he Fluman Person

r]J'rr,.. Vatican II, a significantly broadconsensus in moral^theologi-

cal literature suggests that the human person is the most appropriate point of

departure for elaborati"g ;" int *t"ttit'g of morality in general and for

providing the fundament?l criteria which u" tttttt"ty for dealing u'ith spe-

cific moral questions. &;;;;;, the human has always been taken seriously

in Roman Catholic -otl intotogy because-' for Catholics' to take the human

seriously is to take ,.ti;;tly th;"'""to' God who became incarnate in the

humanity of Jesus. H;;;;' 'ht tt'ott striking.feature about the-reneu'al in

moral theology since int to"I1tit is the notice-able shift from using the lan-

orrrrre of "human nature" to that of the "human person'"suaB;;1sHii."rf;;

proloundly the rvay the human person serves as rhe

criterion for determinit[ p'optt moral behavior' For example' from its per-

spective on human .,""?t'*tiitn emph-asized the natural tendencies of com-

mon bodily ,,.rr.,,.tt' l"a f"t"tio"'' Catholic moral thinking derived abso-

lute, univers"l ,to.-'' M;;lly righractions,were those which were done in

accord with the ,t*uoi "t'Joi t'ih f"t"lty' The moral absolutes in Catholic

sexual ethics, for example, are determined on this basis'" - -

it . shiit to the human person, ho$,ever, has allowed a movement a\\/ay

from basing .no."t .otttlt"io't' ot the finality of bodily strucrul:::and func-

rions taken i.,a.p.rla.t'ily olttre totality 9f.1he

persln A personalistic founda-

tion for morality *"''f il;;tit Sttond Vatican Council inGaudiun et Spes'

especially in Part I. d;;;tnalistic criterion was employed in Part II of that

document when dealing with i"ssues pertaining to marriage and the tamily:

Thereforewhenthereisaquestionofharmonizingconjugallor'ewith the ,.rpot"iblt t"t"tni"iott of life' the moral aspect of anr

procedure . . . ttt"tt be determined by obiective.standards' These'

based on the nature of the human Person and his acts ' (n' 51)'

63

GI Rewon Informed BY I'aith

l,otris .f rtrrsscns, who has studicd thc official commentary of Gaudiu.m et Spes'

fi,,,l, ,i.,,,r this expression applies to the entire dornain of human activity, ancl

11.t jrrsl t. sexuai activity.'Also, this

'rinciple is affirmed by the expression

rlt;rr "ltrrrlrl'r activity must be iudge<1 insofar as it refers to the human person

intt'glally and adeqlatelv consideicd."r In other words, in personalistic mo-

r aliry thc human p".ro., adequately considered is the criterion for discovering

rvlrt't ltcr :rn act is morally right.'l'5is chapter .orrrii".i the anthropological basis of pers.nalistic moral-

ity. It begins *ith ,tt. theological fonn'datiJn-s by presenting. an understand-

irig of th"e human person as the image of God' Its second section briefly

tlc"scribes the fundamental dimensiorrr-of ",h. human Person adequately con-

sidcred": a relational being, an embodied subiect, an historical. be,lng' and -1

lrcing fundamentally .qr.tr'l .o others but-lniq9cly original'. Finally' it will

briefl'y state the p.rro.r"litti. criterion which is to be applied in making a

moral fudgment about human acts.

Image of God

To say that the Person adequately considered is the norm of morality

docs not dethrone God and raise the human person to the level of supreme

valuc. God remains supreme, the ultimate center of value' In fact, the biblical

rvirness to rhe -yr,.iy of creation provides the theological foundation for

rrnclcrsranding th! ultimate place of God and human life as a reflection of

()<xl. The st6ry of crearion tells us that at the summit of creation stands

woman and man, made in God's image (Gn l:26-27)' Through the motif of

tlrc image of God (cf. Ps 8:5; Wis 2:23; I Cor 11:7; Jas 3:9)' the Bible

uigurorriy affirms the sacredness or dignity of every Person prior to any

human achievemenr. The Catholic tradiiion, as reflected for example in the

Vatican Declaration on Abortion (n. 5) and in the pastoral letter EconomicJustice

|ilrAtt(n.32'79),hasbaseditsclaimsforfundamentalhumandignityandhrrrn:rn rights on this theological foundation'

'l'n ,lry that the human"person is the "image of God" is first.a theological

slittcment -before

it is an anthropological one. This means that it says some-

rlting about the relation beru,een God and us which has implications for what

ir ,rr'i.rns to be human. For example, one thing it says is that God has so

cstrrlrlishcd a relationship with .tt fh.t the human Person cannot be properly

rr'tlc'sr..d apart from iod. God sustains this relationship by divine faithful-

rrt.ss unrl loue. As long as Gocl offers divine love (i.e., grace), humans will ever

rt.rrrlrirr ()<xl's image- and enioy a sacred dignity whether- in sin or not,

u,lrt.rlrt:r rrcting hurianly or not.'The biblical truth about the human person is

tlr:rt lx'ing thc image of God is irreversible'As :rn rrptl-rroiological statementr "image of God" saYs that u'e all share

'I'he Human Person

in a common human condition u,hich has a common end, namelv Ciod. lt also

says that human clignity does not dcpend ultimately on human achievements,

but on divine love. We have u'itnessed the moral implications of this inarguments against abortion, in del-ense of care for handicapped nerylyrrns,and in reflection on issues of economic and social justice for all regaldlctrs ofrace or hrrman attributes.

-'-' | - " (,

Further implications of the image of God motif for a personalistic moral-ity can be drawn out of elaborations of the central symbols for God in the

Christian faith. For example, the root svmbol of God is "God is love" (l Jn4:8 and 16), i.e., God is the one who is perfectly self-giving. This claim leads

to the Trinity which is the theological code word for the freedom and totalityof God's self-giving. It means that God is eternally the giver or lover (Father),

the receiver or beloved (Son), and the gift or love u'hich binds them together(Spirit). When God expresses divine love outside the Trinity, nature colnes

into being, with the human Person being the point at which nature reaches

self-consciousness.As Michael and Kenneth Himes have shown, our understanding of the

triune nature of God (both the immanent and the economic Trinity) can shed

light on the true meaning of being human. For example, by putting this great

symbol of the Christian tradition into dialogue with the economic and ethicalthemes of the pastoral Ietter, Econornic Justice for All, they point out that

if God is triune, if God is the perfect relationship of the love and the

beloved and the love which unites them, then to maintain that the

human being is created in the image of God is to proclaim the

human being capable of self-gift. The human person is the point at

which creation is able to acknowledge gratefully the divine self-giftand to respond by giving oneself in return.2

Likewise, the trinitarian doctrine implies a communitarian understand-ing of being human. The trinitarian vision sees that no one exists by oneself,

but only in relationship to others. To be is to be in relationship. -l'he individ-ual and the community co-exist. Humanity and relatedness are ProPortionalso that the deeper one's participation in relationships is, the more human one

becomes. Since community is necessary to grow in God's image, the funda-

mental responsibility of being the image of God and for living in conrmunityis to give oneself away as completely as possible in imitation of God's self-

giving. The freedom which humans need for living morally is the freeclom to

give themselves more completell'. A deeper particiPation in the human com-

munity enhances the humanity of each person while the failure to establish

community diminishes the humanity of all. r

From tl-ris trinitarian r,ision of thc human person as the image of God u'e

65

66 Reason Infonned BY Faith

crtn sce that the tunclarnental clynamic of a personalistic morality is the dy-

narnic of receivinq and giving lovc' Thc Johannine version of tire great com-

nrandment captuies it &".tt"y, "As I haie lovc'd vou' so -vou 1Ys::love one

another" (Jn 13:34). We first receive love and then "'" to iou" in imitation of

tl'rc love u'e have be"r, giuen. It is like the basic rhythm <lf life-breathing in

and breathing out. wf,; .i,rt.t paft of this dynamic m-oveTelt ceases' life

cnds. The trinitarian ,iri." "iifrJ

person tells us that to be the image of God

is not only a gift but ,tro " r.rpo,tsibility' The moral life lived out of the

image of God not o"ff t.;oi..t'i., *h't"o"e has received as gift' but also

proitir., to use these gifts wetl in communion with others'

This theologi.d ti;i;" ;f ,ht Person lrelps us to see that our fundamental

relationship to God g;;6;"t;ti it'-"d ttr-rough the wa1's,we ":1"* -glf-::

"nd enhrnce the giftJdness of others' To be the image of God is an rmperattve

calling us to live o,r, oiitt" fullness of the gifts we have received by moving

outofourselvesandintotheworldofourrelationships.To^withdrawinto;;;t;it;;; ; horra o.t, gir,s, and to cut off the dynamic of receiving and

ili"g love by r"f,r.i.rg tJgift another is to abort our gifts and to mock God'

?i i. ,1", ,;mity put. Iiden"ies the sort of self-giving..-.hitl being the t*iq: "jGod demands, and it blocks the movement toward Iiving fully in communron

withGodandothers.ThejudgmentparablewhichJesustoldof.thetalentsgiven to the three servants i., Nl"ttht- 25:14_10 is a pou'erful indictment of

this kind of life.A personalistic morality with th-eological foundations in the image of

God asks: Have we accepted our gifts, and how u'ell do we use them to

contribute to positive, 1;g.'-giui"g reiationships and to the development of the

human environment? In otf,er .^ro.dr, the m'ral implications of the trinitarian

vision of the human p.rron as the image of God have to do with the quality of

our relationships and *irh f,o- ot" "tiot" build up or destroy the network of

relationships which make up human life'

The Person AdequatelY Considered

ThehumanPerson..adequatelyconsidered''isthepersonasunderstoodbyr"rro.,informedbyfaith'Thebiblicaltruthabouthumanitybeingtheir|,rg. of God is the clnviction of faith which informs reason's grasp of the

h.rJ.. person' If v'e are irreversibly the image of God' then u'e. are so in the

totality of our personalities arrd noi iust in certain aspects, such a.s intellect

,rra *itt. so ail the fundamental dimensions r,r'hich constitute the person

;:irrt"g..[y and adequatell, considered" participate in the human person's

imaging God.Inthissection,Iamcleeplyindebtedtotheu'orku'hichLouisJanssens

has done to elaborate th. .o.t..pt of the person adequatelv considered' He

The lluman Person

based his analysis on the teaching tif Vatican [], especialh' Gau.dium et Spes.a

I-Ie says, in brief, that tl-re human person is aclequately considered u'hcn taken

as an historical subject in corporeality u,ho stands in relation to the rvclrld' to

other persons, to social structures, and to God, and u'htl is a unique original-

ity u'ithin the context of being fundamentally equal with all other Persons.To say that these dimensions constitute an "integral and adequate" consider-

ation of the person means that the human person is alu'ays, and at the same

time, every one of these dimensions interacting to form a slrnthesis which isthe integral human person. My separating them here is purelv fbr purposes ofdiscussion. Since Janssens does not claim a hierarchy for these dimensions, Iwill present them in a manner slightly different from his own by organizingthem under four maior groups: a relational being, an embodied subiect, an

historical being, and a being fundamentally equal to others but uniquely

original.

A Relational Being

The trinitarian vision of God in its implications for humanity under-

scores very clearly the relational dimension of being human. Human exis-

tence does not precede relationship, but is born of relationship and nurtured

by it. To be a human person is to be essentially directed toroard others. We tecommunal at our core. The image of being human in the creation storv is a

communal one: "And now we u'ill make human beings; thev will be like us

and resemble us. . . Male and female, God created them" (Gn l:26-27).Personal existence, then, can never be Seen as an "1" in isolatiOn, but alu'ays

as "I" and "you" in relationship.The significance of being directed torvard others has wide-ranging moral

implications. In medical moral matters, for instance, it has implications foruoih ludging the appropriareness of using life-sustaining treatments and for

determining death. If someone's capacity for relationships, i.e., one's capac-

ity to receive love and to give love, never develops (as in the case of the

anencephalic fetus) or is irreversibly lost (as in the case of those in a chronic

vegerative state) can we say that he or she enioys human life in srrch a

personal way that it ought to be sustained at all costs? An awareness of iusticealso shows us that personal existence is a shared existence. Through inter-dependence we discover that we bear mutual responsibilities. Our prrrsuit ofindividual ends can be justified onlv to the extent that u'e resPect the patterns

of inter-dependence which make up our relational selves. From the point ofvieu' of justice, then, we need to ask u'hether our moral choices and actions

detract from the value of true community or promote the kind of self-giving

which sustains the well-being of life together.

As relational, social beings, human Persons need /a liae in social groups

67

Reason Informed B.Y Faith68

witb appropriate structilres u'hich sustain human dignitv ancl the comrnon good'

-rt "

*"r^r significance of this aspect of being hrrrnan is that \\'e must resPect

,fr.-f"*, ani institutions of socicty u'hich promote cornrlurlal living and

rrohold the common good. But \\1e must be careful not to absolutize any one

.,l,"rrr firrm. The ieed for social structurcs demands that struct*res be

rener.l,ed, and at times revisecl, according to changing circumstances and the

grorving demands of hurnan dignity' For example, slavery \\/as once an ac-

i.p,"a iocial institution in biblLal times as well as in the formati'e years of

this country; however, it is no krnger accepted because the sense of what

human dignity demands could not.uppott it' Likewise, many today find the

ir*, fruoiing capital punishment to b. ttttpttt in light of new structures of

lau. enforcement as well as a heightened sense of the respect due the dignity

of human life. The moral significance of living with appropriate structures in

social groups is that in maiittg moral choices, we need to ask u'hether our

actions"wili preserve o. .r.rd..rii.re the basic structures (such as marriage and

the family) *hi.h *. need in order to safeguard and promote human well-

being."The relational dimension of being human reaches its high point in our

relationship to Godin faith, hope, andlove' Each PerTl has eternal signifi-

cance and worrh. The moral i..rpo.t of this aspect of the person is that all

relationships must find their source and fulfillment in God. After all, the

fundamenial conviction of our faith is that human life is fulfilled in knowing,

loving, and serving God in communion with others'

An Embodied Subiect

To speak of the human Person as a subject is to say that the person is in

char$€ of hi, o. her own life. That is, the person is a moral agent with a

certain degree of autonomy and self-determination empowered to-act accord-

ing to his"or her conscience, in freedom, and u,ith kno$'ledge. The catholic

,."'di,ion has been clear that we cannot speak of morality in anv true sense

apart from human persons who are able io act knowinglv and u'illingly (cf'

Sf. I-II, prologue).The gr"atloral implication of the person as subiect is that no one may

ever use ihurn"r, p.rru.t as an obfect or as a means to an end the rvav we do

other things of the world. Every right entails a duty, and the rights that

belong ,o ih" p.rron as subiect entail the duty of demanding respect for them'

And so we must respect the other as an autonomous agent capable of acting

u,ith the freedom of an inforryed conscience. Exploitation of human Persons

for one's own advantage is never allou'ed. we show respect for the hurnan

person as a subiect b/guaranteeing that he or she can act on the basis of a

'I'he Iluman Person

clulv infbrnrecl ancl free conscience. Sincc the inptlrtancc ri'hich thc (latholic

traclition has gir,en to the person as moral sullject requires morc attention, thc

sulrsequent chaptcrs on freeclonr anti knou'lcdgc, sin, and cousciencc u'illexplore this aspcct at greater length.

Tcr speak of the human Person as 'an embndiel subiect is t<l use a morc

unitivc cxpression than thc farniliar one r.ri "txdy anc'l soul," the (]reek ver-

sion of this aspect of being human. "F.mboclied subiect" inlplies tlrat <tur

bodies are not accessories. Thet, are not merely sornething rt'e hal'e to house

our subjectivity, but are essential to our being integrated Persons. We cxpress

ourselves as the image of God through our bodies. What concerns the body

inevitably concerns the whole person, for our bodies are essential to being

human and to relating in human ways. The fact that u,e have bodies affects

every expression of ourselves in relationship. The affection of love, for exam-

ple, needs to be expressed in bodily ways, such as through a gift, or a kiss, or

an embrace, or sexual intercourse. God so krved us as to come to us in bodilyform so that u,e could know divine love in the only rvay humans can knou'

it-in an embodied form.The fact that we have bodies and cannot enrer inro relationships apart

from them entails a number of moral demands. Since our bodies are svmbols

of interiority, bodily expressions of love in a relationship ought to be propor-tionate to the nature of the commitment bettveen persons. Alscl, boclilr'exis-tence means that we must take seriousll' the limits and potential of the

biological order. Since the body is subiect to the lau's of the material t-orld,we must take these lau,s into account in the way we treat our bodies. \\'e are

not free to intervene in the body in any way we want. For example, to flood

the blood system with toxic drugs means to so damage the body as to killourselves. To relate u'ell to others we must take care of our bodily health and

respect bodily integrity. Bodily existence also means that we must accept our

genetic endowment u'hich sets the baseline for certain possibilities and limita-rions ro our phvsical, intellectual, and psychological capacities. We have the

moral responsibility to live u'ell within these limits and not to push otrrselves

to become or to do what our genotyPes, taken together u'ith our environ-

ment, would not support.As body persons we are a part of the naterial world. To be a part of the

marerial world holds both great potential and serious limitation. 1-he poten-

tial is that, created in God's image v,ith the mandate to bring the earth under

human control, we can act as co-agcnts ir ith God to make the u'orlj a

continuously more livable place. The developments of sciencc and technol-

ogy are certainly helping us to do that. But human creations are ambiquous.

Herein lies the serious limitation. The very' products which help us to im-prove communication, production, and prosperitv can be detrimental to our

69

70 Reasox Informed lly Faitlt

corporeality and communalitv bv entailing negative effects such as trafficcongestion, air, u,ater, and noise pollution, land erosion, and the accttmuia-tion of toxic waste. I-ikcu'ise, the \,ery techniques which are being developed

in the life sciences to benefit the human community, such as developments in

reprocluctive technology' and genetic engineering, can easily be extended to

produce disturbing results for the wholeness of societv and the common

good. Being part of the material world requires moral agents to consider the

negative effects necessarily entailed in the positive discoveries of technologvand to weigh their moral importance.

An Historical Subiect

An embodied spirit is necessarily an historical subiect. While the spiritenables us to become more than ourselves, our bodies anchor us in the here

and now" To be an historical subject, then, means to be relentlessly temporal,

seizing each opportunity of the present moment as Part of a progressivemovement toward our full human development. Much of spiritual theologytoday has capitalized on this characteristic of the person by using the meta-

phors of Iife as a journey and of each person as a pilgrim made to rest only inGod. Narrative theologv, too, reflects on the temporality of human existence

when it talks about the "narrative quality of experience, "r i. e. , every momentof iife is in tension with the past and the future. When we integrate our Pastinto the person we are becoming we move into the future not only with a

sense of integrity but also u'ith a coherent sense of direction.The moral imperative of being an historical subiect is to integrate the

past into the person we are becoming so as to shape a future rather than tosettle into a static condition. The moral significance of the personal historicalprocess is that one's moral responsibility is proportionate to his or her capaci-

ties at each stage of development. We must be careful to regard moral culpa-bility for behavior relative to each stage of development. Also, the actions ofhistorical subjects have their full moral meaning only when considered inrelationship to the total context u'hich includes the future consequences.

Just as persons develop and change, so do cultures. Progress or regress is

always possible and the elaboration of new values is never ending. As neu'possibilities open up to us through science and technology (such as artificialmeans of reproduction) and as ne\\r values emerge (such as a new appreciationfor the relational meaning of sexuality), we must constantly discern and orderlau,'s and values which rvill enrich human dignity. As historical subjects, ourmoral reflection must be as dynamic as the human life which it intends t<r

guide. As we acquire ne\\' potential and elaborate netl' t'alues, we need todiscover appropriate \\/ays to integrate them into our uniquely individual butr'onrrnonlv shared I ives.

Tl:e Human Person

L'undamentally Equal butLlnique\ Ariginal

The dimensions of being human considerecl tl'rus f ar afhrm a frndatncntalequality among human persons. Iiquality allor.vs us to takc an intcrcst ineverything that is human and to understand the moral obligations u'hichinform our common humanity. Flou'ever, human persons are sufficientlydiverse so that u.'e must also taken into account the originalitl, and unitlueness ofeach person. This means that while everyone shares cgrtain common featuresof humanity, each one does so differently and to different degrees.

James M. Gustafson has analyzed a person's unique moral characteraccording to the uncontrollable and the somervhat controllable features.6 Thefertures of ourselves over r.lhich we have no conlrol in esrablishing ouruniqueness are our genetic endou'ment, our unconscious motives, and the

social-cultural conditioning to which we have been subjected in the process ofgrowing up.

Beyond these uncontrollable features are those over u hich lr'e do havesome control. One of these features is our beliefs, or stable convictions,which give direction and meaning to our lives. The extent to u,hich ourbeliefs influence the originality of our lives depends not only on u'hat beliefswe hold but also on how intensell, u'e hold them. The perspective, or point ofview, from which we look on the u'orld also accounts for originalitr'. Whatwe think is important and how we respond to it are inlluenced b1' the \\'ay $/e

see it. Also, dispositions, or a readiness to act in a certain wa1', mark ourunique character. Affections, or sensitivities, influence the depth and swift-ness of our moral responses. Finally, our intention, or the basic direction ofour actions governed by our knou'ledge and freedom, puts the distinctivemark of personal style on what we do.

In each of us, these leatures are all interrelated through the imaginarion.Understood in its deepest sense, the imagination is not merely a capacity forfrivolity in an otherwise serious u'orld; rather, the imagination is the capacityto construct a world. By means of the imagination u'e brinq together diverseexperiences into a meaningful u'hole. Influenced by the philosophy of PaulRicoeur, Philip Keane describes the imagination in his studr', Cbristian Ethics

and tbe lrnagination,

as the basic process by which u'e drau' together the concrete and theuniversal elements of our human experience. With imagination u'elet go of any inadequately pre-conceived notions ofhori. the abstractand the concrete relate to one another. We suspend iudgment abouthow to unite the concrete and the abstract. We let the tu'o sides ofour knowing play with one another. By allowing this interplav

7t

Reason Infonned BY Faith72

between the tu'o asPccts of our knowing, we ge-t.a much deeper

chance to look at rvhat u'e know, to form a vision of it'7

Wlrenwe..getthepicture''throughtheimaginativeprocesswecometorrn image which"puts together diVerse beliefs and experiences_so that \ve can

,,nd"rsia.r.i -h"i is goiig on and relate to it appropriatelv. When religious

lrcliefs, for example,*".."p"r, of the imaginative process, they enter into the

conrent of what *. ."p.ii..rce and contribute toward connecting the manv

tlirnensions of experience with the values entailed in those beliefs. This gives

,,r r dirtlrl.tively religious "picture" of the world and a wav of responding to

it such as we explored in the last chapter'

Since *" ^."

guided and formed by the images which give us a "picture"

ol- the world, the imagination sets the directitn and limits of our moral

llcSavior. The imaginat-ion informs what we think, what we see' the way we

fcel, our readinessio act, and the direction of our actions. It gives a definite-

llcss to our characters in such a way that when our master images change, we

,,r. ,ig.rifi.a.ttly changed. Since this is so, we find a clue to ourselves through

rhc m-aster i.n^ge, of ihe imagination' They help us to organize our lives and

irr{lrrence our rnoral arguments. choices' and actions'

A person's ,tniqu! identity within the fundamental equality of a commu-

nity of persons has profouncl moral implications' especially for giving pasto-

r.rrl'guidance. Becauie each person embodies the common features of human-

ity iiiffer.rrtly, we canno, .*p.., nvo people to respond-to the same situation

i,r rhc same way. They ,r" simply not capable of it' One's moral character

,.'t, th. ,".tg" oi porsibllities fot ttiiott' Eaih person's capacity is limited both

l,y the .r.r.5.trroil"ble givens and by.the somewhat controllable givens inte-

gi'.t"a by one's moral"imagination. Even though -: *1y all.,appeal to the

srrnc objective norms in rela'tion to the same issue, each of us will only be able

lo live uP to the norm and respond .t-o--lht issue according to his or her

cupacity.^A person's sublective responsibility for-moral behavior is relative to

itr" a"ultop*ent of that i..so."t moral capaci'y' fo one can be held responsi-

lrlc lor doing what is be1'en6 his or her power to do"

In a pisto.al ,ettirig, then, the ad"ite of Bernard Hnring reflecting the

u,isrl'm oi S,. ,{prro.rr,i, Lig.rn.i is sound, "One should never try to impose

u,lrur the other person cannot"sincerely internalize, except the case ofprevent-

itrg grave iniuitice tou'ard a third person'"8 We can only hold a Person

sccourrtable for what is relative to that person's capacity. A-p.er.son is only

,.,.,,,tty culpable for failing to do rr,,hat tre or she is capable of doing. There-

lr',c, since each person', -r.tio.r,

remain subiect to iustification in light of

,lrjt.ctivc moral ntrms, the demands of the situation, and one's capacity, we

,',rr'r cxpcct to find some differences betu'een what a moral situation demands

,,1 ,,rtclrcrson and what it demands of another'

Tfu Human Persort 71

[-he Personalistic Criterion

These then are climcnsions of the human Person adequatelv considcred'

Wtren taken together in an integrated u'ar-, thcy fcrrn'r thc foundation of a

personalistic mirality. l,ouis Janssens has used these cssential dirnensirlns of

,h. hl.,,-,,rr,-, pcrson to form this criterion: an action is morally rigbt if it is

bcneficial to the person adequately considered in himself or herself (i e '' as an

unique, emboclied spiri$ and in his or her relations (i.e.' to others, tti social

.r.u.r.,."r, to tht: material world, and to God).e For Janssens this is an

obiective criterion since it is based on the constant dimensions of being

human. But since it is a criterion about the human Person as an historical

being, it requires a regular review of the possibilities we have available to

p.o.inr" the human p".ron so that \\'c can determine whether they truly do

,n. Jr,l.r"rm r".ogrrires that the application of this criterion is not easy. To

use"it in a *or"ll-y responsible u,ay requires u,isdom-the special gift of the

morally goo<1 peison who has an affinitv for u'hat is right and whose iudg-ment i; iirpir.a by a morally good disposition, an attitude u'hich is ready to

place our activitv as much as possible at the service of the human person

adequately considered. ro

Conclusion

As we try to understand the human person adequately, u'e .may

better

appreciate the great advantage of the language of "human Person" over "hu-

man nature" t6 express the anthropological foundations of morality. The

advantage to "human nature" is that it underscores what is common to all' Its

great di.lsadvantage, however, is that it does not adequatelv express one's

iundamental orifinality. The language of "human pelso,n, by contrast, is

more adequa,. 6"."n.. it caPtures the uniqueness of the person u'ithout

abandoning those features of the common human condition and the moral

demands founded uPon them.A view of the iruman person such as the one presented here challenges

Roman Catholic theology to integrate empirical evidence into its moral assess-

ments. Moral theology f.o* a personalistic perspective must take into ac-

count the experienceJ of people over time in order to determine what sorts of

activities beit serve the peison adequatelv considered. As a result' moral

theology must include noi only deductive but also inductive methods in order

to take-human experience seriously. An inductive approach rvill yield reliable

though tentative conclusions oPen to revision. \ew historical erperience and

new"euidence u,ill emerge to reinforce a position already held or to call it into

question and ask that it be reformulated or rescinded if necessary.

Even though each of the features of the human Person treated above can

be given rrr.,.L,.-gr""r.r elaboration in order to develop the anthropological

74 Reason Inf'onned BY f'uith

foundations of a personalistic mtirality of responsibilitv, I u'ill fiicus in thc

ncxt chaptcr only on those u,hich the (,atholic tradition has macle the irldis-

pensable features of thc. nroral subtect: knou'ledgc ancl freeclom. Iior u'itllout

ih.r. *" c'lo not have rrue ntortlity at all. 'I-he subscquent chaPters on sin and

conscience u'ill then consider the person e\)en rlore adequately in the light of

faith and grace.

Notes

l. Louis Janssens, "Artificial lnsemination: Ethical considerations,"

Louvain Studies 8 (Spring 1980): 4.

2. Michael 1. Him.s and Kenneth R' Himes, "Rights, Economics, and

the Trinity," Commonttseal 113 (March 14, 1986): 139'

3. Ibid., pp. 139-140.4. t ouis Janssens explored these dimensions in a preliminary way in

his ,,Personalisr Morals," Loutsain studies 3 (Spring 1970): 5-16. His most

worked out version is in the methodological introduction to his treatment ofartificial insemination, "Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations," L\u-

vainStudies 8 (Spring 1980): 5-13.5. The e*pr"ision is from Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Qualitv of

Iixperience," Journal of the American Acadenty of Religion 39 (197 l): 2^91-311.

6. For this analysis of Gustafson's, see l-is can Ethics Be cl:ristian?

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. :2*47 '

z. enitlp S. Keane, Christian Ethics an.d the Imaginatioz (Ramsey: Paulist

Press, 1984), p. 81. some of the influential material from Paul Ricoeur are..The Metaphorical Process as cognition, Imagination, and Feeling," criticalInquiry 5 (f978), pp. 143-159; aIso, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed.

.rrd ti".rt. by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

198 l).8. Bernard Haring, Free and Faithful in Christ, Vol. 1: General Moral

't'heologl (New York: Seabury Press, 1978), p. 289.

9. 1r.ttt.ttt, "Artificial Insemination: L,thical Considerations," I'ouaain

Studizs 8 (Spring 1980): ll.10. Ibid.,pp. l4-15.