SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette · SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, ... severely...
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&ttttlb. 39041 5139 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, i 3 th OCTOBER, 1950 by Registered as a newspaper TUESDAY, 17 OCTOBER, 1950 CONVOYS TO NORTH RUSSIA, 1942. Admiralty foreword:— The safe passage of convoys carrying vital war supplies to North Russia was one of the chief commitments of the British Home Fleet from August, 1941, until the end of the European War in May, 1945. Like the passage of the Malta convoys, it involved a series of major fleet operations. The Russian convoy routes, in contrast to the complete freedom of movement of the Atlantic routes, were restricted to the east and south by an enemy-occupied coastline and to the west and north by ice. The convoys them- selves were subject to attack by surface forces over a large part of their 2,000-mile passage, to air attack for 1,400 miles, and to U-boat attack throughout their entire run. The severe Arctic weather added to their- navigational difficulties during winter months, but they ran a greater risk of attack between March and September owing to the continuous daylight of the Far Northern summer. Nevertheless, in spite of these very adverse conditions, under British command, and almost entirely under British naval and air escort, forty outward and thirty-five homeward bound Russian convoys made the passage during a period of nearly four years. The first, which sailed from the United Kingdom in August, 1941, only two months after the German invasion of Russia, arrived safely, and by the spring of 1942 twelve more, had made the passage with the loss of only one out of 103 ships. From the spring of 1942, however, the threat of attacks on the convoys increased, for the Germans were already preparing to stop the flow of supplies to Russia with every means at their disposal, including the basing of heavy ships in Norway, among them the new battleship TIRPITZ. This new and evergrowing threat could be met only by giving greater protection to the convoys, but the general war situation still very severely limited the numbers of allied escorts available in northern waters. In July, 1942, the Russian convoys suffered their first and greatest disaster when Convoy P.Q.17 lost twenty-one of its thirty-four ships during a series of heavy enemy daylight attacks lasting a week. The next convoy, P.Q.I8, which sailed in {September—the August convoy to Russia was abandoned in favour of a convoy to Malta—was also heavily attacked and lost thirteen of its forty ships. Then followed a break of two months, during which all available escorts -were taking part in the Allied invasion of North Africa. After the invasipn the Russian convoys were resumed, and on 31st December strong German forces, endeavouring to attack the convoy, were engaged in the Barents Sea. A German heavy cruiser, the ADMIRAL HIPPER, was crippled, an enemy destroyer was sunk and the whole convoy reached Archangel without loss. During the next two years the Russian convoys ran only during the long dark months of winter and lost only three ships, all in January, 1944.! No further losses were sustained until March, 1945, when one ship was sunk. This proved to be the final" casualty and brought the total losses in outward bound Russian convoys to sixty-two, or 7.8 per cent, of the 792 ships sailed in them during the war. In the homeward bound convoys, twenty-eight, or 3.8 per cent., of the 739 ships sailed were lost. The total casualties in merchant ships on the Russian route were 829 officers and men. The Royal Navy, too, paid a heavy price, for two cruisers, six destroyers, three sloops, two frigates, three corvettes and three, minesweepers were sunk with the loss of 1,840 officers and men. The forty outward bound convoys carried to Russia the huge total of £428,000,000 worth of
Transcript of SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette · SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, ... severely...
&ttttlb. 39041 5139
SUPPLEMENT TO
The London GazetteOF FRIDAY, i3th OCTOBER, 1950
byRegistered as a newspaper
TUESDAY, 17 OCTOBER, 1950
CONVOYS TO NORTH RUSSIA, 1942.
Admiralty foreword:—The safe passage of convoys carrying vital
war supplies to North Russia was one of thechief commitments of the British Home Fleetfrom August, 1941, until the end of theEuropean War in May, 1945.
Like the passage of the Malta convoys, itinvolved a series of major fleet operations.The Russian convoy routes, in contrast to thecomplete freedom of movement of the Atlanticroutes, were restricted to the east and southby an enemy-occupied coastline and to thewest and north by ice. The convoys them-selves were subject to attack by surface forcesover a large part of their 2,000-mile passage,to air attack for 1,400 miles, and to U-boatattack throughout their entire run. The severeArctic weather added to their- navigationaldifficulties during winter months, but they rana greater risk of attack between March andSeptember owing to the continuous daylightof the Far Northern summer. Nevertheless, inspite of these very adverse conditions, underBritish command, and almost entirely underBritish naval and air escort, forty outward andthirty-five homeward bound Russian convoysmade the passage during a period of nearlyfour years.
The first, which sailed from the UnitedKingdom in August, 1941, only two monthsafter the German invasion of Russia, arrivedsafely, and by the spring of 1942 twelve more,had made the passage with the loss of onlyone out of 103 ships. From the spring of1942, however, the threat of attacks on theconvoys increased, for the Germans werealready preparing to stop the flow of suppliesto Russia with every means at their disposal,including the basing of heavy ships in Norway,among them the new battleship TIRPITZ.
This new and evergrowing threat could bemet only by giving greater protection to the
convoys, but the general war situation still veryseverely limited the numbers of allied escortsavailable in northern waters.
In July, 1942, the Russian convoys sufferedtheir first and greatest disaster when ConvoyP.Q.17 lost twenty-one of its thirty-four shipsduring a series of heavy enemy daylightattacks lasting a week. The next convoy,P.Q.I8, which sailed in {September—the Augustconvoy to Russia was abandoned in favour ofa convoy to Malta—was also heavily attackedand lost thirteen of its forty ships. Thenfollowed a break of two months, during whichall available escorts -were taking part in theAllied invasion of North Africa. After theinvasipn the Russian convoys were resumed,and on 31st December strong German forces,endeavouring to attack the convoy, wereengaged in the Barents Sea. A German heavycruiser, the ADMIRAL HIPPER, wascrippled, an enemy destroyer was sunk and thewhole convoy reached Archangel without loss.
During the next two years the Russianconvoys ran only during the long dark monthsof winter and lost only three ships, all inJanuary, 1944.! No further losses were sustaineduntil March, 1945, when one ship was sunk.This proved to be the final" casualty andbrought the total losses in outward boundRussian convoys to sixty-two, or 7.8 per cent,of the 792 ships sailed in them during the war.In the homeward bound convoys, twenty-eight,or 3.8 per cent., of the 739 ships sailed werelost. The total casualties in merchant shipson the Russian route were 829 officers andmen. The Royal Navy, too, paid a heavyprice, for two cruisers, six destroyers, threesloops, two frigates, three corvettes and three,minesweepers were sunk with the loss of 1,840officers and men.
The forty outward bound convoys carried toRussia the huge total of £428,000,000 worth of
5140 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950
material, including 5,000 tanks and over 7,000aircraft from Britain. The tonnage figuresare:
Year
19411942194319441945
Approximate amount Approximate amountif cargo despatched of cargo lost enrom U.K. or U.S.A.
(tons)300,000
1,350,000450,000
1,250,000650,000
route.(tons)10,000
270,000
—10,00010,000
Total 4,000,000 300,000
The U.S.S.R. in 1943 expressed their appre-ciation when M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassadorin London, paid this glowing tribute to the menwhose, courage had made possible the carriageof these vital war supplies to Russia:
"The Russian convoys are a NorthernSaga of heroism, bravery, and endurance.This Saga will live for ever, not only in thehearts of your people, but also in the heartsof the Soviet people, who rightly see in itone of the most striking expressions ofcollaboration between the Allied Govern-ments, without which our common victorywould have been impossible."
The following are extracts pom Despatchescovering the period 1st January, 1942, to 3lstDecember, 1942, submitted to the LordsCommissioners of the Admiralty by AdmiralSir John C. Tovey, K.C.B., D.S.O.,Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.
EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH COVERING' THEPERIOD IST JANUARY TO 31sT MARCH, 1942
Home Fleet,20th May, 1942.
Loss of s.s. WAZIRISTAN1. The year started with the first loss from
these convoys ; it was brought about by amost unfortunate combination of circum-stances. Convoy P.Q.7 was so delayed by.defects while assembling at Hvalfiord* that theAdmiral Commanding, Iceland, decided tosail it in two parts. The first, which sailed latein December, consisted of only two ships: thecruiser and destroyers of the ocean escort weretherefore held back for the second, and larger,part ; and the two ships were given two mine-sweepers as ocean escort.
2. These were sailed as usual to join theconvoy near Jan Mayen Island 'but failed tomake contact before the local escort oftrawlers parted company, or in fact at all. Themerchant ships thus arrived south of BearIsland without escort: U-boats, working in thisarea for the first time, succeeded in sinking theWAZIRISTAN. The COLD HARBOUR,her companion, arrived off the White Sea aweek late.
3. That the first appearance of U-boatsshould coincide with the first unescortedconvoy was most unfortunate. In order thatescorting cruisers should not be exposed to
Admiralty footnote:—* On the west coast of Iceland.
U-boat attack at convoy speeds, they wereordered after this attack to part company withtheir convoys between 14° East and 26° Eastand pass through this area at high speed, re-joining the convoys when the latter had comethrough. It was considered unlikely th,atenemy surface forces would operate in the samearea as U-boats.
Loss of H.M.S. MATA8ELE4. Convoy P.Q.7B arrived safely, but P.Q.8
was attacked by U-boats north-eastward of theKola Inlet*. The s.s. HARMATRID wastorpedoed on 17th January, but reachedharbour in tow: the MATABELE, one of thetwo escorting destroyers, was torpedoed thenext day and lost with only two survivors.
5. The increased enemy effort against theconvoys, of which these unfortunate losseswere evidence, though expected, was disturb-ing. The early spring was approaching, witha period of two or three months during whichthe ice would still compel the convoys to passthrough two narrow focal areas close to theenemy coast, without the compensation of foulweather and long darkness to res.trict his airactivity. It seemed therefore that air attacks,and surface or U-boat attacks made possibleby air reconnaissance, might reach a scalebeyond the escorting resources of the HomeFleet.
6. I pointed this out to Their Lordships andpressed for strong and continuous Russianpatrol activity off the Kola Inlet, to make thatarea untenable by U-boats, and for short-rangeand long-range fighter protection. The cruisercould not remain in company with the convoy,in U-boat infested waters, solely to provide theA.A. defence which could come more effec-tively from fighters. The Rear Admiral Com-manding, 10th Cruiser Squadront, in theNIGERIA, was stationed at Murmanskthroughout February to represent these require-ments to the Russians, tl;e NIGERIA provid-ing escort for east and westbound convoys•between Bear Island and the Kola Inlet.
Surface Threat from Trondheim7. The presence of the TIRPITZ at
Trondheim, where she arrived on 17th Januaryand, still more, her reinforcement on 23rdFebruary by the SCHEER and PRINZEUGEN, constituted another and more seriousthreat to these convoys. It seemed probablethat the heavy ships, if they attacked, woulddo so between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands,leaving the eastern section of the route to theirU-boats and aircraft. It was therefore neces-sary to provide heavy cover on this part ofthe route, even though this could not be donewithout uncovering to some extent theNorthern Passages.
8. To economise the use of this heavy cover,I asked the Admiralty on 26th February thatthe convoys should be sailed simultaneouslyfrom each end, so that their passage throughthe danger area should be synchronised. Thiswould entail a 14-day cycle. I also asked forfour more destroyers, to enable the coveringforce to have a proper screen and the convoya close escort of two destroyers. '
Admiralty foo'notes:—* The entrance to Murmansk.t Rear Admiral H. M. Burrough, C.B.
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950 5141
Attack by TIRPITZ9. The first convoys to receive heavy ship
cover were P.Q.12 and Q.P.8, unusually largeconvoys of between 15 and 20 ships each,which sailed from Hvalfiord and the KolaInlet on 1st March. Cover was provided bythe whole Home Fleet as far as longitude 14°East; but the real danger, in my opinion, wasthat arising from U-boat and air attack further .east, and I was unable to obtain any increasein the meagre A/S escorts of these convoysor in the scale of A.A. defence, except for apromise of Russian long-range fighters, at somefuture unspecified date, in the approaches tothe Kola Inlet.
10. The eastbound convoy, P.Q.12, wasfortuitously sighted by aircraft off Iceland.Probably, in my opinion, suspecting that theconvoy was transporting troops to effect a land-ing in North Norway, the TIRPITZ wastempted out to attack it. She failed to locateit, but succeeded in sinking a straggler, theI-JORA, from the westbound convoy (Q.P.8)on the 7th March.
11. The same low visibility which hamperedthe TIRPITZ, and severe icing conditionswhich precluded the use of our aircraft forreconnaissance, prevented me from bringingher to action ; but she was attacked by the air-craft of the VICTORIOUS off the LofotenIslands, on her way back to Trondheim,apparently without success. She immediatelytook refuge at Narvik and completed herpassage on 13th March.
12. I had. despatched eight destroyers underCaptain (D), 8th Destroyer Flotilla, with theTRINIDAD in support, to sweep up the coastfrom 66° North on the night of 12th/13thMarch, in the hope that the TIRPITZ wouldmake an earlier move. Five submarines weremaintained on patrol off the northern entranceto Trondheim, but did not succeed in attacking.P.Q.13 and Q.P.9
13. The next two convoys, P.Q.I3 and Q.P.9,each of 19 ships, sailed on 20th and 21stMarch respectively, -after a 48-hour delaycaused by the presence of U-boats off the KolaInlet. It was not possible materially to increasethe A/S escort, which consisted of two des-troyers, a minesweeper and two trawlers forthe eastbound convoy, and one destroyer andtwo minesweepers for the westbound one, butone cruiser accompanied each as close cover,with another west of Bear Island in support:the main fleet, under the command of the ViceAdmiral Second in Command* gave coverover the western half of the route against theheavy surface forces at Trpndheim, while fiveminesweepers and a Russian . destroyer rein-forced the escorts off the Murmansk coast; noair support was available outside the immediatevicinity of the Kola Inlet.
14. The enemy made another determinedattempt to interfere with the convoys. P.Q.I3was located by aircraft, east of Bear Island, on28th March and repeatedly attacked by divebombers, three ships being sunk. On thefollowing day, the TRINIDAD and ECLIPSEcaaie in contact with three enemy destroyersattempting to attack the same convoy: in briefengagements in very low visibility one enemy
Admiralty footnote:—* Vice Admiral A. T. B. Curteis, C.B.
A 2
destroyer was sunk and others damaged, theTRINIDAD being hit by a torpedo and herspeed reduced, and the ECLIPSE having twoguns put out of action. A Russian destroyerwas also in action, but without result. Theconvoy had experienced heavy weather and was;widely scattered, but 14 ships reached theirdestinations, the remaining two probably hav-ing been sunk by U-boats, of which at leastnine were operating in the area. One U-boatwas seriously damaged by the GOSSAMER,of the local escort.
15. Q.P.9 was fortunate to escape detectionand arrived complete in Iceland. One U-boatwas sighted on 24th March in low visibility,,rammed and sunk by the SHARPSHOOTER.*Increased Protection
16. These attacks, and the continued move-ment northward of enemy surface, U-boat andair. reinforcements, showed clearly the import-ance attached by the enemy to the stoppage ofthis traffic. Further representations to the Ad-=miralty were therefore made and somedestroyers and corvettes from the WesternApproaches were promised for the next con-voys. The Russians also agreed to receive amission from Coastal Command to help inorganising their oversea reconnaissance andfighter protection. I recommended that thenumber of convoys should be reduced duringthe next few months, when the German aero-drome conditions and air reconnaissance wouldimprove, whilst the convoy routes would stillbe restricted by ice: but the .U.S.A. was nowgiving first priority to deliveries to Russia, ofwhich her quota was far behind schedule, andit seemed probable that the convoys would in-crease rather than decrease.
EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH COVERING THEPERIOD IST APRIL TO 30ra JUNE, 1942
Home Fleet,2nd August, 1942. -
1. Throughout the quarter the Russian con-voys remained the chief commitment of theHome Fleet. The last pair to be run in Marchhad been heavily attacked, and the enemy was;obviously determined to do everything in hispower to stop this traffic. The U-boat and airforces in Northern Norway had been heavilyreinforced, the three remaining destroyers weredisposed offensively at Kirkenes, and the heavyforces at Trondheim remained a constant, ifreluctant, threat.
2. Early in April destroyers, corvettes andtrawlers were transferred from the WesternApproaches to bring the A/S escort of eachconvoy up to ten. Requests were made to theRussian naval authorities to co-operate byreinforcing the escort at the eastern end of theroute, by providing long-range fighter or A/Sair escort and bombing the enemy aerodromes,,and by disposing their submarines south of theconvoy route to discourage surface raiders eastof Bear Island. The response was disappoint-ing. 'P.0.14 and Q.P.W
3. Convoys P.Q.14 (23 ships) and Q.P.I0 (16ships) sailed on 8th and 10th April respectively.Admiralty footnote:—
* The sinking of this submarine, U.655, by H.M-.S..SHARPSHOOTER, and also that of U.585 by H.M.S. FURYin this area, has since been confirmed.
5142 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950
The former was escorted by five destroyers,four corvettes, two minesweepers and four A/Strawlers, with the EDINBURGH, NORFOLKand two destroyers providing close cover: thewestbound convoy had the LIVERPOOL, fivedestroyers", one minesweeper and two trawlers.The KING GEORGE V, DUKE OF YORK,VICTORIOUS, KENT, NIGERIA and eightdestroyers provided heavy cover.
4. P.Q.14 ran into ice south-west of JanMayen Island and was delayed and scattered:two-thirds of the convoy lost touch and returnedto Iceland, with several of the escort who hadbeen damaged by ice. The remaining nineships, with most of the escort, continued their"passage. .The delay had probably disorganisedto some extent the German arrangements forattack, but the convoy was sighted by enemyaircraft on 13th April and attacked by U-boatseast of Bear Island on 16th April, one shipbeing sunk.
5. Q.P.10 was subjected to air and U-boatattacks for three days, while on passage betweenthe Kola Inlet and Bear Island, and four shipswere sunk. One other returned to Kola, theremaining eleven arriving safely in Iceland.
P.Q.15 and Q.P.II6. Before the next pair of convoys was due
to sail, I suggested once more that these con-voys, if they could not be postponed until theice moved north, should be limited in size.This proposal was not accepted: convoysP.Q.15 and Q.P.ll, which sailed on 26th and28th April respectively, contained 25 and 17ships.
7. The eastbound convoy was escorted byfour destroyers, one A.A. ship and three mine-sweepers, and included a C.A.M. ship*; theNIGERIA and two destroyers provided closecover. The westbound convoy was escorted byfive destroyers, five corvettes and twotrawlers, with the EDINBURGH as closecover. Distant cover for both convoyswas given by the KING GEORGE V,U.S. battleship WASHINGTON, VIC-TORIOUS, U.S. cruisers WICHITA andTUSCALOOSA, KENYA and ten destroyers(of which four were American). This was thefirst occasion on which United States shipsoperated as part of the Home Fleet.
8. Four submarines were disposed off thethe Norwegian Coast, moving north-eastwardswith the convoy, to provide cover against thesurface forces at Trondheim ; being joined laterby the TRIDENT, which accompanied P.Q.15as far as longitude 5° East.
HM.S. EDINBURGH Torpedoed9. Q.P.ll left the Kola Inlet on 28th April
and was sighted and reported by aircraft andU-boats the next day. On 30th April theEDINBURGH, about fifteen miles ahead of theconvoy, was struck by two torpedoes from aU-boat. Her stern was blown off and she was•unable to steer, but she proceeded at very slow•speed towards Murmansk, escorted and towedT>y the FORESIGHT and FORESTER, who•were detached from the convoy escort. Mine-sweepers, tugs and Russian destroyers were sentirom Murmansk to assist.
dbdm:ralty foo'no'.e:—* C.A.M. ship—a merchant ship fitted with a catapult
JToi flying off an aircraft.
10. The protection of these Russian convoysagainst surface attack must always involvegrave risk of ships of the covering force beingtorpedoed by U-boats. The convoys comeunder early air reconnaissance and for a greatpart of the voyage have up to eight U-boatswithin striking distance. The number ofescorts and the necessity for strict economy offuel do not permit of prolonged A/S hunts;the speed of the convoys is 8 knots or less ; soU-boats put down by the escorts have little diffi-culty in regaining contact. The risk fromU-boats has always been appreciated by theFlag and Commanding Officers of the coveringcruisers ; but it is obvious that effective protec-tion against surface forces in the varying visi-bility usually experienced can only be providedif the covering cruiser is hi the vicinity of theconvoy.0.P.11
11. The convoy drove off an attack by fourtorpedo aircraft and, on 1st May, was five timesattacked east of Bear Island by three large Ger-man destroyers. The escorting destroyers,though greatly inferior in gunpower, met theseattacks with gallantry and skill and by then-aggressive tactics succeeded in driving off theirpowerful opponents. One merchant ship wassunk and the AMAZON was damaged, thoughable to proceed. No further losses were suf-fered by this convoy.
12. The three German destroyers then trans-ferred their attentions to the EDINBURGH,who was now in tow of a Russian tug andescorted by the FORESIGHT andFORESTER, one small Russian clestroyer andthe minesweepers HARRIER, HUSSAR, GOS-SAMER and NIGER. The German destroyerslocated her on the morning of 2nd May, in lowvisibility and extreme cold. The tow was im-mediately slipped and the EDINBURGH, whowas unable to steer, circled slowly at abouteight knots.
13. A series of most gallant actions followed,the enemy being engaged in turn by the FORE-SIGHT and FORESTER, the remaining gunsof the EDINBURGH, and the minesweepers.One enemy destroyer was sunk and the othertwo 'damaged; but the EDINBURGH wasstruck by another torpedo and had to be aban-doned, being sunk later by a torpedo from theFORESIGHT; two officers and 56 ratingswere lost. The FORESIGHT and FORESTERwere seriously damaged, both being brought toa standstill during the course of the action, buteach in turn covered the other while she effectedthe repairs necessary to enable her to proceed.•The minesweepers were not damaged, thoughmore than once they had engaged enemy des-troyers single-handed and driven them off:
14. P.Q.15, which had sailed from Hvalfiordon 26th April, was reported by enemy aircrafttwo days later, in spite of a spirited attack onthe sighting aircraft by the Norwegian seaplaneproviding A/S escort. A U-boat made contactthe following day. On 1st May the convoy wasbombed wthout success by six Ju.88s, one ofwhich was shot down. As all the enemy des-troyers in the Far North had been sunk ordamaged in the final action of the EDIN-BURGH, I instructed the NIGERIA andLONDON to leave convoy P.Q.15 west of BearIsland and not to proceed into the U-boatwaters further east unless the convoy wasthreatened by enemy cruisers or larger vessels.
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950 5143
15. On 2nd May, the Polish submarine P.551,who was about 100 miles out of her coveringposition, was sighted by the convoy escort andunfortunately sunk. Later in the day the con-voy was attacked by six torpedo aircraft andthree ships were sunk, one or two aircraft beingshot down. No warning was received of thisattack, the only determined one which theseaircraft had so far delivered, and they were firstsighted only 6,000 yards away. Another air-craft was destroyed the next day, during an un-successful bombing attack; and, althoughshadowed by aircraft and. U-boats as far aslongitude 36° East, the convoy arrived at KolaInlet without further loss. The local escort ofships of the 1st Minesweeping Flotilla gavevaluable assistance in the Barents Sea, escortingships of the convoy and rescuing survivors ofthose sunk.
16. The heavy covering force was sighted byaircraft the day after leaving Scapa andshadowed up to the latitude of Seidisfiprd,where visibility began to decrease. On 1stMay the PUNJABI came into collision in afog with the KING GEORGE V and was sunk,the KING GEORGE V being damaged bothby the collision "and by the subsequent explo-sion of the PUNJABI'S depth charges. TheDUKE OF YORK, flying the flag of the ViceAdmiral Second in Command, Home Fleet,from Hvalfiord, was instructed to relieve theKING GEORGE V, the Vice Admiral Secondin Command assuming command of the cover-ing force, after which the KING GEORGE Vproceeded to Seidisfiord to fuel her screen andthence returned to Scapa.
Loss of H.M.S. TRINIDAD17. The TRINIDAD had been damaged
during the course of an action with Germandestroyers attacking a convoy in March. Shehad received temporary repairs at Murmansk,enabling her to steam at 18 knots, and wasnow ready to leave for permanent repair inthe United States. She was due to sail on 9thMay, but at that time there were i.-idicationsof a northward movement by the German shipsat Trondheim and her departure was delayeduntil 13th May while the situation svas beingcleared up by air reconnaissance. TheSCHEER was found to have moved to Narvik,the remainder being still at Trondheim.
18. Cover for the TRINIDAD, who was fly-ing the flag of the Rear Admiral Commanding,18th Cruiser Squadron*, was-provided by fourcruisers and four destroyers, under the com-mand of the Rear Admiral Commanding, 10thCruiser Squadron, operating west of BearIsland ; and she was escorted by the SOMALI(Captain (D), 6th Destroyer Flotilla), MATCH-LESS, FORESIGHT and FORESTER. Thebattiefleet left Scapa on 15th May torendezvous with Task Force 99 east of Icelandand provide more distant cover. The Russians'long-range fighter escort, expected up to a dis-.tance of 200 miles from the Murman coast, didnot materialise.
19. The TRINIDAD was sighted by enemyaircraft on the morning of 14th May, 100 milesout, and was attacked by bombers and torpedoaircraft that evening, south-west of Bear Island.
Admiralty footnote:—* Rear Admiral S. S. Bonham-Carter, C.B., C.V.O.,
D.S.O.
One bomb hit and one near miss were obtained,,starting several-fires and causing a list. The'fires got out of control and spread rapidly,,and the ship had to be abandoned after threehours. . She was sunk by. torpedoes from theMATCHLESS.. One officer,'60t naval ratingsand 20 merchant seamen taking passage werelost.
20. The escorting destroyers joined the RearAdmiral Commanding, 10th Cruiser Squadron,and this force set course for Iceland. They wereshadowed by enemy aircraft until 2000 on 15thMay, when about 25 Ju.88s attacked withbombs: no hits were scored on either side.This attack took place over 350 miles fromthe nearest aerodrome, which meant that theconvoys must now expect to be attacked fromthe air at any time during five days of thsirpassage.
Amended Arrangements for Cover21. On 16th May, -the pocket battleship
LUTZOW left the Baltic to join the force inNorway ; and ten days later, during the passageof the next two convoys, she moved up taNarvik to join the SCHEER. Though thisreinforcement must increase the chances of theenemy nerving himself to undertake a surfaceattack on the convoys, the U-boat and airthreats were such that it was most undesirableto risk our heavy ships or cruisers east of BearIsland. This fact had been emphasised bythe loss of the EDINBURGH andTRINTDAD.
22. With all the German, destroyers in theFar North either sunk or damaged, the threatof destroyer attack had temporarily dis-appeared ; and it was no longer necessary torisk cruisers to guard against it. The disposi-tions for the next convoys were therefore-changed: four cruisers, accompanied by threedestroyers, provided close cover west.of BearIsland against the pocket battleships; whilethe main fleet cruised north-east of Iceland,ready to deal with the TIRPITZ if she shouldcome out in support.
23. Two submarines accompanied the east-bound convoy, to discourage surface attack,and the British and Russian submarine coveroff the north-west and north of Norway wasmaintained 'as before, five British and threeRussian submarines being employed. Afterthe move of the LUTZOW to Narvik, theRussians were asked to instruct their sub-marines .to simulate by wireless traffic a largernumber; and an air ipatrol from the UnitedKingdom'was• established as far as 71° North'23° East.
24. In addition to the changes already men-tioned, all the merchant ships of P.Q.I6 carriedballoons; some degree of A/S protection asfar as longitude 10° East was given by fourflying-boats from Iceland; and the SeniorBritish Naval Officer, North Russia, was per-mitted to adjust the sailing time of Q.P.I2 upto 24 hours either way, to take advantage ofweather unsuitable for air reconnaissance. TheRussians promised to cover the passage of theseconvoys with a big scale offensive by 200 Armybombers on the aerodromes of North Norway:but unfortunately were only able to deliverone small attack which took place after theenemy's main attacks on the convoy had beencompleted.
5144 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950
25. Owing to the evident inability of theRussians to provide air co-operation in theBarents Sea, I had asked for R.A.F. recon-naissance and long-range fighter aircraft to bestationed in North Russia. These would pro-vide the convoys, during the worst part of theirpassage, with A/S patrols, fighter protectionand reconnaissance against surface attack.But the number of aircraft, in Coastal Com-mand was insufficient to meet any of theserequirements. and the convoys had to continuethis most hazardous passage virtually withoutair co-operation (see also paragraph 32).
P.Q.16 and Q.P.1226. P.Q.16, which sailed on 20th May, con-
tained 35 ships and, despite the fact that thiswas the most unfavourable time of the year,was the largest convoy which had so far beenrun. It was escorted by five destroyers, fourcorvettes, four trawlers, one minesweeper andoner A.A. ship. It was located by enemy air-craft on 24th May and, though one shadowerwas shot down on 25th May by the Hurricanefrom the C.A.M. ship, was shadowed con-tinuously for the next six days.
27. The first attack, 380 miles from the<enemy aerodromes, was made on 25th Mayby eight torpedo aircraft and about' twentyJu.88s: one ship, the American s.s. CARL-TON, had a steam pipe fractured and turnedback for Iceland, in tow of the trawlerNORTHERN SPRAY: one Ju.88 was shotdown and four more were probably destroyed.
28. The main weight of air attack startedon the afternoon of 26th May and continuedalmost without respite until 30th May. Duringthis period no less than 34 torpedo aircraftand 210 bombers attacked the convoy, sinkingfive ships and damaging three others, as wellas the Polish destroyer GARLAND: three air-craft were shot down and twelve more wereprobably destroyed. Numerous attempts were
made by U-boats to attack the convoy, butwith one exception they were driven off,several U-boats 'being damaged: in the onesuccessful attack, one.ship was sunk, makinga total loss of six ships out of 35. The small-ness of the losses in comparison with the enemyeffort was due to the skill and endurance ofthe escort, under the command of the Com-manding Officer of the ASHANTI, and to thesteadiness, good gunfire and excellent stationkeeping of the convoy. The German bomberspressed their attacks home on one day only,while their torpedo aircraft were cautious inthe extreme and generally ineffective. SomeRussian fighters were present on the last twodays and claimed to have destroyed some ofthe enemy after their attacks.
29. Q.P.12, escorted by six destroyers, oneA.A. ship, one minesweeper and four trawlers,left Kola Inlet on 31st May. They weresighted shortly after sailing ; but the enemyconcentrated all his force on the more im-portant eastbound convoy and Q.P.12 reachedIceland without being attacked.
30. The cruiser covering force was in com-pany with P.Q.16 for the first air attack, buttheir operations were otherwise without in-cident, as were those of the heavy coveringforce. The threat of surface attack by thetwo pocket battleships at Narvik did notmaterialise.
P.Q.17 and Q.P.13^31. The operation for the supply of Malta,tearly in June, left insufficient destroyers inthe Home Fleet for the simultaneous runningof Russian convoys. The next pair were there-fore postponed until 27th June.
Summary of Results32. The approximate scale of attack and the
losses for the convoys run during the quarterwere: —
Convoy
P.Q. 14
<>.P. 10
P.Q. 15
<J.P. 11
P.Q. 16
=Q.P. 12
Ships sailed
24
16
25
13
35
15
Shipsturned back
16
1
1
1
Ships lost
1
22
003
100
151
0
Attacked by
U-boats
U-boats34 bombers
U-boats6 bombers6 torpedo aircraft *
3 destroyersU-boats4 torpedo aircraft
U-boats208 bombers34 torpedo aircraft
Nil
Reacheddestination
7
11
22
12
27
14
Note.—About 15 U-boats operated against each pair of convoys.
EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH COVERING THEPERIOD IST JULY TO 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1942
Home Fleet,3rd January, 1943.
Threat of Heavy Surface AttackInformation received in June indicated that
the enemy intended, at last to bring out hismain units to attack the next eastbound convoyeast of Bear Island. The strategical situationthus produced was wholly favourable to the
enemy. His heavy ships would 'be operatingclose to their own coast, with the support ofpowerful shore-based air reconnaissance andstriking forces, and protected, if he so desired,by a screen of U-boats in the channels betweenSpitsbergen and Norway. Our covering forces,on the other hand, if they entered these waters,would' be without shore-based air support, onethousand miles from their base, with- theirdestroyers too short of fuel to escort a damagedship to harbour.
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950 5145
2. Apart from submarine attack off theenemy coast, a more favourable dispositioncould be brought about only by inducing theenemy heavy ships to come further to the west-ward to deliver their attacks.
3. With this object, I proposed to theAdmiralty that the convoy, on reaching theapproximate longitude of 10° East, should turnback for twelve or eighteen hours, unless in-formation showed that the enemy had not afterall put to sea, or title weather was such as toprevent air shadowing. I hoped that this tem-porary turn back would either tempt theGerman heavy ships to pursue, or cause themto return to harbour, or compel them to cruisefor an extended period among our submarines,nine of which were concentrated between BearIsland and the Norwegian coast. ThreeRussian submarines were also in this area.
4. The Admiralty did not approve of thisplan but, after further discussion, issued in-structions on 27th June which envisaged thepossibility, under certain circumstances, of theconvoy 'being temporarily turned back bythe Admiralty, but not of this turn being timedto achieve the object I had in view. In theevent, this question did not arise, as the enemysurface movements took place later than hadbeen expected. The Admiralty instruction alsostated, inter alia, that the safety of the convoyagainst surface attack to the westward of BearIsland must be met by our surface forces, andto the eastward of that meridian must dependon our submarines ; and that the cruiser cover-ing force was not intended to go east of BearIsland unless the convoy was threatened by thepresence of a surface force which the cruiserforce could fight, or in any case to go beyond25° East. •
Diversionary Operations5. In an attempt to divert the enemy surface
and air forces, a dummy convoy, consisting ofthe 1st Minelaying Squadron and four colliers,and escorted by the SIRIUS, CURACOA, fivedestroyers and some trawlers, was assembled inScapa Flow for a week and sailed two daysafter .the convoy. It sailed westabout theShetlands and then eastward to 1 ° East, hopingto attract the attention of the German air re-connaissance and simulate a raiding forcebound for Southern Norway (Operation ES).The battlefleet sailed later the same day andadjusted its course to give the impression ofcovering the raiding force.
6. The only German reconnaissance of Scapaduring the period of assembly apparently failedto notice this convoy, nor was it sighted onpassage. The operation was therefore repeatedon 1st July, but again .without success.
fi.P-137. The westbound convoy sailed from Arch-
angel on 26th June, some ships leaving Mur-mansk the next day to join. It consisted of35 ships and .was escorted by five destroyers,three corvettes, one anti-aircraft ship, threeminesweepers, two trawlers and, as far as theBear Island area, one submarine. It wassighted by enemy aircraft on 30th June and2nd July ; but once more the enemy's policy wasto concentrate on the eastbound laden convoy,and Q.P.13 was not attacked.
8. The convoy was divided east of Iceland,one section proceeding direct to the
United Kingdom and the other to Hvalfiord, enroute for America. This change of plan wasordered by the Admiralty when the convoy wasalready at sea. The officer who became Com-.modore of the Hvalfiord section was not there-fore aware of the position of the minefield inthe Denmark Strait nor of the danger of navi-gating in that area without accurate knowledgeof his position. This section ran foul of theminefield and on 5th July the NIGER (Com-mander A. J. Cubison, R.N.) and five merchantships were sunk ; one other merchant ship wasdamaged. These were the only casualtiessuffered by the convoy.
F.J2-179. The eastbound convoy sailed from
Hvalfiord on 27th June. In addition to 34 mer-chant ships, an oiler for the use of the escortand three rescue ships sailed in this convoy.The escort comprised six destroyers, four cor-vettes, three minesweepers, four trawlers, twoanti-aircraft ships and two submarines.
10. The route was considerably longer thanthat for earlier convoys this year, for the iceallowed passage north of Bear Island and aconsiderable evasive detour in the Barents Sea ;and all the convoy was bound for Archangel,recent heavy air raids having destroyed most ofMurmansk. " . •
11. Part of the convoy iran into drifting ice inthick weather in the Denmark Strait. Twomerchant ships were damaged and had to returnand the escort's oiler, the GREY RANGER,was also damaged: her speed reduced to eightknots and it was doubtful whether she couldface heavy weather ; it was therefore decided totransfer her to the fuelling position north-eastof Jan Mayen (Force Q) in exchange for theALDERSDALE.
12. The convoy was located by enemy aircraftand U-boats on 1st July, a little later than usual,and thereafter* was shadowed continuouslyexcept for a few short intervals in fog. Thoughthis fog was not permanent enough to preventshadowing, it did decrease the number of. airattacks. The first, by nine torpedo aircraft,took place late on 2nd July: it was unsuccessfuland one aircraft was shot down. A solitary air-craft scored a torpedo hit on the morning of4th July, the merchant ship later being sunkby our own forces ; and there was an unsuccess-ful attack by six bombers in the evening. Laterthe same evening another attack, by twenty-fivetorpedo bombers, took place: two ships weresunk and one damaged, and at least four aircraftwere shot down.
Covering Forces13. Meanwhile the two covering forces were
moving into position. The cruiser force, underthe command of Rear Admiral Commanding,1st Cruiser Squadron*, left Seidisfiord dur-ing the night of 30th June/1st July and arrivedin a covering position north of the convoy on2nd July. It consisted of the LONDON, NOR-FOLK, WICHITA, TUSCALOOSA and threedestroyers, of which two were American. Theywere not sighted by the enemy until late on3rd July.
14. The heavy covering force, comprising theDUKE OF YORK (Commander-in-Chief),
Admiralty footnote:—* Rear Admiral L. H. K. Hamilton, D.S.O.
5146 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950
WASHINGTON, VICTORIOUS, CUMBER-LAND, NIGERIA and nine destroyers, wasshadowed for a short period north-east of Ice-land on the 1st July, while the screen was re-fuelling in succession at Seidisfiord ; and againfor a short period early on 3rd July, while in acovering position south of the convoy. Lateron that day, course was altered to the north-ward, to cross the convoy track and reach aposition north-west cif Bear Island, within airstriking range of the convoy on the morning of4th July: this time was calculated from theinformation available to be the earliest at whichsurface attack was likely to materialise. Whileon passage to the new covering area, which wasoccupied for about 24 hours, the battlefleet wasjoined by the MANCHESTER and ECLIPSEfrom Spitzbergen.
15. Air reconnaissance of the Norwegian har-bours had been hindered by the weather, butthe available information showed that the heavyunits were probably moving northwards, and anair photograph of Trondheim late on 3rd Julyconfirmed that the TIRPITZ and HIPPER hadleft. The flying-boat patrol and the two linesof submarines between North Cape and BearIsland were being adjusted to cover the line ofapproach to the convoy as it moved eastwards.In view of the uncertainty of the enemy's posi-tion, Rear Admiral Commanding, 1st CruiserSquadron decided to continue to provide closecover and to pass to the eastward of BearIsland. .
Route16. A fresh ice reconnaissance on 3rd July
found that the passage north of Bear Island hadwidened. The Admiralty suggested "to theKEPPEL (Senior Officer of Escort) that theconvoy should pass at least fifty miles northof it, but he preferred to stay .in the lowvisibility on his original route and to makeground to the eastward: Rear Admiral Com-manding, 1st Cruiser Squadron, however, onclosing the convoy, decided 'that a morenortherly route was necessary and ordered theKEPPEL to alter course to pass 70 miles northof Bear Island and, later, to open to 400 milesfrom Banak.
Scattering of Convoy17. At 1230/4th July, the Admiralty gave
Rear Admiral Commanding, 1st CruiserSquadron permission to proceed east of longi-tude 25° East, should the situation so demand,unless contrary orders were received from me.This was a reversal of the policy agreed be-tween the Admiralty and myself (see para-graph 4): as no information in my possessionjustified this change, I instructed Rear AdmiralCommanding, 1st Cruiser Squadron to with-draw when the convoy was east of 25° East,or earlier at his discretion, unless the Admiraltyassured him that the TIRPITZ could not bemet. The Admiralty at 1858, however, in-formed him that further information wasexpected shortly and instructed him to remainwith the convoy pending further instructions.
18. At 2111/4th July, the Admiralty madea signal, prefixed "Most Immediate", order-ing Rear Admiral Commanding, 1st CruiserSquadron to withdraw to the westward at highspeed (this is understood to have been dueto U-boat information, but that fact was notknown to the addressees): at 2123, the
Admiralty, in a signal prefixed " Immediate ",ordered the convoy to disperse and proceedto Russian ports owing to threat from surfaceships; and at 2136 followed this up withanother "Most Immediate" signal orderingthe convoy to scatter (this latter signal was in-tended merely as a correction of technicalwording from " disperse " to " scatter ", butthis too was not known at the time). BothRear Admiral Commanding, 1st. CruiserSquadron and the Commanding Officer of theKEPPEL took these signals to indicate that anattack by the TIRPITZ was imminent: theconvoy was immediately ordered to scatter,the escorting destroyers to join the cruiserforce, and the rest of the escort to proceedindependently.
Enemy Surface Forces19. The enemy heavy forces, however, had
not yet left North Norway: it was not until1700 on 5th July that they were sighted andreported by the Soviet submarine K.21, northof North Cape outward bound: and three anda half hours later the submarine P.54 reportedthe TIRPITZ, HIPPER and six destroyers,still steering to the north-eastwards. Soonafter, for some reason at present not estab-lished, the enemy fleet abandoned their enter-prise and returned to harbour: possibly theirinformation of the position and compositionof our two covering forces was at fault, or theywere unwilling to face the threat of oursubmarines.
20. During the night of 5th/6th July, Ireceived three signals from the Admiraltysuggesting that if the battlefleet was sightedsteering to the eastward it might make theTIRPITZ reluctant to go as far as the convoy ;and that the TIRPITZ might be damaged and,if I could refuel my destroyers, might presentan opportunity for the VICTORIOUS. Thelatter seemed to me unlikely, for it was almostcertain that the TIRPITZ, especially ifdamaged, would not 'be sailed down theNorwegian coast until adequate fighter coverand seaward reconnaissance were available:moreover the DUKE OF YORK was short offuel. Arrangements were made for the fleetto reverse its course if the approach of enemyaircraft was detected; and at 0645/6th Julywhen the destroyers had completed with fuel,course was altered back to the north-eastward.An hour later an enemy aircraft passed overthe fleet, above the clouds: endeavour wasmade to attract his attention by gunfire andfighters, but without success. The weathercontinued unfavourable for air reconnaissance,so that at 1545/6th July the course of the fleetwas again reversed and the units returned toharbour.
21. The submarines STURGEON andMINERVE, returning from patrol lines offNorth Cape, had meanwhile 'been diverted bythe Flag Officer Submarines to establish apatrol off the entrance to Vestfiord. TheGerman ships were sighted by a Mosquito air-craft on the morning of 7th July, leaving Arno,in North Norway, on their way back to Narvik.It is possible that they passed inside the Leadsand thus evaded the submarines.Further Attacks on Convoy
22. When the order to scatter the convoywas received, it had covered- more than halfits route with the loss of only three ships.
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950 5147
Now its ships, spread over a wide area, wereexposed to die powerful enemy U-boat and airforces. The enemy took prompt advantage ofthis situation, operating both weapons to theirfull capacity. In spite of widespread searchesby a few Coastal Command aircraft which'hadproceeded to North Russia after their patrolsand by minesweepers and corvettes in thesewaters, a fortnight elapsed before the resultsof these attacks and the fate of the variousships of the convoy were fully known.; Of thethirty-four ships remaining when the convoywas scattered, twenty-one, including the .fleetoiler ALDERSDALE and one rescue ship,were sunk, and thirteen, including one whichwas refloated after running aground in NovaZemlya, eventually reached Archangel.
Postponement of P.Q.I823. There was not time for another convoy
operation before the withdrawal of many HomeFleet cruisers and destroyers for Operation"Pedestal"*. P.Q.I8 had therefore to bepostponed until early in September. Thepossibility of running the westbound convoyalone during this interval was examined, butadequate submarine cover could not beprovided.
24. Much of the ammunition reserves in-tended for North Russia had been lost in shipsof P.Q.17: there was also a shortage of food.Four destroyers,' the MARNE, MARTIN,MIDDLETON and BLANKNEY, were there-fore sailed on 20th July to Archangel withammunition to replenish the escorts and shipsof Q.P.14 and with provisions: they weresighted 'by aircraft on 21st July near JanMayen Island, but their voyage was otherwisewithout incident.
Independent Sailing of Russian Ships25. Two Russian merchant ships, at the re-
quest of the Soviet Government, were sailedfrom Iceland on llth and 12th August respec-tively to attempt the passage unescorted. Thisthey eventually achieved after a long voyage ex-tending well into the Kara Sea.
Air Co-operation26. Further attempts were made during
August to arrange air co-operation in the FarNorth. Two officers on the Staff of Air OfficerCommanding, Bomber Command came toScapa at rny request to discuss the possibilityof an attack by heavy bombers on the enemyships at Narvik ; this operation was dependenton there being a suitable aerodrome in NorthRussia for the bombers to land and refuel aftertheir attack. I promised to arrange the trans-port °by sea of the necessary ground staff andstores to such an aerodrome if it could befound. ^
27. Two squadrons of Hampden torpedo air-craft were flown to North Russia, ready to sup-port P.Q.I8. Their ground staff, stores andtorpedoes were carried to Kola in the TUSCA-LOOSA, escorted by the RODMAN,EMMONS and ONSLAUGHT. I had recentlyreceived a. disquieting report about conditionsin Russian hospitals in which the seamen fromthe escorts and merchant ships of .these con-voys were treated: the personnel and stores of
Admiralty footnote:—* Operation " Pedestal" was the sailing of a large
convoy for Malta in August, 1942.
the British medical unit, which resulted frommy representations, also took passage in theTUSCALOOSA, and as much ammunition andfood as possible was sent.
28. On instructions from Moscow, the medicalunit was later refused permission to land atArchangel; while that portion which had beenlanded by the TUSCALOOSA at Vaenga waso'rdered to leave. The stores were left in NorthRUssia but the personnel had to return to theUnited Kingdom in Q.P.14. I renewed myrepresentations for the strongest pressure to bebrought to bear to induce them once more tochange their minds.
Sinking of ULM29. While the TUSCALOOSA was on passage
indications of German activity east of theBarents Sea were accumulating. A Russianice-breaker was attacked by an unidentified sur-face ship east of Nova Zemlya and severalplaces were bombarded. I considered the re-tention of the TUSCALOOSA's force in NorthRussia, pending further intelligence, butSenior British Naval Officer, North Russia re-presented that the Murman anchorages wereunder constant air attack and that a longer staythan necessary was most undesirable.
30. The TUSCALOOSA, with her escort re-inforced by the MARTIN and MARNE,-sailedagain for Iceland on 24th August. A sweep bythe three British destroyers was ordered, to thesouthward of the TUSCALOOSA, to interceptany enemy vessels leaving Northern Norway forthe Kara Sea. The German minelayer ULMwas met at 2230, south-east of Bear Island, andsunk by these destroyers* The British andAmerican ships were located by aircraft andshadowed intermittently on the following day,but no attack developed.
Operation EV—Passage of P.Q.18 and Q.P.1431. Plan. The experience of P.Q.17 had
shown that the enemy was now ready to bringhis heavy surface forces against the convoys,well to the eastward in the Barents Sea. Norcould it be assumed that he would continue toleave the westbound convoys alone. The coverprovided by the battlefleet, while the convoyswere east of Bear Island, had always been morethreatening than real; for I had strong objec-tions to taking heavy ships into the Barents Sea,far from their bases and exposed to heavy con-centrations of U-boats and shore-based aircraft,with little hope of bringing the enemy to action.The battlefleet screen absorbed a number ofdestroyers which could otherwise be used toprovide real cover, close to the convoy. In thevariable visibility which prevails in those lati-tudes, the presence of a strong force ofdestroyers would constitute a threat which theenemy, in spite of the longer range of his guns,would probably be reluctant to face.
32. I therefore decided to rely for surfacecover on a strong force of destroyers, under thecommand of the Rear Admiral Commanding,Ijfome Fleet Destroyers (Rear Admiral R. L.Burnett, C.B., O.B.E.), flying his flag in theSCYLLA, and to accept the consequent re-striction on the movements of the battleships,for which small screens of low endurance onlywere retained. The destroyer force was totransfer off Nova Zemlya from P.Q.I8 toQ.P.14, leaving the former to complete its voy-age with the normal anti-submarine escort, re-inforced by any forces which the Russians might
5148 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, J950
be persuaded to provide. The fuel require-ments of the escort and covering force were tobe met by two oilers sailed under separate escortto Spitzbergen, and two more with P.Q.I8,transferring with the covering force to Q.P.14.
33. Frequent German air reconnaissance ofIcelandic ports had been reported, so it wasdecided to sail the eastbound convoy directfrom Loch Ewe, with a local escort from theWestern Approaches Command until arrival offIceland.
34. A considerable increase was possible inthe scale of shore-based air co-operation. TheRoyal Air Force in Iceland undertook, as faras the weather would permit, to provide anti-submarine escort to the convoys as far as 73°North, ice reconnaissance daily when they werewest of Jan Mayen and fighter protection forforces in Icelandic ports. Eleven Catalinasand thirty-two torpedo carrying Hampdens, ofwhich five were lost on passage, were flown toNorth Russia to provide anti-submarine escortin the eastern end of the Barents Sea and re-connaissance and a striking force in case theGerman heavy ships put to sea. Arrangements
-were also made for P.R.U.* aircraft in in-creased numbers to reconnoitre the Norwegianfiords, working from the United Kingdom andNorth Russia. Russian promises of anti-submarine escort, fighter cover and bombingattacks on German aerodromes were also made.An important addition to the air defence was
. the new auxiliary aircraft carrier AVENGER,equipped with twelve Sea Hurricanes and threeSwordfish, who formed part of the escort ofboth convoys.
35. The ANSON (Vice Admiral Second inCommand, Home Fleetf), DUKE OF YORK,JAMAICA and five short endurance destroyerswere moved to AkureyriJ. Their radius of.action was very limited, unless the "destroyerscreen was slipped, but they might be of valueif the enemy surface forces unexpectedlyattacked at the western part of the route: itwas hoped too that their absence from Scapawould deceive the enemy and make himimagine 'that a heavy covering force was at seaas usual. I remained at Scapa in the KINGGEORGE V to be in touch with the latestintelligence and in general control of theoperations.
36. Additional cover was provided forQ.P.14 after passing Bear Island by a force offive cruisers and four destroyers, under ViceAdmiral Commanding, 18th Cruiser Squadron §,after they had carried stores to the Norwegianforce in Spitzbergen. Endurance would notpermit this force to cover P.Q.I8 as well.
Preliminary Movements. 37. In order to reduce as far as possible theduration of the operation for the destroyercovering force and the escort of P.Q.I8, theconvoy was brought from Loch Ewe to theDenmark Strait by a separate escort from theWestern Approaches Command, the permanentescort starting from Icelandic ports. It wasnecessary to hold three conferences, one at
Admiralty footnotes:—* P.R.U.—Photographic Reconnaissance Unit.t Vice Admiral Sir Bruce A. Fraser, K.B.E., C.B.t On the north coast of Iceland.§ Vice Admiral S. S. Bonham-Carter, C.B., C.V.O.,
D.S.O.
Loch Ewe for the convoy and others atHvalfiord and Seidisfiord for the escort andcovering forces. These were conducted insuccession by Rear Admiral Commanding,Home Fleet Destroyers.
38. The convoy sailed from Loch Ewe on2nd September and immediately met foulweather. It arrived off Skagi on 7th Septem-ber, thirty-six hours astern of station, and wasthere joined by the ocean escort of threedestroyers, four corvettes, two anti-aircraftships and four trawlers. Apart from theweather, and two U-boat contacts, the passageso far had been uneventful.
39. The weather improved on 8th Septemberand the convoy was joined the next morningby Rear Admiral Commanding, Home FleetDestroyers, in the SCYLLA, eight destroyers,the AVENGER, two Hunt class destroyers toescort her, three minesweepers and two sub-marines, all from Seidisfiord. The other eightdestroyers of the covering force were saileddirect from Akureyri to refuel at Lowe Sound,Spitzbergen. The oilers OLIGARCH andBLUE RANGER, escorted by four destroyers,had sailed from Scapa for Lowe Sound on 3rdSeptember.
Submarines40. Besides the two submarines which
formed part of the close escort, four were dis-posed off the Northern Lofoten Islands in anattempt to intercept the German surface shipsif they moved north, and three off the northcoast in the usual covering positions. TheSCHEER, HIPPER and KOLN moved upfrom Narvik to Altenfiord on 10th September.They were sighted by all four submarines onthe coastal patrols, TIGRIS, TRIBUNE,UREDD and P.54 ; but the TIGRIS alone wasclose enough to fire torpedoes: her attack wasspoilt by one of the screening destroyers, whichalmost rammed her just before she fired, .andthe torpedoes missed astern. After this, thefour inshore submarines were moved up to jointhe covering patrol off the north coast.
First Contact41. The convoy was first sighted by an
enemy aircraft late on 8th September, but wasnot shadowed until 12th September. .Thisimmunity was due to clouds and low visibility ;but it did not unduly disturb the enemy, forhis U-boats were in contact and shadowingfrom 10th September onwards. It did, how-ever, prevent the early and comparatively smallscale ah* attacks which had been directedagainst previous convoys; and thus had theunexpected and unfortunate result of deprivingthe guns and fighters of the practice and experi-ence which would have helped them to dealwith the first massed attack.
Fuelling42. The SCYLLA and five of the destroyers
with the convoy parted company north-east ofJan Mayen Island on llth September and pro-ceeded to Lowe Sound to fuel. The eightdestroyers which had been fuelling joined 'theconvoy early on 13th September, and the forcewith Rear Admiral Commanding, Home FleetDestroyers rejoined at noon the same day. The.two oilers and their screen left Lowe Soundand cruised to the north-westwards to fuel the
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950 5149
destroyers of the cruiser force and await thereturn of the destroyer covering force. All thedestroyers with the convoy were topped up insuccession throughout the passage by the twooilers in company.
U-Boat and Air Attacks43. Though several promising attacks on
U-boats had already been made by the escorts,the first losses to the convoy from U-boatattack did not occur until just before RearAdmiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyersrejoined: two ships were sunk.
44. The air attacks started in the afternoonwith a diversion by six bombers, followedimmediately by a massed attack by forty tofifty torpedo aircraft, each carrying twotorpedoes. This attack came in low, and littlemore than visual warning was obtained, withthe result that the fighters were caught out ofposition, chasing bombers and shadowers. Theattack was pressed right home and eight shipswere sunk. Two smaller torpedo attacks weremade that day, but no more ships were hit.One more serious loss occurred during thenight, the large 'freighting tanker ATHELTEMPLAR being sunk by U-boat.
45. As a result of his experience on the firstday, the Commanding Officer, H.M.S.AVENGER, decided to change his tactics andreserve his fighters for the heavy attacks.Fighter patrols were relieved at short intervals,so that they should not be short of fuel orammunition if an attack developed withoutwarning, and the main force of fighters wasnot normally flown off until the striking forcewas actually in sight. This system, though itdid not give the fighters time to prevent anattack from developing, did ensure that theyshould harass its final stages, disturbing theenemy and spoiling his aim.
46. Combined with the greater accuracy ofanti-aircraft gunfire, which came with experi-ence, the new tactics proved successful. Twoheavy torpedo attacks, by 'twenty-two andtwenty-five aircraft respectively, and two bomb-ing attacks, all on 14th September, succeededonly in sinking one merchant ship ; and a pro-longed attack by about seventy bombers onthe next day was entirely without success.During the whole period, just over two days,"of concentrated air attack, the enemy lost atleast forty aircraft: there can be little doubtthat these heavy casualties, especially amonghis limited supply of really skilled torpedopilots, was largely responsible for the steadydecline in the size and vigour of his attacks.
47. The AVENGER, whose flying deck istoo small for landing on when the ship is pitch-ing, was fortunate in having calm weatherthroughout the operation. The precaution ofattaching two Hunt class destroyers to theAVENGER, for her close protection, provedits value. Several attacks were directedespecially at her, but she suffered no damage.
48. No more air attacks were made onP.Q.I8 while the destroyer covering force wasin company, but off Cape Kanin, near theentrance to the White Sea, three further attackssucceeded in sinking one more ship. Threemore ran aground in a heavy gale off the DvinaBar, but were later refloated, so that twenty-seven of the original forty, and all the escort,arrived safety at Archangel.
0.P.1449. The Westbound convoy of sixteen
merchant ships, escorted by two Hunt classdestroyers, two anti-aircraft ships, fourcorvettes, three minesweepers and four trawlers,sailed from Archangel on 13th September.They were, routed east of P.Q.I8 to pass thatconvoy in approximate latitude 73 ° 30' North,off Nova Zernlya. Here, Rear Admiral Com-manding, Home Fleet Destroyers with his six-teen destroyers, the AVENGER and her twoHunt class destroyers, and the two convoyoilers, transferred in three groups from P.Q.I8to Q.P.14 during the night of 16th/17thSeptember.
50. The latter convoy had been sightedearlier by German aircraft, but the weather wasnow thick and no shadowers were present towitness the transfer. Nor had any U-boatsapparently succeeded in following the covering.force across. The favourable weather con-tinued, and in spite of one aircraft sighting on18th September, Rear Admiral Commanding,Home Fleet Destroyers had hopes of gettingsafely past the southern end of .Spitzbergen andevading further attack by a turn there to thenorth-westward. But the convoy was locatedagain by two enemy aircraft on the morningof 19th September, and the U-boat pack joinedup again during the day.
51. Rear Admiral Commanding, Home FleetDestroyers had decided not to weaken theescort by going again to Lowe Sound to refuel..He had detached two destroyers to bring oneoiler from there to join the convoy, and toorder the other, with her escort, to return toIceland. One ship, which had straggled .soonafter leaving the White Sea, rejoined; andanother straggler was collected by a destroyerdetached from the convoy and escorted to jointhe Spitzbergen oiler force.
52. No air attacks developed, but the U-boatpack, whose performance so far had beenmediocre, made a final effort to redeem theirfailure. In spite of vigorous counter-attacksby the powerful escort, they succeeded in sink-ing the minesweeper LEDA (CommanderA. H. Wynne-Edwards, R.N.) and one merchantship on 20th September, and in hitting theSOMALI (Lieutenant Commander C. D.Maud, D.S.C., R.N.) in the engine room. Thelatter was taken in tow by the ASHANTI.The tow continued under difficult and dan-gerous conditions for four nights and threedays ; but then a northerly gale arose and theSOMALI broke in half and sank, a mostunfortunate end to a gallant attempt.
53. In view of the U-boat menace, RearAdmiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers-had meanwhile detached the SCYLLA andAVENGER to Seidisfiord, transferring his flagto the MILNE. On 22nd September two moremerchant ships and the R.F.A. GREYRANGER were sunk by U-boats*. The convoyhad been routed east of Iceland and throughto Loch Ewe, and the covering force destroyers
Admiralty footnote:—* As a result of these U-boat movements, the convoy
was given anti-U-boat escort by Catalinas from SullomVoe, On the 23rd September, one of these aircraft,although it did not actually meet the convoy, sighteda U-boat at OS33 Z in the vicinity of the convoy andsteering a course of 160° towards it. This U-boat wasattacked by the aircraft with six depth charges anddestroyed.
5150 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950
remained in company as far as Cape Wrath,which was reached on 26th September withoutfurther loss.
54. They had been escorting the two convoysin succession in conditions of almost con-tinual action for a period of 18 days. To theiruntiring vigilance is mainly due the fact thatthe losses were no heavier. These lossessummarised were: —P.Q.l 8. Ten merchant ships by air attack,
three by U-boat. Arrived twenty-seven. Four fighters lost (threepilots safe).
Q.P.14. SOMALI, LEDA, GREY RANGERand three merchant ships byU-boat. Arrived sixteen.
German. At least three U-boats sunk andjseveral more damaged. At leastforty aircraft shot down and many
. more damaged. About two hundredand fifty aircraft torpedoes wereexpended.
Battlefleet55. Vice Admiral Second in Command, Home
•Fleet, with the 'battlefleet, put to sea fromAkureyri on llth September, with the hope ofinducing the enemy to believe that heavy coveras far as thie Bear Island area was being pro-vided as usual. In this he was probablysuccessful, for he was sighted on 12th Septem-ber, on a north-easterly course, and was notagain located, though he returned .to Akureyritwo days later. A similar movement was madefrom 19th to 22nd September, but was notdetected by the enemy.
Submarine Operations56. All available submarines were employed
providing cover and escort for these convoys.After the passage of P.Q.I8 and Q.P.14, theTIGRIS and TRIBUNE were diverted topatrol off the Lofotens for the German heavyships returning to Narvik- from Altenfiord ;but nothing was seen of them. The RUBISat the same time laid mines on their expectedroute. Shortly after parting company withQ.P.14, one of the escorting submarines, P.614,torpedoed and sank a U-boat.
Summary of Results57. The approximate scale of attack and
the losses for the convoys run during thequarter were: —
58. In attacks on convoys and escorts on thisroute, the German Air Force achieved thefollowing results (figures for the previousquarter in brackets): —
Bombers
SortiesSunkSorties per sinking
126 (248)0 (7)- (35)
Torpedoaircraft173 (44)
13 (4)13 (11)
EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH COVERING THEPERIOD IST OCTOBER TO 3IST DECEMBER, 1942
Home Fleet,4th March, 1943.
Return of Hampden Crews1. After the passages of P.Q.I8 and Q.P.14,
the two squadrons of Hampden torpedo air-craft which had flown to Russia for this opera-tion were presented to the Russians. TheARGONAUT, INTREPID and OBDURATEsailed on 13th October to bring home the crewsof these aircraft. * On the outward passage theseships carried the medical unit, which the SovietGovernment had now .consented to allowashore, and food for the British forces in NorthRussia. The Norwegian expedition in Spitz-bergen had also discovered some fresh needs forthe winter ; and the ships called at Barentsburgon the way.
2. The passage was made without incident,save for one sighting by enemy aircraft: theforce reached Kola Inlet on 21st October, sailedthe next day and arrived at Scapa on 28thOctober.Independent Sailings
3. After considerable discussion with the Ad-miralty, it was decided at the end of Octoberto sail about ten ships independently each waybetween Iceland and North Russia, taking ad-vantage of the long nights and the passage northof "Bear Island. The original plan was to sailthe ships at 100-mile intervals in order ofspeed; but for political reasons it was neces-sary to sail British and American shipsalternately, which led occasionally to one shipovertaking another on -passage. Trawlers werespaced along the route for life-saving ; and theAdmiralty ordered two submarines as well tobe used for this purpose.
4. The first eastbound ship left Reykjavik on29th "October and was followed by twelveothers. The first indication to the enemy that
Convoy
P.Q. 17
Q.P. 13
P.Q. 18
Q.P. 14
Ships sailed
38 (+ 2 rescue vesselsjoined later)
35
40
•
20
Attacked by
U-boats6 bombers
33 torpedo aircraft ...
No
U-boats140 torpedo aircraft120 bombers
U-boats
Ships lost
0^1 +210 }• after3 J scattering
5 own minefield
3100
4
Reacheddestination
13
30
27
16
Notes(i) In P.Q.I 7, two of the ships turned back to their port of departure, whilst one went aground the day after
sailing but was subsequently salved.(ii) About 15 U-boats operated against each pair of convoys.(iii) Fleet oilers and rescue vessels in company with the. convoys are included in these numbers, but escorts,
are not.
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950 5151
anything was in the wind was an attack by theNORTHERN SPRAY, one of the rescuetrawlers, on a U-boat near Jan Mayen Island.It is probable that the news of this encounterled the enemy to increase his air reconnais-sance and U-boat patrols. Of the thirteen east-bound ships, five reached Archangel, four weresunk, one ran aground near South Cape, Spitz-bergen, and three returned to Iceland. Onlyfour westbound ships were sailed, of whiehthree arrived safely at Akureyri: the fourthwas recalled when it became apparent that therewas considerable enemy activity in the BarentsSea, but failed to get the signal and was sunk.A fifth westbound Russian ship was sailed on14th November, just ahead of Q.P.15, andarrived safely. The Russians thereafter con-tinued to sail ships independently in theintervals between convoys: four more weresailed late in November and fifteen inDecember : all arrived without loss,
5. The operations for the occupation ofFrench North Africa left too few. ships in theHome Fleet to provide escorts on the earlierscale ; but the light and ice conditions, morefavourable than at any other time of the year,and the withdrawal of much of the German AirForce in Northern Norway offered opportunitiesfor more lightly escorted convoys. It was there-fore decided to resume this traffic in mid-November with a westbound convoy from theWhite Sea.
6. As the passage would be made in almostcontinuous darkness, and foul weather couldalso be expected, I requested that the convoyshould be limited to twenty ships, butthe Admiralty directed that thirty shipsshould be included. It sailed on 17thNovember, escorted by five minesweepers,four corvettes, one trawler and oneA.A. ship ; and was to be reinforced in theBarents Sea by five destroyers under the com-mand of Captain (D), 8th Destroyer Flotilla,relieved by five others from a position westof Bear Island. The Rear Admiral Com-manding, 1st Cruiser Squadron*, in theLONDON, with the SUFFOLK and threedestroyers, provided surface cover west of Bear •Island. One Russian and three British sub-marines operated off the. exits from Altenfiord,to deter the HIPPER and KOLN from sailing.
7. The convoy met a succession of galesthroughout its passage. These, with the almostComplete lack of daylight, caused it to becomevery scattered. Neither destroyer forcesucceeded in making contact with the mainbody ; and by the time the convoy had passedBear Island, it and its escort had broken upinto a number of small groups, spread over alarge area and 'without knowledge of eachother's whereabouts. The route was adjustedto pass south of Bear Island and avoid thenormal U-boat concentration between thereand Spitzbergen, but many ships did notreceive the amending signal.
8. In the absence of air reconnaissance, forwhich the weather was quite unsuitable, theenemy was presumably even more lacking inknowledge of the situation than ourselves. Ofthe thirty ships which sailed, twenty-seven
Admiralty footnote ; —* Rear Admiral L. H. K. Hamilton, D.S.O.
arrived safely in Icelandic waters, one returnedto Kola Inlet and two were sunk, both probablyby U-boats. The safe arrivals were roundedup and taken straight on in two convoys toLoch Ewe.
Mid-winter Policy9. From late November to mid-January the
lack of daylight is such that air reconnaissancein the Arctic is virtually impossible. Providedthat a convoy is of such a size that it canbe handled and kept together, it thereforestands an excellent chance of evading bothU-boat and surface attack, and even of com-pleting the passage without the enemy know-ing of its existence. A large convoy, on theother hand, is likely to fail to keep in companyand to split, as did Q.P.I5, into a large numberof small groups, covering a vast area and un-aware of each other's position or composition.Such small groups would be more liable todetection by U-boats than a single concentratedconvoy, and would present the enemy surfaceforces with an ideal opportunity for an offen-sive sweep. Our own covering forces arealways handicapped by having to identify aradar contact before they are free to attack:the enemy need,not do so. The splitting ofthe convoy into a large number of scatteredunits would greatly add to this handicap.
10. It was obviously advantageous to,runthrough as many ships as possible during thisshort dark period, rather than to defer ourcommitments until air reconnaissance couldstart again. Though it would be impossibleto provide strong surface escort for a largenumber of small convoys, the chances ofevasion were, in my opinion, so good that therisk of interception by superior surface forcesshould be accepted.
11. I had asked that about six merchantships, escorted by three trawlers", should beheld ready in Iceland to sail shortly before thearrival of Q.P.1S if the U-boats were drawnout of position by that convoy; but theAdmiralty did not approve this suggestion.They proposed instead to wait until 22ndDecember and then to sail a convoy of thirty-one ships, with an escort of summer dimen-sions. The experience of Q.P.15 confirmedmy opinion that a convoy o'f this size couldnot fee handled: the Admiralty proposal, more-over, would waste the first half of the darkperiod.
12. I therefore signalled my intention on25th November to limit the convoy in size andasked that the assembly of the first ten shipsmight be hastened. This small convoy was tobe escorted by four destroyers from the HomeFleet and any minesweepers and trawlerswhich could be made available. TheAdmiralty, however, insisted in their reply of26th November that it was essential to providea covering force strong enough to deal withthe scale of attack which they expected, andconsidered that the only alternatives wereeither to sail thirty ships in company, or inthree groups so close together that one forcecould cover all three. After, further discussion,including a Visit to London by my Chief ofStaff, I was directed to sail the convoy in twoparts of sixteen ships each, escorted by sevendestroyers and some smaller craft; and theHome Fleet was reinforced by two 6-inch
5152 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950
cruisers to allow of cruiser cover in theBarents Sea.
13. The large number of U-boats whichusually surround and accompany these seven-knot convoys are a serious menace to cover-ing cruisers so far from their base. The experi-•ence of the past year, and especially the lossof the EDINBURGH, had underlined this risk.After balancing it against the risk of surfaceattack, my intention had been that the 6-inchcruisers, if they became available, should pro-vide cover as far as 25° East and thenreturn to Iceland. The Admiralty, however,were insistent that the cruisers should cover"the convoys right through to Kola ; this insist-ence was fully justified in the event, for other-wise the cruiser force would probably not havebeen present at the action on New Year's Eve.
J.W.51A14. For security reasons, the titles of the
convoys were changed from P.Q. and Q.P. toJ.W. and R.A., both starting with the number51. The first sixteen ships were assembled atLoch Ewe on 15th December. So that nomore time should ibe wasted, it was decided tosail them direct from there, followed a weeklater by the next sixteen, all routed east ofthe Faroes.
15. The first group, J.W.51A, was escortedfrom Loch Ewe by three Hunt class destroyers,one minesweeper, two corvettes and twotrawlers, the Hunts being relieved north-eastof Iceland by seven destroyers under Captain(D), 8th Destroyer Flotilla from Seidisfiord.The Rear Admiral (D), Home Fleet* in theSHEFFIELD, with the JAMAICA, OPPOR-TUNE and MATCHLESS, was to providecover to the vicinity of Iceland, enter Seidis-fiord to refuel and again provide cover from15° East: but low visibility prevented thecruisers from getting into Seidisfiord, so thetwo destroyers were detached to 'fuel and jointhe close escort, while the Rear Admiral (D)proceeded with the cruisers.
16. I sailed from Scapa on' 19th Decemberin the KING GEORGE V, with the BERWICKand three destroyers, to provide cover to thewestwards of 15° East, subsequently returningto Scapa. Four submarines were disposed offthe exits from Altenfiord.
17. No enemy forces of any sort wereencountered, and the convoy arrived intact atKola Inlet on Christmas Day, the only incidenthaving been a report by a Russian aircraft oftwo ships which proved to be the OPPOR-TUNE and MATCHLESS. Five ships of theconvoy were detached off Kildin Island andarrived at Molotovsk, in tlie White Sea, on27th December.
J.W.51B and R.A.5118. Only fourteen ships were ready for the
next convoy, J.W.51B, which left Loch Ewe on22nd December with an escort similar to itspredecessor. The BULLDOG, on passage toSeidisfiord, suffered severe weather damage ; soCaptain (D), 17th Destroyer Flotilla hadonly six destroyers in company when he sailedfrom there to join the convoy. Cover as far as15° East was provided by the ANSON,wearing the flag of the Vice Admiral Second in
Admiralty footnote:—*Rear Admiral R. L. Burnett, C.B., O.B.E.
Command, Home £leet*, with the CUMBER-LAND and three destroyers, sailing fromAkureyri on 26th December.
19. A westbound convoy, R.A.51, of thirteenships, with the escort from J.W.51A, left KolaInlet on 30th December. The Rear Admiral(D), Home Fleet, with his cruiser force, was tocover both these convoys in the Barents Sea andsubsequently, if fuel permitted, to return "toSeidisfiord.
20. The first part of the passage of J.W.51Bwas without incident, though it is possible thatthe convoy was sighted by enemy aircraft on24th December. The ORIBI had a gyrocompass failure and lost touch on 28th: aftersearching for twenty-four hours she failed toregain contact, and proceeded independently toKola. During that night a gale arose and theport wing column of the convoy lost touch:the BRAMBLE was detached to search forthese ships and the VIZALMA, stationedastern of the column, also lost touch with themain body. Neither of these rejoined the con-voy, but three of 'the merchant ships latersucceeded in doing so.
Surface Action21. At 0830 on New Yearns Eve, the situation
was therefore as follows. The convoy, now re-duced to twelve ships, was on an easterlycourse, about 220 miles north-north-west ofthe Kola Inlet and 13 miles south of its orderedroute. The escort still in company consistedof H.M. destroyers ONSLOW (Captain R. St.V. Sherbrooke, D.S.O., R.N., Captain (D).17th Destroyer Flotilla), OBEDIENT(Lieutenant Commander D. C. Kinloch, R.N.),ORWELL (Lieutenant Commander N. H. G.Austen, D.S.O., R.N.), OBDURATE (Lieu-tenant Commander C. E. L. Sclater, D.S.O.,R.N.) and ACHATES (Lieutenant CommanderA. H. T. Johns, R.N.), H.M. corvettes RHODO-DENDRON (Lieutenant Commander L. A.Sayers, R.N.R.) and HYDERABAD(Lieutenant S. C. B. Hickman, D.S.C., R.N.R.),and H.M. trawler NORTHERN GEM (SkipperLieutenant W. J. Mullender, R.D.. R.N.R.).Some 35 miles to the northward was H.M.trawler VIZALMA (Temporary LieutenantJ. R. Anglebeck, R.N.V.R.) with one merchantship in company, and about 15 miles to thenorth-eastward was H.M.S. BRAMBLE(Commander H. T. Rust, D.S.O., R.N.). RearAdmiral R. L. Burnett, C.B., O.B.E. (RearAdmiral (D), Home Fleet) flying his flag inH.M.S. SHEFFIELD (Captain A. W. Clarke,R.N.), with H.M.S. JAMAICA (Captain J. L.Storey, R.N.) in company, was about 25 milesnorth of the convoy and 10 miles south of theVIZALMA. None of these four groups kneweach other's relative position, and there was oneother straggler in the vicinity.
22. Reports had been received of D/F bear-ings' on one U-boat well ahead of the convoy,one U-boat'well to the southward and an enemydestroyer off North Cape; and a suspectedU-boat had been reported and attacked with-out success the evening before. But there wasotherwise no indication that the enemy was atsea, or even aware of the passage of the convoy.
23. The visibility in the twilight was about7 miles to the northward and 10 miles to the
Admiralty footnote:—* Vice Admiral Sir Bruce A. Fraser, K.B.E., C.B.
SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950 5153
southward. The sky was mostly covered withlow cloud; wind W.N.W. force 3 ; sea slightwith no swell. . There were 16 degrees of frost,and ice on all ships.
24. The HYDERABAD, on the starboardquarter of the convoy; sighted two destroyers(later seen to be three) bearing 180° at0820: she thought they were Russian destroyerscoming to reinforce the escort and did not re-port them: but they were sighted and reportedsoon afterwards by the OBDURATE, stationedon the starboard beam of the convoy. Sheclosed them at best speed and they retired tothe north-westward, across the stern of the con-voy, opening fire at 0930 on the OBDURATE,who retired on the convoy. Captain (D),17th Destroyer Flotilla, from ahead, altereddown the port side of the convoy and orderedthe destroyers to concentrate. While theORWELL, OBEDIENT and OBDURATEwere moving to comply, the ACHATES, whosestation was on the port quarter, started to laya smoke screen to cover the convoy, whichmade an emergency turn to 135".
25. Before the other destroyers had joined,the ONSLOW sighted a large ship to the north-westward, coming towards her at high speed.This was probably the HIPPER. She turnedeast and opened fire on the ACHATES, whowas very conspicuous because of her smokescreen. The ONSLOW immediately openedfire, at 9,000 yards, and turned to a courseparallel to the enemy to keep between her andthe convoy. The other three " O" classdestroyers were now joining and the enemy re-tired to the northward under smoke, firing afew salvos at the convoy as she did so.
26. Captain (D), 17th Destroyer Flotillaconcluded that the enemy was unwilling toface the risk of torpedo attack by ourdestroyers and for the next 25 minutes he madeuse of this fact. He detached the OBEDIENTand OBDURATE to close the convoy and in-crease its protection against any attempt by theenemy destroyers to attack ; and himself in theONSLOW, with the pRWELL in company,conducted an intermittent action with theHIPPER, scoring several hits and preventingher from coming any closer to the convoy. At1020, however, the ONSLOW was hit fourtimes in rapid succession. and suffered con-siderable damage. A and B guns were put outof action and fire broke out in the fore super-structure and messdeck, the main aerials andboth radar sets were destroyed, the engine roomholed, and Captain (D) was severely woundedin the face, disabling the left eye so that hecould not see. In spite of this severe handicaphe continued to direct the flotilla and his shipuntil compelled to disengage the ONSLOW asa result of a further hit. Only after receivingreports that the hole in his engine room wasplugged, that the main engine's and steering gearwere still efficient and that OBEDIENT hadtaken charge of the destroyers in accordancewith his signalled instructions did he consentto leave his bridge to receive medical attention.From his sea cabin he continued to receivereports of the action and to advise LieutenantCommander T. J. G. Marchant, R.N., whoassumed command of the ONSLOW.*
Admiralty footnote:—* Captain (D), 17th Destroyer Flotilla, Captain R.
St. V. Sherbrooke, D.S.O., R.N., was subsequentlyawarded the V.C. for his conduct on this occasion. •
27. Rear Admiral (D) meanwhile, away tothe northward, had at 0858 obtained radar con-tact on a ship to the north-westward of hisforce. While closing to identify this echo hesighted at 0932 gun flashes over the horizon tothe southward, but considered that they wereH.A. fire. The echo was the VIZALMA andher merchant vessel; but before they could beidentified as such, the gunfire to the south-ward increased and an enemy report wasreceived from Captain (D) 17. Course wasaltered to close and speed worked up to 31knots.
28. About 1030, soon after the ONSLOWhad suffered her damage, two ships were de-tected by SHEFFIELD'S radar, one bearing180° and the other 140°, both on an easterlycourse. From "subsequent examination of thereports it apears probable (but by no meanscertain) that the former was the HIPPER andthe latter the LUTZOW, some miles ahead ofher. Although both ships came in sight soonafter and were seen to be larger than destroyers,and therefore enemy; it was impossible toidentify them precisely: Rear Admiral (D)therefore altered to the eastward to allow theradar action plot to become clearer*.
29. After the cruisers had been on this coursefor about 20 minutes, the leading enemy ship(probably LUTZOW) altered to starboard to-wards the convoy and Rear Admiral (D) turnedtowards the other, who soon followed her con-sort to the southward. The SHEFFIELD andJAMAICA opened fire on this second ship(probably HIPPER) and appeared to take hercompletely by surprise, as she failed to replytill after the SHEFFIELD'S fourth salVo. Hitswere seen almost at once and the enemyappeared to alter towards under cover ofsmoke. While the SHEFFIELD was startingto conform, a destroyer was suddenly sightedfine on the bow and fire was shifted to this newtarget. She was hit at once and repeatedly,and left in a sinking condition. The Germanslater admitted the loss of this destroyer. TheJAMAICA meanwhile ..was engaging anotherdestroyer, which turned away and was lost toview.
30. During this action the radar had con-tinued to track the original target (probablyHIPPER), and as soon as it was over the chasewas resumed. She was sighted again at 1215and soon after two destroyers and the secondlarge ship (probably LUTZOW) came in sight,all steering to the westward. The last namedship had probably made a wider sweep to theeast and south than her consort and sank theBRAMBLE in the course of it; for a reportwas received from the BRAMBLE of an enemycruiser, and an engagement was seen in herprobable direction between a heavy ship anda much smaller one which fired a single gunand pom-pom tracer. At 1045 an enemy shipfrom the north-eastward came in sight of theOBEDIENT, and the destroyers protecting theconvoy once more went into action. It is notpossible definitely to establish which ship thiswas: there is some evidence to suggest that itwas a third heavy ship, possibly a 6-inchcruiser, or it may have been the LUTZOW.
31. Since the Commanding Officer, H.M.S.OBEDIENT -had taken command and theAdmiralty footnote:—
* The enemy force was in fact LUTZOW, HIPPER andsix large destroyers, one of which was sunk.
5154 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1950
HIPPER had been driven off, the close escorthad been shepherding the convoy to the south-ward. Several enemy ships had been reported,but none of these attacked and it is possiblethat these reports .were mistaken. TheOBEDIENT, ORWELL and OBDURATEwere concentrated between the convoy and theenemy heavy ships, .the ONSLOW wasstationed at the head of the convoy, and theACHATES* who reported that she was holedforward and speed reduced to 15 knots, wasordered to proceed to the same position. Shehad been covering the convoy with smoke, withthe utmost coolness and efficiency, since thestart of the action, and had sustained thisdamage from a near miss at about 0945.
32. Unfortunately, she again became the firsttarget of the attacking heavy unit (LUTZOWor 6-inch cruiser). Her bridge was hit, herCommanding Officer killed, and considerabledamage was sustained in a boiler room andelsewhere. In spite of this she continued,under the command of her First Lieutenant,Lieutenant L. E. P. Jones,. R.N., to screen theconvoy with smoke for another hour and fortyminutes, until compelled at 1300 to ask theNORTHERN GEM to stand by. Half anhour later the ACHATES sank. The loss ofthis ship and so many of her fine company,after the outstanding work she had done, ismost deeply regretted. Eighty-one survivorswere picked up.
33. The enemy ship, after damaging theACHATES, had been engaging the remainingthree destroyers, trying to break through tothe convoy. She managed to put theOBEDIENT's W/T out .of action, and theOBDURATE was 'ordered to assume com-mand, but apart from this she had no success,while several hits were claimed on her. Twodestroyers which followed her took no part inthe action. She disappeared to the north-westwards at 1130. Twice more during thenext forty minutes did an enemy heavy shipapproach the convoy but each time she wasdriven off by the escort. On the first of theseoccasions the shell splashes are reported tohave been larger than any others seen that day,and it seems probable that these two attacks,at any rate, were made by the LUTZOW.Finally, this ship, whoever she was, also with-drew to the north-westward.
34. The SHEFFIELD and JAMAICA main-tained touch with the two heavy ships until1345, by which time it was established beyondall doubt that they were retiring towards theirbase. Minor splinter damage was sustainedbut no casualties. The cruisers then returnedto cover the convoy. '
35. The close escort, who were unaware thatthe enemy had finally left, spent an anxiousnight; but no further attack developed and theconvoy arrived complete at Kolalnlet.
36. The conduct of all officers and men of theescort and covering forces throughout thissuccessful action against greatly superior forceswas in accordance with the traditions of theservice. That an enemy force of at least onepocket battleship, one heavy cruiser and. sixdestroyers, with all the advantage of surpriseand concentration, should be held off for fourhours by five destroyers and driven from thearea by two 6-inch cruisers, without any loss tothe convoy, is most creditable and satisfactory.
Additional Cover,37. Though full information of the progress
of this action did not become available till later,it was evident that the cruiser force was unlikelyto have enough fuel remaining to cover R.A.51throughout the dangerous part of its passage.I therefore put to sea in -the KING GEORGEV, with the HOWE, KENT, BERWICK, BER-MUDA and six destroyers, to give additionalcover. The weather limited the speed of thedestroyers, so the Rear Admiral Commanding,1st Cruiser Squadron was detached with thetwo heavy cruisers to proceed at best speed toa covering position south-west of Bear Island ;the battlefleet occupied a covering area furtherto 'the west.
38. The enemy surface forces, however, hadapparently had enough. Captain (D), 8thDestroyer Flotilla, in command of the escort, bythe help of D/F bearings and contacts obtainedwith radar, manoeuvred the convoy to avoidthe small number of U-boats which were onpatrol and brought it without loss to the UnitedKingdom.
Summary of Results39. The approximate scale of attack and the
losses of merchant shipping, on this route duringthe quarter were: —
Convoy
Q.P. 15
J.W. 51A
J.W. 51B
R.A.51
Independents
Ships sailed
30
16
14
14
37
Attacked by
U-boats
— •'
Heavy surface forces...U-boats
—
Unknown
Ships lost
2
—
—
—
6
Reacheddestination
27
16
14
14
28
Notes(i) Where the sum of the columns 4 and 5 is less than column 2, the remaining ships returned to their port of
departure.(ii) The U-boat effort was smaller than in the previous quarters, and varied between 3 and 7 against each convoy,(iii) Air attacks were experienced by a few of the independently sailed ships only.
P R I N T E D I N O R E A T B R I T A I N
LONDON
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1950
Price \s. 6d. netS.O. Code No. 65 39041
