later phase, and lateroccupied a position on the Senne.

The news from the Belgian army, of whichKing Leopold had assumed command on theoutbreak of war, was not good. Belgian cyclisttroops from east of the Meuse were falling backon Huy. At Maastricht, it was reported thatthey had been forestalled by enemy action fromthe rear and had been unable to demolishimportant bridges over the Albert Canal andthe Meuse across which : the enemy hadbegun to move. Air bombing was requestedand was extremely effective, but could notaltogether deny the passage of the waterobstacles to the enemy. On my right theFrench Cavalry Corps had reached theirposition on the line Huy—Hannut—Tirlemontand reconnoitred the Belgian anti-tank obstacle.They reported that, as I had supposed, therewas no effective obstacle on the Gembloux lineand that the obstacle on the Perwez line wasnot only unfinished but badly sited on a forwardslope. I thereupon conveyed to General Georgesa confirmation of my objections to pushingforward so as to make use of the obstacle in itsunfinished state, notwithstanding the Belgians'anxiety that I should do so. Later that day Iwas informed that he had decided that the mainline of resistance was to be on the Gemblouxline as planned, but that the French were topush out advanced troops to the line of theobstacle. He expressed the hope that the B.E.F.would conform, and ist and 2nd Corpsaccordingly reconnoitred the anti-tankobstacles reported to exist round the forest ofMeerdael with a view to pushing forwarddetachments with anti-tank guns. They foundthem complete only in places.

20. The first phase of Plan D was successfullycompleted by i2th May, and the French istArmy on my right then accelerated the pro-gramme governing their forward movement bymoving by day as well as by night. The enemyprogress across the Albert Canal had up to nowbeen relatively small, due to a successfulcounter-attack by the French Cavalry Corps atSt. Trend, but larger concentrations were nowreported north of the Albert Canal. Disquietingnews was received from the Ardennes, where aGerman thrust was reported as developing onthe front of the French gth Army, with at leasttwo armoured divisions.

On this date I requested the War Office toexpedite the despatch of the ist ArmouredDivision to the greatest extent possible. I alsoasked that they should be shipped to the nearest'available port and loaded tactically with a viewto operations as soon as possible after landing.

The day was one of great activity in the air,and afforded great opportunities for the Royal

Air Force to impede the enemy advance; butsuch opportunities were of a fleeting character,since the enemy established strong anti-aircraftdefences soon after his arrival, particularly intowns at which roads converged. Tacticalreconnaissance became virtually impossiblewithout fighter support, and the demands madeon the fighter group of the Air Component wereextremely heavy. They had been met withunfailing skill and courage, and with markedsuccess, but by now the group was reduced tosome 50 aircraft, and although I had asked forfour fresh squadrons from home, only one hadarrived. In three days' operations, the BritishAir Force in France had firm reports of thedestruction of 101 enemy aircraft, mostlyfighters, against a loss of 78 of our own.

That afternoon a conference was held at theChateau Casteau, near Mons which was attendedby the King of the Belgians, General VanOverstraeten, M. Daladier, Generals Georgesand Billotte, and my Chief of the General Staff(Lieutenant-General H. R. Pownall), as myrepresentative in my absence. The primaryobject of the conference was to achievesome measure of co-ordination in theBelgian theatre of war. General Billotte'scommand included the French ist and7th Armies, between which lay the BelgianArmy under the independent commandof their King, and the B.fe.F. which, thoughunder the command of General Georges, was notunder that of General Billotte. Whatever thenature of the operations, a common doctrinewas clearly necessary and when General Georgesenquired if the King of the Belgians and Iwould be prepared to accept co-ordination byGeneral Billotte as bis representative, GeneralPownall said he was sure that I would agree.The King of the Belgians likewise agreed.

. 21. On I3th May I moved my Command Postforward to Renaix; no event of major impor-tance occurred during the day, but some smallinfantry attacks developed on the British sector.These were easily held. Movements of the mainbodies of the French ist and 7th Annies con-tinued in accordance with their plans, and unitsof the latter were by now north of Antwerp onthe Dutch border. It was, however, becomingincreasingly evident that they would be unableto prevent the enemy occupation of Walcherenand Zuid Beveland which was developing fromthe north-east.

During the day and the following night theBelgian forces were in process of withdrawingtheir northern forces to the general line Louvain-Antwerp, and the Staff of the Belgian G.Q.G.expressed concern lest the simultaneous with-drawal of their Cavalry Corps and that of theFrench, north-west and south-west from theirjunction point at Tirlemont, would create a gap.There appeared to me to be little danger, butnevertheless I ordered I2th Lancers to watchthe situation, assisted if need be by divisionalcavalry regiments.

22. On I4th May I went to Brussels, where at12 noon I met the Commanders of ist and 2ndCorps at the British Embassy. The Commanderof 2nd Corps reported that the Belgian istCorps was now reforming in 4th Divisionarea. I also discussed the organisation of thesecond position on the Senne canal and of aCorps reserve line east of Brussels. 5th and 48thDivisions were ordered to reconnoitre the Senneposition on I5th May. That afternoon at 3 p.m.


I visited H.M. the King of the Belgians andGeneral Van Overstraeten and reached agree-ment that the Belgian ist Corps should bewithdrawn from the area of 2nd Corps and thatthe left boundary of the B.E.F. should beadjusted so as to allow the Belgians the use ofthe road Vilvorde-Alost for this purpose. Ialso stressed the importance of having freshBelgian troops established early in positionnorth of Louvain to continue the British linecovering Brussels.

Further serious news came from the southwhere the enemy had crossed the Meuse betweenSedan and Me"zieres, and further north he wasreported to be surrounding the fortress of St.Heribert (4 miles S.S.W. of Namur).

The French Cavalry Corps on my right hadon the previous day received orders to retireto the Perwez position whence they subsequentlywithdrew, according to plan, to the main positionrunning through Gembloux.

At the request of Air Marshal Barratt Iplaced at his disposal for use on the Frenchfront three squadrons of fighters which I hadonly recently received in response to an urgentappeal to the Secretary of State for War.

23. On 15th May the Dutch Army laid downits arms; the immediate effect of this on theoperations of the B.E.F. was small, for theBritish forces operating in Holland had at notime been under my command. I anticipated,however, that this would come as a shock tothe Belgian Army.

The French 7th Army withdrew' its advancedformations to the neighbourhood of Antwerpand on this day ordered divisions to move acrossmy rear to fill the gap created further south.This move, however, did not take place tillsome three days later when it was accomplished,thanks to efficient traffic control, with littledelay to our own movements.

On this day (i5th May) I established acommand post at Lennick St. Quentin, 6 mileswest of Brussels. On the British front, the daypassed quietly on the whole, ist Corps was notattacked in strength ; 3rd Division of 2nd Corpswas attacked north-west of Louvain and itsforward positions were penetrated, but a counter-attack successfully restored the original line.There was considerable enemy bombing ofrearward areas during the day, and the movementof refugees became increasingly difficult tocontrol. This was, in part, due to the bombingof Tournai and other towns on the routes andto the French decision to close the frontier topedestrian and horsed traffic. Despite myrequests, made as early as loth May, the Belgianauthorities had done nothing to restrict the useof private motor cars or the sale of petrol.

During the day I received a request that Ishould take over part of the front held by theFrench division on my right. To meet thisrequest I placed under the orders of this divisiona brigade of 48th Division ; this step provednecessary since at about 6 p.m. the enemy hadpenetrated the French front, thus threateningthe right of 2nd Division. By this tune, how-ever, 48th Division, less one brigade, was inposition in ist Corps reserve behind 2ndDivision, and I agreed with the commander ofist Corps that the withdrawal of his rightshould take place to the River Lasne to joinup with the French left. This movement wascarried out on the night of the 15/16 May,closely followed by the enemy.

By the night of i5th May the movementsenvisaged in Plan D were all running ahead ofschedule. 4th Division was moving into Corpsreserve behind 3rd Division; 5th Division wasmoving on to the Senne in place of 5oth Divisionas originally planned, and the latter was nowmoving to G.H.Q. reserve along the RiverDendre.

OPERATIONS—SECOND PHASE(i7th-26th MAY)

Withdrawal to the Escaut decided on; the threatto Arras and to the right flank; formation ofMacforce and deployment of 2yd Division onthe Canal du Nord. The enemy reaches theSomme and cuts communications with the Base ;Calais and Boulogne invested: the admini-strative position. The organisation of the Canalline. Alternative lines discussed with Frenchand Belgians, resulting in further withdrawalfrom the Escaut to the Frontier defences andfresh plans for attacks southwards in conjunctionwith French main forces. $th and $oth Divisionscounter-attack on 21st May. A further attackin conjunction with French planned for26th May: this plan is abandoned owing topenetration of Belgian line on the Lys.

The beginning of the withdrawal (ifith-T.'jth May)24. By i6th May, it became clear that a

prolonged defence of the Dyle position wasimpracticable. The French ist Army on myright were unlikely to make good the groundlost' on the previous day, notwithstanding thesupport I had given them in the air and on theground, and a further withdrawal seemed likelyto be forced on them by events in the south.

On the other hand there had been no seriousattack on the Belgian positions on my left;nevertheless, any withdrawal from our presentpositions would of necessity involve a withdrawalby the Belgian Army in the course of whichBrussels, and probably Antwerp also, would beabandoned to the enemy.

Very early on i6th May therefore, I sent arepresentative to General Billotte who wasco-ordinating the movements of the British,French and Belgian Forces; I asked that, ifhe intended to withdraw, he should let me knowthe policy and the timings at once, especiallyas the first bound back to the Senne canalsinvolved a march of some fifteen to twentymiles.

At about 10 a.m. I received from him ordersfor a withdrawal to the Escaut, and for theoccupation of the positions along that fiveroriginally planned. The operation was to beginthat night (16/17 May), one day being spent onthe Senne and one day on the Dendre positions ;thus the Escaut would be reached on the nightof 18/19 May, though the French orders didnot rule out the possibility of staying for longerthan one day on each bound.

That evening, I held a co-ordinating con-ference at ist Corps Headquarters as a resultof which I ordered 5th Division, which was onthe way to join 2nd Corps, to the line of the Sennein ist Corps reserve. Two brigades of 46thDivision* which had been moved up from theLines of Communication for the protection of

* One of the three divisions sent to France forpioneer duties.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 59*3

vulnerable points, were ordered to relieve unitsof ist and 2nd Corps on protection and trafficcontrol of main routes in Belgium. Railheads,which had been advanced on i3th May to thegeneral line Enghien—Ninove, were now movedback across the frontier.

During the night i6/i7th May the withdrawalto the Senne positions began, and was success-fully completed by the afternoon of the lyth.Some enemy tanks and motor cycle units hadbeen reported on the right flank of ist Corps,west of the forest of Soignies, and as a precaution,part of the ist Army Tank Brigade, which hadstarted to withdraw for entrainment, wasturned about to meet the thrust.

By the time the tanks reached their entrainingstations railway difficulties prevented the trucksbeing moved, and the remainder of the movewas carried out by road; this gave rise toinevitable mechanical trouble later on. *

By.the early morning of iyth May the situationin the south had become grave, and enemyarmoured and mobile forces were reported tohave crossed the Oise. At St. Quentin thesituation was obscure, and though by this timeGeneral Giraud, lately commanding the French7th Army, had been ordered to take commandof the forces in that region, it was clear fromreports and from visits of liaison officers thathe had not yet succeeded in establishing effectivecontrol. A gap of at least twenty miles existedsouth of the Forest of Mormal in which thereappeared to be no organised resistance. Laterin the day information was received from theFrench that ten enemy armoured divisions wereengaged in the battle.

During the whole of this period, communi-cation with my liaison officer at General Georges'Headquarters was maintained so as to keep intouch with events as they developed. However,I received no infoimation thiough this channelof any steps it was proposed to take to close thegap, which might have affected my owncommand.

It was not till later, on the night of iqth/zothMay, that General Billotte informed me of theaction which was being taken to this end bythe French Armies in the south.

The defence of rearward areas.

25. Rear G.H.Q. at Arras had intensified theprecautions already being taken against sabotageand air landing units, but on the early morningof I7th May a telegram was received fromGeneral Georges ordering 23rd Division to moveat once to occupy the line of the Canal du Nord,on a frontage of fifteen miles from Ruyalcourt(10 miles north of Pdronne) to Arleux (6 milessouth of Douai).

The division, which, like the I2th and 46thDivisions had joined the B.E.F. for work inrearward areas, consisted of eight battalions onlywith divisional engineers, but no artillery, andsignals and administrative units in no more thanskeleton form. Its armament and transport wason a much reduced scale and training was farfrom complete.

Nevertheless, troops of these three divisionsfought and marched continuously for a fortnight,and proved, were proof needed, that they werecomposed of soldiers who, despite theirinexperience and lack of equipment, could holdtheir own with a better found and more numerousenemy.

23rd Division moved to their positions duringI7th May; they were provided with about fortyfield, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft guns fromordnance reserves.

The enemy break-through was now offeringan imminent threat to rear G.H.Q., to thecommunications over the Somme at Amiensand Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meetthis, every available man and weapon wascollected and orders were issued to thecommander, Lines of Communication Area, forthe remainder of I2th and 46th Divisions to bedespatched to the forward zone. One brigade(36th Infantry Brigade of I2th Division)arrived during the day, and the leadingbattalion was despatched with four field gunsto cover the north-western exits from PeYonne,while engineer parties, organised by theCommander, G.H.Q. Troops, were sent toprepare for demolition the crossings over theCanal du Nord between the river Somme andthe right of 23rd Division at Ruyalcourt.The remainder of 36th Infantry Brigade weremoved forward to Albert, and the other twobrigades of I2th Division ordered to the Abbe-ville area. These latter, however, arrived toolate to come under my effective command, andtheir operations on the Somme were carriedout under the Commander Lines of Communi-cation Area.

Elsewhere in the area between Corps rearboundaries and the Somme, local defenceschemes were put into operation under theorders of the Commanders of G.H.Q. Troopsand of " X " Lines of Communication Sub-Area*.Few if any of these units or their commandershad any experience in fighting, but theirdetermination was beyond all praise.

A mobile bath unit, for example, took partin the defence of St. Pol, while, both now andlater, the General Construction Companies ofthe Royal Engineers, and many units of theRoyal Army Service Corps, set to work toplace their localities in a state of defence andmanned them until they were overwhelmed,relieved or ordered to withdraw. Whereverpossible, transport was collected or requisitionedto enable parachute detachments to be dealtwith.

These many small delaying actions all contri-buted to gain the time required for the.with-drawal of the main forces.

The defence of the town of Arras itself wasentrusted to the O.C. ist Bn. Welsh Guardswho had under his command some units of theRoyal Engineers, an Overseas Defence battalion(gth West Yorks), and various details includingan improvised tank squadron.

Orders were issued for all administrative troopsnot required for defence to move forthwith northof a line Orchies-Lens-Fre'vent.

At the same time to guard against a moreimmediate threat to my right flank a force wasorganised consisting of I27th Infantry Brigadeof 42nd Division, ist Army Tank Brigade,a Field Artillery Regiment and the HopkinsonMissionf, all under the command of Major-General F. N. Mason-MacFarlane, my Director

* This Sub-Area had been formed to deal with unitswhich, remained in the old G.H.Q. and Corps areaswhen the B.E.F. moved into Belgium.

f The Hopkinson Mission, under the Command oiLieut.-Colonel G. F. Hopkinson, had been formed tosecure certain information for the R.A.F. and forG.H.Q. immediately on entry into Belgium.

59̂ 4 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

of Military Intelligence. The force was knownas Macforce and its task was to cover thecrossings over the Scarpe between Raches (3miles N.E. of Douai) and St. Amand. It beganto assemble at Orchies on the afternoon of i7thMay.

Withdrawal to the Escaut begun.26. It had now to be decided whether or not

the withdrawal from the Senne to the Dendrewas to begin on the night of 17/18 May, and thesituation in the South was such that I felt thatto spend a day on the Senne would be to riskbeing outflanked on the right and so imperilthe force under my command to no good purpose.General Billotte had issued orders for withdrawalto the Dendre that night, but I had also seenan order from General Georges which envisagedremaining on the Senne for a further twenty-four hours. I therefore sent a liaison officer toGeneral Billotte to represent my views. Inthe result, General Billotte's orders stoodconfirmed.

By 4 p.m. on i7th May therefore ist and 2ndCorps were on the Senne with 5th, ist and 4thDivisions in line right to left. 48th Divisionwas covering the right flank from Enghien toLembecq. 5oth Division was on the Dendre, towhich line 2nd and 3rd Divisions were nowwithdrawing,, whilst 3 Corps was in position onthe Escaut with 42nd Division (less one infantrybrigade) and 44th Division.

27. On i8th May I held a conference at theheadquarters of ist Corps at which were settledthe details of the withdrawal to the Escaut.This line was to be held with six divisions, rightto left ist Corps (48th and 42nd Divisions, lessone infantry brigade, with 2nd Division inreserve), 2nd Corps (ist and 3rd Divisions with50th Division in reserve), 3rd Corps (4th and 44thDivisions), on a front from the bridge over theEscaut at Binaries to Audenarde, both inclu-sive. 5th Division was in G.H.Q. reserve.

There was little pressure during the day onthe British front or on that of the Belgians tothe North. Owing to the late arrival of ordersthe Belgian Army had started their withdrawalafter the B.E.F.; they had therefore asked forand received protection to their right flank atBrusseghem up to 7 a.m. and Assche up to8 a.m. on i8th May. On withdrawal theyeffected a junction with the B.E.F. on theDendre at Alost.

Southward from their junction with theB.E.F. the French line ran through Mons andMaubeuge, and enemy tanks were attackingthe front of the French Corps on my immediateright. Enemy air action had by now intensifiedon the front of the B.E.F. and continuous fightersupport was necessary during the hours of day-light, both to enable our reconnaissances to takeplace and to hold off enemy bombers. Theenemy did not confine bis attention to troopsbut attacked the long columns of refugeeswhich continued to move westwards.

The position on the Canal du Nord.28. The position on the Canal du Nord had

caused some anxiety, partly on account of con-tradictory orders received. Shortly after ordershad been issued on I7th May for the occupationof the position by 23rd Division, an order wasreceived from G.Q.G. allotting to the B.E.F.the sector Pe'ronne-Ruyalcourt instead of thesector Ruyalcourt-Arleux which was now to be

occupied by the French. It was not howeverpracticable to move the 23rd Division againand G.Q.G. were informed to this effect. Yet,by next morning no French troops had appearedeither on the right of 23rd Division or to relievethem. Later in the day, however, an order wasreceived by which the commander of the French2nd Region was ordered to fill the gap. En-quiries by a liaison officer at Amiens, where thestaff of the French 7th Army was in process oftaking over from the 2nd Region, establishedthat no troops would be likely to arrive fortwenty-four hours at least.

By the afternoon, however, some enemy hadreached Pe"ronne, and were in contact with36th Infantry Brigade.

On this day Major-General R. L. Petre,commanding the I2th Division, was givencommand of the troops engaged on this flank,namely 23rd Division, 36th Infantry Brigadeand the garrison of Arras.*

In the meantime an order issued by the FrenchFirst Group of Armies had laid down theboundary between the French ist Army andthe B.E.F. through Maulde, Orchies, Rachesand He*nin Li6tard. Arras was thus excludedfrom the zone of the B.E.F., but its defencewas necessarily continued by British troops.All troops not required for defence left on theigth, including rear G.H.Q. which moved in twoechelons to Hazebrouck and Boulogne in accord-ance with plans prepared on i7th May whenthe threat to Arras became serious.

On the evening of i8th May I moved backmy command post from Renaix to its previouslocation at Wahagnies.

Moves of the Royal Air Force.29. On this day also, the bulk of the Advanced

Air Striking Force moved from the neighbour-hood of Rheims to Central France and the AirComponent moved one of their main operationalaerodromes from Poix to Abbeville. On theevening of I9th May enemy action obliged themto evacuate this aerodrome also. The Ah*Officer Commanding the Air Component thenmoved his headquarters to England, but anadvanced landing ground was maintained atMerville until 22nd May.

From the 2 ist May onwards all arrangementsfor air co-operation with the B.E.F. were madeby the War Office in conjunction with the AirMinistry at home. The air liaison work wascarried out in England at Hawkinge and thetargets selected in accordance with telephoneor telegraphic requests from the B.E.F. so longas communications remained open, supple-mented by information received from the RoyalAir Force, and other sources.

Alternative plans considered.30. On the night of 18/19 May, the ist, 2nd

and 3rd Corps completed then: withdrawal tothe line of the Escaut without interference, andprepared to defend the line of the river. Soonafter arrival, however, the level of the waterbecame dangerously low, at places less thanthree feet deep. It looked, therefore, as if, apartfrom the unusually dry weather, some of thesluices in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes hadbeen closed in order to produce inundationsin the low lying ground in that area, even ifat the expense of the water on the front of theB.E.F.

* Major-General Petre's command was known asPetreforce.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17. OCTOBER/1941 "59*5

The enemy had, during the previous day,penetrated as far as Amiens, and rail communica-tion with the bases was severed' at that'point.'Communications by road and rail over theSorrime at Abbeville were still holding on igthMay and the town was being placed in a stateof defence with such resources as were available,mainly, units of I2th Division. However, therewas little doubt that enemy armoured forcesin'that area, which at the time I estimated atfive armoured divisions, would shortly breakthrough to the coast.

The force could then no longer be suppliedthrough the ports south of the Somme, and thegreat bulk of the reserves, which were in therearward areas, would • shortly cease to beavailable to the force for the purposes of main-tenance or replacement. Several days' reservehad, however, for some time past been maintainednorth of the Somme.

The prospect of securing the reinforcement ofthe Armoured Division had likewise becomeremote/ I had been advised that two ArmouredBrigades, of this division would disembark atHavre on i6th May, and were to concentrate atBolbec, and I had therefore sent instructions bythe hand of a staff officer to the Commander(Major-General R. Evans). He was to move theleading brigade on disembarkation with allspeed to secure, the crossings of the Somme westof Amiens, from Picquigny to Pont Remy, bothinclusive, with a view to .the concentration of theremaining -brigade behind the Somme and themove of his division to join the main body ofthe B.E.F. However, in the meantime, ordershad been issued locally to concentrate theDivision south of the Seine, and the plan tocross the Somme and join the B.E.F. provedimpossible to execute. The division thereforeremained in the Lines of Communication Areaand never came under my effective command.

About midnight on the iSth/igth May,General Billotte came to see me, and gave mean account of the situation as he saw it. Healso told me of the measures which were beingtaken to restore the situation on the front ofthe French Qth Army, though clearly he hadlittle hope that they would be effective. Reportsfrom the liaison officers with French formations.were likewise not encouraging ; in particularI was unable to verify that the French hadenough reserves at their disposal south of thegap to enable them to stage counter-attackssufficiently strong to warrant the expectationthat the gap would be closed.

Thus, in my opinion, there was an imminentdanger of the forces in the north-eastern area,that is to say the French forces next to the sea,the Belgian Army, the B.E.F. and the bulk ofthe French ist Army on our right, beingirretrievably cut off from the main Frenchforces in the south.

There were three alternative courses of actionopen to the northern forces under GeneralBillotte : first, in the event of the gap beingclosed by successful counter-attacks madesimultaneously from north and south it wouldin theory be possible to maintain the line of theEscaut, or at any rate the frontier defences,and thence southwards on one or other of thecanal lines.

Secondly, there was the possibility of a with-drawal to the-line of the Somme as far as itsmouth. This plan had the attraction that weshould be falling back on our lines of communi-cation and if it was successful would not entail

the abandonment of large quantities of equip-ment. It would obviously be unwelcome tothe Belgians who would be faced with thealternatives of withdrawing with us and aban-doning Belgian soil, fighting on a perimeter oftheir own, or seeking an armistice.

So far as I am aware, the French HighCommand had never suggested such a move-ment up to that date and it is doubtful whethereven had they, decided on immediate withdrawalas soon as the French gth Army front on theMeuse had been penetrated, there would everhave been sufficient time for the troops in thenorth to conform.

Thirdly there was the possibility of with-drawal north-westwards or northwards towardsthe Channel ports, making use of the successiveriver and canal lines, and of holding a defensiveperimeter there, at any rate sufficiently long toenable the force to be withdrawn, preferably inconcert with the French and Belgians. Irealised that this course was in theory a lastalternative, as it would involve the departureof the B.E.F. from the theatre of war at a timewhen the French might need all the supportwhich Britain could give them. It involvedthe virtual certainty that even if the excellentport facilities at Dunkirk continued to beavailable, it would be necessary to abandonall the heavier guns and much of the vehiclesand equipment. Nevertheless, I felt that inthe circumstances there might be no othercourse open to me. It was therefore onlyprudent to consider what the adoption of sucha plan might entail. On this day therefore atabout 1.30 p.m. the Chief of the General Stafftelephoned to the Director of Military Opera-tions and Plans at the War Office and discussedthis situation with him.

The Position of the French ist Army and theBritish right flank reinforced.

31. The French ist Army had by igth Maycompleted its withdrawal and was in touchwith the right of ist Corps. On the night ofi9/20th May they took up positions on the lineof the Escaut as far south as Bouchain ; but atthat point, instead of continuing to hold thatriver towards Cambrai (which according to myinformation was not held in strength by theenemy) they had drawn back westwards alongthe river Sensee. Thus in the quadrilateralMaulde—Va-lenciennes—Arleux—Douai, somenineteen miles by ten, there was assembled thebulk of the French ist Army, amounting tothree Corps of two divisions and two divisionsin reserve—a total of eight divisions. TheCommander of the French 3rd Corps, Generalde la Laurencie, remained that night in closetouch with General Mason-MacFarlane, at theheadquarters of Macforce.

Further west the French Cavalry Corps wasassembling at Oppy, north-east of Arras.

None of these forces were being seriouslypressed at this stage, but since the enemy hadalready penetrated, so deeply further south, Ifelt it necessary, without more delay, tostrengthen the dispositions for the defence ofwhat had become the bastion of Arras. It wasalso necessary to secure crossings westwardsfrom the right of Macforce, along the lineCarvin—La Basse"e.

I therefore ordered soth Division, then inG.H.Q. reserve, to send one Infantry Brigade(25th) to take up positions on the Canal on theline La Bassee—Carvin under the command of

•5916 -SUPPLEMENT TO THE. LONDON GAZETTE, -17 -OCTOBER:

Macforce. The remainder of the division wasmoved that night (i9/20th) to the same area,and was thus suitably placed for the counterattack in which they took part on 2ist May.

I also ordered I2th Lancers with a fieldbattery to move to Arras and carry'out necessaryreconnaissances south and south-westwards,and to gain touch with the outlying portions ofPetreforce.

Arras was heavily bombed for the first time'on igth May, but 23rd Division, though in anexposed position, was not seriously attacked.However, at 5 a.m., 6th Royal West Kent, of36th Infantry Brigade, on the Canal du Nordnorth-west of Peronne, had been attacked byenemy tanks and had been withdrawn to Saillyon the road to Albert.

General Petre that night issued orders for23rd Division to withdraw from the Canal duNord to the line of the Grinchon river south ofArras to join up at La Herliere with 36thInfantry Brigade which was to hold a linethence to Doullens. 23rd Division was, how-ever, caught by enemy aircraft when embussedand finally occupied posts on the line of theScarpe for some six miles East of Arras.

Thus, by the evening of igth May, the situa-tion was somewhat relieved in that the defensiveflank had begun to take shape. On the otherhand, the character of the operation had nowradically altered with the arrival of Germantroops in Amiens. The picture was now nolonger that of a line bent or temporarily broken,but of a besieged fortress. To raise such asiege, a relieving force must be sent from thesouth and to meet this force a sortie on thepart of the defenders was indicated.

The attack of $th and 50$ Divisions.32. On 2oth May, the breach South of Arras

deepened and widened. From indicationsreceived during the day the enemy armouredforces appeared to be directed on two mainobjectives; one down the valley of the Sommeon Abbeville, the other by Hesdin and Montreuil,doubtless making for the Channel Ports.I2th Lancers, early in the day, reported tanks

"from the direction of Cambrai approachingArras, where they were held off by the WelshGuards; a strong request for bomber supportwas therefore made through the War Office tothe Air Ministry. Later in the day enemytanks were reported to be ten miles west ofArras, and all endeavours by I2th Lancers toreach Doullens had failed. By 6 p.m. theywere back on the line Arras—St. Pol.

Early in the morning General Sir EdmundIronside, the Chief of the Imperial GeneralStaff arrived at G.H.Q.; he brought with himinstructions from the Cabinet that the B.E.F.was to move southwards upon Amiens, attackingall enemy forces encountered and to take stationon the left of the French Army. He was alsoto inform General Billotte and the Belgiancommand, making it clear to the latter thattheir best chance was to. move that nightbetween the B.E.F. and the coast.

Similar information was to be given by theWar Office to General Georges. During theday however, it appeared that operations wereactually being directed by General Weygandwho later, on 23rd May, announced in a GeneralOrder that he was now Commander-in-Chiefin all theatres of war.

- I .discussed,--these- instructions- with,'.the.C.I.G.S. at- my Command Post at Wahagniesat 8.15 a.m.; I put to him my view thatwithdrawal to "the south-westwards, howeverdesirable in principle, was not. in the circum-stances practicable. ;. In the first place, it would involve the dis-engagement of seven divisions which were atthe time in close contact with the enemy on theEscaut, and would be immediately followed up.

In addition to this-rearguard action the B.E.F.in its retirement to the Somme would have toattack into 'an area already strongly occupiedby the enemy armoured and mobile formations.Some of these indeed now appeared to be holding

•the line of the Somme whilst others were already-within a short distance of the coast, and mightturn northwards at any time. Thus the B.E.F.would be obliged to disengage its seven divisionsin contact with the enemy, fighting a rearguard'action, at the same tune to attack south-west-wards, and finally to break through enemyforces on the Somme. During this manoeuvreboth flanks would have to be guarded.

Secondly, the administrative situation madeit unlikely that sustained offensive operationscould be undertaken. Communication with thebases was on the point of being interrupted.The mobile echelons of gun and small armsammunition were full, but once they wereexhausted I could not safely reckon on beingable to replenish them.

Lastly, though I was not in a position tojudge, I had the impression that even if I haddecided to attempt this manoeuvre, neither theFrench ist Army nor the Belgians would havebeen in a position to conform.

Nevertheless, I told the C.I.G.S. that I fullyrealised the importance of an attack in asoutherly direction and that I already had plansin hand to counter-attack with the 5th and5oth Divisions to the south of Arras and thatthese divisions would be ready to attack onthe following morning (2ist May). These werethe only reserves which I then had available,apart from one armoured reconnaissance brigade,and one infantry brigade of 2nd Division. Tocreate a further reserve I had already begunnegotiations with Belgian G.Q.G. for the reliefof 44th Division on the Escaut, but these werenot yet completed.

The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action and accom-panied by the C.G.S. he left for Lens to meetGenerals Billotte and Blanchard. At thatinterview the C.I.G.S. explained the action tobe taken by 5th and 5oth Divisions. GeneralBillotte fully agreed to this plan, and said thatthe French would co-operate with two divisions.

On return to my headquarters, the C.I.G.S.sent a telegram to General Georges which madeit clear that, in his opinion, General Billotte'sArmy Group would be finally cut off unless theFrench ist Army made an immediate move onGambrai or unless General Georges launched acounter-attack northwards from Peronne. Myliaison officers with Generals Billotte and Blan-chard conveyed a similar message from me tothose commanders, making it clear that if ourcounter-attack was not successful the Frenchand British Armies north of the gap wouldhave their flank turned and could no longerremain in their present positions.

On 2ist May I sent a formal acknowledgementof the instructions brought by the C.I.G.S.adding that, in my opinion, withdrawal to the

-SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON~GAZETTE; 17 OCTOBER, 1941

south-west was' entirely impossible until thesituation had been retrieved on the front of theFrench ist Army.

33. 5th Division was therefore "ordered .tojoin 5oth Division in the Vimy area, and itscommander, Major-General Franklyn, was placedin command of all the British troops operatingin and around Arras. Frankforce, as it was tobe known, consisted of 5th and 5oth .Divisions(each of two brigades only), ist Army TankBrigade* (previously with Macforce) togetherwith Petref orce. and the force under O.C. i2thLancers. Petreforce was by this time very tiredand widely dispersed.

My immediate instructions to General Franklyriwere to. occupy the bridgeheads on the Scarpe,east of Arras and thus to relieve the remains of23rd Division. He would then be suitablydisposed to advance south and south-east ofArras on the following day in conjunction withthe French. '

It will be convenient to conclude the storyof Frankforce here.

During the evening of 20th May, GeneralFranklyn completed his reconnaissances for anattack on the following day to secure the lineof the rivers Scarpe and Cojeul: his intentionwas to exploit success by moving on 22nd Mayto the Sensee and thence towards Bapaumeand Cambrai. In these plans he had the fullco-operation of General Prioux, Commander ofthe French Cavalry Corps, but the lightmechanised divisions were much" reduced instrength and probably had no more than onequarter of their tanks fit for action.

However, one of these divisions was orderedto advance on each side of Frankfbrce, while12th Lancers watched the right flank on theArras—St. Pol road. The hope was not realised,however, that the French 5th Corps would alsoattack southwards from Douai with two divisionsin co-operation with Frankforce on the 2ist.A conference had been arranged at 6 p.m. onthe 20th at General Franklyn's headquarters butno representative from that Corps attended.Finally, at 12.30 p.m. on the 2ist I received aletter from General Blanchard to say that theCorps Commander, General Altmeyer, thought'hecould move on the 22nd or the following night.

Tim;, however, was vital. General Franklynadhered to his plans, and at 2 p.m. attacked withist Army Tank Brigade, I5ist Infantr,y Brigadeof 5oth Division and I3th Infantry Brigade of5th Division all under General Martel. TheFrench ist Light Mechanised Division co-operated, though its movements did not developso widely to the flanks as General Franklynhad hoped.

The opposition was stronger than had beenexpected. Objectives for the day were reached,and in the evening there were heavy dive-bombing attacks by the enemy. Enemy tankshad been put to flight: over 400 prisoners hadbeen captured: a number of enemy had beenkilled and many transport vehicles destroyed.

The tank brigade had, however, begun tosuffer severely from mechanical trouble ; thetanks had been on the road continuously sincethey detrained -at Brussels, and the mileage

* At this time their strength was reduced to approxi-mately 65 Mark I and 18 Mark II tanks. By the end ofthe withdrawal from Arras there remained 26 Mark Iand 2 luark II tanks.

•covered" had -already far e'xceeded the estimatedlife of the tracks which were now beginning tobreak through wear.

It v/as clear therefore that the attack ofFrankforce would not maintain its momentum.unless it was reinforced and supported by theFrench on its left. • During 22nd May, therefore,.General Franklyn held his ground, and pro-longed his right flank westwards, while the-French Cavalry Corps took up a position at•Mont St. Eloi. All day long pressure increasedround his right flank, and an observation postof i2th Lancers on Mont St. Eloi could see atone moment as many as 48 enemy tanks.

• Next day (23rd May) the enemy advancedsteadily north-eastwards from the high groundof the Lorette ridge, and by evening they werereconnoitring the' southern outskirts of Bethuneand the road from Lens to Carvin. It was clearthat Frankforce was becoming dangerouslyhemmed in. Two roads were still available fortheir extrication and at about 7 p.m. I decidedthat .there was no alternative but to withdrawFrankforce. This withdrawal had necessarily tobe in an easterly direction. 5th and 5othDivisions had been engaged with the enemy allday and had inflicted very severe losses ; theywere now ordered to withdraw to the areaaround Seclin, where they would be well placedto take part in any further counter-attack tothe southward which might be staged. Petre-force was withdrawn to an area north of Seclin.

Thus concluded the defence of Arras, whichhad been carried out by a small garrison, hastilyassembled but well commanded, and determinedto fight. It had imposed a valuable delay on agreatly superior enemy force against which ithad blocked a vital road centre.

2ist May — The Organisation of the Canal line.34. The time had now come to organise, as

soon as possible, the further defence of thesouth-western flank of the force." The enemy advance beyond Arras had hithertobeen carried out almost entirely by armouredforces, supported by motorised infantry whichwas doubtless increasing in numbers every day.The situation regarding the enemy's normalinfantry divisions was still uncertain. It wastherefore of first importance to reinforce theorganisation of the line of the canals from theEscaut to La Bassee, and to continue it toSt. Omer and the sea. These canals offered theonly anti-tank obstacle on this flank. They were,however, crossed by numerous bridges, many ofwhich had already been prepared for demolitionby our own engineers under my Engineer-in-Chief (Major-General R. P. Pakenham- Walsh),the Commander of Macforce, and the FrenchCommanders' of the fortified sectors of Lille andFlanders (Qene'raux de Brigade Bertschi andBarthdiemy).

It had been proved that even weak garrisonsholding important road centres, such as Arrasand Doullens, were of much value in imposingdelay, for the initial advances of the enemyalways followed the main roads. It was thereforedecided to continue the policy of organisingsuch " stops," not only along the canals but atall possible centres whether north or south ofthe canal line.

Macforce, which had been formed onMay, had been augmented on i8th and igth byI38th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) whichwent into line on the canal between Raches and

' SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

Carvin, and on the following day isgth InfantryBrigade of the same division joined the force.On 2ist May I27th Infantry-Brigade rejoined the42nd Division and the sector from Millonfosseto St. Amand was handed over to the French.

Already on 2oth May, I had ordered Major-General Curtis, Commanding 46th Division, totake command of the sector of the canals betweenAire and Carvin. General Curtis' force wasknown as Polforce, and was to.consist of fourbattalions - of 46th Division, 25th InfantryBrigade of 5.oth Division (in line between LaBassee and Carvin) and one field battery,together with a number of engineer and otherunits o'f G.H.Q. troops which had been movingnorthwards and .were collected on the Canal.It had originally been intended that part of thisforce should hold St. Pol, Prevent and Divion,but the railway trains in which were the remain-ing three battalions of 46th Division failed toreach that town in time and remained south ofthe Somme. The defence of these localities southof the Canal had therefore to be abandoned.

Further to the north-west the defence of thecanal line was being organised by BrigadierC. M. Usher, Commander of X Lines of Communi-cation Sub-area. On 22nd May he reported thatthe enemy had already reached the left bank ofthe river Aa between Gravelines and St. Omer.23rd Division had been ordered to move to thisarea and its leading battalion (6th Green Howards)arrived at Gravelines. Brigadier Usher thereforeheld the right bank of the river from St. Omer toGravelines with this battalion and five batteriesof heavy artillery used as infantry, in conjunctionwith certain French troops of the SecteurFortifie des Flandres.

The front of Macforce was covered by theFrench, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps, who were stillin their quadrilateral on the line of the Escautand the Sensee. Here, however, informationwas frequently lacking and could only be obtainedby reconnaissance.

Thus, by 22nd May, the canal line was occupiedin the sense that the whole of the length of 85miles from the sea at Gravelines to Millonfosse(West of St. Amand) was divided into sectorsfor each of which a British commander wasresponsible. The total strength of the troopson the Canal line did not on this day exceed10,000 men, and the number of anti-tankweapons was barely adequate to cover all thecrossing places: certainly there could be noquestion of being able to keep an effectivewatch against small parties of infantry crossingthe canal between the bridges. The barges,however, had almost all been moved away orat any rate to the bank furthest from the enemy,.and bridges were fast being prepared fordemolition.

2ist May—The Situation on the Belgian Front.35. On 2ist May at 4.45 p.m. I met the three

Corps Commanders. I told them what hadhappened on the southern flank and how, in-order to take the initiative and encourage theFrench ist Army to do likewise, I had gone tothe length of committing practically the wholeof my reserve.

From the Corps Commanders I learned thatthe line was thinly held and that attacks hadtaken place at several points. At Petegem onthe front of 44th Division the enemy had secureda bridgehead 1,000 yards deep on a front of3,000 yards, and at the junction with the French

near Maulde on the front of ist Division anumber of enemy had crossed the river dis-guised as refugees, but had been detected anddriven out with the bayonet. The Corps Com-manders all felt that they could hot how holdon for more than .twenty-four hours. Wediscussed a withdrawal to our old frontierdefences, where advantage could be taken of theexisting blockhouses and trenches, and of thaanti-tank ditch. This move would have littleeffect on the French on our right since it wouldpivot on the junction point, where the Escautcrossed the frontier, but "would seriously affectthe Belgians, who now held the line of theEscaut from Audenarde to Ghent and of thecanal from Ghent to the sea at Terneuzen.

I had also to consider the pressing need tostiffen the defence of the canal line westwards toGravelines and to form a new reserve to replacethe divisions now committed to counter-attackssouthward from Arras.

A provisional decision was therefore reachedto withdraw to the frontier defences on the nightof 22nd/23rd May, details being left until I hadreached agreement with the French and theBelgians.

General Weygand had visited General Billotteduring the day and the latter indicated that anattack was being planned for the following day(22nd May), northwards from the direction ofRoye, with the object of closing the gap. At8 p.m. on 2ist May I went to Ypres where inthe Burgomaster's office I met H.M. the Kingof the Belgians and General Billotte. Therewere also present General Van Overstraeten,General Champon, the head of the FrenchMission with Belgian G.Q.G., General Pownalland others.

I explained the situation which was developingon the Escaut about Audenarde, and the diffi-culty of maintaining positions there since thewater in the river was so low as no longer toform an obstacle. It was then agreed that onthe night of 22nd/23rd May the Escaut should beabandoned and that the Allied armies shouldoccupy a line from Maulde northwards toHalluin, thence along the Lys to Courtrai andGhent.

I discussed the possibility of reserves. Itappeared that the available divisions of theFrench ist Army were all too tired to take partin offensive operations in the immediate future.It was therefore agreed that the French shouldtake over a further sector of the defensivepositions northwards from Maulde, so that the2nd and 48th Divisions could be withdrawn intoreserve on leaving the line of the Escaut. The ,,French took up these positions on 22nd May.On the north, 44th Division on withdrawalfrom the Escaut were to hold the sector Halluin- -Courtrai, but it was hoped that a Belgianformation would relieve them on the night of23rd/24th May.

When these moves were complete the Alliedline would run slightly west of north to Halluin,and then almost at right angles, north-eastwardsalong the Lys. It was evident that sooner orlater the Belgian army would have to swingback to a line in rear, pivoting on their rightof Halluin. Accordingly at the end of theconference General Billotte asked the King ofthe Belgians whether if he were forced to with-draw he would fall back on to the line of theYser. His Majesty agreed, though evidentlywith some regret, that no alternative line existed.

SUPPLEMENT to THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5919

On return from the meeting, orders were issuedto implement these decisions, and that eveningI moved my command post to the Chateau dePremesques, midway between Armenti&res andLille.

The final severance of the L. of C. and the invest-ment of Boulogne.

36. During the gist May the enemy penetra-tion into the rearward areas increased and com-munication across the Somme was finallysevered. Since the I7th May the Commanderof the Lines of Communication Area (Major-General P. de Fonblanque) had been takingenergetic steps for its defence, in so far as it waspossible with the few and scattered troopsavailable.

These consisted, apart from ArmouredDivision and 5ist Division now returningfrom the Saar, of those portions of I2th and46th Divisions (some nine battalions in all)which could not be despatched forward, threeunbrigaded infantry battalions and the contentsof the reinforcement depdts, together withtroops of the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corpsand of the administrative services.

On '23rd May, however, the War Officeappointed Lieutenant-General- Sir HenryKarslake to command the defences on the Linesof Communication and I was not concerned inthe operations which ensued. Nevertheless,I did not immediately abandon hope of theArmoured Division breaking through, and Iurged the War Office to use their best endeavours.to this end and to prevent its being used piece-meal in local operations at the request of theFrench Command.

At about 3.30 p.m. on the 2ist May, I receivedinformation that an enemy column of all armswas approaching Boulogne. The rear elementof G.H.Q., consisting largely of the Adjutant-General's Branch and of headquarters ofServices, which had been sent to that town onI7th and i8th May, had been moved to Wimereuxon 20th May as a result of enemy bombing.* All possible steps had been taken to putBoulogne in a state of defence with the troopsavailable, consisting of labour units and thepersonnel of rest camps. On igth May, anendeavour was made to bring up troops frombeyond the Somme, to hold the line of the Canche;but the time for this was past and the troopscould not get beyond Abbeville. The hospitalsin the Etaples area were now evacuated, and on2ist May a party of Engineers, supervised bymy Director of Works, Brigadier W. Cave-Browne, demolished most of the bridges overthe Canche.

As soon as the news of this new threat wasreceived, the War Office was asked for bomber

. support, which was at once forthcoming. Enemytanks were located and bombed at Hesdin andFruges, but no good targets were obtained onthe coast road. The War Office was also askedto send a detachment of Royal Marines for thedefence of Boulogne but had already doneso. Early on the 22nd May, 2oth GuardsBrigade (Brigadier W. A. F.' L. Fox-Pitt) oftwo battalions with an anti-tank battery.landed, thus establishing the defence of thetown and enabling those troops who were notrequired for the defence to be evacuated ingood order.

By the evening of 22nd May, the enemyarmoured forces were within nine miles of Calais.

if-g final

evacuation was carrie.d out under the orders ofthe War Office, being completed on the nightof 23/24th May.

The Administrative Situation.37. During the whole of this period I had

been kept in the closest touch with the adminis-trative situation by the Quarter-Master-General(Lieutenant-General W. G. Lindsell). Up toi6th May the administrative arrangementswhich formed part of Plan D had worked well,and although enemy air action steadily intensifiedduring the period, there was no serious inter-ference with the maintenance of the force.

On i7th May, however, the Quarter-Master-General decided, in view of the situation southof Arras, to discontinue the use of the railwayfrom the regulating station at Abancourt viaAmiens and Arras, and to switch all traffic viaEu and Abbeville to Bethune. He also orderedforward every available trainload of ammunitionto the Hazebrouck area.

On igth May, directly after the C.G.S. hadspoken to the War Office as to the possibilityof enforced withdrawal, the Q.M.G. telephonedto the War Office to discuss the opening of newbases. On the same day, one of his staff officers.left for London to arrange an emergency ship-ment programme for supplies and stores tothe ports of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. Itwas to prove none too soon, for the railwayat Abbeville was cut on 2ist May. A new planhad to be put into operation at once for themaintenance of the fcfrce north of the Somme,estimated at 250,000 men and requiring a dailylift of ammunition, supplies and petrol, of some2,000 tons.

The petrol situation, fortunately, gave no causefor concern since, although the dumps forwardof the Somme had been destroyed on evacuation,together with a large civil storage plant nearDouai, there still remained a large army bulkfilling station near Lille.

The supply situation was however, bad, andon 2ist May, Corps had only three daysR.A.S.C. supplies in the forward area. Mattersmight, at any time, have become serious had itnot been for the success of the measures takenbetween 23rd and 26th May, to organise thesupplies in Lille belonging to the ExpeditionaryForce Institutes and to civilian firms.

The decision to maintain the force throughthe northern ports was finally taken on 2istMay and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Areaestablished at Dunkirk, together with a sectionof Q.M.G's staff, in close touch with the Britishand French Naval authorities.

Rail communication in the area was by nowprecarious, and plans were worked out on thebasis of establishing dumps, one in each Corpsarea, which could be wholly maintained byroad. The position was, by this time, greatlycomplicated by the numbers of improvisedforces which the quickly changing situationhad made necessary: most of these, like thethree divisions for pioneer duties, had no properadministrative echelons. Some were withinreach of Corps, but others were not and thesehad to be dependent on fortuitous sources ofsupply, or else live for a time on the country.

The situation had" grown even worse by22nd May, when the ports at both Boulogneand Calais were out of action, and the greaterpart of the Railhead Mechanical TransportCompanies had been captured. Furthermorea^ reconnaissance of Ostend had shewn that the


port could not be worked for military require-ments at short notice. A certain amount ofrations and small arms ammunition was sentby air up to 23rd May, but from then onwardsit became impossible for aircraft to land. On23rd May therefore, on the advice of the Q.M.G.,I decided to place the B.E.F. on half rations.

Dunkirk, though its water supply wasdestroyed, remained available for unloadingsupplies till 26th May, but constant air raidsimposed a well nigh unbearable strain on thestevedore battalions. However, they remainedat duty until, in the end, all the quays and craneswere put out of action. Thereafter suppliescould only be landed on the beaches. Lightersarrived to embark troops loaded with a portionof supplies, ammunition and water, and thesewere unloaded and distributed by Corps. Thedelivery of supplies to Corps was maintained,albeit irregularly, up till 30th May when thelast convoy went forward from the supply depdton the beach at La Panne.

By 20th May all the General Hospitals hadbeen cut off from the forward area andimprovised arrangements had to be made forthe evacuation of casualties. Some of theCasualty Clearing Stations had to be divertedfrom their normal function and used as Hospitals.Hospital ships continued to berth at Dunkirktill the night 3ist May/ist June and casualtieswere evacuated to them by road and by rail.Ambulance trains were running as late as 26thMay.

*Further proposals for an attack Southwards.

38. On 23rd May the French ist Armypushed forward some elements southwardsfrom Douai. On the same day, 5th and 5othDivisions, which had attacked two days before,were themselves being attacked on the Scarpeand had already lost most of their tanks throughmechanical wear.

The threat to their rear was increasing hourlyand they were thus unable to make any furtheradvance or to assist the French, except in so faras they were able to engage troops who mightotherwise have threatened the right flank of -

the French advance. The French approachedthe outskirts of Cambrai meeting with littleopposition but withdrew later on being attackedby dive-bombers.

On the same day I received a copy of atelegram from the Prime Minister to M. Reynaud,which read as follows:—

" Strong enemy armoured forces havecut communications of Northern Armies.Salvation of these Armies can only be obtainedby immediate execution of Weygand's plan.I demand that French Commanders in Northand South and Belgian G.Q.G. be given moststringent orders to carry this out and turndefeat into victory. Time vital as suppliesare short."I was not sure whether the situation which

was developing for the allied armies in thenorth could be accurately appreciated excepton the spot. I therefore telegraphed to SirJohn Dill asking him to fly over that day.

The next day, however (24th May), the PrimeMinister again conferred with M. Reynaud andGeneral Weygand in Paris, and I received thefollowing telegram from the Secretary of Statedescribing that conference :—

" Both are convinced that Weygand's planis still capable of execution and only in its

execution has hope of restoring the situation.Weygand reports French VII Army is advanc-ing successfully and has captured Peronne,Albert and Amiens. While realising fullydangers and difficulties of your position whichhas been explained to Weygand it is essentialthat you should make every endeavour toco-operate in his plan. Should howeversituation on your communications make thisat any time impossible you should inform usso that we can inform French and makeNaval and Air arrangements to assist youshould you have to withdraw on the northerncoast."It will be noted that, according to the telegram

General Weygand informed the Prime Ministerthat Peronne, Albert and Amiens had- beenrecaptured. It later transpired that this in-formation was inaccurate.

The Weygand plan, as it came to be known,was for a counter offensive on a large scale.

From the north the French ist Army and theB.E.F. were to attack south-west at the earliestpossible moment with about eight divisionsand with the Belgian Cavalry Corps supportingthe British right.

The newly formed Third French Army Groupwas reported to be organising a line on theSomme from Amiens to Peronne with a view toattacking northwards.

A new cavalry Corps was assembling south ofthe Somme near Neufchatel and was to operateon the line of the Somme west of Amiens, in'touch with the British Armoured Division ontheir left.

I fully appreciated the importance of attackingearly before the enemy could bring up hisinfantry in strength, but facts had to be faced.The 5th and 5oth Divisions were on this day(23rd May) still closely engaged with the enemy,and 2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions, would not be-come available for a further 48 hours, since theFrench and the Belgians> though they hadarranged their relief, could not complete itearlier. The ammunition immediately available,to the B.E.F. .was of the order of 300 roundsper gun and with communications cut with themain base, the prospect of receiving any furthersupply was remote.

The French light mechanised divisions andour own armoured units had already sufferedserious losses in tanks which could not bereplaced. Such information as I. had receivedof the Belgian cavalry did not lead me to takean optimistic view of the prospect of theirbeing able to engage, at short notice, in a battleforty miles away and on French soil.

Experience had already shown the vitalimportance of close co-ordination of the alliedarmies in any operation. General Billotte hadbeen appointed the co-ordinator at the con-ference at Mons on I2th May, but in practice,the measure of co-ordination fell far short ofwhat was required if the movements of thethree allied armies were to be properly controlled.

Except for the issue of orders to retire fromthe Dyle (obtained only after I had sent Major-General Eastwood to General Billotte's head-quarters to represent my views), I received nowritten orders from the French First Group ofArmies, though at the meetings betweenGeneral Billotte and myself which took placefrom time to time, we always found ourselvesin complete agreement. Unfortunately, how-ever, General Billotte had been seriously.-and.


as it turned out, fatally injured in a motoraccident returning from the conference which heand I had attended at Ypres on the night of2ist May. General Blanchard succeeded him incommand of the French First Group of Armies,and presumably succeeded to the function ofco-ordination although this was never officiallyconfirmed.

outof three different nations, and that I personallycould not undertake any measure of co-ordina-tion in the forthcoming operations as I wasalready actively engaged on my Eastern andSouthern fronts and also threatened on myLines of Communication.

Nevertheless, I saw General Blanchard andproposed to him that to implement our part ofthe Weygand plan, we should stage an attacksouthwards with two British divisions, oneFrench division and the French Cavalry Corps.So far as we were concerned the attack couldnot take place till the 26th at the earliest owingto the.reliefs which were in progress, and theneed to assemble 5th and 5oth Divisions. Ialso asked General Blanchard to enquire fromG.Q.G. how such an operation could be syn-chronised with the attack from the line of theSomme which was said to be in process ofpreparation. These negotiations, as will be seen,were later continued by Sir Ronald Adam onmy behalf. I emphasised, both to the Secretaryof State and'to General Blanchard, that theprincipal effort must come from the south, andthat the operation of the northern forces couldbe nothing more than a sortie.

I never received any information from anysource as to the exact location of our own orenemy forces on the far side of the gap; nordid I receive any details or timings of anyproposed attack from that direction.

zyrd May—Further development of the Canal line.39. On 23rd May the organisationwas con-

tinued of " stops " behind the Canal line.At Hazebrouck, where the organisation of

defences had been begun on 2 ist May by thestaff of the Major-General R.A. at G.H.Q.the garrison was now about 300 strong andincluded eighteen French light tanks and someBelgian machine gunners.

Cassel was occupied by i3/i8th Hussars, lessone squadron, and on the same afternoon (23rd)Brigadier Usher's force took over the defence ofBergues.

On the night of 22/23rd May the withdrawal-to the frontier defences had been carried out.The French had taken over the sector northwardsfrom Maulde and the right boundary of the.B.E.F. was now Bourghelles-Seclin both inclu-sive to the French.. This change of boundary didnot however affect the dispositions which theB.E.F. had taken on the Canal line by whichthe rear of the French positions was protected.

On the left of the B.E.F. the Belgians, whohad previously agreed to relieve the 44thDivision after withdrawal to the Lys on thenight of 23rd/24th May, ordered one of theirdivisions to occupy the sector Halluin-Courtraion the night of 22nd/23rd May. 44th Divisionwas concentrated in G.H:Q. reserve on themorning of 23rd May.

On the right, 2nd and 48th Divisions passedthrough the French on the night of 22nd/23rdMav and also concentrated in G H.O reserve.

These moves left only four divisions on thefrontier defences and made'it possible to with-draw the headquarters and Corps troops of3rd Corps for employment on the Canal linewhere they were badly needed. This was doneat 4 p.m. on 23rd May, leaving ist Corps with42nd and ist Divisions and 2nd Corps with3rd and 4th Divisions.

2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions tcame under3rd Corps and that night made a' march west-wards. I had decided to employ 2nd and 44thDivisions on the Canal line facing west, but theirmove required a farther twenty-four hours tocomplete.

Meanwhile the canal defences required stiffen-ing as much as possible. And accordingly,Polforce temporarily assumed control of thewhole front between St. Omer and Raches,and two regiments of 2nd Armoured Recon-naissance Brigade were placed under its com-mand. Polforce also undertook the responsi-bility for demolitions as far north as Wattenincluding no less than 43 bridges.

The sector eastward from Raches was nowhanded over to the French, the Britishdemolition parties being left on the bridges atthe disposal of French 3rd Corps.

Macforce, now comprising four field batteries,half an anti-tank battery and one battalion,withdrew from the line Carvin-Raches on23rd May and was moved to a rendezvous inthe. eastern end of the Forest of Nieppe whereit was joined by Headquarters and one. regimentof ist Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade.i39th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) continuedto hold the sector from Carvin to Raches until26th May.

.The situation on the canal line deterioratedduring 23rd May and the enemy establishedbridgeheads at Aire, at St. Omer (which seemsto have changed hands twice during the day)and near Watten.1 His tanks were reported asharbouring in the forest of Clairmarais, andduring the day his armoured fighting vehiclescame within three miles of Hazebrouck. ,Bythe evening, however, these movements nadbeen checked and steps taken to keep. theenemy out of the Forest of Nieppe.

. The enemy had also been active that day onthe canal line at Be'thune, where they had beendriven off and had then moved towards Carvin.Here the defenders had been reinforced byfurther artillery under C. R. A. 2nd Division(Brigadier. C. B. Findlay), and the crossingswere firmly held.

On 23rd May Calais was finally isolated. Itsgarrison; had been reinforced under the ordersof the War Office, by 3oth Infantry Brigade(Brigadier C. Nicholson) and 3rd battalionRoyal Tank Regiment—a cruiser tank regiment.I had intended to move the latter within thecanal line, but it was already too late-. Aftertwo attempts they were driven back into Calais,with the. exception of three tanks whicheventually reached Dunkirk by way of Grave-lines. The remainder of the gallant defenceof Calais was conducted under the orders of theWar Office. It-was finally concluded on thenight of 26/27th May.

Information received at this time indicatedthat two enemy armoured divisions wereconverging on Calais and two more,- supportedby a motorised. S. S. (Schutz-Staffel) division,on St. Omer. A fifth armoured division appearedto he mnvincr rm


2qkh May. Preparations for counter attack andstrengthening of canal defences.

40. During 24th May, I had simultaneouslyto prepare for a counter-attack southwards onthe 26th and also to press forward with thestrengthening of the canal line.

To make the detailed arrangements for thecounter-attack I appointed the Commander ofthe 3rd Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir RonaldAdam, who, on my behalf, continued negotia-tions with General Blanchard, and with theCommander of the French 5th Corps, GeneralAltmeyer.

The final plan was for a counter attack withthree French and two British divisions underthe command of General Altmeyer. As afirst stage, on the evening of 26th May, bridge-heads were to be established south, of theScarpe, and the main attack was to start thefollowing morning, with the objective Plouvain—Marquion—Cambrai. Sir Ronald Adam withthree divisions (two British and one French)was to advance east of the Canal du Nord, andGeneral Altmeyer with two French divisionsto the west of the Canal du Nord, his right beingcovered by the French Cavalry Corps. Thisattack was never carried out for reasons whichwill presently appear.*

On the same day, I issued orders to dissolvethe various improvised forces on the Canalline, and their units were absorbed by theformations in the areas of which they now were..I appointed Major-General Eastwoodj to takecommand of the defences on the Canal line,and he assumed command early on 25th May.

The position on the Canal line was consider-ably strengthened -during 24th May. 44thDivision began to move into the line betweenthe forest of Clairmarais and Aire, with 2ndDivision on its left between Aire and La Bassee,and 4&th Division (lately Polforce) from LaBassee to Raches. It was not till the eveninghowever that 2nd and 44th Divisions gainedcontact with the enemy and for most of the daythe defence of the sector still remained underthe Commanders of Macforce and Perforce.

Fighting of a somewhat confused characterwent on for most of the day in and south ofthe Forest of Nieppe, and the enemy also beganheavy bombing and shelling of Cassel. Theremainder of Macforce, which included fieldand anti-tank artillery, was therefore sentto reinforce the i3/i8th Hussars.

48th Division (with under its command partof 23rd Division in the area Gravelines—St.Omer) was ordered to send one "infantry brigadeto Dunkirk and one to Cassel and Hazebrouck.I45th Infantry Brigade completed its reliefof the improvised garrisons of the two latterplaces on 25th May, but General Thome foundthat the French had already made completedispositions for Dunkirk, and had informedthe British Base Commandant. He thereforedecided to send I44th Infantry Brigade toBergues and Wormhoudt. He established hisH.Q. at Bergues, which he- rightly regarded asthe vital point of defence.

The French reinforce Dunkirk.41. The local defences of Dunkirk, in

accordance with French practice, were under

* See pars.. 43.f Major-General T. R. Eastwood had recently

arrived in France to take command of a division, and,pending a vacancy, was attached to the Staff of G.H.Q.

the Admiral du Nord, Admiral Abrial, whosecommand included Boulogne, Calais andDunkirk. Under his authority the commandof military forces in these areas was assumed on24th May by General de Corps d'Arme'e Fagalde,commanding the French i6th Corps which upto now had been fighting on the left of theBelgian Army.

The French defences of Dunkirk were basedon the peace time organisation of the SecteurFortifie des Flandres, and extended only asfar as the Belgian frontier. They comprisedan inner and an, outer sector, the inner on theline of the old Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thenceby Bergues to the frontier and so to the sea;the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omerthence by Cassel and Steenvoorde to thefrontier. General Fagalde had at his disposalcertain regional troops in numbers equivalentto a weak division, who were located in theouter sector from Grayelines to the Forest ofClairmarais and whose dispositions had beenroughly co-ordinated with those of BrigadierUsher. About this time the 68th FrenchDivision arrived at Dunkirk from Belgium andtook over the inner sector.

On the 24th and 25th May the British postson the river Aa were taken over by the French,who also began to operate the inundations,which formed part of the defence scheme ofDunkirk and extended each side of Bergues andas far as the Belgian frontier north of theBergues—Furnes canal.

2$th May—Attacks on the Canal Line and onthe Belgian Army.

42. On 25th May, enemy activity intensified.Two enemy Corps were reported to be attackingthe French in the area Denain—Bouchain ; theenemy was also across the canal at St. Venant,and was developing the bridgeheads betweenthat place and Aire and also at St. Omer, whilstfurther north the situation on the river Aa wasstill obscure.

At about 7 a.m. on 25th May, news wasreceived that in the late evening of 24th Maythe enemy had attacked the Belgian 4th Corpson the Lys with a force reported to be of fourdivisions, supported by tanks. The attackpenetrated to a 'depth of i| miles on a front of13 miles between Menin and Desselghem.

It was fast becoming a matter of vitalimportance to keep open our line of communica-tion to the coast through a corridor which washourly narrowing. It was no longer possibleto count on using the main road Estaires—

• Cassel—Dunkirk, while the news which hadjust been received made it certain that beforelong, the whole area east of the Yser canalwould be in the hands of the enemy, since there <•was, in fact, no satisfactory defensive positionbetween the Lys and the Yser canal. Thereseemed, therefore, to be a serious risk of theBelgian right becoming separated from theBritish left at Menin, and of the Belgian Armybeing forced to fall back in a northerly, ratherthan in a westerly direction. I considered itvitally urgent to prolong the British frontwithout delay northwards to Ypres, alongthe old Ypres—Comines canal, now practicallydry, and round Ypres itself to the line of theYser canal.

As an immediate step, I2th Lancers weresent off early on 25th to .watch the left flank of2nd Corps on the Lys, and gain touch with theright flank of the Belgians.


The remaining infantry brigade of 48thDivision (i43rd) was later placed under 2ndCorps, and a pioneer battalion sent to beginpreparations for the defence of Ypres in caseBelgian measures for the purpose should proveinadequate.

The Belgians had at this time one divisionin reserve between Menin and Ypres, and thiswas ordered to counter-attack at 2 p.m. "How-ever it is doubtful whether it was found possibleever to launch this counter-attack. Orders werealso issued for the Belgian ist Corps to comeinto line on the right of their 4th Corps betweenGhelewe and Ledeghem; this move was carriedout on the 26th May.

Sir John Dill (who had now become C.I.G.S.)and whom I had asked to visit me, 'arrived onthe morning of 25th May, and I explained theposition to him. He then telegraphed to thePrime Minister and to the Secretary of State,that there could be no disguising the seriousnessof the situation. He added that in his opinionthe proposed counter-attack to the south couldnot be an important affair in view of the enemyattacks which had penetrated the Belgiandefences.

General Blanchard arrived during Sir JohnDill's visit and took part in our discussions.

During the day the Belgians continued towithdraw in a north-westerly direction underenemy pressure. Reports also indicated that afresh enemy attack would take place next dayon the northern end of the Lys position.

OPERATIONS—THIRD PHASE26th-3ist MAY

The decision taken, in agreement with the French,to withdraw behind the Lys. H.M. Covernmentauthorises withdrawal to the coast. The Dunkirkperimeter organised by Sir Ronald Adam.The Belgians ask for an armistice. GeneralBlanchard at first determines to remain inposition but later French yd and Cavalry Corpswithdraw to Dunkirk. Occupation of perimetercompleted. Problems of embarkation of Britishand French troops. Withdrawal of 2nd andyd Corps. G.H.Q. closes and C.-in-C. embarksfor England.

The decision to Withdraw.43. By 6 p.m. that night (25th May) I was

convinced that the steps I had taken to securemy left flank would prove insufficient to meetthe growing danger in the north.

The pattern of the enemy pincer attack wasbecoming clearer. One movement from thesouth-west on Dunkirk had already developedand was being held; the counterpart was nowdeveloping on the Belgian front.

The gap between the British left and theBelgian right, which had been threatening thewhole day, might at any time become impossibleto close : were this to happen, my last hope ofreaching the coast would be gone. At thistune, it will be recalled, I had no reserves beyonda single cavalry regiment, and the two divisions(5th and 5oth) already earmarked for the attacksouthwards.

The French ist Army, which was notaffected in the same way as the B.E.F.̂by the situation which was developing onthe Belgian front, had, it will be remembered,agreed to provide three divisions and the

Cavalry Corps for this attack. Therefore, evenif no British divisions could be made available,the possibility of carrying out the operationwould not be entirely precluded. I did realisehowever that the French Were unlikely to takethe offensive unless British support was forth-coming.

Even so, however, the situation on my northernflank was deteriorating so rapidly that I wasconvinced that there was no alternative but tooccupy, as quickly as troops could be madeavailable, the line of the Ypres-Comines canaland the positions covering Ypres. I thereforeissued orders to 5oth Division to join 2ndCorps at once, and shortly afterwards I ordered5th Division to follow. 2nd Corps placed5th Division on its left flank northwardsfrom Halluin along the Ypres-Comines canalwith 5oth Division on its left around Ypres. Atthis time also, the greater part of the mediumand lieavy artillery of ist and 2nd Corps wasgrouped under 2nd Corps, and the successfuldefence of the positions on the Ypres-Cominescanal and around Ypres, which was maintainedduring the next three days; was greatly assistedby these artillery units, which remained inaction till they had fired all their ammunition.

The Commander of 3rd Corps, who was nolonger required to take part in the attacksouthwards, was now ordered to take over thecommand of the front from St. Omer to Rachesfrom Major-General Eastwood, whom he relievedon 26th May. .

I immediately communicated my decision tothe headquarters of the French First Group ofArmies, but I was unable to get-into personaltouch with General Blanchard that evening ashe was visiting the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges.However, I went to see General Blanchard athis headquarters at Attiches early next morning(26th May), at a moment when the enemy wasattacking at Carvin and had penetrated thefront of a North African Division near Boisd'Epinoy. I found that General Blanchard alsofeared the collapse of the Belgian Army and feltthat the time for a counter attack southwardswas past. Indeed he had already decided thatthe situation on both flanks made it necessaryto withdraw.

After an hour's discussion, we arrived at ajoint plan for the withdrawal of the main bodiesbehind the line of the Lys. These arrangementswere subject to there being no further deteriora-tion in the Belgian situation.

With this decision, there vanished the lastopportunity for a sortie. The layout of theB.E.F. was now beginning to take its finalshape. Starting from what could be describedas a normal situation with Allied troops onthe right and left, there had developed anever lengthening defensive right flank. Thishad then become a semi-circular line, withboth flanks resting on the sea, manned byBritish, French ' and Belgians. Later theposition became, a corridor in shape. Thesouthern end of this corridor was blocked bythe French ist Army; and each side wasmanned, for the greater part of its length, byBritish troops. Next to the sea were Frenchtroops on the west, and French and Belgiantroops on the eastern flank.

The immediate problem was to shorten thisperimeter. British and French forces weretogether holding a front of 128 miles of which97 miles were held by British troops, though

5924 SUPPLEMENT TO .THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

some sectors were held jointly with the French.The virtual closing of Dunkirk as a port ofentry was making the supply situation evermore difficult, and the ammunition situationpermitted only of very restricted expenditure.

The Plan for Withdrawal.. 44. Later, on 26th May, I discussed the planfor withdrawal with the Corps Commanders, andissued orders for the operation in accordancewith the agreement reached with GeneralBlanchard that morning. The plan, as agreedwith the French First Group of Armies, envisagedthe reservation of certain roads for the exclusiveuse of the B.E.F. In fact, however, Frenchtroops and transport continued to use them, andthis added very considerably to the difficultiesof the withdrawal of British troops. The roadswere few and for the most part narrow, and forthe next three days they were badly congestedwith marching troops and horsed transport ofFrench formations, and with refugees.

On the night 26th/27th May, ist and 2ndCorps, leaving rearguards in the frontier defences,were to swing back to the old divisional reserveposition with their right at Fort Samghin(5 miles south-east of Lille), while the Frenchprolonged this line from Thumeries to the canalat Pont-a-Vendin, linking up there with 2ndDivision. The following night (27th/a8th May),main bodies were to withdraw behind the Lys,leaving rearguards on the Deule canal up to itsjunction with the Lys at Deulemont: theserearguards were to stay there until the next night(28th/29th May). The immediate effect ofthese dispositions would be to shorten the totalperimeter by some 58 miles, but on the otherhand I had to face the possibility of having tooccupy the front from Ypres to the sea, some25 miles long, which was still the responsibilityof the Belgian Army.

There remained the question of the future.I had not so far discussed with GeneralBlanchard a further withdrawal to the sea.However, the possibility could not have beenabsent from his mind; nor was it absent frommine, for, although up to now no instructionshad been given authorising me to undertakesuch an operation, I had, as I have said, foreseenthe possibility of such a move being forcedupon us.

I returned from the conference at GeneralBlanchard's headquarters at about 10.30 a.m.on 26th May to find a telegram from theSecretary of State which read:—

. . . " I have had information all ofwhich goes to show that French offensivefrom Somme cannot be made in sufficientstrength to hold any prospect of functioningwith your Allies in the North. Should thisprove to be the case you will be faced with asituation in which the safety of the B.E.F.will predominate. In such conditions onlycourse open to you may be to fight your wayback to West where all beaches and portseast of Gravelines will be used for embarka-tion. Navy will provide fleet of ships andsmall boats and R.A.F. would give full support.As withdrawal may have to begin very earlypreliminary plans should be urgently prepared.. . . Prime Minister is seeing M. Reynaudto-morrow afternoon when whole situationwill be clarified including attitude of Frenchto the possible move. . . ."

I replied that a plan for withdrawal north-westward had been agreed with the Frenchtha't morning; I added that the news from theBelgian front was disquieting,' and concludedby saying:—

. . . " I must not conceal from you thata great part of the B.E.F. and its equipmentwill'inevitably be lost even in best circum-stances."

Later in the day, I had a further teiegramfrom the War Office which read as follows :—

" . . . Prime Minister had conversationM. Reynaud this afternoon. Latter fullyexplained to him the situation and resourcesFrench Army. It is clear that it will not bepossible for French to deliver attack on thesouth in sufficient strength to enable them toeffect junction with Northern Armies. Inthese circumstances no course open to youbut to fall back upon coast. . . . M. Reynaudcommunicating General Weygand and latterwill no doubt issue orders in this senseforthwith. You are now authorised tooperate towards coast forthwith in con-junction with French and Belgian Armies."

The Situation, of the Belgian Army.45. The situation on the Belgian front was

causing me ever increasing anxiety. At theconference at Ypres on the evening of 2ist May,His Majesty the King of the Belgians had agreedthat, if forced to abandon the positions on theLys, he would withdraw to the Yser, maintainingtouch with the left of the B.E.F. Now, however,signs were not wanting that the Belgian Armywere being forced to withdraw northwards andaway from the Yser canal. If so, the task ofdefending the whole line as far as the seaappeared likely to fall on ourselves and theFrench, as actually did happen.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, whohad been carrying out liaison duties withH.M. the King of the Belgians since the opera-tions began, came to G.H.Q. on the morning of26th May, and I e'xpressed to him my earnesthope that the Belgian Army would fall backtowards the Yser. Sir Roger Keyes took thismessage back to the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges,where he saw His Maj esty. Later he telegraphedto me sajdng that the Belgians would do theirbest, but that His Majesty considered that theonly method of avoiding immediate and com-plete disaster was a strong and immediatecounter offensive between the Lys and theEscaut. Such an operation was, however, quiteout of the question since, now that 5th and5oth Divisions had been committed, my reserveswere again reduced to one weak cavalryregiment.

The indication that the Belgian Army wouldwithdraw northwards and not to the Yser, wasconfirmed in a note, a copy of which I received,sent on 26th May by General Michiels, theChief of the Staff of the Belgian Army, toGeneral Neissens, head of the Belgian Missionwith G.K.Q.

This note contained the following passage :—. . . ft To-day, 26th May the Belgian Army

is being attacked with extreme violence onthe front Menin-Nevele,* and since the

0 battle is now spreading to the whole of thearea of Eecloo, the lack of Belgian reserves

• * Eight miles west pf Ghent.


makes it impossible to extend our boundaries,which were notified yesterday, further to theright.

We must therefore, with regret, say thatwe have no longer any forces available tofill the gap in the direction of Ypres.

As regards the withdrawal to the Yser the.idea must be ruled out since it would destroyour fighting units more quickly than thebattle now in progress, and this without lossto the enemy."On receipt of this information, on the morning

of 26th May, I asked the Secretary oi State tobring strong pressure on the Belgian Govern-ment to withdraw their Army westwards andto maintain touch with the B.E.F. I alsocommunicated in the same sense to Sir RogerKeyes, but his reply never reached myHeadquarters.

26th May—The Southern and Western fronts.46. On the remainder of the front 26th May

was marked by heavy air action everywhere.The enemy attack on the French North Africandivision at Carvin which was in progress whenI visited General Blanchard at Attiches, wasdriven back by the • prompt action of twobattalions of 5oth Division which were deployedbehind the French troops. 2nd and 44thDivisions reacted against the enemy and bothsucceeded in advancing some distance west-wards from Merville and Hazebrouck respec-tively towards the Canal.

Further north, the French had completed therelief of all our troops on the river Aa fromSt. Momelin northwards But had themselvesbegun in places to withdraw towards the.Mardyck Canal. It therefore became the morenecessary to strengthen further the defencesof Bergues, and this was carried out under theorders of 48th Division.

Plans for final withdrawal.47. On this evening (26th May), I put in hand

my plans for a final withdrawal. I was uncertainhow far I should be successful in withdrawingthe whole of the B.E.F. within the bridgeheadat Dunkirk, nor could I judge how much fightingmy troops would have to undertake during thewithdrawal.

I had, therefore, asked the War Office whetherit would be possible to send out an infantrybrigade of the ist Canadian Division so as toprovide a nucleus of fresh and well trainedtroops on the bridgehead position. ~ This requestwas at once agreed to, and orders were givento despatch the Brigade to Dunkirk on thenight 26th/27th May. These orders were,however, cancelled on 28th May.

The contraction of the B.E.F. area and theshortening of its Lines of Communication wasnow making it possible to dispense with anumber of the rearward units. I had alreadyissued orders for the embarkation of a number ofkey personnel who could be spared so as to easethe supply situation which was becoming acute;I now ordered the withdrawal of all units which'were not required to continuejihe battle. Thispolicy involved leaving most of the fightingtroops until the last, but if full use was to bemade of the shipping available, and congestionavoided on the beaches, no other course waspossible.

The task of organising a bridgehead at Dun-kirk, and of arranging the details of embarkation

was likely to prove an exacting one: workhad to begin at once, and my own headquarterswere fully occupied with the withdrawal of theforward troops.

I therefore appointed Lieut-General Sir RonaldAdam to undertake this duty, and sent withhim my Quarter-Master-General and otherstaff officers from G.H.Q. He was to takecommand of the troops already in the area,make arrangements for the troops of ist, 2ndand 3rd Corps who would be withdrawing intothe bridgehead and arrange for the embarkation.He was to act in conformity with the orders ofGeneral Fagalde, provided that these did notimperil the safety and welfare of British troops-

Sir Ronald Adam accordingly handed overcommand of the 3rd Corps to Major-GeneralS. R. Wason (till then Major-General R.A. atG.H.Q.), and took up his duties on the morningof 27th May.

At 7 a.m. that morning he attended a con-ference at Cassel as my representative. Atthis conference there were present AdmiralAbrial and General Fagalde from Dunkirk,General Blanchard, General Prioux, now incommand of the French ist Army, and GeneralKoeltz who was representing General Weygand

Sir Ronald Adam and General Fagaldearrived early, and before the conference beganthey had the opportunity to -reach general'agreement on the organisation of the bridgeheadposition.

The perimeter was to extend from Gravelinessouth-eastwards to the Canal de la Colme,along the canal to Bergues and thence by Furnesand Nieuport to the Belgian coast. In fact,the French were by now evacuating Gravelinesand the western part of the perimeter, and inprocess of going back to the line of the MardyckCanal from the sea to Spyker, on the Canalde la Colme. The French were to be responsiblefor the defence of the western half of the peri-meter as far as Bergues inclusive, and theBritish for the eastern half. By this time, theposition of the Belgian Army was so obscurethat the possibility of its being included inthe bridgehead was not taken into account,though the perimeter could of course have beenextended eastwards to include them if necessary.

Sir Ronald Adam then explained to GeneralFagalde his plan for Corps boundaries, assemblyareas and the layout of beaches. He speciallystressed the importance of avoiding traffic

.congestion in the perimeter and said that hehad decided to allow no British transportnorth of the canals except such as was strictlynecessary for tactical, supply or medical pur-poses. He urged General Fagalde to issuesimilar orders to the French troops under hiscommand. He also suggested that the Frenchtroops entering the bridgehead position shouldall be located in the'western part of the peri-meter. However, it appeared that these ordersdid not reach all the French troops, who broughta quantity of transport into the sector.

These matters were later reviewed at the fullconference, but the principal business was theissue by General Koeltz of an order of the dayby General Weygand.

This enjoined a resolute attitude on the partof every leader, and the counter-offensivewherever possible. General Koeltz then pro-ceeded to urge Generals Blanchard and Fagaldeto attempt the recapture of Calais and, though


at the time they had nothing available savethe 68th Division and the regional troops,they did not demur.

However, so far as I am aware, no action wasever taken in this respect.

Description of the Dunkirk Perimeter.48. The British sector of the Dunkirk peri-

meter had its right at Bergues, and thencefollowed the canals to Fumes and Nieuport.These places were old-fashioned fortified towns,easy to defend but affording good bombingtargets. The destruction of the bridges pre-sented no difficulty, and all were in fact blownin time by British or French troops except thatat Nieuport which was wide and solid, and couldnot be demolished before the arrival of the enemy.Two natural switch lines were available : thecanal from Bergues to Dunkirk and the Canaldes Moeres from Dunkirk south-east towardsHondschoote.

Immediately north of this line came theinundations, extending from Bergiies over thedistrict of the Moeres to a width varying fromone to three miles. Except in a few places,they did not cover the roads but were designedto leave them clear, while preventing deploy-ment. They did, however, sometimes preventtroops from digging themselves in. On theBelgian side of the frontier the order to beginthe inundations was not given by Belgian G.Q.G.till the morning of 26th May and they neverbecame effective.

To the north of the inundations was morelow-lying land ; then came the Bergues-FurnesCanal, and the main lateral road from Fumesto Dunkirk. Finally there was the narrowstrip of dunes giving way to a wide, open beachrunning the whole length of the position andshelving very slowly to the sea. There were noquays or piers whatever except those at Dunkirkitself. At intervals of about a mile along theshore lay the seaside resorts of Coxyde, LaPanne, Bray Dunes and Malo-les-Bains.

Layout of the Sector and Problem of Traffic Control.49. Sir Ronald Adam, on leaving Cassel,

went at once to the headquarters of the 48thDivision at Bergues to find out the latest situa-tion and in particular what troops were imme-diately available either to hold the perimeteror to control the traffic. He learnt that theenemy were advancing north eastwards fromthe.Forest of Clairmarais : there could thereforebe no question of using any of the reserves of48th Division, and the only troops immediatelyavailable were certain engineer units. GeneralThome, however, lent his C.R.A. (BrigadierHon. E. F. Lawson) who was instructed to layout the defence of the perimeter, and to use forthe purpose such troops as were on the spot,or were entering the perimeter.

The position was then divided into threeCorps areas, each including a collecting areaoutside the perimeter, a sector of the canal lineand a sector of the beach.

Already it was seen that the traffic problemwas going to assume formidable proportions.Ever since the loth May it had been a potentialsource of trouble, but it had been kept in handin the early stages by strict adherence to pre-arranged plans and by the use of infantry fortraffic control. Once the withdrawal from theDyle began, the problem became acute in Franceas well as in Belgium. Refugees began to leave

their homes in northern France before the FrenchGovernment put into operation the plans theyhad made. The French organisations were notavailable and no British troops could be sparedto control the traffic. The refugee problem hadtherefore become increasingly acute, and thetide which at first set westwards from Belgiumhad now met the enemy again in theSomme area and had begun to turn back onitself. Scenes of misery were everywhere, andthe distress of women, children and aged peoplewas pitiable. Fortunately the fine weatherand warm nights mitigated their plight to somedegree and though the outbreak of famine wasexpected at any moment it did not actuallyoccur in the area of the B.E.F. Little, un-fortunately, could be done to help the refugees,since supplies for the troops were still seriouslyshort. Moreover their presence on the roadswas often a grave menace to our movement.It had been necessary to give Corps a free handin handling them*: on occasions it had beennecessary to turn vehicles into the fields inorder to keep the roads clear.

During the 27th May, troops and their trans-port began to withdraw into the perimeter onthe fronts of all three Corps; and where thetroops had received the necessary orders,

' vehicles were disabled and abandoned in theassembly areas. The few troops who could bespared for traffic control did not, however,prove sufficient for the purpose, and conse-quently a great number of British and Frenchvehicles entered the perimeter and the town,of Dunkirk when they should have remainedoutside. There was inevitably a large numberof vehicles which had become detached fromtheir units, and a number of cases also occurredthat day in which units became separated fromtheir formations and arrived within the peri-meter without sufficiently clear orders. Thesewere sent to reinforce the defence of the peri-meter, or embarked, as seemed best to those incontrol.

Next day (28th May) when Corps started totake charge in their areas, the difficulties withthe British traffic were cleared up, only to bereplaced by difficulties with the French traffic.

The French 6oth Division .began to arrivefrom Belgium, and at the same time rearward^elements of their light mechanised divisions"appeared from the south-east and south. Thesewere soon followed by the transport of theFrench 3rd Corps, mainly horsed. None ofthese appeared to have received orders to leavetheir transport outside the perimeter: seldomdid they do so unless compelled by Britishtraffic control posts.

By the 28th, Brigadier Lawson, using thegreatest energy, had succeeded in the urgenttask of manning the perimeter from Bergues toNieuport with troops from a number of units,chiefly artillery.

50. The Admiralty had placed - the navalarrangements for embarkation in the hands ofthe Dover Command. A Senior Naval Officerhad been sent to Dunkirk to work out detailedplans, and steps had been taken to collect alarge number of small ships, and of boats fortalcing troops from the beach out to the ships.

On 27th May, however, these arrangementshad not had time to take effect, nor had it yetbeen possible to provide sufficient naval ratingsto man the beaches. Yet a start was made;


beaches were organised at La Panne, Bray Dunesand Malo-les-Bains, one being allotted to eachCorps ; and military beach parties were impro-vised on each Corps beach. They carried onwithout naval assistance for two days, but werehampered by a.shortage of small boats and by alack of experience in their use. The troops wereunable to handle boats on a falling tide, andduring daylight on the 27th, when only onedestroyer and two whalers were available forwork on the beaches, not more than two hundredmen were embarked.

Dunkirk, which for some days had beenheavily bombed, received a particularly severeattack on 27th May; lorry columns had beenset on fire in the town and a pall of black smokefrom the burning oil tanks .hung continuouslyover the town and docks, impeding the airdefence.

Though the outer mole could still be usedthe inner harbour was now blocked except tosmall ships.

Dunkirk was therefore cleared of all troopsand they were sent to the dunes east of thetown to await embarkation. The port itselfwas kept under the control of G.H.Q. andmanned by naval ratings. At one time itseemed likely to go out of use at any moment,but troops were in fact embarked there till theend, in numbers which far exceeded expecta-tions.

Supplies, water and ammunition were des-patched from England to the beaches, andon 28th May the first convoy arrived. Unfortu-nately a high proportion of these stores weredestroyed on the way over or sunk when.anchored off the shore. Nevertheless consider-able quantities were landed at Coxyde and LaPanne and served to create a badly neededreserve.

• During 27th May, the move of 5th and 5othDivisions was completed and the left flank thusextended as far as Ypres. On the front fromBergues to Hazebrouck enemy pressure steadilyincreased.

On the same afternoon, G.H.Q. moved fromPremesques to Houtkerque (six miles W.N.W.of Poperinghe). Communications were difficultthroughout. the day since Corps headquarterswere all on the move, and it had not yet beenpossible to re-establish line communicationswhich hitherto had run through Lille.

The Belgian Armistice.51. During 27th May, I received a further

telegram from the Secretary of State whichread " . . . want to make it quite clear thatsole task now-is to evacuate to England maxi-mum of your force possible ". It was thereforevery necessary to discuss further plans withGeneral Blanchard, for no policy had yet beenlaid down by G.Q.G. or any other French higherauthority for a withdrawal northward of the Lys.I had no idea what plans either he or AdmiralAbrial had in mind.

In the evening, I left my headquarters atHoutkerque with the C.G.S. and the Frenchliaison officer from .General Blanchard's head-quarters to try and 'get into touch with GeneralBlanchard. I failed to find him at La Panne,so I went on to Bastion No. 32 at Dunkirk tovisit Admiral Abrial, only to find- that both heand General Fagalde were equally unaware ofhis whereabouts.

While at the Bastion, General Koeltz askedme, shortly after n p.m. whether I had yetheard that H.M. the King of the Belgians hadasked for an armistice from midnight thatnight. This was. the first intimation I hadreceived of this intention, although I hadalready formed the opinion that the BelgianArmy was now iqcapable of offering seriousor prolonged resistance to the enemy. I nowfound myself suddenly faced with an open gapof 20 mile's between Ypres and the sea throughwhich enemy armoured forces might reach the•beaches.

Owing to the congestion on the roads, I didnot get back to my headquarters at Houtkerqueuntil about 4.30 a.m. on 28th May. There Ifound that a telegram had been received fromthe War Office at 1.30 a.m. saying that H.M.the King of the Belgians was capitulating atmidnight.

Withdrawal- to' the Sea.52. .Next morning (28th May), General

Blanchard arrived at my headquarters atHoutkerque at about n a.m., and I read him.the telegram which I had received the previousday from the Secretary of State. It was thenclear to me that whereas we had both receivedsimilar instructions from our own Governmentfor the establishment of a bridgehead he had,as yet, received no instructions to correspondwith those I had received to evacuate my troops.General Blanchard therefore could not see hisway to contemplate evacuation.

I then expressed the opinion that now theBelgian Army had ceased to exist, the onlyalternatives could be evacuation or surrender.The enemy threat to the North-Eastern flankappeared certain to develop during the nextforty-eight hours. The long South-Western flankwas being subjected to constant and increasingpressure, especially at Cassel and Wormhoudt,and the arrival of the enemy heavy columnscould not be long delayed. These considerationscould not be lightly dismissed. While this dis-cussion was taking place, a liaison officer arrivedfrom General Prioux, now in command of theFrench ist Army, to say that the latter did notconsider his troops were fit to make any furthermove and that he therefore intended to remainin the area between Bethune and Lille, protectedby the quadrangle of canals.

I then begged General Blanchard, for the sakeof France, the French Army and the AlliedCause to order General Prioux back. Surely,I said, his troops were not all so tired as to beincapable of moving. The French Governmentwould be able to provide ships at least for someof his troops, and the chance of saving a part ofhis trained soldiers was preferable to the cer-tainty of losing them all. I could not movehim. Finally he asked me formally whether itwas my intention to withdraw that night to theline Cassel-Poperinghe-Ypres.

I replied in the affirmative and informed himthat I now had formal orders from His Majesty'sGovernment to withdraw the B.E.F. and thatif I was to have any hope of carrying them outI must .continue niy move that night. GeneralBlanchard's parting was not unfriendly, andwhen he left I issued my orders for withdrawalto provide for that change of mind on the partof the French High Command for which I sosincerely hoped and which in fact took placelater.


ist and 2nd Corps were to withdraw on the .night of 28th/29th May to a horse-shoe positionon the line Proven-Poperinghe-Ypres-Bix-schoote, with outposts on the line Ypres-Godevaersvelde. The position of 3rd Corps wasmore difficult and obscure. 2nd Division, nowreduced to less than the strength of an infantrybrigade, had fought hard and had sustained astrong enemy tank attack. It was already inprocess of withdrawing from the line and orderswere issued for it to fall back in the direction ofBeveren and Proven, prolonging the right flankof ist Corps. 48th and 44th Divisions were in'contact with the enemy on a front of over twentymiles from Bergues through Cassel to VieuxBerquin, in touch with the French ist LightMechanised Division, west of the latter place.The French ist Army had 3rd and 4th Corps inline between Merville and Sailly-sur-la-Lys,but were out of touch with their 5th Corps.

The orders to 48th Division were to standfor a few hours longer. They withdrew thatnight under pressure from the enemy, with theassistance of the armoured vehicles of theHopkinson Mission. The garrison of Worm-houdt was extricated together with such portionsof the garrison of Cassel as could disengage fromthe enemy. 44th Division was also orderedto disengage that night, and to move north- 'eastwards towards the old frontier defences.46th Division, which had moved on the night26th/27th May from the Seclin area to Steen-vorde, was to move into the Dunkirk perimeter.

Before he received this order, the Commanderof 44th Division (Major-General Osborne) hadvisited headquarters of the French 4th Corps,where he learned of the Belgian armistice ; andheard that General Prioux had orders to standhis ground. He, too, had endeavoured toconvince General Prioux that the only hopefor his army lay in withdrawal.

Later, on 28th May fresh orders were issuedby the French ist Army. They were to theeffect that General Prioux himself wouldremain with the 4th Corps in its present position,and that General de la Laurencie, with his own3rd Corps and the Cavalry Corps, would with-draw so as to arrive within the Dunkirk peri-meter on 3oth May. No copy of this orderreached General Osborne, who learned of thechange*of plans when, at 10.30 p.m. that night,he visited the headquarters of the French istArmy. As General de la Laurencie had decidedto begin his move at 11.30 p.m., General Osborne.had some difficulty in conforming, but succeededin doing so. I was genuinely very glad to learnthat part, at any rate, of the French ist Armywould now be sharing in the withdrawal, how-ever great the difficulties might be.

Occupation of the Perimeter Completed.53. ist and 2nd Corps were now free to pro-

ceed with the occupation of their sectors of theDunkirk perimeter, and both Commanders metSir Ronald Adam on 28th May. 2nd Corpshad, that morning, ordered Headquarters, 2ndArmoured Reconnaissance. Brigade, to take overthe sector from Fumes exclusive to the sea atNieuport, and now ordered 4th Division to movefrom the line of the Ypres-Comines Canal torelieve them. 3rd Division was to follow assoon as possible and take over the sectorbetween the French-Belgian frontier and Furnes.

These two divisions had been in the line atYpres since 25th May. They had held positions

on the historic ground of the Ypres-CominesCanal, Zillebeke and the eastern outskirts ofYpres, and on these positions, the infantry, wellsupported by the artillery, had stubbornly heldtheir ground in the face of strong and deter-mined attacks by the enemy.

ist Corps also ordered ist Division to moveinto their sector of the perimeter; on the sameday ist Corps was ordered to reinforce thegarrison of Bergues with one battalion. Thisorder could not be carried out that day, butnext day (29th May) a battalion of 46th Divi-sion (9th Foresters) was sent there.

During this time it had been, a constantanxiety to G.H.Q. lest those enemy forcesreleased by the Belgian armistice should fore-stall our occupation of the perimeter. Therehad been no time to lose. Early on the 28ththe leading enemy mobile troops and tanks hadreached Nieuport, and they would have arrivedthere unopposed had it not been for the workof a troop of i2th Lancers. The state of theroads, congested as they were with refugees andBelgian troops, must also have played theirpart in delaying the enemy. Throughout theday, however, the defensive positions wereimproved and a number of additional troopsfrom various units, chiefly Royal Artillery, werecollected and organised to occupy them.

On 29th May, troops of I2th Infantry Brigadeand Corps Artillery began to arrive; thatnight 4th Division relieved the mixed detach-ments which up to now had been holding thesector. Throughout the 29th May the enemyhad been attempting to cross the canal betweenthe French-Belgian frontier and Nieuport.At the latter place, where the bridge had notbeen blown, they established a bridgehead inthe town. Everywhere else they were drivenback. Some attempted to cross in rubber boats;others were disguised as civilians, even as nuns,and attempted to cross with the refugees, horsesand cattle. On this day enemy forces advancingnear the coast were shelled by H.M. ships.

Thus, once again the enemy had been fore-stalled just in the nick of time, and the promptand gallant action of the troops on the spot hadgained the few vital hours which were to makeit possible, against all expectation, to embarkpractically the whole force.

54. On the afternoon of 28th May, I movedmy headquarters from Houtkerque to LaPanne, which was in direct telephonic com-munication with London. On arrival I heardreports from Sir Ronald Adam and the Quarter-Master-General.

These reports were not optimistic. No shipscould be unloaded at the dock§ at'Dunkirk, and

. few wounded could be evacuated. There wasno water in Dunkirk and very little on thebeaches. The naval plans were not yet in fulloperation, and some 20,000 men were waitingto be taken off the beaches, 10,000 having beentaken off in the last two days, chiefly fromDunkirk. The area was congested with Frenchand Belgian troops and their transport, as wellas with refugees.

They gave it as their opinion that, given areasonable measure of immunity from air attack,troops could gradually be evacuated andsupplies landed. If, however, intensive enemyair attack continued, the beaches might easilybecome a shambles within the next forty-eighthours.


I communicated the gist of this report to theC.I.G.S. and I asked that H.M. Governmentshould consider the policy to be followed in theevent of a crisis arising, as well it might.

In reply, I received two telegrams which.read:—

". . . . H.M. Government fully approveypur withdrawal to extricate your force inorder embark maximum number possible ofBritish Expeditionary Force. . . . If youare cut from all communication from us andall evacuation from Dunkirk and beaches had,in your judgment, been finally preventedafter every attempt to re-open it had failedyou would become sole -judge of when it wasimpossible to inflict further damage to enemy."

I also received a gracious telegram of en-couragement and good wishes from His Majesty,the King, which I communicated to all ranks.

General Weygand telegraphed on this dayappealing personally to me to ensure that theBritish Army took a vigorous part in any counter-attacks necessary; the situation, he added,made it essential to hit hard. When he sentthis message, he could have had no accurateinformation of the real position or of the powersof counter-attack remaining to either the Frenchor the British. General Koeltz had not, as yet,had time to return to G.Q.G. with a first-handreport on the situation, and in any case thetime for such action in the northern theatrewas long past.

French troops arrive : Problems of embarkation.55. By 2gth May, the naval arrangements

.were beginning to bear -fruit: however, duringthe day, the enemy began to shell Dunkirk fromthe' south-west, and the port and the beacheswere constantly bombed.

Owing to a misunderstanding, the personnelof certain anti-aircraft units had been embarkedinstead of being retained for the defence ofthe port-of Dunkirk. Therefore, I -was themore dependent on the action of fighter aircraft,and I made this clear to the War Office. Irealised how heavy was the demand to be madeon the Royal Air Force for the remainder of theoperation, and how impossible it would be toexpect that they could succeed completely inpreventing air action on the beaches. Yet theydid succeed in intercepting a large part of theenemy attacks, and those which'arrived, thoughat times serious, were never able to impedeour embarkation for long.

French troops were now arriving in the peri-meter in large numbers, and, unfortunately,brought with them much transport. The conges-tion created within the perimeter was well-nighunbearable and for two days the main road'

' between La Panne and Dunkirk became totallyblocked with vehicles three deep. The Frenchwere in process of withdrawing all their troopsbehind the defences on the Belgian frontier, andfor the next two days' their dispositions weresuperimposed on those of the British troops inthat part of the perimeter between the frontierand Bergues. The French military forces,within the perimeter or now approaching it,consisted of two weak divisions of the i6thCorps (6oth and 68th), General Barthele'my'sregional troops, General de la Laurencie's3rd Corps of two divisions (i2th and 32nd), andthe Cavalry Corps, together with some artillery.

The arrival of these troops, though welcomefrom-so many points of view, raised the questionof embarkation in an acute form. Admiral Abrialhad apparently received no orders from hisGovernment that the whole of the British troopswere to be embarked, and he professed greatsurprise when he heard of my intentions. Hehad, it seems, imagined that only rearwardelements were to be withdrawn, and that Britishtroops would stay and defend the perimeter tothe last, side by side with the French. I there-fore sent Sir Ronald Adam to see the Admiral.He explained the orders to extricate my Forcewhich I had received from His Majesty's Govern-ment and which had been confirmed the daybefore.

Meanwhile, the French troops were expecting,to embark along .with their British comrades,notwithstanding that no French ships had so farbeen provided: the beaches were becomingcrtiwded with French soldiers, aiid difficultiesmight have occurred at any time. I urged theWar Office to obtain a decision as to the Frenchpolicy for embarkation and asked that the Frenchshould take their full share in providing navalfaculties. However, to permit embarkation ofthe French troops to begin at once, I decided toallot two British ships to the French that night,and also to give up the beach at Malo-les-Bainsfor their sole use.

Medical arrangements.56. Hospital ships worked continuously till

3ist May though "continuous bombing madetheir berthing difficult and they frequently had

'to put to sea before they were fully loaded.Walking wounded were taken on board personnelships from Dunkirk or the beaches, but to preventdelay in embarking fit men, orders were issuedthat the most serious cases should only beembarked on hospital ships. Casualty ClearingStations had been established at Dunkirk and atthe beach at La Panne. Some of the woundedwere, however, too ill to move. They had beencollected into two Casualty Clearing Stations,one at Crombeke and one at Rosendael, wherethey were to be cared for till the enemy shouldarrive.

The Evacuation of yd and 2nd Corps.57. The 3rd Corps Sector included the canal

from Dunkirk to Bergues, with the town ofBergues, and a little more than two miles offront west of the town. By the evening of .29th,3rd Corps had withdrawn 44th and 2nd Divisionsfrom their positions and Corps headquarterswere now embarked. 44th and 48th Divisionswere ordered to be transferred to ist Corps, and2nd, 23rd .and 46th Divisions to proceed toDunkirk for embarkation, ist Corps was alsoordered to embark what remained of 42ndDivision, except for I26th Infantry Brigade.Subsequently a change was made, 44th Divisionbeing embarked and 46th Division remainingwith ist Corps.

During the 2Qth and 30th May, 5th and 5othDivisions came into the 2nd Corps, area: theformer, sadly reduced in numbers, was with-drawn from the line, while the latter occupied asector between the Belgian frontier and the rightof the 3rd Division.


On the evening of 2gth May, therefore, theorganisation of the perimeter was complete, andSir Ronald Adam's task was successfullyaccomplished. He himself embarked that night.

By 3oth May, there remained in the area, atan estimate, 80,000 British troops for evacuationand I had now to complete the plans for thefinal withdrawal of the Force. I had received atelegram from the Secretary of State, whichread as follows :—

" Continue to defend present perimeter tothe utmost in order to cover maximumevacuation now proceeding well. . . . If wecan still communicate with you we shall sendyou an order to return to England with suchofficers as you may choose at the momentwhen we deem your command so reduceduthatit can be handed to a Corps Commander.You should now nominate this commander.If communications are broken you are to handover and return as specified when your effectivefighting force does not exceed equivalent ofthree divisions. This is in accordance withcorrect military procedure and no personaldiscretion is left to you in the matter. . . .The Corps Commander chosen by you shouldbe ordered to carry on defence and evacuationwith French whether from Dunkirk orbeaches. . . ."The problem was to thin out the troops, while

maintaining a proper defence of the perimeter,yet at the same time not to retain a largernumber of men than could be embarked inone lift.

I had received orders from home that Frenchand British troops were to embark in equalproportions. Thus it looked at one time as ifthe British would have to continue holding aperimeter, either the existing one or somethingsmaller, at least another four or five days, toenable all the troops to embark. Yet the enemypressure was increasing and there was no depthin our position. A line on the dunes could onlybe held during the hours of darkness to coverthe final phase of the withdrawal.

I discussed the situation with the Commandersof ist and 2nd Corps on 3oth May. Embarkationhad gone well that day, especially from Dunkirk,but enemy pressure had increased at Furnes andBergues and it was plain that the eastern endof the perimeter could not be held much longer.The enemy had begun to shell the beach atLa Panne. I was still concerned lest the arrange-ments for embarking the French should for anyreason prove inadequate. I therefore motoredto Dunkirk to inform Admiral Abrial of myviews and to assure myself that the arrangementsfor embarking British and French troops inequal proportions were working smoothly.

The Admiral assured me of his agreementabout the evacuation of the sector, and we thendiscussed the problem of embarkation.

I had already agreed with General de laLaurencie to evacuate 5,000 picked men from his3rd Corps, which had fought alongside us andof the fighting value-of which I had a highopinion. However, the Admiral told me thathe had had orders from General Weygand thatthe personnel of the Cavalry Corps were to beembarked in priority to others. The matterwas settled in a most friendly atmosphere andI satisfied myself, so far as it was possible, thatno trouble was likely to arise in practice overthe sharing of the berths at the Dunkirk mole.

-I judged that it would be imprudent to con-tinue to maintain our position on the perimeteroutside the permanent defences of Dunkirkfor more than twenty-four hours longer, and Itherefore decided to continue the evacuationby withdrawing 2nd Corps on the night of3ist May/ist June.

Orders were accordingly issued for 2nd Corpsto withdraw 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions to thebeaches and Dunkirk. 5oth Division was to fallback to the French defences on the Belgianfrontier, and come under command of ist Corps,together with the British Base staff atDunkirk. These moves began to take place onthe morning of 3 ist May; by this time therehad been a general thinning out of the wholeforce, and I felt that, however the situationmight develop, valuable cadres had been with-drawn which would enable the fighting units ofthe B.E.F. to be quickly reformed at home.

58. The remains of the B.E.F., on being with-drawn inside the area of the French defences, nowcame under the orders of Admiral Abrial, andthe time had therefore arrived for me to handover my command, in accordance with theinstructions I had received, and to embark forEngland. I invited Generals Blanchard andde la Laurencie to j oin me on the j ourney. To myregret they were both unable to do so, though1 was able to arrange for some of the staff ofGeneral de la Laurencie's 3rd Corps to sail withthat of G.H.Q.

I had selected Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G.Alexander to remain in France in command ofist Corps, now numbering less than 20,000 menin all. On the afternoon of 3ist May I gave himhis instructions, which were based on those I hadmyself received from H.M. Government. Hewas to operate under the orders of AdmiralAbrial, and to assist the French in the defenceof Dunkirk. At the same time he was to occupyhimself with arrangements for the evacuation ofhis command, and I stressed the importance ofthe French sharing equally in the facilities whichwere provided for evacuation.

I agreed with Major-General Alexander onthe night 2nd/3rd June as a provisional date forevacuating his force.

That evening, therefore, at 6 p.m., my head-quarters closed, and after handing over commandto Major-General Alexander,* I embarked inH.M.S. Hebe, and sailed for England about2 a.m. on ist June. At this time the withdrawalof 2nd Corps was proceeding according to plan,but under increasing enemy pressure by landand air; the troops were moving to their places

"on the beaches steadily and in good order. Theplans made by the Admiralty to provide smallcraft were by now in full operation; embarka-tion was proceeding far more smoothly than ithad yet done, and was favoured by a calm seathat night.

In all, 211,532 fit men and 13,053 casualtieswere embarked at Dunkirk and the beaches, inaddition to 112,546 allied troops, f

* An account of events after Major-General Alexanderassumed command is given in Appendix I.

f These figures have been obtained from the-WarOffice.


SOME LESSONS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The importance oj equipment; the time factor;liaison; dejence in depth; the employmentof air forces; river crossing and demolitions ;signal communications; traffic control;security; supply and transport; the behaviourof the troops.

59. So ended a campaign of 22 days whichhas proved that the offensive has once moregained ascendency in modern war when under-taken with ah army equipped with greattysuperior material power in the shape of airforces and armoured fighting vehicles.

The British Expeditionary Force had advancedsixty-five miles from the frontier to the Dyle :then the same distance back from the Dyle tothe frontier : finally a further fifty miles to thesea at Dunkirk. A frontal advance had becomea flank defence ; a flank defence the defence ofa perimeter which at times exceeded one hundredmiles, with my force of nine* divisions and partsof three semi-trained and partially equippeddivisions sent to France for labour duties.Finally had come the witRdrawal to the seaand the shrinkage of this wide front to thetwenty-four miles of the Dunkirk bridgehead.

The series of situations which the B.E.F. hadto face was not brought about by failure on theirpart to withstand enemy attacks when holdinga position of their own choosing : it was caused.by the enemy breaking through completely ona front many miles away from that held by theB.E.F. Nevertheless this break through, onceit began, was destined to involve in its ill-fatedconsequences both the French ist Army andthe B.E.F. In the withdrawal which ensuedboth these armies lost the whole of their artilleryand transport.

It would not be appropriate in -this Despatchto discuss questions affecting the higher com-mand of the Allied forces : on these matters Ireceived orders from H.M. Government andthrough the French commanders under whomI was placed.

Nor is .this Despatch the place to deal atlength with the military lessons of the Cam-paign ; I have already conveyed my detailedviews to the proper quarter.

There are, however, certain matters which itmay be convenient to mention, in broad outline,in this Despatch since they may serve in somerespects to amplify and to explain the narrativeof events. They are dealt with in the paragraphswhich follow.

The paramount importance of equipment.•60. It was clear from the outset that the ascen-

dency in equipment which the enemy possessedplayed" a great part in the operations. He wasable to place in the field and to concentrate noless than ten armoured divisions in the areawhich he selected and later, to employ at leastfive of these against the British rearward de-fences. On the other hand, the British armouredforces in the theatre of war amounted to sevendivisional cavalry regiments equipped withlight tanks, one regiment of armoured cars ofan obsolete* pattern, and two battalions ofinfantry tanks, the latter, except for twenty-three Mark II tanks, being armed each with onemachine-gun only.

* Excluding 51st Division on the Saar Front.

Our anti-tank armament was more ample thanthat of the French, but did not extend furtherback than the division. No guns were availablefor the defence of Corps or rearward areas or forthe three " Pioneer " divisions, except by with-drawing weapons from the formations to whichthey had been allotted in War Establishments.

These instances amongst many others whichmight be quoted serve-to indicate the vitalnecessity for an expeditionary force, if it is tobe used in a first-class war, being equipped on ascale commensurate with the task it is to becalled upon to fulfil.

The days are past when armies can be hurriedlyraised, equipped and placed in the field, formodern war demands the ever increasing use ofcomplicated material. Indeed the scientific sideof warfare has been evolving at a very rapid rateeven since the end of the war of 1914-18 and iscontinuing to do so. Modern equipment requirestime to design and produce, and once it is pro-duced, further time is required- to train troopsin its technical and tactical uses. Improvisedarrangements, made at short notice, can onlylead to the shortage of essential equipment, theproduction of inferior articles, and the unskilfulhandling of weapons and vehicles on the battle-field.

The Time Factor.61. The speed with which the enemy exploited

his penetration of the French front, his willing-ness to accept risks to further his aim, and hisexploitation of every success to the uttermostlimits emphasised, even more fully than in thecampaigns of the past, the advantage whichaccrues to the commander who knows how bestto use time to make time his servant and nothis master.

Again, the pace of operations has been soaccelerated by the partnership between offensiveaircraft and modern mechanised forces that thereserves available for the defence are of littleuse unless they are fully mobile or already inoccupation of some reserve position. Forinstance, had it not been that eight TroopCarrying Companies, R.A.S.C., weue available,the attack south of Arras could never have beenmounted, nor indeed could the flank defences onthe canal have been organised in time to forestallthe enemy.

We had already foreseen, and taught at theStaff College, that the methods of staff dutiesin the past war would prove too slow for modernrequirements. Headquarters of formationswere so frequently on the move that confer-ences, supplemented by Operation Instructionsor messages, usually replaced the formal orderswhich had been the accepted procedure in pastcampaigns.

Full use was also made of liaison officers of allgrades, who had been provided by the WarOffice on a generous scale. In the period beforeactive operations began, they were of real valuein settling matters of detail and in reconcilingpoints of view which did not always at firstcoincide; during the fighting they were moreoften than not the actual bearers of OperationInstructions, and performed most valuableservice to their commanders in ascertaining theexact state of affairs in forward or flank units.The junior .liaison officers, known as MotorContact Officers, likewise showed determinationand resource in carrying out their duties.


The liaison with flanking French formationswas carried out by the exchange of bilingualliaison officers. I was particularly fortunate inthe French officers who were attached for theseduties from neighbouring formations.

I would also like to take this opportunity ofrecording my thanks to General de DivisionVoruz and the staif of his Mission with G.H.Q.for their unfailing helpfulness at all times.

Defence in Depth.62. Closely allied to the question of the time

factor is that of defence in depth. The speed atwhich armoured units can advance, once theyhave, broken into a position, calls for a moreelastic conception of defence than would benecessary were it designed solely to hold up amarching enemy. Consequently, frontages may,in-the future, be considerably shorter than thosewhich the French High Command required theB.E.F. to hold in France.

In more rearward areas, schemes must beprepared for the manning, at short notice, ofcentres of communication and other importantdenies. Therefore, all units, even those designedfor purely administrative purposes, must beprepared to take their part in the battle, andthey must receive the necessary preliminarytraining.

Anti-tank defence is a science as well as acraft. It is a science in that it is necessary toperfect armour-piercing weapons and anti-tanktactics. It is a craft in that troops must betrained to stalk tanks by day, to keep track oftheir movements, and to attack them in theirharbours at night.

The Employment of Air Forces.63. It was clear from the reports of the

Spanish war, confirmed by those of the Polishcampaign, that the enemy would employ hisair forces to further the offensive operations ofthe army by the use of dive bombers and para-chute troops. The latter, though effectivelyemployed in Holland, were less used against theB.E.F.; however, the nuisance value of thosewhich were employed, by their interference withrailway, telephone and telegraph communica-tions in rearward zones, Was altogether out ofproportion to their numbers. There were seldomtroops available to isolate and search the areaswhere they landed, usually at dusk, and noFrench civil organization existed for the purpose.

The enemy bombers, both high level and lowflying, were a more serious menace. Theircontrol by the German command was mostefficient, capable of bringing the aircraft to theirobjective by wireless call at short notice.

Attack by dive bombers was a new experiencefor British troops. Even those who had grownaccustomed to heavy shell fire in France during1914-18 found that this form of attack, whenfirst encountered, placed a strain on morale.As had been anticipated, it was soon realisedthat those who were properly entrenched andhad perfected the drill of taking cover when onthe move, suffered relatively little danger.

Ground anti-aircraft defence, both gun andlight automatic, improved in accuracy as timewent on and it accounted for the destruction ofover 500 aircraft in addition to its effect in

breaking up formations of enemy aircraft. Butbeing purely defensive, it can never prove thecomplete antidote to 'enemy bombers and recon-naissance aircraft, even when available insufficient strength. A commander must have athis call sufficient fighters to intercept and attackthe enemy.

The commander must, likewise, dispose of asufficient bomber force to be able to engageopportunity targets of. vital tactical importance.Such targets were the enemy mechanisedcolumns at Maastricht, Sedan and Boulogne.The machinery for their control must be efficientenough to ensure that aircraft can be despatchedin time.

River Crossing and .Demolitions.64. The skill and speed of the enemy in

crossing water' obstacles was very apparent aswas also the excellence of his equipment for thepurpose. On the other hand, the paramountimportance of demolitions on such obstaclesas a means of imposing even a short delay, wasestablished: during the operations the B.E.F.destroyed over 500 bridges, and there were fewfailures. From the number of demolitionswhich it was found necessary to carry out, it isclear that every engineer unit, no matter whatits normal role, must receive the necessarytraining to execute such work.

Signal Communications.65. During the operations a very heavy strain

was thrown upon the Royal Corps of Signals:not least upon those responsible for the com-munications of G.H.Q. The problem was two-fold : first to provide the normal communica-tions within the force, secondly to provide thelong-distance communications required to enableG.H.Q. to remain in constant touch with FrenchG.Q.G., the War Office and the Royal Air Force.The latter considerations made it necessary tofollow the buried cable, and thus dominatedthe moves of G.H.Q. Communications withinthe B.E.F. demanded mobility and rapidity ofconstruction combined with the need to dealwith a heavy volume of traffic. The frequentmoves, and .the time lag which occurred whencipher had to be used, resulted in a heavydemand on despatch riders.

Traffic Control.66. The vital importance of controlling move-

ment by road was emphasised over and overagain during the operations.

The movements of mechanised columnsdepend for their success on the proper recon-naissance and allotment of roads, the avoidanceof traffic blocks and the power to divert the flowof traffic quickly and without interruptionwhenever an obstacle occurs. The danger ofinterference by enemy bombing is alwayspresent, but it can be minunised by the employ-ment of fighter aircraft, by an adequate layoutof anti-aircraft guns, by the provision of facilitiesfor clearing breakdowns and the repair of roads,and by the training of troops in a proper drill.when attacked from the air.

The movement of refugees, as has beendescribed above, laid a further burden on theProvost service. Though the greatest effortswere made by all ranks to cope with the task, itwas evident that our organisation required con-siderable expansion. Recommendations for the


creation of a road control organisation underthe Quarter-Master-General, on the linos of thatin use in the French Army, had already beensubmitted, but unfortunately too late for morethan preliminary results to be achieved.

Security.67. Akin to the foregoing problem is that of

security/ Until loth May the work of theIntelligence Service in this respect had beenheavy and constant, but when operations began,it 'assumed almost unmanageable proportions.This was due to the opening of the Belgianfrontier, the mass movement of refugees, andthe arrival of enemy saboteurs and agents byparachute/

The troops, however, soon became aware ofthe danger and realised the importance, ofsecurity measures and the paramount need fordiscretion.

Supply and Transport.68. As has been already indicated in this

Despatch, the operations showed clearly howcomplete reliance cannot be placed on any onechannel of movement or maintenance. Enemyaction by mobile forces or by air may putimportant road or railway routes out of actionfor hours or days at a time, or even completelysever communications with the bases.

The proportion of reserves held forward, andunder load, on rail or on lorry, must therefore behigh, despite the resultant extravagance in trans-port. The War Office had provided Lines ofCommunication Railhead Companies, R.A.S.C.,to operate in the event of a railhead being out ofaction for a time, and these units fully justifiedtheir existence.

During the final phases of the operations, thecivilian employees pf the French and Belgianrailways were often not to be found, and theRailway Operating Companies, R.E., had to takeover the working of the trains at short notice.

The change of bases made necessary after20th May was a fine example of quick decision,flexible administration, and the power of theadministrative staffs at home and in France toimprovise at short notice.

The Behaviour of the Troops.69. Most important of all, the Campaign has

proved beyond doubt that the British Soldierhas once again deserved well of his country.The troops under my command, whatever their 'category, displayed those virtues of steadiness,patience, courage and endurance for which theircorps and regiments have.long been famous.

In addition to the fighting troops, the rear-ward units, as well -as the three divisions sent toFrance for pioneer duties, all found themselves,at one time or another, engaged with the enemyalthough often incompletely trained and shortof the proper complement of weapons.

Time and again, the operations proved the.vital importance of the good junior leader, whohas learned to encourage, by his example, themen whom he leads, and whose first care is the.well-being of the troops placed under his com-mand. Firm discipline, physical fitness, efficiencyin marching and digging, and'skill at arms, old-fashioned virtues though they may be, are asimportant in modern warfare as ever they werein -J-hp nact

APPRECIATIONSThe Royal Navy; the Royal Air Force;

Commanders and Staffs

The Royal Navy.70. I have already referred to the embarkation

of the Force from Dunkirk and its transport toEngland which evoked the wholehearted admira-tion of the Army. The operation was carried outin accordance with the finest traditions of theRoyal Navy. The plan involved the use ofhundreds of privately-owned small craft, andwas put into execution at short notice and at atime when Naval resources were severelystrained by demands elsewhere. It was carriedthrough regardless of danger and loss by enemybombing. My deep gratitude is due -to allconcerned, particularly to Vice-Admiral Sir B. H.Ramsay, Vice-Admiral at Dover, Rear-AdmiralW. F. Wake Walker, who superintended the

• actual embarkation and Captain -W. G. Tennant,R.N., the senior naval officer ashore. Nor canthe Army forget the sterling work of all thosemembers of the Merchant Navy and the civilianowners of small craft, in many instancesvolunteers, who unhesitatingly and regardless ofdangers gave their services to the BritishExpeditionary Force.

The Royal Air Force.71. Successful operations on land depend more

than ever before on the closest co-operationbetween aircraft and troops on the ground, andthe B.E.F. owes a deep debt of gratitude to theRoyal Air Force for their work throughout theoperations. Pilots returned to the air again andagain to carry out essential tasks for both Frenchand British Armies, when they were long overduefor rest and sleep.

The embarkation of the Force would havebeen well-nigh impossible but for the fighterprotection afforded. The toll taken* of theenemy aircraft on this and earlier occasions hasonce again established the individual superiorityof the British airman in the air.

I wish specially to record my thanks to Air-Marshal A. S. Barratt (now Sir Arthur Barratt),Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British AirForces in France, and to the Air Officer- Com-manding my Air Component, Air-Vice-MarshalC. H. B. Blount.

Commanders and Staffs.72. The course of operations in May afforded

very unequal opportunities for the severalbranches of the Staff, Services and departmentsto show thek efficiency, and it would, therefore,perhaps, be invidious to deal with their work indetail to a .greater extent than I have alreadydone in this Despatch. Some, however, wererequired with their Staffs to bear a speciallyheavy and prolonged strain of responsibilityand I wish to refer particularly to the valuableservices of my Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-General H. R. Pownall), my Quarter-Master^General (Lieut.-General W. G. Lindsell), and myEngineer-in-Chief (Major-General R. P. Paken-ham Walsh), my Signal Officer-in-Chief (Major-General R. Chenevix-Trench), and my MilitarySecretary (Brigadier Sir Colin Jardine, Bart.).

From the narrative of events, it will be evidenthow great is the debt I owe to the Commanders

*On one day, 77 enemy machines were shot down at'the loss of only 16 of our own.


of my three Corps. Lieut.-Generals Sir AlanBrooke, M. G. H. Barker and Sir Ronald Adam,Bart. The sudden turn of events on iyth Maythrew a violent and unexpected strain on theCommander, Lines of Communication Area (thelate Major-General P. de Fonblanque), and Iwish to record my sincere appreciation of hisgood and devoted work during the time that hewas serving under my command.

Finally, I desire to express my thanks andgood wishes to all those officers in' the' FrenchArmy whose duties brought them into contactwith the British Expeditionary Force, and whosegoodwill, understanding and personal friendshipdid so much to foster the good relations whichexisted between the two armies.

Honours and Awards.73. I am submitting separately the names of

officers and other ranks whom I wish to recom-mend for reward or to bring to your notice forgallant or distinguished service.

I have the honour to beSir,

Your Obedient Servant,

GORT,General,

Commander-in-Chief,British Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX TO SECOND DESPATCH OF C.-IN-C., B.E.F.

OPERATIONS OF IST CORPS FROM 6 P.M.ON 3isT MAY TO MIDNIGHT SND/SED JUNE,

1940

Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander,on taking over command of ist Corps, handedover command of the ist Division to BrigadierM. B. Beckwith-Smith. He then proceeded toDunkirk to see Admiral Abrial, who informedhim that he intended to hold the perimeter tillall the troops were embarked. A French Corpson the right was to hold the sector from Grave-lines to Bergues (Gravelines however had notapparently been in French hands for some days)and a mixed French and British Corps undercommand of Major-General Alexander was tohold a line from Bergues to Les Moeres, andthence to the sea.

Major-General Alexander at once • told theAdmiral and General Fagalde that in his viewthis plan did not take account of the true navaland military situation which was serious anddeteriorating rapidly. The fighting condition ofthe tro'ops was now such that prolonged resist-ance was out of the question and the presentfront could riot in his opinion be maintainedafter.the night ist/2nd June : furthermore theline to be held was so close to the beach and toDunkirk that the enemy might soon stop allfurther evacuation by short range artillery fire.He gave the same opinion to the Secretary ofState and received a reply that the British forceshould be withdrawn as rapidly as possible on abasis of equal numbers of British and Frenchcontinuing to be embarked from that timeonward. This he showed to Admiral Abrialand General Fagalde informing'them that hewould hold the sector allotted to him till mid-night ist/2nd June and then withdraw undercover of darkness. They agreed that in the.circumstances no other plan was feasible.

The naval situation had by now grown worse,and the Channel from Dunkirk was under direct

artillery fire. It was therefore evident that theforce could not be evacuated completely on thenight ist/2nd June. Major-General Alexandertherefore agreed on a modified plan with AdmiralAbrial and General Fagalde at 8 a.m. on ist June.He arranged to hold his present line tillmidnight ist/2nd June; thus he would coverDunkirk and so enable the French to evacuateas many of their troops as possible. He wouldthen withdraw to a bridgehead round Dunkirkwith all available anti-aircraft and anti-tankguns and such troops as had not yet embarked.

During the ist June, heavy enemy attacksdeveloped on the British sector, supported bybombing and artillery fire. The garrison ofBergues (ist Loyals) were forced to withdrawto the line of the canal north of the town, andto the west, 46th Division, i26tH InfantryBrigade of 42nd Division and ist Divisionwere forced back north of the canal for about1,000 yards. 5oth Division had also to meetenemy penetration from the east, but bynightfall on ist June the enemy advance hadbeen checked on a line Bergues-Uxem-Ghyvelde,thence due east to the frontier and along thefrontier defences to the sea.

Embarkation was temporarily stopped at3 a.m. on 2nd June to prevent casualties indaylight; by that time there remained in theDunkirk area about 3,000 men of variousartillery and infantry units, with seven anti-aircraft guns and twelve anti-tank guns. Theyheld the outskirts of Dunkirk throughout

- 2nd June with little interference save heavyshelling and bombing of the beaches.

By midnight on 2nd/3rd June, all the remain-ing British troops had been embarked. Major-General Alexander, with the Senior Naval Officer(Captain W. G. Tennant, R.N.) made a tour ofthe beaches and harbour in a motor boat andon being satisfied that no British troops wereleft on shore, they themselves left for England.

LONDONPRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120, George Street, Edinburgh 2;

39-41 King Street, Manchester 2; i, St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;80, Chichester Street, Belfast;

or through any bookseller.

SUPPLEMENT The London Gazette - ibiblio and the assistance of the French authori-ties the Force was...

Documents

Transcript of SUPPLEMENT The London Gazette - ibiblio and the assistance of the French authori-ties the Force was...