The Enforcement Imperative - EIA

COMBATING THE ILLEGAL TRADE IN IVORY

www.eia-international.org

The EnforcementImperative

Contents

Front cover photo: © Pierre Gleizes/EIA. Back cover photo: © Kantipo.

Executive Summary 1

The Illegal Ivory Trade 2

Enforcement Flaws 4

Seizures 8

The Profit Motive:Economics OfIvory Trade 10

The EnforcementImperative 11

Recommendations 16

References 17

AcknowledgementsMany thanks to Brian Emmerson and allat Emmerson Press for printing thisreport.

Emmerson Press: +44 (0)1926 854400

This briefing was written, researchedand edited by Julian Newman, RachelNoble, Mari Park and Mary Rice.Picture research and report design byJoaquim Pereira.

Printed on recycled paper (October 2004).

The Environmental Investigation Agency(EIA) is an independent, international campaigning organisation committed to investigating and exposing environmentalcrime. Since 1984, EIA has used pioneeringinvestigative techniques all over the world toexpose the impact of environmental crimeand to seek lasting solutions. EIA’s aims areto:

• Stop illegal trade in endangered species

• Gain lasting protection for species under threat

• Protect the shared environment of manand wildlife.


Above: South Luangwa Conservation Society scouts on parade.

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Executive Summary

1

Executive SummaryThe sheer scale of the illegal trade in ivorypresents enforcement officers worldwide withan enormous challenge. The sophistication andscope of organised syndicates far outweigh thecapacity and resources of many enforcementagencies, particularly in developing countries.Although the number of successful seizures istestament to the dedication and efforts of thoseworking on the frontline, the reality is thatthese efforts are frequently thwarted by a seriesof fundamental flaws in enforcementmechanisms.

There are many problems associated withenforcing meaningful control over the ivorytrade and circumventing them will be a gradual,but vital, process. The most pressing of theseproblems is the need to improvecommunication and cooperation between thevarious enforcement agencies at both a nationaland international level. Using existingmechanisms like Interpol more proactively, aswell as developing new initiatives such asnational task forces, would facilitate bettercommunication and result in improvedcooperation.

Other deficiencies include inadequateregulations, insufficient penalties, judicialfailure and lack of governance. All of these

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need to be addressed at a national level ifenforcement agencies are to act with adequatelegal authority. Imposing insufficient penaltiesresults in demoralised officers and provideslittle or no deterrent to criminals. Raisingoverall awareness of wildlife issues and theseriousness of wildlife crime at judicial andgovernment level is imperative if any of theseproblems are to be addressed.

Whilst it is impossible to put an exact figure onthe amount of ivory being traded illegally everyyear, it is likely to be worth hundreds ofmillions of dollars. Elephant populationsparticularly at risk are those in range states thathave little or no resources to combat theactivities of poachers and smugglers. Yet theindividuals who benefit most from the illegaltrade of ivory are those highest up thecommodity chain. Removed from any physicalrisk, they operate with impunity and aredirectly responsible for the deaths of poachersand enforcement officers. They perpetuate anillegal trade which undermines the efforts ofpeople in the field who are fighting to conserveand protect their natural resources. If the illegaltrade in ivory is to be tackled, enforcementmeasures must be strengthened andimplemented as a matter of urgency.

There aremanyproblemsassociatedwithenforcingmeaningfulcontrol overthe ivorytrade.

The Illegal Ivory Trade

The Illegal Ivory TradeIvory smuggling is only one component of theillicit global trade in wildlife. Whilst the valueof wildlife products on the black market isunknown, a report commissioned for the USGovernment in 2002 estimated that theworldwide illegal wildlife trade is worthbetween six and ten billion dollars a year1.

The trade in ivory is regulated by theConvention on International Trade inEndangered Species (CITES). The illegal tradein ivory is tracked by the Elephant TradeInformation System (ETIS), a CITES endorsedmonitoring system which in 2002 reportedrecords of over 7000 illegal ivory seizures madeworldwide since 1989: the equivalent of 200tonnes of ivory2. These seizures account foronly a fraction of ivory smuggled worldwideand putting a dollar value to them is difficultdue to the wide variation of prices along thecommodity chain. However, the illegal ivorytrade is probably worth hundreds of millions ofdollars a year.

Those involved in the trafficking of ivory rangefrom low volume-low value carriers, such astourists or workers returning home withsouvenirs, to high value-high volume smugglingcarried out by organised crime syndicates andinvolving large consignments sent by air freightor shipping container.

2

The Singapore Seizure:A Missed OpportunityDetailed analysis of the facts surrounding aseizure of over six tonnes of ivory inSingapore in June 2002 highlights many ofthe enforcement flaws that continue tohinder efforts to tackle the illicit trade.

While the actual seizure itself came aboutthrough unprecedented cooperationbetween national enforcement agencies,NGOs, Interpol, the Lusaka AgreementTask Force (LATF) and the CITESSecretariat, the follow-up investigation hasbeen a dismal failure. The contraband ivoryhad a market value of over US$11 million.However after two years the onlyprosecution appears to have been aUS$3000 fine for the Singaporeantranshipment agent1. An excellentopportunity to break a major ivorysmuggling ring and to establish a cleardeterrent to those involved in large-scaleillegal ivory trading has been squandered.

It is especially galling for the handful ofenforcement agents in Zambia and Malawiwho cracked the case. Their difficult anddangerous work has not producedsatisfactory result and the leaders of thesmuggling syndicate have evadeddetection.

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Right:Part of the sixtonnes of ivoryseized in Singaporre

An excellentopportunityto break amajor ivorysmugglingring...has beensquandered.

The Illegal Ivory Trade

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Lilongwe clearly showed the involvement ofindividuals in Zambia, Malawi, Singapore,Hong Kong and Japan in smuggling largeamounts of ivory since the mid-1990s2.Despite this compelling evidence, theinternational cooperation and judicialprocedures needed to follow the case to itsconclusion have been insufficient.

In Zambia, where the trail that led to theseizure began, the chief suspect involvedin transporting truckloads of illegal ivoryinto neighbouring Malawi evaded detectionfor a year. When the authorities eventuallycaught up with him he was released afteran initial interview in Lusaka. A poacherwho admitted shooting 58 elephants in theSouth Luangwa area was caught in 2002.He was given a custodial sentence of fiveyears in 2003, but was released in 20043.Although field information in mid-2003indicated that the illegal trade in ivory ineastern Zambia had fallen as a result of theSingapore seizure, the latest reports fromLuangwa indicate renewed elephantpoaching4.

In Malawi, where the ivory was gathered forshipment, there have been noprosecutions. A key syndicate memberbased in the capital of Lilongwe fled beforeenforcement agencies could locate him.Two other individuals implicated in thecrime have been interrogated and releasedon bail5. Moreover, attempts to prosecutethem failed due to the court’s insistencethat all six tonnes of the ivory be returnedto Malawi as evidence. Despite legal advicethat a sample and a sworn affidavit fromthe relevant enforcement agencies inSingapore would suffice, there have yet tobe any prosecutions6.

In Singapore the authorities failed toconduct a thorough investigation of thecase. Although the shipping bill for thecontainer stated the consignee as theSingapore-based company DelightHarvest, the authorities accepted theexplanation from company executives thatthe name had been used without theirknowledge7. Basic analysis of Singapore’sregister of company information wouldhave revealed that one of the directors hadbeen a founding member of an ivorycarving business in Singapore in 19888.Furthermore, while the agent involved inarranging the onward shipment of thecontainer escaped with only a small fine,scrutiny of shipping and business recordswould have shown his involvement in acompany that had received six previous

shipments from the syndicate’s operativesin Malawi9.

In Japan, the next destination for the ivory,there do not appear to have been anyprosecutions to date. Whilst a degree ofinvestigation has been carried out10, theprogress of the enquiry into the companylisted as the recipient for the shipment isunknown. Hong Kong enforcementagencies have similarly failed to track downsenior members of the syndicate thoughtto be Hong Kong nationals or residents11.

While the huge haul of ivory attracted manyheadlines and the seizure itselfdemonstrated good cooperation betweendifferent agencies, the case has sincefoundered. An attempt has been made toreopen it under the auspices of the LATF,involving shipping the ivory from Singaporeto Nairobi for forensic analysis. Yet ameeting organised by LATF to discuss thecase failed to attract participation from anyof the Asian countries involved12.

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Below:ASU Company,Yokohama, Japan:Destination addressof numeroussuspect shipmentsfrom Singapore.

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Enforcement Flaws

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Regulatory Failure andInadequate SystemsIn many instances the national legislation thatcontrols the ivory trade is inadequate,confusing or extremely complicated. Thailandis one of the main destinations for illegal ivoryand is the second largest unregulated ivorymarket in Asia3. It is also the largest domesticivory market in South-East Asia4. Yet despite aseries of successful seizures of African ivoryover the last four years, attempts to control theillegal trade are profoundly hindered bynational legislation which permits the sale andpossession of ivory from domesticatedelephants in Thailand5. This loophole providesa convenient cover for those dealing in ivoryfrom poached elephants.

Another example of inadequate legislation isthe provision in CITES which allows for tradein ivory obtained prior to the ban, a loopholeoften exploited by illegal traders6. Chineselegislation allows trade in pre-ban ivory. Yetwhilst most dealers would say that their ivoryhad been obtained prior to the ban7 there is noway to prove this8. Furthermore a host ofsurveys and interviews reveals that the amountof ivory on sale in China could not possiblyhave come from legitimate pre-ban stocks9.This loophole allows illegal ivory to belaundered onto the domestic market in China.Emerging registration systems should helpcounter this problem but their implementationwill only take place in a few provinces. Therewill also be huge financial and humanresources implications for the adequateimplementation of any such system.

Shipments in transit provide yet anotherloophole in regulation. Since it is difficult tocontrol goods in transit, many shipments ofillegal products are shipped through transitports or Free Trade Zones. In the case of theSingapore seizure, the syndicate’s decision tooffload the container in Singapore – a FreeTrade Zone - was a deliberate bid to confusethe trail. Enforcement and judicial authoritiesdo not always apply the same importance togoods passing through their territory in transitas they do to direct imports.

Enforcement FlawsDue to its large scale and complexity, the illicitwildlife trade poses a severe challenge toenforcement communities worldwide. Ivorytrade is no exception. The developing countriesof Africa and Asia are home to many of theworld’s remaining wild elephants. Severeresource constraints in these range states limitefforts to protect elephants from poachers.Conversely, in some of the major ivory markets,combating wildlife crime is neither a politicalnor an enforcement priority.

During the last few years, a series of seizuresinvolving substantial quantities of ivory haveoccurred and provide testament to theeffectiveness of front-line enforcement agencies.However, such efforts are being repeatedlyundermined by a series of fundamental failures,which include inadequate regulations,insufficient penalties, judicial failure, lack ofgovernance and weak cooperation betweenagencies, both at national and internationallevel.

... nationallegislationthat controlsthe ivorytrade isinadequate,confusing orextremelycomplicated.

Left:Thai legislation allows the sale and possession of ivoryfrom domestic elephants.

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Enforcement Flaws

Below:EIA Investigator andKenyan Parks officialinspect the remainsof a poachedelephant.

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Inadequate DeterrentsAppropriate legal sanctions are key tocombating ivory smuggling. Poachers,smugglers and illegal traders are not deterred ifpenalties are relatively lenient, seeing only highprofit for potentially low risk. The efforts ofenforcement agencies are also undermined asofficers become demoralised by the lack ofpositive results. Strong penalties serve to setboth the level of deterrence and the seriousnesswith which offences are pursued.

In the case of the Singapore seizure, the penaltylevied on the individual arranging thetranshipment was woefully inadequate. Despitebeing involved in shipping contraband wortharound US$11 million, and admitting to havingarranged the onward shipment of fourcontainers from the same syndicate, he receiveda fine of only US$3000. The fine, however, is inkeeping with Singapore’s Endangered SpeciesAct of 1989, which states that anyone foundguilty of importing or exporting wildlife partswithout a permit can be fined up to US$3000for a first offence and up to US$5800 or a yearin jail for repeat offences10.

In China, penalties for ivory smuggling are farharsher. Under the relevant Notification, onewhole elephant tusk is valued at approximatelyUS$30 00014. Under the criminal law code,

trading in protected wildlife worth more thanUS$24 000 is punishable by life imprisonmentand even death (although this has never beenapplied in ivory cases)12. For selling just onetusk the culprit could potentially receive a lifesentence. This penalty was recently handeddown in the cases of 295 tusks (weighing 2.6tonnes) seized in Qingdao in May 2002 andthree tonnes of tusks discovered at Shanghaiport in September 2002.

These harsh penalties indicate thedetermination of the Chinese Government totackle the large-scale criminal groups andprovide a powerful deterrent. During trips in2002 and 2003 to Guangzhou in southernChina, EIA found that ivory retailers weregenerally well aware of trials involving ivorysmuggling and were therefore more cautiouswhen discussing the ivory trade. In June 2002,a senior executive from a reputable and long-standing ivory carving business told EIA thatthe market was extremely quiet. He felt thatthis was due to a high profile trial that wastaking place in Beijing involving a number ofdefendants charged with participating in theillegal import of 14 tonnes of ivory through thecity’s airport13.

Judicial FailureEven when adequate sanctions are provided bylaw, lighter penalties are often levied by thejudciary. This is due to a variety of reasons,including a lack of awareness of the seriousnessof wildlife crime, and of environmental crime ingeneral, within the judiciary. It can also be dueto convoluted bureaucracy, poorcommunication channels, or corruption.

In August 2003, an undercover operationconducted by agents from Malawi’sDepartment of National Parks and Wildlife(DNPW) resulted in the seizure of 127kg oftusks and the arrest of one individualresponsible for ivory trafficking aroundLiwonde National Park14. When the case camebefore the district magistrate, the defendantwas fined only US$55, even though Malawi’sNational Parks and Wildlife Act allows for amaximum custodial sentence of five years forthe illegal possession of ivory. DNPW requesteda judicial review, and the original sentence wasrevised to one year in prison15.

Similar cases have also been seen in Cameroonand are compounded by a bureaucratic morassin which cases get interminably delayed or lost.Since 2003, an innovative collaborationbetween the Ministry of Environment andForests (MINEF) and an NGO called The LastGreat Ape Organisation (LAGA) has succeededin bringing seven cases of illegal ivory dealingto court. Under Cameroon’s 1994 forest law,cases involving illegal wildlife can be tried

under two different Articles: Article 158 fortrading or killing protected wildlife, whichcarries a maximum penalty of three years injail, or Article 155 for illegal possession ofwildlife, which carries a maximum sentence oftwo months in jail16.

Until recently, when a case was tried underArticle 158, the magistrate had chosen theweaker provisions of Article 155 for almost allof the cases brought to court by MINEF-LAGA17. In July 2004, a successful operationled to the arrest of two individuals connected toillegal ivory carving operations in the port cityof Douala. The operation led to the seizure of116kg of worked ivory. Despite the obviouscommercial nature of the carving workshops,the defendants were fined only US$80 andserved 13 days in jail while awaiting trial. Thiswas the first wildlife crime case to come tocourt in Douala and the leniency of thesentence is being contested by MINEF18.

Governance ProblemsResearch shows there is a correlation betweencorruption, the effectiveness of ivory tradecontrol and elephant conservation. ETIS (theElephant Trade Information System) uses levelsof corruption as a measure for determining theefficiency of enforcement with regard to ivorytrade controls. This is achieved by using aCorruption Perception Index which “… affordsa reasonable independent measure as it has …been documented that the illicit movement ofivory is often facilitated by corruption on thepart of law enforcement authorities around theworld”19. Another study exploring the linkbetween governance and the loss of biodiversityestablished that the rates of recovery inelephant numbers between 1994 and 1998 werestronger in the least corrupt countries20.

The corrupting effect of money from the illegalivory trade in African countries with weakeconomies is especially pernicious. Enforcementagents are often poorly paid and may thereforebe susceptible to bribery by ivory dealers. Anew warden arriving at South LuangwaNational Park, Zambia, in 2001, becamesuspicious that his game scouts were involvedin an organised poaching ring. Prior to hisarrival a notorious local elephant poacher hadbeen apprehended with illegal ivory,maintaining that he was acting on behalf of thethen warden of the park. The poacher claimedthat he had been contracted to poach 100elephants, of which he had shot 58 before beingcaught. Clandestine investigations by officersfrom outside the region confirmed that severalof the park’s staff were involved in an ivorypoaching gang21.

Enforcement Flaws

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Right:Ivory seized fromdealers in Cameroon.

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Lack of Inter-Agency Cooperation In cases where a number of differentenforcement agencies have shared responsibilityfor enforcing ivory controls, the potential forconfusion and inaction is enormous unlesscooperation protocols are established. It iscommon for more than one government agencyto be responsible for controlling ivory trade,both at national and international level. As wellas the Management and Scientific Authorities,as required by CITES, Police and Customs arealso involved in enforcing controls.

In China, for example, the CITES ManagementAuthority is the Endangered Species of WildFauna and Flora Import and ExportAdministrative Office, which is part of the StateForestry Administration (SFA). The WildlifeConservation Department, which is partlyresponsible for domestic trade, also falls underthe auspices of SFA. The GeneralAdministration of Customs, the Public SecurityBureau and the Ministry of Commerce alsoplay a role in enforcing ivory controls. Whilst aNotification clarifying areas of responsibilitywas issued in 2001, overlaps and inadequatecommunication persist22

As well as restrictions underlined byadministrative divisions, one of the majorobstacles for cooperation between differentagencies is varying levels of awareness andpriorities. In China, while Customs seeinternational ivory control as a priority, thedomestic retail outlets selling ivory products arenot subjected to any concerted inspection. Oneof the reasons for this is that while SFA isresponsible for countrywide administration ofwildlife issues, the body empowered to policewildlife goods on the market is the Ministry ofCommerce. This means that any enforcementoperation on retail markets must involveofficers from both Ministries, which is notalways practical.

Nonetheless, based on information provided byEIA, a seizure of 300kg of ivory in Guangzhouin March 2003 was a positive example ofcooperation between SFA and the Ministry ofCommerce, a precedent which should befollowed by other government agencies aroundthe world23.

Lack of International CooperationIllicit ivory often moves across a number ofinternational borders before reaching its finaldestination. For instance, the ivory seized inSingapore in 2002 was transported throughZambia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africaand Singapore en route to Japan.

While the criminal syndicates easily spancontinents, cooperation between enforcement

agencies in the relevant countries is oftenlacking. In the case of the Singapore seizure,communications between enforcement agenciesin Malawi and Zambia, and their counterpartsin Asia, have been problematic. After theseizure, repeated efforts to establish a channelof communication to expedite arrests andprosecutions were made, with little success.Attempts to reinvigorate the case under theauspices of LATF, a regional enforcement bodyspecialising in wildlife crime, have beenfrustrated by the lack of participation by theAsian countries involved24. This situation mayreflect the problems associated withadministrative divisions at a national level,where agencies responsible for enforcementmatters in one place are different from thoseresponsible in another, thereby hindering theprocess and resulting in a failure to act.

Yet examples of efficient internationalcooperation demonstrate the potentialeffectiveness of agencies working together. InJuly 2001, Customs officers in the UK detected58 tusks passing through Gatwick Airport enroute from Kenya to Beijing. Followingconsultation between agents in the twocountries, a controlled delivery was arranged,resulting in the arrest of the importer inChina25.

Enforcement Flaws

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Below:Briefing for joint raidoperation betweenSFA and the Ministryof Commerce inMarch 2003,Guangzhou.

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Seizures

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Singapore July 2002A record seizure of over six tonnes of ivorybound for Japan from Malawi, containing532 tusks and almost 41 000 unworkedJapanese signature seals (hanko), is madeby Customs officials in Singapore3.

China October 2003Nearly two tonnes of ivory estimated to beworth US$346 000 is seized by Hong KongCustoms officials. The ivory, en route fromTanzania via India and Indonesia, wasthought to be destined for mainlandChina2.

China March 2004Over 300kg of ivory is seized from variousivory shops in Guangzhou following a jointoperation by China’s Endangered SpeciesImport and Export Management Office andthe State Forestry Administration1.

Thailand October 2003Arriving on an Ethiopian Airways Flight, 65tusks addressed to a Malian resident inThailand are seized at BangkokInternational Airport. Raids in October2003 recovered 5355 pieces of ivory worthS$460 000 for sale in Bangkok hotels and13 612 pieces for sale elsewhere5.

Spain July 2004 Spanish Civil Guard seize 3.4 tonnes ofraw and worked ivory from a Madridfactory, the result of a year-longinvestigation triggered by an earlier seizureof 110kg of elephant hair thought tooriginate from Cameroon4.

Seizures

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Belgium June 2004 Airport Customs seize more than 10 tusksconcealed in stone statues from theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC),reportedly destined for Barcelona, Spain9.In 2003, Brussels Customs made over 11seizures of ivory originating from Angola,Cameroon and DRC, destined for Asia andEurope10.

Tanzania January 2004Police seize 73 tusks and arrest four men -a Sudanese national, a Korean, and twoTanzanians. An earlier seizure in Dar EsSalaam in 2002 saw the recovery of 1255tusks11.

Ethiopia April 2003Ethiopian officials seize 37 tusks,reportedly destined for Asia. The tusks,weighing a total of 145kg were returned tothe Kenya Wildlife Service6.

Cameroon July 2004Ivory worth US$1104 weighing 150kg isseized from two dealers in Douala,Cameroon, during a joint operationbetween MINEF and LAGA7.

Zambia July 2004Two women from Lusaka, Zambia arearrested for illegal possession of 691pieces of carved ivory, en route to SouthAfrica8.

The Profit Motive: Economics of Ivory Trade

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The Profit Motive: Economics of Ivory TradeThe enormous profits to be made from the illegal ivory trade, particularly in consumer states, can be illustrated by the caseinvolving over six tonnes of ivory seized in Singapore in 2002.

Based on the following figures, the value of the seizure would have rocketed from US$310 000 in Lilongwe, Malawi to atleast US$11.2 million if it had reached Japan.

Paid to local raw suppliers by middleman in Chipata, Zambia1

US$15 per kg

Paid to middleman in Lilongwe, Malawi2

US$50 per kg

Black market price for raw ivory in China3

US$145 per kg

Wholesale price in Tokyo, Japan4

US$240 per kg

Lowest retail price for plain hanko (1.5 x 6cm) in Tokyo, Japan5

US$302 per kg

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The Enforcement Imperative

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The South LuangwaConservation SocietyAfter five years operating as an HonoraryRangers Rapid Action team (RATZ) inSouth Luangwa, Zambia, the SouthLuangwa Conservation Society (SLCS) wasformally registered in July 2003.Established to provide support for anoverstretched wildlife authority, SLCSworks alongside, and sometimes in placeof, National Parks staff and supplieslogistical and personnel back-up in thefight against poaching and snaring in andaround South Luangwa National Park. Inan area of limited opportunity SLCSprovides training, education andemployment to individuals from the localcommunities. SLCS employees are all fromthe local communities. Many of theindividuals employed are former wildlifepersonnel – former scouts or community-based officers - who were retrenchedduring a transition phase. SLCS drawsupon their experience and providesmeaningful and ongoing employment tothese individuals, utilising their skills anddeveloping institutional and communityknowledge.

Experience has demonstrated thatpoaching often starts in the villages withthe local people. Much of the informationobtained by SLCS scouts comes frominformers in the villages, which is thenpassed on to ZAWA to be dealt withaccordingly. By working with people atcommunity level, SLCS is working towardsestablishing improved conservationpractices and effecting a positive change inperception towards the environment and itswildlife. As an organisation, SLCS hasmade small but incremental changes thathave resulted in enormous success,increased awareness and a positiveattitude at grass roots level which can, andshould, continue.

Their objectives are to provide an effectiveanti-poaching body and to encourageimproved environmental and wildlifeconservation practices among the mainstakeholders of this area, the Zambianpeople themselves. In 2001 and 2002SLCS (then operating as RATZ) wereinstrumental in identifying a massive ivorycartel which had been operating withimpunity since 1995. Their efforts andinformation resulted in over six tonnes ofillegal ivory being seized in Singapore inJune 2002, the biggest seizure since the1989 ivory ban was imposed.


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The Way ForwardEnforcement actions can be broadly classifiedinto three categories – prevention, detectionand suppression:

• Prevention: Actions needed toprevent the criminal activities fromoccurring

• Detection: The effective discoveryof illegal acts

• Suppression: The successfulinvestigation and prosecution of violatorsof law

The United Nations Environment Programme’sGuidelines on Compliance With andEnforcement of Multilateral EnvironmentalAgreements issued in 2002, contain keyrecommendations on practical enforcementmeasures. The recommendations include:

• the need for proportionate penalties• sentencing guidelines• regular review of existing laws• coordination between enforcement agencies• training of prosecutors and magistrates• cross-border intelligence sharing CITES and Enforcement

IssuesCITES and its Parties are increasingly awarethat there is a clear and desperate need tostrengthen enforcement worldwide. Issues ofenforcement and compliance have long been thesubject of discussions at CITES meetings andhave been consolidated into Resolution Conf.11.3. This requires Parties to securecooperative compliance and trade controlmeasures in accordance with the Convention26.

Many additional studies and discussionsregarding enforcement continue to be carriedout, the most recent being a meeting of theCITES Enforcement Expert Group in 2004.This meeting, attended by members of theCITES Tiger Enforcement Task Force, ICPO-Interpol and the World Customs Organisationamongst others, concluded that a lack ofcooperation and communication betweennational, regional and international agencieswas one of the major causes of enforcementproblems27.

The CITES Enforcement Expert Group issued astatement which stresses the general importancefor Parties to recognise the “seriousness ofillegal trade in wild fauna and flora and identifyit as a matter of higher priority for theirnational law enforcement agencies”. They alsourge the Parties to implement Resolution 11.3more fully and make key recommendations.

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Right:Certification sign forregistered ivoryshops in Japan.

Below:Hong Kong Customsintercepted acontainer carryingnearly two tonnes ofivory, October 2003.


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Strengthening MeasuresThere are a number of general suggestions andCITES initiatives that could help tackleidentified enforcement deficiencies, which arelisted below.

• Inadequate Regulatory SystemsClosure of Domestic Ivory Markets. Controlof supply alone is not enough – demand mustbe curtailed.

Regulatory Reform. Reviewing legislation ona regular basis will contribute to closing legalloopholes.

• Inadequate PenaltiesReview of Penalties. It is worth rememberingthat the acquisition of poached ivory ofteninvolves violence, with many instances ofanti-poaching personnel being injured or evenkilled. Those individuals trafficking in illegalivory may be physically removed from thepoaching, but they are still complicit andpenalties should reflect this.

• Judicial FailuresRaising Judicial Awareness. Regulations canbe complex and contradictory. Theseproblems can be overcome by raisingawareness at all levels of the judiciaryand by the formulation of clear sentencingguidelines.

• Governance ProblemsGovernance Reform. Wildlife crime thriveswhere corruption is rife. National anti-corruption strategies should encompasswildlife crime where appropriate.

• Lack of Inter-AgencyCooperation at National LevelImproved Cooperation between RelevantAgencies at a National Level. Creation oftask forces and Memoranda ofUnderstanding between different agencies canhelp facilitate cooperation.

• Forming Partnerships. In areas wheregovernmental enforcement agencies areinadequately resourced, partnerships withoutside agencies, such as NGOs and touristoperators, can assist. The cooperationbetween MINEF and LAGA in Cameroon is agood example of enforcement assistance froman NGO, while SLCS in Zambia usesrevenue from tourist operators and donors toaugment the government’s anti-poachingcapabilities.

• Lack of InternationalCooperationInternational Intelligence Sharing andCooperation. Mechanisms such as Interpoland the World Customs Organisation’sRegional Intelligence Liaison Office networkhave facilities for intelligence exchange, butare not always fully utilised. Communicationsbetween countries on different continents canbe difficult and actionable information isoften withheld. Here the CITES EnforcementAssistance Unit has a brokering role to play.

Developing Regional Mechanisms.Developing regional enforcement mechanismsthat are similar to the Lusaka AgreementTask Force will facilitate enforcement inrelevant regions.

Building Networks. CITES Parties areencouraged to provide the Secretariat with thecontact details of their national lawenforcement agencies responsible forinvestigations. In order to build a betternetwork for cooperation, they are alsoencouraged to nominate officials from therelevant national enforcement agencies toparticipate in the Interpol Wildlife CrimeWorking Group28.

The Submission of Information to CITES.Reporting seizures to be included in ETISwhenever they occur, provides a means bywhich to develop a global picture of theillegal trade so that authorities around theworld can be alerted. The submission of the ECOMESSAGE format, used by relevantauthorities to report infractions, is alsoencouraged by CITES29.

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Closing Domestic Markets: AfricaCITES is increasingly aware of the fact that the ivory trade is extremely difficult to control,particularly for countries with resource constraints.

Following Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev. CoP12) on trade in elephant specimens and Decision12.39 regarding the control of domestic ivory trade, the CITES Secretariat was directed by theParties to conduct desk-based research on ten countries that have active internal ivory marketsbut inadequate control over their domestic trade. The countries studied were Cameroon, China,DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Japan, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda and the United States of America.

As a result of this exercise, the Secretariat drafted a Work Plan, in which it called for a halt on“all domestic sales of ivory”, including raw materials and worked products, in all Africancountries except for Zimbabwe. In the Draft Work Plan, the Secretariat states:

“The Secretariat believes that any exploitation of ivory obtained fromAppendix-I elephant populations is completely incompatible with such a listingin the Appendices of the Convention. It is convinced through its work in relationto internal ivory controls that a continent-wide approach needs to be adopted tobring a halt to once and for all the illegal trade in ivory and that it is at thesource of such ivory that efforts should be focussed [sic]”1.

The Secretariat’s comment is echoed by many of the poorest nations in Africa, despite theclaim made by other Africans that money from the sale of their ivory would go some waytowards alleviating their poverty. In June 2004, 14 West and Central African countries (Congo,Benin, DRC, Chad, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso,Togo, Côte d`Ivoire, Senegal and Guinea) participated in a symposium. This culminated in aunited position, which calls for a total ban on ivory trade2.

Whilst this united stance demonstrates significant support for the Secretariat’s domestic tradeban initiative in Africa, it is also true that these countries lack the capacity and resources toimplement their propositions.BOX

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Closing DomesticMarkets: AsiaThe main identified ivory markets of Asiaare China, Japan and Thailand. Despitethe fact that these three countries have notbeen verified as having adequate control,they continue to have active internalmarkets. Moreover, whilst Japan wasdeemed as having ‘sufficient’ control for thelast one-off sale agreed in 1997, its systemis still unable to prevent illegal ivory fromentering the legal market3.

Domestic market control in China andThailand is even more inadequate, withless developed regulations4. Along withNigeria and DRC, these two countries wereidentified by ETIS as having “very poor lawenforcement effort and efficiency, andconsequently exert the greatestcontemporary influence on illegal trade inivory today”5.

In order therefore, to contribute to efforts inAfrica aimed at protecting remainingvulnerable elephant populations, logicwould suggest that any call for a halt intrade in Africa should also be applied to theivory consuming markets in Asia.


The Common SenseApproachApart from specific multi-lateral measurestargeting enforcement problems, there are othermore general methods which, if applied,provide effective measures for the overallimprovement of enforcement that couldsubstantially reduce the illegal trade in ivory.

• Raising Public Awareness. A substantialamount of illegal ivory is carried by touristsor workers returning home, who often claimignorance of ivory trade controls. Thestrategic dissemination and placement ofinformation regarding regulations andpenalties can be effective.

• Training Enforcement Officers. The CITESEnforcement Expert Group recommendedthat funds and expertise be made availablefor enforcement-related training programmesand training materials30.

• Focusing Resources. Like most illegalactivities, ivory smuggling producesidentifiable patterns and methods. Thetraining of enforcement personnel can help ingenerating risk profiles that allow scarceresources to be more effectively used. Forinstance, while it is impossible to guard all ofAfrica’s elephants from poachers, organisedsmuggling involves collection of the ivory at asingle location for packaging and despatch. Itis at this point in the commodity chain thatthe illicit shipments are vulnerable tointerception, and Cameroon, Malawi andNigeria appear to be some of the key conduitcountries for ivory leaving Africa.

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Above:Oriental ivory carving.

Right:Public awareness leaflet for tourists in Hong Kong.

Recommendations

GeneralRecommendationsEIA urges governments to:• Improve communication and cooperation

between enforcement agencies at bothnational and international level, by creatingchannels utilising existing mechanisms as wellas creating new ones

• Raise awareness of ivory and wildlife tradeamongst government officials, particularlyenforcement agencies and the judiciary.

• Provide training opportunities forenforcement agents

• Strengthen regulations governing the controlof ivory, the imposition of penalties, thejudicial system and governance

EIA urges African Governmentsto:• Set a date for closure of domestic markets

EIA urges the Governments ofChina, Japan and Thailand to:• Set a date for closure of domestic markets

Recommendations forCoP13ProposalsFor CoP13, Namibia is proposing an annualquota of two tonnes of ivory and trade in hideand hair goods and worked ivory forcommercial purposes. South Africa is proposingto trade in hide goods for commercial purposes.

EIA believes that these proposals should beopposed for the following reasons:

• Allowing an annual quota before theproposed one-off sale has been progressed ispremature

• Allowing trade in elephant specimens otherthan worked ivory will further complicate thealready complex rules regarding this speciesand present an additional enforcementchallenge

• Allowing trade in elephant specimens otherthan ivory will increase the monetary value ofelephants and stimulate poaching andsmuggling

• Data managed by the World ConservationMonitoring Centre data on elephant hide andhair products is not comprehensive, due to theinconsistency in units reported by CITESParties in submitting information. Furthertrade is premature because, whilst theavailable information is inconclusive, thevolume of trade in these specimens wouldappear to be high

Working DocumentsKenya has put forward three documents: oneon the conditions for the one-off sale, one onthe revision of Resolution 10.10 and anotheron the revision of Resolution 11.3. The firstdocument refines the conditions for the sale andincludes stronger precautionary elements. Thelatter two documents are aimed atstrengthening the enforcement of ivory andCITES trade controls in general and incorporatesome of the key recommendations made by theCITES Enforcement Expert Group.

EIA urges CITES Parties to:• Oppose proposals from Namibia (Prop. 7)

and South Africa (Prop. 8)• Support Kenya’s document (29.4) which

proposes the revision of Resolution 10.10 toincorporate a variety of specific enforcementmeasures

• Support Kenya’s document (29.5) whichaugments the conditions for the one-off sale

• Support Kenya’s document (Doc. 24)proposing the revision of Resolution 11.3except for the recommendation to expand theremit of the Tiger Enforcement Task Force

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References

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References1. USG Interagency Working Group in support of the President’s International

Crime Control Strategy (2000) International Crime Threat Assessment.

2. CoP12 Doc. 34.1, CITES.

3. Milliken, T. (2002) The World’s Unregulated Domestic Ivory Markets, aTRAFFIC briefing document.

4. Martin, E. and Stiles, D. (2002) The South and South East Asian IvoryMarkets, published by Save the Elephants.

5. Wild Animal Reservation and Protection Act 1992.

6. Art. VII, CITES.

7. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Wildlife 1988.

8. Martin, E. and Stiles, D. (2003) Ivory Markets of East Asia, published bySave the Elephants.

9. Ibid. Environmental Investigation Agency (2000) Lethal Experiment: Howthe CITES-Approved Ivory Sale Led to Increased Elephant Poaching.

10. The Straits Times, 12 July 2002.

11. Notification 2001/234.

12. Criminal Law and Criminal Law Procedure of the People’s Republic ofChina 1979.

13. Pers. comm., confidential, June 2002.

14. “Malawi ivory trafficker hit with prison term”, ENDS, 9 January 2004.

15. Environmental News Service, 16 September 2003.

16. Pers. comm., LAGA, August 2004.

17. Pers. comm., LAGA, September 2004.

18. Ibid.

19. CoP12 Doc. 34.1.

20. Smith, R.J., et.al. (2003) Governance and the loss of Biodiversity inNature 426:6962, 67-69.

21. Environmental Investigation Agency (2002) Back in Business: ElephantPoaching and the Ivory Black Markets of Asia.

22. TRAFFIC (2002) An Assessment of China’s Management of Trade inElephants and Elephant Products.

23. Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Major breakthrough in China’s fightagainst illegal ivory trade’, press release, 15 March 2004.

24. LATF, ‘Press statement on the examination and investigation of 6.5 tonnesof African contraband ivory seized in Singapore’, 4 June 2004.

25. ‘Blocking illegal trade in ivory’, Legal Daily, 10 August 2001.

26. Res. Conf. 11.3.

27. Statement of the CITES Enforcement Expert Group,Annex 1, CoP13 Doc. 23

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

The Singapore Seizure: A MissedOpportunity1. Reported at the 49th CITES Standing Committee Meeting.


3. Pers. comm., confidential, April 2003.

4. Pers. comm., South Luangwa Conservation Society, Zambia, July 2003.

5. Pers. comm., Anti Corruption Bureau, Malawi, July 2003.

6. Ibid.

7. Pers. comm., Agri-food and Veterinary Authority, Singapore, July 2002.


9. Ibid.

10. Pers. comm., Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan, September2004.

11. Pers. comm., Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, HongKong, China, October 2003.

12. LATF, ‘Press statement on the examination and investigation of 6.5 tonnesof African contraband ivory seized in Singapore’, 4 June 2004.

Seizures1. Environmental Investigation Agency, ‘Major breakthrough in China’s fight

against illegal ivory trade’, press release, 15 March 2004.

2. South China Morning Post, 15 October 2003.

3. The Guardian, 13 July 2002.

4. Environmental News Service, 29 July 2004.

5. The Straits Times, 7 November 2003.

6. ‘Tusks seized in transit’, http://www.news24.com, 8 October 2003.

7. Cameroon Tribute, 27 July 2004.

8. The Times of Zambia, 22 July 2004.

9. Pers. comm., Brussels Customs and Excise, 20 June 2004.10. Pers. comm., Brussels Customs and Excise, 2003.

11. Reuters, January 2004.

The Profit Motive: Economics ofIvory Trade1. Pers. comm., confidential, August 2002.

2. Documents found at Allena Curios, Lilongwe, August 2002.

3. Beijing Daily, 27 May 2002.

4. Martin, E. and Stiles, D. (2003) Ivory Markets of East Asia, published bySave the Elephants.

5. Ibid.

Closing Markets1. Draft Work Plan, SC50 21.1 (Rev.1).

2. ‘Symposium reiterates need to ban ivory trade’, AngolaPress, 29 June 2004.

3. Japan Wildlife Conservation Society (2004) Black andGrey; Illegal Ivory in Japanese Markets, 2nd ed.;Environmental Investigation Agency (2004)Conditions for importing countries for the proposedone-off sale of ivory stockpiles from Botswana,Namibia and South Africa, a briefing documentavailable at; http://www.eiainternational.org/cgi/reports/report-files/media74-1.pdf.

4. Environmental Investigation Agency (2000) LethalExperiment; How the CITES-Approved Ivory Sale Ledto Increased Elephant Poaching; and EnvironmentalInvestigation Agency (2002) Back in Business; ElephantPoaching and the Ivory Black Markets of Asia. ForThailand, see; Martin, E.B. and Stiles, D. (2002) TheSouth and South East Asian Ivory Markets, publishedby Save the Elephants.

5. CoP12 Doc. 34.1.

© D

aryl & Sharna B

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EIA UK62-63 Upper Street

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