The European Natural Gas Market - Challenges and ... · -3-Background: EE2 / DIW Program “The...

- 1 -

The European Natural Gas Market -

Challenges and Perspectives

Franziska HolzBased on joint research with Christian von Hirschhausen, Anne Neumann and others

in the Program “Globalization of Natural Gas Markets”

Rio de Janeiro

July 31 - August 2, 2006

DIW Berlin (German Institute of Economic Research)and Dresden University of Technology

Chair of Energy Economics and Public Sector Management

- 2 -

Agenda

1. Research Program “Global Gas”

2. European Gas Markets: Where We Stand

3. The Evolution of Long-Term Contracts(Neumann/Hirschhausen, 2006)

4. Transatlantic Prices (Neumann/Josse-Vasquez, 2006)

5. Transatlantic Competition in a Computational Simulation Model (Holz/Hirschhausen, 2006 , and Holz/Pavel, 2005)

6. Conclusions

Sources: www.hydrowingas.co.ukwww.naturalgas.org

- 3 -

Background: EE2 / DIW Program“The Globalization of Natural Gas Markets” (2004-2007)

- Jointly between Dresden University of Technology, Chair of Energy Economics and Public Sector Management, and DIW Berlin

- Research and advice to policy makers and the corporate sector, three modules:1) Computational model of the European (and trans-Atlantic) natural gas market

- Competition/oligopoly, effect on prices, quantities- Infrastructure bottlenecks (pipelines, LNG-terminals)- Role of Russia …

2) Institutional economic modeling on governance structures and contracts- Nexus between regulation and contracts- Changing role of long-term contracts- Vertical integration along the LNG value added chain

3) Econometric analysis of energy price developments- Relation between North American, European, Asian gas and oil prices- Cointegration and/or convergence of trans-Atlantic natural gas prices ?

http://www.tu-dresden.de/wwbwleeg/projekte/gg.html

- 4 -

Agenda






6. Conclusions


- 5 -

Natural Gas Exports to Europe 2004

2004

Algeria

Lybia

Nigeria

UK

Netherlands

Others pipe

Middle East

Others LNG

Russia

Algeria

Norw ay

Pipeline: 89 %LNG: 11%

Source: BP Statistical Review 2005

- 6 -

European LNG Regasification Capacities (2005 vs. 2010)

Sines

Huelva Cartagena

Barcelona

RovigoPanigaglia

Brindisi

Zeebrugge

Miford Haven

El Ferrol Bilbao

Isle of Grain

Fos sur MerFos Cavaou

Montoir

Revithoussa

Marmara

bcm/a in 2005bcm/a in 2010

Sagunto

WilhelmshavenRotterdam

Gdansk

Krk

- 7 -

The Traditional Long-Term Contracts in Europe

- Generally, tied to infrastructure projects (capital-intense, asset-specific)

- Long-term take-or-pay contracts linking seller and buyer into bilateral monopoly

- Risk-sharing between exporters and importers in the „old world“ of no competition

- Price indexation to oil

- 8 -

Increasing Importance of Spot Markets

- Europe- NBP, Zeebrugge, TTF- Italy, Germany, France, Austria

- North America- Henry Hub (of 36 trading places including Canada)- Liquid future and option markets (up to 6 six years)

- Competition of North American and European Markets- Active arbitraging with price differentials of ~$0.30/MBtu (+$0.40/MBtu Regasification)- Little impact on prices in market of which LNG spot cargoes have been diverted from- Increasing linkage of long-term contracts to spot market prices

- Role of LNG- Decreasing capital intensity in particular in the LNG industry- Increasing number of market participants- Increasing share of spot trade

- 9 -

Market Participants in Europe: Market Concentration

Source: Third Benchmarking Report (European Commission, 2004)

3rd Benchmarking Report (2004)

- 10 -

Institutional Design

REGULATION

From monopoly to competition

- 11 -

Conclusion: Where Do We Stand in Europe?

- Diversification process of supplies is on a good way (LNG)

- Liberalization still has a long way to go in many EU Member States

- Regulation (e.g. of transmission, storage) differs between Member States but harmonization cannot be expected in the short term because of lacking EU competences (principle of subsidiarity)

- …

- 12 -

Natural Gas Markets in Europe: Where Do We Stand ?

- Europe = region with less and less own (domestic) production increasing import dependency

- BUT: increasingly diversified import portfolio

- Partly due to soaring of LNG projects and imports

- fragmented market with lasting national monopolies, and nationalregulation(s) which are poorly harmonized

- Undecided which elements of the value chain to be regulated and how (transmission, storage, etc)

- High concentration on the wholesale market, but number of players has been increasing over the past years

- Traditional contract structure: long-term contracts, generally tied to transport infrastructure development

- Recently (since beginning 1990s in UK, late 1990s in Europe): spot markets with increasing liquidity (NBP, Zeebrugge, TTF)

- 13 -

Agenda






6. Conclusions


- 14 -

European gas imports: Contractedvolume (in bcm)

(Stand 2004)

Evolution of Long-Term Contracts

- Development of long-term contracts in liberalized markets

- Analysis with a focus on transaction cost:

- Change of institutional framework, market environment, and growing importance of natural gas in the fuel mix

Impact on traditional importing contracts?

0

400

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

OtherUKNetherlandsAlgeriaLNGRussiaNorway

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The Issue

- Development of long-term contracts in liberalized markets with a focus on transaction cost

- Decreasing asset-specificity along the value chain of natural gas

- First empirical qualitative evidence on Europe, a lot of work in the US

Impact of uncertainty, asset-specificity and frequency of trade on traditional natural gas importing contracts?

What are the main drivers for diminishing contract duration?

This paper in a nutshell:

Restructuring of the industry implies that long-term contracts loose some of their importance, and that they are likely to play a considerable role (only) when large-scale, asset-specific investment decisions are at stake.

- 16 -

Theory: Structural Changes in theInternational Natural Gas Industry

- Cost reduction in the LNG value-added chain- Economies of scale in liquefaction- Lower costs for shipping- Economies of scale in regas

- Diminishing asset specificity of investments- Formerly: field-specific contracts- Nowadays: infrastructure developed, less hold-up risk, more general country-focused

contracts- More players on both sides (producers, traders, importers)

- Development of spot markets and shorter-term trading

- Increased number of market participants- Producers- Buyers

Less need for long-term contracts to overcome the hold-up problem

- 17 -

Factors Influencing Contractual Structures

- Development of spot markets for natural gas

- Increasing share of (LNG) spot trade

- Moving away from oil price indexation towards natural gas spot priceindexation

- Internationalization of trade

- Decreasing capital intensity in particular in the LNG industry

- Increasing number of market participants

Inverse relation between gas sector liberalization and contract length

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Changing Nature of Long-Term ContractsC

ontra

ctD

urat

ion

(in y

ears

)

Year of signatureDiminishing contract duration over time

Positive relation between contract duration and yearly contracted volumes

- 19 -

Econometric Analysis of Determinants of Long Term Contract: Specification

Analogous to Joskow (1987)

(1) Contract Durationi = ci + β1YVoli + β2Dummy(1990-1998) + β3Dummy(1999-2005)

+ β4PROJECT + β5TRAD + β6LNGDummy + β7Spot + εi

(2) Contract Durationi = ci + β1log(YVoli) + β2Dummy(1990-1998) + β3Dummy(1999-2005) + β4PROJECT + β5TRAD + β6LNGDummy + β7Spot + εi

(3) Log(Contract Durationi) = ci + β1log(YVoli) + β2Dummy(1990-1998) + β3Dummy(1999-2005) + β4PROJECT + β5TRAD + β6LNGDummy + β7Spot + εi

CD – contract duration (years)YVol – yearly contracted volume (in bcm)

PROJECT – contract concluded in greenfield infrastructure project and extension (LNG) (dummy)SPOT – share of LNG Spot trade in worldwide LNG trade (percentage per year)

TRAD – traditional player vs. incumbent (dummy)LNGDummy – identifies LNG-Contracts

Dummy– European Legislation)ASIA – identifies Asian contracts

- -+

- 20 -

Econometric Analysis of Determinants of Long Term Contracts: Summary Statistics

Contracted Annual Volume (YVol)

Contract Duration (CD)

0.150.03Min1616Max2.832.29Mean

22Min3939Max19.0119.30Mean

135253Obs.EuropeALL

- Own dataset, more than 300 contracts- Information on date of contract signature, time period of delivery, yearly or total

contracted volume- Sample truncation OLS standard procedure will produce biased estimation

(Maddala, 1983; Masten / Saussier, 2005; Sykuta, 2005)- truncated regression model - Seperate analysis of ALL and EUROPEAN contracts signed betweeen 1980 and 2005

- 21 -

Results Europe (135 observations)

Reported are estimated coefficients and p-values. ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level

Positive relation between asset-specificity and contract duration

0.2890.3380.393Adj. R2

0.3430.3880.429R2

-0.02(0.8760)

-0.44(0.7298)

-0.17(0.7738)

-0.14(0.6939)SPOT

0.13(0.1888)

1.08(0.4043)

0.99(0.5159)

0.96(0.4228)LNGDUMMY

-0.04(0.7125)

-0.37(0.7714)

-0.48(0.7539)

-1.01(0.4472)TRAD

0.28**(0.0115)

3.97***(0.0020)

5.97***(0.0000)

5.34***(0.0001)PROJECT

-0.21(1.0000)

-0.99(0.9993)

-9.99*(0.0504)

-9.21***(0.0050)D1999-2005

0.16(1.0000)

3.84(0.9975)

-5.97***(0.0012)

-5.08***(0.0055)D1990-1998

0.22***(0.0000)

3.12***(0.0000)

0.98***(0.0000)

0.95***(0.0000)YVOL

2.54(0.9995)

13.15(0.9913)

21.18***(0.0000)

20.90***(0.0000)C

(3)(2)(1)(1)SpecificationMLOLS

- 22 -

Results All Contracts (263 observations)

0.1630.1810.231Adj. R2

0.1990.2170.257R2

0.08(0.3086)

1.57(0.1719)

0.09(0.9294)

0.11(0.9123)

ASIA

0.05(0.5293)

0.74(0.4718)

0.54*(0.0919)

0.46(0.1278)

SPOT

0.14*(0.0716)

1.94(0.1023)

1.22(0.3031)

0.99(0.3547)

LNGDUMMY

-0.06(0.2796)

-1.09(0.2171)

-1.66**(0.0478)

-2.05***(0.100)

TRAD

0.16***(0.0134)

2.77***(0.0017)

2.53***(0.0018)

3.06***(0.0001)

PROJECT

-0.29(0.4324)

-4.83(0.3672)

-9.36***(0.0009)

-9.43***(0.0006)

D1999-2005

-0.03(0.9124)

-0.53(0.9040)

-3.36***(0.0050)

-3.85***(0.0010)

D1990-1998

0.12***(0.0001)

2.09***(0.0000)

0.84***(0.0000)

0.84***(0.0000)

YVOL

2.79***(0.0000)

17.15***(0.0000)

19.10***(0.0000)

19.66***(0.0000)

C

(3)(2)(1)(1)Specification

MLOLS


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Conclusion: Long-Term Contract Analysis

- Contracts dedicated to infrastructure investment exhibit significantly longer durations prevailance / importance of LTC to secure efficient investments

- Positive effects of EC Directive: shorter contract duration

- Market developments enhance shorter term trading

- Importing contracts with political unstable regions secured over long time spans

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Agenda






6. Conclusions


- 25 -

Increasing Importance of Spot Markets

- Europe- NBP, Zeebrugge, TTF- Italy, Germany, France, Austria

- North America- Henry Hub (of 36 trading places including Canada)- Liquid future and option markets (up to 6 six years)

- Competition of North American and European Markets- Active arbitraging with price differentials of ~$0.30/MBtu (+$0.40/MBtu Regasification)- Little impact on prices in market of which LNG spot cargoes have been diverted from- Increasing linkage of long-term contracts to spot market prices

- Role of LNG- Decreasing capital intensity in particular in the LNG industry- Increasing number of market participants- Increasing share of spot trade

- 26 -

The Most Important Transatlantic Spot Markets: Henry Hub and NBP (daily data based on daily quotes, USD/MBTU)

- 27 -

Theory: Law of One Price

Cointegration:- xt, a N-dimensional process, is co-integrated if each component of the process is I(1) but

there exists v, a N-dimensional vector, such that v‘xt is I(0) Johansen Test

Law of one price:- LOP is equivalent to having every relative price in the system constant in the long term

α ~ transportation costs, quality, risk premium, etc.β ~ relationship between the prices

β = 0 no market integrationβ = 1 LOP holds; markets are fully integrated;

proportionate pricesConvergence

- A dynamic structural change, time-varying coefficient models Kalman Filter- Updating process, expected value of given the former values minimizing the variance

βt ~ relationship between the pricesβ = 0 no market integrationβ = 1 LOP holds; markets are fully integratedβ 1 increasing market integration over time

lnp1 = α + β*lnp2 +et

lnp1t = α + βt*lnp2t + et

βt = βt-1 + ut

- 28 -

Estimated β-coefficent for the Atlantic Basin

-1.0

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

25 M

arch

199

916

Jun

e 19

9908

, Sep

99

29, N

ov 9

921

Feb

ruar

y 20

0011

May

200

001

, Aug

00

30 O

ctob

er 2

000

25 J

anua

ry 2

001

23, A

pr 0

117

Jul

y 20

0108

Oct

ober

200

123

Jan

uary

200

229

, Apr

02

23 J

uly

2002

17 O

ctob

er 2

002

29 J

anua

ry 2

003

24, A

pr 0

317

Jul

y 20

0322

Oct

ober

200

305

Feb

ruar

y 20

0430

, Apr

04

27 J

uly

2004

19 O

ctob

er 2

004

19 J

anua

ry 2

005

15, A

pr 0

511

Jul

y 20

0517

Oct

ober

200

525

Jan

uary

200

6

- 29 -

Conclusion: Transatlantic Prices

- Increasing convergence of transatlantic gas prices

- Open question: Where is the price for natural gas, wehre is the price determined?

An international natural gas market is evolving, with own price setting mechanisms

Natural gas prices (alone) can serve as reference in contracts (e.g. NBP prices for European contracts)

- 30 -

Agenda





5. Transatlantic Competition in a Computational Simulation Model (Holz/Hirschhausen, 2006, and Holz/Pavel, 2005)

6. Conclusions


- 31 -

2.1 GASMOD Model Structure: 2-Stage Game:1st Stage: Exports, 2nd-Stage Wholesale Trade

Upstream Producer Pipe

f Russia

Wholesale Traderr Germany

capf,r

cap f,r

exp-capfFinal marketm France

Finalmarketm Germany

Intra-EU-capr,m

13 possible exporters (pipeline and LNG)Wholesale trade between 17 European regions

imp-capr

imp-capr

Upstream Producer LNGAlgeria, Libya, Egypt, Iran, Middle East, Russia, Norway,

Nigeria, Trinidad, Venezuela

Wholesale Trader r France

capf,r

exp-capf

North America

Demand for LNGin the Atlantic Basin

- 32 -

Model Specification

Exporters: Algeria (LNG and pipe), Libya (LNG and pipe), Egypt, Iraq, Iran (LNG and pipe), Middle East (Qatar, Oman, UAE, Yemen), FSU (LNG and pipe), Norway (LNG and pipe), Netherlands, UK, Nigeria, Trinidad, VenezuelaImporters: UK, Netherlands, Spain/Portugal, France, Italy/Switzerland, Belgium/ Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Sweden/Finland, Austria, Czech/Slovak Rep./Hungary, Balkan, Romania/Bulgaria, Baltic, Greece, Turkey(Assumption of one exporter / trader and domestic producer per country)

Reference year 2003 (will to be adapted to 2005 data)5-year steps: 2003, 2010, 2015 2020, 2025Standard data (IEA, BP, OME, some own estimations)Profit maximizing behavior of market participants:

Cournot oligopoly with competitive fringe on export market Cournot oligopoly in most European marketsPrice-taking behavior of domestic producers

- 33 -

LNG and Pipeline Exports to Europe in the Next Decades

Expected increase of natural gas exports over time comes with an increasing diversification of supplies, in favor of LNGThe share of LNG is increasing over time, especially in the next decadeLNG mainly comes from North Africa, Africa and the Caribbean, only few from the Middle East

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

2003 2010 2015 2020 2025

Tota

l exp

orts

to E

urop

e in

bcm

per

yea

r

LNGPipeline

10%

21%24%

26% 24%23%

- 34 -

2.4 Transatlantic LNG Market: Simulation ScenariosHolz/Pavel (2005)

The main questions to be answered:- Where will be the capacity bottlenecks?- Where will additional LNG exports go to in the Atlantic basin, to the EU or the US

market?

Increased Pipeline Export Capacity: +50 bcm(C) More Export Capacity

(no binding import capacity)

Higher reference gas demand: +45%

Higher reference LNG demand: +650 %

(EIA scenario)

Higher reference gas demand: +45%(B) Demand Expansion

Increased LNG Export Capacity: + 175 bcm

LNG reference demand of 15 bcm*Oligopolistic Traders(A) Benchmark (2003)

North AmericaEuropeScenario

- 35 -

Transatlantic LNG Market:Europe absorbs most of the Atlantic LNG

- Demand expansion leads to relative more LNG supplies to North America and less in Europe, where pipeline gas fills the gap

- Increased export capacity mainly goes to Europe

0

50

100

150

200

250

Reference Imports2003

Benchmark(A)

Demand Expansion(B)

More Export Capacity( C)

LNG

impo

rts in

bcm

/ ye

ar

EU (LNG)

USA (LNG)

- 36 -

Transatlantic LNG Market:Geography plays a role

Prices increase substantially, especially on the North American market, influenced by increased European imports (competition for LNG with Europe)

Additional LNG to the North America mainly comes from the CaribbeanGeography (transport costs) plays a role

Nigeria = swing supplier between Europe and North AmericaShaded figues: binding constraints

LNG Exports (total) Egypt Middle East Nigeria Trinidad Venezuela Algeria Libyain bcm / year Reg3: Reg6: Reg11 Reg12 Reg13 Reg14 Reg15Benchmark 11,9 26,6 22,7 18,7 0,0 31,0 3,5Demand Expansion 11,9 26,6 22,7 18,7 0,0 31,0 3,5More Export Capacity 35,0 50,0 40,0 40,0 15,0 65,0 45,0

LNG Exports to EU:Benchmark 10,8 22,5 18,4 13,3 0,0 31,0 3,5Demand Expansion 5,6 15,0 10,8 5,8 0,0 24,6 1,1More Export Capacity 27,3 33,4 24,7 19,3 4,5 60,1 37,8LNG Exports to USA:Benchmark 1,1 4,1 4,3 5,4 0,0 0,0 0,0Demand Expansion 6,3 11,6 11,9 12,9 0,0 6,4 2,4More Export Capacity 7,7 16,6 15,3 20,7 10,5 4,9 7,2

- 37 -

Agenda






6. Conclusions


- 38 -

Conclusions

- Internationalization of natural gas markets is likely to lead to more diversified supply portfolios, and thus increase supply security

-Long-term contracts …

- LNG is taking off in Europe, as shown by the large number of regasification facility projects

- The European natural gas markets require substantial investments in infrastructure (pipelines, LNG, distribution)

-Globalization of natural gas markets and competition for LNG in the Atlantic basin may well take over part of the supplies … and lead to higher prices

- 39 -

Franziska [email protected]

Research Program “Global Gas”:

http://www.tu-dresden.de/wwbwleeg/projekte/gg.html

Thank you for your attention !

- 40 -

Research Program “Globalization of Natural Gas Markets”

WP-GG-16 Anne Neumann and Christian von HIrschhausen: Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited - An Empirical Analysis of Producer-Importer Relations on the Natural Gas Industry

WP-GG-15 Christian von Hirschhausen: Langfristige Erdgasversorgung Europas – LNG vs. russisches Pipelinegas?WP-GG-14 Christian von Hirschhausen: Strategies for Energy Security – A Transatlantic Comparison.WP-GG-13 Anne Neumann and Christian von Hirschhausen: Long-Term Contracts for Natural Gas - An Empirical Analysis.WP-GG-12 Karsten Neuhoff and Christian von Hirschhausen: Long-Term vs. Short-Term Contracts: A European Perspective on

Natural Gas.WP-GG-11 Anne Neumann and Boriss Siliverstovs: Convergence of European Spot Market Prices for Natural Gas? A Real-Time

Analysis of Market Integration using the Kalman Filter.WP-GG-10 Georg Meran and Christian von Hirschhausen: Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access –

A Model of the German Gas Sector.WP-GG-09 Franziska Holz, Christian von Hirschhausen and Claudia Kemfert: A Strategic Model of European Gas Supply

(GASMOD).WP-GG-08 Christian von Hirschhausen, Berit Meinhart, and Ferdinand Pavel: Transporting Russian Gas to Western Europe - A

Simulation Analysis.WP-GG-07 Anne Neumann and Christian von Hirschhausen: Less Long-Term Gas to Europe? A Quantitative Analysis of European

Long-Term Gas Supply Contracts.WP-GG-06 Boriss Siliverstovs, Anne Neumann, Guillaume L'Hégaret, and Christian von Hirschhausen: International Market

Integration for Natural Gas? A Cointegration Analysis of Prices in Europe, North America and Japan.WP-GG-05 Christian von Hirschhausen and Thorsten Beckers: Reform der Erdgaswirtschaft in der EU: Durch Regulierung zum

Wettbewerb?WP-GG-04 Ferdinand Pavel, Boris Dodonov and Igor Poltavets: Is the Ukrainian-Russian Gas Consortium in the Economic Interest

of Ukraine? Lessons from a European Gas Model.WP-GG-03 Christian von Hirschhausen and Anne Neumann: Liberalisierung der europäischen Gaswirtschaft - Neue

Regulierungsbehörde soll mehr Wettbewerb schaffen.WP-GG-02 Anne Neumann: Security of (Gas) Supply: Conceptual Issues, Contractual Arrangements, and the Current EU SituationWP-GG-01 The Globalization of Natural Gas Markets - A Research Agenda.

Contact: [email protected] or [email protected]://www.tu-dresden.de/wwbwleeg/projekte/gg.html

- 41 -

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

Jul-0

1Se

p-01

Nov

-01

Jan-

02M

ar-0

2M

ay-0

2Ju

l-02

Sep-

02N

ov-0

2Ja

n-03

Mar

-03

May

-03

Jul-0

3Se

p-03

Nov

-03

Jan-

04M

ar-0

4M

ay-0

4Ju

l-04

Sep-

04N

ov-0

4Ja

n-05

Mar

-05

Ma y

-05

mill

ion

ther

ms p

er m

onth

Maturity of Spot Markets in Europe

Source: Cedigaz (2004), IEA (2005), BP (several issues), Heren Ltd.

• Increasing share of short term LNG trades in European imports

• Daily traded volumes at NBP

020406080

100120140160180200

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

bcm

0

2

4

6

8

10

12share in %TotalImportsShareofLNG

Spot market liquidity enhances short-term trade and reduces uncertainty

- 42 -

Results Europe (135 observations)

Reported are estimated coefficients and p-values. ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level


0.2890.3380.393Adj. R2

0.3430.3880.429R2

-0.02(0.8760)

-0.44(0.7298)

-0.17(0.7738)

-0.14(0.6939)SPOT

0.13(0.1888)

1.08(0.4043)

0.99(0.5159)

0.96(0.4228)LNGDUMMY

-0.04(0.7125)

-0.37(0.7714)

-0.48(0.7539)

-1.01(0.4472)TRAD

0.28**(0.0115)

3.97***(0.0020)

5.97***(0.0000)

5.34***(0.0001)PROJECT

-0.21(1.0000)

-0.99(0.9993)

-9.99*(0.0504)

-9.21***(0.0050)D1999-2005

0.16(1.0000)

3.84(0.9975)

-5.97***(0.0012)

-5.08***(0.0055)D1990-1998

0.22***(0.0000)

3.12***(0.0000)

0.98***(0.0000)

0.95***(0.0000)YVOL

2.54(0.9995)

13.15(0.9913)

21.18***(0.0000)

20.90***(0.0000)C

(3)(2)(1)(1)SpecificationMLOLS

The European Natural Gas Market - Challenges and ... · -3-Background: EE2 / DIW Program “The...

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