The Attacks of World War Three.

8/6/2019 The Attacks of World War Three.

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CE D A T T H E N A T IO N A L A R C H IV E S

DEQLASSIRIED- h it y H..r~ ~11}O ;f- ( .-'f~- -~-.--~~---Aut on N vyI"1)-

By - 4 6 \ N. ; \M. Date Iiia l l o " '. . ' . . . ~ - r - , . . . . . ~ . -f t c I F ~ $. :~ ; iC~ .IT" ~. .~, ' - . .. ~ : ' .." "' ~j .- 'i ~~ . ~.;,,> . .

C O M M A N D E R S < : l O N F B R E N O E ,., .

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DATE ; . Al?ri.~ 2,.5:, .2p, & : 273 1950-sPLACE~

CHAIRMAN Lie~lte:nruit General r e H. EdwardsPRESENT;Mr t Thomas K . Finletter Maj. Gen~ R. W~ B u r n sGen. H . S. V a . . ' . d e n b e : t ' g Maj. G e n o O . R. CookGen. G . d. Ke:r,mey M8.j~ Gell. C. B. g"tio:a.sI L t . G e n . .H. A. O l ' a i g Maj" Gen. D. M ., SohlE);btel:'L t . G e n . . B . W a , Chidlaw Maj. Gen. L. S,' Kute)7 i"j L t . Gen~ K~ B . Wolf.e Maj. Gen. W. E. Kepner

\ L t . Gen. G . E. S t t a t e l n e y e r Maj .. G e n ~ L . w . Johnson! L t . Gen. N~ F. 'nr:i,ning : M o . ; ) Gen. K . P. M O N a u g h t o nI L t . G e n . C. E . L e I v I p . y B r i g , Gen., O . .s, P i c h e rL t . G e n . E. c . v1Jhitehead rig. G ' 3 . 1 : 1 . R. B e r o n! L t . G a n " J. K. Oannon " '~J~ii;g;. {(en. S~ Srru:bh:I L t t G e n . E . w . B,o.wlii ' lg;s Brig. GenQ H. G . B~ikje;r~tj: ., Gen. s . E l. Anderson B J . ' : t g. ( j e n . O r F. fJafn! ~J1d,j G : e n . q . ~ p" Saville B.dg. GaIl. E , , B~ That.olter, ~,if~~ ".,, M O iJ . " Gen. R. ,E. Nugent > B;'rig~ Gen. c. M~.Maj. G e n . F. H . , . S m . t t h B.rig;, Gen , E. C . L y n c hMo.j. (Jan, W. E . Todd 'B l' Ji g . . ( f e n . W. C. S w e E in e :" .Ma.j. G e n . C. P..Cabell B r ig .< t' , G e n . J.. B . M6he~bm~~l! .; .Md5. G , e n . F. S. H o n g Btig-. Gen, 8. D. Gru']j:l.;)sMaj. G e n . B o G ., A r m s t r o n g CQ1. H . C , P a r k s~ O : d . G e n . ' 1 " .


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~ . ' . o .~ ~ ,~ ~ o . ~ . 'r w " ((]I T e V ~C b L ~ " h ' ..u 'W U . \

R O D UC E D A T HIE N A TI ON A L A R C H IV E S----~- DECLASSIIDEDAuthor i ty NNP gr;;D:f (~Y i I A NARA D ate I ~ '~~ _."--

PRESENT: (continued)" .., . "

~dditio~ PersonnelMaj. Brandt "CoL" H~ ., '.' ~Gen. C. A . L., WaldronM a j . G e n . D. L. Putt Col. G. P ..Di~oSi.,rayBrig. Gen. W . D', Eckert .'., Col. E. VandevanterBrig. Gen. J . F. Carroll Col. J . D. S:tevensonBrig. Gen. \~. G. S m i t h Col. S . B . HackBrig. Gen. D. N . Yates Col. G. S . BrownCol. C . P . Br01NIl . Col. G . E . Price001. R. v J . Puryear Ool. L . \1 . StockingCol. T . J . Dayharsh Col, R. C, NcBrideCol. J . E. Thomas L t . C o l . W . A . TopeCol. W . T . Seawell Lt. Col. E. J. illiite,

. . . . .. 0

Jr. iIf

I!I!ii1

Pa~~. . . . . 1. . 2

Col. D. A. Burch.lna.LCol. W. T. KempLt. Col. Re . H. l\'~rshall

r N ..D.E X~,,_.~-----

Intelligence Estfrnate, (~;ly.1950(Mej Gen C. P. Oabl$lJ,J ... , . . . . . . .. 4 ' II .. ,. 14 ' 1

." 0, 16' J' : 1 4 f ' :11 ., , .' ,. .. . " ..; I

. " . 37 \\fl , ~ .. .. 50

DisGussion ..O FFTA CK J.;E l(TO P, S ll!CRE~ ).:~

( M c i j Gen S. E. Anders9n)Discussion . Air Defense .of the U. S. ."(MaJ Gen S. E. Anderson)

.. '.'

Discussion COVERPO IN T ,(~OP SECRET) . .(Maj Gen S. E. Anderson) . . . , . . -(! i . . . . 56Discussion .. e , .. II 72 {

I


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- - - = ' ~ - " D E Q L A s s I I D E D " - . _ , . , , - -( ~ - . . , . . , . . . . . _ . m ; ._ . . . . . , . , - . - . _ ~ ~ . . _ _ , '

Authority NN r > i s ' 1 )D*~y J/ANARADate 11l (O~

1 '~ C ( . , 1 P s1 E C C l l ~ U ~ T

R O DU C ED A T TH E N A TI ON A L A R CH IV E S

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IN DE X (contfd)---.- . . . . .ComrnandPresentat1on, ConAC.(lot Gan E. Whitehead)(Col G. S. Brown)

Discussion~ , .."f".~ ~ . 78

.. ,. ,til

Command P resentati on, FEAF 0 '" ..(Lt G e n G . E. Stratemeyer)(Brig Oen O. S, picher)DiscnssionII 0 .. .. , III

'" 0 . , .

Corn~nd Presentation, ~ATS.(M a j G a n ~. S, Kuter)Discussion."). 0 ,

. .Command Pre aerrta tion, Alaska .

(M a j Oen F. Armstrong)C 0 1 1 I G 1 8 n ' t s i' .. " '" ... ... '"(Lt Gen N. F. Twining)Discussion. 0 0, .

. .Command PresentatIon, S A C

(Brig Gan J,' B. Montgomery)(Lt Gan C. E. LaMEly)Discl,18sion.

. . .Command Presentat1 bn; AMC, (Lt Gen B o W , Chidlaw)(Maj Oen C o . B. Stone')(Maj 'Gan O. F.. COOk)

Discussion.

o

,. , . .. '. , ._ "Conversion and Equipping Program. , (Maj Oen F. H. Smith)Flying Hours and 'I'ra tritng Requirernents(Maj Gan W. E. Todd)

Discussion. . .General Remarks . . " .

(General Vandenberg) .. II .. .. ..

COmmDndPresentation, APG. (Maj Gen W. E. Kepner)Discussion. 0 " .

iii

. . . 97114 129141. . .. .

o 159181. .. . . ..- "'186

189 203

. . o f " 231257

.. " . .. 2912 9 6

314326

, 335,. . . . .

. . 3 51

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R O D UC E D A T TH E N A TI ON A L A R C H N ES

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--~-DEQLASSIruEDAuthority N N ! ? 9 ,.,, 0; ' (By ~ NARA Date) Q . I 0 1 ( O b. -

,


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.t ' E 0 cn E DIN GS..1.0.:.- __ .... _ " .("\lbereupon, on Tuesday, 2 5 April 1950, at :)020 the

" .Conference convened, )G m ~ m ; ;" ~ \ J. l1 X 3 : Gentlemen, cone to order pl.easa,General' Vanclenbere ; has a -rew y.ro~ds fo r u s bef,0J?8we

G:J:l.JV~!\!:DllilB&'1G':Iine i'li Ll.vbe v e r y ' t : l h & r i " ; : .


6/81

R O D U CE I} A TT H E N A T IO N A L A R C 8 1 VE S

DEQLASSIIDEDAuth~rity N N I> S, 1 J D : f (~Y r I A N~Date 1 9 . 1 0 1 ( "

~) (ft, , G . j -' - Y ff"Jl"___'o ' : i J ';7 'r)l~U \ ! " J J U s , ~ \ . \ " , l ! \ ' : , . L L ! J J l- - - - - - - - - . - - - - - ~\ \

I hope '.70 uB,]. al,l join ~n t:.1:LS discussion and 1)u11no punches. :7edon Ithoro' anyt.hi.ng i n 'Jashinct.on but difficulties an-;{i.1a.yso 1;0 archero prepared to continuo' to hoar them. ' , ' ; 0 -.roulcl like t.o hoar tho300d thinGS too.

, : 1 ; : iiO.u~d. 'Li.ko to TIolc.omo you 'a.U horn-and laM glad l,'e havesuch a, :rel?rosontati vo Lang fr om all of tho Conmands

-I~O have the pl.caauro of having our notr SO,crotary of theAir"Forco, Ifr , Finlottcr, T!;Lth us and, if you pcopl.o havcnlt mot

periods and toll him: i.ho ymi


7/81

R O O U C E O A T T H E N A T IO N A lA R C H N E S

---'-"-'-'-'-EGLASSIElEDAuthority NNP Sl1)O: : f IBy 4 6 \ NARA D ate Ig . l 01 ( D b. 1 I~ ~J l .I E C C ' I R J E . 1 r

vrhd.chLe the .Soviet B-29 tY


8/81

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to rrago o'l'fbnsiva ..111;r. -: :- .I~,_ I .' .;Fror&,'-i:.hoforego:Lng_,. it i~~p~.rcl1t thu"i:. th e 'tcd::


9/81

confirm tho basic fact. tl:(atthc S9viot Union 'will not hesitate to

-,'. ._ _ 'J [ J ) ll~ s1 & C[t IE1r -. '.viol1, tho So'vi.cts~vc notyet r-caor-tcd to overt arned aggression;' :1United ...>tatosand its 1111ios. In ordorto '::in "I:,hi8 'r:ar and attain'its fundamentalobjoet;iv9, tho'Sq'Vi?t Union' ~'-ill employno;t.only CVG~yavailable so-ca'Ll.od non-military ;;capon and'~nctic ',Thichpromises success, bu:l:,'ulso coercive military .force.' .Despito'contradictory propaganda : b y Soviet leaders, ail SoViot actions

usc aggrossive mi;tita~'Y action foi' the a.ttainmcnt of its objectives,unless such usc jeopardiz~s scr'LousLy tho major opcnatd.ona'l, baseof Communist, imperialism.

1-.ro,foo1 confident that this concept of' the uso 'of'militaryforce is correct'despite tho fact that '~ recent. Corrtr'aL Into,lligo119C

, ';: Agol1PY roport prosont od.u substantially clifferent vi.ou, This' report. .is now in process of roviqion by the CIA and its member Lrrto'Ll.Lgonceagonc.ics and I nabhor ~xpcct ,that the resultant nov study l',illconform to tho 'ViOT.1)o:jJ:1'!:,'I'ihi.GhI have just. oxprcssod.. At prosonb,houovcr , bhcrc o.+,ofundmnenta.ldiscrepancies botrrcon NIT estim.ateand the.t, of CIA. ,'I'ho,CIA rcportasscrts th",:t. tho Sov:i.etUnionhopes . t .o achaovo its .objcctdvo of wor-Lddonrinat.Lon tlu10ugh subversionDndrovolution rq,thor' {hc.n conquest, oJ o cploi ting in tho pr-ocess 'riarsbotrroon 'thi:;.1d' power-s ',rhiloimi tine for' tho inovi tabid dormfuLl,' ofcapitD.~ism. Th(..1S,,'CIA not only fails-to identify corroctly'tho'l,nilitary character of i;J.1.0 Soviot thront, but also fails toroalizethat in tho.pres'ont by-polar,,1;orld, Soviet oppor-turn.td.os to oxpolit


10/81

major rrar-smiSSD,S t4c c~rp.il1iJ.L p'oiri~o't1i~t ',from t~o. Soviot viot:poirit~. vcrmust of ncco' ....sity bo bot'~:oonthoUnit:od Stc~t6s and thc_So vriot Union.. .. ..It c.lsomsconstruos tho',.fun:cti:oh'al:':id 'purpose of SQviot militcry ,po,>(or in dO$Cl'ibing it as a~,adjUnct' to iil'tc!l1D.tional '..;ommunism.Rather s1,1bvoi~sivo and , : ) _ " C V O , 'lut"ionr'.l";y forccs arc adjuncts to tho.J> ,.armod fQrs:es o f -t.ho~o:vtot 'Union.. ,For those andothor reasons" r

, ,h~;VQdissented '\iit~t h e ; ' ~epo;t:'t ,at? havo':tho o'-bhor mili tD,ryil1t~>11igo1190 D.gol'lCicsanq.>t.~oD~partmcnt of' s t D . , t o . Horrevor-, our

~ 0 . , ~ 0

dissent mo.intl:!ins that, tho SO:Vip,tUnion -Ls norr preparing i'or a.mili tary shor:-doTn1 y;i '011the Uni:ted State s

ThC?S~viot Union 'has b . l:},:C'gc;:carmed fbrco tl1


11/81

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V ' f i " ' 1 , . r r i 1 . illl. ' ,( R 1i' : e n . . i : l i " ' J r '. W~ . I i . C :J .I ~ \k;I l..\~ . u : a .110" \7 grpatly s:trcngt.hcneq. by the thl'out, iIJpliclt. in tho possession

, ._ 0," .} _

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biJtho Soviot Uni~n..go.ins-(:,he Soviet Uniontho danger of D . Sovigt' surprise: abt.ack aguinst the United States 'will

c "f':1 . ., .bo @,Teo.tlyLncrcnscd, . ':j11~"1,'tho Soviots he va 0. t to.incd this nunbor-,",,'ith corresponding ,dol:j.vory cc.pabilitios, til? United Sip.teBsuperiority in toto.ll1:urnbors of zrbonri,c bombs Ifill no longer bo thodeterrent to TI.:1r in t.he scno r'oLatd.vo degroc to -'-;hich it has boon in' t : .he past fC".I ycara,

It is most ~mportant th::-;!:.my csaoasttorrb of the risksinherent in tho United BtE'.tes situo.tion of ~isp1ri%!' of L1ilitE:.r:(fore.os, as compcr-od to ..tho ~oviot Union, be nado ';jith.tho militarycapabilitios and the objcctivos of tho Soviets i n ni.nd ruthor than. ~

7~. ,


12/81

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0 . _ . .. .. " " .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

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' . ' ' . .T r . . r ft i, : - . , " n . . ~ . .T I I fi"'J. ' i T ' , ) ) T i~ '(.'if!' '.,'. " ~ , \ ~ , : ~ ~ ~ , ~ / ~ ~ ~ ' . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . , . u , ' " - . ; . ~',' the:i,r, imJ!!.edic1:~e in~}3rrti:?ns.~ . >,T'h


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trading ofinitic.;L,:a"tQi"u.c bl;OlTS, Tiould. ,l(;av9 tho Soviet -Un~on in a.',. :'. '" .:'.~.

."- . ~ . , ( Q j ' r e : , ; ' fF J f o J , ' f E .l , G ~.:ll}"QJ;ll~, & I ) . I I : : : J ~ J1~ ll4 , '4,. Sta;c,cs retalia,tor~ratb)~~ ~ttaek.;Sov~e.t, inciu~'trial mobilization~d htigG'~rma~q~~G:"8~r~~S:'~TO,~1~d~10V~dG' tho $avict Union 1 ' 1 " i t11a

" ", ", ",~ .. , .' T... 0 o . .

~ol'itin~ingof'fon13i vC-~El,pribility; and. that; ','goXlcl~a~lyspoaking, bho0" ; ,".r e ,~ ~ '_~ " > , ' ' ; ' , ~ .

, 'I'hcprobability pf TJ~..'is_, thol"ofol'o, consio.craply dependent '. '. " I." , " ~.' i : _

u p o n Uni.tod-Sta,,;~s '~ilj_:~a:r-.fCD.pa9ilitios. , Ii' those cp.p~bil:i,ties , 0 _ "

decrease, .tho 'probability of TIal' Trill inorcasq. The prcib-abilit.yof 1TQl' will deer-case if our' knorm dcf'cnai.VQ and offcnsi vo capabf.Id, t:Les

... : Our defonsive capabilit.ies _must be such: -that tho. . I ..are ..adequate ..Soviets 1"~ould bo - u n a J P > 1 q to make an effective ~ t 1 ! ' p r i S e :a:t~aclc, andthus orilJ)lo t.ho United S:t.a.tos !i1obiiizp.tton pot~ntial and. .atomi,c

Our offensivo. Cal)abilitios oust be. ,sufficient. =, '. ~ .

to enable. us to dcstl~Oy solce"hod, atpfuiy ta.rget,s: in tho So'viet,'.'

Union, and; if need be) :t.osustain that ator.U.c attack,.Iicvcr -bcf'oro in: peacetime has the Uni.t.od St~tcs boon

I ," . ~ ..

dircc~ly subjoct~d ~ o s u c ~ s ~ r o n g and r o l o n t l e s s l y in~idious 0 i: ' .~

O P P O S i t i o n a s today~ Such a peace as thp,Unitc~ !3ta~cs i s ,e x p o r i o l 1 c i n g is n o t a poace; it. i s , i n f a c t ; a Y f a r i n Y T h i c h itssurvival is at stalco.Tho present confliot ~an change to aruedwarfare rrhonovcr-it suits the p u r p o s e s and ends of the Soviet Union.Sovi.ot, military povcr is off0!lSivo in charecbcr , '1'h9 first.,line

.t '.,

of defense of" tho Un:i,.ed Stat?~ ~[\lst bo to 'rocognize : C , b , . t. -T f O : arc. . . " ' . : . ~ ' . . o . . " . . . . . ~ ., _ ', at 1 7 a r right 'no,; andth.:-.t 'r-nall-out natd.ona'l, effort dcsd.gnod to.. ': , ~ . '; .. . ~

maintafu' 'pcrmc,l1ont'. n D . : l : ! - . ~ a r : ra~d pol:j,tical. superiority ovqr tho~. .. . ".Soviet Union is l 'ccJ.tt:i,.rod.'


14/81

.Ti,l;J.O1 1 (aH~ ~ - I E C C i R 1 E " r -

is,mrd Tro:c!dUi}an favor qi' :i:hQ"Soviot,.D"ni0n ~ , _ ' ~ - T _ . . ,- - Th e

I,

. ."ratio of .Soviet capabild;ty.: :'GoUnitcd.S-...atcs- capabili:ty, i n the ., ~ I "" 4 of rrar-


15/81

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Tho undorstandi~g P!.:,~f19;1 ~11;:.}1;;t}1ulQd"th0 IlT/hat,H ot' iritclli:~onco: is",". . "-". v ,." ~... , , .csubfrttmtially broa40r than 'tho befor-e, not only rdthi):1iirt.olligonco. l ~ " ".. "organizations th8m~clvosc hat I~i.thin:tho lrlr Force as a 1[h010. .Tn, . '

, ,il1Crdasingl~ra:r:ar,- o f tho fundrunel1tal and vital Tolo that intol1tgoncomust fulfill if our military 'p'Lans andp:t'opar~:ti(~nS arc. to .boLaunched on q !'ob..li's~:LObe.sis.

, 11:irForco intcllitoncc has 0110'roally sor'Lous pr-ob'Iomi n c ommon lTithall o th er g o'V ornm onM .l ' orgDnizations~ Ueither' OlJ.r-

,',soIvoa uor vanyono olso 'r;ili salvo -(,his 1)rob1om ovorrri.glrt r , Thoproblem is tho esto.bl1Shmon:t. of cdcquatc, sat.isfacf,ory, sourcos of

, . ."informa td.on. on tIlo Savioi:; t]lliol1 ano , its Sato11i tos 0 Although 170 arcscm:'chingfor,' crQatine,: and oxpl.o.Lin;~ every opening in the iron

\i... . I. curtain tho.'b 1 rO can '~hinl~ at, our .succo'ssos Leave much 'to 'bo' desired. I

Tho lack of adcquato . : l .nfbrmo. t :Lon is nor.hor-o so grcD.t 0.$ in ,tho ,fiold' of dr'- tochritcal into ~i igonco . Our ihi'ormc:tiol} on Soviet'

" .sbicntific" teGhilJ.Go,~.dovolol)ntOnts in the f'LoLd of C).erona:c:tics'. 'n n d ' r o l a t e d f i o l d s ~ ~ s o r i o u s t o tho p o i n t o f b e i n g ' a l a r m i n g and

, m u s t ; bo overcome. At this moment, \TO arc scr'LouaLy doficient in,~: .'tho"-r.lo[!.ns to collect the necosscry intelligenco ..minimums'on

G:kisting D o D d potontio.i 80vio'~' ~ , i r offc~si y~ ' .and defonsi vo . ,, ';0ct:'.pnbilitics, and, tho." iIll)10diato :Lntontions of their ['.ir ,forces.

To fill tho:go.ps,ino~ir'l:aw'.'lledgc, 'vro cr'c"usiilg many'diffo:c cnf mqthods c.ncl"'sour-cos '71:t,hih the Air Forco and in other'organizo.tians. n o dopont upon our air a+bachoa, air tochnicp.l

11. 1 : ( Q ) I F (C I ? ~ J E1r


16/81

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, 1 r l J . . , n , ~ I E (C fit l E r rliD.isonofficoX's, .,c'Oli,tr~ct 'in'tG!_ligonco S01J.l~COS, commmi.catd.ons'il1"~Ql1~gcnca ,photo ~~1(\:0'i~c'tr~t1ic reconna'Lssnnco ,the into lligol1cOactivit.ios. b:i.'thc' 'Q~cr~~,: : : ,s :GPDlil. : :!11d8, and govcrnmcrrta), C


17/81

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~~'.~' .~:.l~.rc:~:~Tq~..II'; f ./ J .. u : ' . ~ . lk1 . ~ ~ , K - : a . ' . 1 1 . ". . ., ,. ., 'o '" '.infox:rn~tilJn have been', our o.ir attaches belrind the iron~urta.in.. ; . -:. ...:. 'f "j", ,,;" i" I \,... ..'

'F01~reasons of' e cono'~1ytrh?attach~ s y s b e m ~ i 'of all 'th~serv~qeshave re~~n'~lY'~~~n:i~~~~o,ed.'.,1:h..i .s ':~~ii'on'' 4 ' i c t ' , r i o ~ app;eC~~blY,aff.~ct

J : _ ~

the collection of: a i : r ; . intell:Lgenee:j..nfori'~~tioh o n the Soviet E m p : L J ? 6because we rrer-e able to. 'make the btllk of our reductd.ons "in, the ".post.s o i t least imp0l'tanc:e': oubsdde .the Sovi~t Orhit.. HQwevei"',:w : . r e :are' n017 being se~iou;ly :a;E'fect,ecl bi the S


18/81

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trhc q'l1.Ostion

. -m y - op:!.nio.n, ~.~:L $ . riot: sp.tiefacto~i'J:i ~~bactY.:,In spite. of my fullrccogm.t.Lon of tho :onOi '?l i ty of" CIAls problem, I f'oo'L t.hat. it hasll?t yct,drar.'l1. t n . enough merr.of s tc.tu;roDnd thl:i.t it is stillon' somow~at ot: ~..c01.1;."'ltr~,_...sbcro basis'lTith its .sights sot 'GOOlow.,.. . .~. .. .Il?-c:1.dontally, ::?o.ssib~y.l'ro in. ",Ur :iJ'orcQ'rrtcl.Ll.genco D.:!. 'O 3ubj~ctto the sane criticism as to inadequacy' of concept. If..' .\such is the case, I. ehcu Ld corta"inly expect, to 'have th2.t pointodout to meat this conrcronco and o'thorvri.so,

N O - \ T , just one'word about, SGc'li.rity of inforJ!1E.tion. ThoA;Lr Force is genoral1y :looked' upon by tho other eorvtces as beingmore of a socur-t ty risl;: th,-:m thQ o thor-a, 'rhorc a:cemany oxtcnuatdng

I"c.Lr-cumsances-jrhd.ch T shall rtot;,t,.nlwtiInO'to discuss. The factrom~;i.ns,~h1J . t . .tl1:e criticismsm';o too 6i ; tOIi 'J:l1stified, ~nd the'prob'lom La. ~10t-gf)ing to,bo solvcd b y anY' sor'Lcs of rogulations, butpr'LncIpa'l.Iy through a groat mcroaso in socuri ty consciousness'pli the part o~ c v : o r y o n o . To C ' l c c o . m p l i s h t h 2 . t , the energetic a s s i s t a n c eof every c omnander is rcqu:j.red.'. . .','".

. Thank you.- GEI:EDYflillDS: qonorul Cabell, .fro;!! the Intelligence

viO'\'lpoint, have you roached {lny concIusf.onawf, th respect to this

inclico.ti,on of.t~9- Russidn.TTill;i.ngnoss to participato in an incidentthat ~lig~t- 100


19/81

, '~.

ccnc'luet.onaus t : : : : l liheih6r or not the recent. shooting donn 'by tJio'Soviets 'of' th o 'Priv~t'ooi'" :,ias,'1n 'i:ndic'2:t,ion of tho T!i'!.lingnoss '. . '. :.to res ort to 'uar? Ji,S" rp S ' - :S00 1 t n:01! itVms cortain ly a probing.Ho think it TI~S:i:>~ob~bl~"0.(Jlibora:t,~lY 'dono C,S / 2 : pi~obin;g to 130.0uhnt. our roa,ct:ton "liGulci: bc ,qicl not .risk n ."jar b.yv:~rtu.o df their' shooting dorm thnt -,c;irqraft.

, -,comment. ali, ,that '~r add anyt:tiid_~ to ' it?

G i l d : ! CiHlNOU: I 'have hothinr' -bo coranorrb obho.r th


20/81

. 1 1 1 ( Q ) J P : S l E C I T t I E . ~ r r. of 'Staff.h.:i.Vo cit)P~~V0d :p,u .~Jut.},iriod Trcy. plan:}~~lo\;rics OFli'~el lCKL:: '~

. p.:\!'ticulC.~ bPGrD.tiQn~\ .piD:ns~. : GO l1 Cr c: :~ : ~~nctors.pn" t 1 J_ O ' .Dirootor .of Pl.ans and Operatio~s,.:

is going: t.o.prcsql~~t'~:.~fQl1:t!l:L'S ,mo'X'l ' i ihg tho outdano o f OF: ' : l 'ACKm.GElJ,f .JJDEUJOU(. : J : . t - - ~ 'Soc'rotary, Gcnorn'L Vandonberg, lir ..

'.first. triO years 0f. D . Yr2.rbogtnrring 1 Docomber 1949."In, this p'lan, consd.doruta.on has boon given 'bo tho

" .'" .papnbilities o f tho Dntted Stat.es; tho estimated cD~p'2.bilities

of thO"Atlantic Pact, AiliC:s, and the latost il;rt.cl1if~encoestinw.tos :'of Soviet.captlb,ilitiCs. ~nlese.estimatos -havc booncovered in' go.11or0.1b y Gonor-aLCabell.

"this. plan, ccnsadorut.Lon rras given :to tho z-dconbatomic blast -LnRuss i,a, the ::result,s of:,D. como'lobo anc.Lysf,s and eV:;;luc..tion;arc

-e , '.

p'lan vri.Ll.:havo to bochnpcod 'accordingly ~ : " .~ - ,., .. ' ';'rb:o overall stra.tegic 'COnCal)'t:o 'OF:i'J.'J\ctLE pi 'o"Vidos' for

'~liG'atta~b~mbrt'J lHliOd ~b. 't,fo:nD.l objocti '\lOS't b r01 .1Gh Lho rrd.lito.r;r, db:feat' o f tho\ U8SR:'O:ro; lJ.ght. ~bol.'/c. 'by a. ' mQ.jor'offensi v6:offort'inHo"stern'Eurasic nr id ' ( " ;] . '~'tratOgiG C 1 < : i i o l 1 . S P , on en D.t1stcrj_t;y': basis,. in,the Fnr ED.st_

-,"Gortt:\-in b2.sid undor-bakl.ngs for tho Allios have boon

. " ' ).~ . ./


21/81

.. _

> ' . ' :' . .'" .~' '/,' - ,~.~ - ' : " -.

.~.' .-",. . ,...1 ~" "" "

-, . . . .-;~,", ~

'". ',- " c., ,' : , e . , ' .: : . . . . : . . f , ; , t ~ < D ) : ' I P , : .~ i S : ! c ~ l f i 1 f " "Thc~ (J .~p4tl J ;Q. m < i$ i ) ; 1 u m : t l iD : t d: .hc A : L 1 ; L C l ? ' ; I l lUs:t:aCC 0~plisLl.0 : ~ ,- - ~ ,_ ~ . 0 "" - : - '~~ .+ .~ .

follous: " . , , i ~ 0 "f r O ,:i~sti,r,o:~b~o;,il).tcgfi,tyf .tho. -jo::rtcrn:HonU,sphd.ro", ':. ' _ . - - ' ~ _;" ~ ." "".,~ . ~ .,. ' .. _ . ' . '

'and t4o..Al;ticd' mai!i'S~~lj:0rt.areas;, and' . tb ' , pro~.otQ '[uid.- d ,?VO Lop their. '..TmniKlki~gC[tp~bili~l)i~~'~.

2~To;socu.ro,; i l l L V ; i . i l ia . i n , : and .dcf'ond .such-bascs , 111n9.and sea D.ro['~s, ru~c1~lj~ne~!'of cDJmnul1i.cD.tion',~s.rorcq1::Lied fol:' tho

, , I

" . . ' ,'oxccut.t.cn o+, tho concept .3. TR sto.bili~d, as soon as practicable, tho Soviot

offensives, po.r~icularly D.gD.:i.l1~'brccs vi'to,l to the Allios; 0.11 air,, ,

nava'L, .'and ground forcos 1:r11ic11an "0 0 spared. from athor essential"t.aska 1 . " l i l ' . i . be used fQ~ t~1is'purpoao ,

4 . , To,conduct 2 , - 1 : ; the oal'li(;'st pructd.cab'Ic date astr~.togic 8.ir offonsivo [ \gCLi. . '1st -t.ho-eLomcnba of tho. Soviot ;';c.r-making: co.pnbility.

5. .To.ini t':\.uW-developmorit of .bh o . offensive p o- ,m ):' .of.. - , .,, " , .

the 'ArmodForcQs "fb.rsuch latur oper-atd.ons c;s milY bo ncccasaryfor tho achi.ovomcnt, 0' the ovorc'Ll, 'i'hr objoctives . '''.. .

6. ',Toprov:Ldo. osson:ti:U aid: be, Q J . D : . j~llios in.; .SUP1)Ol,.,t of cfforts'con,;ri}:mtiIlC dir9ct)_y'\io the implomontatioi1 of. - - : - . 1 . : - " , . 'tho ovoral.l. st.r'.togic.col)copt .

7. Tooxp16it;' 0:[:. the; QQ,rliost 'prn.ctic~bl(; dabo , tho.ps;rchoJ:oGica.,l voclm'os~e~. of tho USSR,and its so.t,q).likJs byinforlP.Q.,ti011.[l.cti v:itio:s mid by obhor spccf.e I,' operctd.ons ,

1 7


22/81

''i .: .,'P,"!

, .) ". . . . _ . . .

. ., . . . .;'1. .:\

. ,,'.',~'. ',\',~,IP. dcvoloping'OF}fJ:.AC1~LE,hopldn' ~f a~t:1t0n for, tho, . :. . ,, ' . ,. fWst;, tHO yoars of War haabocn divided 'int'S! t;tteco' D.~)proximato .time

pfiasos i;iitlr opGr.ations,' subscquorrt theroto c:J,nsidercd "~S boing

Tho first ~Jho.seis -0ho ljOl'i.ddD"'P;;lytbrough, D-plus- 3 moritha,. ".Thofirst char go ago.inst il.l1ioQ ros-oul'!e'OS is,-to provi4o for

to be mdol'ta.ken on an il'Ulstori ty basis, nlldyd_ll :il1y:olvG theacocpbcnco of ccnsadorub'Ic- ri51;:I3.

, . .D.ss:\Jgncd. ,..Tho d$furrs:t vntasJx:cS' i1 lcllw 1C ':' " '" " "

,Insl.1I'iriEvt110:'int?gl!ity: 'a f thq-f'f?storn: H~IDisPh~!Gy" < .,Uesto:r:n' Hemisphere n12t5.on5. . AIJ10ng those' moceures' [1,1'0':

Tht? establishment of 13. limited, air Y[lji'lting, and cominurti"6D.tionsnot ..\ 'I'ho-provision ,for defense of Canada- initiallY"!iitp linutcdCanadian for8os.

lrrcidontt:.l1y, " b h i 1 ' 1 ' D , l : t g h i ' i t t t this, prosoni/at;Ldn" the ]J tUQ de:rds181 1 , ( 0 ) lF~SJi : IR

" ~ .', . " " ._ 0


23/81

. ' '.' .

~1~;e. /.< ct~.. - , . , - S ~ ~ ~,i;"f ' J ~ ~ : " , - . ~fl!.N,i'iT~~A~~~~~VES" , ' - . ." " ~ ' _ . . , , - , _ " , ;.. . 1 _ " , ' , I ""

DEQLASSIEIED. Auth~rity h i t t Y ! > 9 r ? J Q : f - ' {~y ~ NAMD:~.~ ,~ ! .~ I~~ ,~~~ ' i l l \

0 "! '. - ' - QStJ.li,\


24/81

DEQLASSIBIED----=------I Auth~rity N N ! > S I ? " D : H~y46\N~Date 1 ~ I O I ( O b _

. T - < O ) . T l F ' ' '~rmt;~-Il1r]f;c o r , SiS-. ; . i!iLb: 'r T ! r l . g h t \ ) o " i l " l t : 61i{ in th o FaI" Ec.st, O FF:M CK Lb.

_ _ _,_.,,. .....-.. ~...., -~.-. . . .I. , '"

incitcD.tos 0: fightcr .do.fcnao for 4' dny figl'ltox's, 1 0.11-::00,thor, .__.rll".. . . .and under bho strc.tcgic o.ir 'offo11Si VI) is shoim tho 6th fi{;hter group

T )-i)"horoas the o.ctUC.l :,?l':)crnm in: tho Fo.r'EMt is 2 day intercepts, 1o.ll::.r..rcdthor fighter group , and 3 :figlYGor bonb , The light bombbuilds u:J c.t D-plus-) tol g1'ou). 'fhat t,:hirtl aqundr on 1;o.B. .o1:'iginc\lly scheduled to cone '1'01:1 tho regu~C1.r squcdrons oquf.ppodT d .tIl B - L 61s , Hotrcvcr , " ! i n o y ccnnof be .suPPol't.cd in conbab and thethird squadron" Tft.Jt1k have -to:bu furrri.shcd by .tho .Hr lio:tion.:'.l Guard.

GBi.1AI{JERSOH: .Defense of t,he Cax:ibbco.nar-oa, includingthe Po.nama Co-nv,l and tho'Venezuolan oil m~ocJ ';;i11 bo )ro.vic1odin coo.rdd.n.vtd.on Y;ith British, Vonozuolo.n, and Dutch ,:\ut110rit.ios.The c.iJ;.~ '~~l1d1;vo. l bases Trill. bQ:o'Dtb;bli~hocl on Icolnnc1, .and tho

ova'Iuatd.on of the fC'::'.sibility of the ' o i y . ; r ~ t i " n . , . tho planprovidos for two p['.N.troop comparu.oa t~)ho D.ir...)_~.:;msported by t,hoUSAFto 1001['.11(: D.S soon c.s possible. Those .paratrDop, conpenfcswi.Ll be !,01ievccl by 1,1:'.rino forces.

Tho' noxb bask discussed is tho Str


25/81

priorities, iiil1. bo under tho control of tho J'jir~t01;.iof8'of Staff._.For-ces f'or this task l;i1:,l be dcp'Loyod ['.8 r2.piclly. 0.8 fL.(\siblo to

, \."tinitiD.tcd from these 'bD.sOS c,r\~l.fran bases in tho United States, staging..' .th1'0'11[;11 ..:\lo.s1w anrl U10 IITortho,f.stnroc , Bases In Eco'Land, Horth

A... . 1 t1 f" ld'l Eas t 1 ' / " - \ 1 . 1 bo 'SO'(' f l' t~ .n "8 ';'8ri.cn, anr: 10 ! , " ;La G. "'~.K _,_. ,.tL,' o 8 ~'G~' g


26/81

dorm ].J11d~rtro.togilc r,ocol)l1c,issm1Cc heavy, strategic' rcconncd.ssanco

under -bhoso f'Lgurcs ,GBU - 'u :DERSOl ;; Tho t .hi rd ccbogory of tc.slcs in OFF'I'~l.Cl~LE

. nr e not ro latcd t.o opcrct.Lons in -:iostorn Europa.Tho soc.tU'it;{ of tho 'United Stat.es and her Allies. requires,

T[i"o11espect, " 0 : 1 c orrtdnont-a L ;Guropo) the ptu"SU[\ l1CO of D . contzlnu.lngpolidy t > develop, at the' our'Li.csf possiblo nomont., -CheCD.po.bilityof holding 0. line covcni.ng tl~e -,;ostern Eur6~)OD.ll corlp'lox, prcforo.b'l::rno farther to t.nc i70St "(;'hd11he Ithirio, Realizing th.:rt. tho,.D.cconplish;,!ont of' this punpo.sc is Lnrcasfbl.o rrirth tho forcos trlrl'ch

I,,;iIL bo c:v'::Lilc.hlo in tho period 1950-1951~ this p'Lcn onvascgcs ['.8 enaltern[ltivu, eithor the; h,-:lcl.in:;;, iT possible, of n subatnrrtdrrl,bridgehead in " :: 'O S 'l :.O . ," 1 1U 1 'u p a 8 1', if this pr-cvcs ihfonsiblo, thouo.rliost pructd.ccbl,o return to ",;cstorn Eur-ope, in'orclor bo prcvorittho cxp'Lol.bat.Lon and cDrar . tunizD;t , ion of that ar'oa Yiith rosufterrtlong-torn ch.saat.r-oua- effects 06. the: natd.onc L intorosts of the UnitedSt2."tcs anc. her Allies.

1, study of the: for cos c.vnile,blo il1c'.icc.tos that 070n thofirst nltcrno:i:.ivc, hl)lc~tnG ~~bridcohc.:,.d, cppocr s to bo beyond :)l'osGnt

.forcos, tho scc::nclt.l-bcrndtivo _- the cD.rli03t ~Jrncticc.blc r-cturn totho Contincnt -- ,:ill pr-obably have to, be adopt.od,

22


27/81

: 1 , '_ _ . ' - , " < ~ _ _ , _ __ ' _ . ,~ E P H 9 G ~ ,t E D A1T H E N A ' r ! O N A ' L [ A R ~ H i V ~ S :I"~ ' .' ,


28/81

" > :: ' . : ' ; , ' ~ '- " " " , . ~ ' , ' . , " '. - - ~ . I , > , ,- - ' ~ .'~1 ", ' ' ' : ' ' - : ; ' _ ~ : ; " f ' ~ : ' . . ' VHENATIONAJ:


29/81

- up [,t tlie present' tiLW?

G:GH C,, \BE~ -_ 'L : .I"pon' t ansvrcr tho;~ qucatd cn h ero under thebuild-up.

COL S E':m L IJ :- llcoordin~ t:J the inforc.o.ti,)ll TiC h ave Gild I ' lh iohtrouI be rct'oa-rod to in ,0. 1[ttC~1~ prosentc,ti;m, tho British p1D.11 by1953 to li.D.VO n:)pr')xlJ:1o.te1tr46~l.jet interceptor [!.ircl'o'ft in theirsys t.on,

GEE~UDS:001;: Th'.:G) Ibo1icvo, is tho only Ilo'jorLncr'caso in their


30/81

6 ,: If .: ~ " .. :"e,'_ ~~: '~.:_,'.,;_,-.\,._~ ~ t i f{ : ; '; , _ ;- . : ' . .ATJO~A~~~~~~Y,~cs,; : ; .: : . ,"':'"-:...-:;...,:'~.'_:' " " " ' c " "' = -" '- ' - '. "" ,

__;~"'e ". ,: ,/ ,_,. ,~/_'' '' '' '. DECLASSIFIED .. 11-- .Au th o rity 'A / N D 3 1 37 (f7/kyL NARA Date" ~ ~ Z ' { J / p . . , : .

} r u ' , ' & ' J E C C ] R : I E TPI 1 '11 - ",.,. 1 ,..' ondorrt n bho s:tn+u,


31/81

l.,.: .t

COL" sE:"Y~;r~J"L;: f ' o ' R P ' : i , p l~'l;.q.C~on. D...;Day,. tho. British havecppr-oxtnato'ly 100 fiGhtors,. 16 light bonbora.. and 0. forr tr~\l1Bports,end phct.c r'cccc , ~110S()' nrc to; be .augnorrtod .8.8 soon hero plusAustralian-How, ZOD.ID.nl1s Launched froLl or' S ' 0D.goc1 through tho 1.lod:i,.te:r:ral1ounJ:nx::D.1J .1C~.t~)supp lcnorrb thoseopcrctd.ons, end, fil~o.lly; To stnbilizo Soviet offensi vcs inthis CoX 'Go. cs ear-Ly 0.9 possf.b.Io ,

Cor'bc.il1 otlll,:r,.:11l;ioc1 opcrntd.oua in tho lIoditorro.ncanHill be conduc'bod. to tho extent pro.cticv.blc o.nd C "l1sist,ont -di tllthe roquircnon:t.s LIt' tho prin~',ry objoctzi.vcs , 'I'hoso oporo.tions,not lis ted in order of' il:lpc)r~L:l1ce, 1.1"0:.. '

271 r - ( Q ) ' I P 1 E C C ~ E T .. .


32/81

~.-~'

'oJ' ~. ," : " ~ ;; : : : 4 , ~~rb~h ' 1 i R ~ ~ . ' i h Atliccl hontroi -~i" ~hC' ihtftorrC!.icc1itcrrnnoanmel tlw, 'Cairo-Snozo.rco..

To conduct, operntions designod t o J:1D;intb.:i;nth0 ;)ricnto.tion

t h o i r Trill t . ) resist.c To suppor-t , [1.8fOD.Gj.ble, indigenous forces 'one;d~rccl in . ,

dolnyinG Soviet cdvanccs 'blll'~]uGh.:~si


33/81

Ltj.t;L-subL1urino - : r .,rfnre,- c opcrntd.cns and nininz, .. :> .e ;ni l1s-G cmor .w forcos om: buses rrh.i.ch ?OSOD . throat tCI tho li11.03of c:nll:mnicatiOl1;

Lir.ntod ,figh;tcr c.1~fonsos c I n e . ,air oD.rly TTnrning pcr td.onao f t.hoao lines of coi:u1unicntioi.1 Y.ithin ro.l1Go of' onony air attack." - < < ~ ) i? -(to, '~ .. "" ':, r'

, ,i:ith avadLabl, f:JrcOS)~UF'~l~G tIl0 .first, f.~)h.c:sq.This p'Lcn recognizes th0.t it is inprQ.c~icq.l 'GO lo.y do-rm ,. ..~'. ,- . . . ._ .

c. 11['.1"8.nd rust C,)UXSC .of ac td.on for tho .ovorc LL .


34/81

DEQLASSIIDEDAuth;Uty N i N ! ? 9 1 'hOf{ 'I------------------~__----I B y ~N~Datel i IO' IOb. ' .

. .tho Allied need far 1.I:idGloEnst oil; 0 . 1 1 1 . . 1 ) lest,Soviot T;oC\lG1cSSOS :'.;llich havo dcvoIopod .:'.ncl cor.Ld be

qX)Jloitod~No o.ttonptis. 'hedo. in t:::tis IJlim t,,J ov;:"lt'tc.'to those; fo.ctors

[ ' .so. bo-sis 'for solectin~,:tl~c :.lliod. cour-se ()f,~ction for t.ho socond" " .' p l l D . s O of' tho .uc.r.. Instead, tho_ basf,c strD.togy mel 'tc;sks undor-tckon

for thos 0 OPoi"o.ticns c.m~i(:Ci"od nocnsscry in ft1X"lihorc.nco"of thoovcral.l, concept in re.;e;c,rd.to .rcstorn Europe,

Contdnui.ng tho c~cfcnsi ve to.slm, ccut,inuillG the strc.tcGio. "'. . .:,

[\i1" ;)ffollSivo, o.11e:c:'ntinuinc; o)crD.tiops to [vlintc,in security of. linos i::f cOl:u:lUl1icntioh.

Dur'Lng tho scccnd phase, -.;0 nobf.Ld.zo nt naxf.nun speed endnovo forces t) .',lostern Em'cain. Grcuml forcos Gill. be doployedpril1cipo.lly t. th o ' N o rth TrQErc .\fric~n o.ruD. for its sccuri,ty end toundci-tckc lir.1itod objocti vc operations in t.ho !Jodi tcrrail0an.

,'. ,Air end navat fOl;COS rri.Ll, 'direct offorts t01'w.rd tho destruction' ~" - .of .thc overall Soviet. Tmr-,.r:1nl( ing cnpac1ty, o.ttainr.1Qnt of air

." 'superiority, oveJ;'cor:lil1[~ho si.l:~));1arinc,thrsat, chockinG th o SQviotadvance, and pc.rticipatinC in'tho linited objcct.i.vo operationsin .bho lJoditorro.no.::!.l1. 2ls .t.l.wsc .o}J0rD.tiol1s ~~~in succoss, o.n(~['.8fDl~COS build. up, in Berth A~'rica." thoro 8h:":u1


35/81

I .~ '. t ~:(tis:Ldcr -t:) bo fraf_l''',D-pllis..;,12. . . . . . . . ' . ~ ' : . : ' ; ' I ~ ~ ~ ~ r (~ \ t : ~ . : ~ 1I~\~'}..~... c ' : " ~ ~ . ' . . . . . ~ \ . . ' h. , ~." i. ~ L ' J 1p:nths to D ' _ ' p ~ u s " ' 2 ; 4 r ' 1 0 l : ~ i b J i , S ' , ! ~ I ~ g . J f } . - ;; b l ' : g ; J l , {~pur ' P l1"}" Jn~~o"frbn D-plUS-2;..l..ncrrths t~th00-1f~t~i';~I{() ~ ' { c : ~ ~ ; ' \ i ~ s t 'c pr~~lolTtCd j.ll oven nor'o gOllor~l,

" '

terns. Th o 0 1 1 8) ;': :,,1 1 'pl~~ild~,iile those phnacs iric1uc:os':, .

Contdrnri.ng tho ossontic.l '::ofcnsivo t~sks1tho strc.togic., ~,, I

_;.ir offensive, n~c~ r.1D.itit~il1inG c~ntrQl of. ' l : l 1 1 o " s of cormumcctd.on,In addition', opel~6'y'bi1S in Hcstc~n' Eurc.sio. i;ill be continued .tocrcabo condi tiDns fo~ tho c~'r1iost return to "Icabcm Europe. 'hoS:e

. . . . . .

"

'they incJul:o 'Coi.uj.tol'-air opcr'atd.ons to .::'..tJuo.inovorn'Ll, nil.'superiority end 10,00.1n il" eupronacy over so Lcc-ocd arccs,

They include intcl'


36/81

0 .1

,l

I $ . ' ( Q ) ' ' ~ " )t. ,, . ,.(~ll U, S. forces c.ve.~lc.blo for invasion of ~icst,orn Eur-ope(Chc.rt)COL~)L.LELL: Those forces" cs ;;l'JU ccn soc, c.re approxanato'Iy.

30 U.S. Amy Ini'o.ntrY Di.vi.ai ons plus 6. crmor-od nne: . 5 airborne I"[J:th. r . .140' o.nti-o.ircro.ft bnto.lliQns. Tho Envy forces as, indicv.tod here'o.~~o.noto.bly 10 hov.y-.f'c


37/81

, ' . ;"civii 4 .:C f< : \~ t ;! ? :~ 1 ; }~+i ta !y eOVl. .rm . iO i{ t p lan~; . !:. P .. j":~';~'~:':;,' .L cor.1l:1i:',d~t.':iJlO:n~'.' .t . . . f~ , ,~ t f .t . .j L } c ~ . ' ;' . ' ! ' - - : ' ~ " ' . t . " ' ; 1 ; ' ' t -!~'! " , J F , ' ~ ~ ' , < ' - .G . ; ' ~ ' ~ r - ' ~ ; 6 b l ~ ~ ~ { i b ; ~ t ~ : i ~ s " ' ; i ~ : ; ,11dJ: ... ' 1 . " :!, ~ ; :::: . & V o r n g ' t h d :r0,c_tl ' l l .rOr.lOnts,.for: nobiliza.tiol1 and~ , . '.. '.'

6..,

r ' . ; . ~ . ~

al.Locctd.on of 1 ! r o J J $ . p o ! " t . o . t i C ; 1 1 1 fv:.cilU;ios requirod for, tho', " . , . , " . , , " - : ' ~ . . : ' : " ' ' ' ' > A .t I,rt~tf{f~oj~.;:-/! / J , ' J , ; ; , (';t,~, Ii:; I' ~. I ,~". ,i { 1 .~conduct -of Y r ; ~ 'U n ~ 1 6 ; 8 F F r r j . b K f u E . . ' " ' , . '. : \ ' ~ ~ . . , : . - r - - ~ d. ~ r, ~~,~,~... ~,

1\;t .thoi?tc~:on~'ti.hic:6.150', the Air FQrq:e plan atonntng frc:r.l", ..'{'p: . o_.~. ,. I "l-~'.jd\~,"\.! ,-~~t~'~~~; . 1 : ( . / : : ~ " I ' : t ; ; . - X F ~ ~ J , . _ /~ : ~ ' . ~ . :~a\ t - : > ~ . .OF:~TACr;:f",E"i~"1)oi : l~F ' ,~;QO_l~C:. : i l1dt 'od 'n tl l.c' ..\i1' ,,~ftaff en d upon cpprova'l,~ . r - . . , . . . . . 0, ,0-', .~.,~. ~":\-"}" .,;l~ ~:t~:'!~


38/81

E D A T T Il E N A T IO N A L A R c H iv e s

c h 2 - 1

DEQLASSIEIEDAuthority N N f ? St1JD: f {By 4 A NARA Date I A I O l iD b. ---

liJ ) J I D 'E (C l i~JErGEN EDW ARDS: Gentlem en, -che conference is open for dis-cussion?, or any questions in clarification of General Anderson'spresentation.

GEN K EN N EY : Where is the air strength coming from tosupport the holding of the Rhine?

GEN ANDERSON: General, unless we have fighter supportin England) there probably will be none in 1950 or even for theduratLon of this plan in the next two' y ears. As we say} holdingof the Rhine J as enviSioned in this plan, is infeasible. We eventhink holding a bridgehead in western Europe is infeasible duringthe period of this plan.

GEN EDWARDS: General Cannon, you might have some com-menta on supporting the ground army over there.

(]EN CANNON: There are not adequate air forces in Europeto support a dBfense of the Rhine at the yresent time. There 1sno use in sending additional air forces to Europe unless they arebased west of the Rhine, which would create the necessity for baseson French aof L, What air forces we have currently located in Europe

are improperly disposed and would have to displace to the west of theRhine iDnneo.iately in the event of an emergency. At best they couldperform only one mission fram presently occupied bases. There areonly three or four airfields in France which are capable of Bupport-ing modern combat aircraft.

GEN EDWARDS: , G eneral Anderson, would you comment on whatplans vT S have or thoughts we have with the view to establishing


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ch2-2

,v t i : (Q ) h ~:C C t~R 'I fbase areas on the North African'w8stern half of the Continent?'GENANDERS9N:For so~ months the Air'Staf~ has been con-

Bidering the establishing of a ,base area in Northwest Africa. InJanuary of' thil3' y,ear we sent a ,survey te,am to Northwest Africa with

I

really thre,e objects ,i:q v;iew.The first was to f:1,ndout whether or not the French would

welcome us; the second wa,s to find out whether. there was an area inwhioh we could now,;:p.re-a~o,c1l;.e~ntral supplies with tlie Frenohmen. "acting as 'safekeallex:s ;;:and third", to pf ck a ba se area inwhich to

. .~dave 10J;l a ir.fie Ids. ,\ "Wehave n,ow.processed a report based upon that survey. ",". .' .' ~ , . ~.~

trip. 'Certain actions, have beeri approved by the Chief of Staff." .

Amongthose actions are the stockpiling of central equipment in the,/Casablanca area now and I:! .dir~et~ve to the Air Staff to under-bake. .the dovelopm(1:ntof three mediumbomber airfields in the Northwest

" . ~ . .,Afr Lean 'area.,.. ' ... 'This act,u?ll.~d.eyelopmentwill, of course, depend. upon en-. ,~. :. " ,abHng: legislation 8J;lQ. 'P~en apPX:0p;t'iations.. ~ .. "

GENE D y JA BDS ,: .. 'XQ:U might bring everybody here up to date. , ~ " .on the status of oUr V ~ E . : ' aird:rOlliOsat the present time.

GENAWDERf}O;N,Al?o for some time we have tried to ~rral1ge~ 0 I t _. '. ~

for the.,building


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I \T T H E ~ N A TI () N A LA R C H I V ES

ch2"3DEGLASSIEIED

Author i ty NNP S I 1 J D ~ {~Y 4A_NARADat e I a . l o l ~ b

Johnson? JI~;\D) I t . : E C C I I I k: " i fG E N JOHNSON: .Tha~ is abou t c orr e ct. At th e 'p re sen ttime th re e ba tta lion s of ' av'i ati on e ng in eer s.

G E N Al'l 'DE RSON:We a re sondi ng ov e r to assi st w i th th osebatta li on, en g in e e rs. Qu i te r ec e ntl y th e E n gl i sh , h a ve a sked i fthose e n gi n e er s c a n assist th om in th e l en g th e n in g of th ose fi g hte rfields.

G EN JOHNSON: We ar e goi n g to n e ed tha t J incidentally,

us w e . w on 1t ask for an yth i ng e i a 9 a t th e pr e sen t time. The r e a r eno f ig hte r f'Lo'Ldaov er 6) 000 f e et be s. ldea Woodbridge a nd C ar n a byw h ic h th ey h ad dur i ng th e w a r .

Those fi e lds h a ve no fa c i li tie s o~copt ru n wa ys, so ou rpr e sen t pl a n i s to p u t f ig h te r s on th e 6) ODD- f oot r u nw a ys; but i fthoy h av e a n esc ort mission . we . ha v e to p ut th em ov e r the bombe rba ses to top them of f. Th e r e 1s no oth e r pl a n at th e p re sen t timo.

I am qu i te c on ce r ned, abou t the de f e nso of th e U .K. ai r -dr - omsa be c au se th e B ri ti sh do not h av e a se t- up f or th e de fe n se ofth ei r a irdromes. G en e r al C a bel l says th ore i s a possibi li ty of asu r p ri se attac k. Th e B ri ti sh donl t f e ol th a t the r e i s th e pos-si bi li ty of wa r i n th e n e xt ye a r or 80, so th ey w il l not g o i n todef e nsi v e meas~r es u nti l the y f e el th e si tua tion i s qu i te a bitmor e c ri tioa l th a n it i s a t the p r ese n t time .


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R O D U C E O A T T H E N A TI O N A L A R C H IV E SJ _ , ~. ' .,0 ,,.,._~~~;.,_.: \~ __B,


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pose at that time, and aLso dt is the, earliest date by wh,ich .,an operational nir dofense system can ba attained in an o~derlymanner.

Present intelligence establishes the' following factorsin connection w~th Soviet capabilities to attack'thGJ UnitedStates: First, there will be li ttlo or no warning of an enemyair attack; second, the enemywill attempt to deliver a wajorportion of his stockpile of atomic bombs in a minimum,~eriodof time in order to achievo maximum shock effect; third, effec~ivea~tacks maybe conducted Under 'conditions of adver sc w~~ther ordarkness,

The Soviet TU-4mediumbomber is the only aircraftin the Soviet long-range air :force which could be used currentlyin an atomic atta..ok against: .the UnitEid:Stat.os, Qonsidering all"f'ac'bor-s it is anticipat~d that' a n 'lmprovo9.,TU-4will still be theprinCipal vehicle for Soviot long-range operations as late as1 9 5 3 .

,Estimatod Soviet at6IDic bombstockpile and Tu-4s 8va11-. ,ablo are as shown on this chart.

(Chart ahown }'COLDAYHA.'RSH:rombased ar.ens:at:.Velknl and Al?kurtti

...Soviet TU-4s have the com~ktradduses. shown.p : y these arcs (indicat~"ins). With one refueling 'bhey can ottain: this .lino (in.dicating) J

" t. I, ' 0 : . , . 0 . : .. . . '~and with two r~fu01ings the'y' have this capa1?ility,./indic-?ting), and. . , " . : '" .~', . . . ,.~ ..~ . ",with 1 ona-waymiSsion thOjThavo 4500 compatra~8i.~.~


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R E P R OD U C E D A T ~ H E N A T IO N A L A R C H IV E S

ch2-6

DEGLASSIEIEDAuthority N NP g, ' ? D : t - (~Y - 4 i \ NARA Date J J J - 0 1 { 1 > P-~ --,

o : ~ . .

, ' .GEN AN J)E R~ON :

,,'It is estimated ~hatby the middle of this.. ~.'. . .,'; .~ .

yoar tho So~iots w~ll havo ~romten to twenty utomic bombsavail-ablo a:r:dw~ll h~V0 415 TU-4s oPElra:ti~na~tn their long-rango: ~ .~ r :force. It is alsO estimeted ~hat by_mid-l952,the Soviets willhave from 45 to 90 atomic bO~bsavailable and, 120.0TU -4s opera-' .tiona1 in their long-range air force. Further, the latest inte.1li-. ., . .: ,.' ..~", '@nceestimates indicate that the estimate of atomic bombavailability'. ~" . '.'for tho Soviets maybe ,mater~al~y revised upward based upon theFuchs leaks.

The T u - 4 has performance char~oteristics roughly oompar-able to the U.S. B-29. : w e ; have ahovn their range and their ccmbrrtradius. Wehave also shownan estimate d Soviet stockp;ile of from45 to 90 abcmto bombs in 1952. Fifty of thos.s 'bombson targets in

; 0 " ~

the United States could produce nearly ,2,mill~on Amorican casualties.Thoy could destroy Governmentalmachinery in 1-TBahingtonnd.very 0 0 t " . ~ r '

soriously dis~u:pt our entire co~unicntions ,coID:ple:x.Such destruction could, of itself, ~?riou8Iy hamp~rour

effor~,s t? mobilize ouriarmed forces and indus:try and, yet, the. .foregoing is but a smn~lveroentage of the damagethat could be

.- '0

indicatod by fif:t,y bombs on target, for, in add~tion, these bombscould destroy nlarge J)6rcentugo of the' industrinl capacity re-q_uirettto put anna into tho hands of the Uni~cd Statos armedforces after they oro mobilized. If sOlc?tively p1oced, 50 bamb~could simultaneiously destroy 70 per cent of United States industrya.esignatod in our mobilization pLans to produce tanks, artillery


44/81

.'A T H IE N A TIO N A L ARCHIVES

ch7DEGLASSIIDED

Authority N I N ! > Sr ;;O :f {By 4 A NARA Date 1 i J . t 1 1 / b b. -- ---

1 r ((j) I F E C C i~ E 1fand.jsmaLl, arms. The;ycould completely destroy our atomic energyindustry, 30 :per cerrt of our special steel forgings industry, and85 per cont of facil~tie8 to produce marine boilers

.Bea communications wIll determir..Bwhether' ve can sustain0.11198overseas} and 'wlJ.etherwa can a.e;ploy',andmaintain our ownforces overseas. A-bombattacks on our major ports, the Navy'smothball f'Leet and major Navyyards coul~ oonceivabIy deny us thisability. The foregOing are but a few examp les of the simultaneousdestruction 50 bombs on selected target8 could cause.

There is no question but that the Soviets have sufficientin~elligenoe of U.S. industry to enable thom to select these tar-gets. Further, there +s no question but that the Soviets know thelocation of those targets.

United States bombs on Soviet targots .couLd certainlycripplo their wp.reffort in the'; 'samemanner' t1i~~.Soviet bombscould cri:pp~e our own. Without quostion, tho Soviet~ realizo thisa n ? it is our 'opipion that the :present intensive Soviet efforts tonttnin an adequate air defense system are designed to minimize thoeffect of a U.S. counter-attack with atomic bombs. Certainly J then, 0' 'L

I" ;

the Soviets would like to' 'kiil, ;'at its sourceJour copabilityto'countorattack. Our intolligenco believes a likoly Soviet a110co.-tion'of A-bombsin 1 9 5 2 will includo 20 to 25 Atomic bombsused -',o :against tpo bases on whioh our atomic bamb-carrying planes are locatod.

J i , J ; l .short, 50 bombs on target might make it imposE!ibleforthe United States ever to mobilize and fight back. Thoymight make


45/81

chS

~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~,7;'f:i,~:."~~m,=,, :T'",.~.~ .,_..,-~ , ..DEGLASSIRIED ~'Jii~",i1o,ti!~1:b~U&'tilil:,';.1;~",~'~_,;~(~:~=~,,, .:"~:.!:L~j~":'" '.....' ,....

Authority N~!> S J ' b C > : f IBy 4 A NARA Date 1 1 1 1 0 1 { D b

it ~lpossible for us to utilize our own stockpile of atomic"WOo.ponB.

I emphasize that avadIabIe ':intelligence i~dicotEls the. " , ..Soviets Will have the c[lpllbi~ity for such an at.ta ck by I J'l1;ly1952. Henceforth, this date is treated D .S critical. It is the t:imeby which wemust have an 'effective operational air defense systemin being.

Our present air defense system is ,very ,small.,(Chart shown.)GENk\NDERSON:This chart shows air deft;msGunits as now

deployed. Twenty-four fighter squadrons, sevon oorrtro'l corrtor aand 28 basic radars are stationod. in the' United States and Aluska,Fighter units are generally deployed as 'groups on Gov:errnnent-owneclnir'i'ields bocause of lack of funds for better positioning by aqua-drons .-

If we had the noceaea.ry funds, wewould deploY,tf.'1emasshown on this chnrt.

(Chart s hown . )GEN ANDERSON:This chart ndds' OLlO squac.r?n for defense

of tho Chioo?ooren, ,~ne squadron' for the defense qf ,the L08 .1 . ' ' : { " ; 'r 'Angeles area and spreads out our 'defenses'. D . lii::tle ,1;>1". . . '.

Such 5 deployment would stili "105YEL undefended such:major tor,gets. e:s our iron ore 'system 'in tho Duluth aroa , tho

,,'

'industrial,complexes in the Missidsippi River valley, and n\ ' " 0

.. , .",1'ori tipal number of the bases of ourretnlintory for.ees, Howover


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... -,'.._. ~ __ 0'__ DECLASSIFIED

Author i ty NN f > g t '? O:f (~Y - 4 6 \ NARA D ate I 9 . 1 Ol~"oh9

this doployYilEJntould givQ greater air defense capEtbll1ty thannow exists.The'presently progrEtmmedJoint Chiefs of Staff~npproved

aircraft control and warning system in tho Unitocl States andAluslm oonsfnts otLeleven pont!,'ol centers 'and 85 basic radars as

00 dODited on this 'char-t,(Chart sh(JWn.)G E N ANDERSON:This system was plo.miedto meet a fore-

casted Eussian CEtpability in 1 9 53 of sporadic, dispersed attacksagairist our resources. It di d not include a coverage of areasin which certain units of O u r retaliatory force are located andWl;fS intended only us the basic "framework for an ultirllDte mrcraftcontrol and warning system.. This/bo.sie frnD16workwill be completed

o and opera tIom 1 by 1 July 1952.The exposed condii;ion of cortain bases of our Strntegic Air

!ComtoonSlas becomo a matter of groat concern in View of the proba-bility that the RUSsians will have a stockpile of 45 to 90 atoJYIic

0 o.bombs,ond'" thEy capability o f ~laOing them on targets, of theirohoos'mg by 1952.

Twocourses of action oppear to us to be open. They are:To move our bases inside the presently authorized warning system,- or to oxtend the warning systen to incluc10 these 0bns8!=fJ '0

Our studies have revealed that it would cosf appro.xi-LIDtely $100,000,000 to movo the bnses within the warni~g syste~.On this baSis alone wewould have docided in favor of-extending the


47/81

. 'syatem, HoweverJ there was an addi tional'renson for 'such 11 de-cision: namely, to proVide additional 'r'adG~ cover6.g~ o f ' itlportantfndustries oU'ceide of the presently au'bhor-i zod system.

Our re'corro:nendedaircraft control and warning system in-oludos oleven additional radars for ooverage of exposed StretegioAir Cor1Q8ndbas6s[lS shown on this ohart.

G E N VANDENBERG:Colonel; w ou Ld you put that' 6thorchar-t up there s'o we' c a n compare them?

. ,.!.(Whereupon," the 'Thst two charts were c1isplciyed simul-tnneauSly.)

GEN EDWARDS: You said eleven more, didn't'you?

GENANDERSON:Yes, s'i:t; eIeven additional.GEN EDWARDS: Did I 'se'e' 109 and 851GEN/ANDERSON:'es. Thore nrc 'eleven nc.dea :'specifically, .for cover-age of S A C bases, sit. There are Others adCled, which

WtJ will mention., Boceueo sone of the basen are' 10E8 exposed than others,

w e have divided't'll'is coverage of bases ofthe Strategic AirC01waud into two priorities. I n the first priority e i g h t radarsimmeClidtely' esseD:tiitll.1re 'shbwn in red (inc.!cating); in thesecond 'priori ty .throe . r'ndrl"i-s 'are' shown in green (:i~~icatin~):Five" a(1~1i'ibna'l: basic:' radDr;s :posi:ti6necY on the southen~t~rn ooa~tWQuld,cf[clcl'~eded 'W'arhing for :ihland tarB~ts and c~rabrit 'units.Two of 'these~ar~"in ' :b:h::it ' pri6tit'y for,'i~diQte c~:6~truotion; three


48/81

chll

~_".~.~_,_._...J;.:....I ,,\~ .-.::.:~"~"L""~"n" '~J. '~_? _ .,a .. . . . '-;:..,.::'~.,.hl~;!;,:,:;~_ '.!.DEGLASSIIO:ED

Authority NN() SJ'?JD~I~Y 4 6 \ NARA D ate I f l . 1 0 I~ "

are in second priority.Selective outwara. extension of warning is desirable

in light of increasing enany capabilities. For areas adjacent toour northeastern border, the ~lanned Cannad1an aircraft control[mel wa rnin g system will p rc-v :ideadditiona l eurl y warn ing if th ep r es en t e xp eo te d C 01n p le ti OI id at e o r 1957 is changed to 1952

.I n t h e Duluth and Vancouver areas eight additionalbaSic radars on Oanadian territory are required.to provide similarextension of warning. This Canadion system w ou ld p rov ide a ddi ti on alearly warning for the Northeast, for the Great Lakes area and thePaCific Northwest. The Canadians are being urged to accomplisht hi s p ro gr am.

The total rqquirement for additional radars is twenty-'- ' . , ! " ' ~ ,0.four for a total of 109"basic rudar-s,, . .Both our eastern and western coasts have vital targets

g oo gr a: ph 1c al ly e xp ose d t o a tta cks f rom se uw ar 'd wi th ndrnraum varnfng,A study of selective extension of the land-baseq warning systeosseaward by picket ships has revealed Q requirement for ten pickct-ship stotionsj"two stations each off New Yo~~, Phf.Lade Lphdu , ..Nor-

c" "

folk, San FranCiSCO, and Seattle.We believe this augmented aircrqft control and.wyrping , 0

s y'st dm t o b e te ch ni ca ll y f ei t. si bl e,a nd i n c on son an ce ~"~i?h i ? P ?' ,r. '..~, ..-_ .-

proseht"stote an d rate of te c}mologi cnl .c1e velopLnn t . Its ip ple -" " ." - I .~, ~."/. ~

nentatibn would not involvo exooaatvo oxpendf turo for nar.dwqrQ- .'. .... ., ~.'.which is prosently available. Further, this systen a~~oars tp

. ' . f '" , ~ . . ".! . " .


49/81

present Q propor balance b~"!;weenhe aircraft control and warning'portion of an =. defense in, being,. and the rS's61lrchand develop-ment program necessary t? im:p~ovehe capability of the syste:6. '"IIt af:rords an [iir?rn,ft control and wmming coverage ,for o'ur no'fitimportant industr;l.ol, Goverlll1entol,'and population complexos, and',for our retaliatory forces.

Combatunits must b e properly positioned Qnd integratedwith t:Pis .conbr o.l and warning system to provide any defense. Wehave calculated t~e re:g,uirernentin terras of all-weather fighter squa-drons.

I would like to explain briefly the reasoning involvedin this calculation. "

Since.we are unable to forecast accurately the oxact;" "" ,targot comp loxes tpe U S S R :wauIe>.se,lect to attack, W < 3 are forced'to include in our n~r qefenso covorage all of the resources vita.lto mobilization for war , and our retaliatory forces.

Placement of 2 5 atomic bombs in 1 9 5 2 on our atomic forcewith sinultnneou8 delivery of as manyas 65 additional bombs on'

" . . . . .~. . .political ond po~ulatio~~cGnters and selected industrial facili-ties is t~e sco~e, we b e l i e v e , and the pattern of attonptodatonic attack with which our air defense systom must be pre:pi:u!edto~ . ~COpe. Mass attacks by l a r g e nunbers of oneny'airplanes on a. . ,. '_.linitoc\ area .WQulc1e Less pro(1.uctivGthan aoIectdvo atrtaclcc by,"

o_ , .,


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ch13

" ~ . ; * "'_ ~~I J J~ .1 "."_"_".,..;! ......l..iI-,.~ - , v _ ' ! . . . . . . : . : ., ; ,""~r. . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . ;_,;,'_.:. DEOLASSIIDEDAuthority N { k i P S t 1)0* (By 4 A . N~RA Date. J g l n l { o b. ~ _-

ODUCE D A T T Ht : N A T IO N A L A RCH IV E S

atomic bomb. Webelieve our fighter units should be 80 pOsitioned

tbnt, ~ minimumof one squadron will be available against any do-tectecl attack. A fighter de,ployrnSnton this basis in the UnitoclStates and Alaska generates a requiromentfor 67 fighter squacrons,all-w~a~hor in capability, located on 5 3 bases as shownon thischart.

(Chart shown.)GENANDERSON:On this chert the blue circle indicates

a one-squadron deployment, the green square indicates a two-squadron deployment, and the rod triangle a three-squadron deploy-mont, for a total deplo~ent of 67 squadrons on 53 bases.

Anti-aircraft weapons are an essential part of any OV8r~, ". . 'n11 9,.~~ defense' system.' "The,.results that night be obtained by narkedncceloration of the ungutded- rocket project and .ono of the 8urfaco-"to-air ,guided Iilissi1es projeets ~re so,potentia.l:).;y valuable,partioulnrly inthe low-altitude bnnd, that, this ucceIorn't.Lon isossential.

Because of the potential capabi~~ty, of rockots 'and ~, ;guided missiles, We have employed, in, th~B 1952 dO}J1oymontbf""coobut units} only seventoen autonatic ~cQPonanGninoteen , g un 'battalions in 21 LocaL defense, areus , The provision of ',the-se:unitsis within the presently programmedcapabilities, of tho 'Arr:lY~''

Cer ta In other types of uriits must be ac1c'.s.ct to the,,'Qver'-allair defense capabf.Ltty. .RadiOintercept units offer tho moat 'likely


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R O DU C ED A TT H E N A TI ON A L A R CH IV E S

ch14DEGLASSIFIED

Authority N t t Y ! ' > 9 1 ' i 2 D :t (~Y 46\NARADat e 1 1 1 1 0 1 { O b

v l l 1 J J !? ~ C ~ ~ ~ ' l l ~ ,possibility of obtaining clews:o~enemy intention. Augmentation ofthe nobLIe r'addo aquadz-onsof the USAFSecurity Service to anappropriato strength, and their, proper positioning,is being expeditedto provide additional intelligence on th e location, cnpabilitie8,Gndthe intentions of tho Soviet Air Force.

TheAir Force now has avad InbLe 24 fighter squadrons fordoploJrr1ontfor oir defense. Our presont prog~an calls for us tohave 27 squadrons ovailable by1uly 1952. This leaves a def-fcitof 4 0 squadrons.

Studies. of .the ,OFFTACKD I : c1eploynentlee1us to believe thatfour Marine and eight Na'vysquadrons" which are nob aChedulecl"for "C1.eploynentntil D.-pIus-one'month, :mightbe available for,;the airdefense role., However, amee we 'have been talking this plan overwith the Navy, they indicate' that they nave other use for thosesquadrons, and we still have a deficit"of 4 0 .

Wehave considered the llossibleem1l1oynmt of the' AirNational Guard to I'10etpartially the r~qulreI1ent for nir defensein being. prior to D-Day The Air'Nntional Guard cannot meet thisr'equt.rerssrrb ,

Weare conafderIng their .uae.in the post':'D-Dayperiod in "air-ground om}air transport operations, but not in Qir,~defense andnot on D-Izry. After federalization 81'1c1. short perLed of refresher

'.training, they can attain and 11ElintainQ high stote of conbat pro-ficioncy dnd To8adinessfor post,.;D-Dnyoporations.

The;requirernents st,:r.ted are those existing prior to the


52/81

ch15

. , ,~ ~ ," " D E c L A s s i i iE D ' . " , ,Authority N~!) Sr?;O~{. ~Y 4 A NARA D ate I Q . I 0 \ ( D b

""" ~ 17':, @ ~ fF J ' " ' U " ) ; f" '1 ~~ll:~);l l - ' ~ 1 i2~~ S. ~ !l.o.ttack. The peak effort of all forces :possessing an uir de'fensecapability Dust be used to courrtor initial air atrtccks , In event .of 'Ymr it is probable that the greatest ueI:u'.Dcl.n Durall' (leien~os,both q~[Ilitatively and quantitativoly, will be I : lD.de on 'H ..llour ofD-Day. It is this probability of an initial aurpr'Lao a+back thntposes the greatest dangers, for our s~curity now inoludes notlosing tho fir)t oQ!:lJlaign of the war , ,It Lncludea not having ourcities c1estroyed and our population deoi::::u:tted in the prQoess' ' O fwinning ou r firstcompaign.

Theuadi tional -coatis to the DG];lnrment of Dofens(j" of" our:proposed alr defense systsL1ore:. o'!t;lJ:;lntf)dto be $187) 000, 000' ini-tially, with $1, 0~7 , 000 s 000 annua L re cu.-rIl l ing cost .: .

TheAir Forco rocoJ::ilI1enc1ec1 to li : ! h o Joint Chiefs 0 . : 1 3 :StD.ffthat 1 1. cOL1r!1itteebe established to determine each 'sd'rv'ico"s con- 0,tribution to tho Sy?t0r:l, to cost it nore accurately than wehod ostlwtect, and to recormend actions ,noCoJ3sa:ry, tb' secure ':i:tse f f e c t i v e ioplo~eritntion by 1 July 1952.

Tho Joint Chiefs of Steff' directed the Joint Stro.t~Bic. .:. 'Plans Co~mttee to nake such cormorrbs anclto give 'their reCOr:l1'j8n...dations . On 21 April tho ~oint Strategic P'lnns Group reported. totho Plans Coomittoe, which bas now considorod their report, os-sentially the ollowing:

a , Tho pro sont; nir dofenso of the Unitocl Stutes and Alaskais ino.cto-qun;;e.

b. Thero should bo in being by ..1,July 1952 an olloro.tiolll.l.l


53/81

,


54/81

E P RO O U C E D A T H IE r 1 A T IO N A L A R CH IV E S

O " " ~ " ' ~ D E O L A S s i m E D 'Author i ty NNP S l ? ; D : ' f ( -By 4 A N~RA Date 1 1 1 1 0\( O b

ch17

G E l ' 1 EDWARIS:The conference is now open for a disCUE!sionof Genoro.lAndersonfs prosentation on air defense.

G EN .cA BE LL : I would like .tio make one, point. GeneralAnderson referred to the :fact that the estimate of the atomic, .bombc8pab111tiea. was 8ubJectto materially upward revision be-cause of the Fuchs leaks.' Since that considera.tion has' been made)'reconsidera.t10n has been given) and that is not borne out by thelatest study .

.That upward reVision is only a alight one and only in theUpper brackets o~ the stockpile.

GENEDWARDS:General Kuter.GENKUTER: I understand that the use of the air bases.

in NeWfoundlandand Labrador is essential 1n OFFTACKLEnd wouldcertainly be essential as of 1 July 1952;.

I would like to ask General Anderson what the status orconsideration of air dafenae is of those baaea ;. : .'

GEN ANDERSON;Wehave been dil;lCu8sing the air defenseof the labrador-Newfoundland bases with the Cana'dians.. We,"comeup against aoottar of n(:itional pride there. They do not want the.eUnited States to provide air defense for their oountry; mos+particularly do they not want us to put it in in peaoetime; andthe.y.,.


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I 'I A TI O N A l A R C l- Il V ES.. ,,~'_H.r.DEGLASSIElEDAuthority b! I N ! > 9)1;0* (

ch18 B y 4 6 \ NARAat e IiiO\ ( ~. ~~ ~I~ I f ' i n \ \ - : ; ) , . ~ ~ " i : ; , l , f " L " - " ' iT~ I . , ) J ~ - l l " ' l. .ll ~ II .cd) LLa ~ l!,,,,, I.. . .:l

As times grow. more tense, :E beli've wewill be able toplace defenses for our bases 'in Newfou;ndla.;ndnd. Labrador.

NOW, you also:spoke, of.Greenland, .didn!t you~GENK U r E R : Iwould like to hear about it.G'ENN D ER SON : We.haven 'tdone a thing about that.GENVANDENBERG:think pernapa I can throw a little

light on the Canadian situation..The Chief of the Canao.ianAir Force is as worried about' . .'

that ;problemas we are, and he has comedownto !fieseveral t:'bmeSto see if I could, when tb,ese people comec:townhere1Bell themon tho necessity for this air. warning system in Canada:

As General Anderson said, he is faced with budgotarytroubles, and also tho same troubles that we are faced with inthis country with this balanced forCe idoa. They apparently' gotit from us, arid:they are having a great deal of trouble.

Howevor, tho Minister J Mr. Claxton, was d?v~ at EglinFielcl in 'this last joint orientation course, and I got in alittle worle'W:lthhim, as did Mr. Symington. After seeing some'. 'of the destructive effect of tbe bombs dropped from the E-36 andsomeof the firepower of tho fighters 1 he went home, I think, alittle wiser man.

Whether or not that is going to.have any effect or not,I donIt know, but I dokriow toot .baf'ore we.can expeob to get anymaterial assistance from Canada, ,it i'Till bo sometime in thefuture __ in the neighborhood of two, three, or four years; 80


56/81

oh19

O " H ' :' : ; : ; ; ~ E Q L A S s i I D E D ' -Authority N N P S'1)0* { -~Y 4J\NARADate lilO~

U C E D A T T H E N A T IO N A L A R C H IV E S

I think we are going,t"o -havo t6plan on 'shfp:pin:g;mobile stationsup :cl:iore 'and deploying our, fighters up there 1 : l ; i e c E r L \ S e :we can r t ;(1.0it in ]enoetim.e unle'as'"';;o get' our Government 'end 'our Defense. . t . .Deportment to understan"d'tl,lis problem and p\lshoUl:" G0ie:rnmentagainst tho irs to soe if wo can It do this. . , " '.

GENE DW AR IS : It" might be worth"ihiie ,General' Ane.ers,on,to give a brief pioture of' what we are actmilly (Laing with rO'speot ..to exporidf.ture o:f funi1.sJ selection of sites:; lottIng, of ccn+rac+a,and so on and so forth, On this radc.r s"ystem,

GEGNNDERSON: Do you mind if I ask" Genera L Myers togive that, sir? 0.,.

GENEU-lABIS TlID.twill be fine.GENM'YEBS:'"The 24 site s in"the Zone of Irrte r for) in- the"'

first phase, will all be advertised, contracts awarded tftis"f;tsc:ia1YGar, with a completion'- da'teof the first of July 195'r ; , d n the cen-!struction, which, of courao , will giveQ year:to the:fii'at' of"July 1952 to gl3t thoro in op,eration. 0"

T h e socond phase; 61 Si tes, i n ' t h e Z o n e o f . , t h e " I r i t e r i o r ,are under design now, and will be \clvertised soon, with 1951:ft.ihasfor tho constrruotdon ,' " . '.,

T h o eLovon in Alaska, bids have aLroady rbeon opened' on:,: ' . : .1 : ' ' . : .somo of 'them, and othors are to be opened -acon,: with a' oomp.lo.Londate' on the construction of the first of December of 1951-.'.

Wehove a requiremont f'or'approXiDlD.toly 39 inillion dollars'more thaD the 85.5 now available ,to actuo'lly complete the AlaQkan


57/81

P R O ll U C ED A T T IiE N A T IO N A L A R C H IV E S - - " ' : = : : - ' ; ' r i i c L A s S I i I E D ' -Author i ty NNP S r ? ,O * ( .~Y r I A N ~ RA D ate alO~ch20

I I ( Q ) I i s I E J C ~ I E I I .and SACportions of thebasio aircraft oont;ol ~nd"l'i~~ning:system- .of 8 5 basic radars and a request is going to the Secretary of, "Defense with the request that it be transmitted to tilo Burenuof

tho Budgot and the Congress for this additional money.Without "that money, it is estimated that wewill only be

able to complete sone 60-0


58/81

DUCE D A T T tt f lA T JO N A l A R CH IV E S

ch21

,.~,~,,.J~~DEOLASSIEIEDA uth ority N IN P S'1)0* (~y 4 A . N ~ ' R ADate lQ) O~

~I'~Jr"(('l r , i { r ' J FD fi' $ l l 't l l ' \ \ . U If, '_ Cj ) . ! b , J ' \S? il~ o ! . . L : J

and cfomfuUnlcatibns inAla/ska due ' , t6 change in t;heir sites., ,GEN VANDENBERG: Thon, is it not true that this complo-

tion dntG of 1952 is contingent upon our getting money this Con-

GEN MYERS: 10s, sir; I feel i t d ef in it el y is.GENVANDENBERG:Thore seems to be very little chance of

t ha t, do es n' t there, G en er al Wh it e?Gt!:NWHITE: The balance of: the 85.5 I think we are going

to get. IvIr. Vinson is working on that: As to any additional authori-zation I am doubtful. ' ".

GEN RAWLINGS : derierarAirdersonJ then, tho 86C011(1 phaseLa stiil not inc1uc1ec1in the program that he has just outlined?

GEN AN mB SON : N o G EN R AWL IN G S: The odcU tional 24?

: - : GEN ANDEBSON: N9.GENRAWLINGS: As I recall, thore was an estiIJ'1.ate of

about 70 million dollars." G E N ANDERSON! No, You see) I tried to make the pointthat we have a JCB aut.hordzod ayatora. That is this one (inclicat-ing); that is tho one we or iginally estimated would cost 85.5m:tll1on (10l10.rs.

Now, th6' other ono is what wo havo presenter, to theJ O i n t Chiefs as a n aaditional r e q u i r o~c nt , in light of Sovieta'toraf,o 'cu:pabilities) 'Thichhas' not yot boon appr-oved by the JointChiefs.


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E P R O D U C E D A T T !< E N A T I O N A L A R C H IV E S

eh22

GENRAWLINGS:That amounts to howmany d.ollars, roughly?Seventy, a s I recall.

GENANDERSON:Seventy for the ad.dit~onal aircraft controland warning points.

GENRA1.-TLINGS:ight.GENANDERSON: e s

GENRAWLINGS:Iwould like to ~s~ a Question, GeneralAnderson. Obv1ously~ the early ~arni~g ~as a great deal to dowith our capability for def'enae , Youmontn.oned that we WElretry-ing to pick up more intelligence in that direction. Could youelaborate on that a little? .

GENANDERSON: would l;lke Genera~ .Cabell to, if hewill.

GENCABELL: Our efforts clang that line pro principallytbrough tho Air ]'oree Security SerVice, expansion of its facili~io8.

(]ENRAWLINGS:Is it odeQuato1 .GEN.CABELL~W~think we havo 0. good chance of accompLleh-

ine early warning "- that is, oarly-early warning through thoaugmerrtsrtLon of the facili tio s which wo have already proposed.

GENANDERSON:What you were asking, I beliove is thj.s:Does this plan provide an adequate QugmontatiQll,of tho service?I think the answer, in General CabeLl.Ls opinion to that, is Yes.Is thnt right?

GENCABELL: Ye GENVANDENBERG :. ...1 Is that the moneyfor the Brooks Field..~ .

,_",.


60/81

ins.~"tlf~,f~'~~: " " ",: 6E:N~BAWLING$::'That is "a part of ;it, sir.GENCABELL:The Brooks Field installation is tho ccnter

qi it" General V8ndcnberg,,'but the main I)ugmontl),tion1s in thefield.

GElNEDWARDS: (lon't like to curtuil this discul3sion,gentlemen, but we are little behind s ch edu le , ' so Iwill askGeneral Anderson to continue with his preaerrtatdon of our capa-bilities plon nowknownas VERDANCY.t is an application toOFFTACKLEhich actually ahows our best estimate to(luy as towhat we can do and what will happen to our Air Force on D-plus-

~ o

three] und so forth.,GENANDERSON:Gentlemen, this is roally a stucly we

0 0 ,unc1ertook to determine the capabilities of an Air Force compoeodOf 48 groups to fight 0. weI"agQinst Russin, begilU1ing 1 July1953. It will aLao indicate the cD.pnbili t i e s of an Air Force of58 and 77 groups.

An eatiIacte at" present Russian capabLl.f ties has alreadybeen presented. '

The notable difference betwoen preaorrt and 1953capabilities is tho greatly incroasoc. Soviet atomic potential.In 1953 it is ostimated the "SOV iets w il 1h av o 1200 B-29-typeaircreft in their long-range bomber forco and on estimated atomicstockpile' of 75 to 135 bo~bs. It is currontly-impossible toprodict the extent to which the military assistance now starting


61/81

t o bo provided ourEuro:peQnAlf~,os IDy have enhe.n~~d, their defen-sivo potentinl1ty by 1953. It cannot be assumed, hoW~ver, thatsuch aid will prevent the Soviots fron accomplishing their Ground..- "offensivos in Europe.

The strategic coriccpt and basic undertalcings of thisstuc1y are identical to those of OFFTACKLE-which, in sUI:Il::l11ry,;>ro-vic.o for Ilonjor of'foris Lve in Western Eurasin and Q strategic def'ensein the Fur East.

(Chart shown.)GEN ANDER $ON.: The- four tasks shown on this chart are

the same as those shown in OFFTACKLE: De fana Lve tasks, air of-f'ens Ivo , o:perations, in Western EUrnsia,anc1 control of essentialcommunications.. -_

The _concep~ of operations ane the plan of nction have beonc_evelo:pod in four tine phases, which moo D-Day plus thro~ nonths,phase 1; D-plus-threEl._,toD-plus-18 months, phase 2,; D-plus-18 toD~plus-36, phase 3 j and D-plus-36 to the ond of the war, phase 4 .

The ccnposf tioD. of the Air Force on D-Day is [IS shownon this char t.

(Chart ahcwn , )I' .'GEN ANDERSON : Four he'a.vy bcnb gr'oups; 11 Il8c1iULl.bomb

groups; two strategic re ccnnaf.asance gr oups , heavy; one strntegic _.,reconnaissnncE) grQuP, ::tJ.ediur::r;: iWOw6uthor re conna Laccnco groups;

r . . one light bopb;: 12 fighter interceptors; (hght fiGhter' bombers;one tactical recon; four troop carrier, heavy; -two troop carrier,


62/81

O O O C E D A T T l' I E N A T I O N A L A R C H IV E S ~n>'_~r iE~{~SS;~DAuthor i ty NNP Sr~();-{ ,~y$\N~RA Date J Q . I O~h25

' ' 1 r ( Q ) lP z C IR , J E /J r .medi um, f or 4 8 group~.

Then, in the Nat1?-Onl Guard wo would ha~e 27 fighter. '.groups; 1~~/3, o r a light bo~b group in the Reserve; ond 6 - 2 / 3 oftho troop carrier in,the Reserve. '. ,

The nission of the National Guard was assumed to be thatprioorily of tnctical nvintion and suppor-t to ground f or cos , a nos ec on da ri ly : pa rt io ip at io n i n a ir c_ofens8 a ft er D- Da y.

The defensive tasks ~dertaken during the first phaseD-to-D~plus-three-months -- will be on an austerity basis, andwill involve considerable risk.

The Air eJ'ontroland Worning' System for the air defenseof the United States will be t he p res en tl y p la ?l led7 5 basic radarsand ten control centors. To fully man t hi s s ys te m f or ' c on ti nu ou so PE ir at io n w i ll r eq ui re 13}000 technically qualifiecl men to bep rov ide d o ve r and above the regular 48-group progren, as we nowe]mow it.

These additional troops will be obtained fran Air ~atio~al. ,Gunrd AC&W groups by D -p lu s- on e n on th . As Q result, the operationof tho control r ada r s i n the systen will be oonsiderably least ha n satisfactory during tho most criticnl period of the firstphase of war.

The fighter interceptor forcos Qvailable withiuoa 48-Broup Air Force ore deploysQ within the control area of the AC&Wsystem, or will be 8-2/3 groups,

(C ha rt s ho wn .)


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P ~OQl JC ED ATmE N ~ 'n ONA l ARC 0J V1 ,S _

, :0,n


64/81

R O D U C E D A T T io lE N A T IO N A L A R C H IV E S

ch27- , ' :; " , ~" _, ;, :, ,, !~ ~~ .. ,: .. .' ;} ,' ~:1.;.l_+~' , : ~ S ~ O" -~ . T "; 2:.~-"~,"""'-~=DEGLASSI1JIEilAuthority N iN r > g \ ? :2 D * {~Y r IA NARA D ate I if 0 ' (O b

!r.f;iI : t ( ' ) \ 0 i5) ~ r f.~> F I7 J v . n l i l 1 1 J ~, v ! J t'-iU!b ~ - < > 4~'~will be limited. Therofore } planning mu'st'continue for thec.ovoloprnontof overseas bases essential for the initial atonicorrenaivo-, U.S. -:British planning is being ca1'1'ioc1out for .thodeveLopmerrtand u~e of bases in tho United Kihgdom. It. oust berecognizee: that the United Kingclombases roy be' deniod to us shortlyafter.tho outbrenk of hostilities. It is requisite tbatbQsas in thoAzores, ]'r~nch Morocco, Labrador, Tripoli, and. the Midd,;Least beCleveopoclto the minimumessential for the conduct- 'of' strategiCair:' operations for the fir.st three months ofth6 war.

The estiIl]l1ted cost to develop these additional basefacilities is approximately $108,000,000.'

In19,53, t.ho. task of the strategic air units will, in- .. ;.:. ~ . o i':gohero.l} be of. a three-fold nature: Firgt ~"attack on Russit:lninclustriul resources; second} retardation of the Russian ~T.ourla. '.' ~ . _", ,.

i ',,.,,_

. ..of'fonad, o ; and, third, counter o.tonicattacks.Tho plan of dolivory is to nispatch tho first attacks

from tho Western Bomis:phcre} utilizinG both heavy and me0.iumbonbcr-s; tho lnttor, refueling on route to target. Hea~ybomberswould depart bases such as Limestone, Rapid City):Spokano, Dr Fair-

. . . . . . ,field-Suisun; ];lerhaps utilize Eielson,"'Al~akQJ>as an en routo stag-ine; 'bnso; use Dhahran and Okinawaas post; -et:dltc' staging 'buaes. ~.' i : i n c t ' roturn to the United Stutes 0:6' ptacticlble for thes soonconduct of fur:t:p.oroperations.

r J'~, mQdi~s wil1'dopart GooseBay-and Barmen, :gost-he usestrike staging basee < m e l . as sembIe ' in 'the U.K'~for further operations


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P R O D U C E D A T T fl E N A T IO N A L A R CH IV E S

""" '"~- 'W'


66/81

E P R O DU C E O A T T f i E N A T IO N A l 1 \R C H IV E S. ~ - :: -r .- ~ .z : ~ _ .. :t .. ~.',:,~S:~~~_:tb~;,.J;..,~..,,,~"=DEGLASSIUntDAu th o rity ~ I N ! > s \ Z ,b:f (~y i I A NARA D ate 1 ~ I0 ' (O bch29

(Chnrt shown.)GENANDERSON: Those ficuros are bused on the best uva Ll,-

able in f'ormntion, inclucdnC thO UBO of reports, from our operationsana lyst and tho WeaponsSystens Evaluo.tion Group. Doponcl1nc on thonccuracy of the factors WID hOVEl been Given Gnd havo used, the flotualsituation could, be betto~, or :it cou Id bo worse .bhan depicted here. :,

COL SEAWELL: As we' have o.lroaC',y'co:vored, thrOU@lOut thovarious ~a8ks, w .e shall have deployod, for the, first-phase oIlerations,the four heavy bonber-a which operrrte from'the :Unitoc1States; sevenmedium bombers, inoluding the one in Okinawa in,the Far East; thotwo heavy strateGiC roconnaf.ssance g'I'OUpS; mid the ono'modiur.1.

The weather {3l'ou.pswill'DO c..e.ployo('~,n a worlc1-wic... basis.This lisht bomb b~OUP is tho ono presently doployed to tho FarEast. The flGhtGr~intorcoptor8, totalling l2J ~ill be deployoQtwo in tho Far East and ton for the United Statos ane Alaska.

Tho fiGhter 'bonb Inc.ludo the throe in the Far East anci.tho two for osoort Llission with S.AC. We0.100 havo'B.ssutlOc1.ha,t~tho tW(/j.n 'booupation in Europe i'Till be rondered inoffootivQ ..

' , ' . . i ; 'G E l N A N D E R S O N : 'Inasmuch as the 'Soviot zrbomf,oc[!PQbilit~:my be of (leci8ivo proportions in 1953, it has boon necessary to,: ,:" ,.rmko an eva luzrtdon of tho compot ton of the .exchenge of I1toIJi,O " 'blows;

This evaluation. indicate-a .:the follow:inc,:probabl~ rosults:It i E believed thnt the Soviets will,attack our population,.


67/81

" "

ch30

centors and accept incidental destruction to specific industriol ,installations

. In add.ltIon, Soviet attacl


68/81

e P R O DU C E D A T 7 1 -I E N A T IO N A L A R C H IV E S . _ " . -= - ~ ~ E Q L A S S i F ii D Authori ty ~N{) Sl."o*L -

oh3J. ~Y4AN~RADate 1 a . I O ~ .~or c es) both g rou n d" a ne t i 1 r , w i l l . p r o b a b l y c o n t i n u e to bo n u n e r i c a l -ly supor-ror to those o f the. Allies. However, the Soviet fieldforcos.Day h a v e boon soriouslyretardod in their nq v a n c e acrossWostern E u r o p e .

ShouH~.tho tact1~nl ouployrnnt of atonic bOrlbF.!nako nl1njorroc1uction in tho offO:ctivenesc of the RUssian QIT.lOC f'orces,tho Allies !:light ho.l.d, in 1953, some territory inWostern Eur-opeat D-plus-threo~Iilonth8; but the ability to s;l(;ploit any enemyweakneases 'iTOuldbe soverely curtnilac:. because of insufficienttacticnl air Q nu i np Uf fi ci on t grOUllG forces.

The Soviet submar-Ino CDt1}Jlign and .tacticnl cir willprocludo securing and developing base arons in the ScandinavianPeninsula .

By tho end of the first :phns~J the United. KingclOL1willprobnbly not be a usable ai r base for strategic oir operations.

The Soviot aubmar me oampa ign nny well rk1ko thG s u pp o rt '.! .::.~ of lcirge o ve rs e~s o pe ra ti on s p ro hi bi ti ve i n cost oven i f theforcos and logistic suppor-uwure nVliilable.

!nthe Far E~st, air operations of b o t h Allies andSoviet:will be of Q linitorl) non-sustained nq ture as a resultof prooccupatdon in EUrlJ.Giaand. boccuso of logistic d.ifficulties.

T h o s ec on d p ha so, D- pl us -3 t o D~plu8-18 months: At thee nd of tho f ir st th re e norrths of o:po:l:'ntionr:;, tho TJ.08t ci@1ificant


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force will have boon roduccd to the oquivalent of ono heavy, oner:10CUlli.1, and 2/3 reconne.taccnce groups.

On tho baois of tho oVQluntion at the end of the firstphaao , only lini to (1unc1ortnkin@for aecond=phase operations franD-plus-3 to D-plulJ-18 norrbha are opon. Those linited operationsore":' To recuperate f'rootho Soviot -Atonic offensive and mobilizeat-the fastest practicable rater continue the dofensive tasks; oon-t1nue the very-greatly reduced strategio air offensive) seourethe UniteLLKingdon~ aecure Spain against inv'.SLonj con~Inue tor.:taintain Allied control of the Cairo-Suez area with local 011(1British forces; nnd maintain-control of essential lines pfoonrrrrunications.

Wecan begin to deyloy sone forces for counter air opera-tiona in "Hestern Eurasia,.ns indicated on this chart.

(Chart shown.)COLSEA"iELL:As General Anderson previously pointed out,

eluring phase 1 no forces ).other than tt:\ctical pro -occupation forcewill be prosent to operate in EuroDe. The force ceployment thatcan be madeto the United Kingo.pm.sndNorthwest Africa, c10pending

ion circumstances, will occur at D~:plus-4, at which time we can (10-ploy four fighter bombgroups"

At D-:plus...6, we can have in place two' :f1c1ltcr iJ?-teroeptorcroups. Those foroos woulSlbuile, up GssentfIJ.11yas incl~c?-~G~1eret'so that by the end of tho :phasewewou.LdhaveI'i'lo intQj~co~~orJ

." .four fighter bomb, one tao re con., two':;and-'two-thircls troop carrier


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ch33Authority N I J 4 P i S l 1 ) 0 * {~y 4 A N~ Date 1 1 1 O~

i~~ i!~j i f( ! ; ? ! !" ! l !f ;!~~ ; j; l~W f" 'O '~l~ i1! '~~~1'",~~~~~~~Jt.:Qt\lW'%.il1'i'-'''_~~~~\I1~

erOUJ?S.G EN ANDERSON: I would like to o~phnsize, that that

is the tota l av ai la ble for .. oth the U nito(l Kin gc .oT. ln d Northw ostAfrica.

GEN EDWARDS: Doe a th at in cl ude any Nntiona l Gu ard (JI'OUpsG m N ANDERSON: Yes. That is wh ere wo get those, "sir

f rom tho National G ua rd -- that h av e beon f ec era lized"and havo comein.

T h o third p h c s o , D-p lus-18 to D-plus-36 months: Dur in gth e th ird phaae of oparat tone from D-plus-18 to D~1?lus-36 norrbhs ,t he g en e ra l 1 I1 1i o( 1s tr a te g y and tasks to be under-taken will be to:Contin uo tho defensi ve tasks a s r eq ui re d, c on Qu ct op er ati on s inWestern Eu rasia w hi ch ha ve as their op er ation the re duc ti on ofef foc ti ve ne ss of Sovi ot f or ce s and the craa+Lon o f com'lit io nsthat w il l pormit tho ea rli est pr acti cablo roturn in forco of theAl li es to Wostorn Eu rasia .

Be gi nni ng a t a ppr oxin ately D-p lu s- 24 months, a build-upof doployod st!otegic a ir un its cnn be modo.

C O L S E A W E L L : T hn t b ui lc 1- U P, be gi n ni n g o n n p pr o: x: ima te lyD-p lus-24, ohould roach np prox~~tely fi vo he avy bomb, 1 3 mOGiuoboob, throe hoa vy strnt re con, and fivo D Qd i u n strnt recon by thoond of the th ird year .

GEN ANDERSON: Wo hav e n asur aed t oot el ur in g t h e se condo " , : ' 1 : .phase w e w ill h av e [~inod onough par ity i n the ci r to per.mit us to

, .~ .use th o U nited Kingdon in th is ph ase as n base orc a Therefore,

..; " , '.'


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0 1 1 3 4

tho U .K .- _will 15e'-- ,. - .If' the Unito a , :Kiricc:'or::t liasboccco urrbenab.Ie P h Y S i c a l i i Y ,oli'politically, tho Northwest African

( . , : : - . ,; . ," i _area will be utilizE)Q as a n alternate, base aroa ,Northwost Africa should. be avaf.Iab.le to the Allies. Cor-

, ,tain of the f()r.co's:T.1~hilj;zecl f6r':"th&'Jl>er-~'ntfff"'iJ:f'droe


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~ - " ~ ; : ; ; r i E c i L A s s i E I E D ' _ m "Authority N N P S ) 1 J O : f - ( "~Y 4 A N ~R A D ~te ' I , g . , ! O ~

R O D UC E D A T l H E N A TI ON A L A R C HN E S

ch35

. , ~ n ?( Q ) f i ? : ) ~E (C ~ lE 'rthis action requfras D . Te-entry in force into EuropeJ de;fent,.of tho US!3RJnd the establishing of oontrol over the defeatedoneoy.

Our studios deploy forces only toD-plus-36. Th~rofore,in this phase, forces are not allocated to spe'eifie oportrbf.ona

Now,we have seen that with this 48-Croup Air ]'orce intho phase of D-plus-4 to D-plus-2l menths, we have one heavy andone ne~ium bombgroup for an offensive effort. If tho strengthof the Air Force is Lncreased from 48 to' 58 or 77 groups, the

, ,

strategic ooncojrt, basic unc1ertakinge:~'and general tasks willrennin essentially tho' s~~"as those' prevlou'sly discussocl.

The D-Day comllosition of the 58-Group Air Force is, ," '

il1dicatocl on thi; c~rt\ :("i~did~'tiriGY~"Th e bomber streng"bh rena Inao .

tho saw; heavy recorlli.:li~,'sanceot1~in:s the same.," ,Wehavo'added one nedium rGoorinnissance unit; we have

0.d:ctod,iX fighter -interce,ptor groups, two fi[!;htor bmbor' groups)\and one tactical r'eoonriafaance group -- an increase, of ten Groups.

On the theory .thnt at least one fiGhtor~interceptorsquadron should be.in position ~o defend essential inst~llntionsih tho Unitec1.States LlI3Hinstenemyattaok, tho available airdofenso forces in this 58-sroup Air Force would still bo 19 squn-drons short of tho oaloulatod rGquiro~~nt of 67 fighter-inter-ceptor squadrons for tho dofense of t h O United States one Alasko.

This caLcu'Latodrequfrenarrt still entails tho naxfmumrisk tho Unitoc1States cnn afford to take.


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RE P ROOUCE D A T fH E N A T IO N A LA RCH tV E S ~' ' '~- '~~EOLAssi i iED' '4 -~,,"Author i ty N l N f> S r ? : 2 c > : f IBy 4 A N~RA: Date I 1 1 1 O ~

... . . . . . . . - ~",.' ',_""

areas wou~c~cause ,gr ;eo. } : ; !3r : attrition on onomy attackers and, would-: otherwis~' i~terfor~. with his 'operations so as. to .ro{\uco comdder-ably the of'fo cbLvenoas of his otto.cks.

Oonaf.de rub.ly Le sa .IJhysic.::l.1dostruction and fower por-sonnel casualties would bo the rosult. This, in turn, woule reQuiron shorter recovery period and allo~ n ~ore rupid nobi11zo.tion, butit 1'1us.tbe. b0r1'lein n~ind' trot with Edr defenseof .the :mEtgniudeconto1)1pl8.ted, ae rdoua 'interfe,ronoo, w,ill sti'Ll 'be mnc1ewith" ourmobili~~tion offort.

The re connaf.aeanoe requirements for .tho strategio niroffensive will notbe fulfilled by the provision o o ne u ddi ti 9n nlmeddun !3tr8.tegic -reCOIll1ttissance group, but tho' .anourrt of radaraeopo .photogrll},lhy now. sc1:loc1ulcc1to be (~ono by the conbrrt -bomberforces i-lL~.1be rcduce e,

The aclditi9nnl three to.cticnl air groups :will enab Leus .tio L'k'lke some ini tio.l contribution to tho task of retardingtho' Buaaaan advance other than that which can be .:n:p,c1ey ocoupa -tion forcos in Goruqny.

A sm.~ary o f d op lo yr ~n t capability is i n Qi c n t e c _ o~ thischart.

(Chert shown, )C OL S EAWE LL : As you will noto J tho factors we uae d

and which were exp.lndne d by the GenorCll, wauIe:' in(,itctte aoras 0,(1-vance in the buihl-up of stratogic units resulting from the


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DEOLASSIFIEDA uth ority N I N ! ? i s 11)0l(By 4 f A NARA Date I a . 1 0\~ O b. _ _-1 1 3 7

incrOD.socldeferiaf.vo of'fort avndIabIe for tho Unlto(!.Sto.tooand Alaska. " ,

GEN ANDERSON: : GontlcrlOn, thilJ study has boon undor tekenin tho full realization thnt i f it i s on tho pessiDistic si~oJ it i sno Cloo(Tor our purposes. Wehave shown this t.o all of tho AirStaff and had thoir vory critioal o.ppro.isol of it. ;Choydo notbolieve that it is'pessinistio.

In sono reape cta -- tl?t is, in the capab Ll.Ity' of industryto equip unit's --, they think it may 'be optiLlistic. I am thinking

. .now of the part of the' study I am copling to.The study has fnClic8ted that the mininUL1 Air Force we

should have in being to successfully fight a war begi~ing in1953 is 77 groups. That' Air Force is ccmposec... as inClicatee. on theno xt ohart.

(Chart shown . ). ,HEN ANDERSON: Therearo six heuvy borabrrrdnorrt groupo,

sixteen Y.1EJcliunonbar dnont. GTOUPS; three strateGic ro oonnaf.aeencegroups, hoavy ; throe 1:1.OdiUL1;wo weather; still ono light bonb;24 fighter-interceptor; 12 fighter borabar j two tac ro connaf.seenco jfour troop carrier, hoavy; four troop cnrrio~7 DBdiup ~- for atotal of 77 groups.

Wo cstinoto that'thoso Groups would have the followingoapabilities:

The full fighteI'-intorcoptor er0U.pn;l:nililumequirenent forair defense of the Unite-d Stotos and; Alnskn could be provided. Thoso


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,>",l-""~'~ DECLASSIFIED ;~Author i ty N lN P g l1JO "f ( . ~ " . ~" '.' '" -,--- ..---~ ~ -- ......----,~y 4J\NARADate 19,IO~

oh38

ccnba't units, with a unit oquipnent of 7 5 aircraft and Q levolof 2.8 crows par a Lrcr'af't for '24-hour alert Stdt~J.[i., tocether 'with24 r[\ctar installations above t h e ' presently app'rO,fo'clprogram, anda oonninG LovoL 1)01"'01tinB 24-hour alert status fer th o radar sYfJton

The Attacks of World War Three.

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