More unfinished business: the Falklands/Malvinas, maritime claims, and the spectreof oil in the South AtlanticOver a quarter of a century ago, the Oxford geographer John W House (1983) wroteabout `unfinished business in the South Atlantic' and identified four themes that struckhim as germane in the aftermath of a short conflict between Argentina and Britainover the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The four were as follows: a conflict over territorialsovereignty, a problem of decolonisation, the right to self-determination, and the settle-ment of international disputes (page 233). In a map of the South Atlantic and Antarcticregion, the overlapping claims to the Antarctic Peninsula and surrounding islands, suchas South Georgia, are helpfully laid out and remind readers that this dispute overthe Falklands/Malvinas should never be seen in isolation from the disputed territoriesof the South Atlantic. What is strikingwhen compared with some maps recentlyprepared by the International Boundaries Research Unit at Durham Universityisthe limited attention given to maritime boundaries and the implications therein forresource exploitation (see figures 1 and 2).

Commentary

Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2010, volume 28, pages 571 ^ 580

doi:10.1068/d2804cm

Claimed as Argentina exclusive economic zone

Area beyond 200 nm covered by Argentina submission to the United Nations Commissionon the Limits of the Continental Shelf

Area within 200 nm of Antarctic territory claimed by Argentina

`Special Area' for coordinated Argentina ^ UK hydrocarbon activities (1995 ^ 2007)

Polar stereographic projection

0 400 at 608S

nautical miles (nm)

Figure 1. Argentine maritime claims over the South Atlantic and Antartic (source: reproducedwith kind permission of Martin Pratt at the International Boundaries Research Unit, DurhamUniversity).

As these maps suggest, islands such as the Falklands/Malvinas, South Georgia, andothers such as Shag Rocks(1) have a capacity to generate not only exclusive economiczones but also additional outer continental shelves. The end result is to extend sovereignrights over millions of square kilometres of ocean floor and the water column.

This apparent lacuna on the part of House is entirely understandable, however. Inpart, it is simply a matter of timing. The key reference point is the 1982 Law of the SeaConvention (LOSC), which was formally signed in December of that year and enteredinto force in 1994. By the time Martin Glassner was penning an expansive review forPolitical Geography Quarterly in 1991 on `the frontiers of the earth' it was becomingmore routine, at least in geography, to consider the implications that followed for thechanging legal and political geographies of the oceans (Glassner, 1991). The LOSC,especially Article 76, has recently enjoyed considerable public scrutiny in the aftermathof the 2007 Arktika expedition, which culminated visually at least with the planting ofthe flag at the bottom of the central Arctic Ocean (Dodds, 2009; 2010). While someobservers were critical of this expedition for its alleged `land-grabbing antics', theexpedition itself was motivated not only by the International Polar Year (2007 ^ 09)but also in lieu of the demands placed on coastal states by the LOSC (ie Article 76)to submit relevant geological and hydrographic materials to the Commission on the

Polar stereographic projection

0 400 at 608S

nautical miles (nm)

Claimed as UK exclusive economic zone (South Georgia/South Sandwich Islands)/fishery conservation zone and designated area (Falkland Islands)Area beyond 200 nm covered by UK submission to the United Nations Commissionon the Limits of the Continental Shelf

Areas of potential UK EEZ within 200 nm of Antarctic territory

`Special Area' for coordinated Argentina ^ UK hydrocarbon activities (1995 ^ 2007)

Figure 2. British maritime claims over the South Atlantic and Antartic (source: reproducedwith kind permission of Martin Pratt at the International Boundaries Research Unit, DurhamUniversity).

(1) Argentina and Britain have an outstanding dispute concerning whether these rocks have acapacity to generate maritime zones beyond the territorial sea (see Charney, 1999, more generally).

572 Commentary

Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The latter, in turn, issues a `recommendation'after carefully considering the evidence for whether a claim can be made for anextended or outer continental shelf. Such a c`laim' matters in the sense that, if accepted,a coastal state can accrue further sovereign rights to resources on the seabed (Elferink,2006).

This context is entirely relevant to a recent public spat between Britain andArgentina over the arrival of an oil rig (Ocean Guardian) from Scotland to watersnorth of the Falkland Islands (see figure 3).

The rig will be drilling in, at least, six different areas and in so doing revivinginterest and, indeed, anger in Argentina over the prospect of the waters surroundingthe disputed islands being further exploited for commercial benefit. We say `further'because, of course, the creation of a fisheries zone in 1986/87 was critical in trans-forming the post-1982 Falklands economy, previously dependent on the production ofwool, into one of the wealthiest communities per capita in the South American region.A fishing-licensing regime, especially directed towards the exploitation of squid,generated millions of pounds in revenue and allowed for a new wave of infrastructuralinvestment and governance reform (Dodds, 2009; Dodds and Manovil, 2001).

This commentary intervenes in this recent controversy between the two countriesin three ways. First, by focusing on resources and examining why the spectre of oil

Falklands Island designated area Rockhopper exploration

Desire petroleum Borders and Southern Petroleum

Argos resources BHP Billiton partnered with Falkland Oil and Gas

Figure 3. Falkland Islands: offshore exploration areas (source: modified from www.bgs.ac.uk/falklands-oil/download/A3map.jpg).

Commentary 573

exploration and exploitation has provoked angry Argentine protests ranging from thediplomatic to the highly ritualised, and visually significant, burning of British flagsoutside the British Embassy in Buenos Aires (cf Billig, 1995). Second, by consideringthe wider implications of this ongoing dispute for maritime claims throughout theSouthwest Atlantic and Antarctic Peninsula. And, finally, by considering the populargeopolitics of the disputed islands and the multiple ways in which Argentine politicalleaders mobilise particular understandings of place and territorial claims (Murphy,1990). While we clearly cannot attend to all the dimensions of this long-standingterritorial conflict, it does provide a timely reminder that the exploration, mapping,and claiming of territory remains an ongoing affair, and arguably it is the maritimedimension of the Falklands/Malvinas that has further heightened the apparent stakes.

Black gold in the Southwest AtlanticThe British journalist Peter Wilby recently noted in the New Statesman magazine that:As early as 1973, US News and World Report speculated about a`nother Kuwait'. Atthat time, Britain spurned the oil companies' inquiries for fear of provoking Argentina.Oil, the British thought, could eventually be a lubricant, dissolving the sovereigntydispute into a joint agreement to exploit the undersea riches. Though the Falklandersmight have protested, such a deal would have caused little stir in London. Both theBritish and Argentinian governments, however, made catastrophic miscalculations,with the result that sovereignty became as sensitive an issue in London as it was inBuenos Aires. Could the politicians miscalculate again?'' (Wilby, 2010).The first sentence is an important one. For Argentine geopolitical writers in the

early to mid 1970s, it was axiomatic that the Malvinas were an important element intheir geostrategic evaluations of the South Atlantic (Child, 1979; Cosentino, 1970). TheFalklands/Malvinas as a `new Kuwait', especially in the aftermath of the 1973 ^ 74 oilcrisis, further encouraged Argentine military writers to promote the significance ofthe region to the national citizenry (Pittman, 1981). At the time, moreover, a numberof factors were routinely invokedresource potential in terms of both living andnonliving assets, including oil and gas; the significance of shipping routes aroundCape Horn; and the possible threat posed by the Soviet blue water navy aspart of wider Cold War military planning (Hurrell, 1983). During the years of theArgentine military regimes in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interest also existed indeveloping military collaboration with the apartheid regime of South Africa. Indeed,some commentators even called for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization to becreated in order to bolster anticommunist resistance in the region (Hurrell, 1983).By the time of the 1982 conflict Argentine military writers were largely persuadedthat the decision by the UK government to launch a task force to resist the Argentineoccupation was motivated by these kinds of geostrategic factors. The small popula-tion on the Falklands itself was regarded as a kind of convenient excuse, helpingto persuade British public opinion of the righteous decision to send a task force totheir rescue.

Competing understandings of the South Atlantic and the Falklands/Malvinaswithin British and Argentine geopolitical imaginations lay at the heart of this dispute.Formally annexed by the British in 1833, the waters surrounding the Falklands havefor most of the British occupation played an important role in shaping the life of thecommunity (Beck, 1988). Although wool was the key export of the Islands, shippingprovided the key mode of transport between the Islands and the wider world,including Argentina and Chile. Before the 1980s, there was little to no commercialfishing, and the first tests for oil did not occur until the late 1990s. The 1982 conflicttransformed the Falklands into a major foreign and defence priority for the UK.

574 Commentary

Arguably, even today, these islands are in the top five British defence priorities interms of commitment via military personnel and equipment. There are currentlymore than 1000 service personnel stationed at Mount Pleasant Airbase in EastFalkland.

Hydrocarbon exploitation in the South Atlantic was part of a broader process ofinitial improvements in Argentine ^ British relations in the 1990s. During the Menemadministration, Anglo ^Argentine cooperation as epitomised by the 14 July 1999 JointStatement was, in hindsight, the highpoint in this rapprochement (Dodds and Manovil,2001).(2) On the knotty question of possible oil exploration, an agreement was securedbetween the two parties in 1995 to create a special cooperative area. This occurred aspart of a broader attempt to defuse the ownership question by creating a so-calledsovereign umbrella arrangement whereby any cooperation would not prejudice eachside's legal rights. The Falkland Islands Government, working closely with the BritishGeological Survey, announced an oil exploration zone in 1993. In 1998 drilling wascarried out in the North Falklands Basin, and traces of oil were found in some of thewells drilled. Further exploratory work was carried out in 2004 and additional com-panies were licensed to explore for oil deposits. The 2010 round of oil exploration is thelatest episode of a process to discover whether there are commercially recoverabledeposits to the north and southwest of the Falkland Islands.

The initial phases of oil exploration occurred during the so-called c`harm offensive'of the Menem Administration, the most infamous element being the English-speakingForeign Minister Guido di Tella's attempts to improve relations with the Islandersdirectly.(3) This ended with the emergence of the Nestor Kirchner Government(2003 ^ 07) and a decision to withdraw cooperation with the UK over Falklands/Malvinas matters, notably in the area of living-resource management, flight arrange-ments, and the dissolution of collaboration within the so-called Special Co-operativeArea. As a former governor of the southern province of Santa Cruz, Kirchner learnt hispolitical trade in a region of Argentina especially interested in the status of the Malvinas(indeed, the Islands are represented, in Argentinian maps of the region, as territoriallyinclusive of the neighbouring and southernmost province, Tierra del Fuego).(4) Thishas continued under the succeeding administration headed by his partner CristinaFernandez de Kirchner (2007 ^) and arguably consolidated a deterioration of relationswith the UK and the Falkland Islands Government.

The current oil crisis needs to be seen within this recent context of worseningrelations between Britain and Argentina. In February 2010 the chief of staff to theArgentine President announced that ships sailing between Argentina and the Falklandswould require a permit, which would be rescinded if there were any involvement with

(2) The 14 July 1999 Joint Statement contained five key elements regarding Anglo ^Argentine cooper-ation and long-term rapprochement. These were as follows: visits by Argentine citizens; air servicesbetween Chile, Argentina, and the Falkland Islands; fisheries cooperation, visiting rights of theArgentine relatives of the dead; and the status of Argentine place names. The statement itself isavailable at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/uk-argentina-exchange-o-new02647.(3) Falkland Islanders and Argentines treated the personal charm offensive of the former ArgentineForeign Minister with suspicion alike. One point worth noting is that the 1994 Argentine Con-stitution reaffirmed the importance of the Malvinas to Argentina, as does the current constitution.As the relevant transitional provisions note, ``The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimateand everlasting sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and Sandwich Islands and thecorresponding maritime and insular areas, because they are an integral part of the Nationalterritory.''(4) The southern border between Argentina and Chile was also a key issue of concern for theKirchner government, especially involving the so-called Hielos Continentales controversy (seeAllan, 2007).

Commentary 575

Falklands-based oil exploration. At the same time, the Argentine military announcednew investment in four offshore patrol vessels for surveillance operations in the SouthAtlantic (military action has been ruled out for now). British naval vessels have beenoperating in the region, and HMS York intercepted an Argentine corvette in theFalkland Islands conservation zone. As the British newspaper The Sun noted inthe aftermath of this latest encounter, ``The Navy has intercepted an Argentine warshipin our waters in the first head-to-head of the Falklands row. Destroyer HMS Yorkspotted the vessel up to ten miles inside the disputed `oil zone' around the SouthAtlantic islands'' (The Sun 2010).(5) Simultaneously, it had been reported that a Britishnuclear submarine, HMS Sceptre, was sailing towards the Falklands in an effortto enhance the British military presence in the face of further Argentine attempts topenalise British firms working in Argentina that have investments in the Falklands oilindustry (Daily Mail 2010).

As Michael Watts has reflected, with reference to the tropical Niger Delta, theexploration and exploitation of oil has played a key role in fuelling hydrocarboncapitalism and violence (see Watts, 2008). The stormy waters of the South Atlanticprovide yet another example of the interaction between commercial exploration, thespectre of violence, and resource-led nationalism. As a report by the British newspaperThe Daily Telegraph acknowledged:Royal Navy ships have already been put on standby to protect commercial shippingheading to the region after Argentina said all vessels passing through its waterswould have to apply for a permit. The authorities stopped a shipment of pipesbound for the island last week.

British companies identified as beneficiaries of investments in Falklands oil includeBarclays, HSBC and BHP Billiton, the mining house that has an investment inFalkland Oil and Gas and copper rights in Argentina'' (The Daily Telegraph 2010).Both Britain and Argentina have deployed naval forces and accused one another of

provocation. For the Falkland Islanders the prospect of a new revenue stream is anattractive one, in light of the vagaries of the fishing-licensing regime and fears that livingresources in the Southwest Atlantic have shown to be vulnerable to ecological change.

Mapping wars: Falklands/Malvinas and the wider Antarctic and South Atlantic regionIt is hard to underestimate the importance of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute to thewider South Atlantic. Put simply, Argentina and Britain have a series of territorialdisputes over the Antarctic Peninsula and other South Atlantic possessions, includ-ing the South Orkneys, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands. The entry intoforce of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty added an important caveat in the sense thatarticle IV effectively suspends territorial claims for the duration of the treaty. Twoof its original signatoriesBritain and Argentinaagreed along with another coun-terclaimant, Chile, to cooperate with one another in scientific and political terms(Dodds, 2002). In effect, this meant attention turned in the 1960s and 1970s to theoutstanding disputes north of the Antarctic Treaty region. Although legally distinct,Argentina and Britain both understood that the legal status of South Georgia andthe Falklands/Malvinas were interlinked. Britain, for example, retained a militaryand scientific presence on both sets of islands in an attempt to deter possibleArgentine action prior to 1982.

Although a return to those war-like conditions looks unlikely, both countrieshave been involved in another kind of militarised competitionone based on

(5) As readers will no doubt recall, especially those able to remember the 1982 conflict, The Sun wasinfamous for a number of headline pieces such as ``Up your Junta'' and ``Gotcha''.

576 Commentary

mapping. On the face of it, this actually resembles the 1940s and 1950s when Britishand Argentine personnel battled it out to produce ever-better maps of their rivalAntarctic sectors (Dodds, 2002). There is, however, a different kind of focus. If in the1940s and 1950s attention was turned towards mapping polar territory, the new `map-ping wars' involve the seabed off the islands and territories of the South Atlantic.Tellingly, both Britain and Argentina have made submissions to the CLCS under theprovisions of Article 76 relating to sovereign rights over the outer continental shelf. InOctober 2007 British newspapers such as the The Guardian condemned the Britishsubmission to the CLCS as a form of `` icy imperialism'' and argued that it underminedthe spirit and intent of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (The Guardian 2007). As it happened, inMay 2008 the UK government confirmed that it would not be making any submissionregarding British Antarctic Territory, but it reserved the right to do so in the future.Article IV was cited as a key constraint.

In May 2009 the UK submitted its materials for the Falklands and other SouthAtlantic islands such as South Georgia. The executive summary noted:The present submission deals only with the outer limit of the continental shelf inthe region of the Falkland Islands, and of South Georgia and the South SandwichIslands region, and is thus a partial submission of the UK ... .The United Kingdomhas no doubt about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia andthe South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas.'' (6)

A month earlier, Argentina submitted its materials to the CLCS. Within theirsubmission, the relevant provision of the 1994 Constitution is noted pertaining to thesovereignty of the Malvinas and other islands. Moreover, the submission noted:The Argentine Republic has never recognized the illegitimate British occupationof the southern archipelagos, as the presence of the United Kingdom derives fromthe usurpation in 1833 of a part of the Argentine national territory, which wasimmediately protested and never consented by Argentina.''(7)

Strikingly, the Argentine submission contained materials referring to the A`rgentineAntarctic Sector, and thus, unlike the UK, the Argentine Republic submitted a fullsubmission with no reference to the constraints placed on sovereignty claims by the1959 Antarctic Treaty. The CLCS will not be able to make recommendations concerningareas of shelf which are the subject of competing submissions, and the UK has requestedthe CLCS not to consider Argentina's submission regarding the Argentine AntarcticSector either. Submissions by Australia and Norway also included information concerningthe continental shelf off their claimed Antarctic territories but asked the CLCS to exclude,for the moment, direct consideration of those areas. However, in their submissions theAustralian and Norwegian governments noted that continental shelf rights do not dependon any express proclamation, implying that they do not consider such submissions torepresent new claims or extensions of existing claims in Antarctica.

Popular geopolitics of the Malvinas: claiming place and placing claimsAn important element of Argentine political life is the disputed status of the Malvinas.It is woven into the fabric of everyday life, and there are frequent reminders of whatMichael Billig once termed `` banal nationalism'' (Billig, 1995; Escude, 1988). Argentinemaps always include the Malvinas as Argentine territory, and this extends to theinclusion of the Islands in `national weather' reports (on education and the Malvinas

(6) The UK submission to the CLCS pertaining to the Falklands, and of South Georgia and theSouth Sandwich Islands, are available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs new/submissions files/gbr45 09/gbr2009fgs executive%20summary.pdf(7) The Argentine submission to the CLCS is available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs new/submissions files/arg25 09/arg2009e summary eng.pdf

Commentary 577

see Dougherty et al, 1992). Almost every Argentine town or city has a road or publicbuilding of significance named after the Islands, as well as prominent monumentscommemorating Argentine soldiers who lost their lives in the 1982 conflict. The sloganLas Malvinas son Argentinas is found on billboards all over the country and frequentlyshouted at demonstrationsincluding those recently held outside the British Embassyin Buenos Aires. As one might expect, the current tensions have generated extensivepublic comment from the President and Chancellor of Argentina, which shouldbe understood within the context of these daily reminders relating to the nation's`undisputed and unconditional' sovereignty claim.

Despite the prominence of the Malvinas in the political and everyday life of thenation, Argentine diplomatic efforts have framed the dispute as one which also incor-porates additional territories and their surrounding maritime spacesincreasinglysignificant in light of the potentially lucrative resources which may lie underneath theseabed. The symbolic importance of the Malvinas for Argentina has been interwovenwith the economic potential of the South Atlantic region. President Kirchner and theArgentine Chancellor Jorge Taiana have both made efforts to emphasise the value ofthese surrounding waters, perhaps a necessary measure given the overwhelming atten-tion placed on the Malvinas question in Argentina. Interestingly, Taiana has talkedof the ``illegal'' British occupation and action (ie oil exploration) in the region asconstituting a threat to the `` heritage and national wealth of Argentines and theirfuture generations'' (Pagina 12 2010a).

The Argentine government has used this additional maritime resource dimensionto broaden what might have otherwise been seen as an exclusively bilateral dispute,framing it, instead, as an issue which should concern the continent and developingnations around the world. Indeed, President Kirchner devoted her entire keynotespeech at the Cumbre de Latina America y el Caribe (CALC) in February 2010 to theconflict of interests in the South Atlantic and its relationship to resource disputeselsewhere. She stressed how the presence of a ``British colonial enclave in the SouthAtlantic'' should concern developing nations around the world with renewable andnonrenewable resources and underlined the obligation of all states in Latin Americato act regionally, supporting one another in cases of extraterritorially, regardless ofwhether those claims pertain to land or maritime spaces (Pagina 12 2010b). In ameeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in February 2010, ChancellorTaiana raised the increasingly sensitive issue of how to protect developing nationswith nonrenewable resources, as a way to contextualise the ongoing sovereignty disputein the South Atlantic.

Argentine diplomacy is thus projecting the Malvinas issue onto the regional andglobal stages in ways which ask pertinent questionsparticularly for many leaders ofdeveloping nationsabout the nature of international relations, and more specifically,the management of resource disputes between developing nations and permanentmembers of the UN Security Council. Several Latin American leaders, including thePresidents of Brazil and Venezuela, followed up President Kirchner's speech withequally damning condemnations of England's and/or the UK's (often used inter-changeably in political speeches in Latin America) presence in the South Atlantic,describing it as a `` relic of colonialism'' (La Nacion 2010). President Hugo Chavezmade an impassioned address on his weekly TV programme Alo Presidente in whichhe spoke directly to Queen Elizabeth II, making it clear that the time for suchantiquated imperialistic actions was over and that Venezuela would support Argentinain the face of any continued aggression (BBC Mundo 2010). Shortly after her keynotespeech at the CALC, the President of Argentina labelled the latest oil explorationactivities by British companies as a `` pillaging'' or `` robbery of [Argentina's] non-renewable

578 Commentary

natural resources'', drawing clear parallels with European colonial practices on thecontinent.(8) In these ways President Kirchner and others are utilising the Malvinasdispute to critique what they consider to be the remnants of an old-world order,based on European imperialism, and also as a means to inform the creation of acontemporary world order which takes into account the management of resources indeveloping-world nations, and through international organisations such as the UN.

Acknowledgements.We offer our sincere thanks to Martin Pratt at the University of Durham forhis comments on an earlier draft and for kindly giving us permission to reproduce figures 1 and 2.Jenny Kynaston kindly drew figure 3.

Klaus Dodds, Matthew C BenwellDepartment of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London

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Commentary 579

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CommentaryMore unfinished business: the Falklands/Malvinas, maritime claims, and the spectre of oil in the South AtlanticBlack gold in the Southwest Atlantic

Mapping wars: Falklands/Malvinas and the wider Antarctic and South Atlantic regionPopular geopolitics of the Malvinas: claiming place and placing claims

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