Swiss politics and political institutions: 2a) Federalism and Municipalities

Swiss politics and political institutions:

2a) Federalism and Municipalities

Prof. Dr. Andreas Ladner

iMPA 2013

| ©IDHEAP – [email protected] | | 21/04/23 |

What is federalism all about?

Federalism is about organizing a territory

Federalism is about dealing with cultural differences

Federalism is about dealing with economic differences

Federalism is about organizing public services


Territorial Challenges


26 cantons and 2596 municipalities


Inhabitants (7.8 Million)

ZH 1'211'647 BS 187'667BE 943'696 GR 186'744VD 620'294 NE 165'731AG 544'306 SZ 130'232

SG 449'399 ZG 99'388GE 408'820 SH 73'305LU 347'209 JU 68'794TI 310'215 AR 53'515VS 276'170 GL 38'546BL 260'036 NW 38'000SO 244'015 UR 35'246FR 236'339 OW 32'414TG 227'306 AI 15'021

Quelle: www.badac.ch


A center (capital city)?


Cultural differences?

The „Röschtigraben“ The „Spaghettigraben“


Source: Michael Hermann, Heiri

Leutholt, sotomo


(Economic) Differences

Alp Furna (GR)Zürich Paradeplatz (CS, UBS)

BaselBerner Seeland


The rich and the poor


Who does what?


Program

Nation building without federalism would have been impossible in

Switzerland.

Since then, however, things have changed considerably. The nation

state has become much more powerful compared to the federal

units, and complex patterns of cooperation emerged.

From the point of view of a political scientist we shall briefly analyze

the functions and the functioning of Swiss federalism.

A special emphasis is put on the way Swiss federalism copes with

challenges such as the increasing entanglement of the different

layers of the state when it comes to the provision and funding of

services, the growing disparities among the federal units, and the

loss of sovereignty of the nation state due to globalization.


Further readings

Ladner, Andreas (2010). "Intergovernmental relations in

Switzerland: towards a new concept for allocating tasks and

balancing differences", in: Michael J. Goldsmith and Edward C. Page

(eds.). Changing Government Relations in Europe: From Localism to

Intergovernmentalism. Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political

Science. pp. 210-227. ISBN13 978-0-415-54846-5.

Ladner, Andreas (2009). "Local government and metropolitan

regions in federal systems: Switzerland", in: Kincaid, John, Helen S.

Meyner and Nico Steytler (eds.) A Global Dialogue on Federalism,

Volume 6: Local Government and Metropolitan Regions in Federal

Systems. McGill Queens University Press. p. 329-362. ISBN 978-0-

773-5356-33.


Content Block 2: Part 1: Federalism

1. Preliminary remarks about Swiss Federalism

2. Comparative Federalism

3. Swiss Federalism: instruments and functioning

4. A successful reform of Swiss Federalism


1. Preliminary remarks about Swiss Federalism


Cantonal identities


My conclusion

If there are no differences there is no need for

federalism.

Federalism means accepting diversity.

Do you agree?


2. Comparative Federalism


Confederations or unitarist states

Alliance Federalism Unitary state

Centrifugal state Centripetal state

Co-operation Objectives: autonomy and diversity

Objectives: integration and

equality of living conditions

Centralized organization in

all domains

Single purpose alliance (e.g. Nato)

Confederation (e.g. EU)

Confederal federal state (e.g. Canada, Switzerland, US)

Unitary federal state (e.g. Germany, Austria)

Decentralized unitary state (e.g. France)

Centralized unitary state with

centralized steering unit (communist republics)

Quelle: Stalder, Kurt (1999). Föderalismus und Finanzausgleich. Schriftenreihe der Fachgruppe für kantonale Finanzfragen. Solothurn: Verlag FkF.


Federalism and devolved governments

In confederal systems, the central government is a legal creation of the constituent units (see the two oldest countries US and CH). Important here is the autonomous constitutional existence.

In unitary systems, any regional governments are legal creations of the central institutions (devolution). Some unitary countries are more decentralized that some federations.

Unitary countries such as Colombia, Italy and Japan have relatively strong regional governments. France and Peru are moving towards significant devolution to elected regional governments. In some countries such as the UK there are some regions asking for devolution.


Federalist countries


Importance of Federalism

40 per cent of the world’s population

almost all democracies with large areas and/or populations are

federal

democratization brings along federalism (Argentina, Brazil,

Mexico)

with Belgium, Ethiopia and Spain formerly unitary countries

become federalist

Federalism has been adopted in post-conflict democracies

(Bosnia, Democratic republic of Congo, Iraq, Sudan, South Africa)

The EU has a number of federal characteristics

Anderson (2008:1ff)


About 25 states

Belgien, 3 Regionen, 3 Gemeinschaften, Verfassung von 1994

Kanada, 10 Provinzen, 3 Territorien, Verfassung von 1867/1982

Äthiopien, 9 Bundesstaaten, 2 eigenständige Städte, Verfassung von 1995

Bosnien und Herzegowina, 2 Entitäten (innerhalb der bosniakisch-kroatischen Entität "Föderation Bosnien und Herzegowina" 10 Kantone)

Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, 50 Bundesstaaten, 1 Bundesdistrikt, Verfassung von 1787

Komoren, 3 Territorien, Verfassung von 2001

Deutschland, 16 Länder, Grundgesetz von 1949

Nigeria, 36 Bundesstaaten, 1 Territorium, Verfassung von 1979

Österreich, 9 Bundesländer, Verfassung von 1929.

Mexiko, 31 Bundesstaaten, 1 Territorium, Verfassung von 1917

Südafrika, 9 Provinzen, Verfassung von 1996

Schweiz, 26 Kantone (bis 2000: 20 Kantone und 6 Halbkantone), Verfassung von 1848 (Totalrevisionen von 1874 und 1999)

Spanien, 17 autonome Gemeinschaften, zwei Autonome Städte (Ceuta, Melilla)

Saint Kitts and Nevis Indien, 28 Staaten, 7 Territorien, Verfassung von 1950

Serbien Montenegro Venezuela, 23 Bundesstaaten, 1 Bundesdistrikt, Verfassung von 1999

Pakistan, 4 Provinzen, 2 Territorien, Verfassung von 1973

Russland, 21 Teilrepubliken, 6 Regionen, 49 Gebiete, 2 Städte föderaler Bedeutung, 1 autonomes Gebiet, 10 autonome Bezirke und 7 Föderationsbezirke, Verfassung von 1993

Argentinien, 23 Provinzen, 1 Bundesdistrikt, Verfassung von 1994

Brasilien, 26 Bundesstaaten, 1 Bundesdistrikt, Verfassung von 1988

Irak, 3 Bundesstaaten, Verfassung von 2005

Australien, 6 Bundesstaaten, 2 Territorien, 3 Außengebiete, Verfassung

Vereinigte Arabische Emirate, 7 Emirate,


Saint Kitts and Nevis


India


29

La Belgique


Kanada


Common characteristics

At least two orders of government, one for the whole country and one for the regions with different elections

A written constitution with some parts which cannot be amended by the federal government alone

A constitution that formally allocates legislative and fiscal powers to the two orders of government ensuring some genuine autonomy for each order

Usually some special arrangements in the upper houses for the representation of the constituents units giving to smaller units greater weight than they would merit

An umpire procedure to rule on constitutional disputes between governments

A set of processes and institutions for facilitating or conducting relations between governments

Anderson, George (2008). Federalism: an Introduction. Forum of Federations, Ontario: Oxford University Press.


Names of the constituent units

States: Australia, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Malaysia,

Mexico, Nigeria, US

Provices: Argentina, Canada, Pakistan, South Africa

Länder: Austria, Germany

Cantons: Switzerland

Regions, communities: Belgium

Autonomous communities: Spain

Regions, republics, autonomous areas, territories, cities:

Russia


Distinctive characteristics

A. Territorial structure, disparities in terms of population and economy

B. Division of tasks and services between the different levels

C. Income and spending of the different levels

D. Tax autonomy, tax system, formal and material harmonisation

E. Role of the federal units in the decision making process of national

level

F. Financial disparities between the federal units and mechanism of

equalization

Stalder 1999: 3


The Constituent Units

From 2 (St. Kitts and Nevis, Bosnia-Herzegowina) to 50 (USA) or 86

(Russia)

The largest unit may be bigger than many countries (Uttar Pradesh in

India: 160 million people, California: 34 million)

Some units may be very tiny: Nevis has only 12,000 people, AI has

15,000.

In some countries one or two units encompass the majority of the

population (St. Kitts 75 %, Flanders 58 %, Punjab in Pakistan 56 %)

In other countries the largest unit constitute a small part of the

population (California 12 %, Moscow 7 %, Zurich 17.3 %)

Anderson (2008:14ff.)


Important distinction

Symmetric federalism

– All federal units have the same tasks, competences and

resources

Asymmetric federalism

– There are differences between the federal units, especially

as far as their autonomy is concerned


Federations typically divide their territory into one

main class of unit

Some federations have special territorial units with

lesser constitutional status usually making them

subject to the central government (the national capital

district -> Washington DC; remote and thinly

populated territories -> Canada; special tribal areas,

overseas territories, Québec)

Anderson (2008:16)

Exemples


Congruent versus incongruent federalism

Congruent: The federal units are ethnically

and culturally similar to the state as a whole.

Incongruent: The federal units differ from

each other. Each unit is more homogeneous

than the state as a whole.


Examples

Argentina, Austria, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Mexico,

the United States have a clearly dominant language

and relatively low levels of religious or ethnic diversity

In Switzerland, India, Canada, Ethiopia, Spain, Belgium

or Russia the diversity is reflected in the composition

of the constituent units.

Anderson (2008:17f.)


Who Does What and How?

Basically two different approaches:

Dualist Models: Different jurisdictions are assigned to each order of

government, which then delivers and administers its own programs

(Canada, Brazil, US).

Integrated Models: Many shared competences and the constituent-

unit governments often administer centrally legislated programs or

laws (Germany, Austria, South Africa, Spain).

India and Switzerland have strong features of both. Australia is

dualist in administrative arrangements, but has many areas of

concurrency.

Anderson (2008:21 ff.)


Integrated Models (-> co-operative federalism)

For most subjects central government sets framework

legislation that constituent units can complement with their

own legislation.

In these areas the government of the constituent units

delivers programs -> small civil service for central

government

Challenge: Restricting the detail of central government policy

making

Sometimes there is also joint decision making. Federal law

must be approved by all constituent units (Germany)


Dualist Models

Each order of government delivers programs in the area of its

responsibility using its civil service and departments, the

federal government is thus present throughout the country.

In all dualist constitutions there are some shared or

concurrent powers (very few in Canada and Belgium, many in

Australia). Where powers are concurrent, federal power is

usually but not always paramount.


Patterns of distribution of power in different policy area

Defence: always federal sometimes constituent units (CU)

Treaty ratification: almost always federal, sometimes CU

Major physical infrastructure: usually federal, sometimes concurrent, joint or

shared or CU

Primary and secondary school: usually CU, occasionally concurrent, rarely

federal

Post secondary education and research: no clear pattern

Pensions: either concurrent, joint, shared or federal

Health care: usually CU, sometimes concurrent, joint or shared

Police: usually shared, occasionally concurrent or joint, rarely federal or CU

joint = to orders make concurrent decisions; concurrent = both make laws in defined areas; shared =

different legal powers, decisions are made independently


Residual Power

In bottom-up federations residual power is in

the hands of the constituent units

In federations that emerged from previously

unitary regimes, residual power is in the

hands of the federal state


Relationship between the federal units

Competitive federalism

– There is competition between the different federal units to the benefit of the citizens (exit, voting by feet)

Solidary federalism

– Compensation of disadvantages among the federal units, equalization systems, co-operation.


Competition

Many economist argue that a federation should minimize

the extent to which constituent units use tax competition

to influence companies and individuals to locate in a

particular area (limited control over mobile taxpayers).

Danger: downward spiral of tax rates, loss of revenues,

focus on other taxes.

Some economist favour fairly extensive tax competition

because they believe it can promote better services

(Anderson 2008: 31).


Different revenue and spending arrangements

In some countries, the central government dominates

the levying and collection of revenues as well as the

delivery of programs.

In other countries, the constituent units play a more

important role in the collection of revenues and their

expenditures are larger.


Central-government revenues relative to total government revenues

around 45 % Canada, Switzerland54 % United Statesbetween 60 and 75 % Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,

India, Germany, Spainover 80 % Argentina, Malaysia, Mexico,

Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela


Central-government direct spending relative to total government spending

30 to 40 % Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Germany

between 45 and 60 % Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Spain, South Africa, US

over 75 % Malysia, Venezuela


Public expenditures in Switzerland


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Transfers to constituent units

In all countries central government raises more

revenue than it spends for its own needs.

Some transfers are unconditional, others are

conditional (and for example promote the

achievement of national purposes or

standards).


Central transfer relative to constituent-unit spending

13 to 26 % Canada, Switzerland, US23 to 30 % Russia, Malysia44 % Germany46 % Australia, India68 % Belgium73 % Spainmore than 83 % South Africa, Nigeria, Mexico


Tax system

Income tax and value added tax

Which shares go to the different tiers?

Who decides on the tax rate?


Income tax

Schweiz Kanada USA Deutschland Österreich

Einkommenssteuer (Lohnsteuer)

Einziehende Stelle Bund, Kantone,

GemeindenBund, Provinzen Bund, Staaten Steuerverbund

(Gemein-schaftssteuer)

Bund

Anteil Bund 28.8 63.0 81.5 42.5 69.0Anteil Gliedstaaten ca. 43 37.0 18.5 42.5 16.5Anteil lokale Ebene ca. 28 15.0 14.5 Steuerföderalis-

musBund regelt Steuerbasis und Progression, über die Höhe entscheiden Provinzen

Steuerföderalis-mus

harmonisiert (Verteil-schlüssel)

harmonisiert (Verteil-schlüssel)

Nach Stalder 1999, eigene Ergänzungen


VAT

Schweiz Kanada USA Deutschland Österreich

Wahrenumsatz-steuer

Anteil Bund 100.0 46.2 50.0 69.5

Anteil Gliedstaaten 53.8 100.0 48.0 18.7

Anteil lokale Ebene Spezialsteuern Weitere Umsatzsteuern

2.0 11.8

Verteilung Verteilschlüssel Verteilschlüssel

Nach Stalder 1999, eigene Ergänzungen


Revenue structure


Disparities between constituent units

The wealth of constituent units within federation differs

greatly, affecting their ability to raise own-source revenue.

Most federations have provisions for dealing with these

differences through transfers.

There is a great variety in the design and the underlying

principles for these transfers.


Different redistribution systems

Usually there are transfers from central government to the

constituent units. In Switzerland and Germany there also

transfers from richer to poorer constituent units.

What is the aim of the equalization: minimal standards, same

level, within a range, super-equalization?

The importance of unconditional transfers in equalization

programs varies.

Conditional transfers can also include equalization considerations.

Central government spending (investments) in specific areas can

also have a equalizing effect.


Vertical Relations

In federations the two houses the parliament

are constituted on different representative principles,

with one chamber (usually the upper house) using a

formula based on constituent units whereas the system

for the lower house is closer to the representation by

population

are elected or namend in different ways

can have quite similar or distinct powers


Bundesrat (Germany)

Probably the most distinct Upper House

Länder delegates are not elected but named by their

governments and officially led by their minister-

presidents

Legislation that affects the Länder must be approved

by the Bundesrat


Representation in the Upper House

Equal number of members from each full constituent

units: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico,

Russia, South Africa, Switzerland

Unequal number with weight given to population:

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India


Power of the Upper House

US: Senate has all power of the House of Representatives, but it

alone approves key appointments, declarations of war and treaties.

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Switzerland: absolute veto power

Germany: Veto over matters affecting Länder and suspensive veto

over other matters

India, Nigeria: veto of the Upper House can be overridden in a joint

sitting of the two Houses

Austria, Malaysia, Spain: Suspensive veto only

Canada: extensive legal powers but only uses them to revise and

delay

Belgium: Veto on all matters that can affect the federal system.


3. Swiss Federalism: Instruments and Functioning


The basic characteristics of Swiss Federalism

The existence of the cantons is guaranteed

The cantons are free to organize themselves internally

The cantons elect their own authorities

The cantons dispose of far reaching competences

The cantons dispose of their own financial resources

There is no political control ruling over the cantons

The cantons participate equally in the decision making

process on federal level


The institutions of Swiss Federalism

Vertically: Participation of the cantons in the

decision making on national level

Horizontally: Co-operation between the cantons

Neidhart, Leonard: Föderalismus in der Schweiz. Zürich: Benzinger, 1975


Horizontal institutions

Treaties between cantons (Konkordate)

Conference of high civil servants and directors

The conference of the cantonal governments

Regional governmental conferences


The House of the Cantons in Bern


Vertical institutions:

The second chamber in the Parliament („Ständerat“) The majority of the cantons which is needed to change

the Constitution („Ständemehr“) The right of the cantons to launch an initiative The possibility of eight cantons can launch a

referendum The possibility to call for a joint assembly of the two

chambers of Parliament The role played by the cantons in the pre-

parliamentary decision making process The execution of federal policies by the cantons


The Council of States


Party composition of the Council of States 1975-2011

1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007

FDP 15 11 14 14 18 17 18 14 12CVP 17 18 18 19 16 16 15 15 15SP 5 9 6 5 3 5 6 9 9SVP 5 5 5 4 4 5 7 8 7LPS 1 3 3 3 3 2 - - -

LdU 1 - - 1 1 1 - - -

Lega - - - - 1 - - - -

Grüne 2Grünliberale 1

Total 44 * 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46


The National Council


Party composition of the National Council 1975-2011

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

701

91

9

19

22

19

28

19

35

19

39

19

43

19

47

19

51

19

55

19

59

19

63

19

67

19

71

19

75

19

79

19

83

19

87

19

91

19

95

19

99

20

03

20

07

FDP CVP SP SVP Grüne Andere


The majority of the people versus the majority of the cantons

Datum Vorlage Ja-% Volk Kantone gescheitert am

14.1.1866 Mass und Gewicht 50.5 9,5:12,5 Ständemehr23.10.1910 Volksinitiative für Proporzwahl Nationalrat 47.5 12,0:10,0 Volksmehr13.03.1955 Volksinitiative zum Schutz der Mieter und Konsumenten 50.2 7,0:15,0 Ständemehr03.03.1957 Zivilschutzartikel 48.1 14,0:8,0 Volksmehr15.11.1970 Finanzordnung des Bundes 55.4 9,0:13,0 Ständemehr04.03.1973 Bundeskompetenzen Bildung 52.8 10,5:11,5 Ständemehr02.03.1975 Konjunkturartikel 52.8 11,0:11,0 Ständemehr27.03.1983 Energieartikel 50.9 11,0:12,0 Ständemehr12.06.1994 Kulturföderungsartikel 51 11,0:12,0 Ständemehr12.06.1994 Erleichterte Einbürgerung für junge Ausländer 52.8 10,0:13,0 Ständemehr

Beinahe Kollisionen Ergebnis

18.02.1979 Atominitiative 48.8 9,0:14,0 abgelehnt18.02.1979 Stimmrechtsalter 18 49.2 9,0:14,0 abgelehnt06.12.1992 EWR 49.7 7,0:16,0 abgelehnt03.03.2002 Uno-Beitritt (VI) 54.6 12,0:13,0 angenommen


The Council of the States and the majority of the cantons: an increasing disequilibrium

One person from Appenzell Innerrhoden = 35 people from Zurich

Theoretically about 9 percent of the citizens can block a political project, in reality this percentage, however ist higher (20 – 25 percent or even higher)

Do you know about similar problems in other countries? Are there any solutions to solve the problem?


4. A successful reform of Swiss Federalism


„The Reform of financial equalization and task allocation (RET)”


Problems of the old system

1. Increasing centralization, cantons and municipalities

are increasingly concerned with the execution of

federal projects

2. Increasing inequalities between the cantons

3. Opacity of the transfer system

4. „Violation of basic principles of political economy and

fiscal federalism“


Goals of the new system

Modernizing and strengthening Swiss Federalism through

clearer assignment of tasks and disentangled of

responsibilities between the federal state and the cantons.

Increasing the performance of the equalization system

and decreasing the cantonal differences as far as the

financial resources and the tax burden is concerned.

Making the provision of public services more efficient

through a more modern form of co-operation between the

different layers of the state and through a stronger inter-

cantonal co-operation.


Expected efficiency gains

At the beginning of the reform project:

about 3 billion Swiss francs (vgl. Klöti 2000: 20)


Four instruments to achieve the above mentioned goals:

1. A disentanglement of tasks and financial responsibilities

2. New forms of co-operation and funding

3. A more encompassing inter-cantonal co-operation with

an equalisation of the financial burden

4. A new financial equalisation scheme


How can these goals best be achieved?


1. Disentanglement of tasks and financial responsibilities

Disentanglement of tasks: 15 task will be entirely assigned to the cantons, 6 tasks will be entirely assigned to the federal state.

The guiding principle for the assignment of tasks is the principle of subsidiarity.

In the course of the disentanglement of the funding of public services conditional grants are abolished as well as payments depending on the financial situation of the cantons. The new financial equalisation scheme (see beyond) will provide the cantons with more freely spendable resources (unconditional transfers).

-> These changes should stop the increasing centralisation, increase the responsibilities of the cantons and provide them with more unbound financial resources.


Tasks which will entirely fall into the realm of the federal state


Tasks which will entirely fall into the realm of the cantons


2. New forms of co-operation and funding

In spite of the effort to disentangle public functions there still remain a number of shared tasks.

In general, the Confederation will be responsible for the definition of strategies, the cantons for their execution.

Through this differentiation cantons will be able to decide for themselves on the way a specific public good or service should be produced to meet the citizens’ demands.

Instead of subsidies the cantons will receive global transfers based on the services they provide (products).


Shared Tasks


3. A more encompassing inter-cantonal co-operation with an equalisation of the financial burden

In a number of sectors inter-cantonal cooperation can be declared mandatory. Among those sectors are universities, special health care institutions, cultural institutions and public transportation in urban areas.

The general conditions for mandatory inter-cantonal cooperation define a well qualified majority of the cantons (eighteen) which can ask the Confederation to declare inter-cantonal cooperation mandatory.

A inter-cantonal equalisation of financial burdens guarantees the principle of fiscal equivalence.


Newly organized domains of inter-cantonal co-operation


4. The new financial equalisation scheme

On the financial side, the equalization of resources will guarantee a minimal amount of income to each canton.

In the new system, the former “index of financial strength” is replaced by a “resource indicator”. The resource indicator measures the financial capacity of the cantons, or, technically spoken, their resource potential.

The resource indicator is calculated on the basis of taxable income and wealth of the natural persons (inhabitants) and the profits of the juristic persons (business, firms, enterprises). These elements reflect the economic situation in the cantons more accurately than does the current system.


– Resource equalization is accompanied by cost compensation. The mountain regions on one side and the cantons with central cities on the other are confronted with specific production costs that cannot be compensated by resource equalization. Therefore, the reform of financial equalization and task allocation includes two specific instruments.

– The geographic and topographic cost compensation takes into consideration the specific production cost of mountainous cantons due to the steepness of their surface as well as to the low density of their population. Examples for such additional cost are snow removal, expensive road construction, avalanche protection and so on.

– With the socio-demographic cost compensation cantons with high per capita cost for social welfare and infrastructure resulting from central city problems will be compensated. In central cities there is usually a concentration of poor, elderly and unemployed people as well as immigrants and addicts. In addition, these regions have higher expenditure on services such as public security and public transportation.

Cost compensation


The compensation schemes


Compensation in cases of hardship

RET is designed to be neutral as far as the cost for

the Federal state and the Cantons are concerned.

However, a political fund was needed (for the next

28 years) in order to prevent some poorer cantons to

be even worse off in the new system (“political

fund”).

Two thirds of the money come from the national

state, one third from the cantons.


The differents steps of the reform


64.4% Yes- and 35.6% No-votes, accepting cantons 18 5/2, refusing 2 ½ (ZG, SZ and NW)

Step 1: Constitutional changes


Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederationof 18 April 1999 (Status as of 7th March 2010)

The cantons and the assignment of their tasks

New:


.

Duties of the Confederation and the Cantons


New: Principles for the allocation and fulfilment of state tasks


1

2

3

New: Inter-cantonal agreements and co-operation


Step 2

Two years after the vote (Flims 2006) the Parliament

accepted the necessary changes of about 30 federal laws. No referendum was launched against these changes.


Step 3: How much money goes into the different „compensation baskets“?


2,5 billion

-> 72,5 percent(1,8 billion) for the vertical equalisation of the resources

27,5 percent (682 million) for cost compensation.

The contribution of the strong cantons in terms of resources amounts to 70 percent (about 1,26 billion.) of the vertical resource compensations.

The fund for cases of hardship paid by two thirds by the national state and one third by the cantons and amounts to 430 million for the first eight years.

Money initially promised (Federal Proposition of December 2006):


First message

2001


Final decisions

Parliament accepts the transfers suggested in 2007

The new scheme starts on January 1, 2008


Finanzausgleich: Ausgleichszahlungen für 2011 errechnet

Bern, 06.07.2010 - Die Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung

(EFV) hat die fälligen Ausgleichszahlungen der einzelnen

Kantone für das Jahr 2011 ermittelt.

Für das Jahr 2011 stellen der Bund und die ressourcenstarken

Kantone insgesamt 3,635 Milliarden Franken zugunsten der

ressourcenschwachen Kantone zur Verfügung. Weitere 705 Millionen

stellt der Bund für Kantone mit Sonderlasten bereit. Der Betrag für

den Härteausgleich in der Höhe von rund 366 Millionen bleibt gemäss

Finanzausgleichsgesetz (FiLaG) gegenüber 2010 unverändert. Damit

stehen für den Finanzausgleich nächstes Jahr insgesamt rund 4,702

Miliarden in Form zweckfreier Mittel zur Verfügung.


Evaluation

-> Wirksamkeitsbericht des Finanzausgleichs

zwischen Bund und Kantonen 2008 bis 2011;

Vernehmlassung


Minimal availability of resources after equalisation : 85 percent


Metropolitan Regions


Thank you for your

attention!

Swiss politics and political institutions: 2a) Federalism and Municipalities

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Transcript of Swiss politics and political institutions: 2a) Federalism and Municipalities