Alister E. McGrath

'The Article by which the Church stands or falls'

In this essay Dr McGrath, who teaches at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, discusses another Riformation topic in the shape of a reappraisal of the significance of the Christian article of justification.

The importance of the doctrine of justification to the emerging Churches of the Reformation is generally recognised. 1 Luther assigned it a normative role in a Christian dogmatics, thus: articulus iustificationis est magister et princeps, dominus, rector et iudex super omnia genera doctrinarum, qui conservet et gubernat omnem doctrinam ecclesiasticam et erigit conscientiam nos tram coram DeO.2 For Luther, the articulus iustificationis was the Word of the Gospel, the starting point for the theology of the Church. Indeed, it seems clear that Luther's ecclesiology is a direct consequence of his conviction that the church of his day had abandoned the touchstone of the Gospel: even as late as 1532, Luther was prepared to grant the Pope his authority and power, provided he acknowledged the forgiveness of sins in Christ. 3 The importance of the doctrine of justification within a Lutheran dogmatics was emphasised by the Schmalkadic Articles of 1537: in hoc articulo sita sunt et consistunt omnia, quae contra papam, diabolum et mundum in vita nostra docemus, testamur

1 F. Loofs, 'Del' articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae', Theologische Studien und Kritiken 90 (1917), 323-400; E. Wolf, 'Die Rechtfertigungslehre als Mitte und Grenze reformatorischer Theologie', Evangelische Theologie 9 (1949-50), 298--308; reprinted in Peregrinatio I1; studien zur riformatorischen Theologie, zum Kirchenrecht und zur Sozialethik (Miinchen, 1965), 11-21. A survey of seventeenth century dogmatic works suggests that the description articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae, or articulus aut stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae, is more accurate. Thus ]. H. Alsted, Theologia scholastica didncta (Hanoviae, 1618), 711 Articulus iustificationis dicitur articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae ...

2 W A XXXIX!1.205.2f. :> WA XL.357.18--22 (On Galatians 3.5) Papa, ego volo tibi osculari pedes teque

agnoscere summum pontificem, si adoraveris Christum meum, etpermiseris quod per ipsius mortem et resurrectionem habeamus remissionem peccatorum et vitam aeternam, non per observationem tuarum traditionum. Si hie cesseris, non adimam tibi corona m et potentiam tuam.

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et agimus. 4 This concern was reproduced in the dogmatic works of Philip Melanchthon, who saw the llllllp/s/ii('kl' chri.<;tlichen GlaubenB as being contained in the doetI'ine of justification. A close examination of his attitude to the AdiaphOl'ist controversy indicates that Melanchthon was prepared to pennit cOIlcessions, particularly in the area of church polity, wherever they posed no threat to the doctrine of justification. 5

This concern for the articulus iustiflCationis is also evident in the early Confessional material of the Reformed Church: locus de iustificatione in theologia facile primarius nobisque ma,rime Balutaris est; quo obscurato, adulterato vel everso fieri nequit, ut puritas doctrinae in aliis loci.') retineatur aut vera ecclesia cons is tat. 6 However, it must be conceded that, since the time of Beza, the Centraldogma of Reformed Orthodoxy is indisputably that of predistination. This view, which owes its most lucid expression to Alexander Schweizer, in his highly influential study Die protestantischen Centraldn~'{ma in ihrer Entwicklung inner­halb del' nformierten Kirche (Zurich, 1854-6), can only be accepted as valid during the period of 'protestant scholasticism'.7 Whereas the 'earlier theologians of the Reformed Church, such as Calvin, had subsumed their discussion of matters such as predestination, reprobation and election under the general aegis of the cognitio Dei redemptoris, Orthodoxy tended to make the divine decrees themselves the starting point for theological specu­lation. All else, justification included, is therefore a consequence of the divine decrees, decrees actualised in time as the ordo saluti.'): praedestinatio ---7 vocatio ---7 iustificatio ---7 sanctificatio ---7 glorificatio. This inevitably results in justification becoming a purely incidental aspect of the actualisation of the divine decision to elect. However, it must be appreciated that this shift in emphasis in the ordn salutis from justification to predestination is itself a consequence of decisive change in theological methodo­logy associated with the onset of 'protestant scholasticism'. Whereas Calvin made the redemption of man in Christ the starting point for his discussion of more rarified matters such as

. , Die Bekerllltnisschriften der evangeIL<;ch-Iutherischen Kirche (Gottingen, 1952),416.23-4.

r, Scc C. L. Manschreck, A critu:al examination and appraisal of the AfiiapllOrist controversy in the life of Philip Melanchthon (Unpublished doctol'al thesis: New Haven, 1948), 28ff; 50ff; 184ff.

" Leidcll Synopsis XXXIX, 1. '7 See E. Troeltsch, Verrzurzjt und OfJerzbaruYl __ f5 bei Johann Gerhard und

MclanchtluJIl (Gottingen, 1891); Paul Dibon, La philosophie n.eerlandai.se au su'cll' d'or; l'ensei,I,Trlement philosophique dartS les universites a l'epoque pri'cartesierlTle 157[,-16[,0 (Paris, 1954).

'The Article by which the Church stands or falls' 209

election and reprobation, Orthodoxy extrapolated from the basic datum of redemption to the divine decision to redeem, and hence to the divine decrees. These decrees themselves then became the logical starting point for a characteristically synthetic and deductive methodology, which inevitably resulted in justification being assigned a low priority in the ordn salutis. The systematic exposition of the salvation of mankind would logically begin with the divine decision to redeem, proceeding thus from the intratrinitarian decision to the opus trinitatis ad extra-i.e. the actualisation of that decision in time. However, the existence or otherwise of these divine decrees was originally considered under the general aegis of man's redemption-i.e. under justification. The preceding and succeeding elements of the ordn saluti,.<; themselves arose from speculation concerning the articulus iustificationis, using an analytic and inductive methodology. This leads to the important observation that the logical starting point of Orthodoxy is itself the consequence of the soteriological starting point characteristic of the first age of the Reformation. In an important study, Kickel showed that Beza may be regarded as having effected this decisive change in theological methodology within Reformed Orthodoxy. 'The place of the doctrine of justification, as well as the doctrine of the Trinity, the two natures and the sacraments in theology is determined by the doctrine of predestination'.8 This same methodology led to predestination being considered under the doctrine of God (and not salvation), to the supra- and infra-Iapsarian debate, and the concept of limited atonement within Reformed Orthodoxy. The mere shift of the locus praedestinationis from the context of the doctrine of salvation to that of the doctrine of God must be regarded as having the utmost significance in this respect, as it reflects a more philosophical approach to theology, characteristic of the rise in interest in Aristotelian metaphysics associated with Beza.9

Indeed, the fact that both Beza and Thomas Aquinas discuss predestination under the doctrine of God can be regarded as the consequence of the intrusion of Aristotelian metaphysics into theology .

B W, Kickel, Vernunft und OfJenbanmg bei Theodor Beza (Neukirchen, 19(7), 169.

~ The rationalising tendency so characteristic of Beza and Zanchius has been well documented in a number of important works. See: E. Bizer, Frilhortho­doxie und Rationalismus (Zurich, 19(3); O. Griindler, Die lrtJtteslehre Giralmo ZanchL<; (Neukirchen, 19(5); Kickel, op. cit., Griindler points to considerable affinity between Aquinas and Zanchius. An important early study is that of Paul Althaus, Die Prinzipien der deutschen riformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der aristotelL'ichen Scholastik (Leipzig, 1914), who

EQLVIII:3-B

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The essential point is that the later Reformed emphasis upon the divine decrees is itself a direct consequence of an earlier con­cern for the articulus ius tification is. The change in theological methodology associated with the rise of 'protestant scholasticism' led to this secondary aspect of the articulus iustificationis assuming greater priority over the original starting point for theological speculation. This point may be confirmed by an examination of the Amyraut controversy, and the critique of the reformed doctrine of predestination associated with the Salmurian Academy.1D Amyraut's critique of the decretum absolutum is based upon his heilsgeschichtlich approach to the question-an approach which is itself the direct consequence of the remarkable emphasis he places upon the doctrine of justification.!l In effect, Amyraut's critique of Reformed Orthodoxy at this point represents a reassertion of the doctrine of salvation as the legitimate starting point for theological speculation-speculation which could not endorse the doctrine of predestination associated with Reformed Orthodoxy. If predestination is the Centraldngma of Reformed theo­logy, it merely indicates how far that theological tradition departed from the paths marked out for it in the first ages of the Reformation.

The articulus iustificationis has come to have a meaning independent of whatever the concept of justification assumed in the Pauline corpus in the New Testament. In dogmatic theology, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, the concept of justification has come to mean the restoration of man's broken relationship with God-a meaning which is best illustrated from the brilliant Tridentine definition of the term: Quibus verbis iustificationis impii descriptio insinuatur, ut sit translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius primae Adae, in statum gratiae, et ad adoptionis filiorum Dei, per secundum Adam Iesum Christum salvatorem nostrum. Thus stated, the Christian doctrine of

locates strongly scholastic elements in the teaching ofB. Keckermann (1571-1(09) and]. H. Alsted (1588-1638). Althaus, op. cit., 12. HoW'ever, it is more probable that reformers such as Peter Martyr, familiar W"ith Italian humanism, developed an interest in Aristotle as a consequence, and thereby introduced Aristotelianism into Reformed theology: see P. McNair, Peter Marry", in Italy (Oxford, 19(7), 100-115, esp. 10&-7. We aW'ait further studies on the Italian humanism of the period before any firm conclusions can be draW'n.

I{) J. Moitmann, 'Pradestination und Heilsgeschichte bei MOYse Amyraut', Zeitschrift for Kirchengeschichte 65 (1954), 270-303; F. Laplanche, Ortho­do,x"u' et predu-ation: l'oeuvre d'Amyraut et la querelle de la grace universelle (Paris, 19(5); B. G. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut heresy; Protestant scholasticism and Humanism in seventeenth century France (Madison and London, 19(9).

I I See Armstrong, op. cit. , 222-40 for an excellent discussion.

'The Article by which the Church stands or falls' 211

justification constitutes the real centre of its theological system. 12

There never was, and never can be, any true Christian Church without the doctrine of justification, for the Church cannot exist without witnessing, in Word and Sacrament, to the truth of what God has done for man in Christ-a truth which must be expressed in its life and doctrine, and supremely in the doctrine of justification. In the Christian doctrine of justification, we are dealing with the turning of the godless man against his godlessness; with his transformation from man without God to man with God,for God, and bifore God; with his transition from homo peccator to homo iustus; with his transition from nature to grace. All else in theology is either a presupposition or a consequence of this, the basic doctrine of the Christian faith. It is not clear that this is the Pauline understanding of justification. However, the concept has come to have a meaning within dogmatic theology which is essentially independent ofthe Pauline concept, so that even if it could be shown that it plays a minimal role in the context of Pauline soteriology, or that its origins lie in an anti-:Judaizing polemic quite inappropriate to the theological circumstances of today, the significance of the articulus iustifica­tionis within a Christian dogmatics would not be diminished thereby. The Church has chosen to subsume its discussion of soteriology under the aegis of justification, thereby giving an emphasis to the term which is quite absent from its Pauline context. That the concept of justification was selected results from historical circumstances, most notably the rise in Pauline scholarship in the twelfth century,13 the semantic relationship between iustitia and iustificatio14 which led the theologians of High Scholasticism to see in the concept of justification a means of rationalising the divine dispensation towards mankind in terms of justice, and the emphasis placed upon an already important

12 Thus A. Ritschl, Die christliche Lehre von del' Rechtfortigung und Versohnung (Bonn, 1870) §1, p.l. An analysis of I. A. Dorner's theological system suggests that the doctrine of justification constituted its centre: see]. Rothermund, Personale Synthese: lsaak August Domers dogmatische Methode (Gottingen, 1968), 69. In his 1841 treatise, Das Prinzip unserer Kirche, Dorner had emphasised that the fundamental principles of Protestantism W'ere the articulus iustificationis and the Schriftprinzip: K. Barth. Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert (Zurich, 1952), 529-30. Dorner himself appears to have employed the former more extensively than the latter.

13 On the historical circumstances, see A. E. McGrath, lustitia Dei: a history of the Christian doctrine ofjustlflCation{to be published shortly by Cambridge University Press), Vol. I.

14 A. E. McGrath, Justice and justification: semantic and juristic aspects of the Christian doctrine of justification', Scottish Journal of Theology 35 (1982) 403-418.

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concept by Luther's theological deliberations on how- the state­ment 'God is just' could be gospel. 15 A similar situation has arisen W"ithin the theology of English-speaking Protestantism, w-hich has isolated the concept of 'Atonement' as equivalent to 'the w-ork of Christ'16-a ga in, through a historical accident, albeit an accident w-hich has led to a much less felicitous choice than Justification'. The term 'Atonement', or 'at-one-ment', probably deriving from the medieval Latin adunamentum,17 w-as coined by Tyndale to translate the Latin reconciliatio or the Greek Katallage. The term originally referred to one particular concept W"ithin the Pauline soteriological repertoire--namely, 'reconciliation'. How-ever, it rapidly acquired an absolute sense, meaning not 'reconciliation', but 'the propitiation of God by the expiation of sin' or 'the grounds on w-hich reconciliation is possible'-a use which appears to date from the introduction of the Authorised Version of the Bible, and w-hich is probably based on its unusual translation of Romans 5:11 in particular. 1B This development meant, not only that one single Pauline soteriological metaphor became elevated above others, but that it acquired a meaning apparently quite indepen­dent of the term Katallage on w-hich it w-as originally based. If'the doctrine of the Atonement' has come to mean that area of Christian doctrine which is generally referred to as 'the w-ork of Christ', there is no reason w-hy 'the doctrine of justification' should not legitimately be allowed the same scope.

The peculiar function of the doctrine of justification is that it is the regulative or normative principle of Christian dogmatics. The Christian faith itself stands or falls W"ith the fundamental declaration that God has in Christ established a new relationship

15 See Iustitia Dei, Volume II for a discussion and references. 16 e.g.]. McLeod Campbell, The nature of the Atonement (London, 1865); R. W.

Dale, The Atonement (London, 1875); Hastings Rashdall, The idea of Atonement in Christian theology (London, 1919).

17 R. E. Latham, Revised medieval Latin word-list (London, 1973),8-9. III The German Versohnung has the dUol sense of 'reconcile' as well as

'appease'. This makes the translation of German works on the matter into English somewhat problematic: see the remark of the English translator of Dorner's System del' christ lichen Glaubenslehre (A system of Christian doctrine) (4 vols: Edinburgh, 1880---82) Volume 4 p.l). The unusual feature of th Authorised Version's translation of Romans 5:11 is its inclusion of the t/(jinite article, thus: ' ... through our Lord]esus Christ, through whom we have ,'eceived the atonement'. This lends itself to the interpretation that the 1Jt'llljirill C/l/'i.~ti may be conveniently labelled as 'The Atonement', It is intlTl'sting to notice that the Revisers, whilst substituting 'reconciliation' for ';ltOlll'lIlent', nevertheless retained the definite article. The astonishing incollsistellcy on the part of the Authorised Version may be illustrated by comparing the translation of katallage at Romans 5:11; 11:15; 2 Corinthians :':W-19.

'The Article bp which the Church stands or falL<;' 213

betw-een himself and sinful man, and the life of faith stands or falls W"ith the know-ledge of this decision on the part of God. The Christian doctrine of justification is indeed the fundamentum Novi Testamenti, the iuti£x super omn ia genera doctrinarum, the articulus stantis aut cad£ntis ecclesiae-and, once grasped and held, its consequences for Christian dogmatics, ethics and spirituality must be explored and articulated. 19 The articulus iustificationis requires transformation about the dogmatic, ethical and spiritual axes in order that its dogmatic, ethical and spiritual components may be resolved, just as a vector V can be resolved into its components along the x, y and z, axes by a series of transformations V ~ V x' V y' V z·

The articulus iustificationis contains W"ithin itself the germs of the leading doctrines of the Christian faith-i.e. it is an analytic proposition, requiring analysis ifits implications are to be under­stood. Covertly contained W"ithin the articulus iustificationis are particular concepts of God, Christ and man--concepts which assume a specifically Christian significance when properly interpreted. By declaring the articulus iustificationis to be the normative principle of Christian dogmatics, we are in effect defining both the centre and the limits of Christian theology.20 This has four consequences:

I. the saving action of God in Christ is declared to be at the heart of the Christian faith, and the priority of soteriological considerations in matters oftheology, ethics and piety thereby asserted;

11. any necessary presuppositions or consequences of the article must be regarded as being de fide;

Ill. any doctrines which are necessarily excluded by the article must be regarded as non-Christian or anti-Christian;

IV. any matters on which the principle has no direct bearing must either be regarded as adiaphora, or as matters to be resolved by the application of other, secondary, criteria.

These four points W"ill be discussed individually.

1~ This is in no way to suggest that these three can be separated, although it is evident that they can be di.'itinguished, if only at the notional level.

20 cf. Wolf, Die Rechtfertigungslehre, ed. cit., 14: 'Wir reden daher besser von ihr als von der Mitte und Grenze reformatorischer Theologie und suchen damit ihre theologische Funktion anzugeben, die ihrem Gehalt entspringt. Mitte--<.las heisst: aUes in reformatorischer Theologie ist auf sie bezogen; in ihr wird ja das subiectum theologiae zentral erfasst. Grenze---das heisst: alles, was ausserhalb des durch diese Mitte Bestimmten und Zusammegefassten liegt, ist "error et venenum" in theologia.'

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I.

By affirming that God's saving action in Christ lies at the heart of the Christian faith, we are defining the articulus iustificationis as the magister et princeps super omnia genera doctrinarum. Theological speculation must begin with, be based upon, and be governed by, God's saving action in Christ. Every responsible Christian statement about God, about Christ and about man must have its focal point in the crucified Christ: crux sola nostra theologia.

The priority of soteriological considerations in the formulation of Christian doctrine can be illustrated from the history of its early development. Referring to this development, M. F. Wiles observed that 'even in the most technically philosophical and dogmatic debates, issues of soteriological concern were always of paramount importance'.21 The early Church was emphatic in its assertion that Christianity was a way of salvation, a conviction central to its piety and its liturgy, and hence to its doctrine. The influence ofthe lex orandi on the lex credendi is fundamentally soteriological: the early Christians worshipped Christ as their saviour, and left their bishops to work out the Christological and Trinitarian conse­quences of this basic conviction. The task of early Christian theology was basically to articulate the consequences of the lex orandi-the worship of Christ as Saviour. The belief that Christ was the redeemer of mankind rapidly achieved the status of an axiom-a proposition that was beyond dispute, the denial of which would have constituted a scandalum oecumenicum­whose ramifications required elaboration, both in terms of its presuppositions and its consequences. The introduction of secondary principles, such as to gar aproslepton atherapeuton22 enabled this basic soteriological conviction to be articulated in terms of Christology and anthropology-but it was always appreciated that these were secondary principles, subordinate to the greater truth of the redemption of mankind in Christ. The Arian and Apollinarian controversies provide an excellent illustration of this point.23 The history of doctrine provides no

21 M. F. Wiles, The making of Christian doctrine. A study in the principles of early doctrinal development (Cambridge, 1978), 95. See also his Remaking of Christian doctrine (London, 1975), 41-82.

22 Gregory of Nazianzen, Ep. 101. Other secondary principles which may be noted include: 'God alone can save'; 'the deifier cannot himself be deified'.

2:; cfPollard's celebrated remark, that the victory of Athanasius over Arius was a 'victory of soteriology over cosmology': T. E. Pollard, 'Logos and Son in Origen, Arius and Athanasius', Studia Patristica 2 (Texte und Untersuchungen 44), 282-7; p. 287; The background is best studied from W. Marcus, Der

'The Article by which the Church stands or falls' 215

support for the thesis that the doctrine of the Trinity arises from an analysis of the subject, predicate and object of the proposition Deus dixit,24 or from an analysis of the dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.25 It cannot be emphasised enough that the historical origins of the doctrine of the Trinity are soteriological, not grammatical or dialectical.

The characteristically Christian knowledge of God is the cognitio Dei redemptoris, rather than the cognitio Dei creatoris. The insistence upon the priority of soteriological considerations associated with the articulus iustificationis points to the inade­quacy of any other knowledge of God, a distinction also inherent in the related and vital distinction between natural and revealed theology. 'God himself has endued all men with some knowledge of his deity'26-and the distinction between a general, and a specifically Christian, knowledge of God lies in the cognitio Dei redemptoris. It is this soteriological orientation of the Christian knowledge of God that underlies Melanchthon's celebrated dictum: hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia eius cognoscere, non ... eius naturas, modos incarnation is intueri,27 and Schleier­macher's location of the 'distinctive essence of Christianity' in the fact that 'in it all religious emotions are related to the redemption wrought by Jesus of Nazareth'.2B The object of faith is not primarily God the Creator, but God the Redeemer, the divina erga nos benevolentia.29 The twin poles of saving knowledge are of God as Redeemer and of ourselves as redeemed-a knowledge

Subordinationismus als historisches Phiinomen (Munchen, 1963). The soteriological concerns which underly Apollinarian Christology are well documented by E. Muhlenberg, Apollinariu.<; von Laodicea (Gottingen, 1969).

24 The view is first proposed by Barth in his Christliche Dogmatik im Entwuif (Munchen, 1927), 127, and may be studied at length in his Church Dogmatics, 111, 295-333. Here the intra-Trinitarian distinctions are grounded upon the internal distinctions of the act of revelation, Deus dixit, as 'the revealing God, and the event of revelation, and its effect on man' (Ill, 299).

25 A view particularly associated with Tillich, who appears unable to distinguish the triadic structure of dialectical thinking and the triadic structure of Trinitarian thinking.

26 Calvin, Institutes l.iii.3. Cf P. Brunner, 'AlIgemeine und besondere Offen-barung', Evangelische Theologie 1 (1934), 189--215.

27 Loci Communes (1521 edition) praefatio. 2B Christian Faith §22, 1. 29 Calvin, Institutes IIl.ii.7 'Nunc iusta fidei definitio nobis constabit si dicamus

esse divinae erga nos benevolentiae firmam certamque cognitionem, quae gratuitae in Christo promissionis veritate fundata, per Spiritum sanctum et revelatur mentibus nostris et cordibus obsignatur.' The whole section should be studied, as in it Calvin makes it clear that he does not regard the whole of Scripture as the object of faith, in that parts of it contain threats and condemnations, rather than promises of salvation.

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whose locll.') is Christ, apart from whom such knowledge is impossible. 'Faith looks at nothing but the mercy of God and a dead and risen Christ'.3o The point underlying this is that man must evaluate the concept of 'God' if he is to know God. To post­Kantian man, God qua God, the Ding an sich, has no apparent m<m-ward reference, whereas God qZlil Saviour has. The Christian understanding of God is Deus pro nobi.s, not Deus in se. That God is Creator need take us no further than Deism; that God is Saviour implicates man's destiny with God's. That the Christian knowledge of God is primarily soteriological must be regarded as calling into question the 'method of correlation'-the grounds of theological discourse must be regarded as being dictated by the cross, not by man's quest for relevance. 31 The theolngia crueL., both poses the questions and provides the answers, and responsible discussion of God must avoid the 'flighty thoughts' (Luther) that seek God anywhere else than in the crucified Christ.

For Paul, the 'word of the Cross' was the foundation of his mission to both Jews and Gentiles-the word addressed to all mankind, be they believers or pagans. The articulus iustifi.cationis claims to represent the essential form of the Church's proclama­tion of Christ to the godless. As such, it must provide the theological foundation on which the Church can take its stand against secular theories of man and salvation. The former point is of particular importance, for the articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae points to a particular understanding of the nature of man. For Luther, man-as a theological entity-was defined by the formula homo iustijicari fide. This crucial point is clearly stated in the thirty-second thesis of his Disputatio de homine (1536):32

32. Paulus Rom. 3. Arbitramur hominem iustificari fide absque operibus, brevitur hominis definitionem colligit dicens: hominem iustificari fide.

However, although Luther does not appear to have developed this

30 Comm. in Gal 3.6; CR 50.205. 31 Tillich's method of correlation has 'no place for pragmatic man. It is built on

the assumption that man by his very nature must ask these "ultimate" or existential questions'. Harvey Cox, The secular cif)! (New York, 1965), 79.

:;2 Text as established by G. Ebeling, Lutherstudien Band 11: Di..<;putatio de homine 1. Teil (Tiibingen, 1977), 22. The 40 theses are divided as follows: Nos. 1-20 concern the philosophical definition of man, Nos. 21-40 the theological definition. On the problem of the dating of the Disputatio, see p. 6. For the importance of a theological definition of man, see E. Wolf, 'Mensch­werdung des Menschen? Zum Thema Humanismus und Christentum', Evangelische Theolngie 6 (1946-7), 4-25.

'The Article by which the Church stancL') or falls' 217

theological anthropology, it is nevertheless clear that he under­stood man to be defined as a theological entity by the articulus iu.')tijicationis, and not by secular philosophical definitions, such as animal rationale, sensitivum, corporeum.:3:3 A similar criticism can be made of the highly influential Boethian definition of 'person', persona est ratiorwiis naturae individua suhstantia.:H

This point appears to have been realised during the period of High Scholasticism, and led to a fundamental shift towards a more theological definition of persona as the relationship between man and God.:35 The tendency in the twentieth century to define persona in terms of an [ch-Du relationship readily lends itself to theological articulation as homo coram Deo.:36 However, it must be pointed out that the nature of this relationship between God and man requires careful articulation in terms of the articulus iustijicationis. A purely deist definition of man is totally unacceptable to Christian theology-and such a definition inevitably results from the attempt to use Genesis 1.27 in this respect-Le. to define man as 'created in the image of God'. As we shall see, the articulus ius tijicat ion is forces us to posit a radical dichotomy between homo peccator and homo iustus. A purely deist definition of man-such as 'created in the image ofGod'-is quite inadequate to deal with the fact of human sin-and this is why Luther's definition of man, homo iustificari fide, is preferable, pointing to precisely this point. 37 The attempt to define man sub loco dei creatoris will inevitably result in a definition of man which could be ascribed to any theology-be it deist, Judaist, or whatever-which accepts that God created man: as we have stressed, the characteristically Christian insight into human nature must arise through the cognitio Dei redemptoris-Le. man must be defined sub loco dei redemptoris, in terms of his redemption through Christ. Whilst man was created in God's image, he is re-created in Christ's. The articulus iustijicationis points not merely to man's being created in God's image, but to the renewal of that divine image in his redemption in Christ.

11.

The articulus iustijicationis is the iudex super omnia genera

33 Thesis 1: Ebeling, op. cit., 15. :>4 de Trinitate V, 3; MPL 64.1343C. :;5 Duns Scotus appears to have been instrumental in effecting this change. 36 On this, see W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropolngie der

Gegenwart im Lichte der Theolngie (Gottingen, 1962). :;7 Barth makes a similar criticism, but for different reasons: CD IIII2, 19-54,

esp. 26-32.

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doctrinarum, the yardstick by which the teaching of the Christian Church is to be compared. The Christian doctrine of justification forces us to posit a radical dichotomy between homo peccator and homo iustlL.,). It is only on this basis that man's relationship to God and to himself and to others can be articulated. The negative presupposition of justification is therefore sin. The universalism implicit in the articulus iustificationis makes it necessary to insist that all men stand in need of reconciliation to God-Le. that all men are alienated, and require reconciliation to God. In this sense, as the negative presupposition of reconciliation, sin is essentially dysteleological, standing at the opposite of the teleolog­ical good of the Kingdom of God. However, the more fundamental point is that sin is a theological concept, without any meaning outside the community of faith. Rather than characterise it is as Werthsbegriff, with its moralist overtones, sin must be understood as a theological reflection on the nature of man which arises from reflection on the crucified Christ. By insisting that sin be understood theologically, rather than empirically or morally, we are in effect declining to identity sin with any specific element of human conduct. This has the important consequence of allowing the neglected concept of original sin to be defined as the natural human state, as revealed by the theologia crucis-the state of human alienation from God, which only assumes its full significance when the implications of God's saving action in Christ are grasped. One is forced to think about sin only in so far as one is forced to reflect upon the presuppositions implicit in the only acceptable datum for theological speculation-namely, the restoration of the sinner to fellowship with God in Christ. That sin has moral and empirical aspects will be evident-but at this point, it is important to emphasise that these aspects are secondary. Whether they are caused by sin, or related to it as epiphenomena, lies beyond this study. The theological definition of man begins with the fact that he is the object of justification. Where the actuality exists, there is also the corresponding possibility-and the question of the possibility of justification leads to the assertion of the actuality of original sin. The confusion surrounding the concept of original sin largely arises from a failure to appreciate that its dogmatic function relates to its being the negative presupposition of the articulus iustificationis.

The articulus iustificationis also poses two fundamental questions: Who is the justifier? And who are the justified? The Christological and ecclesiological aspects of the soteriological canon now claim our attention.

The person of Christ is the central mystery of the Christian

'The Article by which the Church stands or jall.·,' 219

faith: however, the mystery of his person is bound up with his being the agent of God's reconciliation of his alienated world to himself. The question 'Who is Christ?' must, on analysis, reduce to the more pertinent question 'Who is Christ for me?' If Christ is the agent of God's reconciling work, he cannot himself require reconciliation-Le. he is outside the scope of the articulus iustification is , and hence of its negative presupposition. The person of the Mediator-for such is the most appropriate term to describe his function-must be such that he is able to represent both the alienated and the party wishing to abolish that alienation. The essential point that emerges from such an analysis is this: the mediator must represent the alienated, except for their alienation; and he must represent God to the alienated. The consequent conclusion that Christ is sinless must be understood as a consequence of the articulus ius tification is , and the role assigned to the person of the Mediator, rather than as a consequence of the observation of the moral excellence of Christ's character. We do not propose to develop this point here. Rather, we wish to emphasise that the Christological question arises from the articulus ius tification is , and must be answered in the same framework. The early Church, by worshipping Christ as their Saviour, implicitly JX>SCd both the Christological and the Trinitarian questions-the question 'Who is Christ?' requires reference to God, and leads to the further question of 'Who is God?'. Furthermore, the need to define the Christian understanding of salvation in Christ, as opposed to the Gnostic interpretation of the saIlle notion, led the theologians of the second century to introduce the idea of oikonomia,38 and hence of redemptive history. The Fathers declined to follow Aristotle, and see in history merely a collection of events, 'what Alcibiades did and had done to him', seeing instead the arena in which the great redemptive acts of God were performed. The heilsgeschichtlich approach to the articulus iustificationis recognises that the Christian proclamation stands or falls with redemptive history, in that it correlates the work of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

The ecclesiological question posed by the articulus iustifica­tionis may be regarded as arising from the question of how homo peccator becomes homo iustus. How does man appropriate the

38 The term is best studied from the (regrettably) unpublished doctoral thesis of M. Widman, Der BegrijJ OlXOVO/-lla im Werk des Ireniius und seine Vorgeschichte (Tiibingen, 1956); see also]. Lawson, The biblical theology of Saint Irenaeus (London, 1948), 115-291. The heilsgeschichtlich approach of Amyraut should also be noted-see]. Moltmann, op. cit . . On the whole question, see the intriguing study of Oscar Cullmann, Chri.''it and Time (London, 1962)

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beneficia Christi? The question points to the receptive nature of faith, in that the offer of reconciliation is accepted, and further serves to emphasise the divine initiative in justification. However, we propose to consider instead the more practical question of Christian ethics within the community of faith, and more specifically the theological foundation on which Christian ethics should be based.

In the concept of justification lies an implicit appeal to justice­the conviction that theJudge of all the earth will do right (Genesis 18:25). However, what concept of justice is appropriate to describe God's dealings with men? And what relevance does this concept of justice have to man's dealings with his fellows in the political community?39 Within the political community, justice is generally taken to mean a set of rules or principles for regulating social conduct, these rules or principles themselves being grounded in some higher principle.40 However, whilst men understand the need for, and are prepared to affirm, a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic duties and rights, and for determining the proper distribution of social benefits and burdens, there is nevertheless no general agreement as to precisely what these principles might be. In other words, men recognise the need for justice, but cannot define it. This conceptual difficulty will evidently be reduced if we distinguish the concept of justice itself from the various interpretations of justice which have existed and now exist. In other words, justice can be defined by the role it plays, rather than its content.41 The question posed to the Christian is this: what set of principles should be regarded as underlying justice in the light of the Christian doctrine of justification,42 either in the political or ecclesiastical community?

:~" See the discussion in A. E. McGrath, 'Rectitude: the moral foundation of Anselm of Canterbury'S soteriology', Downside Review 99 (1981), 204-213; K. Barth, Rechifertigung una Recht (Zurich, 1938); B. Schiiler, Die Herrschaft Christi una dns weltliche Recht (Roma, 1963); Ernst Wolf, 'Zum protestant­ischen Rechtsdenken', in Peregrinatio Il, 191-206. For the problem in its general theological setting, see A. E. McGrath, ~ustice and Justification: semantic and juristic aspects of the Christian doctrine of justification', Scottish Journal of Theology 35 (1982) 403-418.

40 Usually conceived as 'natural la\'v'. 41 Thus H. L. A. Hart, The concept of Law (Oxford, 1961), 155-9. 42 The problem is posed '-Vith characteristic brilliance by Barth: 'Die Frage

lautet zunachst: Gibt es eine Beziehung z'-Vischen der Wirklichkeit der von Gott in Jesus Christus ein fur allemal vollzogenen Rechtfertigung des Sunders allein durch den Glauben und dem Problem des menschlichen Rechts: eine innere, eine nowendige, eine solche Beziehung, durch die mit der gottlichen Rechtfertigung auch das menschliche Recht in irgendeinem Sinne zum

'The Article by which the Church stands or falls' 221

The articulus iustifzcationis forces us to posit a dichotomy between horrw peccator and homo iustus, as emphasised above. That man is made in the image and likeness of God is a theological foundation for a deist ethics-but is quite inadequate to undergird a specifically Christian ethics. God, having created man in his own image, subsequently and more wonderfully acts to redeem him from the sin which latterly characterises him. A Christian ethical system must firstly recognise this tension between homo peccator and homo iustus, and secondly attempt to articulate its consequences. The essential point arising from a theological definition of man is that he is a sinner-made in God's image, but still a sinner.4:3 A tension must be posited between iustitia fidei and iustitia civilis, analogous to the distinction between homo iustus and homo peccator. This dichotomy arises precisely because the divine imperative is addressed to the Christian community, to homo iustus, who must realise that the basis of his ethical system will find no legitimation outside the community of faith. Just as the justified sinner is simul iustus et peccator, so he finds himself in a tension between iustitia fidei and iustitia civilis, between the Christengemeinde and the Biirgergemeinde. This tension has been articulated in terms of two models-the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms, and the Reformed doctrine of the kingly rule of Christ. Again, it must be stressed that both models are a theological response to the tension between horrw peccator and homo iustus insisted upon by the articulus ius tification is .

The classic Lutheran reply to the relation between iustitia fidei and civilis is the doctrine of the two kingdoms, the regnum Christi and regnum mundi. In Thielicke's reinterpretation of this concept, the tension is conceived eschatologically:44 in the redeeming act of Jesus Christ, the eschatological crisis of history has taken place, and the old and the new aeons run parallel to each other. Christian ethics is therefore set in the context of the interim period between the two aeons. This eschatological reinterpretation of the two kingdoms removes many of the

Gegenstand des christlichen Glaubens und der christlichen Veranwortung und damit auch des christlichen Bekenntnisses '-Vird? (Rechifertigung una Recht, 3). Barth returned to this question in 1946: CD IV/2, 676-726.

43 E. Wolf, Zum protestantischen Rechtsdenken, 204. 44 See H. Thielicke, Theologische Ethik (3 volumes: Tubingen, 1951-64) Volume

I, 583-604. The emphasis placed by Thielicke on the articulus iustificationis in the ethical sphere can be seen from his declaration that his ethics should 'decline the Reformation doctrine of justification through every case provided by the grammar of our existential life' (Einfohrung in die christliche Ethik (Miinchen, 1963), 10-11.

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difficulties associated with the older Lutheran teaching, which many regarded as leading to the German church crisis of the 1930's. The most important development of Thielicke in this respect is the emphatic rejection of any form of harmony between the two kingdoms--that they coexist is merely a consequence of the present age seeing the passing of the old aeon, and the ushering in of the new, so that they temporarily overlap. However, it is not clear that Thielicke has solved the basic problem, although his restatement of the theological grounds upon which a possible solution might emerge must be regarded as exemplary. The ethical edifice which Thielicke erects appears to amount to a compromise with the forces and institutions of the old aeon, and fails to direct the Christian towards the coming of the new aeon.

The beginnings of the characteristic Reformed model may be seen in the political writings of Martin Bucer. Bucer expresses the tension posited by the articulus iustifiationis in the concept of the regnum Christi, understood as an aspect of the regnum Dei but in hoc seculo or in mundo.45 It is appropriate that Christ should have a regnum et civitatem sanctam in ten'is-and this Bucer identifies with the Church.46 The eschatological tension that underlies Thielicke's doctrine of the two kingdoms is also evident in Bucer's ecclesiology, although the tension is here between the regnum Christi and the regnum Dei-the former being an aspect of the kingdom of God in the present order, an order which will ultimately pass away, thereby resolving the tension. This basic theme is developed in the theology of Karl Barth, particularly in his short work Christengemeinde und Biirgergemeinde.47 The two communities may be compared to two concentric circles, the Christian community being the inner and smaller-but both centre on the Kingdom of God. The purpose of the Christian community is to remind the civil community of the existence of the Kingdom of God, so that the State may itself become more like that kingdom. Thus the State has a place in the ordained plan of

45 w. Pauck, Das Reich Gottes auf Erden. Utopie und Wirklichkeit. Eine Untersuchung z,u Butz,ers de regno Christi und z,ur englischen Staatskirche des 16. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1928).

46 On this, see de regno Christi. edidit F. Wendel (Paris/Gutersloh, 1955) 1:3, 33. See also J. Courvoisier, La notion de l'egliBe chez, Bucer (Paris, 1933).

47 K. Barth, Christengemeinde und Burgergemeinde (Zurich, 1970). An interest­ing point, relevant to this study, is that the early Reformed theologians tended to articulate the nature of the new obedience in essentially humanist terms, until the theological genius of Calvin showed how this could be interpreted Christologically. See A. E. McGrath, 'Humanist elements in the early Reformed doctrine of justification', Archiv for Rtiformationsgeschichte 73 (1982), 5-20.

'The Article by which the Church stands or falls' 223

salvation, in that it protects man against chaos and thus gives them 'time for repentence and amendment of life', so to speak. Whilst the State lies outside the Church, it does not lie outside the kingly rule of Christ. Again, Barth has laid a sound theological foundation for Christian ethics which incorporates the basic tension necessitated by the articulus iustificationis: however, it is far from obvious that the ethical system-if it can be called that­which he develops on the basis of this foundation has any compelling conviction. In particular, Barth's rather benevolent attitude to the State appears to reflect the Swiss state as a model: it is far from obvious that Barth's ethics would have prevented the German church crisis of the pre-war years.

The essential point emerging from both these theological foundations for Christian ethics is that they recognise the tension necessitated by the articulus iustificationis. This tension is not recognised by any ethical theory which bases itself merely on the datum of man having been created in the divine image, a datum quite inadequate as the starting point for either a specifically Christian definition of man or for a specifically Christian ethics. Indeed, by failing to recognise the dichotomy between homo peccator and homo iustus, such an approach is likely to lead to a form of Utopianism, precisely because the limitations placed upon man's spiritual and moral abilities, both as an individual and collectively, by original sin are not recognised. The Christian understanding of man is of man as a sinner, and this must lead to a realistic approach to political theorizing: precisely because man is a sinner, an 'ideal society' is a chimera-the most that can be done is to minimise the effects of sin as an interim measure before the eschatological consummation. Furthermore, the equation of piety and culture, such as occurred in Kulturprotestantismus, is excluded on account of the gulf that is seen to separate them. However, it is far from clear what particular political system is to be advocated as specifically Christian in the light of the articulus iustificationis: Barth's case for democracy as the Christian political system is tenuous in the extreme. At most, all that can be said is that the Christian understanding of salvation leads us to enter a firm nolle prosequi against certain theories of the State which are in apparent contradiction with it.

Ill.

As iudex super omnia genera doctrinarum, the articulus iustificationis defines the limits of the Christian faith. The problem of defining heresy has confronted the Church from the

224 The Evangelical Quarterly

earliest times. The use of the regula fidei is as much concerned with defining what lies outside the Christian faith as with what lies within it. If the distinctive essence of Christianity consists in the fact that God has redeemed mankind through Jesus Christ, it must follow that the Christian understanding of God, Christ and man be such that this redemption is possible. The actuality necessarily implies the possibility. The Christian understanding of the Redeemer must be such that God can effect redemption through him; the Christian understanding of man must be such that redemption can be accomplished; and the Christian under­standing of God must be such that he can effect the redemption of man through Christ. As responsible Christian discussion of God, Christ and man is regulated by the articulus iustiflCatiollis, it will be evident that the denial or rejection of this principle may hl' assumed to be alien to Christianity. To assert that redemption is impossible, or that redemption is possible apart fi'om Christ, 01'

that mankind does not require redemption, contradicts thl' articulus iustijicationis and must therefore be regarded as non­Christian or anti-Christian, as error et venenum in theologia. The denial of the article of justification must be regarded as radically altering the concept of Christian belief to the point at which the epithet 'Christian' is inappropriate and improper. At every level of tradition and authority, the Church has always proclaimed thl' reconciliation of man to God through Christ, along with its presuppositions and consequences, whether implicit or explicit. However, it will be evident that, once the articuln.') iw;tijicali()lIis is granted, the question of its proper interpretation arises. The distinction between what is Christian and what is not lies ill whether the articulus in.'itijicationis is admitted; the distinction between Orthodoxy and heresy lies in how this principle, once granted, is understood.

Heresy can arise in two basic manners, each relating to the two crucial questions noted above-i.e. Who is the Redeemer? Who are the Redeemed? The articulus in.'itijicationk'i may be admitted, and yet-

(a). it is interpreted in such a way that Christ cannot effect man's justification; or

(b). it is interpreted in such a way that man-the oqject of justification-----cannot be justified, properly speaking.

The answer to the question, Who is the Redeemer?, must be able to account for the uniqueness of his office, and also for his ability to mediate between God and man. If Christ is the agent of reconciliation between God and man, his relation to both must be

'The Article by which the Church stands or falls' 225

such that his work of reconciliation be possible. Therefore it is necessary that, whilst there must be an essential similarity between Christ and man, there must also be an essential dissimilarity, in that otherwise the uniqueness of his office is called into question. All men are not the agents of reconciliation. Heresy can therefore arise by a failure to maintain the tension between these two pre-requisites, so that a statement of the one amounts to a rejection of the other. In other words, a tension must be maintained between Christ's divinity and humanity. If the superiority of the Redeemer be stressed, without the concomitant assertion of his equality with man, his ability to reconcile is dissipated, he no 10l1ger having any point of contact with those he was supposed to redeem. On the other hand, if his common humanity be emphasised, without reference to his essential superiority, the Redeemer himself comes to require redemption, along with those he came to redeem, he being in this respect not better off than any other man. Therefore either the Redeemer cannot redeem, or the Redeemer can redeem only to the same extent as all other men, so that all men are the agents of God's reconciliation ofthe world to himself. In essence, these amount to the Docetic and the Arian heresies, although their points of reference are somewhat different.

The answer to the question, Who are the redeemed?, must be capable of explaining why redemption is necessary from outside humanity itself--i.e. why all men cannot be Redeemers. The object of redemption-i.e. man-must both require redeeming, and also be capable of accepting or receiving that redemption when it is offered. These two aspects of the matter must both be maintained simultaneously, in a manner akin to the humanity and deity of the Redeem;r. If man's need for reconciliation be granted, yet his own impotence to provide it be denied, the ~onclusion must be granted that man himself could be the agent of his own redemption. That is not to say that a particular individual could redeem himself, but rather that some other man could redeem him, and he another. Reconciliation could then be effected, if not by all men, then at least by some, to varying degrees. This immediately calls into question the uniqueness of the person of the Redeemer. Ifman's impotence to redeem himself be granted, and yet his ability to accept that redemption-if offered-be denied, reconciliation becomes impossible, save by imposition from outside: and imposed or enforced reconciliation is no reconciliation. Broadly speaking, these two positions may be regarded as representing the Pelagian and the Manichaean heresies, although it is obvious that the actual natures of these

EQLVIII: 3-C

226 The Evangelical (JCW,./ 1'1"/.1'

heresies are not quite identical \'vith the I'0sillol'~' cl.·.· .• I rI,..c1 above.

The four positions outlined above df"(' 10 I,.. n:I.·.It·c1 .r~, inadequate, rather than faLse; in that, whilsl III;lillldllllll!', 11 ... articulus iustifccationi.s (\'vhich \,ve considt'J" 10 I"'I""'~"III 11 ... essence of the Christian proclamation), thcy plan' ohsl; ... I.·s ill ils path by an inadequate interpretation of its ten liS. II is ill litis s,'n~C" that the article of justification defines both the ('('Iltn' ;lIul 11 ... limits of the Christian faith: the focus is thc n'dl'l'lllillg \\'tII"k of God in Christ, around \'vhich a number of inll'qwdiltiolls ("illl I It" developed. To give a geometrical analogy, the an'd of ;llltlH"llli("­ally Christian teaching on man and Christ can he likt"H"d 10 ;1

square, \'vhose diagonals intersect on the saving wor'k of (:od ill Christ. The limits of the Christian faith are defincd hy Ihe fillll'

corners of the square, representing the Docetit- a"HI !\"iilll teachings at the ends of one diagonal, and the Manichac;1II ;lIId Pelagian at the ends of the other diagonal. The area cJl('ompdsscd W'ithin that square may be regarded as authentically Chl'istiall, ill that redemption is both asserted to be necessary and possi"!,' ill the terms stated.

It is clear that it is this limitation of the scope of Ch,.istill1C doctrine that causes us to speak of the articulus stl1llti .... {lilt cadentis ecclesiae. Where the articulus is denied, then' is no Christian Church. There never has been, and never can be a tnlly Christian Church \'vhere there is no articulus iustificatioTl i. .... The question ofthe proper interpretation of the article then arises, and leads us to define heresy in terms of the soteriological canon-i.e. that is heretical which cannot simultaneously maintain both the article of justification and the concept of Christ or man associated W'ith the heresy. As \,ve have pointed out above, the essence of heresy thus conceived lies in its basic inadequacy to do justice to the central doctrine of the Christian faith-that God \,Vas in Christ reconciling the \,VorId to himself. Any opinion \,Vhich denies the articulus iustificationis must be regarded as non-Christian or anti-Christian, as it denies the specifically Christian interpreta­tion of both God and the Christ-event. In her liturgy and \,Vorship, the Church continually reminds the faithful of God's redeeming \,Vork in Christ; to reject this is to place oneself outside the Church and the consensus fu1elium.

It W'ill be evident that certain matters, most notably relating to Church polity, fall outside the scope of the soteriological canon. These matters must either be recognised as adiaphora, matters of indifference, or else settled by the application of other, secondary criteria. Such matters are adiaphora precisely because they pose

'The Article by which the Church stands or falls' 227

no threat to the articulu.s iustifccationis, either in regard to its existence or its interpretation. The discussion of adiaphora W'iU evidently depend upon agreement being reached concerning the nature of the secondary criteria to be employed in their discussion. Ho\,Vever, on the basis of the soteriological canon, the existence of adiaphora in the theological, and not merely the ethical, realm must be ackno\,Vledged. 48

In his study, \,ve have argued that the articulus iustifccationis provides the best point of departure for theological speculation concerning God, Christ and man. Such a starting point can be justified from the study of the development of Christian doctrine, and provides an important empirical link betW'een the Christian experience of justification and the concept of justification itself. In her \,Vorship, in Word and Sacrament, the liturgy of the Church continually proclaims Christ's saving passion as being at the heart of the Christian faith, as evidenced in her \,Vorship of her Saviour. The Church does not worship Christ merely as her Lord-she \'vorships him as her Saviour, \'vhose rights over her are a consequence of his saving passion and death. The belief that God \,Vas in Christ reconciling the worId to himself lies at the heart of the Church's piety and \'vorship--and hence must also lie at the centre of her theological system. Christian theology, as the ancilla ecclesiae, must attempt to articulate the consequences of this fundamental belief for Christian thinking about God, Christ and man; If Christian theology allo\'vs itself to become detached from the \'vorshipping life of the Church, it W'ill lose \'vhatever sense of perspective it may have: its task is to assist the Church in her proclamation of 'the \,Vord of the Cross', and to define its consequences for Christian piety and practice. The theologian is continually reminded, in the anamnesis of Christ's saving passion, that the liturgy of the Church provides him W'ith the starting point for his speculation: the lex orandi has, in effect, pre-empted him. This starting point is itself firmly grounded at every level of authority-Scripture, Tradition, the Creeds of Christendom, the ministry of the Word and Sacraments, the W'itness of the saints, and the consensus fidelium. The claims of Tradition in determining the starting point for theological speculation cannot be ignored-and Tradition, \'vhich formulated the lex orandi, points to the saving death of Christ as that starting point.

It is our contention that the analysis of the germs of concepts

48 Contra Schleiermacher, Rothe, and, to a lesser extent, Martensen: see J. Schiller, Probleme del' christlichen Ethik (Berlin, 1888).

228 The Evangelical Quarterly

contained within the articulus iustificationis provides, if not a systematic theology, then at least the foundations of one. 4~l The theologian who makes this his starting point will derive a theology grounded in both the Christian experience and the Word of God. A theologian of the Word cannot ignore the fact that one aspect ofthe Christian proclamation stands out as the Word ofthe Gospel,50 from which all else proceeds, the magister et princeps, dominl1.c<;, rector et iudex super omnia genera doctrinarum. A 'theologian of the Word' must be a 'theologian of the Word', the Word by which the church stands or falls, the articulus iustificationis.

49 See Alister McGrath, 'Del' articulus iustificationis als axiomatischer Grundsatz des christlichen Glaubens', Zeitschrift foT' Theologie und Kirche 81 (1984), 383-94; idem., 'Homo iustificandus fide. Rechtfertigung, Verkiindigung und Anthropologie', Kerygma und Dogma 29 (1983), 323-31.

;;0 Contra Karl Barth. See A. E. McGrath, 'Karl Barth and the articulus iustificationis. The Significance of his Critique of Ernst Wolf within the Context of His Theological Method', Theologische Zeitschrift 39 (1983),349-61. See further idem., 'Karl Barth als AufkHirer? Del' Zusammenhang seine!' Lehre vom Werke Christi mit del' Erwahlungslehre', Kerygma und Dogma 30 (1984), 273-83.