The Influence of Interest Groups on Federal Education Policy

Anne Whitesell

Fowler Paper Competition

Table of ContentsABSTRACT........................................................................................................1LITERATURE REVIEW.........................................................................................2

INTEREST GROUPS IN EDUCATION..........................................................................................8CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK..............................................................................15METHODOLOGY...............................................................................................20

STRATEGIES TO INFLUENCE EDUCATION POLICY......................................................................22ANALYSIS.......................................................................................................23

SUBMITTING LETTERS TO MULTIPLE HEARINGS........................................................................25THE INFLUENCE OF PACS, LOBBYING, AND REVENUES.............................................................27EDUCATION POLICY ISSUES.................................................................................................29MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS..................................................................................32

CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................38APPENDIX 1....................................................................................................41APPENDIX 2....................................................................................................47BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................49

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AbstractMuch research has been devoted to studying the influence of interest groups in

shaping public policy; I chose to focus my research on groups interested in federal

education policy. The data comes from the letters of support submitted by interest

groups to the nomination hearings for Secretary of Education appointees Rod Paige,

Margaret Spellings, and Arne Duncan. I collected data on the characteristics of the

groups, their strategies, and the issues mentioned within the letters. The

relationships between variables were analyzed using a series of chi-square tests

and binominal regressions. My results show that financial resources and the nature

of the group’s members affect the group’s strategies. The results also show that the

specific issues mentioned are influenced by the background of the nominee, the

incoming administration’s priorities, and the current political climate. Further

research on the topic might include looking into how interest groups shape

education policy in other venues (lawmaking, regulations, etc.).

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Literature ReviewAny study of American education policy will uncover an extensive network of

competing interests looking to make their mark in governmental policy. These

groups cover a vast constituency, ranging from educators (primarily teachers,

principals, and administrators) to student and parent advocacy groups, to groups

representing various religious, ethnic, and other minorities (Bailey 1975, 7). These

groups have existed since the creation of public schools, and special interests have

existed since the country’s founding. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist No.

10, the role of a republican government is to control the effects of factions, or those

groups which are “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of

interest.” Therefore, before delving into the influence of outside groups in

education, it is important to have a basic understanding of the creation of interest

groups as a whole and their influence in the governmental process.

In his 1951 book The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public

Opinion, David Truman postulated that advanced societies are bound to see an

increase in the quantity, and significance, of interest groups. As people develop

specific skills and labor becomes specialized, those with similar interests will band

together; in times of disturbance, such as periods of economic crisis or political

change, these individuals will meet with increased frequency (Truman 1951, 97).

Eventually, these meetings lead to the formation of interest groups, defined as “any

group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon

other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of

forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes” (Truman 1951, 33).

Truman also suggested that the formation of new groups occurs in waves, for as

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one group emerges to present their claims, another will emerge in opposition (59).

These groups will then bring their concerns, whether they are interested in

maintaining the status quo or are promoting policy change, to government

institutions (Baumgartner, et al. 2009; Truman 1951).

Agreeing with Truman’s general principle concerning the creation of interest

groups, Mancur Olson stated in The Logic of Collective Action that interest groups

generally exist to advance the common interests of its members (1965, 5). Olson

disagreed, however, with Truman’s emphasis on the importance of group size in

promoting common interests. According to traditional group theory, the amount of

power accorded to a group was proportional to its membership size, so the larger

groups, generally those with broader interests, would usually succeed over the

smaller interest groups (Olson 1965, 121). Olson refuted this theory, pointing out

that it assumes there is a general consensus within large groups as to which action

will best achieve the group’s goals (1965, 60). This is almost never the case,

however, and so small groups that can reach consensus and organize their actions

more quickly have an advantage (Olson 1965, 58). Olson cited politics as evidence

against the traditional theory, where politicians are very much aware of the power

of small, “special interest” groups to change public policy (1965, 127).

If the primary objective of an interest group is to change current policy to

align with the group’s claims, the intermediary goal is to attain access to the

government (Truman 1951, 264). This proves to be a difficult task, however, as the

time and resources of government officials are scarce (Baumgartner, et al. 2009,

22). To begin, advocates must elevate their grievances to the public agenda. Items

on the public agenda generally meet three criteria: first, the group identifies the

problem or gives it a name by which it will be known to the public. Secondly, the

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group identifies the culprit causing the problem, whether it is another group or a

government institution. Finally, the group issues specific demands on the

government to resolve the issue (Cobb and Ross 1997, 5-6). For public action to be

taken on an issue, it must move from the public to the formal agenda, a shift that

signifies the issue is actively under consideration (Cobb and Ross 1997, 7). In order

to be added to the formal agenda, an advocate promoting change from the status

quo must provide objective evidence that an issue exists, as well as convince the

public that a complete overhaul of current policy is necessary. This is especially

pertinent when considering policy changes that have varying impacts on different

constituencies (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 21). Within the education sector,

education issues with strong ties to other policy areas often see a shift to the formal

agenda. During the Cold War, for instance, increased attention to math and science

programs came from the threat posed by the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union.

For some issues, securing a place on the formal agenda will be easier, such

as those issues that are well-covered by the media. The issues that attract media

coverage and the attention of the public are known as salient issues; frequently,

when the salience of an issue grows, so does its importance for the political parties

(Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 99). In other instances, there is a crisis or focal event

that draws attention to an issue. Even so, the likelihood of policy change will remain

low unless the issue was already being discussed prior to the focal event

(Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 122). In the absence of a focal event or the media

coverage that comes with a partisan issue, Truman (1951) places the responsibility

on interest groups to increase awareness of the issue and its possible

consequences. This process is necessary to rally public support based on rational

and stable principles; rationality and stability make for a public that is more willing

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to act. In addition, an interest group has a greater chance of gaining access to

government if it is well-established and has a history of success in the political

process (Cobb and Ross 1997; Truman 1951).

Interest groups have an assortment of access points from which to choose

when looking to receive governmental attention. First, the group must select which

branch of government will be the venue for the proposed policy change, and

whether it will be most effective to lobby local, state, or federal officials. When

appealing to Congress members or the presidential administration, the group may

become involved in the nomination and election process, or wait until the official

has been elected. During the campaign season, interest groups may opt to donate

to campaigns or encourage their members to vote in the primary and general

elections. They may also supply their members with the voting records and

backgrounds of the candidates, thus highlighting which candidate is most

supportive of the group’s goals (Truman 1951, 289-290). Rarely do interest groups

come out with open endorsements of candidates. An interest group faces potential

hostility in the new administration if they campaigned against them during the

election season, and groups with members from different political affiliations risk

division within their organization if they issue an endorsement (Truman 1951, 290).

While interest groups may not officially come out in favor of one candidate,

common links between certain groups and political parties are well known. Labor

unions, for example, typically favor Democratic candidates, while business

organizations generally work with Republicans (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 92)

Opponents of change may threaten to withdrawal support should the

candidate advocate a change in the status quo. This strategy is less effective when

used by groups with a small membership or geographically dispersed constituency,

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because they are unlikely to have much influence on other groups, and the

membership is not large enough to carry significant weight (Truman 1951, 304).

This would seem to run counter to Olson’s group theory, mentioned previously.

There is a caveat to Olson’s theory, though; while small groups succeed when the

issues are narrow and concern a small population, they tend to be less powerful

“when questions which divide the entire nation are involved” because they are

faced with opposition from much larger organized groups (1965, 147). The sheer

size of large business organizations or labor unions, with their millions of members

(and voters), outweighs the quicker mobilization of small interest groups.

Withdrawal of support, therefore, is used most often by the most powerful interest

groups (Cobb and Ross 1997, 39). Those groups that do officially endorse a

candidate seek to gain more than those who choose to remain neutral, with the

greatest gain seen by those who endorse the winning candidate and help create the

candidate’s policy platform (Truman 1951, 285). According to Truman (1951), an

interest group chooses to influence a candidate’s platform in hopes that it will

guarantee access to the future administration.

Turning toward the executive branch was a common route for the policy

advocates studied by Baumgartner et al. (2009, 14). If an interest group seeks to

become influential in the administration, it may begin making its case during the

transition. One way to become involved in the transition is through political

appointments. Truman observed that the public official without conflicting

motivations is an “illusion” and some of the most important connections officials

have are those in “professional and skill groups” (450-452). Consequently, interest

groups that have a hand in creating the administration have the opportunity to

discuss the issues to be addressed by the administration. Thus, when analyzing

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public policies, Truman suggested questioning the interest groups associated with

the administration and their internal organization (439-441). Becoming involved in

implementation is not only important for the advancement of a group’s own

objectives, but also gives them the opportunity to determine which issues will not

be addressed. Bachrach and Barantz called this process of limiting the scope of

policy options “non-decision-making” (as cited in Cobb and Ross 1997, 16).

The transition is a period in which interest groups from all sides are faced

with uncertainty. Those opposed to change increase their efforts to maintain the

status quo, while policy initiators see a presidential transition as an opportunity for

change. Uncertainty increases when control of the White House switches parties, for

as Truman (1951) noted, the new administration may repeal old policies, adjust

former methods, or head in a completely new direction. This window of opportunity

is short-lived because issues capture public attention for only a short time before

being replaced by new concerns. Reauthorizations and nondiscretionary items

occupy a large amount of public officials’ time, forcing new ideas that require extra

time and resources into “issue limbo” (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 220; Cobb and

Ross 1997, 11). In addition, politicians are typically risk averse, so interest groups

with ideologies that conflict with the views of the administration face even more

difficulties. Politicians will also be wary of engaging in issues that increase partisan

conflict (Cobb and Ross 1997, 17).

Policy advocates are at a disadvantage because of their limited opportunity

to bring their issue to the formal agenda, and so for many interest groups,

maintaining the status quo is their most important objective, as found by

Baumgartner et al. (2009) in their study of 98 policy debates. While advocates for

change fight for increased visibility of their issue and attention from public officials,

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opponents benefit from staying out of the spotlight and initially may refuse to

recognize that an issue even exists (Cobb and Ross 1997, 26-27). When the

opponent can no longer deny the existence of an issue, both sides may choose to

share research with public officials. Baumgartner et al. (2009) noted that advocates

are more successful when they can provide an official with expert policy information

because it gives an advocate the opportunity to emphasize one dimension of the

debate (124). It is also a valuable tool because it subsidizes the official’s limited

time and effort. Conversely, a supporter of the status quo can use distribution of

information to highlight potential negative consequences of policy change and may

even suggest that a policy initiator’s position is built on weak evidence (Cobb and

Ross 1997, 30).

In their study, Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that opponents of change

were less likely than proponents to report lobbying activity. Opponents are on the

defensive and only need to act when a group proposing change is a substantial

threat to the status quo. Cobb and Ross (1997) theorized that opposition groups will

attempt to keep the status quo intact using as few resources as possible. As

mentioned above, opponents may stave off change by ignoring the issue

completely, and in many cases, time is on their side; eventually attention dies down

and public officials move on to other issues (Cobb and Ross 1997, 26). On those

issues that require some action, opponents attempt to discredit policy advocates

through the use of stereotypes and attacks on their issue. In addition, opponents

may resort to symbolic placation strategies such as the creation of committees or

commissions. Designed to acknowledge the problem without seriously considering

the initiator’s solution, a committee is typically made up of a bipartisan expert panel

with limited time and resources to study the problem (Cobb and Ross 1997, 34-35).

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In contrast, Truman stated that advisory committees give change advocates

another opportunity to influence decision-making. Such committees provide public

officials with technical information by consulting with those who are likely to be

affected by the new government action (Truman 1951, 458). Regardless, supporters

of the status quo have a distinct advantage because they have already gained

access to the system. As Baumgartner et al. (2009) reported, after two years, over

two-thirds of the policy issues studied had not experienced any change.

Along with the assumption that groups with more experience in policymaking

(usually those defending the status quo) will have greater success, there is a widely

held belief that groups with greater financial resources will get their way more

often. In reality though, policy debates are often composed of sides with relatively

equal resources, for as one side collects resources, their opposition is likely to do

the same (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 229). The correlation between resources and

policy success was positive, but not statistically significant, in the Baumgartner et

al. study. Furthermore, this advantage was stronger for supporters of the status

quo, while advocates of change saw the advantage decrease over time (2009, 234).

The support of the president appears to be more important than the amount of

resources. The probability of success for defenders of the status quo was far greater

when the administration was also defending the status quo (233). For proponents of

change, change was more likely to occur when the administration was in support of

change, though even this probability was lower than the likelihood that the status

quo would remain in place (235). Ultimately, the numerous factors that play into

policy advocating make it extremely difficult for advocates and public officials to

predict the final outcome of a policy debate (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 260).

Interest Groups in Education

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Narrowing the focus to interest groups concerned with education policy,

many of the same trends found among interest groups in general exist. Policy

advocating, regardless of the issue, typically requires a long-term commitment

(Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 219). The majority of education interest groups seek

solutions to far-reaching problems, although occasionally groups form around a

single issue, such as sex education, school and bus safety, or drug abuse (Adam

1975, 170). In general, a consensus already exists on these issues, so once the

policy is changed, the group disbands (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 219). Even for

those who advocate over long periods of time, the ultimate goal may not be to

change an established government program (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 116). Within

an education interest group, a few critical issues exist, but others may be on the

agenda simply because a minority feels strongly about it, or an ally is advocating on

the same issue. This combination of crucial and less important issues is due to the

fact that only a small proportion of education interest groups have any substantial

influence (Bailey 1975, 48). Few groups, for example, have the resources to become

heavily involved in campaigns, or the membership to rally behind a candidate

(Bailey 1975, 79).

As a result of the relative political weakness of education groups, sides of the

policy debate may be composed of a coalition. As observed by Baumgartner et al.

(2009), the composition of debate sides fluctuates for strategic purposes. Groups

may seek out allies whose resources complement rather than duplicate their own

strengths (222). The same occurs within education groups; coalitions form to work

on national issues and separate to deal with local issues, only to come together

again at a later time (Bailey 1975, 72). These coalitions may include groups that

represent other interests in society, such as business groups, labor unions, and

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other professions (Bailey 1975, 79). Typically, business groups aim to keep taxes

low while raising educational standards (Spring 2005, 45). In addition, the Chamber

of Commerce and the AFL-CIO involve themselves in education policy because

education is seen as a means of training the workforce (Adam 1975, 169). In the

1970s, proponents for a cabinet-level Department of Education argued that the

complexity of the interest groups involved in education policy necessitated a

Department separate from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Opposition to the department felt that a secretary of education would become a

“special pleader for an organized clientele,” creating more problems than solutions

for the president (Miles 1979, 107). In fact, the groups concerned with education

policy are far less organized and dominant than in other fields (such as labor, where

the AFL-CIO prevails) and a secretary of education can sort through all of the

conflicting positions to create coordinated, effective policies (Miles 1979, 110).

The wide-ranging nature of education interest groups makes coalition

building an important aspect of advocating, while at the same time complicating

any attempt to predict which groups will see policy success. As mentioned

previously, these groups are not in the least bit cohesive, and attempts to

categorize them will typically undermine their complexity. For general purposes,

however, Bailey (1975) broke down the field into ten categories. Possibly the most

well-known, if not the most influential, of these categories are those of the teachers’

unions. The development of teachers’ unions has been well-researched, so without

delving into the debates over their influence in education policy, a brief overview

will suffice. In the past, teacher unionization was seen as a threat to public schools,

but over time, the unions have become synonymous with the status quo, refusing

any attempt at education reform (Cooper and Liotta 2004, 117). The largest of the

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teachers’ unions is the National Education Association (NEA), with more than 3.2

million members, including public school teachers, administrators, and retired

educators (National Education Association 2010). The association originated as a

forum to discuss teaching and learning issues, but became unionized in the 1970s

(Hunt, et al. 2010, 631). Since its unionization, and the leadership’s shift to a more

aggressive political stance, the NEA has gained recognition and power among

interest groups and government officials (Adam 1975, 166). The other major

teachers’ union, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), has more than 1.4

million members, including education professionals but also some healthcare

professionals and government employees (American Federation of Teachers 2010).

The AFT has been a union since its creation in 1916, keeping close ties with the AFL-

CIO, and its membership is concentrated in urban areas (Adam 1975, 167). The two

unions, while evolving from rivalry to a partnership representing teachers

collectively, still disagree on certain education policies (Hunt, et al. 2010, 629).

Splitting off from the larger teacher organizations are associations

representing individual disciplines (e.g. the National Council of Teachers of English),

as well as organizations advocating for a particular education level. Roy Adam

(1975), for instance, noted the increasing influence of higher education lobbies as a

result of federal contributions to colleges and universities (168). Other important

groups include those representing administrations, such as the American

Association of School Administrators (AASA) and the National School Boards

Association (NSBA). The NSBA represents 95,000 school board members, while the

AASA has a membership of 13,000 (American Association of School Administrators

2010; National School Boards Association 2010). These groups, while having a much

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smaller membership than teachers’ unions, can be influential in policymaking

because they handle the day-to-day management of the schools (Adam 1975, 168).

Frequently, groups that advocate on other social issues also have an interest

in education policy. Religious groups have tried to promote their values through the

education system. The Christian Coalition and People for the American Way, for

example, have engaged in a policy debate over censorship in textbooks (Spring

2005, 50). The National Catholic Educational Association and the National Council of

Churches have an interest in moral education in public schools, and may also

advocate for increased support of independent or private schools (Adam 1975, 168-

169). Women’s organizations and groups advocating minority rights frequently

lobby in the education sector, primarily on issues related to equality (Adam 1975,

169-170).Think tanks, whether liberal or conservative, also influence education

policy through their research and policy proposals. These interest groups may not

have as profound an impact on education policy as teachers’ unions or

administrative associations, but the effects of change in education may result in

change in other policy sectors (Adam 1975, 168).

Regardless of their influence over education policymaking, many of the

techniques used by advocates are the same as those used in other issue areas.

Education groups, for instance, commonly use the mobilization of grassroots

campaigns as a source of power (Bailey 1975, 70). Federal aid to education began

through grassroots movements during the 1960s. On the local and state level, civil

rights groups and religious organizations were not seeing any progress in education

funding, and so they turned to the national government (Spring 2005, 119). Since

then, newsletters, journals, and other sources of communication with group

members, have been used by interest groups to disseminate information about the

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government’s education programs and proposals. In return, the group will provide

the government agency with feedback concerning the operations and public

opinions of the programs (Bailey 1975, 55). Education groups also understand the

importance of building visibility through the media. As Stephen K. Bailey (1975)

writes, “Controversy over education, like all other controversy, is newsworthy” (80).

Oftentimes it is the most controversial of issues that see policy change.

On the federal level, there has been a significant policy change in recent

years. George W. Bush introduced the No Child Left Behind Act in January 2001, and

Congress passed the bill later that year. Under the Obama administration, the

Department of Education created the Race to the Top Program as part of the

economic stimulus program (Brill 2010). Both of these policies push for student

achievement (especially for those in under-achieving schools), highly-effective

teachers, and greater accountability, but the states have the responsibility of

developing the policies to meet these loosely-defined principles.

The definition of student achievement under NCLB was vague, as each state

was responsible for setting adequate yearly progress goals. Under Race to the Top,

student achievement is defined differently depending on whether the subject can be

tested. In those subject areas that can be tested, achievement is defined as “a

student’s score on the State’s assessments under the ESEA.” In non-tested subjects,

achievement is an alternative measure “of student learning and performance” that

is “rigorous and comparable across classrooms” (U.S. Department of Education

2009, 14). In connection with student achievement, George W. Bush announced

that education reform needed to “increase accountability for student performance”

(Bush 2001, 2). This meant that educational agencies would be rewarded for

increasing student achievement, and would be sanctioned for failure to meet

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standards. The Race to the Top Initiative continued with this goal by providing the

flexibility to use more innovative approaches in those schools that have increased

student achievement (U.S. Department of Education 2009, 13).

More specific reforms that have garnered increased attention in recent years

include school choice and performance pay. School choice is traditionally seen as a

conservative method of education reform because it decreases the federal

government’s involvement in education while leaving the private market to

determine the success of schools. Ronald Reagan promoted school vouchers and

parental choice in the 1980s (McGuinn 2006, 43). Support for school choice was not

universal though, as demonstrated during the nomination hearing for Richard Riley,

Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Education. Several senators brought up the issue in their

questioning of Riley. Senator Durenberger (R-MN) noted that there appeared to be

more letters to the editor of the New York Times concerning school choice than

health care reform, another important issue of the time (U.S. Congress. Senate

1993, 21). In an exchange with Senator Coats (R-IN), after Riley expressed his

opposition to school vouchers, the Senator asked him if it would be possible to

conduct a study to “prove once and for all whether all these editorial writers,

educators, and other choice advocates are right” (U.S. Congress. Senate 1993, 42).

Senator Gregg (R-NH) told Riley that opposing vouchers prevented lower- and

middle-class families in rural and suburban areas from having access to school

choice. Riley held firm in his belief that vouchers would only create a poorer public

school system (U.S. Congress. Senate 1993, 52). The debate quieted down

throughout the 1990s, but remained a part of the Republican education agenda. In

2000, the Party’s platform called for the government to “expand parental choice

and encourage competition” through an increasing number of charter schools.

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School choice was outlined in both NCLB and Race to the Top; Bush proposed

greater efforts to inform parents about the alternative to traditional public schools,

and advocated school choice for students attending low-performing schools (Bush

2001, 2). The Race to the Top program provided incentives for states that foster

“successful conditions for high-performing charter schools and other innovative

schools” (U.S. Department of Education 2009, 11).

Performance pay for teachers, also known as merit pay, is another education

policy that in the past has been preferred by conservatives. Defining it at the most

basic level, merit pay is any compensation policy that is not based solely on the

single salary schedule, which determines pay according to years of service and

degree held (Springer 2009, 3-4). Proponents for this type of compensation system

argue that the private market has always paid more those individuals who perform

at higher levels. Applying the same principle to teachers, the argument goes, would

encourage the use of the best and most efficient practices. Merit pay first received

increased attention in 1983 when President Reagan declared, “Teachers should be

paid and promoted on the basis of their merit and competence. Hard-earned tax

dollars should encourage the best. They have no business rewarding incompetence

and mediocrity” (Reagan 1983).

The types of compensation reform programs used by school systems, and

referenced by interest groups, include: pay-for-performance, knowledge- and skills-

based pay, career ladders, hard-to-staff subjects, hard-to-staff schools, and

recruitment and retention awards (Springer 2009, 5). The ambiguity of the term

makes it a prime target for interest groups; much of the advocacy work revolves

around issue definition. Without examining in detail the tactics used by interest

groups debating this issue, it is sufficient to say that many of the strategies studied

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by Cobb and Ross (1997), such as generalizing and use of symbolic definitions, are

employed when lobbying for or against merit pay. Generalization implies that all

merit pay policies are the same, even though, as indicated above, there are

multiple approaches. Generalizations may imply, for instance, that teacher

compensation reform ties student test scores to teacher pay. Symbolic definitions

often arise when debating merit pay because the issue is still relatively new and

foreign to the general public (Cobb and Ross 1997, 14).

Opponents of performance pay also argue that such a requirement coming

from the federal government infringes upon states’ rights. Education reform has

traditionally been limited at the federal level, with states responsible for the

performance of their school districts. Throughout the twentieth century the federal

government’s role in education increased as the quality of public education declined

(McGuinn 2006, 47). On newer issues state and local districts continue to be the

first to experiment with reform. Across the country, for instance, school systems

have begun merit pay plans, utilizing a variety of the programs indicated above. In

Portland, Maine the school system operates under the Professional Learning Based

Salary System. Teachers who go ‘above and beyond the job definition’ through

participation in professional development programs, leadership in student activities,

or enrollment in additional college courses, earn salary contact hours (SCH). Upon

accumulating 225 SCH, teachers permanently increase their salary by moving

across salary lanes. Similarly, in Helena, Montana, teachers can increase their

salaries through voluntary professional development and the creation of a Career

Development Plan. They must also receive positive evaluations from administrators

(Rosales 2009).

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On the state level, Texas implemented the Governor’s Educator Excellence

Grant in 2007, which provided 99 high-poverty high-performing schools in the state

with noncompetitive grants for developing and executing their incentive plans

(Taylor, Springer and Ehlert 2009, 193). Incentives could be distributed on an

individual, team, or school level, and the amount of the awards was chosen by each

school (Taylor, Springer and Ehlert 2009, 218). Schools also determined the criteria

upon which teachers would be evaluated, ranging from student improvement based

on assessments to a decrease in drop-out rates to working in hard-to-staff subject

areas (Taylor, Springer and Ehlert 2009, 195). In North Carolina, the ABC’s of Public

Education was established in 1996. The program awards teachers in all public

schools within the state based on student achievement in math and reading.

Teachers in schools that show “exemplary” growth receive $1,500; teachers in

schools with “expected” growth receive $750 (National Center on Performance

Incentives 2008). The differences among these four systems (Portland, Helena,

Texas, and North Carolina) demonstrate the difficulty in defining merit pay.

According to Patrick McGuinn (2006), changes in education policy such as

these are the result of gradual shift in the “policy regime” (11). These shifts were

the result of a realization that the traditional view of education—public schools work

just fine, problems occur only in poverty-stricken areas, and any reform should take

place on the state or local level—no longer held true (McGuinn 2006, 22). Interest

groups sensed this shift in beliefs, and actively began promoting, or fighting

against, change. These efforts to influence the administration’s education policies

will be studied, and their effectiveness analyzed, in relation to the policies put forth

by No Child Left Behind and the Race to the Top Program.

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Conceptual FrameworkAs noted in the literature review, one of the many ways in which interest

groups seek to influence the executive branch is through the political appointment

process. While the president appoints officials at various levels in both the

executive and judicial branches, the appointment of cabinet officials are some of

the most important appointments a president will make. Rufus Miles wrote in 1979,

when the Senate was debating whether education should have its own cabinet

department, that cabinet officers “with special interests to promote [cause]

problems for the president” but they also “have great potential for helping the

president achieve his purpose”. Cabinet officials help in “refining [the president’s]

vision as to where the country should be headed” and communicate these efforts to

Congress and the public (104). The president’s appointments are approved by the

Senate, as outlined in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution:

He shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,

shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the

Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose

Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be

established by Law.

To fulfill this responsibility, the Senate holds nomination hearings. Though the

nominees are rarely rejected by the Senate, E. Mann and Zachary A. Smith noted

several purposes to these hearings. First, during the hearing the nominee is

questioned to determine whether there is any potential conflict of interest between

a nominee’s financial interests and the responsibilities that come with the position.

If this is the case, the nominee will be asked to find a solution to this conflict (1981,

225). Second, the nominees are questioned to ascertain his or her stance on policy

issues related to the position. Members of the committee are aware that

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presidential nominees may not agree with the president on every issue, but in

general they will represent his policy goals and commitments (Mann and Smith

1981, 217). Senators use the hearings to bring up their concerns within the policy

area; in education, for instance, there is oftentimes concern that the federal

government has taken away too much authority from state and local governments

(Miles 1979, 103).

In addition to input from senators, nomination hearings also give interest

groups an opportunity to express their opinions on the nominee. A group’s interest

in a particular poilcy field is usually evident to the Senate and the nominee, but

submitting a letter in support of the nominee allows the group to outline their

priorities within the field and their expectations for the administration. Rarely will an

administration be able to find solutions to all the issues, so it is in the best interest

of the group to emphasize issues in their nomination letters with which the

president is concerned. Whether or not the group supports the administration’s

stance is irrelevant; the objective is to attain access so they can assert some

influence on the decision-making process. A collection of these letters, therefore,

provides a good foundation for an analysis of the types of interest groups involved

in education policy, including the strategies utilized and the issues of most concern.

The letters analyzed for the purpose of this research include those submitted for the

hearings of Rod Paige, Margaret Spellings, and Arne Duncan.

The data analysis for this research tests numerous hypotheses, which can be

broken down into three areas: characteristics of the interest group, education

issues, and the background of the president and his political appointments. In

regards to the interest group’s characteristics, Baumgartner et al. suggested that

interest groups with greater resources are not significantly more likely to see

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favorable policies implemented. Extending this theory, groups with higher revenues

should not have more connections to the transition or administration than groups

with lower revenues. Even though a wealthy group may not see greater success

than other groups, its resources allow it to become involved in policymaking

through different strategies, such as establishing a PAC or employing lobbyists. As a

result, advocacy groups with PACs will have greater resources than groups without

PACs. This hypothesis stems from the nature of PACs, organizations established “for

the purpose of raising and spending money to elect and defeat candidates,”

according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Similarly, interest groups that

employ lobbyists also possess greater resources, because they can afford to hire

lobbyists from an outside firm or to assign an internal staff member to advocate for

their cause. Following the findings of Baumgartner, et al., one might assume that

interest groups with PACs or lobbyists are not more likely to have connections to

political appointees or transition team members. Lastly, if groups establish

organizations to elect or defeat candidates and designates employees as lobbyists,

they are probably more likely to submit policy proposals to the transition team.

Having a PAC and engaging in lobbying, while indicating greater resources, also

suggests that the group is interested in pursuing multiple strategies to gain access

to the government, and submitting a policy proposal or attending a meeting with

the transition team is just another useful tactic.

Hypothesis 1: Interest groups with PACs will have greater resources than those

without PACs.

Hypothesis 1a: Interest groups that lobby will have greater resources than those

that do not lobby.

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Hypothesis 2: Interest groups with greater resources will not have more connections

to the transition team and/or administration than those with fewer resources.

Hypothesis 2a: Interest groups that lobby will not have more connection to the

transition team and/or administration than those that do not lobby.

Hypothesis 3: Interest groups with greater resources are more likely to submit

policy proposals to the transition team.

Other hypotheses based on an interest group’s characteristics concern the

members of the group. As outlined in the literature review, Truman said that

interest groups develop as a result of individuals looking for a place to express their

grievances. When there is no other forum for expressing their concerns, members

expect to see the group involved in the policymaking process by presenting their

claims to the government (1951, 97). According to Olson, if the group is not

adequately addressing the concerns of its members, individuals may decide that

they can provide the same benefits for themselves without being a part of the

group. Successful groups provide greater benefits to its members than the

members could hope to attain by themselves (1965, 50). Attaining access to the

government is one such incentive; thus, one may hypothesize that groups with

members use more strategies to gain access to the government than groups

without members. Another hypothesis, stemming from Truman’s finding that groups

representing members from varying political parties are less likely to issue

endorsements, is that interest groups representing a collection of organizations are

less likely to be openly partisan, and consequently less likely to advocate for more

partisan issues.

Hypothesis 4: Interest groups with members use more strategies to gain access to

the government than groups without members.

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Hypothesis 5: Interest groups with a diverse membership will be less likely to

advocate for partisan issues.

The characteristics of the president and his political appointees are as

important in understanding which areas see policy change as the characteristics of

the interest groups involved. As stated in the literature review, Baumgartner, et. al

found that interest groups whose priorities aligned with the position of the president

were more likely to see policy change than those in opposition. The top priorities of

the administration are more likely to ascend to the formal agenda, and when they

do, interest groups want to be a part of the discussion. As well as focusing on the

priorities outlined by the president, the interest group may choose to highlight the

areas with which the political appointee has experience. For instance, both Roderick

Paige and Arne Duncan Paige served as senior officials in urban school districts prior

to their nominations as Secretary of Education, so interest groups are more likely to

mention issues that are of high priority in urban school districts. Margaret Spelling,

however, came to the Department of Education after serving as Assistant to the

President for Domestic Policy. She was known on the national stage as one of the

crafters of NCLB (Senior Staff: Margaret Spellings 2008). The background of the

nominee will also contribute to the number of nomination letters received. Paige

and Duncan were known on a state or local level, so their letters of support were

likely to come from regional groups, while Spellings was likely to receive letters

from national organizations

Hypothesis 6: Interest groups will highlight education issues with which the nominee

has experience.

Regarding education issues, less contentious issues are more likely to be

addressed than controversial issues. The reasoning for this hypothesis is alluded to

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previously: groups that do not wish to be seen as leaning to either side of the

political spectrum will stay away from more controversial issues. If a group does

choose to advocate for a more salient issue, they are likely to mention it in a letter

for the nominee that is more likely to add that issue to the formal agenda. For

example, school choice, as introduced in the literature review, is generally a reform

embraced by conservatives. Therefore, one can hypothesize that school choice is

more likely to be on the formal agenda during a Republican administration.

Following the theory that interest groups tailor their letters of support to those

issues more likely to reach the formal agenda, interest groups should address

school choice more frequently in letters of support for Republican nominees.

Performance pay is another example of education reform supported by

conservatives that applies the private market to education. One could hypothesize

then that support for performance pay would be more evident for conservative

nominees, or at the very least, would show up equally among the letters of all three

nominees.

Hypothesis 7: Less contentious issues will be mentioned with greater frequency

than contentious issues.

Hypothesis 8: There will be more mentions of school choice in letters of support for

Republican nominees.

Hypothesis 9: There will be more mentions of performance pay in letters of support

for Republican nominees.

The political climate must also be considered by interest groups when

submitting a letter of support. Over time, both liberal and conservative interest

groups may accept what were once partisan issues. Democrats, for instance, came

to accept the idea of accountability-based reform in the 1990s, after clinging to an

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education platform based on equity (McGuinn 2006, 145). Therefore, while

accountability prior to the 1990s may have been discussed less, the issue should be

fairly common in the Paige, Spellings, and Duncan letters of support. A similar shift

occurred from 2000 to 2008. In 2000, the focus was on student achievement and

accountability-based reform and by 2008 there was a push for renewed innovation

in education. The Democratic Party promoted innovation in assessments to evaluate

teachers and students, adaptation of curricula and school calendars, and new

teacher salary scales in its 2008 platform. Therefore, letters of support for Duncan

should address different issues than those brought up during the nomination of

Paige and Spellings.

Hypothesis 10: A changing political climate means that different issues will be

brought up over time.

MethodologyI used the letters of support submitted to the confirmation hearings held by

the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions for the position of

Secretary of Education to compile a sample of advocacy groups involved in shaping

education policy. While the list provides a good foundation for the interest groups

interested in education policy, it by no means includes every group, for as

mentioned previously, interest groups from many sectors are interested in

education. The hearings investigated are those of Roderick Paige, in 2001, Margaret

Spellings, in 2005, and Arne Duncan, in 2009. I included only the letters coming

from organized groups in the analysis. Consequently, letters from individuals or, as

was frequently the case for the Duncan hearing, from individual schools, are not

parts of the data collection. In total, the list consists of 89 letters of support from 77

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different organizations1. Prior to analyzing the issues addressed by these groups

and their methods of influencing policy, I gathered some basic characteristics to

enable further comparison among the groups.

First, I used data provided by the Center for Responsive Politics to categorize

each group according to whether or not they have an affiliated political action

committee (PAC) as of 2010. It should be noted that these PACs may or may not

have contributed to the 2000, 2004, or 2008 presidential elections. I also used data

from the Center for Responsive Politics to categorize each group according to their

lobbying activity. Interest groups listed as “lobbying clients” were coded “yes” in

the data set; those not listed were coded “no.” The Center defines a lobbying client

as those groups that submitted lobbying disclosure reports to the Senate’s Office of

Public Records during any period from 1998 through 2009.2 I also coded the groups

according to their types of members. Types of members were broken down into

three separate categories: individual membership (such as the teachers’ unions),

group membership (such as those representing school boards), and non

membership (typically think tanks). It is important to note that some groups open

their membership to both individuals and groups; however, for the purpose of this

research, the primary source of membership was used for coding. Information on

annual revenues was also included in the data collection to represent an estimate of

the financial resources of the group. These figures came from the most recent Form

990 submitted to the IRS by the advocacy group3. The groups were divided in half

according to their revenue levels, with the 39 groups labeled as “low” reporting

1 Because the number of letters did not match up perfectly with the number of organizations, I worked with two data sets, one with the group as the unit of observation and the other with the letter as the unit of observation.2 The information for both of these characteristics can be obtained through the Center for Responsive Politics website (www.opensecrets.org).3 The forms were obtained through GuideStar USA (www.guidestar.org).

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revenues less than the median (approximately $7.7 million). The 38 groups labeled

as “high” reported revenues greater than the median4.

Upon collecting basic information on the interest groups, I analyzed their

positions on certain key education issues. The letters were read and coded

according to their mentioning of keywords or phrases that correspond to these

issues. The first issue is student achievement, represented by “achievement” in the

search; essentially, an increase in student achievement is evidence that reform

efforts have worked. Various synonyms exist for achievement, such as performance

or improvement, but I selected achievement as the keyword because of its

widespread use during the 2000 election and after the enactment of NCLB. The

Republican Party’s 2000 platform spoke of “closing the achievement gap” and

promoting academic standards that would show “measured progress in student

achievement.” Student achievement came to be associated with standardized

testing, capturing one of the main themes of recent federal education policy.

Closely related to student achievement is the issue of accountability, which, as

mentioned previously, has become a more widely-known term since Congress

passed NCLB in 2002. Letters of support that mentioned the issue were coded “yes”

under the variable “accountability,” while those that did not mention the issue were

coded “no.” The vague, yet positive connotations associated with these terms

suggest they will be more widely used in the endorsement letters.

Other issues analyzed in this project are geared toward specific reforms. The

issue of school choice, previously discussed in the literature review, is one area

included in the data set5. The remaining issues are those pertaining to teachers.

Both NCLB and RTTT recognize the importance of teacher quality in student 4 Revenue data was unavailable for 12 groups, typically because the group is not listed as a non-profit organization.5 In addition to “school choice,” “voucher” and “charter” were also used as search terms.

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achievement. As discussed earlier, the issue of performance pay, which in theory

encourages teachers to employ the most effective teaching methods available,

remains a controversial issue6. I searched for mentions of teacher recruitment and

retention as well, using the keywords “recruit,” “retain,” “attract” and “retention”.

The NCLB proposal sought to combine federal education programs to provide more

funding for teacher recruitment, while RTTT awards educational agencies that

recruit and retain teachers in hard to staff subject areas or school districts (Bush

2001, 12;U.S. Department of Education 2009, 10). Finally, increased professional

development or teacher training has been a focus of both administrations. Interest

groups were coded “yes” for this variable if the keywords “training,” “train,” or

“professional development” appeared in their letters. These efforts are another way

to place a high quality teacher in every classroom.

Strategies to Influence Education PolicyThe final section of the data set relates to the methods used by the interest

groups to influence education policy. Obviously, indicating their areas of interest

through a letter of support is one strategy used by interest groups. Another strategy

is to submit a policy proposal or letter to the president’s transition team. The

Obama administration made public all of the documents submitted to the transition

team on its website: www.change.gov. From that source, I searched for each

interest group’s name, and abbreviation if applicable, to ascertain whether or not

the interest group had also submitted a document to the Obama administration.

Several groups submitted multiple proposals to the transition; this is not indicated

in the data set. In addition, some groups submitted proposals unrelated to

education (i.e. business groups). These proposals were not coded as “yes” in the

6 “Pay-for-performance” and “merit pay” were an alternative term used in the search.

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data set. Occasionally, proposals were submitted on behalf of multiple groups. For

instance, the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) was

part of a large coalition of interest groups that submitted one request for the

administration to reform NCLB. In this instance, the ASCD was coded “yes” as

having submitted a proposal to the transition team.

As mentioned previously, a third way interest groups seek to influence public

policy is by having a member of their organization appointed to the transition team

or the administration. In this project, connections focused on the department of

Education. Therefore, lists of education agency review team and education policy

working group members were collected from both the Bush and Obama

administrations7. The same information was gathered for Department of Education

political appointees. For Bush, appointees from his first and second terms are

included. I conducted searches on the professional backgrounds of these individuals

to determine whether they had connections to any of the interest groups in the data

set. Only their previous ties to interest groups were considered for the data set; the

connections made after the individual left their position were not included in the

analysis. The organizations affiliated with an appointee or transition team member

in the Bush or Obama administration were coded “yes” for “connection.” If no

individual from the Bush or Obama transition teams or administrations was affiliated

with the organization it was coded “no.”

AnalysisThe 77 groups that submitted letters to the nomination hearings represent a

diverse selection of interest groups. A majority of the groups, about 55%, engage in

7 The names from the Obama transition teams were obtained from www.change.gov. The names from the Bush transition teams came from www.ombwatch.org.

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lobbying activity, and 10 groups, about 13%, also affiliate with a PAC. The data

suggests that groups engaging in lobbying did not equally support the three

nominees. Out of the letters of support written for Paige, over 85% came from

lobbying groups, while this percentage was much smaller for Spellings and Duncan

(about 58 and 46 percent, respectively). A chi-square test indicates this difference

to be statistically significant with value p= .05 (see Table 1). Also, Paige received a

higher percentage of his letters of support from PAC organizations; one-third of his

supporters had PACs, while less than 10% of Spellings’s and Duncan’s supporters

had PACs. This difference is also shown to be statistically significant with value p

= .05 (see Table 2).

The composition of this sample of interest groups is diverse; over 30% of the

groups are not comprised of members. Out of the 53 groups considered to be

membership-based, 33 represent individuals, while the other 20 represent

organizations. This breakdown is not significantly different from the composition

noted by Walker in the early 1990s. In his analysis of interest groups, 39% of

advocacy groups represented organizations, 32% represented individuals, and the

remaining 29% either had no members or a combination of organization and

individual members (as quoted in Andrews and Edwards 2004, 488). The data

confirms hypothesis 4, which speculated that groups with members utilize more

strategies to attain government access than those groups without members. A

comparison of member-based groups with those that do not have members shows

that a greater percentage of groups with members engage in lobbying than those

without. Three quarters of interest groups representing organizations engage in

lobbying and over half of groups representing individual members lobby. In

comparison, less than 40% of non-member groups engage in lobbying activity; a

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chi-square test reveals this difference to be statistically significant with value p

= .05 (see Table 3).

Non-member groups were also less likely to propose policies to the Obama

transition; only 8.3% submitted a document. In contrast, one-third of groups

composed of individual members and 60% of groups representing organizations

submitted a proposal (see Table 4). While the nature of the group’s membership

appears to influence the avenues in which interest groups seek access to the

government, it did not appear to influence the support of a particular nominee. The

largest percentage of Paige’s and Spellings’s letters came from groups with

individual members. Duncan received the greatest percentage of support from non-

member groups, but the differences between the three nominees are not great

enough to be statistically significant (see Table 5).

Although 77 organizations are included in the data set, only ten of the

interest groups have ties to transition or administration officials; six groups have

connections to the Bush administration, while four have connections to the Obama

administration. A chi-square test shows that a letter of support does not indicate

that a group had ties to the transition team, nor did it guarantee an affiliation with a

member of the administration. Less than 14% of interest groups that submitted

letters for the Spellings and Duncan hearings had connections to the administration.

This percentage was lower for groups submitting letters to the Paige hearing (less

than 7%), but the difference is not statistically significiant (see Table 6). This data

suggests early support for an administration and its Secretary of Education does not

guarantee a group’s involvement in the administration. In regards to the transition,

nearly one-third of interest groups submitted a letter or proposal to the Obama

transition. Out of that third, only two had connections within the transition team or

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administration. Submitting a policy proposal may increase a group’s odds of being

included in discussions, but it is not a gateway to political appointment.

Submitting Letters to Multiple HearingsOut of the 89 letters of support sent to the Senate committee, 52 letters were

submitted in support of Spellings, constituting over 58% of the total letters. For

Paige, 15 letters, nearly 17% of the total, were submitted, and Duncan received 22

letters, about 25% of the total. As mentioned earlier, this could be because

Spellings was known on the national stage, while Paige and Duncan came from local

school districts. Of the 77 organizations to submit letters of support, only two

groups—the Council of the Great City Schools (CGCS) and the National School

Boards Association (NSBA)—submitted letters for all three nomination hearings.

These two interest groups display similar characteristics. For instance, neither one

has a PAC, but both engage in lobbying. The data supports hypothesis 5, which

predicted that interest groups with diverse members are less likely to be partisan

and less likely to advocate for more partisan issues. Neither group openly issued

campaign endorsements in 2000, 2004, or 2008. Their nonpartisan nature may be

rooted in the groups’ memberships. The CGCS and NSBA represent groups

throughout the country, so to take a partisan position would likely create tension

within the groups. Also, neither group mentioned school choice or performance pay

plans, the two most controversial issues in the data set, in any of their letters. As

well as refraining from endorsements and more controversial issues, neither of the

groups had connections to the transition team members or the administrations.

Including the CGCS and NSBA, 10 groups submitted letters to more than one

nomination hearing, for a total of 22 letters. All of these groups are composed of

members; seven are composed of individual members, while three represent groups

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as members. The majority of these groups engage in lobbying activity, but do not

have an affiliated PAC. Only the teachers’ union (NEA and AFT) have established

PACs. The teachers’ unions are also the only interest groups out of the 10 that issue

formal endorsements; as is customary, the teachers’ unions supported Democratic

candidates in 2000, 2004, and 2008. It is interesting to note that the unions wrote

letters of support for both of Bush’s appointees. No assumptions can be made from

this observation, however, because any number of reasons could explain why a

letter of support was not issued for Duncan. Seven out of the ten groups submitted

proposals to the Obama transition, but only one of the ten had connections with

either of the administrations; Gabriella Gomez, Assistant Secretary for Legislation

and Congressional Affairs during the Obama administration, advocated on behalf of

the AFT.

In regards to the issues, when submitting letters for more than one nominee,

interest groups tended to tailor the letter to the background of the nominee and the

current political climate. Hypothesis 6 predicted that groups will mention issues with

which a nominee has experience. This hypothesis is supported in the letters of

support submitted by the Council of the Great City Schools. The CGCS mentioned

student achievement in both Paige’s and Duncan’s letter, but it was not mentioned

in Spellings’s. One possible explanation for this is that both Paige and Duncan came

to the Department of Education from urban school districts, where one of the main

focuses was to increase the achievement of students in under-performing schools.

Spellings, however, was nominated as Secretary of Education after serving as

Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy (Senior Staff: Margaret Spellings

2008).

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The political climate also shifted in the course of eight years. The Obama

administration advocated for innovation in order to sustain the increasing student

achievement begun under NCLB, as discussed in the conceptual framework.

Accordingly, the NSBA mentioned professional development, and teacher

recruitment and retention in their letter of support for Duncan. Also, during his

tenure as CEO of Chicago Public Schools Duncan was known for encouraging

change in the areas of teacher recruitment, retention, and compensation (Dillon

2008). These issues were not addressed when writing letters of support for Paige

and Spellings. Rather, the focus was on student achievement and accountability—

issues that were at the heart of the education debate during the Bush

administration.

Overall, the most common issues brought up by the interest groups were

accountability and student achievement. These principles have become less

partisan in recent years; they transcend presidential administrations, so regardless

of the nominee it is an idea worth supporting. Conversely, none of the organizations

addressed school choice or performance pay plans. This finding suggests that even

though both issues are considered to be more salient and partisan, few groups

actively push for change in these areas. This may be because supporters of the

status quo have been effective at supressing the issue and keeping it off the formal

agenda. The absence of these issues from the support letters may also show that

interest groups do not propose policy changes unless there is known support from

public officials. Further explanations for the presence, or absence, of the issues will

be discussed upon analyzing the data set as a whole.

The Influence of PACs, Lobbying, and Revenues

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The data set supports hypothesis 1, which predicted that advocacy groups

with PACs generate more revenue than those without PACs. Of the 65 groups for

which revenue data was available, eight were affiliated with PACs, and five of these

organizations fell into the upper quartile of the revenue spread. A chi-square test

reveals this difference to be statistically significant with value p =.10. The data also

supports hypothesis 2, which stated that groups with PACs are not more likely to

have connections to the transition team or administration. Out of the 10 groups with

PACs, only two (20%) had ties with the administration; approximately 12% of groups

without PACs had connections. The small sample does not lend itself to

generalization, nor is the difference statistically significant (see Table 7). Upon

analyzing the relationship between PACs and proposals sent to the transition team,

it may be that PACs seek to influence policymaking outside of the executive branch.

Any interest group had the opportunity to submit a proposal to the Obama

transition, and yet only half of PACs submitted a proposal. Granted, only 30% of

interest groups without PACs submitted a document to the transition, but once

again, a chi-square test shows this difference is not statistically significant with

value p=.10(see Table 8).

Similar results are found by examining the influence of interest groups that

lobby. As was the case for PACs, groups that lobby had higher revenue levels,

providing support for hypothesis 1a. Thirty eight groups from which revenue data

were available engaged in lobbying activity; 24 of those 38 groups, or 63%,

reported revenues above the median. Over 70% of groups with low revenue levels

did not engage in lobbying activity, a difference that is statistically significant with

value p =.10 (see Table 9). Also similar to PACs, the data lends support to

hypothesis 2a: relationship between lobbying activity and connections to the

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transition team or political appointees is not statistically significant. The 10 interest

groups with connections to the administrations were evenly split between groups

that engage in lobbying and those that do not (See Table 10). A similar breakdown

exists when looking at the connections in each of the administrations. Five

individuals in the Obama administration had connections to four of the interest

groups in the data set. Out of these four interest groups, two organizations engage

in lobbying (AFT and Ariel Invesments), while two do not (Advance Illinois and the

Aspen Institute). Eight individuals from the Bush administration had connections to

six interest groups listed in the data set. Three of those groups engage in lobbying

(the Business Roundtable, National Center for Family Literacy, and the Education

Finance Council ) and three do not (Manhattan Institute, SallieMae, and the Black

Alliance for Educational Options).

The relationship between groups that lobby and those that submitted proposals

to the Obama transition is statistically significant, however. Groups that lobby are

basically divided equally between submitting and not submitting to the transition;

21 groups submitted a proposal and 22 groups did not. In contrast, among groups

that do not lobby the overwhelming majority, over 90%, chose not to submit a

proposal to the transition. A chi-square test shows this to be significant with value

p=.01 (see Table 11). From this evidence, one can infer that these interest groups

use other access points to influence policymaking. Whether or not this leads them

to much success, however, has yet to be determined.

The data does not support the idea that groups with greater revenue will

have more access to the government. Ten groups had connections with the

administrations and revenue data was available for nine of those groups. Four of

these connections were to groups in the lower 50% of the revenue range, meaning

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that five groups with connections reported revenues greater than the median. A chi-

square test shows this to be not statistically significant, though this evidence should

be looked upon with caution because half of the cells from the cross tabulation had

observed counts less than the expected counts (see Table 12). In addition, there

appears to be no relationship between an interest group’s lobbying efforts, their

revenue, and their connections to the administration. Out of those groups with

connections to the administration and high levels of revenue, three participated in

lobbying, while two did not. On the other hand, for those groups with connections

but low levels of revenue, only one out of the four participates in lobbying (see

Table 13). More observations are needed to provide any conclusive results.

Hypothesis 3 stated that an interest group’s financial resources factor into

their decision to submit a policy proposal to the transition, and the data supports

this hypothesis. From the data collected, there is a steady increase in the

percentage of groups submitting proposals as the revenue levels increase. Among

those groups that sent in a proposal to the Obama transition team, nearly three-

quarters reported revenues above the median. Less than 40% of groups who

reported revenues less than the median submitted a policy proposal to the

transition team; this difference is statistically significant with value p = .05 (see

Table 14). As noted before, any organization was welcome to submit a document to

the Obama transition, so it was not as though resources bought access to that

approach. Groups with more resources may feel they have more invested in public

policies, and therefore, there is greater risk that policy change will not be in their

favor. Consequently, they are more willing to submit policy proposals. These

possibilities will be examined further upon analysis of the issues addressed in the

support letters.

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Education Policy IssuesAccountability and student achievement were the most common issues

brought up in the letters submitted to the nomination hearings. Twenty eight of the

letters (over 30% of the total) mentioned accountability, and 22 (nearly one quarter

of the total) addressed student achievement. Accountability was mentioned more

frequently in letters of support for Spellings: 20 of the 52 letters (38%) pointed out

accountability as an issue. For Paige and Duncan the percentages are smaller, but

not statistically significant (see Table 15). This indicates that accountability has

been considered an important issue in education policy from 2000 to 2010,

spanning across two presidential administrations led by the two political parties.

Accountability is a positive term that both sides of the political spectrum can

support— who doesn’t want to see the school system held responsible for ensuring

that students are provided an adequate education? Knowing that accountability

could be spun as a bipartisan issue, Bush used it as the centerpiece of his education

policy proposal during the 2000 campaign. He served as governor of Texas when

the state began using accountability measures to increase student achievement in

the 1990s, and in the campaign he focused on the issue to create a new brand of

conservatism—“compassionate conservatism.” It was this new way of thinking that

helped Bush beat Gore on the issue of education, which has typically been a

Democratic-dominated area (McGuinn 2006).

Student achievement is another issue supported by both political parties. A

chi-square test, however, shows a statistically significant difference between the

percentages of letters discussing student achievement among the three nominees.

Over half of the letters submitted in support of Paige raised the issue of

achievement, compared to 36% of letters written for Duncan and less than 12%

written for Spellings (see Table 16). This difference probably has less to do with the

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political affiliation of the nominee than his or her professional background, as

presumed in hypothesis 6. In their letter of support for Duncan, for instance, the

Council of the Great City Schools states, “Mr. Duncan has led the third largest

school system in the Nation since 2002” and “his efforts can be seen in better

schools and significantly enhanced student achievement and opportunity.” In their

endorsement of Paige, the American Association of School Administrators writes,

“Dr. Paige was an outstanding member of the Houston board of education” and “the

Congress and the administration will benefit from the advice of one who has used

federal funds to help improve student achievement.” Spellings, while just as

committed to student achievement as Paige and Duncan, did not have the

experience of running a school district that went through major reform.

Analyzing two more specific education issues, school choice and performance

pay, produced surprising results. I predicted in hypothesis 8 that groups supporting

school choice would be more likely to submit letters of support for Republican

nominees. The data sample does not indicate this to be the case, however. Out of

all the 89 letters submitted to the Senate committee, approximately 16% of the

letters brought up school choice. Broken down among the individual nominees, 13%

of Paige’s letters, 15% of Spellings’s letters, and 18% of Duncan’s letters addressed

school choice (see Table 17). One possible explanation for this finding is that while

school choice was a relatively new phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s, by the

beginning of the 21st century, the idea had become more commonplace and widely

accepted among all groups, evenly those traditionally opposed to the idea.

The results concerning performance pay were equally striking. The data runs

against hypothesis 9, which assumed that merit pay would be given greater

attention in letters of support submitted for Republican nominees. Out of the 89

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letters submitted by interest groups, only six brought up performance pay, and all

six of these were submitted in support of Duncan. After consideration of the results,

additional search terms were used to guarantee that the issue was being captured

by the search. “Incentive” (referring to teacher incentives) was added to the search,

but the results did not change. There are some limitations to this data because the

number of observations is so small; in fact, in the cross tabulation, 50% of the

observed counts were less than the expected counts.

To reconcile this issue, multiple issues were combined to create a new

variable, labeled “teacher issues.” This category includes mentions of performance

pay, as well as teacher training and professional development, and teacher

recruitment and retention. Some reform efforts have focused on recruiting the

brightest individuals to the teaching profession with the belief that they will be more

effective teachers. For those already in the classroom, training or professional

development is seen as a way to enhance teacher quality. Therefore, the variable

“teacher issues” encompasses all the issues that pertain to teacher quality. After

performing a chi-square test, the differences are still statistically significant (see

Table 18). Over 60% of the letters submitted for the Duncan hearing mentioned at

least one teacher issue, whereas for the Paige and Spelling hearings, less than 10%

of letters from the interest groups mentioned a teacher issue. Further analysis of

this variable shows there no dominant trends concerning the groups lobbying for

teacher issues. Of the 19 letters mentioning teacher issues, just under half were

submitted by groups that engage in lobbying. The groups are also nearly evenly

split between the two revenue levels: six letters came from groups in the lower

revenue bracket; eight came from those in the higher bracket (revenue data was

unavailable for two groups). Even the type of members among groups that

Page | 41

mentioned teacher issues is not drastically different; about 30% of non-member

groups mentioned teacher issues, compared to 22% and 12% for individual and

group members, respectively (see Table 19). From these findings it appears that

the characteristics of the interest groups are not behind the differences in concern

for teacher issues.

If the explanation behind these discrepancies is not reflective of the interest

group’s characteristics, then what factors contributed to the dramatic increase in

the awareness of teacher issues? Again, part of the relationship may stem from

Duncan’s background in Chicago Public Schools. In a speech to the NEA in July 2009,

Duncan recalled his experiences working with teachers in Chicago to implement

new policies; under his leadership, the district increased the number of National

Board Certified teachers and created a pilot performance pay system (Duncan

2009). Duncan’s personal experience in tackling teacher issues reflects a larger

shift in education policy. George Bush established, through No Child Left Behind, an

education policy that expected high levels of student achievement. State and local

education agencies explored various factors that contribute to a student’s success,

including the presence of a high-quality teacher, as the pressure to improve student

performance increased. As Libby Nelson remarked in an article in the Chronicle of

High Education, the awareness of the impact of teacher quality intensified around

2007 when Congress began debating NCLB’s renewal. Kevin Carey, policy director

of Education Sector, noted that the most contentious debates “were actually not

around the testing and the standards part” but “around the teacher-quality

provision” (as quoted in Nelson 2010). The treatment of teacher issues provides

another example of the influence of the political climate, the stances of public

Page | 42

officials, and a shifting policy paradigm on the actions taken by interest groups to

attain access to the government and the policymaking process.

Multivariate Regression AnalysisI used several multivariate regressions to allow for comparison with the chi-

square tests as well as to examine in further detail the variables contributing to an

interest group’s selection of nomination hearing strategy. As noted previously, 10

groups submitted letters of support to more than one hearing, raising the question

as to whether groups that submit multiple letters address the same concerns with

each nominee. I created a new variable, “multiple submissions,” with organizations

coded “yes” if they submitted to more than one nominee, and coded “no” if they

submitted a letter in support to only one hearing. I also transformed the variable

“hearing” into a dichotomous variable: “Republican” represented letters in support

of Paige or Spellings, and “Democrat” represented letters in support of Duncan. I

named the transformed variable “political party”.

The first regression uses the interest group as the unit of observation. It tests

the relationship between the interest group’s characteristics and their decision to

submit more than one letter. The model is represented by the following equation:

Submission of letter to multiple hearings = βpolitical party + βmember +

βPAC + βlobbying+ βconstant

The results from this regression are severely limited by the data set. To

create a more complete picture, more cases would need to be included from other

nomination hearings. In the regression, “Republican” represents political party;

therefore, the results model the relationship between the dependent variable and

the group’s decision to submit letters to Republican nominees only. The model

reports the relationship between the political party and the group’s decision to

Page | 43

submit letters to multiple hearings to be statistically significant. Duncan, however,

is the only Democratic nominee in the data set so more hearings from Democratic

nominees would be needed to provide any solid results. In addition, the regression

showed that the relationship between a group’s members and their decision to

submit letters to multiple hearings is not statistically significant (see Table 20).

These results seem to go against hypothesis 4, which predicted that groups with

members seek to use as many opportunities as possible to gain access to the

government. When looking closer at the data though, I found that within the data

set, every group that chose to submit multiple letters of support has members.

There may be a statistically significant relationship among these two variables, but

more observations are required to reach any sound conclusions.

The second series of logistic regressions is composed of five models with the

letter serving as the unit of observation. Each regression tests the variables that

contribute to which education issues are mentioned in the letters of support. The

independent variables entered into the model include political party8; although the

political affiliation of the nominee may have an impact on the issues brought up by

interest, it cannot be assumed that this affiliation is the sole factor behind the

issues mentioned in the letters. To analyze in greater detail how the traits of the

interest groups factor into which issues they bring up, I included three interest

group characteristics as independent variables: members, PAC, and lobbying9. The

model is as follows:

Education Issue = βpolitical party + βmembers + βPAC + βlobbying +

βconstant

8 To clarify the political party taken into account, the results show the relationship between the dependent variable and a Republican nominee.9 Table 21a provides a breakdown of the expected relationships between the independent and dependent variables.

Page | 44

The results suggest the political party of the nominee and the lobbying

activity of the interest group relate to the decision of interest groups to raise

concerns about “accountability” when controlling for other factors (see Table 21b).

When submitting a letter to a Republican nominee, the probability that the interest

group wrote about accountability increased by a significant percentage (β = 1.145,

p < .10). Interestingly, a bivariate analysis did not indicate the differences in the

percentage of letters mentioning accountability to be statistically significant among

the three nominees, but when other variables are taken into account, there does

appear to be a significant relationship. The results are to be expected when taken in

conjunction with the political climate during the time of the nominations, as

accountability was a larger issue in the Bush administration than in later years. The

model also indicates that interest groups engaging in lobbying are significantly less

likely to mention accountability (β = -1.044, p < .05). This does not mean that

accountability is not of interest to groups that lobby, but it may suggest those

groups chose to bring up more specific, and possibly more controversial, concerns.

The National Association of Charter School Authorizers, for instance, mentioned

accountability in their letter in support of Spellings, but clearly their focus is on

promoting the benefits of charter schools and emphasizing how school choice can

contribute to increased accountability.

Results from the regression on “achievement” show few significant

relationships between the issue and the independent variables. When the hearings

are separated according to Republicans and Democrats, there is not a significant

relationship between the variable “political party” and achievement when

controlling for other variables. The lack of a strong partisan relationship suggests

that achievement is a common issue. Within the data set, it was the second most

Page | 45

referenced issue, behind accountability; it was included in approximately 25% of the

letters. The issue lays at the core of education reform; essentially all the other

issues—increased accountability measures, school choice, better quality teachers—

are the ways to reach higher levels of student achievement. Debate in the

education sector is not over whether students should be achieving more, but how

that will happen.

Similarly, the model on “school choice” does not find any statistically

significant relationships. The results must be interpreted with caution because the

number of letters that brought up school choice is relatively small (14 of the 89

letters). The model shows, for instance, a very large decline in the probability of

mentioning school choice among groups that have PACs (β = -19.333). There may

be a genuine relationship between these two variables, but more observations are

needed to provide sufficient evidence. It is interesting to note that neither of the

three interest group characteristics appear to have any relationship with mentioning

school choice. Perhaps the only characteristic that connects these groups are their

mutual interests in the issue.

The regression on “teacher issues” shows a strong relationship between the

issue and the political affiliation of the nominee. When submitting a letter of support

to a Republican nominee, the probability that the interest group will mention

teacher issues drops significantly (β = -3.043, p < .01). This is to be expected, in

light of the bivariate analyses, which showed that Duncan received the majority of

letters mentioning teacher issues. The results also provide support to hypothesis 6,

which predicted that issues would be tailored to the experience of the nominee. As

was discussed previously, during his time as CEO of Chicago Public Schools, Duncan

placed a lot of effort on working with teachers to provide better training and a new

Page | 46

compensation system. The results also seem sensible considering that Democrats

are widely known as being associated with labor groups, and teacher groups are

one of the largest constituencies within that industry. It should come as no surprise

then that those advocating better conditions for teachers would turn to Democratic

nominees.

I decided to run one final regression testing the variable “performance pay”

against the independent variables. I discussed earlier the limitations that came with

the performance pay variable, particularly relating to the small number of

observations (the issue was brought up in only 6 of the 89 letters). The variable

“teacher issues,” while solving the size problem, had a different limitation: because

it combines multiple issues, the relationship between the issue and the interest

group characteristics may not be accurate. For instance, organizations that have

members may be in support of training and retaining the best teachers, but they

may not support performance pay plans (e.g. the NEA and AFT support professional

development but are strongly opposed to performance pay). The results from the

regression support this theory; groups that have members were significantly less

likely to mention performance pay in their letters of support (β = -2.293, p < .10).

Upon finding that membership plays a significant part in the determining

whether an interest group will mention performance pay, I broke down the variable

“members” to see if the specific kind of members had an influence. I separated the

variable into three categories: those involved in K-12 education, including teachers,

principals, and school boards; other groups, such as business organizations, civil

rights groups, and associations for higher education; and groups without members.

The regression that followed did not produce any significant results. This most likely

occurred because only six groups in the data set mentioned performance pay. Of

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these six groups, only the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) has

members. For this group, education is not the main focus, but is one of the many

areas in which they promote greater civil rights and equal opportunity (Education

2010). These results support hypothesis 5, which predicted that groups with

members would be less likely to address controversial issues. Teacher issues on the

whole may not be controversial, explaining why there was essentially no

relationship between a group’s members and its mention of teacher issues, but

performance pay remains contentious.

After noting that the political affiliation of the nominee had a relationship with

the mentioning of some education issues, I conducted another series of regressions

with the letter as the unit of observation. In this set, the political party variable was

broken down into “Paige” and “Spelling.” For the variable “Paige,” I coded letters

submitted to his nomination as “yes” and those submitted to other hearings, I

coded as “no.” For “Spellings,” letters submitted to her nomination were coded

“yes” and those submitted to Paige or Duncan were coded “no.” The regression

equation is as follows:

Education Issue = βPaige + βSpellings + βmembers + βPAC + βlobbying +

βconstant

The results from the regressions provide further support for hypothesis 6,

which stated that interest groups tailor the issues mentioned to the nominee. The

regression for “accountability” showed that when controlling for other factors,

groups that submitted a letter to Spellings are significantly more likely to mention

accountability(β = 1.196, p < .10; see Table 21c), but this is not the case for those

who submitted a letter to Paige. This reflects the political climate of the time; when

Spellings was nominated in 2005, NCLB and its accountability measures were in full

Page | 48

swing. Spellings also had experience working with accountability measures. As

Senator Hutchinson stated during Spellings’s nomination hearing, during her time

as domestic policy advisor to President Bush, she helped implement education,

health and labor policies. In addition, she worked to implement accountability

measures in Texas when President Bush served as governor of the state (U.S.

Congress. Senate 2005). The “achievement” regression indicated that groups

submitting letters of support for Spellings were significantly less likely to mention

achievement when controlling for other factors (β = -1.540, p <.05). As noted

earlier, this may be due to the fact that Paige and Duncan, as the head of two of the

largest city school districts in the country, focused heavily on student achievement

prior to becoming Secretary of Education. Lastly, for the “teacher issues”

regression, the model showed that the relationship between teacher issues and the

nominee remained the same from the previous regression. Interest groups were still

significantly less likely to mention teacher issues when submitting letters to Paige

and Spellings (for Paige β = -3.128, p <.05; for Spellings β = -3.023, p <.01).

Distinguishing between the Republican nomineees provided further evidence that

interest groups cater to the priorities of the nominee and the administration.

Page | 49

ConclusionsThere exists a widely held assumption, promoted by the mass media, that

lobbyists can get whatever policy change they want by simply spending enough

money and schmoozing enough politicians. What is not widely forecast, however, is

the reality that many policy advocates spend years fighting for their issues only to

reach a stalemate with the opposition (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 6). This struggle

for significant policy change reflects the situation within the education sector as

well. A large part of this challenge in reforming education comes from the actors

involved. Interest groups involved in formulating education policy come from many

different fields, from labor unions to big business to single-issue advocacy groups,

all with a different goal in mind for the future of education. Secondly, within the

government, a fine line exists between the responsibility of the local and state

governments and the influence of the federal government. An increasing

percentage of education funding comes from the federal level, but is not always

accompanied with increased federal regulation; state and local districts are

reluctant to yield power to the federal Department of Education. Even when reform

efforts develop amidst the complicated network of interests with a stake in

education, the result is oftentimes not too far from the status quo.

To study the influences of interest groups on federal education policy, I

analyzed the letters of support submitted for three Secretary of Education

nominees: Rod Paige, Margaret Spellings, and Arne Duncan. I used the sample of 89

letters, coming from 77 organizations, to test 10 hypotheses relating to the groups’

characteristics, their strategies in governmental relations, and their advocacy of

certain key education issues. I consulted previous research in the area of interest

Page | 50

group politics to compose hypotheses tailored to my data set, drawn exclusively

from the education sector. Many of my results aligned with the findings of other

scholars. My analysis, for instance, found that financial resources do matter in that

they provide the group with the ability to create PACs and employ lobbyists, but

resources do not guarantee appointments within the presidential transition team or

administration; the Policy Agendas Project made similar conclusions. Recognizing

the limitations of my data, I also concluded that interest groups with members

typically use more strategies and avoid more controversial issues than groups

without members. These findings are not surprising when taking into account David

Truman’s and Mancur Olson’s works on the development and purpose of interest

groups.

After analyzing the traits of the interest groups within the dataset, I focused

on the education issues presented within the letters. Some of the results were to be

expected; for example, interest groups brought up more general issues, such as

accountability and student achievement, with greater frequency than more focused

issues, such as performance pay and school choice. Unexpectedly, interest groups

addressed school choice with nearly equal frequency among the three hearings; I

had originally hypothesized that groups would present the issue more often for

Republican nominees. I also anticipated that letters advocating performance pay

would be submitted to Republican nominees. The data showed the exact opposite

though: interest groups addressed performance pay exclusively in letters submitted

to the Duncan hearing.

From these results, I reached two conclusions. The first is that the nominee’s

background plays an important role in shaping the education policies mentioned in

the letters of support. In the case of performance pay, it appears that Duncan’s

Page | 51

experience working with Chicago public school teachers to create performance pay

systems may have encouraged interest groups to broach the topic. Secondly, just

as in other sectors, the opportunity for education policy change is limited by the

gradual shift in the salience and controversy surrounding reform issues. In the

1980s and 1990s, public officials fought over the issue of school choice, but by the

turn of the century, liberals and conservatives alike viewed school choice as a viable

option in improving the nation’s schools. Similarly, accountability measures began

in Texas during the 1990s, and by the end of the George W. Bush administration the

approach had become the centerpiece for federal education policy.

Further research could provide stronger support for these conclusions.

Analyzing the hearings from previous administrations would provide a more

complete account of the development of education policy throughout the decades.

For instance, Congress approved the Elementary and Secondary Education Act

under President Johnson. Were there any specific issues mentioned in letters of

support for his Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare nominee? Also, the

Department of Education became its own cabinet position under President Carter;

what issues were addressed in the hearing for the first Secretary of Education? As

well as looking at the development of education issues over time, it would be

interesting to see if interest groups express different priorities in other venues. How

did the issues presented to the Obama transition team, or the feedback submitted

as public comments on the Race to the Top regulations, compare to those

mentioned in the letters of support? Did the interest groups themselves display

different characteristics? Knowing that the education sector is composed of

numerous interest groups, representing diverse constituencies and presenting

Page | 52

different priorities, my research sheds light on only a small part of the role of

interest groups in the education policymaking process.

Page | 53

Appendix 1.

Table 1. Hearing

Duncan Paige Spellings

Total

Does not engage in lobbying

12 (54.5%) 2 (13.3%) 22 (42.3%) 36 (40.4%)

Engages in lobbying 10 (45.5%) 13 (86.7%) 30 (57.7%) 53 (59.6%)Total 22 (100.0%) 15 (100.0%) 52 (100.0%) 89 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 6.468; Significance: .039

Table 2.Hearing

Duncan Paige Spellings TotalDoes not have a PAC 20 (90.9%) 10 (66.7%) 47 (90.4%) 77 (86.5%)Has a PAC 2 (9.1%) 5 (33.3%) 5 (9.6%) 12 (13.5%)Total 22 (100.0%) 15 (100.0%) 52 (100.0%) 89 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 6.097; Significance: .047

Table 3.Membership

Group Individual Non TotalDoes not engage in Lobbying

5 (25.0%) 14 (42.4%) 15 (62.5%) 34 (44.2%)

Engages in lobbying 15 (75.0%) 19 (57.6%) 9 (37.5%) 43 (55.8%)Total 20 (100.0%) 33 (100.0%) 24 (100.0%) 77 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 6.292; Significance: .043

Table 4.Membership

Group Individual Non TotalDid not submit transition proposal

8 (40.0%) 22 (66.7%) 22 (91.7%) 52 (67.5%)

Submitted transition proposal

12 (60.0%) 11 (33.3%) 2 (8.3%) 25 (32.5%)

Total 20 (100.0%) 33 (100.0%) 24 (100.0%) 77 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 13.301; Significance: .001

Table 5.Hearing

Duncan Paige Spellings TotalGroup Membership 5 (22.7%) 4 (26.7%) 16 (30.8%) 25 (28.1%)Individual Membership 8 (36.4%) 10 (66.7%) 22 (42.3%) 40 (44.9%)

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Non Membership 9 (40.9%) 1 (6.7%) 14 (26.9%) 24 (27.0%)Total 22 (100.0%) 15 (100.0%) 52 (100.0%) 89 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 6.263; Significance: .180

Table 6.Hearing

Duncan Paige Spellings TotalNo connections to transition team or political appointee

19 (86.4%) 14 (93.3%) 45 (86.5%) 78 (87.6%)

Connection to transition team or political appointee

3 (13.6%) 1 (6.7%) 7 (13.5%) 11 (12.4%)

Total 22 (100.0%) 15 (100.0%) 52 (100.0%) 89 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: .540; Significance: .763

Table 7.Does not have

a PAC Has a PAC Total

No connections to transition team or political appointee

59 (88.1%) 8 (80.0%) 67 (87.0%)

Connection to transition team or political appointee

8 (11.9%) 2 (20.0%) 10 (13.0%)

Total 67 (100.0%) 10 (100.0%) 77 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: .500; Significance: .479

Table 8.Does not have

a PAC Has a PAC Total

Did not submit transition proposal

47 (70.1%) 5 (50.0%) 52 (67.5%)

Submitted transition proposal

20 (29.9%) 5 (50.0%) 25 (32.5%)

Total 67 (100.0%) 10 (100.0%) 77 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 1.611; Significance: .204

Table 9.Does not engage in lobbying

Engages in Lobbying

Total

Low Revenue 19 (70.4%) 14 (36.8%) 33 (50.8%)High Revenue 8 (29.6%) 24 (63.2%) 32 (49.2%)

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Total 27 (100.0%) 38 (100.0%) 65 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 7.099; Significance: .003

Table 10.Does not engage in lobbying

Engages in Lobbying

Total

No connections to transition team or political appointee

29 (85.3%) 38 (88.4%) 67 (87.0%)

Connection to transition team or political appointee

5 (11.9%) 5 (20.0%) 10 (13.0%)

Total 34 (100.0%) 43 (100.0%) 77 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: .159; Significance: .690

Table 11.Does not engage in lobbying

Engages in Lobbying

Total

Did not submit transition proposal

31 (91.2%) 21 (48.8%) 52 (67.5%)

Submitted transition proposal

3 (8.8%) 22 (51.2%) 25 (32.5%)

Total 34 (100.0%) 43 (100.0%) 77 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 15.523; Significance: .000

Table 12.No connections

to transition team or political

appointee

Connection to transition team

or political appointee

Total

Low Revenue 29 (51.8%) 4 (44.4%) 33 (50.8%)High Revenue 27 (48.2%) 5 (55.6%) 32 (49.2%)Total 56 (100.0%) 9 (100.0%) 65 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 2.424; Significance: .120

Table 13.No connections

to transition team or political

appointee

Connection to transition team or political

appointee

Total

Low Revenue

Does not engage in

16 (84.2%) 3 (15.8%) 19 (100.0%)

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lobbyingEngages in lobbying

13 (92.9%) 1 (7.1%) 14 (100.0%)

High Revenue

Does not engage in lobbying

6 (75.0%) 2 (25.0%) 8 (100.0%)

Engages in lobbying

21 (87.5%) 3 (12.5%) 24 (100.0%)

Total 56 (86.2%) 9 (13.8%) 65 (100.0%)Low Revenue Chi-Square Value: .566; Significance: .452High Revenue Chi-Square Value: .711; Significance: .399

Table 14.Did not submit

transition proposal

Submitted transition proposal

Total

Low Revenue 27 (64.3%) 6 (26.1%) 33 (50.8%)High Revenue 15 (35.7%) 17 (73.9%) 32 (49.2%)Total 42 (100.0%) 23 (100.0%) 65 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 8.676; Significance: .003

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Table 15.Hearing

Duncan Paige Spellings TotalNo mention of accountability

18 (81.8%) 11 (73.3%) 32 (61.5%) 61 (69.5%)

Mentions accountability 4 (18.2%) 4 (26.7%) 20 (38.5%) 28 (31.5%)Total 22 (100.0%) 15 (100.0%) 52 (100.0%) 89 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 3.141; Significance: .208

Table 16.Hearing

Duncan Paige Spellings TotalNo mention of achievement

14 (63.6%) 7 (46.7%) 46 (88.5%) 68 (76.3%)

Mentions achievement 8 (36.4%) 8 (53.3%) 6 (11.5%) 22 (24.7%)Total 22 (100.0%) 15 (100.0%) 52 (100.0%) 89 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 13.058; Significance: .001

Table 17.Hearing

Duncan Paige Spellings TotalNo mention of school choice

18 (81.8%) 13 (86.7%) 44 (84.6%) 75 (84.3%)

Mentions school choice 4 (18.2%) 2 (13.3%) 8 (15.4%) 14 (15.7%)Total 22 (100.0%) 15 (100.0%) 52 (100.0%) 89 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: .169; Significance: .919

Table 18.Hearing

Duncan Paige Spellings TotalNo mention of teacher issues

8 (36.4%) 14 (93.3%) 48 (92.3%) 70 (78.7%)

Mentions teacher issues 14 (63.6%) 1 (6.7%) 4 (7.7%) 19 (21.3%)Total 22 (100.0%) 15 (100.0%) 52 (100.0%) 89 (100.0%)Chi-Square Value: 31.132; Significance: .000

Table 19.Membership

Group Individual Non TotalNo mention of teacher issues

22 (88.0%) 31 (77.5%) 24 (70.8%) 70 (78.7%)

Mentions teacher issues 3 (12.0%) 9 (22.5%) 7 (29.2%) 19 (21.3%)Total 25 (100.0%) 40 (100.0%) 31

(100.0%)77 (100.0%)

Chi-Square Value: 2.206; Significance: .332

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Table 20. Organizations Submitting Multiple LettersMultiple Submissions

Coefficient βRepublican (vs. Democrat)

-1.590**(.769)

Members (vs. No Members)

19.715(8035.759)

PAC (vs. No PAC) .080(.995)

Lobbying (vs. Does Not Lobby)

1.123(.921)

Constant -.012(.990)

Pseudo R2 .302Observations 77*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 21a. Letters Mentioning Education Issues: Expected ResultsAccountability

Achievement

School Choice

Teacher Issues

Performance Pay

Republican

+ No Expectation

+ No Expectation

+

Paige + + + No Expectation

+

Spellings + No Expectation

+ No Expectation

+

Members + + - - -PAC No

ExpectationNo Expectation

No Expectation

No Expectation

No Expectation

Lobbying No Expectation

No Expectation

No Expectation

No Expectation

No Expectation

Table 21b. Letters Mentioning Education Issues: 4 VariablesAccountability

Achievement

School Choice

Teacher Issues

Performance Pay

Republican

1.145*(.643)

-.901(.561)

.159(.703)

-3.043***

(.656)

19.715(4444.59

5)Members -.033

(.558).416

(.621)-.634

(.648).001

(.736)-2.293*(1.274)

PAC .413(.713)

-.697(.855)

-19.333(11394.7

03)

.094(1.037)

-16.078(9462.20

3)Lobbying -1.044**

(.523).391

(.556)-.836

(.636)-.261

(.705)-1.100

(1.347)Constant -.644

(.639)-1.724**

(.801)-21.451

(11394.7.505

(1.017)-38.718

(10454.076)

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03)Pseudo R2 .106 .060 .145 .419 .641Observations

89 89 89 89 89

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

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Table 21c. Letters Mentioning Education Issues: 5 VariablesAccountability

Achievement

School Choice

Teacher Issues

Performance Pay

Paige .823(.883)

.946(.801)

.788(1.097)

-3.128**(1.182)

-18.048(9573.62

4)Spellings 1.196*

(.647)-1.540**

(.639).086

(.720)-

3.023***(.690)

-19.939(5076.75

7)Members .005

(.563)-.139

(.663)-.742

(.677).006

(.736)-2.293*(1.274)

PAC .503(.735)

-1.434(.960)

-19.509(11315.1

86)

.110(1.055)

-16.084(9487.31

2)Lobbying -1.004

(.527).172

(.612)-.910

(.653)-.255

(.708)-1.100

(1.347)Constant -1.662

(.902)-1.738

(1.044)-21.905

(11315.186)

.525(1.043)

-19.009(9487.31

2)Pseudo R2 .110 .0237 .154 .419 .641Observations

89 89 89 89 89

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

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Appendix 2. Explanation of Variables

Variable Description FrequencyHearing To which hearing the interest

group submitted a letter (Paige, Spellings, or Duncan)

Paige: 15/89 letters (16.9%)Spellings: 52/89 letters (58.4%)Duncan: 22/89 letters (24.7%)

PAC Dichotomous; yes or no: does the group have an affiliated PAC as of 2010?

Yes: 10/77 organizations (13.0%)

Lobbying Dichotomous; yes or no: did the group submit a lobbying disclosure report to the Senate’s Office of Public Records from 1998 through 2009?

Yes: 42/77 organizations (54.5%)

Membership Whether the group is composed of mainly individual members (“individual”), members representing organizations (“group”), or no members (“non”)

Individual: 33/77 organizations (42.9%)Group: 20/77 organizations (26.0%)Non: 24/77 organizations (31.2%)

Accountability Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter mention accountability?

Yes: 28/89 letters (31.5%)

Achievement Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter mention student achievement?

Yes: 22/89 letters (24.7%)

Performance Pay Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter mention performance pay for teachers?

Yes: 6/89 letters (6.7%)

School Choice Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter mention school choice?

Yes: 14/89 letters (15.7%)

Teacher Issues Dichotomous; yes or no: did the letter mention performance pay, teacher training and professional development, or teacher recruitment and retention?

Yes: 19/89 letters (21.3%)

Connections Dichotomous; yes or no: did a member of either transition teams or administrations have previous connections with the group?

Yes: 10/77 organizations (13.0%)

Transition Dichotomous; yes or no: did a group submit a document to the Obama transition team?

Yes: 25/77 organizations (32.5%)

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Revenue Dichotomous; of the groups for which data was available, did the group have a reported revenue below (“low”) or above (“high”) the median ($7.7 million)?

Low: 33/65 organizations (50.8%)High: 32/65 organizations (49.2%)No data: 12/77 organizations (15.6%)

Multiple Submissions

Dichotomous; yes or no: did the group submit a letter to more than one hearing?

Yes: 10/77 organizations (13.0%)

Political Party Dichotomous; was the letter submitted to a Republican or Democratic nominee?

Republican: 67/89 letters (75.3%)Democratic: 22/89 letters (24.7%)

Members Dichotomous; yes or no: does the group have members?

Yes: 53/77 organizations (68.8%)

Explanation of Coding

Concept Keyword/ Phrase Example in Confirmation Hearing

Accountability “accountability” “Dr. Paige has demonstrated that accountability and rigorous expectations can indeed produce results for all students…”

Student Achievement “achievement” “…his relentless determination has produced some of the most impressive achievement gains of any major city school system in the nation.”

Performance Pay “performance pay”“pay-for-performance”“merit pay”

“…Mr. Duncan instituted significant reforms for the Chicago teachers’ corps, including pay-for-performance salary incentives…”

School Choice “school choice”“charter”“voucher”

“…she played key roles in passing the No Child Left Behind legislation as well as Washington, D.C.’s pilot voucher program.”

Teacher Training “training”“train”“professional development”

“…increase our focus on improved professional development for our educators…”

Teacher Recruitment and Retention

“recruit”“attract”“retain”“retention”

“…the nation faces a host of other challenges that are outside of the scope of NCLB; these include better working conditions and compensation to attract and keep good

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teachers…”

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