The Development and Direction of Russo-German Political and … · 2017. 3. 10. · Schröder era...

The Development and Direction ofRusso-German

Political and Economic Relations after 1990

Károly Grúber - Tamás Vaszari

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Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade

KKI StudiesSeries of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade

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© Károly Grúber, Tamás Vaszari, 2016© Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016

ISSN 2064-9460

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The Development and Direction of Russo-German ... Relations 3

Russia is the nearest regional power to the European Union, and Germany is economically the most developed and powerful state in the EU. Drawing on historical precedents, the authors1 of this article aim to predict potential scenarios for the development of Russo-German relations in the near future. The bilateral German–Russian relationship is relevant to Central Europe too, due to the fact that they are the dominant powers in the geopolitical and geoeconomic environment of the region.

IntroductIon

From 1949 onwards, as part of the divisions of the Cold War, East Germany (led by Walter Ulbricht and legitimised by the Soviet forces) began to develop its heavy industry according to a Stalinist development strategy. It quickly led to supply problems for consumers and in the sectors not favoured by the government.2 In order to avoid a full-blown revolt from society, party leaders of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were forced to allow a limited private sector, because it could ease the shortages. It was due to this decision that the East German form of socialism could keep a more ‘human’ face all the way until the 1970s, much more so than the regimes of other communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe. However, owing to the realities of world politics, there was no real chance for the reunification of the two Germanies until 1989, and so they followed different development paths.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Brezhnev Doctrine determined the internal hierarchies of socialist countries, and it also ensured the hegemonic status of the USSR within the communist bloc. With the doctrine’s failure and Gorbachev’s ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika,’ Eastern and Central Europe began to move towards democracy and market economy.3 Germany was different, because there existed not only a demand for capitalism and pluralism, but for rapid reunification as well, which was ultimately achieved in 1990. (This article does not intend to analyse in depth the events and causes of the German unification.)

After the reunification and the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Russo-German relations developed positively until quite recently, as a result of various factors. The most important factors were these: first of all, Russia’s foreign policy considers Germany to be its main European partner; there is a massive turnover of bilateral trade between the two countries; there is a significant Russian diaspora in Germany; numerous former GDR citizens speak Russian, and many Russians also speak German. 1 Dr. Károly Grúber is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Széchenyi István

University of Győr. Tamás Vaszari is a PhD student of the Doctoral School of Regional and Economic Sciences at Széchenyi István University and a visiting researcher in the Centre for Russian, Central and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow, Scottland, UK.

2 Richter, 1992. 3 Gorbachev, 2014.

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Table 1Key Figures for Germany and Russia4

Germany RussiaTerritory (in 1000 km2) 357.2 17,098.2Population (in million) 81 144GDP (in million USD)* 3,820,464 2,057,301 GDP/capita (in USD)** 45,888 24,805

* International Monetary Fund, 2014.** Ibid.

PolItIcal relatIons

To understand the current relations between Germany and Russia, it is worth revisiting a few aspects of the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the USSR. Until 1969, as part of the ruling CDU party’s policy, the FRG not only did not recognise the GDR, but devoted much effort to the diplomatic isolation of it. This political attitude of the CDU extended to the Soviet Union as well. The two countries only established diplomatic relations in 1955, but according to the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany did not open embassies in any socialist country (except the USSR) which had recognised East Germany.

In 1969, the SPD and the FDP formed a coalition government, and Willy Brandt became chancellor of West Germany until 1974. The social-liberal government put a new foreign policy doctrine called ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ (New Eastern policy) in place. It was during this period that the FRG normalised its relations with many socialist countries, including GDR, the Soviet Union and Poland, where, in 1970, Brandt knelt before the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. In the United States and even within the FRG, doubts were raised initially about Brandt’s new foreign policy approach. But the Ostpolitik reflected the political situation and balance of power of its time – and Brandt was vindicated by being chosen the Time Magazine’s Person of the Year in 1970. Thanks to the Ostpolitik, mutual isolation was replaced by dialogue. Brandt believed in the power of consultation and persuasion, because these could bring the inner contradictions of planned economies to the surface – and resolving these contradictions became the basis of later reforms and concessions. To gain sufficient political influence over Eastern Europe to push for these changes, and for much longed-for reunification, Brandt favoured building good economic and trade relations. History proved him right, but we also have to admit that without the assertive American foreign policy of the time, it would have been impossible to end the Cold War and reunite Germany.

4 Source: Data of the IMF.

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The basic principles of the Ostpolitik proved to be so successful that they were incorporated into the Schmidt and Kohl governments’ policies towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Despite the United States’ seeking to achieve absolute victory in the Cold War, the West German leadership expected the world to become tripolar before the end of the millennium.5 Thus the Germans tried to build as good relations with the two other potential powers as they could – first of all, with the Soviet Union, which was much closer to them than China. By the 1970s, the pioneering and innovative German foreign policy, begun in 1969, had become the norm throughout Western Europe. The degree of the Ostpolitik’s success is demonstrated by a quote from a speech made by Leonid Brezhnev during his visit to Bonn in 1978: “The relations between the USSR and FRG are qualitatively different. Cooperation has become the norm”.6

Rapprochement between the two Germanies became possible because of this thaw and good German–Soviet relations. The German reunification could happen in 1990 because of the opportunity provided by the Soviet Union’s loss of military influence and economic weakness brought on by the arms race with the United States. From the Soviet point of view, the German reunification was a defeat – although the USSR no longer had to finance its military presence in the GDR (of course, the withdrawal took several years), it had to swallow the bitter pill that East Germany instantly became a member of the NATO and the EU following the reunification. The withdrawal of the Soviet military forces (which became Russian forces after the collapse of the Soviet Union) was completed only in August 1994. But the only option for the economically weakened Russia was to accept the new status quo.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet/Russian military forces, the Russo-German relations maintained their positive and active character. Mutually beneficial economic cooperation continued to underpin positive bilateral political relations under the Kohl and Schröder governments. Germany did its best to position its biggest companies well in the new Russia, which had only just started on the path towards capitalism and appeared full of economic promise. Russo-German relations are also a priority for the Russian diplomacy, because the Russians expect Germany to become the most powerful state in the European Union, and investing in good relations with such a country clearly makes sense. (Russian analysts link Germany’s recent ascendancy to the Greek debt crisis, in which Germany accepted a role as the defender of the eurozone. With this step, Germany proved the primacy of its economy over that of France.)

There are still some groups in Russia today which oppose this rapprochement between the two countries, because of the bad memories of World War II. But the official standpoint is that the German people’s behaviour since 1945 has already proven enough, and earned for them the economic and moral status to be the leading power in Europe.

5 Schmidt, 2003. 6 Pittman, 1992. p. 139.

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The Russo-German economic relations reached their peak during the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder (SPD), in 2005, when the two countries signed a bilateral agreement on the construction of the North Stream pipeline. Schröder was criticised heavily for that, and was accused of pandering to the interests of big business. The fact that Schröder got a senior position in the Nord Stream AG after his political career, only added fuel to the fire. But Germany’s Russia policy in the Schröder era produced serious and measureable results, because bilateral trade increased by 25 per cent in 2004 alone.7

The election of Angela Merkel, a Russian-speaking politician from East Germany, as chancellor opened a new chapter in Russo-German relations. The relations had cooled even before the start of the Ukrainian crisis, which only worsened the situation.8 The Russian diplomats also see Merkel’s approach towards Russia as more sceptical, and believe that she is oriented much more towards the United States, despite the NSA scandal. However, the authors of this article believe that this apparent cooling off can only be described as such when compared to the close relations of the ‘Russia First’ Schröder era, and is primarily an effect of the Ukrainian crisis. This is underlined by the fact that many members of the German political and economic elite are unhappy with this negative change. In 2014, an open letter signed by 60 politicians and businesspeople, led by Schröder, was published in the journal Die Zeit. Jackson, Janes The letter criticised the excessively anti-Russian standpoint of the German government in relation to the crisis in Ukraine. The letter accused the Merkel government’s foreign policy of neglecting German interests, and by accepting the American–Ukrainian standpoint, accused it of indirectly fomenting war in the 21st century Europe.9 At the same time, the majority of the political and economic elite supports Germany’s Russia and Ukraine policy, and is even ready to accept financial losses. Nonetheless, this latter group supports ongoing dialogue, because, without Russia, it would obviously be almost impossible to solve the crisis.

The current German foreign policy is still among the moderate ones: on one hand, Germany considers Russian annexation of the Crimea as illegitimate; but on the other hand, it does not support Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, and accepts Russia’s demand for the NATO not to spread to any more of its neighbours beyond the Baltic states.10 At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Germany and France voted against Georgia and Ukraine being invited into the NATO. However, it is equally true that at the September 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, Germany supported the ‘reassurance policy’, intending to increase the security of the NATO’s Eastern European members.

The German elite’s dual approach has a lot to teach others in the way it seeks to maintain the position of German business interests in Russia. On the one hand, there is the official standpoint, represented by the Merkel government; but on the 7 Steinberg, 2006. 8 This new and complex relationship is discussed in detail in the following studies: Mischke and

Umland, 2014; Jackson, 2014. 9 Schwarz, 2014.10 Dixon, 2014.

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other, a number of businesspeople and former politicians have swung into action to lobby for the Russian leadership at the highest levels. One of the best examples is Schröder’s visit to Moscow in 2014, when he met with Vladimir Putin, and assured him of his support and cooperation.11 It is another question what kind of influence he has over his former party (SPD) and the German political and economic elite.

Besides the Ukrainian crisis, Russo-German relations are also burdened by Merkel’s criticism of Russia’s disrespect for human rights and harassment of NGOs. (The Russian authorities’ actions against a foundation linked to the CDU was a particularly sensitive issue.) Some analysts also speak about personal relations: they claim that Merkel prefers to negotiate with Dmitry Medvedev, a representative of economists, rather than Putin, who can be considered as a representative of siloviks (securocrats). Some even go so far as to link the cooling in Russo-German relations to two factors beside the Ukraine crises. The first is that after 2008, the Russian business climate became less attractive for the German businesspeople than it had been before the economic crisis (although there was a temporary improvement between 2010 and 2013). The second problem was Putin’s return – which meant Medvedev’s departure from the post of President. The German diplomacy tended to see Medvedev as a modernising economist, capable of shepherding Russia towards the West and sustainable economic cooperation, in contrast to Putin, who, as a former intelligence agent and silovik, is much more inclined towards conflict.12

As a result of the above, a shift occurred in the German foreign policy. The earlier Russia-centric foreign policy was replaced by one focused on seeking partnerships with other Eastern European countries, like Poland and Ukraine. German and Russian interests now clash over Ukraine, because Russia would like Ukraine to remain loyal to it, but EU-member Germany wants to see a Western-oriented Ukraine. In our opinion, this clash signifies the end of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s ‘Larger West’ concept, because in the past few years Russia has made it clear that it wants to be an independent pole in world politics, and not just a part of a system dominated by another hegemon. During Putin’s third presidential term, Russia has begun demarcating the geographical extent of its sphere of influence. To achieve this goal, Russia is making use of its ethnic minorities abroad (Ukraine), its armed forces (Georgia) and pro-Russian politicians in neighbouring countries (Eurasian Union). This new reality requires a new approach from other countries, especially Germany, which has always had a more active and, compared to other Western countries, friendlier relationship with Russia. At the same time, Russia has started to draw closer to China, but in our opinion, there are significant barriers to their cooperation.

The journalists of Der Spiegel magazine have cautioned Merkel that an overly anti-Russian political approach could damage German export perspectives in Russia. Any backlash could have domestic repercussions on the Chancellor’s popularity. To put this into context: in 2014, Dr. Eckhard Cordes, the head of

11 Neukirch, 2014.12 Meister, 2015.

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Germany’s Committee for Eastern European Economic Relations foreshadowed the potential loss of 300,000 German jobs in the event of a trade war with Russia.

Previously Germany sought to avoid taking on risky roles like the one described above by defining itself solely as an economic power. However, nowadays the world and in particular the EU and the NATO expect a more active foreign policy from Germany.13 Yet, despite the significant recent reorientation of the German foreign policy, cutting the negotiations completely off with Russia would be contradictory to the philosophy of the good old Ostpolitik. Of course, the German government is clearly aligned with the United States, and it has taken a highly critical view about Russia’s role in the Ukrainian crisis, but in May 2015, there was a top-level meeting in Moscow on the 70th anniversary of the defeat of fascism. According to Russian opinions, this visit and the maintenance of the dialogue might yet bring results, because in the current situation Russian politicians and diplomats appreciate Germany’s enduring friendship, and appeared much more constructive than before. Moreover, after this meeting Russia might be hoping to change the positions of those Central European countries whose foreign policy tends to align with that of Germany.14 Nonetheless, it remains obvious that solving the Ukrainian crisis and unconditionally fulfilling the Minsk Agreement, or any further deepening of the Russo-German economic relations will be simply impossible without Russia.

economIc relatIons

After the deep stagnation of West German–Soviet economic relations after the end of World War II, the new Ostpolitik lent the two countries new momentum from 1969 onwards. In 1970 their leaders signed a bilateral agreement about a new pipeline construction, and in 1972 it was followed by a trade agreement. In 1981 a new economic, trade and industrial development agreement entered into force, having been signed three years earlier. The foreign trade turnover of the two countries increased continuously until 1984, but in 1985 a drastic fall in the Soviet Union’s ability to pay caused the volume of German exports to fall. Gas shipments via the newly built pipeline continued without interruption, but Soviet imports could never regain their earlier peak. In 1990, the Soviet gas exports covered 3 per cent of total European demand and 30 per cent of German needs. Unlike the United States, the FRG did not use economic relations as a way to pressure the Soviet Union’s policies in other areas. Accordingly, Russo-German economic relations remained constructive, and this provided a good base to build a new and even closer partnership with Russia after the fall of the Iron Curtain. However, several American analysts have strongly criticised the German–Soviet/Russian strategic energy relations developed during the Cold War – claiming that the European Union’s current energy dependence on Russia originated partly from those arrangements.1513 Ibid.14 Fenenko, 2015.15 Szemerkényi, 2007.

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One of the undisputed peaks of strengthening the Russo-German economic relations was the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, first proposed in 1997. Since its construction it has guaranteed a direct and secure supply of gas to Germany. The North European Gas Pipeline Company (NEGPC, later Nord Stream AG) was owned by the Gazprom (51 per cent), the E.On (formerly Ruhrgas, 24.5 per cent) and the BASF (24.5 per cent) in the beginning. Now the Gazprom still owns its 51 per cent, the E.On owns 15.5 per cent, and the BASF, the N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie and the ENGIE own 9-9 per cent share. The Stream consists of two parallel pipelines. The first one was constructed in 2011 and the second one in 2012. Since 2013, the total capacity of the two pipelines is 55 million cubic metres of gas per annum, but according to current plans, this measure may double by 2019.

Naturally, the Russo-German economic cooperation goes far beyond the trade of primary resources alone. The presence of German companies in Russia is concentrated in the secondary, tertiary and quaternary sectors of the economy, where the Russians have the greatest need for German know-how. For these reasons, Russia has been encouraging German investors for quite some time to expand their local presence. To achieve this goal, the two countries have signed a “Modernisation Partnership,” which covers the following sectors of the economy: retail, electronics, oil and gas, communication, food, household appliances and vehicle manufacturing. Among the numerous SME joint ventures, we can also find several major deals attractive to Russian society. For example: Siemens trains on the Moscow–St. Petersburg line or a Volkswagen factory in Kaluga. German investments are generally aligned with the Russian industrial-geographical landscape, and the majority of the factories is located around Moscow, St. Petersburg, and in the Voronezh and Ural industrial areas.

After 1990, the most important document in bilateral economic relations was a trade and economic development agreement signed by the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany in 2010. The Germans expected this document to be an ‘Eastern opening,’ while the Russians wanted nothing less than to use it to modernise their entire economy, especially the industrial sector. The agreement contains the following goals, among others:

• preparing Russian enterprises and German-owned enterprises in Russia to produce competitive products, which are able to substitute imports (using German capital and bringing in German machines not available in the Russian market);

• joint ventures in research and development to develop new technologies;• reducing bureaucratic obstacles facing Western companies; and• increasing strategic alliances among companies and improving the general

business climate.

According to the opinion of Russian policymakers, opinion-makers and intellectuals, the German and Russian economies complement each other perfectly, and this fact forms the basis of their mutually beneficial cooperation. Russia needs

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Germany’s know-how, technology, and production equipment; while Germany needs Russian energy resources, minerals, and raw materials. In our opinion, this observation is overshadowed by the fact that the engines of growth in Europe are the tertiary and the quaternary sectors, specifically R&D projects, and innovation. The energy and raw material needs of the service sector are very low. Of course, the energy demand of Europe is never going to be zero, because industry and consumption involves goods made from raw materials. Conversely, Russia does need European knowledge, capital, and commodities made with its know-how, and with the growth of domestic demand Russians are going to pay more and more for them. It follows from the above that German exporters’ interest is an open Russia, with significant demand for their knowledge-intensive products supported by domestic economic growth.

Nowadays, there are almost 6,100 German-owned companies operating in Russia, and the total amount of German FDI in the country is around 20 billion euros.16 One-third of these companies are registered in Moscow, but thanks to the Russian government’s investment incentive policy, German investors are now present in more and more regions. There are German-owned companies far away from the Russian economy’s core regions, for example in Tyumen, Dagestan, and Bashkiria.

The Winter Olympic Games in Sochi provided excellent opportunities for participation to German-owned companies. More than one hundred different German companies worked on the investment and construction phase of the project in various fields, such as infrastructure development, hotel and sports facility construction, and of course, in operating the newly constructed facilities as well. Had world politics not interfered, German-owned companies would probably have won tenders for constructing a fast train line between Moscow and Kazan, ahead of the World Football Championship in 2018, and a third ring road around Moscow.

In 2011, there were 1,611 companies in Germany with some Russian ownership. Only a few of them were large (for example, Nord Stream AG, subsidiaries of Rosneft and Gazprom), the majority were small and medium enterprises owned by immigrants from Russia. The profile of the large companies is mostly energy, mining and metallurgy, but the profile of SMEs is highly varied: we can find everything from retail to tourism. In 2011, the total amount of Russian FDI in Germany was 660 million US dollars.

ForeIgn trade

It is necessary to say a few words about the EU–Russian foreign trade relations as well, in the context of Germany’s membership of the European Union. The framework for trade between the EU and Russia is provided by the Partnership 16 Spiegel Online International, 2014.

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and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1997. The document covers the development of trade relations and capital investment as well. Negotiations on an updated agreement started in 2008, but floundered in 2010 because the two sides could not agree on the Trade and Investment part.17 Russia is also struggling to fulfil some of its WTO commitments.

The EU was a strong supporter of Russia’s WTO membership since the start of the process to the actual accession on 22 August 2012. … The EU will use all the available instruments (bilateral and multilateral) to make sure the WTO rules are respected as it is a key element to improve in the long term the trade and investment relation with Russia.18

Today the EU is still Russia’s most important trading partner, but, because of the sanctions and the WTO expectations, Russian diplomats are more and more focused on diversifying their country’s foreign trade turnover as fast as possible, particularly towards Asian countries.

In the ranking of Germany’s trading partners Russia is currently in the 12th position (13th in exports and 10th in imports). According to our calculations,19 Russia makes up 3.3 per cent of Germany’s foreign trade (2.6 per cent of exports and 4.2 per cent of imports). The total foreign trade turnover in 2014 was 67.733 billion euros, with 29.218 billion euros in exports and 38.415 billion euros in imports. The amount of the surplus on the Russian side was 9.096 billion euros at the end of 2014. It is worth noting that the two countries’ bilateral trade activity is highly concentrated, particularly German imports. The import turnover is largely done by capital-rich large companies, because German companies purchase mainly energy resources and raw materials. Only 1 per cent of the German companies are importing from Russia. German exports to Russia are dominated by motor vehicles, chemicals and agricultural products.

Germany is Russia’s third most important foreign trade partner (after China and the Netherlands). This trade relationship produces a significant surplus every year, most of which finds its way into the Russian state treasury. In 2011, the share of the energy sector in total exports to Germany was 72.3 per cent, metal industry products contributed 8.7 per cent, and the chemical industry had a 5.2 per cent share. The proportion of unprocessed materials makes up a disproportionate share of total exports: 80.9 per cent. In light of this, it is hardly surprising that the Russian government is doing its best to motivate the development of processing industry. The Russians want to purchase the necessary modern technology from Germany, and it explains why the good relations with German are such a priority for Moscow.

In 2014, 32.8 per cent of Gazprom’s exports to the West were sold to Germany, meaning that E.On is Gazprom’s most important European buyer. But the gas export monopoly of the mainly (in 51 per cent) state-owned Gazprom is already a thing of the past, and there are a few more new Russian gas exporters. For example, Rosneft,

17 European Commission, 2015 a.18 Ibid.19 Date source: DESTATIS, 2015.

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which is also state-owned, but also smaller companies like Novatek (nonetheless almost 20 per cent of the company is owned by Gazprom). In 2012, Novatek signed a 6-billion-euro gas contract with a German partner. Until 2011, the main customer of the Russian oil exported by Rosneft was Germany, but China now buys the largest volume, probably at a lower price.20 Because of the economic sanctions brought on by the situation in Ukraine, Russia is denied Western technology and capital for developing its oil production. On the one hand, this is limiting its oil production, while on the other hand, it is accelerating the reorientation towards Asia. But before the deals with China come to fruition (if they ever do), the Russian budget needs every cent paid into state coffers by Gazprom and Rosneft from sales to Western Europe. Half of Russian state revenue is still from the export of the energy resources, and because of this fact, large companies and Western Europe can still count on finding open doors in the Kremlin.

The total amount of foreign trade between the two countries has been decreasing continuously since 2012, but in our opinion, it is not just because of the Western sanctions after the Ukrainian crisis. The fall in global commodities prices has had a negative effect on the value of Russian goods exports. The lack of the structural reforms in the economy worsened the business environment for companies and halted economic growth, and it has had a negative effect to the import of German products, especially production equipment. Because of the decrease in consumption and investments, the rouble crisis in 2014 also hurt the German export to Russia particularly badly.

Table 2The Development of Russo-German Foreign Trade21

We have to take into account the fact that the Polish–German trade (78 billion euros) in 2013 exceeded the Russo–German trade, and this fact has had its effects on politics as well. Germany’s trade-based ‘Russia First’ policy became less central, and German politicians started to treat Poland as a special partner as well. Of course, Poland and Russia hold diametrically opposed positions on many issues, for example, regarding Ukraine. In the long run, it would, however, be a mistake to write off Russia, as there have already been many examples of foreign trade decreasing as a result of a fall in global resource prices. The last one occurred in

20 Umbach, 2014.21 Data source: 2012 and 2013: Deutsche Welle, 2014; 2014: DESTATIS, 2015.

Year Total amount (billion euros)

2012 80.52013 76.52014 67.7

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1987 and after the Russian economy’s collapse in 1998, when trade decreased by 50 per cent in just one year without any conflict causing such a fall.22

gas suPPlIes

The issue of gas supply is the one which attracts the most attention when discussing German–Russian foreign trade; it, therefore, makes sense to consider this question separately. To understand the situation, we have to recall the following:

• only one of the two planned pipelines, the northern one was built, and it has a 55–million-cubic-metre annual carrying capacity;

• the South Stream project was recently abandoned by Moscow;• since 2010, the gas demand of the European Union has been decreasing;• the Russians are looking for new gas export markets in Asia, but they realise

that the prices there are much lower;• the capacity of the North Stream will be doubled by 2019.

In the earlier development plans, the North Stream and the planned South Stream were considered to be able to modernise and enlarge the old and obsolete pipeline system built in the Soviet era. To modernise the pipelines, the most important factor is the gas import demand of the European Union, as it is what determines the size and capacity of the new infrastructure. 80 per cent of the gas demand is generated in seven core European countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. Beyond these countries, the gas import demand of the Central European EU members makes up only 12 per cent of the total demand.23 The demand in the countries which buy the most gas is also decreasing as a result of their energy-saving measures and the use of renewable energy resources. According to the current forecasts, a continuous decrease in gas demand is highly likely until 2030, even with current growth forecasts.

In any case, there is the potential to increase the capacity of the North Stream, because its Western end is geographically nearer to five of the seven key customers. As a result, the raison d’être of the South Stream and the Turkish Stream is very uncertain, and the Nabucco pipeline was also cancelled. If the North Stream will be solely operating in addition to the old pipelines from the Soviet era (which are able to satisfy demand in Central Europe), it will further increase Germany’s importance not only in Russian foreign trade but also within the European Union as well.

22 Пахомов, фон Крамон-Таубадель, and Баласанян, 2011.23 Gaventa, Dufour, and Jones, 2015.

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conclusIons

The main difference in the Eastern policies of Germany and the Anglo-Saxon countries is that Germany always maintained and maintains dialogue with successive Russian governments, even in times of crisis or conflicts. The effectiveness of the German strategy has already been proven, because without the Ostpolitik (based on cooperation and persuasion) the German reunification would not have been possible. Of course, the economic problems of the Soviet Union also contributed to this process.

After the reunification and the collapse of the USSR, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder also adopted the well-established patterns of the Ostpolitik. Thanks to it, German companies could export more and more volumes of goods and capital to Russia, and together with the imports from there, this process led to the interdependence between the two countries. In this situation, the rupture or cooling of the relations is not in the interest of either side. The German companies rely on the profits and jobs generated by Russian demand for their exports, and the Russian companies need not just German capital but, more importantly, their know-how, innovative technology, and machinery as well. These two circumstances almost guarantee the continuity of the political contact at the highest levels, even in such challenging situations as the Ukrainian crisis. Of course, even aside from the situation in Ukraine, there are numerous other problems in the relationship, as listed below:

• It is Germany’s strategic interest to have good relations with the United States and the Eastern European countries (primarily Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states) – their foreign policies are diametrically opposed to the Russian interests.

• Russia’s business environment is less and less attractive for the German companies, because of the lack of economic reforms.

• Angela Merkel prefers to deal with Medvedev, the economist reformer, rather than with Putin, a former employee of intelligence services.

Germany expected that under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency and after finally becoming a member of the WTO in 2012, Russia would start on the path towards integration into the Western economic system. But after the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, the West had to acknowledge the failure of the ‘larger West’ concept, articulated by Brzezinski. It became clear that Russia has aspirations to be an independent regional power, and wants to choose for itself its sphere of influence.

In addition to the above, as Europe’s leading power, Germany is a supporter of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, and, therefore, on the issue of

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Ukraine its interests are opposed to those of Russia. The development of trade with Poland (which never was friendly with Russia) and the strategic political relations require Germany to change its ‘Russia First’ Eastern policy, and build up closer relations and more active dialogue with countries like Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine.

Russia’s current economic problems are not entirely due to the Western sanctions introduced as a result of the Ukrainian crisis. In 2013, the lack of the structural reforms, the effect of the sluggish bureaucracy, and the economic stagnation brought on by obsolete state management practices were already recognisable. In this situation, a good relationship with the German political and economic elite is primarily in Russia’s interests – because of the revenues it gains from exporting energy and raw materials to Germany, and because it wants to involve Germany in modernising its economy. This means that Russia will remain much more open to German initiatives, and will be much more constructive in responding to them than to the demands from such countries with which it does not have common economic and historical goals. One can hope that the German mediation will be able to solve the Ukrainian crisis one step at a time, as this conflict is seriously undermining the European security. It seems that in this issue Washington also accepts Germany’s leading role. In our opinion, after solving the conflict in Ukraine, the interdependence between Europe and Russia will still remain. Of course, China will become an important partner for Russia, but Russia will still have to deepen strategic relations with Europe.

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