The European Court of Human RightsGeneral information, misconceptions and venomous remarks

Discourse by Egbert Myjer, judge at the ECHR, held at the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary on the 16th of November 2007

The European Court of Human RightsGeneral information, misconceptions and venomous remarks

Discourse by Egbert Myjer, judge at the ECHR, held at the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary on the 16th of November 2007

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Table of contents

• EuropeanCourtofHumanRights:generalinformation p. 5

• SubmittingacomplainttotheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights:elevencommonmisconceptions[1] EgbertMyjera.o. p. 14

• Intogavenenum?ThelimitsoffreedomofexpressioninandaroundthecourtroomoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsEgbertMyjer p. 26

1] Englishtranslationof:EenklachtindienenbijhetEHRM:elfveelvoorkomendemisverstanden,in:Advocatenblad18februari2005,p.110-115.

Bornon31July1947inArnhem

MasterinLaw,UniversityofUtrecht,1966-72

AssistantProfessorCriminalLaw,UniversityofLeiden,1972-79

TraineejudgeattheDistrictCourtofZutphen,1979-81

JudgeoftheDistrictCourtofZutphen,1981-86

Vice-PresidentoftheDistrictCourtofZutphen,1986-91

Advocate-GeneraloftheCourtofAppeal,LaHaye,1991-95

DeputyProsecutor-genera/ChiefAdvocateGeneralattheCourtofAppeal,Amsterdam;1996-2004

ProfessorofHumanRights,FreeUniversityofAmsterdam,2000

JudgeoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightssince1November2004

Egbert Myjer

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Historical background

A The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950

1. TheConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedomswasdrawnupwithintheCouncilofEurope.ItwasopenedforsignatureinRomeon4November1950andenteredintoforceinSeptember1953.Takingastheirstartingpointthe1948UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theframersoftheConventionsoughttopursuetheaimsoftheCouncilofEuropethroughthemaintenanceandfurtherrealisationofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms.TheConventionwastorepresentthefirststepsforthecollectiveenforcementofcertainoftherightssetoutintheUniversalDeclaration.

2. Inadditiontolayingdownacatalogueofcivilandpoliticalrightsandfreedoms,theConventionsetupamechanismfortheenforcementoftheobligationsenteredintobyContractingStates.Threeinstitutionswereentrustedwiththisresponsibility:theEuropeanCommissionofHumanRights(setupin1954),theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(setupin1959)andtheCommitteeofMinistersoftheCouncilofEurope,thelatterorganbeingcomposedoftheMinistersofForeignAffairsofthememberStatesortheirrepresentatives.

3. UndertheConventioninitsoriginalversion,complaintscouldbebroughtagainstContractingStateseitherbyotherContractingStatesorbyindividualapplicants(individuals,groupsofindividualsornon-governmentalorganisations).Recognitionoftherightofindividualapplicationwas,however,optionalanditcouldthereforebeexercisedonlyagainstthoseStateswhichhadacceptedit(ProtocolNo.11totheConventionwassubsequentlytomakeitsacceptancecompulsory,seepara-

European Court of Human Rights F-6707� Strasbourg Cedex

General information www.echr.coe.int

6 7

graph6below).

ThecomplaintswerefirstthesubjectofapreliminaryexaminationbytheCommission,whichdeterminedtheiradmissibility.Whereanapplicationwasdeclaredadmissible,theCommissionplaceditselfattheparties’disposalwithaviewtobrokeringafriendlysettlement.Ifnosettlementwasforthcoming,itdrewupareportestablishingthefactsandexpressinganopiniononthemeritsofthecase.ThereportwastransmittedtotheCommitteeofMinisters.

4. WheretherespondentStatehadacceptedthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheCourt,theCommissionand/oranyContractingStateconcernedhadaperiodofthreemonthsfollowingthetransmissionofthereporttotheCommitteeofMinis-terswithinwhichtobringthecasebeforetheCourtforafinal,bindingadjudica-tion.IndividualswerenotentitledtobringtheircasesbeforetheCourt.

IfacasewasnotreferredtotheCourt,theCommitteeofMinistersdecidedwhethertherehadbeenaviolationoftheConventionand,ifappropriate,awarded“justsatis-faction”tothevictim.TheCommitteeofMinistersalsohadresponsibilityforsupervi-singtheexecutionoftheCourt’sjudgments.

B Subsequent developments

5. SincetheConvention’sentryintoforcethirteenProtocolshavebeenadopted.ProtocolsNos.1,4,6,7,12and13addedfurtherrightsandlibertiestothosegua-ranteedbytheConvention,whileProtocolNo.2conferredontheCourtthepowertogiveadvisoryopinions.ProtocolNo.9enabledindividualapplicantstobringtheircasesbeforetheCourtsubjecttoratificationbytherespondentStateandacceptancebyascreeningpanel.ProtocolNo.11restructuredtheenforcementmachinery(seebelow).TheremainingProtocolsconcernedtheorganisationofandprocedurebeforetheConventioninstitutions.

6. From1980onwards,thesteadygrowthinthenumberofcasesbroughtbeforetheConventioninstitutionsmadeitincreasinglydifficulttokeepthelengthofprocee-dingswithinacceptablelimits.TheproblemwasaggravatedbytheaccessionofnewContractingStatesfrom1990.ThenumberofapplicationsregisteredannuallywiththeCommissionincreasedfrom404in1981to4,750in1997.Bythatyear,thenumberofunregisteredorprovisionalfilesopenedeachyearintheCommissionhadrisentoover12,000.TheCourt’sstatisticsreflectedasimilarstory,withthenumberofcasesreferredannuallyrisingfrom7in1981to119in1997.

Theincreasingcase-loadpromptedalengthydebateonthenecessityforareformof

theConventionsupervisorymachinery,resultingintheadoptionofProtocolNo.11totheConvention.Theaimwastosimplifythestructurewithaviewtoshorteningthelengthofproceedingswhilestrengtheningthejudicialcharacterofthesystembyma-kingitfullycompulsoryandabolishingtheCommitteeofMinisters’adjudicativerole.

ProtocolNo.11,whichcameintoforceon1November1998,replacedtheexisting,part-timeCourtandCommissionbyasingle,full-timeCourt.Foratransitionalperiodofoneyear(until31October1999)theCommissioncontinuedtodealwiththecaseswhichithadpreviouslydeclaredadmissible.

7. DuringthethreeyearswhichfollowedtheentryintoforceofProtocolNo.11theCourt’scase-loadgrewatanunprecedentedrate.Thenumberofapplicationsregisteredrosefrom5,979in1998to13,858in2001,anincreaseofapproximately130%.ConcernsabouttheCourt’scapacitytodealwiththegrowingvolumeofcasesledtorequestsforadditionalresourcesandspeculationabouttheneedforfurtherreform.

AMinisterialConferenceonHumanRights,heldinRomeon3and4November2000tomarkthe50thanniversaryoftheopeningoftheConventionforsignature,hadinitia-tedaprocessofreflectiononreformofthesystem.InNovember2002,asafollow-uptoaMinisterialDeclarationon“theCourtofHumanRightsforEurope”,theMinisters’DeputiesissuedtermsofreferencetotheSteeringCommitteeforHumanRights(CDDH)todrawupasetofconcreteandcoherentproposalscoveringmeasuresthatcouldbeimplementedwithoutdelayandpossibleamendmentstotheConvention.Asaresultin2004a14thProtocol,amendingthecontrolsystemoftheConventionwasadopted.Itcanonlyenterintoforceafterratificationbyall(47)ContractingParties.SinceRussiauntilnow(November2007)refusedtodosothenewprovisionsimprovingtheefficiencyofthecontrolsystemforthelongterm,mainlyinthelightofthecontinu-ingincreaseintheworkloadoftheCourt,remainunused.

Organisation of the Court

1. TheCourt,aspresentlyconstituted,wasbroughtintobeingbyProtocolNo.11on1November1998.ThisamendmentmadetheConventionprocesswhollyjudicial,astheCommission’sfunctionofscreeningapplicationswasentrustedtotheCourtitself,whosejurisdictionbecamemandatory.TheCommitteeofMinisters’adjudica-tivefunctionwasformallyabolished.

2. TheprovisionsgoverningthestructureandprocedureoftheCourtaretobefound

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inSectionIIoftheConvention(Articles19-51).TheCourtiscomposedofanumberofjudgesequaltothatoftheContractingStates(currentlyforty-six).JudgesareelectedbytheParliamentaryAssemblyoftheCouncilofEurope,whichvotesonashortlistofthreecandidatesputforwardbyGovernments.Thetermofofficeissixyears,andjudgesmaybere-elected.Theirtermsofofficeexpirewhentheyreachtheageofseventy,althoughtheycontinuetodealwithcasesalreadyundertheirconsideration.

JudgessitontheCourtintheirindividualcapacityanddonotrepresentanyState.Theycannotengageinanyactivitywhichisincompatiblewiththeirindependenceorimpartialityorwiththedemandsoffull-timeoffice.

3. ThePlenaryCourthasanumberoffunctionsthatarestipulatedintheConvention.ItelectstheofficeholdersoftheCourt,i.e.thePresident,thetwoVice-Presidents(whoalsopresideoveraSection)andthethreeotherSectionPresidents.Ineachcase,thetermofofficeisthreeyears.ThePlenaryCourtalsoelectstheRegistrarandDeputyRegistrar.TheRulesofCourtareadoptedandamendedbythePlenaryCourt.ItalsodeterminesthecompositionoftheSections.

4. UndertheRulesofCourt,everyjudgeisassignedtooneofthefiveSections,whosecompositionisgeographicallyandgenderbalancedandtakesaccountofthedif-ferentlegalsystemsoftheContractingStates.ThecompositionoftheSectionsisvariedeverythreeyears.

5. ThegreatmajorityofthejudgmentsoftheCourtaregivenbyChambers.ThesecomprisesevenjudgesandareconstitutedwithineachSection.TheSectionPre-sidentandthejudgeelectedinrespectoftheStateconcernedsitineachcase.WherethelatterisnotamemberoftheSection,heorshesitsasanexofficiomem-beroftheChamber.IftherespondentStateinacaseisthatoftheSectionPresi-dent,theVice-PresidentoftheSectionwillpreside.IneverycasethatisdecidedbyaChamber,theremainingmembersoftheSectionwhoarenotfullmembersofthatChambersitassubstitutemembers.

6. CommitteesofthreejudgesaresetupwithineachSectionfortwelve-monthperi-ods.Theirfunctionistodisposeofapplicationsthatareclearlyinadmissible.

7. TheGrandChamberoftheCourtiscomposedofseventeenjudges,whoinclude,asexofficiomembers,thePresident,Vice-PresidentsandSectionPresidents.TheGrandChamberdealswithcasesthatraiseaseriousquestionofinterpretationorapplicationoftheConvention,oraseriousissueofgeneralimportance.ACham-bermayrelinquishjurisdictioninacasetotheGrandChamberatanystageinthe

procedurebeforejudgment,aslongasbothpartiesconsent.Wherejudgmenthasbeendeliveredinacase,eitherpartymay,withinaperiodofthreemonths,requestreferralofthecasetotheGrandChamber.Wherearequestisgranted,thewholecaseisreheard.

Basic information on procedures

1 General

1. AnyContractingState(Stateapplication)orindividualclaimingtobeavictimofaviolationoftheConvention(individualapplication)maylodgedirectlywiththeCourtinStrasbourganapplicationallegingabreachbyaContractingStateofoneoftheConventionrights.AnoticefortheguidanceofapplicantsandformsformakingapplicationsmaybeobtainedfromtheRegistry.

2 TheprocedurebeforetheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsisadversarialandpublic.Hearings,whichareheldonlyinaminorityofcases,arepublic,unlesstheChamber/GrandChamberdecidesotherwiseonaccountofexceptionalcircumstan-ces.MemorialsandotherdocumentsfiledwiththeCourt’sRegistrybythepartiesare,inprinciple,accessibletothepublic.

3. Individualapplicantsmaypresenttheirowncases,butlegalrepresentationisre-commended,andindeedusuallyrequiredonceanapplicationhasbeencommuni-catedtotherespondentGovernment.TheCouncilofEuropehassetupalegalaidschemeforapplicantswhodonothavesufficientmeans.

4. TheofficiallanguagesoftheCourtareEnglishandFrench,butapplicationsmaybesubmittedinoneoftheofficiallanguagesoftheContractingStates.Oncetheapplicationhasbeendeclaredadmissible,oneoftheCourt’sofficiallanguagesmustbeused,unlessthePresidentoftheChamber/GrandChamberauthorisesthecontinueduseofthelanguageoftheapplication.

2 Admissibility procedure

5. EachindividualapplicationisassignedtoaSection,whosePresidentdesignatesarapporteur.Afterapreliminaryexaminationofthecase,therapporteurdecideswhetheritshouldbedealtwithbyathree-memberCommitteeorbyaChamber.

6. ACommitteemaydecide,byunanimousvote,todeclareinadmissibleorstrikeout

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anapplicationwhereitcandosowithoutfurtherexamination.

7. IndividualapplicationswhicharenotdeclaredinadmissiblebyCommittees,orwhicharereferreddirectlytoaChamberbytherapporteur,andStateapplicationsareexaminedbyaChamber.Chambersdeterminebothadmissibilityandmerits,inseparatedecisionsorwhereappropriatetogether.

8. ChambersmayatanytimerelinquishjurisdictioninfavouroftheGrandChamberwhereacaseraisesaseriousquestionofinterpretationoftheConventionorwherethereisariskofdepartingfromexistingcase-law,unlessoneofthepartiesobjectstosuchrelinquishmentwithinonemonthofnotificationoftheintentiontorelin-quish.IntheeventofrelinquishmenttheprocedurefollowedisthesameasthatsetoutbelowforChambers.

9. Thefirststageoftheprocedureisgenerallywritten,althoughtheChambermaydecidetoholdapublichearing,inwhichcaseissuesarisinginrelationtothemeritswillnormallyalsobeaddressed.

10.Decisionsonadmissibility,whicharetakenbymajorityvote,mustcontainreasonsandbemadepublic.

3 Procedure on the merits

11.OncetheChamberhasdecidedtoadmittheapplication,itmayinvitethepartiestosubmitfurtherevidenceandwrittenobservations,includinganyclaimsfor“justsa-tisfaction”bytheapplicant.Ifnohearinghastakenplaceattheadmissibilitystage,itmaydecidetoholdahearingonthemeritsofthecase.

12.ThePresidentoftheChambermay,intheinterestsoftheproperadministrationofjustice,inviteorgrantleavetoanyContractingStatewhichisnotpartytothepro-ceedings,oranypersonconcernedwhoisnottheapplicant,tosubmitwrittencom-ments,and,inexceptionalcircumstances,tomakerepresentationsatthehearing.AContractingStatewhosenationalisanapplicantinthecaseisentitledtointerveneasofright.

13.Duringtheprocedureonthemerits,negotiationsaimedatsecuringafriendlyset-tlementmaybeconductedthroughtheRegistrar.Thenegotiationsareconfidential.

4 Judgments

14.Chambersdecidebyamajorityvote.Anyjudgewhohastakenpartintheconside-

rationofthecaseisentitledtoappendtothejudgmentaseparateopinion,eitherconcurringordissenting,orabarestatementofdissent.

15.WithinthreemonthsofdeliveryofthejudgmentofaChamber,anypartymayrequestthatthecasebereferredtotheGrandChamberifitraisesaseriousques-tionofinterpretationorapplicationoraseriousissueofgeneralimportance.SuchrequestsareexaminedbyaGrandChamberpaneloffivejudgescomposedofthePresidentoftheCourt,theSectionPresidents,withtheexceptionoftheSectionPresidentwhopresidesovertheSectiontowhichtheChamberthatgavejudgmentbelongs,andanotherjudgeselectedbyrotationfromjudgeswhowerenotmem-bersoftheoriginalChamber.

16.AChamber’sjudgmentbecomesfinalonexpiryofthethree-monthperiodorearlierifthepartiesannouncethattheyhavenointentionofrequestingareferralorafteradecisionofthepanelrejectingarequestforreferral.

17.Ifthepanelacceptstherequest,theGrandChamberrendersitsdecisiononthecaseintheformofajudgment.TheGrandChamberdecidesbyamajorityvoteanditsjudgmentsarefinal.

18.AllfinaljudgmentsoftheCourtarebindingontherespondentStatesconcerned.

19.ResponsibilityforsupervisingtheexecutionofjudgmentslieswiththeCommitteeofMinistersoftheCouncilofEurope.TheCommitteeofMinistersverifieswhetherStatesinrespectofwhichaviolationoftheConventionisfoundhavetakenade-quateremedialmeasurestocomplywiththespecificorgeneralobligationsarisingoutoftheCourt’sjudgments.

5 Advisory opinions

20.TheCourtmay,attherequestoftheCommitteeofMinisters,giveadvisoryopi-nionsonlegalquestionsconcerningtheinterpretationoftheConventionandProtocols.

DecisionsoftheCommitteeofMinisterstorequestanadvisoryopinionaretakenbyamajorityvote.

21.AdvisoryopinionsaregivenbytheGrandChamberandadoptedbyamajorityvote.Anyjudgemayattachtotheadvisoryopinion,aseparateopinionorabarestate-mentofdissent.

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Role of the Registry

Article25oftheEuropeanConventionofHumanRights(theConvention)providesthat:“TheCourtshallhavearegistry,thefunctionsandorganisationofwhichshallbelaiddownintheRulesofCourt.[TheCourtshallbeassistedbylegalsecretaries]”.

ThetaskoftheRegistryistoprovidelegalandadministrativesupporttotheCourtintheexerciseofitsjudicialfunctions.Itisthereforecomposedoflawyers,administra-tiveandtechnicalstaffandtranslators.Therearecurrentlysome500membersoftheRegistry,205lawyersand295othersupportstaff.RegistrystaffmembersarestaffmembersoftheCouncilofEurope,theCourt’sparentorganisation,andaresubjecttotheCouncilofEurope’sStaffRegulations.ApproximatelyhalftheRegistrystaffareemployedoncontractsofunlimiteddurationandmaybeexpectedtopursueacareerintheRegistryorinotherpartsoftheCouncilofEurope.Theyarerecruitedontheba-sisofopencompetitions.AllmembersoftheRegistryarerequiredtoadheretostrictconditionsastotheirindependenceandimpartiality.

TheheadoftheRegistry(undertheauthorityofthePresidentoftheCourt)istheRe-gistrar,whoiselectedbythePlenaryCourt(Article26(e)oftheConvention).He/SheisassistedbyoneormoreDeputyRegistrars,likewiseelectedbythePlenaryCourt.EachoftheCourt’sfourjudicialSectionsisassistedbyaSectionRegistrarandaDeputySectionRegistrar.

TheprincipalfunctionoftheRegistryistoprocessandprepareforadjudicationap-plicationslodgedbyindividualswiththeCourt.TheRegistry’slawyers(alsoknownaslegalsecretaries)aredividedinto20case-processingdivisions,eachofwhichisassistedbyanadministrativeteam.ThelawyerspreparefilesandanalyticalnotesfortheJudges.Theyalsocorrespondwiththepartiesonproceduralmatters.Theydonotthemselvesdecidecases.Casesareassignedtothedifferentdivisionsonthebasisofknowledgeofthelanguageandlegalsystemconcerned.ThedocumentspreparedbytheRegistryfortheCourtarealldraftedinoneofitstwoofficiallanguages(EnglishandFrench).

Inadditiontoitscase-processingdivisions,theRegistryhasdivisionsdealingwiththefollowingsectorsofactivity:informationtechnology;case-lawinformationandpublica-tions;researchandthelibrary;pressandpublicrelations;andinternaladministration.Italsohasacentraloffice,whichhandlesmail,filesandarchives.Therearetwolangu-agedivisions,whosemainworkistranslatingtheCourt’sjudgmentsintothesecondofficiallanguage.

How the execution of judgments works

TheHighContractingPartiestotheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightshavecommittedthemselvestosecuretoeveryonewithintheirjurisdictiontherightsandfreedomsdefinedinSectionIoftheConventionand,inthisrespect,haveundertakento“abidebythefinaljudgmentsoftheCourtinanycasetowhichtheyareparties”(Article46paragraph1,oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights).

InaccordancewithArticle46paragraph2,theCommitteeofMinistersisresponsibleforthesupervisionoftheexecutionofthejudgmentsoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.

OncetheCourt’sfinaljudgmenthasbeentransmittedtotheCommitteeofMinisters,thelatterinvitestherespondentStatetoinformitofthestepstakentopayanyjustsatisfaction(compensationand/orcostsandexpenses)awardedaswellasofanyindivi-dualorgeneralmeasureswhichmaybenecessaryinordertocomplywiththeState’slegalobligationtoabidebythejudgment.IntheperformanceofthistasktheCom-mitteeisassisted,inadditiontoitsownsecretariat,byaspecialdepartmentoftheCouncilofEurope’sSecretariat–theDepartmentfortheExecutionofjudgmentsoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.

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Submitting a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights: eleven common misconceptions [1]

EgbertMyjerNicoMolPeterKempeesAgnesvanSteijnJannekeBockwinkel[2]

Compared with many of the domestic systems of procedural law existing in Europe, the procedure of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is qui-te straightforward and easy to use. Nonetheless, even Strasbourg procedure requires some understanding on the part of practitioners. Just as in domestic proceedings, an error can harm the interests of the applicant and, at worst, result in the loss of the case.

Many of the problems which applicants and their counsel encounter in pro-ceedings before the ECHR can be traced back to a limited number of simple misconceptions. The Dutch judge recently appointed to the Court and the Dutch lawyers working in the Registry of the Court explain below how these problems can be avoided.

Misconception 1:The ECHR is an appellate body

Casesregularlyoccurinwhichapplicants(ortheirlawyers)submitanapplicationtotheCourtallegingthatthedomesticcourtshaveincorrectlydeterminedthefactsofacaseorhaveoverlookedessentialsubmissionsoftheapplicant.OftensuchanapplicationisbasedonthesubmissionthatArticle6oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightshasbeenviolated.

ThefunctionoftheCourtistoensureobservanceoftheConventionanditsprotocols.

TheCourtdoesnothavethefunctionofrectifyingerrorsmadebydomesticjudgesinapplyingdomesticlaw.NordoestheCourttaketheplaceofdomesticcourtsinassessingtheevidence.ItisincorrecttoviewtheCourtasacourtof‘fourthinstance’towhichallaspectsofacasecanbereferred[3].Complaintsthatthedomesticcourtsshouldhavearrivedatadifferentdecision(i.e.adecisionmorefavourabletotheap-plicant)aredeclaredinadmissibleasbeingmanifestlyill-founded.

ItmakesnodifferenceifthecomplaintiscouchedintermsofaviolationofArticle6oftheConvention.Thisarticleguaranteesonlyafairandpublichearingofcertainwell-definedcategoriesofdisputesbeforeanindependentandimpartialtribunal.Itdoesnotalsoguaranteethatdomesticproceedingswillarriveatthecorrectresult.

Misconception 2: An initial letter is in any event sufficient to comply with the six-month period.

TheCourtregularlyreceivesletterssubmittingacomplaintingeneraltermsshortlybe-foretheexpiryoftheperiodprescribedbyArticle35§1oftheConvention;sometimestheselettersincludeastatementthatthegroundsofthecomplaintwillbeexplainedinmoredetaillater.Oftenacopyofajudgmentofadomesticcourtisenclosedwiththeletter.

Howanapplicationmustbelodgedisdescribedindetailinapracticedirection.This,togetherwithotherinvaluableinformation,canbefoundontheCourt’swebsite[4].

AlthoughtheCourtisindeedpreparedtoacceptasimpleletterforthepurposesofcompliancewiththesix-monthrule,thelettermustprovideasufficientdescriptionofthecomplaint:inotherwords,itmustinanyeventsetoutthefactsonwhichtheappli-cationisbasedandspecifytherightswhichareallegedtohavebeenviolated,whetherornotwithreferencestoarticlesoftheConventionanditsprotocols.

TheCourttreatsthedateofdispatchofthelettercontainingthisinformationasthedateofintroductionoftheapplication[5].Forthispurpose,theCourtis,inprinciple,preparedtoacceptthedateoftheletteritself,unlessofcoursethereisaninexplicabledifferencebetweenthedateofthelatterandthedateofdispatchasevidencedbythepostmark.Iftheletterisundatedandthepostmarkisillegible,thedateofintroductionwillbethedateofreceiptattheRegistryoftheCourt.

Afaxedapplicationwillbeacceptedprovidedthatthesignedoriginalcopy,bearingoriginalsignatures,isreceivedbypostwithin5daysthereafter.

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Thesix-monthperiodprescribedbyArticle35(1)oftheConventionisanabsolutetime-limit.Noprocedureforrectificationofdefaultisavailable.

Aninitialletterwhichmerelystatesthatanapplicationwillbesubmitteddoesnotqua-lifyassubmissionofanapplication,evenifthedocumentsfromthefileofthedomesticproceedingsareenclosed:itisthereforenotsufficienttoallegethatthedomesticproceedingswereunfairandthenrefertoanenclosedfileoftheproceedings.Norisitpossibletoexpandthescopeofacomplaintaftertheexpiryofthesix-monthperiod.

Itshouldbenotedforthesakeofcompletenessthatthesix-monthperiodrunsfromthedayonwhichtheapplicant(orhiscounsel)becomesawareorcouldhavebecomeawareofthelastdomesticjudgment.Inprinciple,theperiodisthereforecalculatedfromthedateofthepronouncement,ifpublic;where,however,thedomesticlawpres-cribesnotificationinwrittenformtheperiodiscalculatedfromthedateofserviceordispatchofthejudgment[6].ItisfortheapplicanttoconvincetheCourtthatitshoulduseadifferentdate.

Misconception 3:

An application may be submitted within six months of a judgment on applica-tion for review or a judgment in a non-admissible appeal

Casessometimesoccurinwhichanapplicantlodgesanappealorappealincassationagainstajudgmentordecisionagainstwhichnoappealliesandthensubmitsanappli-cationtotheCourt.Therearealsocasesinwhichanapplicantappliesforanextraordi-naryremedybeforeapplyingtotheCourt.

InsuchcasestheCourtcalculatestheperiodofsixmonthsfromthedecisiongivenattheconclusionoftheordinaryproceedings.Theapplicantis,afterall,expectedtohaveexhaustedevery‘effectiveremedy’.Aremedywhichisavailabletohimonlyincertainexceptionalcircumstances,arequestforleavetoexerciseadiscretionarypoweroraremedynotprovidedbydomesticlawcannotbedeemedtobeaneffec-tiveremedy.Ajudgmentonanapplicationforrevisionofafinaljudgment,ajudgmentgivenonanappeallodgedbyapublicauthoritytosafeguardthequalityofthecase-laworadecisiononapetitionforapardondonotthereforeinterruptthesix-monthperiod[7].Eventhereopeningofordinaryproceedingsdoesnotsuspendtherunningoftheperiod,unlessthisisactuallyfollowedbyanewsubstantivehearingofthecase[8].

Misconception 4:

If a complaint has been made in a letter, it is not necessary to file the applica-tion form.

Rule47§1oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatindividualapplicantsmustmakeuseoftheformprovidedbytheRegistryunlessthePresidentoftheSectionconcerneddeci-desotherwise.Thisprovisionisstrictlyenforced.

TheRegistrysendstheformtotheapplicantafterreceiptofthefirstletter.TheformcanalsobefoundontheCourt’swebsite[9].

Ifthecomplainthasalreadybeensetoutfullyinaletter,itisnotnecessarytorepeatitverbatimintheform.Insuchacaseitissufficientmerelytorefertotheletterintheform.

Formsthatareincompleteorunsignedarereturnedtotheapplicant.Theconsequen-cesofanydelaythatoccursasaresultarebornebytheapplicant.

Misconception 5: A lawyer who states that he is acting on behalf of his client need not submit a written authority to act

Rule45§2oftheRulesofCourtstatesthatrepresentativesmustsubmitapowerofattorneyorwrittenauthoritytoact.Nodistinctionismadeforthispurposebetweenrepresentativeswhoareregisteredasadvocateandotherrepresentatives.

Ifcounseldoesnotsupplyawrittenauthoritytoact,thecasecannotbeheardbytheCourt.InsuchcasestheRegistrysendsareminder.Thiscausesdelay(whichcansome-timesbecostlyfortheapplicant).

TheRegistrysuppliesamodelformofauthoritywhoseuseisnotmandatory(i.e.unliketheapplicationform)butisnonethelessrecommended.Thismodelprovidesforexpressacceptanceoftheauthoritybythelegalrepresentative.ThismodeltoocanbefoundontheCourt’swebsite[10].

Sometimesanapplicantmayhaveauthorisedalawyertoactforhim,butthelawyer’sagreementisnotevidentfromthedocuments.InsuchacasetheRegistryrequeststheapplicanttoarrangeforhislawyertoacknowledgetotheCourtthatheisacting.Until

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thishashappened,thecorrespondenceiscontinuedwiththeapplicantinperson.

Misconception 6:

The applicant has a full year in which to supplement his complaint by means of the application form, written authority and supporting documents

Afterreceiptoftheapplicant’sfirstcommunication,theRegistrysendstheapplicantaletterenclosingthetextoftheConvention,thetextofRules45and47oftheRulesofCourt(detailingtheformalitiestobecompletedinrespectoftheapplication),a‘notefortheguidanceofpersonswishingtoapplytotheCourt’(explainingtheadmissibilitycriteriaappliedbytheCourt)andtheapplicationformwithnotes.

Thelastparagraphofpoint18oftheletter(Englishversion)readsasfollows:

‘Iftheapplicationformandalltherelevantdocumentsarenotsentbeforethattimelimit(i.e.

notlaterthan6monthsafterthedateofthefirstcommunicationfromtheRegistry)thiswill

betakentomeanthatyounolongerwishtopursuetheexaminationofyourcaseand your file will be destroyed.’

Themisconceptionoccursbecausetheapplicant(orhisorhercounsel)readsonlythisparagraph.Elsewhereintheletterthereisawarningabouttheconsequencesofun-necessarydelay.ThesanctionimposedbytheCourtinthisrespectisthatthedateonwhichtheapplicationisfiledistakentobethedateoftheform(oranevenlaterdateiftheformisnotcompletedcorrectly)ratherthanthedateoftheletterofcomplaint.Thismaymeanthattheapplicationisdeemedtobefiledafterthesix-monthperiod.

Thenotefortheguidanceofprospectiveapplicants(point17)statesthattheCourtwishestheformtobefileddiligently.Althougharequesttoextendtheperiodofsubmittingtheformandallrelevantdocumentsmaybemade,theapplicantisrespon-siblefor–andbearstheriskof–ensuringthattheCourtreceivesawrittendocumentadequatelyexplainingthecomplaintwithinsixmonthsofthelastdomesticdecision[11].

AftertheCourthasreceivedtheapplication,theapplicantcanberequestedtosup-plementit,wherenecessary,withanymissingdocumentaryevidenceorotherinforma-tion.TheRegistrymaysetatime-limitforthispurpose.Althoughfailuretocomplywiththistime-limitdoesnotnecessarilyinvalidatetheapplication,itisadvisabletosubmitareasonedrequestforanextensionbeforetheexpiryoftheperiodifitbecomesclearthatthetime-limitcannotbemet.

ItshouldbeemphasisedthattheperiodofayearspecifiedinthelastparagrapoftheletteroftheRegistryisdefinitelynottheperiodavailabletotheapplicant.Theappli-cantcannotderiveanyrightsfromit.Thefileiskeptforoneyearafterthelastcommu-nicationfromtheapplicant.IftheapplicantdoesnotcommunicatewithinthisperiodthefilewillbedestroyedinordertomakespaceintheCourt’salreadyoverfullarchivesforapplicationsthatarepursuedwithgreaterdiligence.

Acomplainantwhocontactsthecourtagainafteralongperiodofsilencemayberequiredtoexplainhissilence,evenifithaslastedforlessthanayear.TheCourtmayattachconsequencestosuchsilence.

Misconception 7:

The entire proceedings can be conducted in Dutch

UnliketheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanCommunities,theCourtofHumanRightsinStrasbourghasonlytwoofficiallanguages,namelyEnglishandFrench(Rule34§1oftheRulesofCourt).

Theoriginalapplicationandthesupportingdocumentsattachedtoitcanbesubmit-tedinalanguageotherthanEnglishorFrenchprovidedthatthelanguageusedisanofficiallanguageofoneoftheContractingParties(i.e.theStatesthatarepartytotheConvention)[12](Rule34§2oftheRulesofCourt).

UntilrecentlyanapplicantwasallowedtousesuchanotherlanguageuntiltheCourtdecidedontheadmissibilityofhisorherapplication.However,aspreparationsareunderwaytointroduceaconcentratedprocedurewithoutaseparateadmissibilityde-cision,inanticipationoftheentryintoforceofProtocolNo.14[13],theuseofEnglishorFrenchhasbeenmademandatoryatanearlierstageintheproceedings,namelyfromthedateonwhichthecomplaintiscommunicatedtotherespondentgovernment.

Theobligationsubsequentlytouseoneofthetwoofficiallanguagesappliesonlytopleadings/observationssubmittedbyoronbehalfoftheapplicant.Itfollowsthattheapplicantneednotsubmitanunsolicitedtranslationofdocumentsfromthedomesticcourtfile,unlessofcoursethesedocumentsaredrawnupinalanguagewhichisnotanofficiallanguageofoneoftheContractingParties.

Ifahearingisheld,theapplicantshoulduseoneofthetwoofficiallanguages(Rule34§2)oftheRulesofCourt).HearingsareheldonlyveryexceptionallyandgenerallytakeplacebeforetheCourtrulesonadmissibility.

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ThePresidentmaybeaskedtograntleavefortheuseofalanguageotherthanEnglishorFrench.Thisisdecidedonacase-by-casebasis.However,evenifleaveisgiven,theadvocateisexpectedtohaveanadequatepassiveknowledgeofEnglishorFrench(Rule36§5oftheRules).

Misconception 8:

Rule 39 concerns interlocutory injunction proceedings

Rule39oftheRulesofCourt,‘Interimmeasures’,readsasfollows:

“1.TheChamberor,whereappropriate,itsPresidentmay,attherequestofapartyorof

anyotherpersonconcerned,orofitsownmotion,indicatetothepartiesanyinterimmeasure

whichitconsidersshouldbeadoptedintheinterestsofthepartiesoroftheproperconduct

oftheproceedingsbeforeit.…”

Thisexpresslyconcernsinterimmeasures.Unlikesome‘provisional’measuresorderedbydomesticcourts,whichinmanycasesareineffectpermanent,theyapplyonlyforthetermoftheproceedingsinStrasbourg.

Inpractice,measuresareadoptedunderRule39onlyifthereisaprimafaciecasethattheapplicantwillotherwisesufferirreparabledamageforwhichpecuniarycompensa-tionafterthecloseoftheproceedingswillnotprovidesatisfaction.Thiswillbeparticu-larlytrueinthecaseofexpulsionsorextraditionstocountriesthatarenotpartytotheConvention,ifthereislikelytobeaviolationofArticle2or3oftheConventionorofProtocolNo.6.

Thereisthereforenopointinapplying,forexample,forsuspensionoftheexecutionofaprisonsentenceorremandincustody,temporaryorpermanentclosureofacon-structionproject,theissueofatemporaryresidencepermitoranadvanceonsocialbenefitorcompensation.

Forthesakeofcompleteness,itshouldbenotedthatthereisalsonopointinreques-tingapplicationofRule39ifthecomplaintisobviouslyinadmissibleforanyreasonwhatever,forexamplebecausetheeffectivedomesticremedieshavenotbeenexhaus-ted.

Misconception 9:

The identity of the applicant can be kept secret from the respondent govern-ment

Inprinciple,theprocedureoftheCourtispublic(withtheexceptionofsettlementnegotiations,Article38§2oftheConvention).

Rule47§3oftheRulesofCourtprovides,however,forthepossibilityofconcealingtheidentityofanapplicantfromthepublic.TheapplicantmustgivereasonswhensubmittingsucharequesttothePresident.

EvenifthePresidentgrantssucharequest,theidentityisnotconcealedfromtheres-pondentgovernment.Theapplicationandalldocumentsrelatingtoitarecopiedinfullandsenttotherepresentativeofthegovernmentconcerned.

Article36§1oftheConventionisinsufficientlyknown.Itreadsasfollows:

‘InallcasesbeforeaChamberortheGrandChamber,aHighContractingPartyoneofwhosenationalsisanapplicantshallhavetherighttosubmitwrittencommentsandtotakepartinhearings.’

UnderRule44§1oftheRulesofCourt,whennoticeofanapplicationisgiventotherespondentgovernmentandtheapplicanthasthenationalityofanotherStatewhichispartytotheConvention,acopyoftheapplicationwillbetransmittedtothegovern-mentofthatotherContractingParty.ItisnotthepracticeoftheCourttowithholdinformationfromthatothergovernment.

Therehavebeencasesinwhichanapplicantwasonthepointofbeingdeported(ex-traditedorexpelled)fromoneContractingPartytoanotherContractingPartyofwhichhewasanational.TheCourthasneverconcealedtheidentityoftheapplicantfromtheotherStateinsuchcases.

Misconception 10: It is sufficient to make a request for compensation in the application form

ItiscommonknowledgethattheCourtmayaward‘justsatisfaction’(pecuniarycom-pensation)toaninjuredparty(Article41oftheConvention).

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Intheprocedurefollowedasstandardhitherto(inwhichaseparatedecisionismadeonadmissibility)theapplicantisrequiredtosubmithisrequestforcompensationaftertheadmissibilitydecision.Theapplicantsubmitshisrequesteitherinhisobservationsonthemeritsoftheapplicationor–ifhedoesnotsubmitsuchobservations–inaseparatedocumentwhichhemustfilewithintwomonthsoftheadmissibilitydecision(Rule60§1oftheRulesofCourt).

Underthenewconcentratedprocedurewithoutaseparateadmissibilitydecision,whichwillnowbecomethestandardprocedure,theapplicantwillberequiredtosub-mithisrequestforjustsatisfactionafterthecomplainthasbeencommunicatedtotherespondentgovernment.

TheRegistrarnotifiestheapplicantbyletterofthepossibilityofsubmittingsucharequestandoftheperiodwithinwhichitmustbesubmitted.

TheCourtdisregardsarequestforjustsatisfactionwhichissubmittedtooearlyintheproceedingsandisnotrepeatedinthecorrectstageoftheproceedings,orwhichislodgedoutoftime[14].

Theapplicantmustsubmititemisedparticularsofallclaimsandcoststogetherwithrelevantsupportingdocuments(Rule60§2oftheRules),failingwhichtheCourtmayrejecttheclaimsinwholeorinpart[15].

Misconception 11:

Appeal against an admissibility decision that goes against the applicant lies to the Grand Chamber

Article28oftheConventionexplicitlystatesthatthedecisionofacommitteeofthreejudgesis‘final’.Nosuchprovision,itistrue,existsinArticle29oftheConvention,whichsetsouttheprocedureifthecomplaintisnotrejectedbyacommittee.

AccordingtothetextoftheConvention(Article43(1)),referralofthecasetotheGrandChambermayberequested‘withinaperiodofthreemonthsfromthedateofthejudgmentoftheChamber’.Sucharequestissubmittedtoapaneloffivejudges.Thepanelacceptstherequest‘ifthecaseraisesaseriousquestionaffectingtheinter-pretationorapplicationoftheConventionortheprotocolsthereto,oraseriousissueofgeneralimportance’(Article43(2)).

However,admissibilitydecisionsarenot‘judgments’withinthemeaningofArticle43

(1).ThisisevidentjustfromArticle45oftheConvention,whereadistinctionismadebetween‘judgments’ontheonehandand‘decisions’declaringapplicationsadmissi-bleorinadmissibleontheother.

Inpractice,arequestforacasetobereferredtotheGrandChamberonthebasisofanadmissibilitydecisionisnotsubmittedtoapaneloffivejudges.

Final observations

Finally,itisemphasisedthatcounselshouldapplytoStrasbourgonlyiftherehasbeenarelativelyseriousviolationoftheConvention.Thelackofself-restraintofapplicants(whetherornotlegallyrepresented)inmanycountrieshasgreatlyincreasedtheworkloadoftheCourt.Itshouldbenotedinthisconnectionthatrelativelyfewcasesinvolveimportantmattersofprinciple.

ThegovernmentsofStatesthatarepartiestotheConvention,whichhavethelastwordonthetextoftheConvention,haverespondedtothissituationbydrawingupanewadmissibilitycriterion.WhenProtocolNo.14entersintoforce,theCourtwillbeabletoturnapplicantsawayifitconsidersthattheyhavenotsufferedasignificantdisadvan-tagefromanallegedviolation,eveniftheircomplaintsareinthemselveswell-founded(seeArticle12ofProtocolNo.14).

[1] Englishtranslationof:EenklachtindienenbijhetEHRM:elfveelvoorkomendemisverstanden,

in:Advocatenblad18februari2005,p.110-115.

[2] ProfessorMyjerisajudgeoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights;MrMol,MrKempeesand

MsVanSteijnarelegalsecretariesoftheCourt(Article25oftheConvention);andMsBock-

winkelwasatthetimeatraineejudgesecondedtotheCourtbytheNetherlandsMinistryof

Justice.

[3] SeetherecentcaseofBaumann v Austria,no.76809/01,§49,7October2004.

[4] http://www.echr.coe.int/

[5] SeeasarecentexampleLatif et al. v. the United Kingdom(admissibilitydecision),no.

72819/01,29January2004.

[6] SeetherecentcaseofSarıbek v. Turkey (admissibilitydecision),no.41055/98,9September

�� ��

2004.

[7] SeetherecentcaseofBerdzenishvili v. Russia(admissibilitydecision),no.31679/03,29Janu-

ary2004.

[8] See,inter alia, Bo c ek v. the Czech Republic(admissibilitydecision),no.49474/99,10October

2000.

[9] Seesupranote3.

[10] Seesupranote3.

[11] SeeforexampleLatif et al. v. the United Kingdom(admissibilitydecision),seesupranote3.

[12] Wewould,forpracticalreasons,advisecautionintheuseofuncommonregionalorminority

languages,regardlessofwhethertheyhavethestatusofofficiallanguageinaparticulararea,

andgenerallyrecommendtheuseofmorewidelyusedlanguagesifpossible.

[13] Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms(Strasbourg,13May2004);CouncilofEuropeTreatySeries/SériedesTraitésdu

Conseildel’Europeno.194.Untilnow(November2007)theProtocolNo.14hasbeenratified

by46ofthe47ContractingParties.

[14] SeeforexampleWillekens v. Belgium,no.50859/99,§27,24April2003.

[15] See,forexample,therecentcaseofCumpa na and Maza re v. Romania[GrandChamber],no.

33348/96,§134,17December2004.

[1] Englishtranslationof:EenklachtindienenbijhetEHRM:elfveelvoorkomendemisverstanden,

in:Advocatenblad18februari2005,p.110-115.

[2] ProfessorMyjerisajudgeoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights;MrMol,MrKempeesand

MsVanSteijnarelegalsecretariesoftheCourt(Article25oftheConvention);andMsBock-

winkelwasatthetimeatraineejudgesecondedtotheCourtbytheNetherlandsMinistryof

Justice.

[3] SeetherecentcaseofBaumann v Austria,no.76809/01,§49,7October2004.

[4] http://www.echr.coe.int/

[5] SeeasarecentexampleLatif et al. v. the United Kingdom (admissibilitydecision),no.

72819/01,29January2004.

[6] Seetherecentcaseof Sarıbek v. Turkey(admissibilitydecision),no.41055/98,9September

2004.

[7] SeetherecentcaseofBerdzenishvili v. Russia(admissibilitydecision),no.31679/03,29Janu-

ary2004.

[8] See, inter alia, Bo c ek v. the Czech Republic(admissibilitydecision),no.49474/99,10October

2000.

[9] Seesupranote3.

[10] Seesupranote3.

[11] SeeforexampleLatif et al. v. the United Kingdom(admissibilitydecision),seesupranote3.

[12] Wewould,forpracticalreasons,advisecautionintheuseofuncommonregionalorminority

languages,regardlessofwhethertheyhavethestatusofofficiallanguageinaparticulararea,

andgenerallyrecommendtheuseofmorewidelyusedlanguagesifpossible.

[13] Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms(Strasbourg,13May2004);CouncilofEuropeTreatySeries/SériedesTraitésdu

Conseildel’Europeno.194.Untilnow(November2007)theProtocolNo.14hasbeenratified

by46ofthe47ContractingParties.

[14] SeeforexampleWillekensv.Belgium,no.50859/99,§27,24April2003.

[15] See, for example, the recent case of Cumpa na and Maza re v. Romania[GrandChamber],no.

33348/96,§134,17December2004.

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In toga venenum?the limits of freedom of expression in and around the courtroom in the

case-law of the European Court of Human Rights [1]

byEgbertMyjer,judgeEuropeanCourtofHumanRights

 

Introductory remarks

Humanrightscasesseldomcauseonetosmile.Exceptionscanbemadeforatleastsomecasesconcerningfreedomofexpression,andmorespecificallycasesinwhichvenomousremarksaremadeinandaroundnatio-nalcourtrooms.ThefirstcasesinwhichtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshadtodealwiththisis-suerelatedtojournalistswhowereprosecutedforcontemptofcourt(Sunday Times v. United Kingdom,judgmentof26April1979)orforhavingpublishedcriticalremarksonthewaynationaljudgeshadhandledacase(forinstance:De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium,judgmentof27January1997,WormversusAustria,judgmentof29August1997;Kobenter and Standard Verlags GMBH v. Austria,judgment2November2006).Morerecentlytherehavealsobeencasesinwhichthepartytotheproceedingsorthedefencelawyercomplainedaboutbeingdisciplinedforthewayhehadexpressedhisviewsinandaroundthenationalcourtroom.Inthelattercasessometimesalsofairhearingissues(Article6)wereinvoked.

InthefollowingIwillelaborateonthreespecificcases.Thefirsttwoareinfact‘leadingStrasbourgcases’,thelastoneisjustquotedtoindicatethatfreedomofexpressionforalawyeralsocountsoutsidethecourtroom.ThefirstcaseisthecaseNikula v. Finland(judgmentof21March2002)inwhichadefencecounselwasconvictedofnegligentpublicdefamationinrelationtoremarksmadeincourtabouttheprosecutor.Inthesecondcase,Kyprianou v. Cyprus(GrandChamberjudgmentof15December2005),alawyerwasconvictedofcontemptofcourtforhavingmadearemarkabouttheverysamecourtthatconvictedhim.Thethirdcase,Amihalachioaie v. Moldova(judgmentof20April2004),isaboutalawyerwhohadanadministrativefineimposedonhimforhavingmadesomecriticalcommentsabouttheMoldovanconstitutionalcourtinanewspaperinterview.

Justtomakesurethatthingsarebalancedoutalittlebit,Iwillconcludemypresenta-tionbyreferringtothecasesDaud v. Portugal(judgmentof21April1998)andHermi v. Italy (GrandChamberjudgmentof18October2004)andthewayinwhichtheEuro-peanCourtitselfdealswithinadequaterepresentationbythedefencecounsel.In cauda venenum. Asanaside,IwillaskyourattentionforthevividanddaringprosewithwhichmyMaltesecolleagueVanniBonelloinhisdissentingopinionhasrecentlycriticisedamemberoftheMoldovanjudiciary(Flux nr. 2 v. Moldova,judgmentof3July2007).

Irealisethatbyhavingmadetheabove-mentionedchoices,Iwillbeunabletosupplyyouwiththespicydetailsofsomerelatedcases,likethecaseofSchöpfer v. Switzer-land (judgment20May1998),aboutdisciplinaryactionsimposedonalawyerfollowingcriticismsofthejudiciarymadeatapressconference,whichwereconsideredbythedisciplinarybodyas versteckte Reklame(subliminaladvertising)and Effekthascherei (cheapshowmanship);thecaseofSadayv.Turkey(judgment30March2006),aboutadefendantwhomadethefollowingoralsubmissionstothejudges(inTurkish,ofcourse:)‘ (..) que je me vois maintenant jugé devant un tribunal instauré pour protéger la dictature fasciste du capitalisme, ce en vertu des lois relevant des régimes fascistes les plus sanglants que le monde n’ait jamais vu (..)’andwhowassubsequentlyhandedanextraprisonsentenceof2months;thecaseVeraart v. The Netherlands(judgmentof30November2006)werealawyerinaradiointerviewmadecriticalremarksaboutatherapistwhohadhelpedawomantorecoversupposedmemoriesaboutincest,allegedlycommittedbyhergrandfather,herfatherandtwoofherbrothers–Veraartbeingthelawyeroftheparents-:‘(..) Someone like that should not be allowed to be a therapist surely? That man, he lives in the North Holland province, he should, er, grow cabbages for the market…He should go and grow cabbages out there but he should absolutely not be working with with with patients, or with people who are in emergency situations (..)’.Asaconsequencehewasdisciplined(admonished)becausehehadexpressedhimselfinunnecessarywoundingterms.ThosewhoareinterestedcanreadthewholetextofthesejudgmentsontheCourt’ssite:www.echr.coe.int(HUDOC).

The case Nikula

The facts:

AnneNikula,aFinnishnationalbornin1962,isalawyerlivinginHelsinki.In1992-3sheactedasdefencecounselintwosetsofcriminalproceedingsbeforeKokkolaCityCourtconcerningthewinding-upofcompanies,inwhichherclientwaschargedwith

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sanctionsorpressurewhenactinginaccordancewiththeirprofessionalstandards”.Lawyers

should,however,“respectthejudiciaryandcarryouttheirdutiestowardsthecourtinaman-

nerconsistentwithdomesticlegalandotherrulesandprofessionalstandards”(principlesI:4

andIII:4).’

TheCourtconsideredthattherehadbeenaninterferencewiththeexerciseofMrsNikula’srighttofreedomofexpression(Article10para1).ItthenwentontoconsiderwhetherthatinterferencewasjustifiedunderArticle10§2.TheCourtacceptedthattheinterferencehadbeenprescribedbylawandhadservedthelegitimateaimofprotectingthereputationandtherightoftheprosecutor.However,thenextquestion,whethertheinterferencehadbeen‘necessaryinademocraticsociety’,wasanswe-redinthenegative.IndoingsotheCourtfirstrepeatedthegeneralprincipleswhichshouldbetakenintoaccountandthenappliedtheseprinciplestoMrsNikula’scase:

(i) General principles

Inexercisingitssupervisoryjurisdiction,theCourtmustlookattheimpugnedinterferencein

thelightofthecaseasawhole,includinginthiscasethecontentoftheremarksheldagainst

theapplicantandthecontextinwhichshemadethem.Inparticular,itmustdetermine

whethertheinterferenceinquestionwas“proportionatetothelegitimateaimspursued”

andwhetherthereasonsadducedbythenationalauthoritiestojustifyitare“relevantand

sufficient”.Indoingso,theCourthastosatisfyitselfthatthenationalauthoritiesapplied

standardswhichwereinconformitywiththeprinciplesembodiedinArticle10and,moreover,

thattheybasedthemselvesonanacceptableassessmentoftherelevantfacts.

TheCourtreiteratesthatthespecialstatusoflawyersgivesthemacentralpositioninthe

administrationofjusticeasintermediariesbetweenthepublicandthecourts.Suchaposition

explainstheusualrestrictionsontheconductofmembersoftheBar.Moreover,thecourts

–theguarantorsofjustice,whoseroleisfundamentalinaStatebasedontheruleoflaw

–mustenjoypublicconfidence.Regardbeinghadtothekeyroleoflawyersinthisfield,itis

legitimatetoexpectthemtocontributetotheproperadministrationofjustice,andthusto

maintainpublicconfidencetherein(see Schöpfer v. Switzerland,judgmentof20May1998,

Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III,pp.1052-53,§§29-30,withfurtherreferences).

TheCourtalsoreiteratesthatArticle10protectsnotonlythesubstanceoftheideasand

informationexpressedbutalsotheforminwhichtheyareconveyed.Whilelawyerstooare

certainlyentitledtocommentinpublicontheadministrationofjustice,theircriticismmust

notoverstepcertainbounds.Inthatconnection,accountmustbetakenoftheneedtostrike

therightbalancebetweenthevariousinterestsinvolved,whichincludethepublic’srightto

receiveinformationaboutquestionsarisingfromjudicialdecisions,therequirementsofthe

properadministrationofjusticeandthedignityofthelegalprofession.Thenationalaut-

horitieshaveacertainmarginofappreciationinassessingthenecessityofaninterference,

aidingandabettinginfraudandabusingapositionoftrust.Aformerco-suspectwassummonedbythepublicprosecutortotestify.Mrs.Nikulaobjectedandpreparedamemoranduminwhichshedenouncedthetacticsofthepublicprosecutorasconstitu-ting“manipulationandunlawfulpresentationofevidence”.HerobjectionwasrejectedbytheCityCourt,whichdealtwiththecaseatfirstinstance,andherclientwaseventu-allyconvicted.

TheprosecutorsubsequentlyinitiatedcriminalproceedingsagainstherfordefamationintheCourtofAppeal.On22August1994shewasconvictedofdefamation“withoutbetterknowledge”,i.e.merelyexpressingone’sopinionaboutsomeone’sbehaviourandnotimputinganoffencewhilstknowingthatithasnotbeencommitted.AfinewasimposedandshewasorderedtopaydamagestotheprosecutorandcoststotheState.BothMrs.NikulaandtheprosecutorappealedtotheSupremeCourt,whichupheldtheCourtofAppeal’sreasonsbutwaivedthefine,consideringthattheoffencewasminor;theobligationtopaydamagesandcostswas,however,confirmed.

MrsNikulathenlodgedanapplicationagainsttheRepublicofFinland,complainingthatherrighttoexpressherselffreelyinhercapacityasdefencecounselwasviolatedinthatshewasfoundguiltyofhavingdefamedtheprosecutor(Article10).ThirdpartycommentswerereceivedfromInterights(TheInternationalCentrefortheLegalPro-tectionofHumanRights)

The law:

TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsheldbyfivevotestotwothattherehadbeenaviolationofArticle10oftheConvention.Againbyfivevotestotwoitawardedher5,042euros(EUR)inrespectofnon-pecuniarydamageand,unanimously,EUR1,900forpecuniarydamageandEUR6,500forcostsandexpenses.Inthelaw-partofitsjudg-menttheCourtalsomadereferencetothefollowingprinciplesadoptedbyinternatio-nalorganisations:

Accordingtoparagraph20oftheBasicPrinciplesontheRoleofLawyers(adoptedin1990by

theEighthUnitedNationsCongressonthePreventionofCrimeandtheTreatmentofOffen-

ders),lawyersshouldenjoy“civilandpenalimmunityforrelevantstatementsmadeingood

faithinwrittenororalpleadingsintheirprofessionalappearancesbeforeacourt,tribunalor

otherlegaloradministrativeauthority”.

InitsRecommendation(2000)21theCommitteeofMinistersoftheCouncilofEurope

recommendsthegovernmentsofMemberStatestotakeorreinforce,asthecasemaybe,all

measurestheyconsidernecessarywithaviewtoimplementingthefreedomofexerciseof

theprofessionoflawyer.Forinstance,“lawyersshouldnotsufferorbethreatenedwithany

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25above).Generallyspeaking,thisdifferenceshouldprovideincreasedprotectionforstate-

mentswherebyanaccusedcriticisesaprosecutor,asopposedtoverballyattackingthejudge

orthecourtasawhole.

ItistruethattheapplicantaccusedprosecutorT.ofunlawfulconduct,butthiscriticismwas

directedattheprosecutionstrategypurportedlychosenbyT.,thatistosay,thetwospecific

decisionswhichhehadtakenpriortothetrialandwhich,intheapplicant’sview,constitu-

ted“rolemanipulation...breachinghisofficialduties”.Althoughsomeofthetermswere

inappropriate,hercriticismwasstrictlylimitedtoT.’sperformanceasprosecutorinthecase

againsttheapplicant’sclient,asdistinctfromcriticismfocusingonT.’sgeneralprofessional

orotherqualities.InthatproceduralcontextT.hadtotolerateveryconsiderablecriticismby

theapplicantinhercapacityasdefencecounsel.

TheCourtnotes,moreover,thattheapplicant’ssubmissionswereconfinedtothecourtroom,

asopposedtocriticismagainstajudgeoraprosecutorvoicedin,forinstance,themedia

(see Schöpfer,citedabove,p.1054,§34,andPrince v. the United Kingdom,no.11456/85,

Commissiondecisionof13March1986,DecisionsandReports46,p.222).NorcantheCourt

findthattheapplicant’scriticismoftheprosecutor,beingofaproceduralcharacter,amoun-

tedtopersonalinsult(seeW.R. v. Austria,no.26602/95,Commissiondecisionof30June

1997(unreported)inwhichcounselhaddescribedtheopinionofajudgeas“ridiculous”,and

Mahler v. Germany,no.29045/95,Commissiondecisionof14January1998(unreported),

wherecounselhadassertedthattheprosecutorhaddraftedthebillofindictment“inastate

ofcompleteintoxication”).

TheCourtfurtherreiteratesthateventhoughtheapplicantwasnotamemberoftheBarand

thereforenotsubjecttoitsdisciplinaryproceedings,shewasnonethelesssubjecttosuper-

visionanddirectionbythetrialcourt.ThereisnoindicationthatprosecutorT.requestedthe

presidingjudgetoreacttotheapplicant’scriticisminanyotherwaythanbydecidingonthe

proceduralobjectionofthedefenceastohearingtheprosecutionwitnessinquestion.The

CityCourtindeedlimiteditselftodismissingthatobjection,whereasthepresidingjudge

couldhaveinterruptedtheapplicant’spleadingsandrebukedherevenintheabsenceofa

requesttothatendfromtheprosecutor.TheCityCourtcouldevenhaverevokedherap-

pointmentascounselunderthelegal-aidschemeorexcludedherascounselinthetrial.In

thatconnection,theCourtwouldstressthedutyofthecourtsandthepresidingjudgetodi-

rectproceedingsinsuchamannerastoensuretheproperconductofthepartiesandabove

allthefairnessofthetrial–ratherthantoexamineinasubsequenttrialtheappropriateness

ofaparty’sstatementsinthecourtroom.

Itistruethat,followingtheprivateprosecutioninitiatedbyprosecutorT.,theapplicantwas

convictedmerelyofnegligentdefamation.ItislikewiserelevantthattheSupremeCourt

waivedhersentence,consideringtheoffencetohavebeenminorinnature.Eventhough

butthismarginissubjecttoEuropeansupervisionasregardsboththerelevantrulesand

thedecisionsapplyingthem(seeSchöpfer,citedabove,pp.1053-54,§33).However,inthe

fieldunderconsiderationinthepresentcasetherearenoparticularcircumstances–suchas

aclearlackofcommongroundamongmemberStatesregardingtheprinciplesatissueora

needtomakeallowanceforthediversityofmoralconceptions–whichwouldjustifygranting

thenationalauthoritiesawidemarginofappreciation(see,forexample,TheSundayTimesv.

the United Kingdom (no. 1),judgmentof26April1979,SeriesAno.30,pp.35-37,§59,with

furtherreferencetoHandyside v. the United Kingdom,judgmentof7December1976,Series

Ano.24).

(ii) Application of the above principles to the instant case

Turningtothefactsofthepresentcase,theCourt’staskistodeterminewhether,inallthe

circumstances,therestrictiononMsNikula’sfreedomofexpressionanswereda“pressing

socialneed”andwas“proportionatetothelegitimateaimpursued”andwhetherthereasons

adducedbythenationalcourtsinjustificationofitwere“relevantandsufficient”.

Thelimitsofacceptablecriticismmayinsomecircumstancesbewiderwithregardtocivil

servantsexercisingtheirpowersthaninrelationtoprivateindividuals.Itcannotbesaid,ho-

wever,thatcivilservantsknowinglylaythemselvesopentoclosescrutinyoftheireveryword

anddeedtotheextenttowhichpoliticiansdoandshouldthereforebetreatedonanequal

footingwiththelatterwhenitcomestocriticismoftheiractions.Civilservantsmustenjoy

publicconfidenceinconditionsfreeofundueperturbationiftheyaretobesuccessfulin

performingtheirtasks.Itmaythereforeprovenecessarytoprotectthemfromoffensiveand

abusiveverbalattackswhenonduty(seeJanowski v. Poland [GC],no.25716/94,§33,ECHR

1999-I,withfurtherreferences).Inthepresentcasetherequirementsofsuchprotectiondo

nothavetobeweighedinrelationtotheinterestsofthefreedomofthepressorofopen

discussionofmattersofpublicconcernsincetheapplicant’sremarkswerenotutteredinsuch

acontext.

TheCourtwouldnotexcludethepossibilitythat,incertaincircumstances,aninterference

withcounsel’sfreedomofexpressioninthecourseofatrialcouldalsoraiseanissueunder

Article6oftheConventionwithregardtotherightofanaccusedclienttoreceiveafairtrial.

“Equalityofarms”andotherconsiderationsoffairnessthereforealsomilitateinfavourofa

freeandevenforcefulexchangeofargumentbetweentheparties.TheCourtnevertheless

rejectstheapplicant’sargumentthatdefencecounsel’sfreedomofexpressionshouldbe

unlimited.

Thepresentapplicantwasconvictedforhavingcriticisedaprosecutorfordecisionstakenin

hiscapacityasapartytocriminalproceedingsinwhichtheapplicantwasdefendingoneof

theaccused.TheCourtreiteratesthedistinctioninvariousContractingStatesbetweenthe

roleoftheprosecutorastheopponentoftheaccused,andthatofthejudge(seeparagraph

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ortoretract.Hedidneither.ThecourtthenfoundMrKyprianoutobeincontemptofcourtandsentencedhimtofivedays’imprisonment,enforcedimmediately,whichtheydeemedtobethe“onlyadequateresponse”;“aninadequatereactiononthepartofthelawfulandcivilisedorder,asexpressedbythecourtswouldmeanacceptingthattheauthorityofthecourtsbedemeaned”.MrKyprianouservedtheprisonsentenceimmediately,althoughhewasinfactreleasedearly,inaccordancewiththerelevantlegislation.HisappealwasdismissedbytheSupremeCourton2April2001.

MrKyprianouthenlodgedanapplicationagainsttheRepublicofCyprus.Heargued(amongotherthings)thathehadnotreceivedahearingbyanimpartialtribunalwithinthemeaningofArticle6§1oftheConvention;thathehadbeenpresumedguiltybytheLimassolAssizeCourtbeforehehadbeenaffordedanopportunitytodefendhimself(Article2§2);thattheLimassolAssizeCourthadfailedtoinformhimindetailoftheaccusationmadeagainsthim(Article6§3(a))andthathisconvictionviolatedArticle10oftheConvention.

HiscasewasfirstdealtwithbyaChamberofsevenjudges.InitsChamberjudgmentof27January2004theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsheldunanimouslythattherehadbeenaviolationofArticle6§§1,2and3(a)andthatitwasnotnecessarytoexaminetheapplicant’scomplaintunderArticle10.TheCourtawardedtheapplicant15,000euros(EUR)fornon-pecuniarydamageandEUR10,000forcostsandexpen-ses.On19April2004theCypriotGovernmentrequestedthatthecasebereferredtotheGrandChamberandthepaneloftheGrandChamberacceptedtherequeston14June2004.ThirdpartyinterventionsonthecontemptofcourtissuesofthecasewerereceivedfromtheGovernmentsofIreland,MaltaandtheUnitedKingdom.

The law:

TheGrandChamber(17judges)heldunanimouslythattherehadbeenaviolationofArticle6§1oftheConvention,bysixteentoonethatitwasnotnecessarytoexamineseparatelytheapplicant’scomplaintunderArticle6§2oftheConvention,unani-mouslythatitwasnotnecessarytoexamineseparatelytheapplicant’scomplaintunderArticle6§3(a)oftheConventionandunanimouslythattherehadbeenaviolationofArticle10oftheConvention.TheCourtawardedtheapplicant15,000euros(EUR)fornon-pecuniarydamageandEUR35,000forcostsandexpenses.

ThereasoninginthejudgmentisespeciallyimportantbecauseofthewaytheCourtdealtwiththeimpartialityissues(Article6§1)inrelationtoanationalcontemptofcourtprocedure.Veryexceptionally,ifnotforthefirsttime,thepresumptionofperso-nalimpartialitywasfoundtohavebeenrebutted.TheCourtfollowstheusualpattern:theCourtrepeatsthegeneralprinciplesestablishedinitscase-lawandthenapplies

thefineimposedonherwasthereforelifted,herobligationtopaydamagesandcosts

remained.Evenso,thethreatofanexpostfactoreviewofcounsel’scriticismofanother

partytocriminalproceedings–whichthepublicprosecutordoubtlessmustbeconsidered

tobe–isdifficulttoreconcilewithdefencecounsel’sdutytodefendtheirclients’interests

zealously.Itfollowsthatitshouldbeprimarilyforcounselthemselves,subjecttosupervision

bythebench,toassesstherelevanceandusefulnessofadefenceargumentwithoutbeing

influencedbythepotential“chillingeffect”ofevenarelativelylightcriminalpenaltyoran

obligationtopaycompensationforharmsufferedorcostsincurred.

Itisthereforeonlyinexceptionalcasesthatrestriction–evenbywayofalenientcriminal

penalty–ofdefencecounsel’sfreedomofexpressioncanbeacceptedasnecessaryina

democraticsociety.BoththeActingProsecutingCounsel’sdecisionnottobringcharges

againsttheapplicantandtheminorityopinionoftheSupremeCourtsuggestthatthena-

tionalauthoritieswerealsofarfromunanimousastotheexistenceofsufficientreasonsfor

theinterferencenowinquestion.IntheCourt’sviewsuchreasonshavenotbeenshownto

existandtherestrictiononMsNikula’sfreedomofexpressionthereforefailedtoanswerany

“pressingsocialneed”.

InthesecircumstancestheCourtconcludesthatArticle10oftheConventionhasbeen

breachedinthattheSupremeCourt’sjudgmentupholdingtheapplicant’sconvictionand

orderinghertopaydamagesandcostswasnotproportionatetothelegitimateaimsoughtto

beachieved.(..)’

The case Kyprianou

The facts:

On14February2001MrKyprianouwasinvolvedinamurdertrial,defendinganac-cusedbeforetheCourtofAssizeofLimassol.Duringthetrial,heobjectedtohavingbeeninterruptedduringhiscross-examinationofaprosecutionwitness,soughtleavetowithdrawand,whenleavewasnotgranted,heallegedthatmembersofthecourtweretalkingtoeachotherandsendingeachothernotes(“ravasakia”-whichcanmean,amongotherthings,shortandsecretletters/notes,orloveletters,ormessageswithunpleasantcontents).Thejudgessaidtheyhadbeen“deeplyinsulted”“asper-sons”bytheapplicant.Theyaddedthattheycouldnot“conceiveofanotheroccasionofsuchamanifestandunacceptablecontemptofcourtbyanyperson,letaloneanadvocate”andfeltthat“ifthecourt’sreaction[were]notimmediateanddrastic,…justice[wouldsuffer]adisastrousblow”.Theygavehimthechoice,eithertomaintainwhathehadsaidandtogivereasonswhyasentenceshouldnotbeimposedonhim

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p.793,§32).Inotherwords,theCourthasrecognisedthedifficultyofestablishingabreach

ofArticle6onaccountofsubjectivepartialityandforthisreasonhasinthevastmajorityof

casesraisingimpartialityissuesfocusedontheobjectivetest.However,thereisnowater-

tightdivisionbetweenthetwonotionssincetheconductofajudgemaynotonlyprompt

objectivelyheldmisgivingsastoimpartialityfromthepointofviewoftheexternalobserver

(objectivetest)butmayalsogototheissueofhisorherpersonalconviction(subjectivetest).

TheCourthasheldforinstancethatthejudicialauthoritiesarerequiredtoexercisemaxi-

mumdiscretionwithregardtothecaseswithwhichtheydealinordertopreservetheir

imageasimpartialjudges.Thatdiscretionshoulddissuadethemfrommakinguseofthe

press,evenwhenprovoked.Itisthehigherdemandsofjusticeandtheelevatednatureof

judicialofficewhichimposethatduty(see Buscemi v. Italy,no.29569/95,§67,ECHR1999-VI).

Thus,whereacourtpresidentpubliclyusedexpressionswhichimpliedthathehadalready

formedanunfavourableviewoftheapplicant’scasebeforepresidingoverthecourtthat

hadtodecideit,hisstatementsweresuchastojustifyobjectivelytheaccused’sfearsasto

hisimpartiality(seeBuscemi v. Italy,citedabove,§68).Ontheotherhand,inanothercase,

whereajudgeengagedinpubliccriticismofthedefenceandpubliclyexpressedsurprise

thattheaccusedhadpleadednotguilty,theCourtapproachedthematteronthebasisof

thesubjectivetest(Lavents v. Latvia,no.58442/00,§§118and119,28November2002).

AnanalysisoftheCourt’scase-lawdisclosestwopossiblesituationsinwhichthequestion

ofalackofjudicialimpartialityarises.Thefirstisfunctionalinnature:wherethejudge’s

personalconductisnotatallimpugned,butwhereforinstancetheexerciseofdifferent

functionswithinthejudicialprocessbythesameperson(seethePiersack v. Belgiumcase,

citedabove),orhierarchicalorotherlinkswithanotheractorintheproceedings(seecourt

martialcases,forexampleGrievesv.theUnitedKingdom,citedabove,andMiller and Others v. the United Kingdom,nos.45825/99,45826/99and45827/99,26October2004),

objectivelyjustifymisgivingsastotheimpartialityofthetribunal,whichthusfailstomeet

theConventionstandardundertheobjectivetest(seeparagraph118above).Thesecondis

ofapersonalcharacterandderivesfromtheconductofthejudgesinagivencase.Interms

oftheobjectivetest,suchconductmaybesufficienttogroundlegitimateandobjectively

justifiedapprehensionsasintheabove-mentionedBuscemicase,butitmayalsobeofsuch

anatureastoraiseanissueunderthesubjectivetest(forexampletheLavents case,cited

above)andevendisclosepersonalbias.Inthiscontext,therefore,whetheracasefallsto

bedealtwithunderonetestortheother,orboth,willdependontheparticularfactsofthe

contestedconduct.

(b) Application of the above principles to the instant case

TheapplicantexpressedhisgrievanceasbeingthatthejudgesoftheLimassolAssizeCourt

hadfailedtosatisfytherequirementofimpartialityunderboththeobjectiveandsubjective

theseprinciplestothecasebeforeit:

‘(a) The general principles

TheCourtreiteratesattheoutsetthatitisoffundamentalimportanceinademocraticsoci-

etythatthecourtsinspireconfidenceinthepublicandaboveall,asfarascriminalprocee-

dingsareconcerned,intheaccused(seethePadovani v. Italyjudgmentof26February1993,

SeriesAno.257-B,p.20,§27).TothatendArticle6requiresatribunalfallingwithinitsscope

tobeimpartial.Impartialitynormallydenotesabsenceofprejudiceorbiasanditsexistence

orotherwisecanbetestedinvariousways.TheCourthasthusdistinguishedbetweena

subjectiveapproach,thatisendeavouringtoascertainthepersonalconvictionorinterestofa

givenjudgeinaparticularcase,andanobjectiveapproach,thatisdeterminingwhetherheor

sheofferedsufficientguaranteestoexcludeanylegitimatedoubtinthisrespect(seePiersack v. Belgium,judgmentof1October1982,SeriesAno.53,§30andGrieves v. the United Kingdom[GC],no.57067/00,§69,ECHR2003-XII).Astothesecondtest,whenappliedtoa

bodysittingasabench,itmeansdeterminingwhether,quiteapartfromthepersonalconduct

ofanyofthemembersofthatbody,thereareascertainablefactswhichmayraisedoubtsas

toitsimpartiality.Inthisrespectevenappearancesmaybeofsomeimportance(seeCastillo Algar v. Spain,judgmentof28October1998,Reports1998-VIII,p.3116,§45andMorel v. France,no.34130/96,§42,ECHR2000-VI).Whenitisbeingdecidedwhetherinagivencase

thereisalegitimatereasontofearthataparticularbodylacksimpartiality,thestandpoint

ofthoseclaimingthatitisnotimpartialisimportantbutnotdecisive.Whatisdecisiveis

whetherthefearcanbeheldtobeobjectivelyjustified(seeFerrantelli and Santangelo v. Italy,

judgmentof7August1996, Reports 1996-III,pp.951-52,§58,andWettstein v. Switzerland,no.33958/96,§44,CEDH2000-XII).

InapplyingthesubjectivetesttheCourthasconsistentlyheldthatthepersonalimpartiality

ofajudgemustbepresumeduntilthereisprooftothecontrary(seeHauschildt v. Den-mark,judgmentof24May1989,SeriesAno.154,p.21,§47).Asregardsthetypeofproof

required,theCourthas,forexample,soughttoascertainwhetherajudgehasdisplayed

hostilityorill-willorhasarrangedtohaveacaseassignedtohimselfforpersonalreasons

(seeDe Cubber,citedabove,§25).Theprinciplethatatribunalshallbepresumedtobefree

ofpersonalprejudiceorpartialityislongestablishedinthecase-lawoftheCourt(see,for

example,theLe Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgiumjudgmentcitedabove,p.25,

§58).Itreflectsanimportantelementoftheruleoflaw,namelythattheverdictsofatribunal

shouldbefinalandbindingunlesssetasidebyasuperiorcourtonthebasisofirregularity

orunfairness.Thisprinciplemustapplyequallytoallformsoftribunalincludingjuries(see

Holm v. Sweden,judgmentof25November1993,SeriesAno.279-A,p.14,§30).Although

insomecases,itmaybedifficulttoprocureevidencewithwhichtorebutthepresumption,it

mustberememberedthattherequirementofobjectiveimpartialityprovidesafurtherimpor-

tantguarantee(seePullar v. the United Kingdom,judgmentof10June1996,Reports1996-III,

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nooneshouldbeajudgeinhisorherowncauseand,consequently,astotheimpartialityof

thebench(seeDemicoli v. Malta,judgmentof27August1991,SeriesAno.210,pp.18-19,

§§41-42).

TheCourtthereforefindsthat,onthefactsofthecaseandconsideringthefunctionaldefect

whichithasidentified,theimpartialityoftheAssizeCourtwascapableofappearingopento

doubt.Theapplicant’sfearsinthisrespectcanthusbeconsideredtohavebeenobjectively

justifiedandtheAssizeCourtaccordinglyfailedtomeettherequiredConventionstandard

undertheobjectivetest.

(ii) Subjective test

Theapplicantfurtherallegedthatthejudgesconcernedactedwithpersonalbias.

Thislimboftheapplicant’scomplaintwasthereforedirectedatthejudges’personalcon-

duct.TheCourtwillaccordinglyexamineanumberofaspectsofthejudges’conductwhich

arecapableofraisinganissueunderthesubjectivetest.

Firstly,thejudgesintheirdecisionsentencingtheapplicantacknowledgedthattheyhad

been“deeplyinsulted”“aspersons”bytheapplicant.Eventhoughthejudgesproceededto

saythatthishadbeentheleastoftheirconcerns,intheCourt’sviewthisstatementinitself

showsthatthejudgeshadbeenpersonallyoffendedbytheapplicant’swordsandconduct

andindicatespersonalembroilmentonthepartofthejudges(seeparagraph18above).

Secondly,theemphaticlanguageusedbythejudgesthroughouttheirdecisionconveyeda

senseofindignationandshock,whichrunscountertothedetachedapproachexpectedof

judicialpronouncements.Inparticular,thejudgesstatedthattheycouldnot“conceiveof

anotheroccasionofsuchamanifestandunacceptablecontemptofcourtbyanyperson,let

aloneanadvocate”andthat“ifthecourt’sreactionisnotimmediateanddrastic,wefeelthat

justicewillhavesufferedadisastrousblow”(seeparagraph18above).

Thirdly,theythenproceededtoimposeasentenceoffivedays’imprisonment,enforcedim-

mediately,whichtheydeemedtobethe“onlyadequateresponse”.Inthejudges’opinion,

“aninadequatereactiononthepartofthelawfulandcivilisedorder,asexpressedbythe

courtswouldmeanacceptingthattheauthorityofthecourtsbedemeaned”(seepara-

graph18above).

Fourthly,thejudgesexpressedtheopinionearlyonintheirdiscussionwiththeapplicantthat

theyconsideredhimguiltyofthecriminaloffenceofcontemptofcourt.Afterdecidingthat

theapplicanthadcommittedtheaboveoffencetheygavetheapplicantthechoice,eitherto

maintainwhathehadsaidandtogivereasonswhyasentenceshouldnotbeimposedonhim

tests.TheCourtproposestoexaminethiscomplaintbyfollowingtheobjectiveandsubjec-

tiveapproacheswithreferencetotheconsiderationsoffunctionalandpersonalpartialityset

outabove(seeparagraphs118-121above).

(i) Objective test

Theapplicantclaimedthat,intheparticularcircumstancesofhiscase,thefactthatthesame

judgesofthecourtinrespectofwhichheallegedlycommittedcontempttried,convictedand

sentencedhim,raisedobjectivelyjustifieddoubtsastotheimpartialityofthatcourt.

TheCourtobservesthatthiscomplaintisdirectedatafunctionaldefectintherelevant

proceedings.Inthisconnectionithasfirsthadregardtotheargumentsputforwardbythe

Governmentandtheinterveningthirdpartiesconcerningtheevolutionofthecommon

lawsystemofsummaryproceedingsinrespectofcontemptofcourtanditscompatibility

withtheConvention.Itnotesinparticulartheincreasingtrendinanumberofcommonlaw

jurisdictionsacknowledgingtheneedtousethesummaryproceduresparingly,afteraperiod

ofcarefulreflectionandtoaffordappropriatesafeguardsforthedueprocessrightsofthe

accused(seeparagraphs46-47,49and52above).

However,theCourtdoesnotregarditasnecessaryordesirabletoreviewgenerallythe

lawoncontemptandthepracticeofsummaryproceedingsinCyprusandothercommon

lawsystems.Itstaskistodeterminewhethertheuseofsummaryproceedingstodealwith

MrKyprianou’scontemptinthefaceofthecourtgaverisetoaviolationofArticle6§1ofthe

Convention.

Inconsideringthisquestion,theCourtrecallsthat,bothinrelationtoArticle6§1ofthe

ConventionandinthecontextofArticle5§3,ithasfounddoubtsastoimpartialitytobe

objectivelyjustifiedwherethereissomeconfusionbetweenthefunctionsofprosecutorand

judge(see,forArticle6§1,mutatis mutandis, Daktaras v. Lithuania,no.42095/98,§§35-38,

ECHR2000-Xand,forArticle5§3,Brincat v. Italy,judgmentof26November1992,Series

Ano.249-A,pp.11-12,§§20-22;Huber v. Switzerland,judgmentof23October1990,Series

Ano.188,pp.17-18,§§41-43andAssenov and Others v. Bulgaria,judgmentof28October

1998,Reports1998-VIII,pp.3298-3299,§§146-150).

Thepresentcaserelatestoacontemptinthefaceofthecourt,aimedatthejudgespersonal-

ly.Theyhadbeenthedirectobjectoftheapplicant’scriticismsastothemannerinwhichthey

hadbeenconductingtheproceedings.Thesamejudgesthentookthedecisiontoprose-

cute,triedtheissuesarisingfromtheapplicant’sconduct,determinedhisguiltandimposed

thesanction,inthiscaseatermofimprisonment.Insuchasituationtheconfusionofroles

betweencomplainant,witness,prosecutorandjudgecouldself-evidentlypromptobjectively

justifiedfearsastotheconformityoftheproceedingswiththetime-honouredprinciplethat

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(i) The general principles

Thetestof“necessityinademocraticsociety”requirestheCourttodeterminewhetherthe

interferencecomplainedofcorrespondedtoa“pressingsocialneed”.TheContractingStates

haveacertainmarginofappreciationinassessingwhethersuchaneedexists,butitgoes

handinhandwithEuropeansupervision,embracingboththelegislationandthedecisions

applyingit,eventhosedeliveredbyanindependentcourt(see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway[GC],no.21980/93,§58,ECHR1999-III,Cumpa na and Maza re v. Romania,cited

above,§88,andNikula v. Finland,citedabove,§46).

Inparticular,theCourtmustdeterminewhetherthemeasuretakenwas“proportionatetothe

legitimateaimspursued”(seetheSundayTimesv. the United Kingdom (no.1),op.cit,p.38,

§62andChauvy and Others v. France,no.64915/01,§70,ECHR2004-VI).Indoingso,the

Courthastosatisfyitselfthatthenationalauthorities,basingthemselvesonanacceptable

assessmentoftherelevantfacts,appliedstandardswhichwereinconformitywiththeprin-

ciplesembodiedinArticle10(see,amongmanyotherauthorities, Zana v. Turkey,judgment

of25November1997,Reports1997-VII,pp.2547-48,§51).Inaddition,thefairnessofthe

proceedings,theproceduralguaranteesafforded(see,mutatis mutandis, Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom,no.68416/01,§95,ECHR2005-...)andthenatureandseverityofthe

penaltiesimposed(seeCeylan v. Turkey[GC],no.23556/94,§37,ECHR1999-IV; Tammer v. Estonia,no.41205/98,§69,ECHR2001-I;Skałka v. Poland,citedabove,§§41-42andLešník v. Slovakia,no.35640/97,§§63-64,ECHR2003-IV)arefactorstobetakenintoaccountwhen

assessingtheproportionalityofaninterferencewiththefreedomofexpressionguaranteed

byArticle10.

Thephrase“authorityofthejudiciary”includes,inparticular,thenotionthatthecourtsare,

andareacceptedbythepublicatlargeasbeing,theproperforumforthesettlementof

legaldisputesandforthedeterminationofaperson’sguiltorinnocenceonacriminalcharge

(seeWorm v. Austria,judgmentof29August1997,Reports1997-V,§40).Whatisatstake

asregardsprotectionoftheauthorityofthejudiciaryistheconfidencewhichthecourtsin

ademocraticsocietymustinspireintheaccused,asfarascriminalproceedingsarecon-

cerned,andalsointhepublicatlarge(see,mutatis mutandis,amongmanyotherauthorities,

Fey v. Austria,judgmentof24February1993,SeriesAno.255-A,p.12).

Thespecialstatusoflawyersgivesthemacentralpositionintheadministrationofjusticeas

intermediariesbetweenthepublicandthecourts.Suchapositionexplainstheusualrestric-

tionsontheconductofmembersoftheBar.Regardbeinghadtothekeyroleoflawyersin

thisfield,itislegitimatetoexpectthemtocontributetotheproperadministrationofjustice,

andthustomaintainpublicconfidencetherein(seeAmihalachioaie v. Moldova,no.60115/00,

§27,ECHR2004-III,Nikula v. Finland,citedabove,§45andSchöpfer v. Switzerland,cited

above,pp.1052-53,§§29-30,withfurtherreferences).

ortoretract.Hewas,therefore,infactaskedtomitigate“thedamagehehadcausedbyhis

behaviour”ratherthandefendhimself(seeparagraphs17and18above).

AlthoughtheCourtdoesnotdoubtthatthejudgeswereconcernedwiththeprotectionof

theadministrationofjusticeandtheintegrityofthejudiciaryandthatforthispurposethey

feltitappropriatetoinitiatetheinstantersummaryprocedure,itfinds,inviewoftheabove

considerations,thattheydidnotsucceedindetachingthemselvessufficientlyfromthesitua-

tion.

Thisconclusionisreinforcedbythespeedwithwhichtheproceedingswerecarriedoutand

thebrevityoftheexchangesbetweenthejudgesandMrKyprianou.

Againstthisbackgroundandhavingregardinparticulartothedifferentelementsofthe

judges’personalconducttakentogether,theCourtfindsthatthemisgivingsofMrKyprianou

abouttheimpartialityoftheLimassolAssizeCourtwerealsojustifiedunderthesubjective

test.

(iii) Review by the Supreme Court

Finally,theCourtsharestheChamber’sviewthattheSupremeCourtdidnotremedythe

defectinquestion.Thepossibilitycertainlyexiststhatahigherorthehighestcourtmight,in

somecircumstances,makereparationfordefectsthattookplaceinthefirst-instanceprocee-

dings(see De Cubber v. Belgiumcitedabove,p.14,§33).Inthepresentcase,althoughthe

partiesdisagreeastotheprecisescopeandthepowersoftheSupremeCourt,itisclearthat

ithadthepowertoquashthedecisiononthegroundthattheLimassolAssizeCourthadnot

beenimpartial.However,itdeclinedtodosoandupheldtheconvictionandsentence.Asa

consequence,itdidnotcurethefailinginquestion(seeFindlay v. the United Kingdom,cited

above,p.263,§§78-79,DeHaan v. the Netherlands,judgmentof26August1997,Reports

1997-IV,p.1379,§§52-55).

Inthelightoftheforegoingandhavingexaminedthefactsofthecaseunderboththeob-

jectiveandsubjectivetestsenshrinedinitscase-law,theCourtfindsthattheLimassolAssize

CourtwasnotimpartialwithinthemeaningofArticle6§1oftheConvention.(..)’

Asfarasthefreedomofexpressionissuesareconcerned,theCourtfolloweditsusualpattern:itfirstestablishedthattherehadbeenaninterference,thattheinterferencehadbeenprescribedbylawandthatithadpursuedthelegitimateaimofmaintainingtheauthorityofthejudiciarywithinthemeaningofArticle10§2oftheConvention.Theonlyquestionatissuewaswhethertheinterferencewiththeapplicant’sfreedomofexpressionhadbeen‘necessaryinademocraticsociety’:

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ItwassubsequentlyupheldbytheSupremeCourt.

Theapplicant’sconductcouldberegardedasshowingacertaindisrespectforthejudgesof

theAssizeCourt.Nonetheless,albeitdiscourteous,hiscommentswereaimedatandlimited

tothemannerinwhichthejudgesweretryingthecase,inparticularconcerningthecross-

examinationofawitnesshewascarryingoutinthecourseofdefendinghisclientagainsta

chargeofmurder.

Havingregardtotheabove,theCourtisnotpersuadedbytheGovernment’sargumentthat

theprisonsentenceimposedontheapplicantwascommensuratewiththeseriousnessof

theoffence,especiallyinviewofthefactthattheapplicantwasalawyerandconsideringthe

alternativesavailable(seeparagraphs79and98above).

Accordingly,itistheCourt’sassessmentthatsuchapenaltywasdisproportionatelysevere

ontheapplicantandwascapableofhavinga“chillingeffect”ontheperformancebylawy-

ersoftheirdutiesasdefencecounsel(seeNikula v. Finland,citedabove,§49,Steur v. the Netherlands,citedabove,§44).TheCourt’sfindingofproceduralunfairnessinthesummary

proceedingsforcontempt(seeparagraphs122-135above)servestocompoundthislackof

proportionality(seeparagraph171above).

Thisbeingso,theCourtconsidersthattheAssizeCourtfailedtostriketherightbalance

betweentheneedtoprotecttheauthorityofthejudiciaryandtheneedtoprotecttheap-

plicant’srighttofreedomofexpression.Thefactthattheapplicantonlyservedpartofthe

prisonsentence(seeparagraph20above)doesnotalterthatconclusion.

TheCourtaccordinglyholdsthatArticle10oftheConventionhasbeenbreachedbyreason

ofthedisproportionatesentenceimposedontheapplicant.(..)’

The case Amilalachioaie

The facts:

InacasereferredtoitbyagroupofdeputiesandtheOmbudsmanofMoldova,theConstitutionalCourtgaveadecisionon15February2000declaringunconstitutionalthestatutoryprovisionsrequiringlawyerstobemembersoftheMoldovanBarCouncil.MrAmilhalachioaie,alawyerandChairmanoftheMolovanBarCouncil,criticisedthedecisioninaninterviewwithajournalist,whichwaspublishedinthejournal“Econo-micAnalysis”.Inafinaldecisionof6March2000theConstitutionalCourtimposedanadministrativefineequivalentto36eurosontheapplicantforbeingdisrespect-

Article10protectsnotonlythesubstanceoftheideasandinformationexpressedbutalso

theforminwhichtheyareconveyed.Whilelawyerstooarecertainlyentitledtocomment

inpublicontheadministrationofjustice,theircriticismmustnotoverstepcertainbounds.

Moreover,alawyer’sfreedomofexpressioninthecourtroomisnotunlimitedandcertain

interests,suchastheauthorityofthejudiciary,areimportantenoughtojustifyrestrictionson

thisright.Nonetheless,evenifinprinciplesentencingisamatterforthenationalcourts,the

Courtrecallsitscase-lawtotheeffectthatitisonlyinexceptionalcircumstancesthatrestric-

tion–evenbywayofalenientcriminalpenalty-ofdefencecounsel’sfreedomofexpression

canbeacceptedasnecessaryinademocraticsociety(seeNikula v. Finland,citedabove,§§

54-55).

Itisevidentthatlawyers,whiledefendingtheirclientsincourt,particularlyinthecontextof

adversarialcriminaltrials,canfindthemselvesinthedelicatesituationwheretheyhaveto

decidewhetherornottheyshouldobjecttoorcomplainabouttheconductofthecourt,kee-

pinginmindtheirclient’sbestinterests.Theimpositionofacustodialsentence,wouldinevi-

tably,byitsverynature,havea“chillingeffect”,notonlyontheparticularlawyerconcerned

butontheprofessionoflawyersasawhole(seeNikula v. Finland,citedabove,§§54and Steur v. the Netherlands,citedabove,§44).Theymightforinstancefeelconstrainedintheir

choiceofpleadings,proceduralmotionsandthelikeduringproceedingsbeforethecourts,

possiblytothepotentialdetrimentoftheirclient’scase.Forthepublictohaveconfidencein

theadministrationofjusticetheymusthaveconfidenceintheabilityofthelegalprofessionto

provideeffectiverepresentation.Theimpositionofaprisonsentenceondefencecounselcan

incertaincircumstanceshaveimplicationsnotonlyforthelawyer’srightsunderArticle10but

alsothefairtrialrightsoftheclientunderArticle6oftheConvention(seeNikula v. Finland,

citedabove,§49andSteurv.theNetherlands,citedabove,§37).Itfollowsthatany“chilling

effect”isanimportantfactortobeconsideredinstrikingtheappropriatebalancebetween

courtsandlawyersinthecontextofaneffectiveadministrationofjustice.

(ii) Application of the above principles to the instant case

Inthepresentcasetheapplicantwasconvictedoftheoffenceofcontemptin facie curiaeby

theLimassolAssizeCourtwhilstdefendinganaccusedinamurdertrial.Thejudgesconsi-

deredthattheapplicanthadshowedmanifestdisrespecttothecourtbywayofwordsand

conduct.

TheCourtmustascertainwhetheronthefactsofthecaseafairbalancewasstruckbetween,

ontheonehand,theneedtoprotecttheauthorityofthejudiciaryand,ontheotherhand,

theprotectionoftheapplicant’sfreedomofexpressioninhiscapacityasalawyer.

TheLimassolAssizeCourtsentencedtheapplicanttofivedays’imprisonment.Thiscannot

butberegardedasaharshsentence,especiallyconsideringthatitwasenforcedimmediately.

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theircriticismdoesnotoverstepcertainbounds.Furthermore,Article10protectsnotonly

thesubstanceoftheideasandinformationexpressedbutalsotheforminwhichtheyare

conveyed.Inthatconnection,accountmustbetakenoftheneedtostriketherightbalance

betweenthevariousinterestsinvolved,whichincludethepublic’srighttoreceiveinformation

aboutquestionsarisingfromjudicialdecisions,therequirementsoftheproperadministration

ofjusticeandthedignityofthelegalprofession(seeSchöpfer v. Switzerland,judgmentof

20May1998,Reports1998-III,pp.1053-54,§33).

WhiletheContractingStateshaveacertainmarginofappreciationinassessingwhethersuch

aneedexists,itgoeshandinhandwithaEuropeansupervision,embracingboththelawand

thedecisionsapplyingit(seeTheSundayTimesv. the United Kingdom(no.2),judgmentof

26November1991,SeriesAno.217,pp.28-29,§50).

Inperformingitssupervisoryrole,theCourthastolookattheinterferencecomplainedofin

thelightofthecaseasawhole,includingthetenoroftheapplicant’sremarksandthecon-

textinwhichtheyweremade,anddeterminewhetherit“correspond[ed]toapressingsocial

need”,was“proportionatetothelegitimateaimpursued”andwhetherthereasonsadduced

bythenationalauthoritiestojustifyitare“relevantandsufficient”(seeTheSundayTimes

(no.2),ibid.,andNikula v. Finland,no.31611/96,§44,ECHR2002-II).

2. Application of the aforementioned principles to the instant case

TheCourtnotesthattheapplicantwasconvictedforstatinginan“interview”giventoa

newspaperthatthedecisionoftheConstitutionalCourt“[would]producetotalanarchyinthe

legalprofession”andthatthequestionthereforearosewhethertheConstitutionalCourtwas

constitutional.HewasalsoconvictedforsayingthatthejudgesoftheConstitutionalCourt

probably“[did]notregardtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsasanauthority”.

Suchaconvictionmayberegardedasaninterferencewiththeapplicant’srighttorespectfor

hisfreedomofexpression,asguaranteedbyArticle10oftheConvention.

TheCourtfindsattheoutsetthattheinterferenceinquestionwas“prescribedbylaw”,within

themeaningofthesecondparagraphofArticle10oftheConvention.Inthatconnection,it

notesthattheissuebetweenthepartiesintheinstantcaseiswhetherArticle82oftheCode

ofConstitutionalProcedure,whichsetsouttheactsforwhichanadministrativepenaltymay

beimposed,shouldbeconstruedbroadlyornarrowly.

TheCourtnotesthatthewordingofArticle82containsageneralprovisionthatmakes

anyoneshowinganobviouslackofregardtowardstheConstitutionalCourtliabletoafine.

Althoughtheactsthatgiverisetoliabilityarenotdefinedorsetoutwithabsoluteprecision

fultowardsit.Itcensuredhimforstatingthat,asaresultofthedecision,“completechaoswouldreigninthelegalprofession”andthatthequestionthereforearoseastowhethertheConstitutionalCourtwasconstitutional.Thecourtalsopunishedhimforassertingthatitsjudges“probablydidnotconsidertheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightstobeanauthority”.

The law:

TheCourtheldbysixvotestoonethattherehadbeenaviolationofArticle10oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.Itheld,byfivevotestotwo,thatthefindingofaviolationconstitutedjustsatisfactionforanynon-pecuniarydamagesustainedbytheapplicant.Theapplicantforgottoaskforthemoneyofthefineback.

InthiscasetheCourtfinallyfoundthattherehadbeenno‘pressingsocialneed’torestrictthefreedomofexpressionoftheapplicant:

1. General principles

TheCourtreiteratesthata“law”withinthemeaningofArticle10§2oftheConventionisa

normthatisformulatedwithsufficientprecisiontoenablethecitizentoregulatehisconduct

andtoforesee,toadegreethatisreasonableinthecircumstances,theconsequenceswhich

agivenactionmayentail.However,thosenormsneednotbeforeseeablewithabsolute

certainty,eventhoughsuchcertaintyisdesirable,asthelawmustbeabletokeeppacewith

changingcircumstances.Accordingly,manylawsareinevitablycouchedintermswhich,toa

greaterorlesserextent,arevagueandwhoseinterpretationandapplicationarequestions

ofpractice(seeTheSundayTimes v. the United Kingdom(no.1),judgmentof26April1979,

SeriesAno.30,p.31,§49,andHertel v. Switzerland,judgmentof25August1998,Reports of Judgments and Decisions1998-VI,pp.2325-26,§35).

Thedegreeofprecisiondependstoaconsiderabledegreeonthecontentoftheinstrument

inissue,thefielditisdesignedtocover,andthenumberandstatusofthosetowhomitis

addressed(seeGroppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland,judgmentof28March1990,

SeriesAno.173,p.26,§68).

TheCourtreiteratesthatthespecialstatusoflawyersgivesthemacentralpositioninthe

administrationofjusticeasintermediariesbetweenthepublicandthecourts.Suchaposition

explainstheusualrestrictionsontheconductofmembersoftheBar(seeCasado Coca v. Spain,judgmentof24February1994,SeriesAno.285-A,p.21,§54).

However,astheCourthaspreviouslyhadoccasiontosay,lawyersareentitledtofreedom

ofexpressiontooandtocommentinpublicontheadministrationofjustice,providedthat

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What can be concluded from the abovementioned case-law?

* Whenalawyerisconvictedandsentencedorwhendisciplinaryactionistakenagainsthiminconnectionwhichhesaidinhisprofessionalcapacity,thiswillbeconsideredasaninterferencewiththeexerciseofhisfreedomofexpression,aslaiddowninArticle10§1oftheConvention.

* Aninterferenceshouldbelookedatinthelightofthecaseasawhole,includingthecontentoftheremarksandthecontextinwhichtheyweremade.

* AccordingtoArticle10§2oftheConvention,aninterferencemaybejustifiedifitisprescribedbylaw,pursuesoneofmoreofthelegitimateaimsreferredtoinparagraph2andis‘necessaryinademocraticsociety’forachievingsuchanaimoraims.

* Inmanycasesitisthe‘necessityinademocraticsociety’testwhichisnotmet.Thereshouldbea‘pressingsocialneed’torestrictthefreedomofexpressionandanyrestrictionshouldbe‘proportionatetothelegitimateaimpursued’.Therea-sonsadducedbytheauthoritiestojustifyitmustbe‘relevantandsufficient’.

* Thespecialstatusoflawyersgivesthemacentralpositionintheadministrationofjusticeasintermediariesbetweenthepublicandthecourts.SuchapositionexplainstheusualrestrictionsontheconductofmembersoftheBar.Moreover,thecourts–theguarantorsofjustice,whoseroleisfundamentalinaStatebasesontheruleoflaw–mustenjoypublicconfidence.Regardbeinghadtothekeyroleoflawyersinthisfield,itislegitimatetoexpectthemtocontributetotheproperadministrationofjustice.

* Whilelawyersarecertainlyentitledtocommentinpublicontheadministrationofjustice,theircriticismmustnotoverstepcertainbounds.Inthatconnection,accountmustbetakenoftheneedtostriketherightbalancebetweenthevariousinterestsinvolved,whichincludethepublic’srighttoreceiveinformationaboutquestionsarisingfromjudicialdecisions,therequirementsoftheproperadmini-strationofjusticeandthedignityofthelegalprofession.Thenationalauthoritieshaveacertainmarginofappreciationinassessingthenecessityofaninterference,butthismarginissubjecttoEuropeansupervisionasregardsboththerelevantrulesandthedecisionsapplyingthem.

* Itisevidentthatlawyers,whiledefendingtheirclientsincourt,particularlyinthe

inthelegislation,theCourtfindsthatinviewofhislegaltrainingandprofessionalexperience

asChairmanoftheBar,theapplicantcouldreasonablyhaveforeseenthathisremarkswere

liabletofallwithinthescopeoftheaforementionedprovisionoftheCodeofConstitutional

Procedure.

Itfurtherconsidersthattheinterferencepursuedalegitimateaim,asitwasjustifiedbythe

needtomaintainboththeauthorityandtheimpartialityofthejudiciary,withinthemeaning

ofthesecondparagraphofArticle10oftheConvention.Itmustnowdeterminewhetherthat

interferencewas“necessaryinademocraticsociety”.

TheCourtnotesthattheapplicant’scommentsweremadeonanissueofgeneralinterest

inthecontextofafiercedebateamonglawyersthathadbeensparkedoffbyaConstitu-

tionalCourtdecisiononthestatusoftheprofessionthathadbroughttoanendthesystem

wherebylawyerswereorganisedwithinasinglestructure,theMoldovanBarCouncil,which

wasanassociationchairedbytheapplicant.

Inthatconnection,theCourtfindsthateventhoughtheremarksmayberegardedassho-

wingacertainlackofregardfortheConstitutionalCourtfollowingitsdecision,theycannot

bedescribedasgraveorasinsultingtothejudgesoftheConstitutionalCourt(see,mutatis mutandis, Skałka v. Poland,no.43425/98,§34,27May2003;Perna v. Italy [GC],no.48898/99,

§47,ECHR2003-V;andNikula,citedabove,§§48and52).

Furthermore,sinceitwasthepressthatreportedtheapplicant’scomments,someofwhich

theapplicantsubsequentlydeniedmaking,theCourtfindsthatitisnotpossibletoholdhim

responsibleforeverythingthatappearedinthepublished“interview”(seeparagraph14

above).

Lastly,althoughthefineof360lei(equivalentto36euros)imposedontheapplicantisa

seeminglymodestsum,itneverthelesshassymbolicvalueandisindicativeoftheConstitutio-

nalCourt’sdesiretoinflictseverepunishmentontheapplicant,asitisclosetothemaximum

thatcouldbeimposedunderthelegislation.

Inthelightoftheseconsiderations,theCourtfindsthattherewasno“pressingsocialneed”

torestricttheapplicant’sfreedomofexpressionandthatthenationalauthoritieshavenot

furnished“relevantandsufficient”reasonstojustifysucharestriction.Sincetheapplicant

hasnotgonebeyondtheboundsofacceptablecriticismunderArticle10oftheConvention,

theinterferenceinissuecannotberegardedashavingbeen“necessaryinademocratic

society”.

Consequently,therehasbeenaviolationofArticle10oftheConvention.(..)’

�6 �7

lity’aslaiddowninArticle6oftheConvention,itisnotacceptablethatthesamejudgestakethedecisiontoprosecute,trytheissuesarisingfromtheapplicant’sconduct,determinehisguiltandimposethesanction.Insuchasituationtheconfu-sionofrolesbetweencomplainant,witness,prosecutorandjudgecanself-evident-lypromptobjectivelyjustifiedfearsastotheconformityoftheproceedingswiththetime-honouredprinciplethatnooneshouldbeajudgeinhisorherowncauseand,consequently,astotheimpartialityofthebench.

Inadequate representation by defence counsel: the ultimate Strasbourg sanction

Thequestionmaybeasked:doestheEuropeanCourtallowinadequaterepresentationbyadefencecounseltobesanctionedordisciplinedatall?Andjustforclarity:Iwouldnotevendaretosuggestthatalawyerbyusinghisrighttofreedomofexpressionistherebyinadequatelyrepresentinghisclient.Still,theremaybecircumstancesthatalawyer,eitherbyclearly‘under-representing’orequallyby‘over-representing’isshownnottoservetheinterestsofhisclientinanadequatemanner.Oneanswerhasbeengi-venabove:itisthedutyofthecourtsandthepresidingjudgetodirectproceedingsinsuchamannerastoensuretheproperconductofthepartiesandaboveallthefairnessofthetrial.ButStrasbourgcase-lawhasprovidedforoneultimatesanctionasfarasgenuinelyinadequaterepresentationisconcerned:ultimatelythenationalcourtshouldintervenetoprotecttheinterestsofthedefendant.Inthecaseof Daud v. Portugal(judgmentof21April1998)theCourtconsidered:

38.TheCourtreiteratesthattheConventionisdesignedto“guaranteenotrightsthatare

theoreticalorillusorybutrightsthatarepracticalandeffective,andthatassigningcoun-

seldoesnotinitselfensuretheeffectivenessoftheassistancehemayaffordanaccused”

(seetheImbriosciav.Switzerlandjudgmentof24November1993,SeriesAno.275,p.13,

§38).“Nevertheless,aStatecannotbeheldresponsibleforeveryshortcomingonthepart

ofalawyerappointedforlegalaidpurposes...Itfollowsfromtheindependenceofthelegal

professionfromtheStatethattheconductofthedefenceisessentiallyamatterbetweenthe

defendantandhiscounsel,whethercounselbeappointedunderalegalaidschemeorbepri-

vatelyfinanced...[T]hecompetentnationalauthoritiesarerequiredunderArticle6§3(c)to

interveneonlyifafailurebylegalaidcounseltoprovideeffectiverepresentationismanifest

orsufficientlybroughttotheirattentioninsomeotherway”(Kamasinskiv.Austriajudgment

of19December1989,SeriesAno.168,p.33,§65).

39. Intheinstantcasethestarting-pointmustbethat,regardbeinghadtothepreparationand

contextofadversarialcriminaltrials,canfindthemselvesinthedelicatesituationwheretheyhavetodecidewhetherornottheyshouldobjecttoorcomplainabouttheconductofthetrial,keepinginmindtheirclient’sbestinterests.Theimpositionofacustodialsentenceonthelawyerinsuchcaseswouldinevitably,byitsveryna-ture,havea“chillingeffect”,notonlyontheparticularlawyerconcernedbutontheprofessionoflawyersasawhole.Theymightforinstancefeelconstrainedintheirchoiceofpleadings,proceduralmotionsandthelikeduringproceedingsbeforethecourts,quitepossiblytothepotentialdetrimentoftheirclient’scase.Forthepublictohaveconfidenceintheadministrationofjusticetheymusthaveconfidenceintheabilityofthelegalprofessiontoprovideeffectiverepresentation.

* Itshouldbeprimarilyforcounselthemselves,subjecttosupervisionbythebench,toassesstherelevanceandusefulnessofadefenceargumentwithoutbeinginflu-encedbythepotential“chillingeffect”ofevenarelativelylightcriminalpenalty,anobligationtopaycompensationforharmsufferedand/orcostsincurredoreventheadministeringofamereadmonition.

* Onlyinexceptionalcasesarestrictionofthedefencecounsel’sfreedomofexpres-sioncanbeacceptedasnecessaryinademocraticsociety.

* Incertaincasesaninterferencewithdefencecounsel’sfreedomofexpressioncanalsoraiseanissueunderArticle6oftheConventionwithregardtotherightofanaccusedclienttoreceiveafairtrial.‘Equalityofarms‘andotherconsiderationsoffairnessthereforealsomilitateinfavourofafreeandevenforcefulexchangeofargumentbetweentheparties.

* Adifferenceshouldbemadebetweensubmissionsconfinedtoacourtroomandsubmissionsmadeoutsidethecourtroom(press).

* Intheproceduralcontextofacourthearingaprosecutormustsometimestolerateveryconsiderablecriticismbythedefencecounsel.

* Itisthedutyofthecourtsandthepresidingjudgetodirectproceedingsinsuchamannerastoensuretheproperconductofthepartiesandaboveallthefairnessofthetrial–ratherthantoexamineinasubsequenttrialtheappropriatenessofaparty’sstatementsinthecourtroom.

* However,specialattentionshouldbepaidifacaserelatestoanactofcontemptinthefaceofthecourt,aimedatthejudgespersonallyandwheretheyhavebeenthedirectobjectoftheapplicant’scriticismsastothemannerinwhichtheyhavebeenconductingtheproceedings.Fromthepointofviewofthedemandsof‘impartia-

�� ��

lawyerdidnotmakesuchanapplicationisofnoconsequence.Thecircumstancesofthecase

requiredthatthecourtshouldnotremainpassive.

43.Takenasawhole,theseconsiderationsleadtheCourttofindafailuretocomplywiththe

requirementsofparagraph1inconjunctionwithparagraph3(c)ofArticle6fromthestageof

thepreliminaryinquiriesuntilthebeginningofthehearingsbeforetheLisbonCriminalCourt.

Therehasthereforebeenaviolationofthoseprovisions.(..)’

IntheGrandChambercaseofHermi v. Italy(judgmentof18October2006)theEuropeanCourthadtodealwithshortcomingsofadefencelawyerappointedbytheapplicanthimself.ThelawyerhadcomplainedthattheStatehadnotsufficientlyinformedhisdetainedclientofthedateoftheappealhearingandaboutthefactthathehadtoasktobebroughttothehearingroomfivedaysinadvance.TheEuropeanCourt,smellingalawyer’stactic,didnotwanttoplayalongwiththedefencegameandmadesomeverycriticalcommentsaboutthepassivebehaviourofthelawyer.Besides,noviolationwasestablished:

Itisregrettablethatthenoticedidnotindicatethatitwasfortheapplicanttorequest,at

leastfivedaysbeforethedateofthehearing,thathebebroughttothehearingroom(see

paragraph17above).However,theStatecannotbemaderesponsibleforspellingoutinde-

tail,ateachstepintheprocedure,thedefendant’srightsandentitlements.Itisforthelegal

counseloftheaccusedtoinformhisclientastotheprogressoftheproceedingsagainsthim

andthestepstobetakeninordertoasserthisrights.

Intheinstantcase,theapplicantwasinformedofthedateoftheappealhearingon1Sep-

tember2000,thatis,morethantwomonthsinadvanceofthehearing.Thesamewastrue

ofthelawyerappointedbytheapplicant(seeparagraph17above).Duringthattime,the

applicant’slawyersdidnotdeemitnecessarytogetintouchwiththeirclient(seeparagraph

18above).Thereisnothinginthecasefiletoindicatethattheapplicantattemptedtomake

contactwiththem.

TheCourtcannotbutregretthelackofcommunicationbetweentheapplicantandhis

lawyers.Preciseexplanationsconcerningtherequesttobebroughttothehearing,andthe

time-limitandarrangementsformakingsucharequest,couldhavedispelledanydoubtsthe

applicantmighthavehadinthatregard.Inthatconnection,theCourtpointsoutthatitis

clearfromthewordingofArticle599§2oftheCCP(seeparagraph31above)andthecase-

lawoftheCourtofCassation(seejudgmentno.6665of1995–paragraph33above)thata

prisonerwishingtoattendtheappealhearinginthecontextofasummaryproceduremust

makeknownhiswishtobebroughttothehearingatleastfivedaysinadvance.Thatwould

havebeenknowntothelawyersappointedbytheapplicant.

conductofthecasebytheofficiallyassignedlawyers,theintendedoutcomeofArticle6§3

wasnotachieved.TheCourtnotesthatthefirstofficiallyassignedlawyer,beforereporting

sick,hadnottakenanystepsascounselforMrDaud,whotriedunsuccessfullytoconduct

hisowndefence.Astothesecondlawyer,whoseappointmenttheapplicantlearnedofonly

threedaysbeforethebeginningofthetrialattheCriminalCourt,theCourtconsidersthat

shedidnothavethetimesheneededtostudythefile,visitherclientinprisonifnecessary

andpreparehisdefence.Thetimebetweennotificationofthereplacementofthelawyer(23

January1993–seeparagraph19above)andthehearing(26January1993–seeparagraph

20above)wastooshortforaserious,complexcaseinwhichtherehadbeennojudicialinves-

tigationandwhichledtoaheavysentence.TheSupremeCourtdidnotremedythesituation,

sinceinitsjudgmentof30June1993itdeclaredtheappealinadmissibleonaccountofan

inadequatepresentationofthegrounds(seeparagraph23above).

MrDaudconsequentlydidnothavethebenefitofapracticalandeffectivedefenceasre-

quiredbyArticle6§3(c)(seetheGoddiv.Italyjudgmentof9April1984,SeriesAno.76,p.

11,§27).

40.TheCourtmustthereforeascertainwhetheritwasfortherelevantauthorities,whileres-

pectingthefundamentalprincipleoftheindependenceoftheBar,toactsoastoensurethat

theapplicantreceivedtheeffectivebenefitofhisright,whichtheyhadacknowledged.

41. TheCourtnotes,firstly,thattheapplicationforajudicialinvestigationmadebytheapplicant

on15October1992wasrefusedbytheinvestigatingjudgeontheprincipalgroundthatit

waswritteninSpanish(seeparagraphs9–10and14above).Theapplicationof15December,

inwhichtheapplicantaskedthecourttocarryoutcertaininvestigativemeasures,wasrefu-

sedbythejudgeinchargeofthecaseforthesamereason(seeparagraphs17and18above).

Thoserefusalsthemselvesdidnotaffectthefairnessofthetrial,sincethevariousinvestiga-

tivemeasuressoughtbytheapplicantwerecarriedoutduringthetrial.

42.Inhisletterof15December1992,aftermorethaneightmonthshadelapsed,theapplicant

alsoaskedthecourtforaninterviewwithhislawyer,whohadstillnotcontactedhim(see

paragraph17above).Becausetheletterwaswritteninaforeignlanguage,thejudgedisre-

gardedtherequest.Yettherequestshouldhavealertedtherelevantauthoritiestoamanifest

shortcomingonthepartofthefirstofficiallyassignedlawyer,especiallyasthelatterhadnot

takenanystepsincebeingappointedinMarch1992.Forthatreason,andhavingregardto

therefusalofthetwoapplicationsmadeduringthesameperiodbythedefendanthimself,

thecourtshouldhaveinquiredintothemannerinwhichthelawyerwasfulfillinghisdutyand

possiblyreplacedhimsooner,withoutwaitingforhimtostatethathewasunabletoactfor

MrDaud.Furthermore,afterappointingareplacement,theLisbonCriminalCourt,which

musthaveknownthattheapplicanthadnothadanyproperlegalassistanceuntilthen,could

haveadjournedthetrialonitsowninitiative.Thefactthatthesecondofficiallyassigned

�0 �1

mereelevendaysbeforethedateofthehearing,theapplicant’slawyersdidnotrequestthat

MrHermibebroughttothehearingroom.

Itistruethat,attheappealhearing,MrMariniobjectedtotheproceedingsbeingcontinued

inhisclient’sabsence(seeparagraph20above).However,intheCourt’sview,thatobjection,

madeatalatestageandunsupportedbyanystatementfromthedefendanthimself,could

notoutweightheattitudeadoptedbytheapplicant.

Inthelightoftheabove,andtakingaccountinparticularoftheconductoftheapplicant’s

lawyers,theCourtconsidersthattheItalianjudicialauthoritieswereentitledtoconcludethat

theapplicanthadwaived,tacitlybutunequivocally,hisrighttoappearatthehearingof3No-

vember2000beforetheRomeCourtofAppeal.Moreover,theapplicantcouldhaveasserted

thatrightwithouttheneedforexcessiveformalities.

ItfollowsthattherehasbeennoviolationofArticle6oftheConvention.(..)’

TheCourtreiteratesthatwhileArticle6§3(c)confersoneveryonechargedwithacriminal

offencetherightto“defendhimselfinpersonorthroughlegalassistance...”,itdoesnotspe-

cifythemannerofexercisingthisright.ItthusleavestotheContractingStatesthechoiceof

themeansofensuringthatitissecuredintheirjudicialsystems,theCourt’staskbeingonly

toascertainwhetherthemethodtheyhavechosenisconsistentwiththerequirementsofa

fairtrial(seeQuaranta v. Switzerland,judgmentof24May1991,SeriesAno.205,p.16,§30).

InthatconnectionitmustbeborneinmindthattheConventionisintendedto“guarantee

notrightsthataretheoreticalorillusorybutrightsthatarepracticalandeffective”andthat

assigningacounseldoesnotinitselfensuretheeffectivenessoftheassistancehemayafford

anaccused(see Imbrioscia v. Switzerland,judgmentof24November1993,SeriesAno.275,

p.13,§38,and Artico v. Italy,judgmentof13May1980,SeriesAno.37,p.16,§33).

Nevertheless,aStatecannotbeheldresponsibleforeveryshortcomingonthepartofalawy-

erappointedforlegalaidpurposesorappointedbytheaccused.Thecompetentnational

authoritiesarerequiredunderArticle6§3(c)tointerveneonlyifafailurebylegalaidcoun-

seltoprovideeffectiverepresentationismanifestorsufficientlybroughttotheirattentionin

someotherway(seeDaud v. Portugal,judgmentof21April1998,Reports of Judgments and Decisions1998-II,pp.749-750,§38,andSannino v. Italy,no.30961/03,§49,27April2006).

Inthepresentcase,theapplicantatnopointalertedtheauthoritiestoanydifficulties

encounteredinpreparinghisdefence.Furthermore,intheCourt’sview,theshortcomings

oftheapplicant’scounselwerenotmanifest.Thedomesticauthoritieswerethereforenot

obligedtointerveneortakestepstoensurethatthedefendantwasadequatelyrepresented

anddefended(see,conversely,Sannino,citedabove,§51).

Inaddition,theCourtnotesthattheRomeCourtofAppealinterpreted,insubstance,the

applicant’somissiontorequesthistransfertothehearingroomasanunequivocal,albeit

implicit,waiveronhispartoftherighttoparticipateintheappealhearing(seeparagraph20

above).Intheparticularcircumstancesofthepresentcase,theCourtconsidersthatthatwas

areasonableandnon-arbitraryconclusion.

Itobservesinthatregardthattheobligationontheapplicanttomakeclearhiswishtobe

broughttothehearingdidnotentailthecompletionofanyparticularlycomplexformalities.

Moreover,thetransferofaprisonercallsforsecuritymeasuresandneedstobearrangedin

advance.Astrictdeadlineforsubmittingtherequestfortransferisthereforejustified.

Itshouldalsobepointedoutthattherewerefurtherindicationslendingweighttotheconclu-

sionthattheapplicantdidnotwishtotakepartintheappealhearing.Firstly,thereisnothing

inthecasefiletoindicatethat,onthedayofthehearing,whenherealisedthathewasnot

goingtobetakentothehearingroom,theapplicantprotestedtotheprisonauthorities.Se-

condly,intheirpleadingsof23October2000,filedwiththeregistryoftheCourtofAppeala

�� ��

2002.On1April2003,theCourtofAppealdismissedthesecondappeal,statingthatitwasclearthattheinformationpublishedinthearticleaboutMrStepaniucdidnotcorrespondtoreality.

RelyingonArticle10(freedomofexpression),FluxcomplainedbeforetheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsthatthedomesticcourts’decisionshadinterferedwithitsrighttofreedomofexpression.Itfurthercomplainedthatthedomesticcourtshadfailedtogivereasonsintheirdecisions,inbreachofArticle6§1(righttoafairtrial).Havingconsideredthefactthatjournalisticfreedomalsocoveredpossiblerecoursetoadegreeofexaggeration,orevenprovocation,andhavingweighedupthedifferentinterestsinvolvedintheapplicant’scase,theCourtinitsjudgmentconcludedthattheinterferencewiththeapplicant’srighttofreedomofexpressionwasnot“necessaryinademocraticsociety”.Accordingly,therehadbeenaviolationofArticle10.TheCourtheldthattherewasnoneedtoexamineseparatelythecomplaintunderArticle6§1.

JudgeBonellohowevermadeinhispartlydissentingopinionthefollowingremarksabouttheMoldovanjudgewhohaddeliveredthenationaljudgment:

1. InthiscasetheCourtcouldhavevoiceditsviewsonthepathologyofanadministrationof

justice.Itdidnot.

2. TheapplicantnewspaperFluxsubmittedcomplaintsrelatingtotwoviolationsofArticle6of

theConvention.Themajoritydeclaredinadmissiblethefirstcomplaintonthelackofinde-

pendenceandimpartialityofJudgeI.M.Asecondcomplaintregardingtheallegedfailureof

thedomesticcourtstogivereasonsfortheirdecisionswasdisposedofbythemajoritywith

afindingthatthiscomplaintdidnotraiseanissueseparatefromthefreedomofexpression

complaintunderArticle10,andthatconsequentlytheCourtdidnotconsideritnecessaryto

examineitseparately.

3. Astheapplicant’sfirstArticle6complaintwasdeclaredinadmissiblenotbyajudgmentbut

byaseparate‘decision’oftheCourt,IamrestrainedfromexpressingifandwhyIagreedor

disagreedwiththatdecision,findingsomecomfortinthereflectionthatitisnotthefirsttime

thatcourtstripoversemanticsontheirwaytojustice.Thisrestraintdoesnotapplytothese-

condcomplaintwhichwasdealtwithbyajudgment;thisenablesmetoelaborateandmake

publicthereasonsformydissent.

4. Ifindithardtoagreewiththemajority’sconclusionthataclaimofviolationoffair-trial

guarantees(derivingfromanallegedfailurebythedomesticcourtstogivereasonsfortheir

decision)raisesnoseparateissuefromthatofaviolationoffreedomofexpression.The

domesticcourtshadcondemnedtheapplicantnewspapertopaydamages,pluscosts,and

tomakeanapologytoaleadinggovernmentpolitician.TheCourtunanimouslyfoundthese

Hors concours: critical remarks in the concurring opinions of European Court’s Judge Giovanni Bonello. Remarks that cannot be revie-wed by a higher tribunal.

AspromisedIwillendbyquotingoneofthemostrecentdissentingopinionsofthejudgeelectedinrespectofMalta,GiovanniBonello.ThewaythisStrasbourgjudgemakesuseofthepossibilityprovidedforinArticle45§2oftheConvention(‘Ifajudg-mentdoesnotrepresent,inwholeorinpart,theunanimousopinionofthejudges,anyjudgeshallbeentitledtodeliveraseparateopinion’)istheultimateexerciseofthefreedomofexpression.Inaforewordof‘AFreeTradeofIdeas;theseparateopinionsofJudgeVanniBonello’(tobepublishedbyWolfLegalPublishers,2008),theBritishjudgeandvice-presidentoftheEuropeanCourt,SirNicolasBratza,andthedeputyregistraroftheEuropeanCourt,MichaelO’Boyle,describedhiswayofwritinginthefollowingterms:‘(..) It is the skill of literature. His legal ideas are conveyed in a stately carriage of imaginative and epigrammatic language. He is a wordsmith of the highest order whose carriage travels surely – sometimes indignantly and angrily – across the finely manicured lawns of the English language. He is most certainly the Court’s first linguistic stylist. (..)’

Inthecaseof Flux (no. 2) v. Moldova (judgmentof3July2007)thefactswereasfol-lows:Theapplicant,Flux,isanewspaperbasedinChisinau.On19June2002Fluxpu-blishedonitsfirstpageapreviewofanarticleduetoappearinafutureissue,togetherwithasummaryentitled“Theredmillionaires”andabigpictureoftheleaderoftheCommunistPartyparliamentarygroup,VictorStepaniuc.Thenextday,MrStepaniucbroughtproceedingsfordefamationagainstFluxandagainsttheauthorofthearticle,arguingthat“thedefendantsdisseminatedinformationwhichisdefamatoryofmeasacitizen,anMPandastheleaderoftheCommunistPartyparliamentarygroup”.On21June2002Fluxpublishedthearticleannouncedtwodaysbefore,whichwasbasedontheaccountofthedeputyChiefExecutiveOfficeroftheAneniiNoicannedfoodplantandwhichreportedonallegedattemptsbyaCommunistparliamentariantohavetheplantdeclaredbankruptandsoldoff.On1August2002aMoldovancourtruledinfa-vourofMrStepaniuc,sayingthatthefollowingstatementfromthe“Theredmillionai-res”summarywasdefamatory:“TheCommunistswanttoselltheAneniiNoicannedfoodplantoffpiece-meal.”ThecourtorderedFluxandtheauthortopayMrStepaniuc3,600MoldovanLei(MDL–EUR270)andMDL1,800respectively,andtoissueanapologywithin15days.TwoappealsbyFluxagainstthatjudgmentwereultimatelydismissed.On6February2003,ChisinauRegionalCourtdismissedthefirstappealasbeingunfoundedandfailedtotakeintoconsiderationthearticlepublishedon21June

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versoundslouderstill,astheallegedfailureofjudgeI.M.togivereasonsforhisdecision(a

decisiontheCourtunanimouslyfoundtohavebeeninviolationoftheConvention)hastobe

assessedagainstawiderhistoricalbackdrop.If,asalleged,thisfailureofthepresidingjudge

marcheshandinhandwithsystemicevidenceoffeebleguaranteesfortheindependenceand

impartialityofthejudiciaryasawhole,thealertshouldhavesoundedmoreinexorably.

11. Iamattachingasanappendixbriefsummariesofseveralexternalreportsonthestateofthe

judiciaryinMoldova,allhighlynegativeandstartling.ForreasonsofbalanceIwantedtoin-

cludereportsfromotherauthoritativesourcesdenyingthattheindependenceofthejudiciary

inMoldovaisastretchercase.Ifoundnone.

12. Itis,inmyview,againsttheseseeminglyuniversalconcernsthattheallegedfailurebyjudge

I.M.togivereasonsshouldhaveenticedtheCourttotakesomenote.TheCourtcouldhave

askeditselfwhetherareluctancetoreasonoutanunreasonabledecisionistheminimumto

expectfromaself-respecting,hireandfirejudiciary.TheCourtcould,orshould,haveinves-

tigatedwhetherthiswas‘telephonejustice’inwhichthetelephonewaspointlessandthe

justicehilarious.

13. Ifinditself-delusorytoharnessimpressiveformulastoavoidfacingcoreissuesoftheadmi-

nistrationofjustice,andthentofeelfulfilledbyonedexteroussweepofthedebrisunder

thecarpet.Nodoubtirrationally,IbelievemorethanImake-believe.Strasbourg,Ithought,

hasaroletoplayinfortifyingstandards,wellbeyondthatofseekingrefugebehindlegal

fictions.Inthelongruntheyonlyenergizethedeterminationofthosewithatalentforfinding

theindependenceofthejudiciaryamusing.Thosebentonmakingtheindependenceofthe

judiciaryobsoleteknowtheyneedlooknofurther.

14. IwouldhaveexpectedtheCourttopounceonthisopportunitytogivehopetothepeopleof

Moldova.Toletoutsometimidwhispersforjusticepoliticallyuntainted.Iwouldhaveexpec-

tedtheCourttohavethoroughlyinvestigatedifthejudgmentthatcondemnedtheapplicant

wassupportedbygoodreasonsorbyanyreasonatall.Iwouldhavebeengratifiedhadthe

CourtaskedhowoftenjudgeI.M.,andothercandidatesfortheheroesoftheresistance

award,foundagainsttherulingpartyoritsexponentsinpoliticallysensitivelawsuits.Itwould

seemthattheadministrationofjusticeinMoldovarespectsanumberofprecepts.Ilooked

fortheminArticle6andcouldfindnoneofthemthere.

15.Allthisalarmsmeprofoundly.Ihavethisold-fashionedprejudiceagainstjudgesapproxima-

telyimpartial.Irespondwithinconstantpassiontothecredoofsomepoliticiansthatjudges

fitnicelyeverywhere,butbestofallintheirpockets.Ifindbland,ifnotinconsequential,the

doctrinethatjusticemustnotonlybedone,butshouldmanifestlybeseentobedone.Far

morerelevant,tome,isthedoctrinethat,forcontrol-freakstoruleundisturbed,injustice

shouldnotonlybedone,butshouldmanifestlybeseentobedone.

domesticjudgmentstohavebeeninviolationoftheapplicant’sfreedomofexpression.This

‘freedomofexpression’findingsurelydeterminedanissuetotallydistinctfromthatwhether

theapplicant’sfair-trialguaranteeshadbeenrespectedornot,andinmyviewthisseparate

complaintshouldhavebeenconsideredanddeterminedseparately.

5. TheCourtenjoysunquestionablediscretiontorefrainfromdecidingcomplaintswhich,

althoughadmissibleandmeritorious,donotraiseissuessubstantiallydifferentfromothersin

whichaviolationofsomeConventionguaranteehasalreadybeenfound.Byruleofthumb,it

cansafelybesaidthatifagraverviolationhaspreviouslybeenestablished,theCourtwould

rightlyfinditfutiletodeterminealsoalesserviolationarisingfromthesamefacts.

6. InthecircumstancesofthepresentcaseIdonotconsiderapossibleinfringementofthe

fair-trialguaranteestobemeanerinweightorflimsierinvaluethanabreachoffreedomof

expression.Theveryparticularfactsonwhichthisapplicationisbasedtendtoindicatethat

onecoreissuetobedeterminedshouldhavebeenwhethertheArticle6fair-trialguarantees

hadbeenrespectedornot.

7. Theapplicantnewspaperclaimsthedomesticcourtsfailedtogivereasonsonwhichtobase

itsconvictionforlibel–notaccidentally,notthroughsomegenuinepressure-of-workover-

sight,butinasmuchasthejudgewhoruledagainsttheapplicantlackedindependenceand

impartiality“becausehewasafriendofMrStepaniuc(theplaintiffinthelibelproceedings)

andhadbeenappointedpresidentoftheBuiucanidistrictcourtbytheCommunistparty

parliamentarygroup”whoseleaderwastheplaintiffinthedefamationproceedingsagainst

theapplicantnewspaper.

8. TheapplicantaddedthatinotherdefamationcasesbetweenFluxandrepresentativesof

thegovernment,judgeI.M.hadalwaysruledinfavourofthelatterandawardedthemthe

maximumamountprovidedforbylaw.By“astrangecoincidence”thesamejudgeexamined

themajorityofdefamationactionsbroughtbyhisfriendMrStepaniuc.AlltheclaimsofMr

StepaniuchadalwaysbeenupheldbyjudgeI.M.eveninthoselawsuitsinwhichtheplaintiff

hadfailedtopaycourtfees,whichfact,byitself,shouldhaverenderedtheactionproce-

durallyinadmissible.Nordidthefactthattheplaintiffconsistentlyfailedtoappearforthe

hearingofhiscourtcaseshaveanynegativeimpactonhispendingcases–theywereallthe

sameexaminedanddeterminedbyjudgeI.M.usuallyatthefirsthearing.

9. Thesearetheplaintiff’sallegationsoffacttoexplainwhyjudgeI.M.couldnotbeconsidered

independentandimpartialandwhyhefailedtogivereasonsforfindingtheapplicantnews-

paperliabletomaximumlibeldamages.

10.Theseallegationsontheirown,ifproved,wouldbeworryingindicatorsofaquestionable

detachmentofthepresidingjudgefromthelitigants–orfromoneofthem.Thealerthowe-

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16.JudgeI.M.’scareercrashed-fromminordistrictjudgetoPresidentoftheSupremeCourt

inaspanoftimeshorterthanittakestosay‘thepartyisalwaysright’.Inanotherwisebleak

panorama,itiscomfortingtonotethatthesacrificeofjudgeswhoaligntheirenergieswith

thewelfareoftherulingpoliticalclass,doesnotalwayscrippletheircareers.

17. IthoughtthiswastherighttimefortheCourttostartpanicking.Thisaself-evidentoppor-

tunitytodetoxanadministrationofjustice.InsteadIhadtowitnesstheCourtallowingthe

Moldovanjudiciarythewidestmarginofdepreciation.

Concluding remark

Incidentally,letnolawyerevertrytoimitateJudgeBonellobyparaphrasinghiswordsinanynationalcourtroomthuscriticisinganymemberofthenationaljudiciaryunlessheisonverysuregroundindeed.RememberthatJudgeBonellositsonoursideofthetable.DespiteeverythingIhaveindicatedabove,IcannotpredictwhethertheEuro-peanCourtofHumanRightswouldbepreparedtoholdthatanyinterferencewiththefreedomofexpressionatthenationallevelwasnotjustified.Ifthereisrealreasontocomplaininsuchterms,itisprobablywisertosavethevenomfortheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsitself.

[1] IwishtoexpressmygratitudetoPeterKempees,seniorlawyerintheRegistryoftheEu-

ropeanCourt,whomadevaluablecommentsonthedraftversionofthispresentationand

undertooktocorrecttheoriginal‘English’version.Anyremainingirregularitiesconcerning

theEnglishlanguageareentirelymyresponsibility.

[1] IwishtoexpressmygratitudetoPeterKempees,seniorlawyerintheRegistryoftheEu-

ropeanCourt,whomadevaluablecommentsonthedraftversionofthispresentationand

undertooktocorrecttheoriginal‘English’version.Anyremainingirregularitiesconcerning

theEnglishlanguageareentirelymyresponsibility.

ContactNetherlandsCouncilfortheJudiciaryPOBox906132509LPTheHagueTheNetherlands

PublishedNovember2007

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