Sun Yat-sen : Will and Autobiography

8/9/2019 Sun Yat-sen : Will and Autobiography

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From “Sun Yat-sen, His Political and Social Ideals”A Source Book Compiled, Translated and Annotated

By LEONARD SHIHLIEN HSÜ, M.A., LL.B., PH.D

THE WILL AND THE

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I. The Will, February 24, 1925

II. The Autobiography


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THE WILL AND THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 3

I HAVE SERVED the cause of the People’s Revolution for

forty years, during which time my object has consistently beento secure liberty and equality for our country. From the experi-ence of these forty years, I have come to realize that, in orderto reach this object, it is necessary to awaken the masses of ourpeople, and to join hands with those countries which are pre-pared to treat us as equals in our ght for the common causeof humanity. At present, we have not yet completed the workof the Revolution, and it is my sincere hope that our comradeswill continue to ght for the ultimate realization of our goal,

in accordance with the Principles of National Reconstruction,the Program of National Reconstruction, the San Min Doc-trine, and the Declaration of the First National Convention,all of which have been drawn up by myself. Recently I haveproposed the convening of a national people’s conference andthe abolition of unequal treaties; you should especially worktoward the realization of these aims within the shortest possibleperiod of time.

The above is my will. SUN WEN

Taken down by Wang Ching-wei, February 24Fourteenth Year of the Republic of China

WITNESSES: T. V. Soong Wu Ching-heng, Sun Fo HoHsiang-ying, Shao Yuan-ch’ung Tai Chi-tao, Tai En-shai Tsui Lu

I. THE WILL OFDR. SUN YAT-SEN


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THE WILL AND THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 5

This account of his own revolutionary career by Dr. Sun teasincluded in Chapter VIII of Dr. Sun’s PHILOSOPHICALESSAYS, published In iQip. The title in Chinese is called

SUN WEN HSUEH SHE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THE GREAT MEN in our history have succeeded in ac-complishing great work because it was in conformity with thelaws of nature, with the sentiments of men, and with the trend

of world progress, and because it fullled the real needs oftheir time. This principle has proved true time after time inthe course of our history, especially in the work of politicalreconstruction. With reference to the Republican Revolution inChina, we are fortunate to have nished the period of destruc-tion. Although the reconstructional work has not yet begun,the hope for the future is nevertheless great, and I am sure thatultimately success will be secured.

It is hoped that the following account of the origin and devel-opment of the Revolution will be a source of inspiration forfurther activities of my co-workers, as well as to myself. Sincethe Republic was rst created, scholars and writers all over theworld have produced a large amount of literature concerningthe Chinese Revolution. But most of these accounts are basedon either wayside observation or newspaper stories. There are,

II. AUTOBIOGRAPHYOF DR. SUN YAT-SEN


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6 THE WILL AND THE AUTOBIOGRAPHYSUN YAT-SEN 7

indeed, very few writers who really know the inside facts ofthe Revolution.

The stories concerning the origin of the Revolution are largely

drawn from the rst chapter of my book, Kidnaped in Lon-don* but that chapter was by no means an adequate accountof the origin of the Chinese Revolution. Furthermore, no onecould foretell twenty years ago whether or not the Revolutionwould be successful. So, at the time the book was written,even though I was in the Capital of Great Britain, I could notsay many things which I can say now. For instance, I darednot confess in that book that I was the founder of the HsingChung Hui (Raising China Society, or the Society for the

Restoration of the Chinese Nation) nor could I disclose thereal purpose of that society, namely, to overthrow the Manchudynasty.

I hereby afrm these facts as corrections to that book. Thefollowing account covers what I am able to remember ofthe last thirty years of revolutionary activities. From the daythat I decided to become a revolutionist to the day when theTung Ming Hui (the Revolutionary Alliance) was founded, the

Revolution was practically limited to my own personal activity.The beginning was so small that I can remember the namesof everyone of my associates. After the Tung Ming Hui wasfounded, the work of the Revolution became more and morecomplicated; and the number of people who participated in therevolutionary activities became larger and larger. There werepatriots and public-spirited citizens, who sacriced their lives

in the work. There were so many that I cannot name them allin this brief account. I hope when the ofcial history of theRevolution is written, a fuller description of those who helpedin the Revolution will be given.

* [In Chinese, London Pe Lan Chi. published in 1897.]

THE FIRST PERIOD OF REVOLUTIONARY

PROPAGANDA 1885-1892

My decision to overthrow the Manchu regime and to establisha republic was made in the year 1885 when the Sino-French

War took place. The school I was attending was the head-quarters of my revolutionary propaganda, and I utilized mymedical profession to establish contacts. Propaganda was keptup without cessation for ten years. During my school days inthe P’u Chi Medical School in Canton, a schoolmate of mine,by the name of Cheng Shih-liang, alias P*i Chen, was mymost active associate in revolutionary activities. He was fullof initiative and ambition, and was very popular among our

schoolmates. He was the center of a group of able, energeticyoung men, and his friends all admired his personality and hisleadership. I talked to him on the matter of revolution. He atonce gave it his full-hearted support. He told me that he wasalready a member of a secret organization, and he promisedthat he would enlist his fraternal associates in my service inconnection with the Revolution.


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After a year in the medical school in Canton, I was trans-ferred to the British Medical College in Hongkong, because ithad a better curriculum, and because Hongkong was a betterplace from which to carry on revolutionary propaganda. In

Hongkong, I kept up my propaganda work for a number ofyears. During my spare hours, I traveled a great deal betweenHongkong and Macao, and lectured on the Revolution withoutany thought of danger. Among those who were inuenced bymy speeches, I may mention the names of Chen Shao-po, YuShao-wan, Yang Ho-ling of Hongkong, and Lu Hao-tung ofShang-hai. Other friends of mine thought that I was insane,and would avoid meeting me. But Chen, Yu, Yang, and my-

self, were often together. Our conversation, our thoughts, andour studies were concentrated on the problem of the Revolu-tion. As a matter of fact, we were not happy unless we weretalking about revolution. This went on for several years, andour friends in Hongkong and Macao called us the “Four BigRebels.” Such was the rst period of revolutionary propaganda.

REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZING WORK

IN CANTON, 1892-1895 AND THE INCIDENTOF SEPTEMBER 9, 1895

After graduation, I practiced medicine in Macao and Can-ton, where I engaged secretly in revolutionary activities. Atthe same time, Cheng Shih-liang was active in securing newrevolutionary co-workers, in making connections with army

ofcers, and in preparing for a revolution. Then, accompaniedby Lu Hao-tung, 1 went to Peking and Tientsin in order tond out how strong was the Manchu government. We alsowent down to Wuhan to observe the conditions in the Yangtze

Valley. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894, weset out for Honolulu and North America, and established aHsing Chung Hui in Manila, hoping to make connectionswith overseas Chinese and to get their support. Unfortunately,most of them were conservative; so several months of activ-ities in the Hawaiian Islands resulted in very little. We didinterest, however, Cheng Yin-nan and his elder brother, ChengTeh-chang, and a few of their relatives. The Cheng brothers

contributed their fortune to the cause of the Revolution, andit was a great help.

Meanwhile, the Manchu soldiers were defeated by the Japanese.Korea was lost to Japan; Port Arthur and Weihaiwei were be-sieged. The capture of Peking and Tientsin was imminent. Asthis war revealed the corruption and weakness of the Manchugovernment, a spirit of unrest prevailed throughout the country.Sung Yueh-ju, a revolutionary comrade in Shanghai, wrote to

me, and urged me to return to China at once, to start a revo-lution. So, instead of going to America, I returned to China,accompanied by Cheng Yin-nan and a few others, to directrevolutionary activities.

Our plan was to capture Canton as our revolutionary baseand so we established a Nung Hsueh Hut (the Associationfor the Promotion of Agricultural Science) in Canton as our


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headquarters. Among those who took charge of that ofcewere Lu Hao-tung, Cheng Shih-liang, and a number of West-ern technicians and army ofcers. We also opened the ChienHeng Company in Hongkong as our subofce, and Cheng

Yin-nan, Yang Chu-yiin, Huang Yun-hsiang, and Chen Shao-potook charge of the work. I myself ran back and forth betweenCanton and Hongkong to organize revolutionary activities.After half a year’s hard work, things were well organized andwe were ready to start the revolution. Unfortunately, due to ourcarelessness in transporting ammunition, the Maritime Cus-toms discovered six hundred pistols in our ships, and manyarrests followed. In this connection, Lu Hao-tung was executed;he was in fact the rst person in China to give his life tothe Republican Revolution. After Lu’s death, two more, ChiuSu, and Chu Kwei-chuan were executed. This time more thanseventy were arrested, including Admiral Chen Kwei-kuang ofthe Canton Navy, who subsequently died in prison; those whowere considered not so guilty were either sentenced to prisonor released. The raid took place on September 9, 1895; thiswas my rst failure in the course of the revolution.

[The Sino-Japanese War look place in 1894-1895.]

FROM JAPAN TO THE UNITED STATESBY WAY OF HONOLULU IN 1895

For three days after the raid, I hid myself in the city ofCanton. About ten days later, I managed to get to Hong-

kong; there I took the boat to Japan, and Cheng Shih-Hangand Chen Shao-po were with me. We stopped at Yokoha-ma. Having realized that there was no hope of immediatereturn to China, I cut off my queue, changed to foreign

clothing, and prepared for another trip to Honolulu. ChenShih-liang, however, decided to return to China in order toprepare for another revolution. Chen Shao-po decided to re-main in Japan for study of the political conditions of thatcountry. I introduced him to my Japanese friend, SugawaraDen, whom I had met in Honolulu during my last trip. Lateron, he introduced Chen Shao-po to Sone Hikotora, who inturn introduced Chen to Miyazaki Yazo, the elder brother of

Miyazaki Torazo. This was the beginning of contacts betweenour revolutionists and the Japanese statesmen.

When I arrived at Honolulu, I gathered the old comradesto strengthen the Hsing Chung Hui. Most of them werediscouraged because of our failure, but others joined ourcause. Due to the general reactionary atmosphere that pre-vailed among the Chinese in Honolulu, I could not do muchthere, and so I decided to proceed to America. I hoped to

do better work in America because there were many timesmore Chinese in the United States than in Honolulu. I wasready to depart.

One day while I was taking a walk on the street, I saw myold teacher, Sir James Cantlie, and his wife, in a car. Tothe surprise of the old couple, I jumped on the car. At rst,they took me for a robber; because I was in foreign clothing


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they did not recognize me. I exclaimed that I was Sun Yat-sen. We shook hands and exchanged greetings. I inquiredhow they came to be in Honolulu; they replied that theywere going back to England by way of Honolulu and the

United States. I then acted as their guide for sight-seeing,and showed them around the town. When I sent them backto the boat, I told them that I was making a trip aroundthe world, and that I should see them again in England. Ifound the Chinese in America even more conservative thanthe Chinese in Honolulu. I traveled from San Francisco toNew York, and stopped at a good many places, sometimesfor a few days, sometimes for a couple of weeks. Everywhere

I preached to the Chinese about the crisis in the mothercountry, the corruption of the Manchu government, and thenecessity of a fundamental national reconstruction in orderto bring about national salvation. I also pointed out thatit was everyone’s duty to participate in the reconstruction.Though I worked hard, there were very few who paid anyattention to me. There were only a few individuals, at mosta dozen or two in each city, who were favorable to my ideasof revolution.

THE HUNG MEN FRATERNITY

The Chinese in various American cities, however, had estab-lished the so-called Hung Men Guilds. The Hung Men Frater-nity had been organized during the reign of K’ang Hsi by men

who were still loyal to the Ming dynasty and wanted to restoreit to power. Before the time of K’ang Hsi, the pro-Ming patri-ots refused to submit themselves to the authority of the Man-chu; and revolted many times against the new government. But

they never succeeded. By the time of K’ang Hsi, the power ofthe Manchus was well established, and most of these pro-Mingpatriots were dead. Those who survived, seeing that nothingcould be done to restore the Ming dynasty in the immediatefuture, decided to organize secret societies for the propagationof nationalist principles to future generations.

[K’ang Hsi (1655-1723) was the second ruler of the Manchudynasty (1644-1912)]

[Ming dynasty (1368-1644)]The program of these secret organizations was to overthrowthe Manchu regime and to restore the Ming dynasty. Suchorganizations must necessarily remain secret, so as to avoiddiscovery by the government. Since ofcials were the toolsof government and the local gentry were the tools of theofcials, these secret organizations excluded ofcials and localgentry from membership. Only under such conditions could

the society survive under the autocratic government of a foreignrace. In order to propagate nationalism, it was necessary toinvent methods adapted to the minds of common people. Sothe initiation ceremony of the Hung Men Fraternity was castin the form of a play, because drama was the most popularform of amusement in China. By means of a play, nationalistideas could be easily propagated, deeds of injustice could be


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portrayed and a sense of revenge could be aroused. The secretsignals of the Fraternity consisted of slang words and badlanguage, so that rened gentlemen would try to get away fromthe people who used these terms, and consequently would not

detect their signals. As mutual aid was very helpful to travelersand the homeless, the Fraternity emphasized mutual aid. Theultimate purpose of all these activities was of course to propa-gate the Doctrine of Nationalism and to hasten the restorationof the Ming regime.

But as time went on, the spirit of the organization changed.The fraternal groups in China, because of their constant con-

ict with the mandarin class, still considered the Manchu gov -ernment as their enemy and still comprehended the signicanceof the fraternal signals. On the other hand, the fraternal groupsabroad had almost completely forgotten the original purposeof the organization in their enjoyment of their free life underthe democratic governments of foreign countries. The groupsbecame merely social fraternities; and lost their political avor.Many of them did not understand even the signicance of the

restoration. When I preached revolution in America, membersof the Hung Men Fraternity were indifferent toward me. WhenI asked them the meaning of restoration, a great majority couldnot answer my question. Only after my comrades in Americahad spent many years in revolutionary propaganda did theHung Men brothers begin to realize that they were the originalrevolutionists.

REVOLUTIONARY WORK IN EUROPE AND JAPAN

AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONNECTIONS

IN CHINA 1896-1900

Although what I did in America was not much, it caught theattention of the Manchu government. As soon as I arrivedin London, I was kidnaped and imprisoned in the ChineseLegation. If Sir James Cantlie had not secured the help ofthe British government and people to get me released, I wouldhave lost my life. It was indeed providential that I had met SirJames in Honolulu. Otherwise, I would not have known thathe had returned to England, and he would not have known that

I had come to London. After I escaped from the trouble inLondon, I remained temporarily in the continental countries tostudy their political conditions and to get acquainted with theirstatesmen. I learned a great deal during my two years on theContinent. I found out that although the European countrieswere powerful and wealthy, and had secured democratic gov-ernments, the people were not happy. For that reason, manyprogressive Europeans wanted to establish a new social order;and they were engaged in social revotionary activities.

In the light of these ndings, I sought for a more permanentsolution of China’s political and social problems by combiningsocial revolution with political revolution. I conceived of theMin Sheng Doctrine (the Doctrine of Livelihood) along withthe Min Ts’u Doctrine (the Doctrine of Nationalism) and theMin Ck’nan Doctrine (the Doctrine of Democracy) as the


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three doctrines of the people capable of solving the problemsof China.

At that time, there were no Chinese students studying inEurope, and the number of Chinese merchants and workersin Europe was very small. Because I had no opportunity todo revolutionary propaganda in Europe, I went back to Japan.Because Japan was China’s next neighbor, it was easier for meto direct revolutionary activities in the Chinese provinces fromJapan than from Europe. On arriving in Japan, Mr. InukaiTakeshi, the leader of the Japanese Liberal Party, sent Messrs.Miyazaki Yazo and Hirayama Shin to meet me in Yokohama,and these gentlemen took me to Tokyo to meet the great dem-

ocratic leader. We talked about our affairs as if we were oldintimate friends. At that time, the Liberal Party in Japan hadjust come into power, and Okuma Shigenobu was Premier,with Inukai Takeshi assisting him. Later on, I was introducedby Inukai to Okuma, Oishi Nasami, Ozaki Yukio, and others.This was the beginning of my contact with Japanese politicalleaders. Afterward, I got acquainted with Soejima Taneomi andothers. These people have helped the Chinese revolutionarywork tremendously, particularly Hisawara and Inutsuka. TheYamada brothers, the Miyazaki brothers, Kikuchi, Kayano,Soejima, and Terao, have also been most earnest in assistingthe Chinese revolutionary work.

These are the names of only a few of those who helped me di-rectly and worked with me intimately in promoting the ChineseRevolution. There were besides a large number of people who

helped indirectly. We must wait for the ofcial history of theChinese Revolution to record in greater detail the invaluablework of our Japanese friends.

There were more than ten thousand Chinese in Japan. TheseChinese were just as conservative as the overseas Chinese inother places. After several years of propaganda work among theChinese immigrants between Yokohama and Kobe, we securedthe support of only a little more than one hundred Chinese, orabout one per cent of the total Chinese population in Japan.But the work of spreading revolutionary propaganda in Chinaitself was even more difcult than among the overseas Chinese.Outside of the members of the secret fraternities, no one in

China would listen to anti-Manchu or revolutionary speeches.The fraternity people were mostly ignorant and lacked strongorganization. They would be able to help when once the revo-lution was well organized; but we could not depend upon themfor organization work.

The ve years between 1895 and 1900 constituted the most dif -cult period of my entire revolutionary career. In the rst place,the failure of 1895 had destroyed practically all that I had been

able to build up in ten years; and incidentally, I could notstay in China to direct revolutionary propaganda work. In thesecond place, my propaganda work among the Chinese abroadwas not effective. What was worse, the Pao Huang Party or theroyalists, who themselves were Chinese, were bitterly opposedto revolution and to the idea of a republican government.They were even more bitter toward us than the Manchus. For


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a while it seemed as though our entire task were hopeless. Yetmy comrades, with their youthful enthusiasm, went forward. Ithen asked Chen Shao-po to return to Hongkong to establisha newspaper, the Chung Kuo Pao for spreading revolutionary

propaganda. I also sent Shih Chien-ju to the Yangtze Provincesto establish connections with secret revolutionary fraternitiesthere; and Cheng Shih-liang to Hongkong to open a kind ofreception headquarters for these fraternity men. The direct con-sequence of these efforts was the merger of secret fraternitiesin the Yangtze Valley, in two Kwang Provinces and in Fukieninto the Hsing Chung Hui.

[Its leaders were K’ang Yu-wci and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao]

Meanwhile, the Manchu Court became intensely antiforeign.The Manchu ofcials thought that they could rely upon theBoxers for their own protection, so they instigated the latterin the wanton massacres of foreigners and in the burning oflegations at Peking. This, we all knew, led to the military inter-vention of China by eight Powers. Hoping to seize this chanceto start a revolution, I ordered at once Cheng Shih-liang toHuichow and Shih Chien-ju to Yangch’en to get our comrades

ready for military mobilization. I headed for Hongkong with agroup of foreign military ofcers, hoping to get into the inte-rior from that port, and to lead a well organized revolutionaryarmy northward for saving the nation from the fatal crisis. Un-fortunately my plan was discovered by some treacherous spies.When my boat reached Hongkong, I was refused landing; andthe plan was thus frustrated. All I could do was, on one hand,

to authorize Cheng Shih-liang to take entire charge of thesituation at Huichow and, on the other hand, to instruct YangChu-yun, Li Chi-t’ang and Chen Shao-po to send plenty ofsupplies to Cheng from Hongkong. I went to Formosa by way

of Japan, still hoping to get into the interior through Formosa.At that time, the Japanese governor in Formosa, Kodama, wassympathetic toward the Chinese Revolution, especially in viewof the fact that North China was already reduced to a state ofanarchism. He sent one of his chief civil ofcials to see me,and promised me help as soon as the revolution took place.

I then modied my original plan. I stayed in Formosa, andthere I employed many Japanese military experts. Since very

few revolutionists had technical training in modern militaryscience, foreign help was very necessary. At the same time, Iasked Cheng Shih-liang to start the Revolution at once, andto capture the coast cities in Kwangtung and Fuklen insteadof capturing the capital city of Kwangtung, Canton, as orig-inally planned. After receiving my order, Cheng Shih-liangimmediately went to the interior and led a big crowd to attackthe Manchu soldiers in the Sin-on and Sinchuan districtsof Kwangtung. After seizing large quantities of ammunition,

the revolutionary soldiers proceeded to Lun-kong, Tan-sui,Yung-hu, Liang-hua, Po-man-hua, and Sandochiu. Whereverthey went, they were victorious, and the Manchu soldierscould not resist them. Finally, they occupied Sin-on, Ta-peng,Wai-chow, Ping-hai, and other cities, then waited for me andother members from headquarters to supply them with moreammunition. Less than two weeks after the Revolution of


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Wai-chow broke forth, there was suddenly a change of cabinetin Japan. Ito, the new Prime Minister, had a totally differ-ent policy toward China from that of his predecessor. Heinstructed the governor of Formosa not to be intimate with

Chinese revolutionist parties, and not to supply ammunitionto them. He forbade military ofcers to join the revolution -ary armies. I was also prevented from going to the interiorthrough Formosa. I then sent Yamada Yoshimasa and otherintimate workers to Cheng’s headquarters to report to Chengthe changed circumstances. I asked Cheng to act according tohis best judgment. It took more than thirty days for Yamada’sparty to get to Cheng Shihliang’s headquarters. MeanwhileCheng and his men had fought more than a month, and had

used up all their supplies and ammunition. They were hopinganxiously for re-enforcements and more supplies. After hear-ing Yamada’s report, Cheng immediately disbanded his armywhich amounted to ten thousand and led a few hundred ofhis personal followers to Hongkong under disguise. Later on,Yamada was caught by Manchu soldiers and was shot. He wasthe rst foreigner who sacriced his life for the Republicancause in China.

While Cheng Shih-liang was ghting in Wai-chow, ShihChien-ju tried many times to capture the city of Canton, buthe failed. Finally, he decided to use explosives to attack theViceroy’s Yamen. He failed again and was caught. He wasthe second strong character who sacriced his life for theRepublican cause. Chien-ju was no less industrious, honest,devoted, and capable than Lu Hao-tung. Both were poets

and prolic writers in addition to being active revolutionaryworkers. If they had not died, they would have accomplishedmany things for the country. Indeed, their death was a greatloss to the Revolution and to the country. But their moral

leadership and their patriotic deeds are still sources of inspi-ration to us. The Wai-chow Revolution was the second failurein the history of the Chinese Revolution, and it took placein the year of 1900.

THE MARKED CHANGE OF PUBLIC OPINION

AND THE PARTICIPATION OF STUDENTS

IN THE REVOLUTION 1900-1905

After this failure, I felt, however, a marked change of publicopinion in China. After my rst failure, the entire countryregarded me either as a bandit or as a rebel. I was cursed bythe entire country and was treated as a dangerous serpent oras a wild beast. Few people in the country dared to make myacquaintance. After the failure in 1900, not only the peoplestopped cursing me, but the progressive elements expressed

sympathy with me in my misfortunes. When I noticed thisdifference, I was supremely happy, because the people of thiscountry were gradually awakening. Moreover, the capture of Pe-king by the Allies, the escape of the Empress Dowager and theEmperor, and the exaction of an indemnity of 900,000,000taels had intensied the political unrest in the country. Theprestige of the Manchu government was altogether lost, and


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the poverty of the country had increased. As the sense of patri-otism was gradually aroused throughout the country, the revo-lutionary movement in China became more and more popular.At that time, the various provinces sent students to Japan for

study. As these students were young and progressive, they wereeasily inuenced by revolutionary ideas. Before long, the centraltopic of discussion among the Chinese students in Tokyo wasthe problem of revolution. Liu Chen-yu was expelled fromschool at the request of the Chinese Minister in Tokyo becausehe gave a ery speech on revolution and anti-Manchuism. Atthe same time, Chi Yuen-cheng, Shen Hung-chai, and ChangP’u-ch’uan edited the Kuo Min Pao (the Citizens’ Tribune) topromote revolution.

The students in China soon followed the lead of the Chinesestudents in Japan. In Shanghai, Chang T’ai-yen, Wu Chih-hui,and Tsou Yung edited the Su Pao (the Kiangsu Tribune).Since it was too radical and revolutionary, the editors were suedbefore the Shanghai court by the Manchu government. ChangT’ai-yen and Tsou Yung were put in jail in the settlement, andWu Chih-hui escaped to Europe. This case involved the personof the Manchu emperor, and it was the rst time in the historyof the Manchu dynasty that the government and the peoplebecame opposite parties in a law suit. Although the Manchugovernment won the suit, Chang and Tsou stayed in jail onlytwo years. As a result, Chang and Tsou were popularly recog-nized as the leaders of democracy.

Tsou Yung wrote a book on the Revolutionary Army which was

very radical, and was very popular among the overseas Chinese.It did more than anything else to emancipate the thought ofthe overseas Chinese. By this time the revolution had becomea popular and nation-wide movement.

THE BEGINNING OF THE TUNG MING HUI, 1905

Between the years of 1902 and 1903, the French Minister inTokyo presented to me an invitation from the Governor ofAnnam, asking me to pay a visit to Annam. But, unfortunately,due to some other business, I could not accept his invitation.Later on, in connection with the exhibition in Hanoi, I made

a visit to Annam. The governor, had already left Annam, butasked his chief secretary to entertain me. In Hanoi, I got ac-quainted with some rich Chinese merchants, including HuangLung-sheng, Chen Chi-t’ing, Chen Pi, Yang Shou, and PengTseng-chi- They became members of our Party, and helpedmuch in Ch’inlien and Ho-kou battles. After the exhibition, Imade another tour around the world by way of Japan, Hono-lulu, and the United States. On passing through Japan, I metMr. and Mrs. Liao Chung-k’ai, Mr. Ma Chiin-wu, Mr. HuI-sheng, and Mr. Lu Chung-shih, who were very enthusiasticabout the revolutionary work. I asked them to look around formore like-minded people, and get them organized. This wasthe beginning of the idea of a revolutionary party which wasestablished later on and was known as Tung Ming Hui.

Several attempts at revolution took place during the period


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between the defeat of Wai-chow and the founding of the TungMing Hui, including the attempts at capturing Canton byLi Chi-tang, Hung Ch’uan-fu and the attempts in Hunan byHuang Ke-ch’iang and Ma Fu-i. Although they all failed, the

general public began to take notice of the bravery and inuenceof these revolutionists. Simultaneously, the Chinese immigrantsin foreign countries became more and more liberal through theeducational propaganda of the Chinese students in Tokyo andthrough the revolution a ry movements in China. So, at thistime, wherever I went, the overseas Chinese gave me a heartyreception, and their attitude toward me was totally changed.

I arrived in Europe in the spring of 1905. Most of the Chinese

students in Europe were favorable toward revolution, Whatwas more signicant, due to the inuence of the Japanesereturned students and the revolutionary movements in China,these students in Europe were not only interested in revolu-tionary discussion, but also in revolutionary action. I took thisopportunity to propagate among them my San Min Doctrineand the Five-Power Constitution, and organized them into rev-olutionary societies.

The rst society was organized in Brussels, and thirty memberswere initiated. The second society was organized in Berlin, andtwenty members were initiated. The third society was organizedin Paris, and more than ten members were initiated. The mostpopular revolutionary society was that in Tokyo, in which sev-eral hundred members were initiated, and in which seventeenprovinces were represented. Kansu province alone, which had

no students in Japan at that time, was not represented. Thiswas the beginning of Ke-ming Tung Ming Hui (the Revolu-tionary Alliance). Since most people dared not use the termKe-ming (revolution), the society was commonly called Tung

Ming Hui (the Alliance). The founding of the RevolutionaryAlliance marked a new epoch in the history of the ChineseRevolution. Indeed, in view of the fact that I had sufferedpreviously so many defeats and that I had been ridiculed andcriticized almost universally, I even ceased to expect that theManchu government could be overthrown during my lifetime.The only reason that I struggled on was to restore the dyingnationalism through “propaganda by deed” and to inspire otherpeople who would follow my example.

[For the sake of precision, ihc Tung Ming Hui is translated as“The Revolutionary Alliance” throughout this volume]

As soon as the Revolutionary Alliance was formed, in whichthe best of the younger generation of China was represented, Irealized that the success of the great revolutionary work mightcome in my lifetime. I settled upon the term Chung Hua MinKuo, or the Chinese Republic, and asked the members of

the Revolutionary Alliance to propagate revolutionary doctrinesand republican ideals among the people of their own provinceswhen they returned. In less than a year after the RevolutionaryAlliance was formed, its membership had increased to over tenthousand and its branches were established in all provinces.Henceforth, the progress of the revolutionary movement wasso rapid that it was beyond anyone’s expectation.


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THE MOVEMENT ATTRACTSWORLDWIDE ATTENTION

Meanwhile, foreign governments became more and more fa-

vorable toward the Chinese revolutionists. One day, on myway to Japan from the Straits Settlements, my boat stoppedat Woosung. A French ofcer, by the name of Bugarbe, cameto call on me. He represented the French Minister of Wa r,and was instructed to say that the French government wouldbe happy to render any assistance to the Chinese revolution-ary movement. He asked about the strength of the revolu-tionists, and I told him the facts. He asked whether or not

the revolutionists had secret understandings with provincialarmies; and he said that if they had, the French governmentwould be glad to give external assistance. I replied that wehad no secret understandings with the provincial armies, andI asked him to help us in that matter. He then sent me eightmilitary aides to assist me in making military plans. At thistime I asked Liao Chung-k’ai to establish a revolutionaryorgan in Tientsin; and sent Mr. Li Chung-shih, accompaniedby a French ofcer, to Kwangtung and Kwangsi to investi-

gate military conditions there. Mr. Hu I-sheng, accompaniedalso by a French ofcer, went to Szechuan and Yunnan toinvestigate military conditions there; and Mr. Chiao I-chai,accompanied by a French ofcer also, to Nanking and Wu-han. The new armies in Nanking and Wuchang were veryfavorable toward the revolution. In Nanking Mr. Chao Po-hsien had understandings with all military ofcers above the

rank of captain, and had secret conferences with them tomake military plans.

Ta Wuchang, Mr. Liu Chia-yun also had secret connectionswith army ofcers, and planned a secret mass meeting inthe Anglican Church. A large crowd attended that meeting.I understand that General Chang Piao, commander of thenew army in Wuchang, came to the meeting in disguise.A number of pro-revolutionary speeches were given at thismeeting, including one from a French ofcer. As a result,the secret activities of the Wuchang revolutionists werereported to the government authorities. Chang Chih-tung,the viceroy of Hu Kuang provinces, employed a foreign

spy to follow the French ofcer. This spy nally becameacquainted with the French ofcer and pretended to befavorable toward the Chinese Revolution. Being a foreigner,the French ofcer told this spy unsuspectingly his plans.Finally, Viceroy Chang Chih-tung reported the revolution-ary plans to the Manchu emperor. The Manchu governmentimmediately sent a protest to the French minister in Pe-king, who in turn reported to the French government theactivities of Bugarbe and others, and asked that the French

government punish them. But the French government tookno action in this affair, and the Manchu government coulddo nothing either. After this took place, there was a changeof Cabinet in France, and the new Cabinet did not approveof French interference with the Chinese Revolution, andrecalled Bugarbe and his associates to France. As a con-sequence, Liu Chia-yun and others were arrested and were


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executed. This was a really important international casecaused by the Nationalist movement.

THE ATTEMPTS IN P’iNG HSIANGAND CHAO CHOW 1906-1907

Shortly after the founding of the Revolutionary Alliance, weissued the Min Pao for propagating the San Min Doctrine andother revolutionary ideas. It was the most popular magazinethat had ever appeared in China. As a result, many individualssuch as Hsu Hsi-lin, Hsiung Chengchi, and Ch’iu Ch’in start-ed revolutionary work quite independently of our movement.

In 1906, some of our Alliance members declared indepen-dence in P’ing Hsiang and Li-ling. When these revolutionistswere ghting with the Manchu soldiers in P’ing Hsiang andLi-ling, the members in Tokyo were most eager to go to theinterior and join the military forces. A large number of ourmembers came to Headquarters every day asking for permis-sion to join the forces in China. The spirit was so good thatwhen Headquarters hesitated to let them go, they made all

kinds of patriotic appeals. Unfortunately, the P’ing HsiangRevolution broke forth without the knowledge of Headquarters,and the authorities at Headquarters were not prepared to givesubstantial help to it. Consequently, the revolutionists weredefeated by the Manchu soldiers. Yii Chi-mou, Liu Tao-i, NingT’iao-yuen, Hu Yin, and others were arrested. They were eitherexecuted or imprisoned. At that time, a large number of our

members were already on the way to Li-ling to participate inthe Revolution. This was the rst shedding of blood on thepart of the members of the Revolutionary Alliance. Hence-forth, a revolutionary amosphere prevailed in the country. The

Revolutionary Alliance became more and more conspicuous,and its movements were closely watched by the reactionaries.Simultaneously, the Manchu government tried many times tonegotiate with the Japanese government for my deportationfrom Japan; so that I was more or less forced to leave Japan.Accompanied by Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, I wentto French Indo-China. In Hanoi, Annam, we established ourRevolutionary Headquarters to direct the operations in China.At one time we instigated a revolution in Ch’ao-chow andHuang-Kang; but it was not successful. This marked the thirdunsuccessful attempt at revolution. Then I ordered Teng Tzu-yuto start another revolution at Wai-chow and again I failed; thismarked the fourth unsuccessful attempt.

THE RIOTS IN CH’lN AND LIEN DISTRICTS,

KWANGTUNG 1907

Then riots protesting against the increase of taxation tookplace in the Ch’in and Lien districts. The Manchu govern-ment ordered Generals Kuo Jen-chang and Chao Po-hsien,each commanding three to four thousand modern troops, tosuppress the riots. I asked Mr. Huang Kech’iang to followGeneral Kuo, and Hu I-sheng to follow General Chao, to


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see if these generals could be converted to the side of therevolution. Both General Kuo and General Chao consentedto come to our side as soon as a regular revolution tookplace. I then sent representatives to the Ch’in and Lien dis-

tricts, asking the local gentry and farmers to co-operate withus in case of a revolution. At the same time, I sent KayanoNagatomo to Japan to purchase ammunition. I also employeda number of retired French army ofcers to train our armiesin French Indo-China. As soon as the ammunition camefrom Japan, we would occupy Fang Cheng, Tung Hsing, andother coast cities.

As Tung Hsing is separated from the French Mongkai only

by a river, though I had to be in French territory, I couldconveniently direct operations in Chinese territory. I calculatedthat we could form two thousand troops without any difcultyas soon as the ammunition arrived from Japan. Should weconsolidate the volunteers in the Ch’in district, we could getanother six thousand troops. When our troops combined withthe modern armies under Kuo and Chao, we would have avery powerful army; and with additional training, we couldeasily occupy Kwangtung and Kwangsi. From there we couldproceed to the Yangtze Valley and join with the modern armiesin Nanking and Wuchang. It would not be difcult at all tooccupy the entire country.

Unfortunately, some members in our Tokyo headquarters quar-reled among themselves, and as a result of this quarreling, theirsecrets leaked out. Their ammunition was seized, and many

men were arrested. At that time, the revolutionists had alreadyoccupied many cities, and were waiting for the ammunition.When the ammunition failed to arrive, I lost the condenceof the armies as well as of the local gentry in these districts.

Seeing that the ammunition could never come, the revolution-ists attacked the Ch’in district, hoping that Kuo’s army wouldhelp them out. But Kuo refused to move because our own armywas not well organized, and because he was watched closely byother government armies. Our troops then attacked Ling-Shanin order to get General Chao to move. Chao, seeing thatKuo did not move, was also afraid to carry out his originalpromise. At last, our troops were forced to retreat to the ShihWan Mountains. This was my fth unsuccessful attempt atrevolution.

THE ATTEMPTS IN YUNNAN 1907-1908

After our failure in the Ch’in and Lien districts, HuangKe-ch’iang, Hu Han-min and I led more than one hundredrevolutionists in French Indo-China, and with the help of

some French ofcers, seized Cheng-Nan-Kuan, and occupiedthree strategic points. We took over the defeated troops andhoped to combine them with the revolutionary troops ofShih Wan Mountains, We also hoped to attack Lung-chow.Unfortunately, the troops in the Shih Wan Mountains couldnot come because of the great distance; is Situated sixtymiles northwest of the Ch’in Hsien, Kwangtuog, and on


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the borderline between Kwangtung and Kwangst, and so alittle over a hundred of our troops had to ght with severalthousands of our enemy’s troops under the command of LungChi-kuang and Lii Jung-ting. We kept on ghting for three

days continuously, and nally we had to retreat to FrenchIndo-China. On passing Lang Son, Annam, a Manchu de-tective followed me and reported me to the Manchu ofcials,who in turn negotiated with the French government in FrenchIndo-China to expel me. This was my sixth unsuccessfulattempt at revolution.

While I left Hanoi, I asked Huang Ke-ch’iang to start anotherrevolution in the Ch’in and Lien districts, and Huang Min-

t’ang to capture Ho Kou, Yunnan, which I thought could beused as our revolutionary base. Later on, Huang Ke-ch’iangleading only a handful of two hundred men walked about theCh’in and Lien districts as he pleased, capturing towns andtaking cities. For several months, the Manchu soldiers did notdare to approach him. Although the exhaustion of ammunitionforced Huang eventually to retreat to French Indo-China, hewas already known throughout China as a gallant ghter. Thiswas our seventh unsuccessful attempt.

Several months later, while I was at Singapore, Huang Min-t’ang, with only a hundred men, captured Ho Kou and killedthe military commissioner there. He took over the control ofthe commissioner’s troops, numbering over a thousand men,and waited for my orders and supplies before proceeding tooccupy the entire province of Yunnan. Being far away from

the country, and being barred from French territory, I couldnot go back to direct Huang Mint’ang’s operations. I wiredHuang Ke-ch’iang to go there and help. On the way, HuangKe-ch’iang was suspected as a Japanese by French ofcials and

was prevented from going across the Chinese border. Lateron, after having found that he was a Chinese revolutionist,the French government expelled him from French Indo-Chinaat the request of the Manchu government. Consequently, therevolutionary troops in Ho Kou lost their leader and darednot go forward. Otherwise, Mengtsu would have been ours,and Yunnanfu would have fallen easily. By reading over thetelegrams to the central government for re-enforcement sentby the Viceroy of Yun Kuei provinces, one can easily seethat the entire province of Yunnan could have been capturedwithout the least difculty. But Huang Min-t’ang failed toreceive any help from outside. After a month of aimlessghting against enemy troops ten times as large as his own,he was forced to retreat to French Indo-China with his sixhundred men. This was the eighth unsuccessful attempt ofthe revolution.

THE SINGAPORE INCIDENT AND ATTEMPTS TO

ASSASSINATE THE EMPEROR, 1908-1910

Later on, the Chinese revolutionists in French Indo-China weredeported by the French government, and sent to Singapore.But the British ofcials prevented them from landing. The


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French consul negotiated with the British governor in Singa-pore, saying that these six hundred people were defeated revo-lutionists and that they were coming voluntarily to Singapore.The governor of Singapore replied that they might be regarded

not as political criminals but as rioters, because no third coun-try had recognized them as belligerents against the Chinesegovernment. The French steamer which accommodated the sixhundred revolutionists was anchored off Singapore for twodays. Finally, the French governor expressed the opinion thatduring the ghting between the six hundred revolutionists andthe Chinese government, the maintenance of neutrality on thepart of the French government in French Indo-China consti-

tuted French recognition of the status of belligerency on thepart of the six hundred men, and that the revolutionists now inSingapore could not be regarded merely as rioters. Thereupon,the government in Singapore permitted them to land. This wascertainly an interesting international episode in connection withour Revolution.

From the battle of Huang-kang to the battle of Ho Kou, sixtimes we failed to carry out a revolution; and each time the

revolution was initiated in the name of the Revolutionary Al-liance. After these six unsuccessful attempts, Wang Ching-weiwas so discouraged that he decided to nd a quicker way ofoverthrowing the emperor. He went up to Peking, and therehe and Huang Fu-sheng attempted to assassinate the Manchuemperor. But they failed, and were arrested. They were releasedafter the Wuchang Revolution.

FINANCIAL CAMPAIGNINGAND ITS DIFFICULTIES 1910-1911

Before the formation of the Revolutionary Alliance, only a

small group of my relatives were willing to contribute moneyfor nancing the revolutionary work. No one else either daredor was willing to help. After the formation of the RevolutionaryAlliance, we were able to start regular nancial campaigns. Onewho contributed most generously was Chang Chin-kiang, whogave all that he got from his business in Paris, amounting tobetween sixty and seventy thousand dollars. Huang Chin-Ian ofFrench Indo-China also deserves special mention. He contrib-uted his life savings of several thousands of dollars toward mil-itary expenses. Li Cho-feng, Tsung Hsi-chou, and Ma Posheng,all prominent merchants in French Indo-China, contributedtens of thousands of dollars each. After many failures, I wasexpelled from French Indo-China, from Hongkong, and in factfrom all places that were near China. I had no way of makingconnections with China. So I trusted all the work in Chinato Huang Ke-ch’iang and Hu Han-min. I myself decided tomake another world tour to promote nancial campaigns in the

interest of the Revolution. Later on, Huang Ke-ch’iang and HuHan-min returned to Hongkong and established headquartersthere. They and Chao Po-hsien, Yi Yang-tien, Chu Chi-hsing,Chen Ch’iung-ming, and Yao Yu-p’ing, having won over themodern army in Canton, planned to capture Canton on acertain day in the year 1910. Unfortunately, somebody in thenew army was too enthusiastic, and started trouble one month


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ahead of the time planned. Yi Yang-tien had to lead a smallbody of troops to attack the city of Canton. He suffered acounter attack and nally was wounded. The enemy caught himand killed him. His men dispersed. This was the ninth time

that our Party had failed. I heard this news in San Francisco,while I was returning to the East by way of Honolulu andJapan. I landed at Japan in disguise. But I was discovered bythe police, and was not permitted to stay in Japan. I then wentto Penang from Yokohama, where I asked Huang Ke-ch’iangand Hu Han-rnin to meet me to plan further revolutions. Atthat time, my co-workers were a little disappointed, because wehad just suffered fresh defeats, and because our Headquartershad been completely destroyed and our military bases taken.

Moreover, our new army comrades in the South had lost theirpositions and could not even make their daily living. They felta sense of despair. But I tried to comfort them by telling themI had faced greater discouragements in my earlier days and thatthe rapid growth of the revolutionary movement justied nopessimism. I told them also that hereafter the greatest troublein the Chinese Revolution would be the lack of persistence anddetermination among ourselves, and not the lack of adequate -

nancial help. I promised them that I would do all I could to re-lieve the immediate nancial shortage. Chao Po-hsien told methat if we planned to start another revolution in the near future,a few thousand dollars would be needed at once to keep thetroops in a certain part of the country from disbanding, andto re-establish revolutionary headquarters in South China. Heproposed also that he and others should return to Hongkong

at once to establish connections in South China, and that vethousand dollars would be needed* for traveling expenses. If therevolution should break out on a large scale, he said, a hugesum amounting to several hundred thousand dollars would be

absolutely necessary. That very evening, I gathered the Chineseimmigrants in that town, and laid the proposition before them.In one evening, eight thousand dollars were contributed. I thenasked my co-workers to start a campaign in different cities, andwe got between fty and sixty thousand dollars in a few days.

Having secured sufcient funds, we decided to proceed with ourwork at once. I myself decided to make another nancial tripto the British and Dutch settlements in the South Pacic. But

the Dutch government refused me admission, and the Britishgovernment and the Siamese government expelled me manytimes from their territories. So I could not even nd standingroom for myself in the great continent of Asia and in the widespace of the South Pacic. The only alternative for me was togo back to Europe and America. In America I traveled exten-sively, and the Chinese immigrants responded very generouslyto my nancial appeal. As a result a revolution broke out in

Canton on March 29, 1911. In this revolution, the best of ourParty gathered in one place and decided to ght the last battlewith the enemy. Although they failed, the death of seventy-twopatriots now lying in the Huang Hua Kong cemetery startledthe world into the realization that the Revolution in Chinahad a far-reaching political signicance. This was our tenthunsuccessful attempt.


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THE SITUATION IN WU HAN, 1911

At rst, Chen Ying-shih, Sung Teng-ch’u, Tan Shihping, andChu Cho-sheng were asked by the Hongkong military ofce

of the Party to send re-enforcements to Canton. After thecollapse of the Revolution in Canton, they turned their atten-tion to Wuhan. Ever since the French military ofcers madeconnections with the new armies in Wuhan, the revolutionaryideas had spread rapidly among them. Yet because they wereclosely watched by the Manchu government, these new armiesdared not start trouble.

When a riot broke out in Szechuan, Tuan Fang, viceroy of

Szechuan, asked Jui Chen, the viceroy of Hu Kuang provinc-es, to dispatch certain troops from Wuhan to Szechuan tosuppress the riots. In response to this request, Jui Chen sentto Szechuan the most radical army just to avoid trouble inWuhan.

The revolutionary atmosphere in the country was already sothick that the Manchu ofcials were constantly in a state ofterror. Wild rumors in Wuchang were freely circulated. Thesituation was very tense. So Jui Chen entered into a secretunderstanding with a foreign consul whereby the latter wouldsend battleships to Wuhan; and in case of a revolution, thecity would be bombarded. At the same time, Sun Wu and LiuKung were pushing the revolutionary work in Wuchang as fastas they could; and the new armies were all prepared for a move.

Suddenly the headquarters of the Revolution in Wuhan were

raided, and thirty were arrested. At that time, Hu Yin wasstill in the Wuchang prison. He advised Chen Ying-shih andothers not to come to Wuchang. But both the artillery and theengineering corps had already entered the revolutionary party.

When they heard that the membership lists had been seizedby the government and that a general arrest would take placethe next day, they decided to take desperate action in order tosave themselves. Hsiung Ping-kun red the rst shot; and TsaiTsimin leading a large crowd attacked the city and bombardedthe Viceroy’s Yamen. Jui Chen escaped to Hankow and askedthe foreign consul referred to above to bombard the city ofWuchang according to the original agreement. But accordingto the Treaty of 1900, none of the treaty powers should act in-

dependently in Chinese affairs. A consuls’ meeting was called.At rst, a majority of the consuls inclined toward bombardingthe city of Wuchang. Others were undecided what to do.

The French consul, who was my old friend and who knewpretty well the inside of the revolutionary party, opposed bom-bardment. The Revolution was opened in my name. The Frenchconsul said before the meeting that Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionaryparty was one for political reform, and not a mob such as

the Boxers, and that he was opposed to intervention. Thesenior consul at that time was the Russian consul. He tookthe same attitude as the French consul, and a majority of theconsuls agreed with the French consul’s opinion. The meetingdecided against intervention and favored a proclamation ofstrict neutrality. Seeing that foreign help could not be got,Jui Chen escaped to Shanghai. When the viceroy ran away,


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I was confused in my thoughts. I thought I would have a goodnight’s rest rst, and would solve the problems next day. I sleptuntil eleven o’clock the next morning. When I got up, I washungry. I went to a restaurant to get my breakfact. On passing

a newsstand, I bought the morning newspaper which openedwith the telegram, “Wuchang occupied by the revolutionists.”All the difculties involved in answering Huang’s telegram werecompletely removed. I had only to send a telegram to HuangKe-ch’iang, explaining how my reply was delayed and tellinghim my plan. I immediately left for the eastern part of theUnited States.

THE BEGINNING OFNATIONALIST DIPLOMACY 1911

At that time, I could have come home in disguise by wayof the Pacic Ocean, and I could have reached Shanghai intwenty days. Then I could have directed the revolutionary warmyself; that would have given me the greatest satisfaction of mylife. But my second thought was that my contribution to the

revolutionary work was not in the battle eld but in diplomaticcircles. So I decided to devote myself to diplomatic work andnot to return until the diplomatic questions were solved. Atthat time, the American government stood for the open-doorpolicy in China. It had no settled opinion about the ChineseRevolution. On the other hand, American public opinion wasfavorably inclined toward our side. In France, both the govern-

ment and the people were favorable toward the Chinese Revo-lution. In England, the people were sympathetic toward us; butthe China policy of the government largely followed the lead ofJapan, Germany and Russia were more or less pro-Manchu, and

our own Party had very little connection with either the peopleor the governments in Germany and in Russia. So we had noway of changing the policy of Russia and Germany. Japan wasvery intimate with China. The Japanese people were not onlysympathetic toward us, but many of them had even sacricedtheir lives to assist the Chinese Revolution. On the other hand,the policy of the Japanese government was not favorable. Ithad expelled me once from Japan, and had once refused melanding in Japan. These actions plainly indicated the attitude of

the government towards the Chinese Revolution. By virtue ofthe Treaty of 1900, however, Japan could not act independently.

In brief, of the six foreign Powers that have most intimaterelations with China, America and France were sympatheticwith the Chinese Revolution. Germany and Russia were op-posed to us. The people in England were sympathetic towardus, but the government policy was not denite. So the key ofour diplomacy would be the attitude of the British government

because it would determine in a large measure the success orthe failure of our Revolution. If the British government was forthe revolution, the Japanese government would not need to befeared. So I went direct to New York, where I took a boat toEngland. In passing through St. Louis, I bought a newspaperwhich reported that the Wuchang Revolution had broken outby the order of Sun Yat-sen, that the revolutionists were going


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to establish a republican form of government, and that the rstpresidency would go to Sun Yat-sen. Having read this item ofnews, I kept particularly secret about myself on the way, andcarefully avoided newspaper reporters in order to keep clear of

unnecessary complications.On passing through Chicago, I asked comrade Chu Chowento go with me to England, On arriving at New York, I heardthat our comrades in Canton were attacking the city of Can-ton, and that the fall of the city was imminent. In order toavoid bloodshed, I telegraphed Chang Min-chi, the viceroy ofKwangtung and Kwangsi provinces, asking him to surrenderthe city to the revolutionists and to join the Party. At the sametime, I telegraphed to my comrades in Canton to save the lifeof Chang. Both these advices were successfully carried out.When I arrived in England, I was introduced by an Americanfriend to the President of the Consortium, and conferred withhim about stopping further loans to the Manchu government.The Manchu government had previously entered into negotia-tions with the Consortium for a Szechuan-Pukow Railway loanof one hundred million dollars, and a currency loan of onehundred million dollars. The negotiation for the rst loan was

practically completed, its bonds were issued, and the cash wasready to be paid. The contract for the second loan was alsosigned, but the bonds had not yet been issued. My idea was tostop the payment of cash for the rst, and to stop the issuingof the bonds for the second. The President of the Consortiumreplied that loan negotiations with China were in the hands ofthe Foreign Secretary. So I asked the President of the Vicar

Arsenal to represent me in negotiating with the Foreign Secre-tary concerning the matter.

I put three demands before the British government: rst, tostop all loan negotiations with the Manchu government; sec-

ond, to prevent Japan giving assistance to the Manchu gov-ernment; and third, to revoke all orders excluding me fromBritish territory, in order that I could travel freely and get backto China. I received favorable answers to all .three from theBritish government. I also had a preliminary conference withthe President of the Consortium concerning the negotiationof loans with the revolutionary government. The chairman saidthat inasmuch as the British government approved my request

to stop further loan negotiations with the Manchu government,the Consortium would be glad to open negotiations with thenew government, provided a regular government was organizedin China and was recognized by foreign Powers. The Consor-tium also sent a delegate, who was a bank president, to Chinawith me as their representative in dealing with the new govern-ment. I thought then that I could do no more in England, soI started home by way of France.

DR. SUN ELECTED THE PROVISIONAL PRESIDENTOF THE NEW REPUBLIC IN 1912

On passing through Paris, both the people in the governmentand outside it showed sympathy with me, especially Clem-engeau. Thirty days after leaving France, I arrived at Shanghai,


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46 SUN YAT-SEN

and, at that time, the parley between South and North wasalready opened, but the form of government was not yet de-cided. Before I reached Shanghai, Chinese and foreign paperscirculated the story that I would bring home a huge sum of

money to assist the revolutionary army. As soon as I arrivedat Shanghai, my own comrades asked me about it, and allnewspaper reporters also asked me about it. I replied: “I havenot brought a penny, but what I have brought home is therevolutionary spirit. Unless the purpose of the revolution isachieved, there is no use to talk about a peace conference.”

Then the delegates from the different provinces opened an elec-tion conference in Nanking, and I was elected the Provisional

President. On January rst, A.D. one thousand nine hundredand twelve, I went through the inauguration ceremony. On thatday, I proclaimed the Republic of China, and adopted the solarcalendar for the rst year of the Chinese Republic. On thatday, I saw the successful accomplishment of the great ambitionfor which I had struggled during thirty years, the restoration ofChina and the establishment of a Republic.

Sun Yat-sen : Will and Autobiography

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