The International Climate Change Regime: The Kyoto Protocol · The Kyoto Protocol International...
Transcript of The International Climate Change Regime: The Kyoto Protocol · The Kyoto Protocol International...
The International
Climate Change Regime:
The Kyoto Protocol
International Climate Change and
Energy Law
Spring semester 2015
Dr. Christina Voigt
UNFCCC
Stronger commitments needed!
…. Art. 17: Protocol necessary (more specific obligations)
Kyoto Protocol - CPI
• Adopted 11.12.1997, Entered into force 16.02.2005,
Members: 192 States and the EU
• Sets quantified emissions limitation and reduction
obligations (QELRO) for Annex-I Parties (37 States)
• Art. 3.1 KP: overall emissions from Annex I Parties
shall be reduced to at least 5% below 1990 levels within
2008-2012 (First Commitment Period)
• Assigned Amounts (Annex B)
• Art. 3.1 KP: Annex I Parties shall not exceed their
Assigned Amounts)
Kyoto Protocol CPII
Amendments to the KP in Decision 1/CMP.8:
– Second commitment period (2013-2020) for KP
Annex-I countries, minus CA (no member), RUS,
NZL, J (no KPII)
– Objective of reducing GHG emisions by at least
18% below 1990 (translation of voluntary pledges
into QUELROs – no strengthening of
commitments), IPCC suggested: range of 25-40%)
15% of global emissions
– Party may «propose an adjustment to decrease»
its QUELRO, review in 2014 – P: link to ADP
– When does it enter into force? (provisional
application/ implementation consistent with
national legislation or domestic processes)
Kyoto Protocol
Countries included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and their emissions targets
Country Target (1990- 2008/2012)
EU-15, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Monaco, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland
-8%
US -7%
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland -6%
Croatia -5%
New Zealand, Russian
Federation, Ukraine 0
Norway +1%
Australia +8%
Iceland +10%
Kyoto Protocol
Countries included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and their emissions targets
Country 2008-2012 2013-2020
EU-15, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Monaco, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland
-8% -20%
US -7% 0
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland -6% -20%
Croatia -5% -20%
New Zealand, Russian
Federation, Ukraine 0 -24%
Norway +1% -16%
Australia +8% - 0,5%
Iceland +10% -20%
Kyoto Protocol
• Rules focus on:
• Commitments: legally binding individual emissions
targets and general commitments
• Implementation: domestic masures and three novel
implementing mechanisms (flexibility mechanisms)
• Minimizing impacts on developing countries
• Accounting, Reporting and Review
• Compliance: Compliance Committee to assess and
deal with problems of non-compliance
The Carbon Market
International Climate Change and
Energy Law
Spring semester 2015
Dr. Christina Voigt
Quiz
1. What does the KP contain and the UNFCCC doesn’t?
2. Which countries have obligations to reduce their GHG emissions under the KP?
3. What is the ADP?
4. Which flexibility mechanisms are set up by the KP?
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Institutional Structure
UNEP/WHO
IPCC
UNFCCC KP
COP, art. 7 CMP, art. 13 KP
SBSTA Art. 9 UNFCCC
SBI Art. 10 CDM EB
Art. 12 KP
JISC Art. 6
Compliance Committee
art. 18 KP
Facilitative Branch
Enforce-ment
Branch
Annex I: OECD + EiT Annex II: OECD Non-Annex: developing countries Groups: EU Umbrella: USA, CAN, NO, AUS, NZ, RF, UK G77 and China (subgroups: AOSIS and LDC, African Group) EIG: Sveits, MX, South Korea OPEC BASIC: Brazil, India, China, South Africa
Secretariat
Art. 8 UNFCC, 14 KP
ADP
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The compliance system of the Kyoto
Protocol
• Three functions
–Fact-finding
–Legal assessment
–Determination of consequences
•Legal basis
–Expert Review Teams (KP art. 8)
–Non-compliance procedure (KP art. 18)
Dec. 24/CP.7 (Marrakesh Accords)
Dec. 27/CMP.1
Rules of Procedure (Dec. 4/CMP.2 revidert Dec.
4/CMP. 4)
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Decision of the Compliance
Committee
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15
XI. Appeals
1. The Party in respect of which a final decision has been taken may appeal to
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the
Protocol against a decision of the enforcement branch relating to Article 3,
paragraph 1, of the Protocol if that Party believes it has been denied due
process.
2. The appeal shall be lodged with the secretariat within 45 days after the Party
has been informed of the decision of the enforcement branch. The Conference
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol shall
consider the appeal at its first session after the lodging of the appeal.
3. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the
Protocol may agree by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and
voting at the meeting to override the decision of the enforcement branch, in
which event the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to the Protocol shall refer the matter of the appeal back to the enforcement
branch.
4. The decision of the enforcement branch shall stand pending the decision on
appeal. It shall become definitive if, after 45 days, no appeal has been made
against it. the Protocol shall consider the appeal at its first session after the
lodging of the appeal.
Flexibility Mechanisms
• Geographic location of abatement measures is
climatically irrelevant
• Aim: global cost-effectiveness and reduction of
compliance costs
• Assigned amounts (AU) can be divided up into units
(Assigned Amount Units – AAUs) allowing Annex I
Parties (37 + EU) to participate in the flexibility
mechanisms
• Units create a tradable currency (1 unit= 1 t CO2 eqv.)
Flexibility Mechanisms
4 Types of Mechanisms:
• International Emissions Trading, Art. 17 (allows for
trade with AAUs, ERUs, CERs)
•Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Art. 12
• Resulting in Certified Emissions Reductions – CERs
• Non-Annex I/ Annex I Projects
• Joint Implementation (Art. 6)
•Resulting in Emission Reduction Units – ERUs
•Annex I /Annex I Projects
•Joint Fulfillment of Commitment (Art. 4)
Kyoto Protocol: Flexibility Mechanisms
Eligibility Requirements:
• Annex I Party
• Ratification of KP
• Compliance
• Methodological and reporting infrastructure in place
• Establishment of designated national entities and registries
• Inventories for accounting the tradable units
Supplementarity
• Art. 17, Art. 12.3(b), Art. 6.1 (d) Kyoto Protocol
• Marrakesh Accords: (Decision 15/CP.7)
“The Conference of the Parties: ...
Affirming that the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1.”
(15/CP.7, preamble)
19
20
21
AUS ETS
(1.1.2012)
L (Lithuania)
Annex-I
China Non-Annex I
NOK 40
10 mil kvoter
= 400 mil NOK
ERUs
NOK 20
10 mil CERs
40 mil NOK
10 mil ERUs
200 mil NOK
CERs
NOK 4
20 mil t CO2
8 Mrd NOK
IET
N (Norge)
Annex I
International
Emissions Trading
Art. 17,
3.10, 3.11 KP
Joint Implementation
Art. 6 KP
Clean Development
Mechanism
Art. 12 KP
USA:
Federal?
WCI
RGGI
(2012)
EU ETS
Siden 2005
NZ ETS
2010
The Global Carbon Market
Others?
Japan
South Korea
China