The European Union-Ukraine-Russia “triangle”: what’s next?

Dr. Lyubov Zhyznomirska,Department of Political Science,

Saint Mary’s UniversityHalifax, 13 February 2014

An EU-Ukraine-Russia “triangle:” a political and geopolitical dimension

Key junctures in the EU-Ukraine relations #Euromaidan in Ukraine

◦ The potential impact of the current protests on the EU-Russia relations and on the EU-Ukraine relations

Presentation Outline:

No institutionally formalized “triangle” at the international level◦ EU/Ukraine, EU/Russia, Russia/Ukraine

Ukraine – between two competing projects of regional integration – the European one by the EU and the Eurasian one by Russia, influenced by both:◦ 1) political, economic, social, and cultural relations;◦ 2) asymmetric relations;◦ 3) facing a so called “civilizational” choice – European democracy versus

Eurasian authoritarianism – a question of attraction and choice Choice by political and economic elites or people?

◦ Russia: Ukraine an essential object in geopolitical plans in Eurasia, Ukraine’s European choice – potential threat to their political regime

◦ The EU: Ukraine’s Eurasian choice is unfortunate but not a problem; cordon sanitaire on Ukraine’s western border, rather than the eastern one

Explaining the EU-Ukraine-Russia “triangle”

Russia – the EU’s “strategic partner”?◦ Views the EU as a competitor in the territory of the shared neighbourhood;

The EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its Eastern Partnership initiative as a “threat” to Russia’s “sphere of geopolitical interest”

◦ European and transatlantic political, economic, and security arrangements as threatening Russia’s domestic political regime, its international stature

Russia’s reaction to the potential signature of the Association Agreement (AA), subsequent U-turn by Ukrainian President V. Yanukovych and Euromaidan protests may:◦ change the EU’s stance in the shared neighbourhood and its relations with

Russia;◦ force the Ukrainian elites to make a “civilizational” choice demanded by

the majority of people, and;◦ provide an opportunity for Ukraine to develop healthier relations with

Russia

Explaining the EU-Ukraine-Russia “triangle”

Ukraine’s European Choice

◦ Sept. 1997, the first EU-Ukraine summit: Leonid Kuchma confirmed Ukraine’s European choice in line with the PCA.

◦ June 1998, EU-Ukraine Co-operation Council: Ukrainian PM Valeriy Pustovojtenko, spoke about Ukraine's desire to receive an association status

◦ July 2002 - Kuchma announced key plans: signing an association agreement with the EU by

2003-2004, negotiating a free-trade area, fulfilling all the requirements for the AA to enter into force by 2004-2007, creating a customs union with the EU by 2005-2007 and meeting all EU membership requirements by 2007-2011

Ukraine’s European Choice

1994 PCA – post-soviet space, not part of CEECs – no EU membership prospect◦ “close relations building upon the existing historical links;”

the “common values;” and the recognition and support to “the wish of Ukraine to establish close cooperation with European institutions”

1999 Common Strategy – UA “strategic partner”◦ Acknowledged “Ukraine’s European aspirations and

welcome[d] Ukraine’s pro-European choice” 2004 – Ukraine included in the European

Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 2008 – the ENP receives an eastern dimension – the

launch of Eastern Partnership

EU’s foreign policy: Ukraine

The conversation of the deaf regarding EU membership prospect for Ukraine and regarding the sequence of the “prospect-reform” agenda

◦ The EU: a lack of strategic vision, implicit support to the status quo on Russia’s

influence in Eastern Europe and on Ukraine in particular (Balfour, 2012), positioning of Ukraine outside of the circle of European countries with a

prospect of accession◦ Ukraine:

inconsistent with its political, economic and social reforms; dual-track foreign policy, with political situation affecting changes in

strategic choice for cooperation high expectations unmet by the EU policy proposals, disappointed but

left with no choice but to accept what the EU has to offer

The EU-Ukraine relations: asking for EU membership prospect

EU’s policy towards Ukraine1999–2009 - no change – “European aspirations” and “pro-European choice” rhetoric

Political association and deep economic integration

Beyond the European aspiration and pro-European choice?◦ “The close historical relationship and progressively closer links between the

Parties as well as their desire to strengthen and widen relations in an ambitious and innovative way,”

◦ the commitment “to a close and lasting relationship that is based on common values” and to “the principles of a free market economy, which would facilitate the participation of Ukraine in European policies,”

◦ Ukraine “as a European country shares a common history and common values with the Member States of the European Union (EU) and is committed to promoting those values,”

◦ “The importance Ukraine attaches to its European identity,” ◦ “European choice” = commitment to building “deep and sustainable

democracy and a market economy.”◦ The common values (i.e., democracy, respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms, and rule of law)

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement:

Decisive times: 2011-2013

EU-Ukraine AA: a beginning to an end of the status quo?

#EuroMaidan in Ukraine: what is it?

50% support EuroMaidan, 42% don’t support (20-24 December 2014 survey by DIF). Support in:◦ Western Ukraine – 80% and 7%, ◦ Central Ukraine – 63% and 28%, ◦ Southern Ukraine – 20% and 71%, and ◦ Eastern Ukraine – 30% and 65%. ◦ Participated in the protest activities: Western – 26%, Central – 15% (Kyiv – 39%), South – 5.5%,

and East – 3% Support antiMaidan – 27%, against it – 57%.

3 surveys conducted by the fund "Democratic Initiatives of Ilka Kucheriv" and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, sponsored by the Renaissance foundation◦ 7-8 December 2013 during the rally (1037 respondents)◦ 20 December 2013 (515 resp.)◦ 3 February 2014 (502 resp.)

From maidan-camp to maidan-sich: changes in residents of maidan:◦ 88% men, 12% women; the average age – 37 years; high education – 43% (higher than the

national average), incomplete secondary education – 4%; increased number of entrepreneurs – from 12% to 17%; students – 6% (down from 10%); dominated by people outside of Kyiv – 88% (55% from the west, 24% from centre, and 21% from east and south)

#EuroMaidan: Who supports it?

The Russian factor◦ Potential presence on the ground in Ukraine◦ The package of assistance “without conditions”◦ Immense anti-maidan information campaign

domestically and internationally◦ Mobilization of Russophiles within Ukraine and

scenarios of federalization

The #EuroMaidan

EU-Ukraine relations:◦ First stage – fully supported the aspirations of the Ukrainian people,

calls for restraints◦ Mediation of the opposing sides by Fule and Ashton◦ Calls for the official opposition to distance itself from the “radicals”◦ The AA deal still on the table◦ EU Commission President Barroso: EU will not compete with Russia

by offering a better financial package◦ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution, 30 Jan

2014◦ European parliament resolution, 5 February 2014◦ EU Foreign Affairs Council statement, 10 February 2014

EU-Russia relations

The Effects of the EuroMaidan