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North Yorkshire Waste Action Group

Objection to Allerton Waste Recovery Park:

FURTHER OBJECTIONS BASED ON JULY MATERIAL FROM AMEY CESPA

Table of Contents

SUMMARY..........................................................................................................................................................4

AWRP Non-Technical Summary..................................................................................................................4

Supplementary Planning Statement...........................................................................................................5

WRATE Model and Misleading Conclusions................................................................................................6

Ecology and Nature Conservation..............................................................................................................7

Air Pollution................................................................................................................................................7

Travel Plan..................................................................................................................................................7

ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS...............................................................................................................................7

Capacity......................................................................................................................................................7

Financial harm............................................................................................................................................8

Traffic impacts............................................................................................................................................9

Abnormal Operation...................................................................................................................................9

National Policy Planning Framework..........................................................................................................9

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................11

PART A: OBJECTIONS BASED ON FURTHER MATERIAL FROM THE APPLICANT.................................................12

A1: AWRP Non-Technical Summary..................................................................................................................12

A2: AmeyCespa’s Supplementary Planning Statement.....................................................................................16

A2.1: Planning Policy, Legislation and Regulation Update............................................................................18

A2.2: Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations..................................................................................23

A2.3: Sub-Regional Policy.............................................................................................................................23

A2.4: Appendix A1 – Community Involvement.............................................................................................27

A2.5: Appendix A3 and Additional Environmental Information Statement – Landscape and Cultural Heritage........................................................................................................................................................30

A3: AmeyCespa’s Part B – Additional Environmental Information...................................................................32

A3.1 Appendix B2: Response Letter..............................................................................................................32

A3.1.1: Recovery or Disposal....................................................................................................................32

A3.1.2: Decommissioning and Restoration...............................................................................................32

A3.1.3: Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS)...................................................................................33

A3.1.4: Sustainability Assessment............................................................................................................34

A4: WRATE Model and Misleading Conclusions...............................................................................................34

A4.1: Towards a Meaningful Comparison.....................................................................................................36

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A4.2: Comments on Appendix B4.................................................................................................................36

A4.3: Comments on Appendix B5.................................................................................................................39

A5: Ecology and Nature Conservation..............................................................................................................41

A6: AIR POLLUTION (Appendix B13).................................................................................................................42

A6.1: Group 3 Metals....................................................................................................................................43

A6.2: Short Term WID Limits........................................................................................................................46

A7: Travel Plan..................................................................................................................................................46

PART B: ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS...................................................................................................................49

B1: NYWAG Views on the Vision Statement.....................................................................................................50

B2: Additional Material on Harm that AWRP will cause...................................................................................52

B2.1 Over-Capacity Issues.............................................................................................................................52

B2.1.1: The European Dimension.............................................................................................................52

Figure B2.1.1: Tonnage of Waste Processed in Netherlands....................................................................53

Figure B2.1.2: Falling Gate Fees in Germany............................................................................................53

B2.1.2: Regional Capacity.........................................................................................................................54

Figure B2.1.3: Residual Waste Arisings and Treatment Capacity - Great Britain......................................55

Figure B2.1.4: Residual Waste Treatment Capacity – Yorkshire and Humber..........................................56

B2.1.3: Overcapacity in North Yorkshire...................................................................................................57

B2.2: Financial harm.....................................................................................................................................58

B2.3: Traffic impacts.....................................................................................................................................60

B2.4 Emissions and Abnormal Operations....................................................................................................61

B2.5: Implications of the National Policy Planning Framework....................................................................63

NPPF and Sustainable Development.........................................................................................................64

Local Determination and Democratic Deficit............................................................................................65

Health and Pollution.................................................................................................................................66

Other Conclusions from the NPPF Document...........................................................................................66

ANNEX A - Letters to Knaresborough Post – April 2012....................................................................................69

References........................................................................................................................................................71

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SUMMARY

1. This document reviews AmeyCespa’s Supplementary Planning Statement and accompanying material. Far from alleviating our concerns, much of this additional material reinforces them and therefore strengthens our objections to AWRP. It reinforces the need to refuse planning permission.

2. The original purpose of AWRP was to treat municipal waste from NYCC and CYC only. Going beyond this original purpose and remit for the proposed facility would distort the local market for waste and put the future of existing local firms at risk, with concomitant adverse impacts on employment. This is a further reason for refusing planning permission.

3. This document also presents supplementary material which adds to our earlier objections.

AWRP Non-Technical Summary

4. There is nothing in the Non-Technical Summery to alter our view that the AWRP is not needed and would cause harm in many ways including to the climate, to the environment and human health and well-being, to the economy and to sustainability.

5. However, there is much deceptive “spin”. Even the artist’s impression on the cover-page is somewhat sanitized; it omits any sign of waste or stored IBA, vehicles and the large plume. In reality this gross intrusion would have major adverse landscape and visual impacts and would harm current recreational facilities, the tourist industry and the enjoyment of public rights of way.

6. Since the proposed AWRP plant exceeds its original purpose (meet the residual waste management needs for NYCC and the CYC) and risks damage to already-established local waste management business, planning permission should be refused.

7. We question whether the applicant has sufficient UK experience, or sufficient experience of incineration. The Applicant’ proposed “solution” flies in the face of their claimed values and aims (their para 1.3.4). Indeed, their failure to meet these values at AWRP leads to many of the objections that we and others have.

8. Environmental and health impacts are significantly greater than AmeyCespa describe. They ignore the fact that many of the emissions from the EfW plant are bio-accumulative and pose unacceptable risks for human health and the environment. Their additional material repeats many of the errors in their earlier evidence leading to erroneous conclusions; e.g. too low a stack height (only 70m). They fail to convince that proper consideration was given to alternatives or to using existing or new facilities elsewhere (Teesside, Ferrybridge). The transport implications were not given sufficient weight and the logistical problems of bringing waste in from across the entirety of North Yorkshire ignored. They continue to talk of AWRP as offering CHP (or CHP ready) despite the lack of a market for the heat. Hence their R1 calculations are based on a fantasy.

9. Section 5.5 (Ecology and Nature Conservation) claims to follow best practice yet ignores the incinerator emissions and the various stresses they cause. AmeyCespa only seem to acknowledge adverse impacts where they apply to items of minor import but ignore or trivialise impacts from AWRP’s main facilities. Mitigation either only addresses relatively minor impacts or would be largely ineffectual.

10. Section 5.7 (Hydrology, Hydrogeology and Flood Risk) contains some contradictions and fails to give adequate consideration of possible future needs for drinking water or issues surrounding local leaching of pollutants into groundwater and the spread of pollution within aquifers via groundwater flows. The

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claim of “Minor Beneficial effect on surface water quality” is entirely wrong; the reverse is true. Adverse effects on water quality will also place stress on aquatic ecosystems. Despite AWRP being within an EA Designated Groundwater Source Protection Zone, AmeyCespa offer no evidence concerning the nature of the surficial sediments or of hydro-geological modelling of the underground aquifer to check for harm.

11. Section 5.10 (Traffic and Transport) downplays the impacts and associated risks. The large number of HGVs associated with AWRP will damage the safety and security of residents and North Yorkshire road users. There are serious safety issues concerning the A59/A168 and contiguous A1(M)/A59 junctions, especially during periods of peak traffic flow.

12. A number of conclusions in Section 5.11 (Air Quality, Odour and Dust) are false. AmeyCespa’s conclusions concerning the operation of AWRP (Section 5.1) are ill-founded. This leads to their overly sanguine views of health impacts and they totally ignore the fear they engender. They also ignore or dismiss the many adverse social impacts that AWRP would lead to.

Supplementary Planning Statement

13. AmeyCespa emphasise the National Policy Planning Framework’s presumption in favour of sustainable development. However, AWRP is not a sustainable development; the “golden thread” of AmeyCespa’s imaginings is actually a vicious circle leading to ongoing harm over decades. There can be no presumption in favour of development. AWRP is alleged by AmeyCespa to serve the wider community yet it would fail to do even this, instead causing harm in a number of ways.

14. AWRP is not the strategic project AmeyCespa claim and it will not deliver the economic, social and environmental benefits that they claim. Indeed, we discuss the harm it will do in each of these areas.

15. There have several changes in Planning since AmeyCespa’s original application. These include the Localism Act which could lead to the abolition of the RSS. However, our evidence is germane irrespective of the possible abolition of the RSS. We see the Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations as irrelevant as there is currently no market for the heat; AmeyCespa pretend otherwise. At best heat use is only speculative.

16. We and others who commented on the proposed new Waste Core Strategy (WCS) feel strongly that it would be wrong to determine planning permission prior to the new WCS being agreed and adopted. This is because all the documents put out by NYCC regarding the WCS have said "this assumes that the incinerator already exists". This presumption is without foundation as it appears to pre-empt the outcome of the AWRP planning application and any subsequent public inquiry. Thus there must be concern that the current WCS development is merely a public relations exercise intended to act as a “smoke screen” behind which a highly controversial proposal can proceed. At the very least, planning permission should be withheld until the LDF and the WCS are firmly in place.

17. We present evidence showing that consultation and so-called “community involvement” have been a sham. We utterly refute the derogatory implications of para 1.4.25 et seq that the public have come to see all new buildings as ugly. This is typical of the attitude shown towards people who disagree with the Applicant. While they have given presentations, they have not given serious attention to people’s concerns. Consultation involves listening and acting on other people’s views, not simply hearing them and dismissing them apparently automatically. Had they take full and proper account of what was said, it would not have been necessary for the Community Liaison Group (CLG) to distance itself from the whole process; why carry on when there is no real dialogue? To claim that the engagement process helped form choices and decisions is hypocritical when there was no real engagement.

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18. AmeyCespa attempt to discredit Harrogate Borough Council, a statutory consultee who objected strongly to AWRP by seeking to place the views of qualified officers above the democratic decision of the Council to object. For AmeyCespa to speak of “inaccuracies and misinformation” in HBC’s formal response is ironic, given the very many examples of inaccuracies and misinformation in AmeyCespa’s Application. This provides a strong example AmeyCespa’s contempt for consultation and the views of others, as does the CLG episode and AmeyCespa’s denigration of NYWAG and others as representing “the negative interests of a few”. If this is their attitude even before planning permission has been decided, how can people trust them to act with respect towards the local communities were planning permission to be granted? Their failures in respect of consultation therefore constitute a further reason for refusing planning permission.

19. The Conservation Management Plan and Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund are discussed. There may well be adverse reaction to a single landowner receiving a large sum in respect of Allerton Park and Garden. Given the unrealistically low amount of monies and the seriously restricted aims of the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund, we feel that this is disproportionate. Given that AWRP’s emissions will harm both the natural environment and the built environment, the restricted timescale over which these monies are available is totally inadequate. Finally, the procedures for managing this fund do not inspire confidence, given the lack of trust in the community engendered by the farcical consultation to date. We feel that the Conservation Management Plan and the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund are of little relevance and the latter is wholly inadequate to offer any realistic mitigation .

20. AmeyCespa’s arguments on Decommissioning and Restoration are disingenuous. The very fact that they propose to construct AWRP on land which was supposed to be restored under the original consents shows that a “suitably-worded planning condition” is no guarantee of decommissioning and certainly does not ensure that funds will be available. It is therefore essential that financial provision is made in a way that ensures that the council does not bear the whole of the decommissioning costs if operations have to cease prematurely or the operator goes out of business. Since AmeyCespa appear unwilling to make such provision, this is one further example of potential financial harm and therefore adds to our reasons for opposing planning permission.

21. In summary, the application runs counter to the UK’s national and international commitments on climate change; is contrary to EU, National and District Planning Policies; will cause harm to the environment and human health and well-being, to the economy and to sustainability; that harm cannot be mitigated; and the applicant fails to prove a need that overrides the harm. Planning permission should be refused.

WRATE Model and Misleading Conclusions

22. Our Chapter on Climate Change sets out faults in the WRATE model and in the methodology used in the original Planning Statement. There are likewise many deficiencies in AmeyCespa’s supplementary evidence. These deficiencies mean that AmeyCespa’s results cannot be taken at face value and certainly do not mean that the EfW (incineration) plant is acceptable. There is nothing in AmeyCespa’s later material to alter this conclusion.

23. We understand that the EA are now moving away from WRATE and (with ERM, WRAP and nine English Local Authorities) are developing an alternative modelling tool in accordance with international standards on life cycle assessment, carbon foot-printing and Defra’s draft guidance on life cycle thinking. Eunomia have already developed an alternative life cycle modelling tool known as ATROPOS, used to analyse policy for Defra and the Committee on Climate Change. NYCC should use the ATROPOS model to validate the applicant’s WRATE report and the claims about carbon savings.

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24. In reality CO2 emissions from the EfW incineration plant are much higher than AmeyCespa claim; incineration is the worst alternative to landfill in terms of GHG emissions. It is in direct contradiction of the sustainability criteria set by the Brundtland Commission. NYWAG object to the proposed AWRP both for the damage that it would cause to the climate and because it runs counter to national and international policy on climate change. Nothing in the new material alters this conclusion.

Ecology and Nature Conservation

25. Our earlier evidence detailed the Environmental Risks arising from AWRP which could extend over a wide area and include acidification and/or eutrophication in ecosystems, lower crop yields, adverse impacts of heavy metals and damage to materials and cultural heritage due to soiling and exposure to acidifying pollutants and ozone. By contrast, AmeyCespa’s assessment of the impacts of AWRP remains confined to the immediate locale of the proposed AWRP. They fail to acknowledge that emissions from the EfW (incinerator) would contribute to ecological damage and damage to materials (and therefore buildings) over a wide area. They also fail to discuss the role of eutrophication and other environmental insults and the environmental damage that they can bring. Thus they continue to downplay the environmental consequences of AWRP. There is nothing in their revised chapter 5 to alter our original conclusion that the evidence they offer is wholly inadequate.

Air Pollution

26. AmeyCespa’s Appendix B13 updates their air quality assessment. Crucially, it still relies on the air quality assessment presented in Chapter 10 of their Environmental Statement. Thus the new assessments are subject to the same deficiencies as those in the original Planning Statements.

27. Their assessment of Group 3 metals follows essentially the same approach as used previously. This is discussed and flaws identified. The methodology chosen does not meet the EU’s aim of a high level of protection. Additionally it flies in the face of the Precautionary Principle whose objective is to take full and proper account of all the potential risks in a manner that fully acknowledges the higher end of the scientifically established or credible range of uncertainty. The Applicant’s approach therefore pays scant respect to the risks imposed on local people and on their environment.

28. AmeyCespa conclude that their additional assessment of short-term WID limits “does not alter any of the conclusions from the original air quality assessment”. The flaws in the original assessment remain so the many of the conclusions of the update are wrong. This makes it impossible to be as sanguine as AmeyCespa are. The overriding conclusion remains: planning permission should be refused in view of the environmental and health risks.

Travel Plan

29. AmeyCespa’s Travel Plan recognises that local availability of public transport is limited and presents a set of possible measures to make travel more sustainable. The Plan is discussed and deficiencies identified. While it might have some limited effect, it can only be a minor palliative, especially as HGVs are the main concern and they are not covered. As with much else at AWRP, the Travel Plan is best seen as a sop which does little to mitigate the unacceptable risks arising from the traffic AWRP would generate.

ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS

Capacity

30. Our chapter on Need and Technology Choices showed that the projections of waste arisings on which the alleged need for AWRP was based are implausible; waste arisings both locally and nationally are falling

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while re-use and recycling are increasing. Many Local Authorities may take similar decisions at about the same time without giving consideration to national or international factors; e.g. the Landfill Directive has led to a large number of MSW incineration projects at various stages of development.

31. Over-capacity in some EU countries (e.g. Germany and Holland) is beginning to have commercial consequences leading to the closing of incinerators and exporting waste across frontiers to fill excess capacity. The European Commission’s Environment Directorate has emphasized the importance of moving waste up the waste hierarchy and that all member states should prioritize waste prevention. The European Commission have called for the UK to avoid sending recyclable material to incineration and have expressed some concern that an over-reliance on incineration could lead to some recyclable material being burned and called on the UK to ensure that recycling and reuse remain the priority for waste treatment. The European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment has called for “the phasing-out, by the end of this decade, of incineration of recyclable and compostable waste”.

32. Overcapacity in Europe and the drive to move waste up the waste hierarchy has implications for the financial viability of the proposed AWRP. Much greater use of re-use and recycling are clearly more in line with the thinking of the European Commission and the European Parliament. To avoid the financial harm that AWRP would bring with it, planning permission should be refused.

33. Research by Eunomia suggests the over-capacity problems seen in Germany and Holland and some localised areas in the UK are likely to be repeated nationally. Both theIr central and high scenario for GB projects overcapacity commencing in 2015/16 (1.2 and 6.6 million tonnes respectively), even excluding potential future capacity, which has not yet entered the planning system. Only on their ‘low’ is the onset of overcapacity delayed until 2017/18.

34. Even though there will be regional variations in the onset of over-capacity, it is highly likely that AWRP would be operating in an over-capacity situation for all or much of its operational life. This is a buyers’ market; people who want waste disposal services would have the upper hand. This adds to the financial risks faced by AWRP and, in particular, NYCC and therefore council tax payers.

35. Inspection of NYCC’s revised waste forecasts shows that they are lower than the forecasts on which the December 15th 2010 decision to award the contract to AmeyCespa, the Council was taken. However, do include a new and unspecified waste stream called “Trade Waste”. This has suspiciously identical and excessively high1 growth rates for Craven, Harrogate, Ryedale, Scarborough and Selby (but not CYC) which fall back to 2% thereafter. Without this change, the MSW predictions for NYCC by 2039/40 would be c. 380,000 tonnes; if we assume an implausibly low 50% recycling rate, only some 190,000 tonnes of waste would require treatment, far below the 320.000 tonne capacity of the EfW (incinerator) at AWRP.

36. The spectacularly high growth rates are unjustified, being an NYCC assumption without any evidence base. In the face of the regional and national over-capacity and the expected highly competitive market for waste treatment in the coming years, the high gate prices of AWRP pose financial risks for NYCC.

37. There needs to be a thorough review both of technology choices and local alternatives before planning permission is even considered. It is essential to refuse planning permission now to avoid further nugatory expenditure2.

Financial harm

38. Our earlier chapters argued that AWRP will cause financial harm to the people of NYCC and CYC who will pay for it and bear the risk for the next 25 years. They advanced a number of reasons for this. However, there are more. These include the lack of a proper examination of value for money and a blind faith that the PFI

1 These rates are 28.5% (2015/16), 40.1% (2016/17), 23.49% (2017/18) and 20.11% (2018/19). 2 Nugatory expenditure is expenditure that does not achieve any result. (Definition of nugatory: Absolutely and without qualification lacking in meaning, substance, or worth)

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process automatically ensures value for money but this is not always the case; PFI is not always the cheapest option for a given scheme. Moreover, using PFI is not always risk free, as the Treasury Select Committee pointed out. Not all risk is transferred to the private sector. Finally, council tax payers don’t want the ongoing certainty of paying over the odds for a guaranteed 25 years. The AWRP proposal is rather like signing for a fixed rate mortgage for 10% APR when the going rate is 5% and probably falling. It is the economics of the madhouse.

39. Granting planning permission for AWRP would give the applicant a monopoly position which will be incapable of challenge for 25 years. This is unacceptable in terms of the damage to competition by local businesses. However, there are financial risks arising from the disparity between the circa £130/tonne gate price at AWRP and the more typical £65/tonne. NYCC’s confidence that it could replace the shortfall in MSW with C&I waste is likely to be misplaced, especially as there is over-capacity in the region. Hence, it may not be possible to fill AWRP and this could create commercial risks in trying to source C&I waste in a very competitive market. NYCC seem not to have factored these risks into their simplistic economic case, nor acknowledged the possibility of penalties being paid if they cannot supply sufficient waste.

40. That part of the capacity of AWRP that in not used for the NYCC/CYC MSW must compete on the open market where the going rate is already far lower and will be subject to downward pressure due to the growing over-capacity regionally and nationally and due to the probable greater effectiveness and lower costs of new and emerging technologies. This leads to the possibility of cross-subsidy from the Councils; this looks suspiciously like a form of state aid and is morally repugnant to us and unacceptable financially as council tax payers.

Traffic impacts

41. This section reinforces our objections on Traffic grounds, with the focus on the increased traffic at the already hazardous A59/A168 junction and the closely associated A1(M)/A59 junction which are contiguous and should be treated as part of the same system. AmeyCespa fail to do this and thereby seriously understate the risks. AWRP would generate considerable additional traffic, particularly HGVs. Moreover AmeyCespa do not allow for the fact that suppliers of waste will determine whether waste will be direct delivered to the site, or be subject to bulking prior to onward transmission. If they decide to send their waste directly to the site instead of bulking, the AmeyCespa’s Transport Assessment and all its conclusions would be largely meaningless since traffic volumes may well be considerably in excess of their estimates. Thus they are downplaying the impacts.

Abnormal Operation

42. There are a number of possible abnormal operation modes which feature failure of part of the air pollution control system leading to permitted emission levels being substantially or greatly exceeded. There appears to be inadequate safety engineering to avoid or minimise these risks. Moreover, emissions of some harmful substances could be reduced by the inclusion of proven technologies. These issues mean that planning permission should be refused in view of the possibility of substantial harm to the environment and human health.

National Policy Planning Framework

43. We have added our views on the NPPF in relation to the AWRP application. It introduces a presumption in favour of sustainable development; there can be no presumption in favour of AWRP because it is not a sustainable development. Our earlier views on the lack of sustainability are extended and reinforced in relation to the definitions and criteria within the NPPF.

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44. We welcome the introduction of greater emphasises on local determination and we suggest that this has been conspicuous by its absence in the case of AWRP and the Waste Core Strategy. The NPPF appears to challenge NYCC’s presumption that it should determine this application, especially as the process to date has ignored public opinion, thus introducing a democratic deficit where none need exist. The NPPF suggestion that planning should be a collective enterprise including rather than excluding people and communities implies that decisions should be taken by a more local body and that the views of local people and communities and their representatives should be given greater weight.

45. Other conclusions from the NPPF Document include the need to “respond to the changes that new technologies offer us”, which AWRP signally fails to do. It also emphasises that planning should be genuinely plan-led, empowering local people to shape their surroundings, with succinct local and neighbourhood plans setting out a positive vision for the future of the area. Plans should be kept up-to-date, and be based on joint working and co-operation to address larger than local issues. Sadly, NYCC have failed to meet these standards. It has been without a Minerals and Waste Strategy for some years and has consistently gone against the views of the public. NYCC should not be taking the most significant contractual and planning decision ever until after it has a valid strategy to guide it.

46. There are further NPPF recommendations that have not been met in the case of AWRP such as the lack of a planning framework for minerals and waste; a scheme that cannot conserve heritage assets in a manner appropriate to their significance; a proposed development would cause harm to the landscape that cannot be adequately screened or mitigated; a Transport Statement or Transport Assessment. These, and the many other NPPF requirements that the scheme fails, reinforce our view that planning permission should be refused

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INTRODUCTION

1. This document reviews information submitted by AmeyCespa in their Supplementary Planning Statement and accompanying material made available by NYCC in July 2012. This includes a number of additional Appendices. Far from alleviating our concerns, much of this additional material reinforces them and therefore strengthens our objections to AWRP.

2. It has not proven possible to review every aspect of the voluminous material submitted by AmeyCespa as part of their planning application for AWRP. Instead, we have for the most part focused on the areas to which we most strongly object. We must therefore emphasise that we do not necessarily agree with statements by the Applicant on which we have not commented. What is clear is that there are very many aspects of the AWRP proposal with which we strongly disagree and that there are cheaper and cleaner alternatives which would gain our support. Neither do we oppose further development at Allerton Park as part of a sustainable waste management strategy though we believe that bringing all residual (after recyclates have been collected elsewhere for treatment) waste through any single site is unjustifiable. We therefore continue to object to the AWRP proposal and emphasise the need to refuse planning permission.

3. We have previously emphasised that there is no need for a facility of any description to treat the amount of residual waste envisaged for AWRP (see our chapter on Need and Technology Choices). Even NYCC seem to have belated recognised that AWRP is overly large (though failing to recognise the full extent of the problem) and suggest that this could be made up by treating commercial waste. We would remind you that the purpose of AWRP and the responsibility of North Yorkshire is to treat municipal waste only. Going beyond the original purpose and remit for the proposed facility would distort the local market for waste and put the future of existing local firms at risk, with concomitant adverse impacts on employment. This is a further reason for refusing planning permission.

4. That said the primary purpose of this document is to comment on the new material by AmeyCespa that was made publically available in July 2012. We have approached this task by commenting on a number of the individual documents in this supplementary material, with appropriate cross referencing to our comments on the original material. We feel obliged to apologise for the repetition in the material below but this is inevitable given the repetitive nature of much of what AmeyCespa say and the fact that this chapter, unlike our earlier chapters, comments on a substantial number of AmeyCespa documents.

5. We have also taken the opportunity to add supplementary material which appears in Part B of this document. This material at Parts B1 to B5 adds to and extends the range of our earlier objections. It includes a discussion of the new National Planning Policy Framework.

6. Finally, we reiterate our view that planning permission for AWRP should be refused.

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PART A: OBJECTIONS BASED ON FURTHER MATERIAL FROM THE APPLICANT

A1: AWRP Non-Technical Summary7. The cover-page to this document has a somewhat sanitised artist’s impression. For example, there is no

sign of any waste or stored IBA awaiting treatment, no sign of any vehicles and no sign of a plume, though this would be up to 300m long on AmeyCespa’s own admission. Even so, the picture makes it clear that the proposed facility is a massive development of uncompromisingly industrial design and utterly alien in a rural landscape and would have major adverse landscape and visual impacts. Despite some limited and inadequate attempt at screening; the AWRP facility would clearly intrude into the openness of the countryside. It would harm current recreational facilities, the tourist industry and the enjoyment of public rights of way. The so-called mitigation measures discussed in Section 5 of the Non-Technical Summary have very little if any impact on the gross intrusion that is AWRP. Planning permission should therefore be refused.

8. In para 1.3.5 AmeyCespa states that “In 2010 AmeyCespa secured a 25-year waste PFI contract to meet the residual waste management needs for NYCC and the CYC. AWRP is central to this contract”. The key phrase here is “meet the residual waste management needs for NYCC and the CYC”. As our chapter on Need and Technology Choices makes abundantly clear, AWRP is grossly oversized to meet this objective. To use Council Tax payers and PFI money to subsidise and/or underwrite this development so that it can also treat commercial waste (a possibility that NYCC have openly admitted to) is wholly wrong. This would, in turn risk damage to already established local waste management business.

9. Since the proposed AWRP plant exceeds its original purpose (meet the residual waste management needs for NYCC and the CYC) and risks damage to already-established waste management local business, planning permission should be refused.

10. AmeyCespa claim (Section 1,3) to have been “formed out of two sister companies, merging the public service provision of Amey with the waste management expertise of Cespa” and that AmeyCespa draws on over 40 years’ experience in waste management; including both construction and service delivery. This, they say “includes the operation of over 90 waste management facilities and dealing with the sustainable, safe treatment of 7,000,000 tonnes of waste every year.” It is worth dissecting these claims:

Although AmeyCespa is registered in the UK its origins are Spanish. It is a recently formed company (2010) created as a joint enterprise by two organizations. Amey, a company operating in the UK, which was acquired by the Spanish company Ferrovial in May 2003 and Cespa, who operate internationally and been part of the Ferrovial Group for over 40 years. Both of these operate within the Ferrovial Services Division and report to the CEO Santiago Olivares and both are wholly owned by Gruppo Ferrovial SA based in Barcelona. Neither Amey or Cespa or AmeyCespa are quoted on the UK stock market they are all wholly owned by the Spanish company Ferrovial.

Much of the claimed expertise in waste management is outside the UK and not necessarily relevant to UK conditions; only the recently acquired Donarbon is a UK-based waste management firm and they appear not to have any incineration experience, at least on the scale of the proposed AWRP facility3.

3 Donarbon is currently delivering a 28 year waste management PFI contract in Cambridgeshire with Cambridgeshire County Council, worth £730 million. The company has waste treatment facilities in Cambridgeshire and a landfill operation. A further two transfer stations, nine household waste recycling centres and other industrial and commercial services in the region are also operated by Donarbon. Source: AmeyCespa Acquires Donarbon Limited, Waste Management World, http://www.waste-management-world.com/index/display/article-display/6539904517/articles/waste-management-world/markets-

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http://www.waste-management-world.com/index/display/article-display/6539904517/articles/waste-management-world/markets-policy-finance/2010/09/ameycespa-aquires-donarbon-limited.html


Technology transfer can be a difficult process and is by no means instantaneous. Clearly the lessons of the Cambridgeshire waste management project have not been applied to AWRP; if they had a more environmentally friendly solution might have been offered.

AmeyCespa claim (para 1.3.4) to be “focused on helping local authorities to design and implement effective waste management strategies, reducing costs whilst improving environmental outcomes for both its customers and the UK public alike”. These claims would not be net by AWRP – it is not the most effective waste management strategy available (e.g. on grounds of substantial over-capacity and unsuitable technology choice to meet NYCC’s and CYC’s needs), far from reducing costs it is much more expensive than other proven technology choices and it signally fails to improve “improving environmental outcomes for both its customers and the UK public alike”. Indeed it has substantial environmental impacts and carries unacceptable health risks for the public.

11. While not strictly reasons for refusing planning permission, the above does lead us to question whether the Applicant has sufficient UK experience. More pertinently, perhaps, the Applicant’ proposed “solution” flies in the face of the claimed values and aims espoused in their para 1.3.4. Indeed, their failure to meet these values at AWRP leads to many of the objections that we and others have.

12. As is made clear in our earlier chapters (e.g. on Climate Change, Harmful Emissions and Health), there are far more, and more severe environmental and health impacts than AmeyCespa describe. Moreover, as will be seen later (see below), some of the arguments they use are unacceptable, for example on air pollution. They fail to adopt a holistic approach and they do not recognise or discuss some adverse effects or health risks. Thus, it is startling to find that the only cumulative Impacts mentioned at para 2.3.1 and therefore included as part of the EIA are:

Leachate Treatment Facility: the development of lagoons and associated infrastructure to treat leachate arising from the Allerton Park Landfill; and

Flaxby Golf and Country Club: the development of a luxury hotel, leisure facilities and golf course.

This totally ignores the fact that many of the emissions from the EfW plant are bio-accumulative and pose unacceptable risks for human health and the environment. It is not acceptable simply to ignore these important effects which lead to strong reasons for refusing planning permission yet place greater weight on a Golf and Country Club than on human health.

13. Para 4.6.1 shows that the digestate and a liquid from the AD plant are sent to the EfW plant. Bearing in mind that it is perfectly possible to produce usable product from AD plant, the technology choice appears sub-optimal.

14. Para 4.6.5 describes elements of the EfW plant including the Flue Gas Treatment/Air Pollution Control. It states that “An integrated air pollution control system will treat all flue gas prior to emission via a 70m tall chimney, so we keep emission levels within safe and statutory limits. Flue gas residues including fly ash will be transported off site in sealed tankers for disposal at an appropriately licensed facility”.

15. Two points immediately arise. Firstly, we have shown that the stack height of 70m is inadequate and likely to lead to emission levels exceeding safe and statutory limits (these are not the same thing – for some emissions best practice demands much more stringent limits than in the UK). As we have already made clear in our previous submissions, this is not acceptable. Secondly, it is unclear whether or not fly ash and APC residues are loaded in an air-tight environment consistent with health and safety needs. Moreover, the destination of the sealed tankers is not stated but it seems likely that they will use the dangerous A59/A168 junction; it is crucial that the sealed containers (tanks) are proof against any theoretically possible road accident since any breach would lead to a major pollution incident.

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16. Construction work will inevitably cause disturbance and we consider the hours envisaged in para 4.13.3 to be excessive. Instead of construction works being undertaken in accordance with the following normal (the hours quoted are not “normal”) hours of work of Monday to Friday, 07:00 to 19:00 (excluding Bank Holidays) it should be 0800 to 1800 and Saturday work should be excluded. No variation should be allowed except for safety agreed by the Local Authority. (Reasons of continuity is not acceptable – it simply acts as an excuse for ignoring any restraint on working hours).

17. Despite misleading claims to the contrary, Section 5 shows that in reality proper consideration was not given to newer, cheaper and more environmentally friendly alternatives and that the transport implications were not given sufficient weight and the logistical problems of bringing waste in from across the entirety of North Yorkshire ignored. Moreover a justification based around a fictitious “do nothing” scenario is no justification at all. We have shown in other chapters that AWRP is over-sized and not needed, that it is unacceptable in its health and environmental impacts (a range of issues apparently given scant consideration in arriving at the AWRP technology choice) and that there are more modern, cheaper and cheaper alternatives. Alternatives such as sending some waste to existing facilities outside the county or to new facilities such as those at Ferrybridge appear not to have been considered at all or dismissed far too easily in view of the potential to save money. We find no evidence that a proper sensitivity analysis of all the assumptions made has been carried out and there is likewise no evidence of the risk analysis that one would expect for a project of this magnitude.

18. Far from being the “optimal technology” that AmeyCespa claim (para 5.2.10), AWRP comprises a mechanical treatment plant that falls far short of the capabilities of MBT in its ability to enhance recycling, an AD plant that does not produce useful product and an incinerator which produces only electricity because there is no readily available market for the heat. It is badly located and fails to make use of existing rail links in North Yorkshire thereby imposing heavy loads on local road networks with concomitant traffic accident risks. The transport implications of the AWRP site (or any other single site) are contrary to the proximity principle and the transport strategy in the Vision Statement. Finally, the AWRP proposal is not compatible with the waste hierarchy as it does not enable re-use and recycling to be maximised and would result in waste being treated further down the hierarchy than is necessary or appropriate.

19. We refuted the claims made in Section 5.4 on visual and landscape impact in our chapter on Other Impacts. The reality is that the proposed AWRP building would appear as an isolated but prominent alien feature of uncompromisingly industrial design in the wider rural landscape; it would be seen from a wide area and the plume could be seen for 10-20 km. Despite some limited and inadequate attempt at screening, the AWRP facility would clearly intrude into the openness of the countryside. It would harm current recreational facilities and the enjoyment of public rights of way. Moreover, AWRP could hurt the tourist industry locally. The 70m (220 ft) high chimney would be a massive industrial development in the open countryside which will have major adverse landscape and visual impacts at the A1M/A59 junction which is the major visitor entry to the York and Harrogate district and would be an unwelcome eyesore to discourage people entering the Yorkshire Dales. To describe such impacts as “slight” as AmeyCespa do is a travesty of the truth.

20. Section 5.5 (Ecology and Nature Conservation) claims to follow best practice yet ignores the emissions from the incinerator and the various stresses that they cause, as identified by the European Environment Agency (EEA) in their 2011 reporti . This is discussed in Section 2 of our chapter: Environmental Insults: Environmental Risks, Traffic, Visual Impact which shows that air pollution is likely to have greater effects than AmeyCespa acknowledge. Also, AmeyCespa only seem to acknowledge adverse impacts where they apply to items of minor import (why all the fuss over Claro House?) but ignore or trivialise impacts from AWRP’s main facilities including the incinerator. Mitigation efforts either only address relatively minor impacts (e.g. those around Claro House) or are likely to be of very limited value or ineffectual (e.g. those intended to address some part of the visual impact).

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21. The claim (para 5.6.3) that “Effects on the geology and ground stability due to the construction of AWRP will largely be Neutral to Slight Beneficial, given the design standards and use of best practice methods” is wholly without foundation. It is axiomatic that no building confers any benefit on geology, by definition it interferes with nature. It is interesting that the proposed efforts to prevent gas seeping into the AWRP facility (para 5.6.5) does not include a gas-impermeable membrane (sometimes also called a radon barrier) in addition to the other measures proposed.

22. Section 5.7 (Hydrology, Hydrogeology and Flood Risk) contains some contradictions. For example para 5.7.3 says that there are three aquifers (water bearing rocks) within the Site area and that the Site lies within the outer extent of an EA designated Groundwater Source Protection Zone (GSPZ). They then say that there are no drinking water abstraction licences within 1km of the Site. AmeyCespa (para 5.7.6) go on to say that “We consider that the construction and operation of AWRP would have a Neutral impact on groundwater and on surface water runoff and there will be a Minor Beneficial effect on surface water quality”. This claim is in error because it ignores several factors:

There is a risk of pollutants leaching into groundwater locally and the deposition of pollutants into local land and hence groundwater and drainage systems. The latter also leads to a risk of pollutants entering the groundwater.

Groundwater is not static; in other words there are groundwater flows. This could lead over time to pollution reaching drinking water abstraction points or precluding extraction at points which might otherwise have been used had not AWRP existed.

Deposition of pollutants into local land and hence groundwater and drainage systems means that the claim of “Minor Beneficial effect on surface water quality” is entirely wrong; the reverse is true. Adverse effects on water quality will also place stress on aquatic ecosystems.

23. Despite AWRP being within an EA Designated Groundwater Source Protection Zone, AmeyCespa offer no evidence concerning the nature of the surficial sediments or of hydro-geological modelling of the underground aquifer to check for harm. Moreover, information on the precise elevation of the groundwater table itself is lacking, because old records do not survey the ground surface of the boreholes and may not be reliable because of the ground-works. The surface and the deeper aquifers are connected, as indicated by high salt levels recorded in one borehole. Under these circumstances it is wrong to claim a “Neutral impact on groundwater”; it is more likely to be negative.

24. Section 5.10 discusses Traffic and Transport and downplays the impacts and associated risks. Our objections on transport grounds are outlined in Section 4 of our chapter: Environmental Insults: Environmental Risks, Traffic, Visual Impact. Briefly, the choice of a single site to treat all of North Yorkshire’s waste makes no sense given this is the largest rural county in England. The position of the AWRP site is wholly inconsistent with the localism policy, being at one corner of the county. There are sites that could better meet the needs of NYCC/CYC. The proposed AWRP appears to be contrary to the Councils policy of road accident reduction. The large number of HGVs associated with AWRP will damage the safety and security of residents and North Yorkshire road users. There are serious safety issues concerning the A59/A168 and contiguous A1(M)/ A59 junction, especially during periods of peak traffic flow giving rise to enhanced accident risks.

25. AmeyCespa’s Section 5.11 discusses air quality, odour and dust and reaches a number of conclusions totally at variance with our findings. The latter are set out in our chapters on Harmful Emissions and their Properties (with the concomitant adverse health effects set out in Health Risks: Adverse Effects from Incinerator Emissions) while the flaws in AmeyCespa’s argument are given in Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment. Taken together, these show that the claims made by AmeyCespa concerning the operation of AWRP summarised in Section 5.1 are ill-founded. (We also gave concerns

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over the construction and decommissioning phases). Much of this is also summarised in our Objection To AmeyCespa Proposal At Allerton Park submitted in January 2012.

26. Health impacts arising from waste incineration (the main technology at AWRP) is a contentious subject for many reasons (complexity, uncertainty, vested interests, the nature of the ‘scientific method’, difficulties ‘proving’ causal relationships, ‘confounding factors’ including both social factors and other sources of pollution, etc.). However, there is a substantial body of scientific opinion showing that there are reasonable grounds for concern about potentially dangerous effects of incinerator emissions on human health, with babies and young children being amongst the most vulnerable. Under these circumstances European law demands that the precautionary principle be applied. As there are less costly, more environmentally friendly systems, this means that the health and environmental risks must be taken into account at the upper end of the range of uncertainty. In particular, the risks of incineration are such that the precautionary principle means that it is wrong to take the risk of incineration when you do not have to.

27. There are a range of social factors which AmeyCespa do not appear to properly recognise and certainly do not adequately discuss in the Non-Technical Summary. As our chapter on Sustainability show, far from creating job opportunities (para 5.13.3 AWRP would serve to destroy jobs, particularly in existing waste management firms and in future re-use and recycling industry. Paragraphs such as 5.13.4 show an unwarranted dismissive arrogance towards the damage that AWRP would inflict on living conditions and house prices in the vicinity. Fear of the adverse health impacts arising from incinerator emissions, adverse impacts on living conditions for people living nearby coupled with economic penalties (e.g. lower house prices) and adverse traffic impacts are all material concerns that have been factors in refusing planning permission for incinerators.

28. All this is sufficient reason to refuse planning permission even without the myriad of other reasons that we have presented elsewhere.

29. While we recognise the need to seek alternatives to landfill and move towards a “sustainable integrated waste management system” (c.f. para 5.15.1). AWRP is not a sustainable solution (see our chapter on Sustainability) and would not meet North Yorkshire’s needs in a sustainable or cost-effective manner. AmeyCespa’s claim (para 5.15.2) that “the environmental impacts of the proposed development have been assessed in great detail” fails to impress because their assessment is replete with many flaws and judgements manifestly biased in favour of their proposal. While accepting that some (not “great”) care has been taken to minimise these, these efforts are either peripheral or ineffective or both (as with visual impact) or leave health and environmental risks that remain above acceptable levels. These facts reinforce the case for refusing planning permission.

A2: AmeyCespa’s Supplementary Planning Statement30. Much of the first part of this document is descriptive but we must take exception to the impression that

there has been proper consultation or community engagement (a point discussed in detail in later sections). Many NYWAG members were present at the so-called consultations which were more like presentations and PR exercises. The whole point of consultation is to listen and take full and proper account of what was said. Had this been done then the widespread public opposition to the incinerator would have been properly understood and a better alternative substituted. AmeyCespa persist in calling AWRP an integrated system (e.g. in Section 5). This is surprising in that the various parts of AWRP need not be part of this allegedly integrated system. Thus the Mechanical Treatment and AD components need not be associated with an incinerator; plant of this same general type could equally well be part of some other system such as MBT/AD – one of several cheaper and cleaner alternative options. Proper consultation would have brought this point home.

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31. The quotation from the National Policy Planning Framework is intended to show reasons why AWRP should go ahead. In fact the NPPF indicates the opposite. It says:

The crucial point here is that AWRP is not a sustainable development, as our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability makes abundantly clear. Consequently, there can be no presumption in its favour. Indeed, we would argue that the very existence of cleaner and more environmentally alternatives means that more sustainable alternatives exist and the presumption should be in favour of these.

32. It is also notable that AmeyCespa have not quoted the recent review by the House of Commons Community and Local Government Committee (15 December 2011) which concluded that the “presumption in favour of development” has to be considered in the context of Local Development plans:

“The NPPF’s introduction of a presumption in favour of sustainable development must be seen as a high-level principle rather than a challenge to the predominance of local decision-making. That is why we have recommended that it be expressed instead as a ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development consistent with the Local Plan’.” (para. 160, our underline)

AWRP fails to meet this test on two counts: it is not a sustainable development and it is not consistent with local plans. Both these shortcomings are amply demonstrated in the chapters we submitted earlier and are unaltered by subsequent changes to policy, legislation and regulation.

33. AmeyCespa see AWRP as a necessary strategic project (our chapter on Need and Technology Choices demonstrates that it is not needed) that will deliver:

34. While these aims are laudable enough in themselves, AWRP does not meet any of them and it is misleading to pretend otherwise. Thus:

Economic Role – the technology choice is obsolescent (i.e. incineration) or less efficient than industry best practice (why does the mechanical separation plant only remove 10% of waste for recycling?), or inappropriately designed (why is there no useful product from the AD plant when such is technically feasible using proven technology?). Worse, AWRP is much more costly than other more modern and proven technologies and its overcapacity will lead to AWRP treating C&I waste and, according to NYCC’s latest projections “Trade Waste” This will lead to the destruction of jobs in

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the local economy as well as the loss of Council jobs as its excessive costs have to be met. Why should council tax payers subsidise such a technology that damages employment prospects for local people?

Social Role: The main social factors are the harm it will do to local people in terms of their health, their environment, the value and desirability of their homes and, for some people, their employment prospects. Far from creating a high quality built environment, it is of an entirely unsuitable industrial design for a rural environment and will blight the existing built environment including, but not limited to local historic buildings. We would favour making the steps needed to move towards “locally responsible and sustainable waste management” but AWRP would put this process on hold for 25 years since it does not represent a sustainable solution. It would destroy resources so that virgin resources have to be exploited when it would not otherwise be necessary. To allow AmeyCespa to have any role in education via the Visitor Centre or otherwise would merely be to encourage company propaganda and proselytising an unsustainable and socially irresponsible “solution” (i.e. AWRP).

The reality of the environmental role is that AWRP places unnecessary risks on human health and the environment, leading quite unnecessarily to the many types of harm that we have discussed elsewhere in our Objection. The main chosen technology (incineration) is the worst possible option for climate change. Far from minimising or utilising waste, AWRP discourages re-use and recycling and gratuitously destroys resources for very little benefit in terms of energy. Mitigation measures are wholly inadequate to address the scale of harm AWRP would cause.

35. To summarize the extent to which AWRP fails to meet its stated objectives, the application runs counter to the UK’s national and international commitments on climate change; is contrary to EU, National and District Planning Policies; will cause harm to the environment and human health and well-being, to the economy and to sustainability; that harm cannot be mitigated; and the applicant fails to prove a need that overrides the harm. Planning permission should be refused.

A2.1: Planning Policy, Legislation and Regulation Update

36. There have been a number of changes since the application and AmeyCespa take this up to April 2012 (the policy documents replaced by National Planning are listed in Appendix A2).

37. The Localism Act is seen by AmeyCespa as having relatively little impact on this application, even with the possible abolition of the RSS. In part this is because they see the evidence base for AWRP as strong and see this as germane even in the absence of the RSS. By contrast, we believe that the case for AWRP and the evidence that they adduce is deeply flawed and we therefore have a wide range of objections, most particularly to the use of an incinerator. The evidence we have produced is likewise germane irrespective of the possible abolition of the RSS.

38. We feel that it is unfortunate that AWRP should remain a County matter; there is a clear tension between the imposition of harm on residents of the Harrogate district and the needs of the local community. We recognise that AWRP will cause financial harm to all who live in York and North Yorkshire and damage job prospects for some but environmental , health and even traffic are largely local matters where harm will be imposed from outside.

39. The National Policy Planning Framework emphasises the role of sustainability and AmeyCespa claim that AWRP offers a sustainable solution. As we have made clear elsewhere in this document and in our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability, this is far from the case. AWRP does not meet any sustainability criterion, even the ridiculously narrow one used by AmeyCespa. All the claims made by AmeyCespa here are unsupportable and the NPPF therefore offers further policy reasons for refusing planning permission.

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40. The Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations are irrelevant as there is currently no market for the heat. Being CHP-ready is of no use without a market. Developing some (as yet unidentified) facility that uses heat would imply further industrialisation in a currently rural environment and this would also meet planning objections. This Scheme cannot be taken into account at this stage as heat use is only speculative.

41. We have commented separately on the North Yorkshire Waste Core Strategy (see Annex A) and were able to agree with much of the Vision Statement, albeit with important reservations. We believe that the “Minerals and Waste Development Framework: Minerals Options and Waste Vision Consultations – March 2012” document and the Vision Statement therein cannot be seen in isolation from the AWRP planning application.

42. We believe that the consultation on the Vision Statement and the Waste Core Strategy (WCS) is a farce. This is because all the documents put out by NYCC regarding the WCS have said "this assumes that the incinerator already exists". That was the baseline for the workshop NYWAG representatives attended at Northallerton on October 19th. This presumption is without foundation as it appears to pre-empt the outcome of the AWRP planning application and any subsequent public inquiry. It begs the question of whether or not the current WCS development is merely a public relations exercise intended to act as a “smoke screen” behind which a highly controversial proposal can proceed.

43. All our evidence points to the fact that AWRP is unacceptable and unsuitable in planning terms and is environmentally damaging. It also poses unacceptable risks to human health. In consequence is definitely premature given the embryonic state of the LDF. At the very least, planning permission should be withheld until this and the WCS is firmly in place; better still, refuse planning permission.

44. The introductory paragraph 1.4.2 is intended to prove that the direction of travel of the present Government is for the facilitation of infrastructure schemes such as AWRP. However, the presumption towards development is irrevocably linked to sustainability and AWRP is not a sustainable development.

45. We can agree with the arguments in para 1.4.3 that the updated and revised policies do not materially affect the conclusions. The crucial point is that our conclusions are and will remain radically different from those of AmeyCespa and lead inescapable to one over-riding conclusion: that planning permission for AWRP should be refused.

46. The NPPF identifies three pillars to sustainable development; economic, social and environmental (c.f. AmeyCespa’s para 1.4.21) and the synergies between them. Thus:

47. To claim as AmeyCespa do at para 1.4.22 that “the ‘golden thread’ of achieving and delivering sustainable development runs consistently through the AWRP proposals” is simply absurd. The statements in the remainder of para 1.4.22 presumably derive from their so-called sustainability assessment which is wrong on almost every count. As our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability shows, AWRP fails even to meet AmeyCespa’s narrow definition of sustainability and falls well short of meeting widely accepted definitions such as that of the Brundtland Commission.

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48. The Brundtland Commission defined Sustainable Development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (the same definition now used in the NPPF, taken from Resolution 42/187 of the United Nations General Assembly). The AWRP would not meet this definition. The 25 to 30 year contract will fundamentally compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs and lead to the destruction of valuable resources that could have been reused or recycled, necessitating the exploitation of virgin resources. The incinerator dominates the facility in cost and treatment volumes and, once built, cannot be reduced in size and its capital-intensive nature forces the operator to run it at full capacity even where there is no need within the county to do so. Its’ use would cause harm by emitting substances harmful to man, wildlife or the environment and damage the Council’s ability to increase recycling to anywhere even near to best practice. AWRP would cause harm to both the environment and human health, destroy jobs that would otherwise have developed in, for example, reuse and recycling and in the leisure and tourism industries for miles around and damage the social fabric by bringing extra traffic (and accidents with concomitant human misery) and reduce leisure and recreational opportunities locally. The local community would suffer other economic harm, for example lower house prices which may lead them to the Valuation Office Agency to reduce their council tax banding4.

49. We conclude that AWRP is anything but a sustainable development and the “golden thread” of AmeyCespa’s imaginings is actually a vicious circle leading to ongoing harm over decades. There can be no presumption in favour of development. AWRP is not in any sense acceptable and planning permission should therefore be refused.

50. AWRP is alleged by AmeyCespa to serve the wider community yet it would fail to do even this. It is markedly more expensive than other technologies and therefore means that council tax payers across the entirety of York and North Yorkshire would face higher council tax bills than would be necessary with a more sensible technology choice. They would also suffer damage to other council services (with loss of council jobs) due to budget constraints in a time of austerity. This spreads economic and social harm across a wide and geographically dispersed region. These factors are one further reason why AWRP is not a sustainable development. There is no clash between the collective interests of the many (the populations of York and North Yorkshire) and the “negative interest of a few”, to use AmeyCespa’s derogatory term. This is simply because both the local population and the wider population of York and North Yorkshire would suffer, albeit that the local people suffer more. Indeed, NYWAG has submitted a petition bearing 10,000 signatures to NYCC opposing AWRP – hardly a negative few.

51. Finally, para 1.4.24 prates about “the industrial infrastructure that the country needs”, presumably in the hope that AWRP will be seen as part of that infrastructure. It is not. Our chapter on Need and Technology Choices show that AWRP is not needed and that there are a number of more favourable options to treat the much smaller amount of residual municipal waste that would arise once re-use and recycling reaches optimal levels.

52. We utterly refute the derogatory implications of para 1.4.25 et seq that the public have come to see all new buildings as ugly. We well know that not all changes t the built environment are negative but equally we know (as most of not all people do) that some changes are positive and others negative while many are neutral. It defies logic to imply, as AmeyCespa appear to, that just because some changes to the built environment are positive then a particular change (AWRP) is positive. In fact AWRP would not appear as a change to the built environment; rather it would be seen as an alien intrusion in a rural environment5. The argument that is negative is not based on some alleged bias against changes to the

4 The Valuation Office Agency has recently reduced council tax bands for homes in the vicinity of wind farms. Source: Council Tax cuts for homes near wind farms, Sunday Times. 22 July 2012. 5 AmeyCespa continue to claim support from CABE, a body who no longer advise the Government. That perhaps says all that needs to be said about the value of their views which, in the case of AWRP meet the strong disagreement of large numbers of people.

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built environment which AmeyCespa wrongly attach to people who object to their proposals. It rests firmly on facts, as set out in this chapter and the earlier chapters of our objection.

53. Para 1.4.29 is one of the least credible paragraphs this author has ever seen. We disagree with every statement in it, with the last three sentences being particularly objectionable.

54. Para 1.4.34 and its various sub-paragraphs presume to give an interpretation of the NPPF’s intentions and relate them to AWRP. We feel that it contains a number of inaccuracies in relation to the latter:

1. We have found that the so-called engagement with the community to be a sham. Admittedly AmeyCespa have given presentations, what they have not done is give serious attention to people’s concerns. Consultation involves listening and acting on other people’s views, not simply hearing them and dismissing them apparently automatically. This sort of concern led to the Community Liaison Group disbanding; why carry on when there is no real dialogue? To claim that the engagement process helped form choices and decisions is hypocritical when there was no real engagement.

2. The claims made in this paragraph are false. WRP is not a sustainable development, would damage people’s lives and would not meet the real needs of the people of York and North Yorkshire. The Landscape Management Strategy is a grandiose name for a set of relatively minor measures that do little or nothing to alleviate the visual impact and landscape harm that AWRP would impose.

3. AWRP is not a sustainable development so most of this paragraph is irrelevant. The overall impact on local employment would be negative, as shown in our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability?

4. To us and very many others the buildings are visually intrusive and constitute a wholly alien and unacceptable feature in an otherwise rural landscape. (This harms the “amenity value” of existing buildings over a wide area). While it is no doubt possible to produce worse designs, it is the fact of placing such enormous industrial buildings in a rural landscape coupled with the unavoidable huge chimney stack (but not sufficiently tall to give adequate dispersion) in a rural landscape that is so very wrong. Given the sheer scale and enormity of the buildings and what they represent in terms of environmental, health and social harm, a few curves and a little inadequate landscaping is irrelevant to the total unacceptability of the AWRP construct. We reject utterly the views of CABE and English Heritage (always assuming they have been quoted correctly). In this context, we would agree with Prince Charlesii when he said “For far too long, it seems to me, some planners and architects have consistently ignored the feelings and wishes of the mass of ordinary people in this country”. Of a certainty, AWRP in its proposed location would fully qualify for Prince Charles famous description “what is proposed is like a monstrous carbuncle on the face of a much-loved and elegant friend”

5. To claim, as AmeyCespa do, that “the development has been designed mindful of the landscape character and unique environment that may exist and developed to integrate with it” is a travesty of the truth, as should be obvious from the above paragraph and all we have said about visual impact. While the site lies outside designated nature conservation and AONB areas, it has a substantial visual impact for miles around and constitutes visual pollution over a wide area.

6. Since incineration is the worst waste management technology for emitting CO2 and other greenhouse gases, AWRP would be hugely damaging to efforts to move towards a low-carbon future (see our chapter on Climate Change). AmeyCespa emphasis that “supporting low-carbon energy is central to the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development”. However, incineration, the main component of AWRP, is the most carbon-intensive energy source (especially as it would be electricity-only) with the possible exception of coal-fired power stations. This alone should be sufficient reason to refuse planning permission, especially when couple with the fact that AWRP is not a sustainable development in so many other ways.

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7. The idea that AWRP could ”contribute towards conserving and enhancing the natural environment” is absurd. We have specified the myriad of ways that AWRP will cause harm to the environment in other chapters and these negate all the claims to acceptability that AmeyCespa make under this point. Taken together, they negate the claims to acceptability made in AmeyCespa’s Planning Statement and Environmental Statement. Moreover, with several proven cleaner, more environmentally friendly and cheaper alternatives to choose from, there is no need to use a highly polluting and visually intrusive facility such as the proposed AWRP. It would be contrary to the Precautionary Principle to grant planning permission.

8. We are not opposed to some form of development for waste treatment at Allerton Park – the objection is to AWRP. WE do, however, feel that the traffic implications of a single site for the entirety of North Yorkshire are unacceptable.

9. AmeyCespa claim that AWRP is mixed us since it contains a mix of waste technologies. This is true only to a limited extent – one might as well say that a kitchen offers mixed use of land because it contains both an oven and d a dishwasher or sink. In other words, the purpose of AWRP is waste management – a single use. The next claim – that it maximises re-use and recycling is patently untrue. Incineration, the main component of AWRP discourages re-use and recycling (as we have explained elsewhere) and destroys materials and goods that could be recycled. This necessitates exploitation of virgin resources, one of the many reasons why AWRP is not a sustainable ”solution”. The education centre, far from encouraging recycling, would simply proselytize an obsolescent technology and promulgate the message “what is the point?” when it comes to recycling.

10. While English Heritage has apparently agreed the proposed mitigation, this does not mean that it is at all adequate. Indeed to speak of the “legibility and significance of the designed landscape” is pure nonsense, verbiage as imprecise and redolent of jargon as to be virtually without meaning. That apart, AWRP would be a “monstrous carbuncle” (to borrow a phrase) that detracts from local heritage assets and the enjoyment thereof. Moreover, it would have a similar malign influence on the enjoyment of recreational facilities.

11. Having a single site is a guaranteed way of maximising vehicle miles compared with a multi-site solution. To speak of promoting “greener, cleaner travel choice” is absurd in the face of the massive and unnecessary intrusion of HGV’s caused by the inappropriate choice of a single site at one edge of the region. Moreover, its location in a rural setting means that workers and visitors (if any) would use motorised transport to get there. The siting necessarily maximises the use of the private car. A wish-list item that employees will be encouraged to use more environmentally friendly means of getting to work than a private car won’t make it happen.

12. It is amazing that AmeyCespa include point 12 – “to take account of and support local strategies to improve health, social and wellbeing for all” AWRP and its EfW(incinerator) in particular, emits a wide range of toxic substances which impose unacceptable health risks over a wide area while we have also shown that AWRP causes harm to the wellbeing and social fabric of the community through the various environmental impacts it causes coupled with damage t employment prospects in some areas of the local economy.

It is somewhat fanciful for AmeyCespa to claim that AWRP would drive waste up the waste hierarchy when the reality is that it discourages re-use and recycling and holds waste at the bottom or next to bottom tier of the waste hierarchy. It reduces opportunities to treat waste at the highest level and is the antithesis of a sustainable solution. It would impose additional costs on the community compared with other proven alternatives which do offer the opportunity to drive waste up the waste hierarchy in an environmentally friendly manner.

55. We agree that the NPPF aims to help deliver development in a way that is sustainable (pare 1.4.35) and support this aim. This is indeed one of the many reasons why we oppose AWRP with its obsolescent

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technology (incineration) since AWRP is not, and can never be a sustainable development. The very principles behind the NPPF mean that planning permission should be refused.

56. AmeyCespa go on to review the Technical Guidance to the NPP (para 1.4.37) and a range of new regulations in paragraphs1.4.38 to 1.4.45. There is nothing in these to alter our objections, though it is pertinent to comment on the Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations.

A2.2: Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme Regulations

57. As we have shown in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices, there is no market for the heat. Consequently, AmeyCespa’s claims in this area are meaningless and there would not be unless new developments were permitted. This would be unacceptable as it would imply further industrialisation of a rural landscape and this threat adds further to the unacceptability of AWRP and hence to our objections. The fact that the scheme is not able to utilise the heat increases the harm promises by AWRP and fails to minimise the use of natural resources.

58. Therefore the Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme is currently of no relevance except inasmuch as it carries the threat of further industrialisation in a rural landscape. Being CHP compliant is of little importance if you cannot sell or significantly utilise the heat.

59. The promise to keep searching for a market for the heat threatens planning blight will continue to exist on the local area for the entirety of the life of AWRP were it to be built. These devalues homes and businesses and is wholly unacceptable.

A2.3: Sub-Regional Policy

60. We are aware that a number of parties commenting on the proposed new Waste Core Strategy (WCS) feel strongly that it would be wholly wrong to determine planning permission prior to the new WCS being agreed and adopted (see Part 2A of this document). This is because AWRP would effectively predetermine the outcome of the WCS and because AWRP is in practice wholly inconsistent with the draft material on which consultation has so far been based.

61. AmeyCespa are clearly aware that Harrogate Borough Council, a statutory consultee, have objected strongly to AWRP and seek to discredit them. It is true that the qualified officers raised no objection; living proof that on this occasion the Council showed greater wisdom than their officer s. For AmeyCespa to speak of “inaccuracies and misinformation” in HBC’s formal response is ironic, given the very many examples of inaccuracies and misinformation in AmeyCespa’s Application and even in statements they have made to the press. Moreover, it should be obvious that HBC had available to them material from consultation which had been submitted by a number of parties following the wholly inadequate report from qualified officers.

62. We would support the various objections which are summarised in paras 1.4.49 and 50. One of the many documents containing inaccuracies and misinformation is AmeyCespa’s Planning Policy Statement and the special pleading in paragraphs 1.4.52 et seq is based on these earlier documents. In the case of the adverse impacts on local sites like Allerton Park, Visual Amenity, the scale of the development, adverse impact on the countryside and concerns over highways issue (i.e. mainly traffic and accidents including fatalities)there is room for judgement and HBC clearly took the wholly justifiable view that these various impacts were unacceptable. The “tick-box” approach by AmeyCespa and their reliance on procedures is not adequate, nor is their reliance on flawed analysis such as their Transport Assessment (a case where independent professional analysis comes to rather different conclusions).

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63. There are many omissions and errors of interpretation in AmeyCespa’s criticisms relating to Harrogate Borough Council’s views and it is undemocratic to attach more weight to an officer’s report than to the Council’s views when the two are incompatible. Flaws in AmeyCespa’s arguments include but are not limited to: Para 1.4.53 (re policy): Clearly HBC considered there were reasons to reject AWRP. Whatever the

officials may have written, there are policy objections at a local level and these have been enumerated throughout our objection. Further policy considerations are given in Part B of this chapter.

Para 1.4.56 (scale of the development) simply reiterates that AmeyCespa consider that there are no policy objections (they would say that, wouldn’t they?) but this does not alter the fact that others do not share their view. We object to the visual impact of such a massive industrial development in an otherwise rural setting (see the visual impact section in our chapter on Other Environmental Insults), as have others.

Para 1.4.56 (impact on the countryside). Adverse impacts on the countryside take a variety of forms including such things as visual impact, loss of recreational facilities and effect on leisure and tourism. Again, we and other have enumerated many policy objections at various levels and AmeyCespa’s reiteration of their own views does nothing to change this. Objectors to the scheme have likewise assessed the scale and impact of the proposed AWRP and share HBC’s view that it is not acceptable. The mitigation proposed is wholly inadequate.

Para 1.4.57 refers to AmeyCespa’s own transport assessment but independent professional opinion places the impacts at a more sever level than AmeyCespa suggest and the supplementary Appendix included in their supplementary material does not properly address this issue.

Paras 1.4.58 et seq do little more than repeat what AmeyCespa consider they have provided and even go so far as to imply (para 1.4.60) that HBC should have known about the further developments of the Landscape Management Plan now presented (though this may be a matter of poor semantics) To say that it should not have been criticised for its inadequacy on the grounds that it is to be further developed is inappropriate and unjustified. The simple fact is that this Plan and mitigation measures are not fully developed and it would be inappropriate to grant planning permission on the basis of half-formed ideas, especially when the information we have to date demonstrates their total inadequacy.

Para 1,4,61 criticises HBC for recognising that no proper option appraisal has been carried out. Reiterating that Part 5 of the Planning Statement contains details of the site search fails to recognise that such a search is but one part of an option appraisal and that there is a link between technology choice and site selection. It also fails to recognise that other people may disagree both with the methodology (such as it is) and criteria used.

Para 1.4 62 speaks of a management plan for Allerton Park and Gardens and claims there is a holistic approach that seeks to deliver targeted landscape character and cultural heritage improvements. Bearing in mind the great damage that AWRP would inflict, this claim is breathtaking in its audacity and shows that AmeyCespa fail to grasp the harm their proposals would do.

Likewise, it is particularly ironic that AmeyCespa are complaining about the suggestion that HBC and its officers have not considered public responses (para 1.4.64). We make it clear later that public consultation by AmeyCespa has been a sham.

Para 1.4.66 to 72 appear to say that AmeyCespa have already submitted the various pieces of information referred to but the very fact that it had been thought to be missing or insufficient is surely a pointer to its inadequacy. For example, it is not unreasonable for people to identify views that they would like to see in a visual impact assessment or to disagree with the assessments as carried out by AmeyCespa (para 1.4.71).

Paras 1.4.73 and 74 concern the landscape and heritage fund which is a part of the mitigation strategy which we believe to be inadequate; indeed the fact that even the proposer sees a need for mitigation confirms the unacceptability of AWRP. Repetition of views already expressed does not alter the fact that the scope of mitigation is inadequate and does not address the social and

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economic costs that AWRP imposes on households in the surrounding area. (We suggest a generous compensation scheme is needed, extending at least as far as Boroughbridge and Knaresborough and a similar distance in other directions.)

64. Paras 1.4.75 et seq refer to five additions concerns that HBC have raised:

Para 1.4.75 seeks to deny that the facility would have wide-ranging implications for traffic. We do not concur with AmeyCespa’s view that there are no significant effects relating to transportation and believe that their traffic assessment is adequate when it is actually inadequate. For example they have failed to carry out a properly comprehensive accident risk assessment and there is already evidence that traffic impacts would be significant. The concern over the siting of AWRP is not a mere whim. Particular concerns focus on accidents and congestion the A168/A59 and A59/A1M junctions which are contiguous and should be treated as a single entity (which AmeyCespa fail to do). Quite clearly, effects will diminish with distance from the site but the whole of the A59 up to and including the junction with the York ring road will be significantly affected, especially where peak traffic to and from AWRP coincides with rush hours. Similar considerations apply to the A59 towards Harrogate and roads into Harrogate from the South. Finally, the site assessment failed to take due note of multi-site options or the proximity principle and placed the entire onus on road links along already heavily congested roads (see Part B); this is not acceptable.

Para 1.4.77 promises continuing ongoing investigation into potential markets to for the heat from the incinerator. This can be roughly translated as saying ”we got the siting wrong as there is no market for the heat but we now want to hold the threat of further industrial development over the local community”. This threat is unacceptable.

Our chapter on Need and Technology Choices shows that AWRP is not needed and will not be needed at any time during its projected 25 year life The original case for AWRP was made in terms of meeting the need to divert municipal waste from York and North Yorkshire away from landfill and this need (much smaller than claimed by AmeyCespa) can be met through cheaper, cleaner and more environmentally friendly technologies. There is also the possibility of using existing or committed facilities, for example on Teesside or at Ferrybridge, thereby avoiding a great deal of capital expenditure. The lack of any need, the existence of viable and cheaper alternatives and the lack of sustainability of AWRP mean that all the claims made in para 1.4.78 are false.

AmeyCespa suggest at para 1.4.79 that HBC may be concerned that PFI is the most appropriate means of funding. If so, this concern is well justified. The dangers have been recognised by the Treasury Select Committee and some of them are highlighted in the extracts below, taken from their conclusions.

“4. If Departments or public bodies do not have a capital budget large enough to allow for desired capital investment, there is currently a substantial incentive to use PFIs which are not included within Departmental budgets (Departmental Expenditure Limits). A PFI deal will have a smaller (but much longer lasting) impact on the current budget of an organisation whereas a conventionally procured capital project will result in a significant one-off hit to the capital budget. In the long term, the PFI arrangement will build up big commitments against future years’ current budgets that have not even yet been allocated or agreed. We are concerned that this may have encouraged, and may continue to encourage, poor investment decisions. PFI continues to allow organisations and government the possibility of procuring capital assets without due consideration for their long–term budgetary obligations.

“8. Government has always been able to obtain cheaper funding than private providers of project finance but the difference between direct government funding and the cost of this finance has increased significantly since the financial crisis. The substantial increase in private finance costs means that the PFI financing method is now extremely inefficient. Recent data suggests that the Weighted Average Cost of Capital of a PFI is double that of

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government gilts. PFI will only provide value for money if this differential in the cost of finance, which has significantly increased, is outweighed by savings and efficiencies during the life of a PFI project. (Paragraph 30)

“9. The current higher cost of finance means there may be a significant opportunity cost from using PFI. (Paragraph 31)

“10. Allocating risk to the private sector is only worthwhile if it is better able to manage the risk and can pass on any subsequent savings to the client. The main benefit highlighted to us by PFI providers was the transfer of construction risk. However a PFI contract which lasts for 30 years is not necessary to transfer this risk. There are also other methods such as turnkey contracts which can be used for the same ends. We have seen evidence that PFI has not provided good value from risk transfer—in some cases inappropriate risks have been given to the private sector to manage. This has resulted in higher prices and has been inefficient. (Paragraph 38)

“11. Some of the claimed risk transfer may also be illusory—the government is ultimately accountable for the delivery of public services.”

[Paragraph numbers taken from the Select Committee report}

Para 1.4.80 concerns harmful emission though AmeyCespa have used the emotive term “toxic fumes” They claim that the concern is unsubstantiated; again this is a misleading and emotive term which simply means that there is no absolute proof. Indeed, health impacts arising from waste incineration (the main technology at AWRP) is a contentious subject for many reasons (complexity, uncertainty, vested interests, the nature of the ‘scientific method’, difficulties ‘proving’ causal relationships, ‘confounding factors’ including both social factors and other sources of pollution, etc.). However, there is a substantial body of scientific opinion showing that there are reasonable grounds for concern about potentially dangerous effects of incinerator emissions on human health, with babies and young children being amongst the most vulnerable. Under these circumstances, European law demands the Precautionary Principle be applied. This principle suggests that as there are less costly, more environmentally friendly systems such as MBT one must ask – “Why take the risk of incineration when you do not have to?”

In addition, public concern over harmful emissions and their health impacts is itself a factor that must be taken into account in considering planning permission and there is precedence for this being a factor in refusing planning permission.

65. We suspect that AmeyCespa are attempting to discredit the democratic decision of HBC on the grounds that they had rejected the opinion of their qualified officers. We find this contemptible; in public service officials are the servants of elected representatives and those elected representatives are free to reject official advice, especially where it is seen as inadequate. This is a prime tenet of British democracy and it is wrong to attempt to discredit it.

66. We believe that consultation has been a sham (see below) and it is wholly out of order to seek to discredit the views of consultees, whether statutory or other groups such as ourselves. While we all (including AmeyCespa) have the democratic right to disagree with views expressed by others the manner of their response to Harrogate Council’s views does not seem to us to be appropriate and provides a further example of their unpreparedness to listen and take proper account of the views of the public. It seems on a par with describing those who oppose AWRP as representing the “negative interests of a few” (para 1.4.24).

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67. AmeyCespa conclude (para 1.5.1 to 1.5.3) their Supplementary Planning Statement by referring to the updated policy, legislation and regulation documents which have evolved since their initial application in September 2011. In essence, they believe that these documents do not alter the acceptability of AWRP.

68. By contrast, we have examined their Supplementary Planning Statement and found it to contain many inaccuracies and to be replete with a number of false claims. We, too, believe that the latest policy, legislation and regulation documents do not materially alter our objection to AWRP and the imperative need to refuse planning permission.

69. In part this is because our objections are based on factors that are at a higher level than the details of planning documents. These include the UK’s international obligations on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and European law in respect of the Precautionary Principle and the Provisions of Human Rights legislation, in particular the Right to Life. More generally, they arise out of real and deep concern for the health and safety of ourselves and fellow citizens and for the environment in which we live.

70. In summary, the application runs counter to the UK’s national and international commitments on climate change; is contrary to EU, National and District Planning Policies; will cause harm to the environment and human health and well-being, to the economy and to sustainability; that harm cannot be mitigated; and the applicant fails to prove a need that overrides the harm. Planning permission should be refused.

A2.4: Appendix A1 – Community Involvement

71. Appendix A1 comprises a Statement of Community Involvement and covers the year April 2011 to March 2012. They say that this period did not cover the core consultation time – yet communities actually saw precious little real consultation in earlier periods. Presentations at which a very few questions were allowed are not consultation in any meaningful sense; Public consultation is a regulatory process by which the public's input on matters affecting them is sought. It is a two-way flow of information and opinion exchange as well as participation (e.g. involving interest groups in the drafting of policy or legislation). In the case of AWRP this has not happened in any meaningful way. Local communities do not feel that they have been consulted and the dismissive arrogance of referring to groups (NYWAG and York Residents Against Incineration (YRAIN)) as representing the “negative interest of a few” despite the 10,000 signatures presented to the Council opposing incineration demonstrates a dismissive arrogance that shows AmeyCespa’s attitude to public consultation in its true light.

72. AmeyCespa’s para 1.3.9 (in their original application) speaks of “pre-application consultation with local communities and statutory and non-statutory organizations” taking place throughout the process and that “where appropriate, these representations have assisted in developing a planning application that incorporates a package of mitigation measures that seek to offset impacts and deliver benefits and enhancements to the environment, social well-being and economic stability.”

73. The second extract from para 1.3.9 combines the get-out clause “where appropriate” with a number of statements that are simply false. Thus:

The package of “mitigation measures” is totally inadequate and does virtually nothing to address the environmental harm and absolutely nothing to address the health risks imposed on the community (here we mean the unacceptably high health risks that remain after the air pollution control). Impacts are simply not offset in any meaningful way.

There are no “benefits and enhancements to the environment, social well-being and economic stability”. As we have shown elsewhere, there is damage to the environment, to human health, to

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social well-being, to employment and to the local economy, including through the choice of unnecessarily expensive and damaging waste management options.

74. Here, however, our main purpose is to look at AmeyCespa claims concerning liaison with the community. The get-out clause “where appropriate” in the text quoted above can readily be translated as “we will ignore anything anyone says that does not chime with what we are trying to do by labeling it ‘not appropriate’”. Such a caveat is not consistent with the AmeyCespa claim that

“A commitment has been made for on-going liaison with the local community, through a format yet to be determined. Local community involvement will be key to refining operational and development changes and opportunities.”

75. The reality of AmeyCespa’s local community liaison can best be illustrated through what happened to the Community Liaison Group (CLG) which AmeyCespa merely refer to as defunct without admitting to the reasons.

76. The CLG was intended to be the vehicle through which community liaison was to have taken place but this broke down because AmeyCespa had failed to convince residents of their commitment to listening and learning from local people. A letter to AmeyCespa by most of the CLG stated that they felt “misled, misrepresented and ignored”. The text of that letter is worth reproducing here because it well illustrates the nature of so-called consultation:

“We were asked to participate in the group in good faith on the basis that balanced discussions would take place and that Amey Cespa would respond to those discussions with mutual understanding and that the outcome would result in some positive actions by The Company towards alleviating the concerns of local residents.

We were therefore extremely disappointed that, having given of our time freely and having raised our expectations of some concessions from Amey Cespa that the only outcome appears to have been a minor reduction in the height of the proposed chimney and the relocation within the site of the bottom ash processing plant.

The process of completion of the Photomontages appears to have been a sham, with many of the photographs taken from positions of low visibility behind trees and other features. The absence of any views from the Temple of Victory in the Registered Parkland of Allerton Park is a major omission. In addition the traffic analysis has done nothing to help mitigate the road safety concerns which were raised at the initial meeting in September.

We therefore wish to be disassociated from any favourable comments or submissions relating to the Community Liaison Group which Amey Cespa may use in support of their impending Planning Application.”

77. AmeyCespa’ response was to dismiss this letter out of hand, with their Bill Jarvis saying “It is unfortunate that those opposed to our proposals make totally untrue statements in support of their cause” (Yorkshire Post, 13 May 2011). This thinly disguised contempt for local communities makes a mockery of community liaison. It is wholly consistent with their arrogant dismissal of the views of others including ourselves the “negative interest of a few” when the reality is that we represent a considerable body of opinion.

78. AmeyCespa’s earlier claim that:

“The local community has been afforded opportunity to contribute to the design development through consultation events held during the pre-application process. The design has been developed considering comments made and resulting in significant design iterations.”

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is untrue. There have been no substantial changes to the design due to views expressed by the local communities, including Parish Councils and the CLC. While AmeyCespa claim that the stack height has been reduced to placate local concerns, we have to point out that:

this reduction is modest in scale and does very little to mitigate the adverse visual impact of AWRP;

the height has yet to be decided by the Environment Agency (EA), as the permitting authority, as AmeyCespa well know.

AmeyCespa have apparently given greater precedence over a few metres of stack height in an attempt to appease concerns over visual impact than they have to concerns over air quality and human health. To afford visual amenity a greater priority than human health represents a distorted sense of values.

79. It is notable that AmeyCespa have resorted to misleading statements. For example, in response to a letter from Mr. Boyle, Bill Jarvis of AmeyCespa stated that AmeyCespa are a British Company. Mr. Boyle’s response is reproduced below:

LETTERS TO EDITORREF. LETTER FROM BILL JARVIS (30th March)Dear Sir,

I refer to the letter from Mr. Bill Jarvis, where he accuses me of inaccurate and misleading comments regarding his company’s plans to build a giant incinerator in the rural idyll of Allerton Park.

I will leave it for your readers to judge for themselves, who is peddling half truths and white lies and will limit my response to just one of Mr. Jarvis’s complaints i.e. my assertion that AmeyCespa is a Spanish company, which he categorically denies.

He emphasizes that as it is registered in the UK it is wrong or misleading to describe it as Spanish.

He fails to mention that AmeyCespa is a recently formed company (2010) created as a joint enterprise by two organizations. Amey, a company operating in the UK, which was acquired by the Spanish company Ferrovial in May 2003 and Cespa, who operate internationally and been part of the Ferrovial Group for over 40 years.

Both of these operate within the Ferrovial Services Division and report to the CEO Santiago Olivares and both are wholly owned by Gruppo Ferrovial SA based in Barcelona.

Neither Amey or Cespa or AmeyCespa are quoted on the UK stock market they are all wholly owned by the Spanish company Ferrovial.

I fully accept that AmeyCespa is registered in the UK and employs UK personnel but it is owned by a Spanish conglomerate and guess where any profits will go.

Is this accurate enough for you Bill?

Sent by Laurie Boyle

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80. Mr. Jarvis did not respond to this letter.

81. This is not the only example of where AmeyCespa’s approach has created adverse public reaction, as the first example at Annex A shows. The second example in Annex A shows how NYCC’s and AmeyCespa’s attempts to persuade people of the rightness of their proposed course of action are seen. Neither of these letters was prompted or written by NYWAG

82. As the CLG episode, AmeyCespa’s denigration of NYWAG and other opponents as representing “the negative interests of a few” when they know fine well that we presented a petition bearing 10,000 signatures opposing AWRP, their attitude to the democratic decision of Harrogate Borough Council to object (discussed above) and other instances show, AmeyCespa have demonstrated their contempt for consultation and the views of others even before planning permission has been decided. How, then, can people trust them to act with respect towards the local communities were planning permission to be granted? Their failures in respect of consultation therefore constitute a further reason for refusing planning permission.

A2.5: Appendix A3 and Additional Environmental Information Statement – Landscape and Cultural Heritage

83. By the very act of proposing measures intended as mitigation, AmeyCespa accepts there will be harm to the landscape and to important heritage assets (Allerton Castle and Park). They cannot mitigate this harm but instead propose to set up two funds using Council tax payer’s money. This is through two conditional promises made in Appendix A3 which amount to

Provision for a Conservation Management Plan (not yet formulated) “to set aims and objectives to conserve and enhance the legibility of the heritage assets within Allerton Park and Garden”. It is promised that this Conservation Management Plan will be finalised and agreed prior to construction of AWRP commencing. In essence this will pay the landowner (just one individual) £1 million to repair the wall around his part of the Allerton estate, and to restore various listed structures to which the public only have access on 2 days each year.

A Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund said to be “designed to provide a resource to allow for enhancement and strengthening of the local landscape character, biodiversity and/or features of cultural heritage within 3.5km radius of the Site and/or within the Landscape Mitigation Enhancement” with applications to the Fund “assessed against the aims and objectives stated within the Landscape Management Strategy and associated documentation”.

Applications will be encouraged for a variety of projects which include “hedgerow works, habitat enhancements and works to features of cultural heritage, Conservation and repair of heritage assets”.

84. There may well be adverse reaction to a single landowner receiving a large sum in respect of Allerton Park and Garden, especially as access to the public is so limited and the community at large gets only tenuous and peripheral benefit (if any). Given the unrealistically low amount of monies and the seriously restricted aims of the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund, we feel that this is disproportionate. Moreover, given that the emissions from AWRP will harm both the natural environment and the built environment, the restricted timescale over which these monies are available is totally inadequate.

85. Somewhat bizarrely, AmeyCespa say (para 1.3.10) that “In essence the Landscape Management Strategy uses landscape as a unifying theme to highlight measures that strengthen, enhance and restore landscape character, features of cultural heritage and biodiversity in a single approach. It then looks to provide a framework structure and approach to deliver these benefits through a Landscape and Cultural

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heritage Fund”. They need to understand that that which damages and destroys (AWRP) does not produce benefits. Part B of their supplementary application even claims to feature “proposals for enhancement”. Again harm is not enhancement.

86. This fund may be intended to enable planting large numbers of trees to in an attempt to hide the AWRP plant. In reality this programme would destroy the current rural landscape by altering its very nature. Moreover, Moreover, AmeyCespa don’t own the land concerned so cannot enforce any plan and the proposals are ineffective.

87. Crucially real harm in terms of adverse social impact and the impact on people’s property values and their quality of life are not even addressed by the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund. Such could be done by offering realistic compensation to householders, comprising both a one-off payment and a subsidy to help pay their council tax bills each year. Professional help to find employment should also be offered to those whose jobs may have been affected by AWRP. Where people within about 10 miles of AWRP find difficulty in selling their homes, there should be sufficient resources to buy them at full market value.

88. We do not, of course, realistically expect the Applicant to offer such a scheme6 but without it people who are adversely affected are not helped in any realistic manner. The Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund is not aimed at this need and is therefore not only inadequate but also largely irrelevant to the needs of the people.

89. As we have already stated the application will cause harm to the environment and human health and well-being, to the economy and to sustainability. That harm cannot be mitigated; the Conservation Management Plan and the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund are of little relevance and the latter is wholly inadequate to offer any realistic mitigation. The inability to offer realistic mitigation or compensation means that planning permission should be refused.

90. The Additional Environmental Information statement sets out how the Landscape and Cultural Heritage Fund would be set up and managed. In essence this falls well short of good governance, especially in a situation where the trust of local people has already been lost. Put bluntly, trust could only be gained through independent management through a charity set up for that purpose and funded by AmeyCespa to a fully adequate level. For this to happen, the charity would need a large initial sum and subsequent payments at a level to be agreed between local councils (and most specifically not NYCC), the charity and AmeyCespa, with a casting vote going to the local councils. This arrangement would need to be legally binding and make full provision for funding in the event that AWRP were sold to another operator or the bankruptcy of AmeyCespa.

91. Para 1.3.25 gives a list of those involved in developing the strategy. Local people and their democratically elected representatives are notable by their absence from this list.

92. We can understand and sympathise with those who view this fund simply as a “buy-off”. As it fails the twin tests of adequate funding and sound governance, we believe that it will remain inadequate. More importantly, it does not help the local people whose lives and economic well-being will be harmed by AWRP. While mitigation of the effect of AWRP is not at all possible, the current proposals are hopelessly inadequate to meet the real needs of the people.

6 The outline scheme offered here is based on observing the compensation paid to residents locally when the A1(M) was constructed, the sort of compensation which now appears likely to people too close to wind farms, the scheme for civil servants who are obliged to move to a different area and, more loosely, the compensation paid in the past by EdF to people living near to nuclear reactors. Hence, no element is unreasonable.

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A3: AmeyCespa’s Part B – Additional Environmental Information

93. AmeyCespa state that their Part B provides additional information for and clarification of their Environmental Statement and should therefore be read in conjunction with it. Likewise, this section should be read in conjunction with our previous objections, in particular those chapters pertaining to environmental issues., in particular: Climate Change Harmful Emissions and their Properties Health Risks: Adverse Effects from Incinerator Emissions Risks from Incinerator Ash Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment Sustainability, What Sustainability?

A3.1 Appendix B2: Response Letter

A3.1.1: Recovery or Disposal

94. Paragraphs 1.2.1-3 and 1.3.1 et seq refer to the R1 formula and a figure of 0.68 for the current plant design. While this figure could change a little as the plant design is refined, the real point is that R1 Values differ significantly depending on whether or not use is made of the heat. Since we see no realistic prospect of a market for heat produced by AWRP, the R1 value should be calculated on the basis of electricity-only, not CHP. This leads to a markedly lower R1 value; most electricity-only plant are outside the definition of recovery.

95. In any event, the discussion of whether or not the AWRP is Recovery is largely academic since its operation does not comply with the waste hierarchy. This is because it discourages re-use and recycling and because the Mechanical Treatment plant does little to enhance recycling.

A3.1.2: Decommissioning and Restoration

96. A little-mentioned additional cost burden is that of decommissioning. The planning application reveals that NYCC (and hence future generations of its residents) are to be committed to the costs of decommissioning the plant and re-instatement of the site which are at present unknown. We find the arguments promulgated by AmeyCespa to be disingenuous. The very fact that it is proposed to construct AWRP on land which was supposed to be restored under the original consents shows that a “suitably-worded planning condition” is no guarantee of decommissioning and certainly does not ensure that funds will be available.

97. The consequence of this is to add to the financial risks NYCC and hence its residents. This arises because NYCC would be committed to the currently unknown costs of decommissioning AWRP and re-instating the site. These costs might be incurred early; if AWRP had to cease operations early for any reason (e.g. new EU or UK legislation7, overcapacity regionally or nationally (see Section B2.1), the heavily-indebted parent company Ferrovial8 becoming unable to meet its financial obligations), NYCC and hence council

7 The current regulations in the UK are relatively lax compared with international best practice. Over the years, the tendency has been towards more stringent emission and other environmental standards

8 A string of divestments has helped Spanish infrastructure group Ferrovial slash its net debt, while the company – which is the largest investor in BAA, the owner of Heathrow airport – continued to diversify away from its domestic market. The BAA sale (5.9% of

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tax payers would be forced to pay for decommissioning early. This represents a substantial financial risk that would negate any alleged financial benefit from AWRP and leave the council with a large and un-resourced bill to pay.

98. This is not to say that a planning condition should not be imposed but by itself it does not ensure that funds are available for decommissioning. It is therefore essential that financial provision is made in a way that ensures that the council does not bear the whole of the decommissioning costs if operations have to cease prematurely or the operator goes out of business. A bond held independently would offer a way forward

99. Since AmeyCespa appear unwilling to make such provision, this is one further example of potential financial harm and therefore adds to our reasons for opposing planning permission.

A3.1.3: Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS)

100. We accept that the ending of LATS does not alter the drive to reduce landfill; it merely alters the policy instruments used. However, LATS9 did place a ceiling on the amount of landfill an authority could utilise without incurring excessive charges10. In Section 8 of the main report to the Executive on the 30 November 2010 it was estimated that over a 10 year period the costs of these penalty charges would be around £120M which one can extrapolate to £300million over a 25 year period. In addition section 7 of the main report offered an estimate for the sale of underused LATS which could have provided an income stream.

101. The LATs was calculated to raise £49M giving a total of £349M attributable to LATS alone. However these benefits and costs no longer apply. Even though the LATS charges are said to be illustrative, the magnitude of a potential cost that might have applied shows the risks involved in relying on Central Government to continue to increase landfill tax in real terms, especially as most of the benefits alleged for AWRP accrue from the latter part of the proposed operational period.

102. The LATS was seen as a significant financial risk to NYCC and CYC and as such it was frequently cited as a major driver for the waste PFI scheme, including the need to develop an in-county solution. This threat has been removed and with it the associated financial risk and the need for an in-county solution.

103. The abolition of LATS illustrates how large financial risks are; though these risks are now in terms of escalating landfill tax. With this tax, commitment is only to a floor of £80/tonne in two years time. There is no certainty that landfill tax will increase in real terms beyond that point and it is very foolish to base project finances on assumed Government policy over 30 years or so. There is much scope for financial harm resulting from wrong assumptions and a full and thorough financial and risk analysis is needed. Since there is little evidence that such an analysis has been carried out and independently scrutinised, council tax payers should be extremely concerned about the financial risks that the council propose to

Heathrow Airport-operator BAA) cuts Ferrovial’s stake in BAA to 49.99%, meaning it no longer has to include the UK firm's debts on its balance sheet. Even so, their debt remains substantial at 5.2bn Euros.Sources: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/555d756a-5e4f-11e1-85f6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz23Pwyj39w http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15237610 9 The Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) aimed at improving ‘green’ waste management and all waste disposal authorities were able to trade, bank and borrow allowances. It specifies (to 2020) an annual quantity of biodegradable MSW that each Waste Disposal Authority (WDA), or group of WDAs where they have pooled their allowances, may dispose of at landfill. The allowances decreased each year and, in combination, set an allowance across England which ensures the country meets the target year allowances. For every tonne that exceeds the annual allowance, the WDA was required to pay a financial penalty of £150

10 LATS allowances were tradable - if an authority underutilised its LATS allowances these could be traded with other authorities.

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/555d756a-5e4f-11e1-85f6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz23Pwyj39w

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15237610

take on their behalf. Planning permission should be refused to save council tax payers from the consequences of these risks.

A3.1.4: Sustainability Assessment

104. Para 1.6.1 et seq seek to defend the methodology of AmeyCespa’s Sustainability Assessment yet to defend any deficiencies by referring to considerations of commercial confidentiality. The latter provides a convenient smokescreen but is actually irrelevant to whether or not AWRP is sustainable. The whole section merely points to AmeyCespa (and NYCC’s) obsession with procedure rather than necessarily getting the right answer.

105. The reality is that AWRP is not a sustainable solution to waste management. In consequence, planning permission should be refused.

A4: WRATE Model and Misleading Conclusions

106. Paragraphs 69 to 86 in our Chapter on Climate Change sets out faults in the WRATE11 model and faults in the methodology used in the report from Fichtner Consulting Engineers Limited which had been commissioned by AmeyCespa as part of the original Planning Statement.

107. Our Chapter on Climate Change focussed on the EfW (incineration) plant and it is right to do so because incineration is so bad for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, before again focussing on incineration, it is worth remembering that AmeyCespa make play of AWRP as an integrated facility for waste management and asking three questions:

Why is the Mechanical pretreatment plant recovering so little of the waste before it is burnt? AWRP will include a large MT facility which will recover a pitifully small amount of municipal solid waste before it goes into the AD and incinerator. Why is there so much non-combustible material going into the EfW and why is there so much recoverable waste being burnt?

Why is the Anaerobic Digester not producing useful product, as so many plant of this type can? The digestate is simply burnt, effectively driving waste further down the waste hierarchy than is necessary.

Why is all of the C&I waste and all of the HWRC waste going straight into the EfW incinerator without any effort to recycle? The proposer (AmeyCespa) have stated that “The EfW facility will receive the mixed RDF and Digestate from the Mechanical Pre-treatment and AD facilities, as well as directly receiving the HWRC [[Household Waste Recycling Centre]] residual and C&I wastes”. This is contrary to the Waste Hierarchy because the applicant is failing to maximise recycling. Since one of the objectives of the Waste Hierarchy is to reduce environmental impact, this would appear unacceptable.

108. Answering these questions honestly means accepting that that neither the design nor the operation of AWRP properly conforms to the waste hierarchy. Moreover, it is poorly designed and operated from the standpoint of reducing GHG emissions. These conclusions hold irrespective of how bad incineration is for GHG emissions but the reality is that the incinerator is the worst alternative to landfill.

109. Most studies show that the advantage over landfill is markedly less for incineration than for any other technology, as illustrated in our chapter on Climate Change. However, the apparently favourable results from studies carried out for the AWRP proposal using the WRATE model which purport to indicate that

11 Waste and Resources Assessment Tool for the Environment of 72

incineration is a good choice from a climate change standpoint are a consequence of known methodological flaws in the model. Indeed, the deficiencies in the WRATE model mean that it is hardly surprising that Fichtner’s results are not in line with what would be expected from the various studies cited in our Chapter on Climate Change. It is simply that a flawed model will inevitably produce flawed results which cannot be trusted.

110. Those who use mathematical modelling are generally familiar with the acronym GIGO – Garbage In, Garbage Out. In other words if the assumptions fed into a model are incorrect then the results are not reliable. This adds to the systematic flaws inherent in the WRATE model, making the results even less meaningful.

111. AmeyCespa’s earlier work in their Planning Statement relied on inherently implausible comparisons - their baseline scenario (all the waste arising sent directly to landfill) is unrealistic as it does not represent a realistically available option while the modelling of AmeyCespa’s proposed ‘solution’ (their second scenario) is only one of many possible solutions. Moreover, the low re-use/recycling target of 50% undoubtedly means that some of the potential CO2 benefits from reuse/recycling are missed.

112. Fichtner’s User Defined Processes were intended to enable them to model components of AWRP including a Mechanical Pre-treatment facility, an AD facility and an EfW (incineration) facility. While AmeyCespa failed to consider other potential solutions many of which are better from a climate change standpoint than the proposed AWRP plant (see our Chapter on Climate Change) this can be done but not with the WRATE model since it is known to seriously underestimate the CO2 emissions from incineration.

113. This flaw alone is sufficient to render meaningless any study of the CO2effects of the various components of AWRP or comparisons between incineration and other technologies using WRATE. Indeed, WRATE has a number of weaknesses that mean that it produces results that differ markedly from those of other life-cycle methods. The WRATE-based conclusion that EfW (i.e. incineration with electricity generation) is a low-carbon technology is contrary to the findings of many other studies.

114. Flaws in the WRATE model are now well-known. For example the respected environmental consultants Eunomia identify significant deficiencies with the WRATE model12:

“The Environment Agency’s software tool WRATE is often used to assess the environmental impacts of waste management treatment methods… we believe the model contains fundamental errors, both in regard to the behavior of landfilled wastes, and with respect to its treatment of the stabilised output from MBT facilities. In the case of the latter, WRATE assumes a proportion of the carbon is degraded within the biological part of the MBT process. However, when this stabilised material is subsequently landfilled, the methane emission is assumed to be exactly the same as that of the non-stabilised material – the model only accounts for the reduction in mass which occurs in material which is biologically pre-treated (occurring as a result of moisture loss). The model, therefore, significantly underestimates the extent to which the biological component of the MBT process reduces the biological activity of material subsequently sent to landfill”.

This means WRATE under-estimates the benefits of MBT as alternatives to landfill and to incineration for reducing GHG emissions and misleadingly suggests incineration is superior to other approaches.

115. AmeyCespa’s results cannot be taken at face value and certainly do not mean that the EfW (incineration) plant is acceptable. There is nothing in AmeyCespa’s Appendix B4 WRATE Model Report to alter this conclusion.

12 See http://www.ineosbio.com/media/files/INEOS%20Bio%20Life-cycle%20Assessment.pdf of 72

116. We have already stated in earlier evidence that the reality is very different. CO2 emissions from AWRP and especially the EfW incineration plant are markedly higher than indicated by AmeyCespa in their planning application. Indeed, incineration is the worst alternative to landfill in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. EfW is in direct contradiction of the sustainability criteria set by the Brundtland Commission, a fact that is particularly serious when one considers the environmental damage that global warming is expected to cause and the potential that it brings for human conflict. NYWAG object to the proposed AWRP both for the damage that it would cause to the climate and because it runs counter to national and international policy on climate change. Nothing in the new material alters this conclusion.

A4.1: Towards a Meaningful Comparison

117. The applicant claims carbon savings as a result of diverting waste from landfill and offsetting electricity generation from gas, oil and coal, using the WRATE computer model and a superficial comparison of AWRP against other technologies (Environmental Statement Chapter 16 and Appendix 16A). But the WRATE analysis is inadequate because of its baseline conditions, analysis against other technologies and conclusions and cannot be accepted without independent validation.

118. We understand that the EA’s WRATE team “no longer exists” and the EA will not “validate” the applicant’s WRATE analysis (Darren Leng, 19 November 2011) and that they are now moving away from WRATE and (with ERM, WRAP and nine English Local Authorities) are developing an alternative modelling tool in accordance with international standards on life cycle assessment, carbon foot-printing and Defra’s draft guidance on life cycle thinking13. Eunomia have already developed an alternative life cycle modelling tool known as ATROPOS, used to analyse policy for Defra and the Committee on Climate Change14 and to model the viability and impacts of waste schemes in London and Ireland. NYCC should use the ATROPOS model to validate the applicant’s WRATE report and the claims about carbon savings.

119. AmeyCespa’s main WRATE report assesses the AWRP scheme only against landfilling. This is contrary to the standard approach used in most WRATE reports, which routinely compare one technology with a range of others. It is, of course, in line with the narrow one-track focus of only looking at the “do nothing” scenario and AWRP but is not adequate or acceptable.

A4.2: Comments on Appendix B4

120. AmeyCespa’s Appendix B4 adds two scenarios making four in all: a baseline scenario which sends all of the waste arising directly to landfill; a second scenario which models AmeyCespa’s proposed solution; a third which models all the waste being sent to an EfW; and a fourth which models the waste being sorted for recycling, with the rejects going to Anaerobic

Digestion (AD) and then landfill.

121. It is immediately obvious from the above discussion that the faults of the WRATE model mean that it will seriously understate the emissions from the third scenario while the results from the fourth scenario will

13 For more information on the research consortium, the tool and its application email [email protected]. The nine local authorities with which ERM works are Dorset County Council, Bournemouth Borough Council, Borough of Poole Council, Bath and North East Somerset Council, Surrey County Council, Cambridgeshire County Council on behalf of the Cambridgeshire & Peterborough Waste Partnership (RECAP), Hertfordshire County Council on behalf of the Hertfordshire Waste Partnership, Cornwall Council and Leicestershire County Council

14 Eunomia (2008) Development of Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for the Waste Sector, Final Report for the Committee on Climate Change, Defra and the Environment Agency, December 2008; Eunomia (2010) Landfill Bans: Feasibility Research, Draft Final Report for WRAP produced for Defra and the Devolved Administrations

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mailto:[email protected]

suffer in comparison with the all-incineration third scenario. In consequence the conclusions that AmeyCespa draw from the work in their Appendix B4 are invalid.

122. We also note that AmeyCespa have failed to model cheaper, cleaner more environmentally friendly options such as those discussed in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices, e.g. Thermal MBT.

123. There are problems with the assumptions in Appendix B4. Firstly, the thermal efficiencies given for the various types of electricity generating technologies are open to question – for example the overall efficiency of CCGT plant is well above 50%iii (typically 56-60%) against the 47% assumed in Appendix B4 while that of coal-fired plant is typically 33%iv, not the 35.7% assumed in Appendix B4. Secondly the electricity mixes assumed are not realistic; in particular an all-hydro mix is unobtainable bearing in mind England and Wales known paucity of hydro resources and equivalents such as a 60% nuclear / 40% renewables are unobtainable on a reasonable timescale while the variable nature of renewables would present security of supply and grid stability problems in such a scenario. Also, the method of extrapolation to a “decarbonised” 2030 mix is overly simplistic and does not properly take account of the way that the load-duration curve (Figure 1) operates. Roughly, the order of plant on the grid is determined by its marginal operating costs which are strongly related to the fuel costs – thus the marginal costs of nuclear and renewable electricity generation are low while gas turbines and coal are high with CCGT intermediate. Hence nuclear and CCGT are base load while coal operates on generally lower load factors (fewer hours per year).

Figure 1: Annual GB Load-Duration Curve for 2005-8

Source: http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/sys_06/chap2/images/fig2-4.gif

124. Plant at the margin at any time is determined by the market15 and this in turn influences the carbon intensity of the marginal plant. Since both the shape of the load-duration curve and total demand varies throughout the day and seasonally, different plant will sit at the margin at different times.

125. It is reasonable to assume that electricity from the EfW and AD plant at AWRP would displace the marginal plant among other electricity generators. For some of the time this will be coal which is broadly comparable with incineration (as EfW) in terms of CO2 emissions but for much of the time it would

15 For a discussion of the electricity market and its history see http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/pubpdf/Industry_Briefs/Electricity_Gillian_Simmonds.pdf There are currently proposals for further reform of the market – see for examplehttp://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Data/electricitymarketinfo/ andhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/15/reform-electricity-market-unworkable

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/15/reform-electricity-market-unworkable

http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Data/electricitymarketinfo/

http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/pubpdf/Industry_Briefs/Electricity_Gillian_Simmonds.pdf

http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/sys_06/chap2/images/fig2-4.gif

replace generation sources that are less harmful in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Indeed, for some of the time (e.g. summer nights) it would displace nuclear plant that emits no CO2.

126. The fact that the AWRP EfW (incineration) plant would result in an increase in the overall CO2 emissions from the electricity sector means that AWRP runs counter to the UK’s obligations and policy on GHG emissions. This adds to the many reasons why planning permission for the EfW (incinerator) at AWRP should be refused.

127. The results from WRATE strongly depend on the energy mix used to calculate the carbon savings against electricity generated by other processes. AmeyCespa have chosen to use a 2015 date for the energy mix comparison and used the somewhat specious justification that by this date the facility should be up and running. This presents a misleading impression of the alleged “benefits” of incineration because the efficiency of other forms of energy generation will significantly improve in the future, alongside national targets. Other WRATE studies (above) choose more realistic dates, e.g. 2020.

128. When considering climate change it is essential to look forward to an appropriate time period. The carbon intensity of incineration is more than 300 gCO2/kWh 16 and will increase above this level as recycling increases and plastic becomes a more significant element of the waste that cannot be recycled and is burnt. This means that incineration such as that proposed by AWRP will rapidly be out of line with national targets - Defra estimates a 75% reduction in carbon intensity from over 300 to about 80 g CO2/kWh by 2030. This suggests WRATE (or a better model) should be re-run with 2030 as a baseline as this is mid-way through the contract period and would therefore be a more appropriate baseline for assessing the carbon emissions.

129. AmeyCespa’s claim that using a “carbon-free” electricity mix “as a comparison to the predicted 2020 mix because the differences in environmental impact between a these two cases should represent the effects of offsetting” is not justifiable. The reality is that if more plant is built over the next eight or so years (as it needs to be) it would include some renewable energy technologies and, for 2020, plant with reasonably short planning and construction lead times (the lead times for new nuclear plant make it unlikely that such plant could be online by 2020). Broadly, new plant is likely to be more efficient than the old plant that it replaces, much of which is coal or oil fired. This means that the amount of coal-fired plant on the system is likely to fall and that the coal-fired plant at the margin is likely to be more modern, and more efficient (and therefore less CO2 intensive) than at present.

130. AmeyCespa have failed to consider the situation later in the life of AWRP; there is no realistic 2030 scenario (and their use of a carbon-free scenario is not justified). This is necessarily subject to much uncertainty, depending on the pace of replacement of aging plant on the current electricity generating system. However, it is reasonable to suppose that the system will move towards a lower CO2 intensity and that, as a consequence, the mix of plant at the margin (with which AWRP’s EfW should be compared) will also become less CO2 intensive. Since the CO2 emissions from the EfW incinerator are, and will remain, comparable with coal-fired plant this means that AWRP will increasingly displace plant that emit less CO2 (in 2030 and even 2040). Again, this fact reinforces the need to refuse planning permission for the EfW incinerator plant.

131. Other conclusions reached in AmeyCespa’s Appendix B4 are similarly unjustified. Taking their main conclusions in turn:

“The AmeyCespa solution was found to be equally as good as the EfW Only scenario for the 2020 electricity mix”.

16 Environment Agency, Biomass: Carbon sink or carbon sinner? 2009. of 72

Since incineration is the worst technology other than landfill from a climate change standpoint (see our chapter on Climate Change), this claim merely confirms the fact that the proposed AWRP represents a very poor choice for waste management. It should be rejected.

“The AmeyCespa solution was found to generally increase in attractiveness compared to other scenarios with increased decarbonisation of the UK electricity grid. The high level of recycling achieved by the solution is an important reason for its good performance.”

Actually the picture is complex as the attractiveness of any solution involving electricity generation depends on the actually plant at the margin. However, all electricity generation technologies except perhaps coal are better from a GHG emission standpoint than EfW (incineration) so the tendency is for AWRP’s incinerator to become increasingly unattractive over time (assuming that the country’s generation mix becomes less CO2 intensive)

The claim that AWRP offers a high level of recycling is utterly misleading – 50% overall recycling is a very low level compared with the 70% plus that has been achieved elsewhere and is targeted in Scotland and Wales. Moreover, most of that 50% is achieved long before the waste gets to AWRP and the incinerator and concomitant financial commitments actually disincentivise recycling.

“The quantitative results presented in this report for global warming potential and abiotic resource depletion17 support the qualitative results reported in Appendix 16 to the Environmental Statement with one exception. The MPT/AD/Landfill18 scenario is clearly preferable in abiotic resource depletion to landfill only but is clearly less preferable than the other options. Hence, the MPT/AD/Landfill scenario should ranked Medium rather than High for this aspect.”

The claim that Appendix B4 supports Appendix 16 to the Environmental Statement is unsurprising but means little because both are based in the same flawed methodology.

132. In conclusion, and none-withstanding claims by AmeyCespa to the contrary, the proposed AWRP solution is very bad from a climate change standpoint and planning permission should be refused.

A4.3: Comments on Appendix B5

133. Appendix B5 presents results from WRATE covering

a. Climate Change b. Acidification Potentialc. Eutrophication Potentiald. Freshwater Aquatic Ecotoxicity e. Human Toxicityf. Abiotic Resource Depletion

It also discusses Potential Electricity Mixes in 2030.

17 There are various methods of categorizing natural resources; these include source of origin, stage of development, and by their renewability, these classifications are described below. On the basis of origin, resources may be divided into:

Biotic – Biotic resources are obtained from the biosphere (living and organic material), such as forests, animals, birds, and fish and the materials that can be obtained from them. Fossil fuels such as coal and petroleum are also included in this category because they are formed from decayed organic matter.

Abiotic – Abiotic resources are those that come from non-living, non-organic material. Examples of abiotic resources include land, fresh water, air and heavy metals including ores such as gold, iron, copper, silver, etc.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_resource

18 MPT is Mechanical Pre-treatment of 72

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_resource

134. However, the discussion is aimed only at a comparison with the irrelevant and unrealistic “do nothing” scenario and fails utterly to carry out a proper comparison between the AWRP “solution” and other options which are both cleaner and cheaper. In consequence Appendix B5 presents an incomplete but biased picture.

135. Bearing this and the comments made above concerning Appendix B4 in mind, it is clear that the conclusions reached in Appendix B5 are either unsupportable or fail to take account of better options. Choosing between two very bad options – landfill or AWRP with its EfW incinerator – is not sensible when cleaner cheaper and more environmentally friendly options exist (see our chapter on Need and Technology Choice).

136. Each of the conclusions reached in Appendix B5 is misleading or wrong. Thus:

The AmeyCespa solution was found to have a climate change saving of approximately 130,100 tonnes of CO2e compared to the baseline when modelled using the 2015 electricity mix.

The flaws in the WRATE model mean that this conclusion is incorrect (see above discussion on Appendix B4). By contrast, other possible solutions such as greater re-use and recycling coupled with Thermal MBT are well able to reduce CO2e emissions compared with either the “do nothing” scenario or the proposed AWRP “solution”.

The AmeyCespa solution was found to have a climate change saving of approximately 118,200 tonnes of CO2e compared to the baseline when modelled using the 2020 electricity mix.

Comments are as for previous conclusion.

While the net saving has reduced in moving the model from 2015 to 2020, the AmeyCespa solution still shows a significant net saving.

The comments under the first conclusion make it clear that the alleged “net saving” is an artefact of the WRATE model and would not exist in reality. By contrast, other solutions would offer savings.

In comparison with the baseline scenario the AmeyCespa solution performed better in all six of the environmental impacts assessed as default by WRATE in both 2015 and 2020.

This may be true, depending on how far the flaws in the WRATE model affect the outcome, However, all it says is that one bad solution (AWRP) does slightly less badly than another (the “do nothing” scenario). It fails to address the fact that other technologies would perform better.

The higher level of recycling achieved by the solution leads to large environmental benefits in all six impact categories in both 2015 and 2020.

We agree that increasing the level of recycling has substantial environmental benefits. However it is wrong to ascribe these to AWRP. Most of the benefits are gained by recycling efforts before the waste reaches AWRP and it is imperative that this continues and increases. AWRP itself offers only very limited recycling through its mechanical separation plant.

There are other types of facility which would enable greater recycling. By contrast, the financial commitments made in the long-term contract associated with AWRP and the associated penalties inhibit efforts to increase recycling.

Abiotic resource depletion would be greatly increased by incineration compared with other available waste management technologies. Even with landfill it would be theoretically possible to recover Abiotic resources but this is not the case with incineration. Metals lost to air are clearly unavailable while those that enter the ash are, for all practical purposes, irrecoverable. Fly ash is hazardous and, along with the air pollution control residues, must be treated as hazardous waste. Where IBA is used in aggregates (as AmeyCespa intend) then the abiotic resources that they contain are lost. Thus

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incineration means virgin resources must be exploited to replace all that the incinerator renders unusable and irrecoverable.

One further point is that the air pollution control equipment itself makes use of resources which are then irrecoverable.

The AmeyCespa solution performs better than the baseline scenario regardless of the level of decarbonisation of the grid past 2020.

As will be clear from the discussions under Appendix B4, this is simply untrue. The reality is that EfW (incineration) is highly CO2e intensive and only coal fired power stations are comparable in CO2e intensity. As coal is less at the margins and as the older and less efficient (and therefore more CO2e intensive) drop off the generating system, then AWRP would increase CO2e emissions from electricity generation.

137. We repeat that choosing between two very bad options – landfill or AWRP with its EfW incinerator – is not sensible when cleaner cheaper and more environmentally friendly options exist. The first step to ensuring that this cardinal error is not committed is to refuse planning permission for AWRP. Then, and only then, can NYCC make a more sensible choice from the many cheaper and cleaner alternatives now on offer.

A5: Ecology and Nature Conservation138. The Environmental Risks section of our Chapter on Environmental Insults: Environmental Risks; Traffic;

Visual Impact shows that AWRP would impose harm to the environment and ecology and that AmeyCespa understate the environmental impacts in their Chapter 5: Ecology and Nature Conservation. Ecosystem damage due to emissions from the AWRP EfW incinerator (which would reinforce the effects of pollutants from other sources) on the environment and ecology are reviewed, including:

acidification of ecosystems, both terrestrial and aquatic, which leads to loss of flora and fauna eutrophication in ecosystems on land and in water, which can lead to changes in species diversity; damage and yield losses affecting agricultural crops, forests and other plants due to exposure to

ground-level ozone; impacts of heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants on ecosystems, due to their environmental

toxicity and due to bioaccumulation; damage to materials and cultural heritage due to soiling and exposure to acidifying pollutants and

ozone

139. The resultant harm would affect both wildlife and agriculture. Moreover, many of the pollutants from incinerators are bio-accumulative and enter the food chain. This affects the health of birds and animals as well as humans and damage to animal health impacts on the health of ecosystems. Pollutants in water courses can enter into aquifers (e.g. the Sherwood Sandstone) and pollute them. This would tend to be a cumulative process (the pollutants are persistent and residency time in aquifers can be long) and could render them unsuitable for any future water extraction.

140. AmeyCespa’s assessment of the impacts of AWRP (their Chapter 5) remains confined to the immediate locale of the proposed AWRP. They fail to acknowledge that emissions from the EfW (incinerator) would contribute to ecological damage and damage to materials (and therefore buildings) over a wide area. They also fail to discuss the role of eutrophication and the environmental damage that it can bring. There are also a range of other environmental insults that they do not discuss (see section 3).

141. Even within the narrow confines of what they do discuss, AmeyCespa tend to understate the effects of the various environmental insults of the proposed AWRP on local ecosystems. This includes downplaying

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both the ecological value of that which they propose to destroy and the impact on remaining ecosystems (e.g. through pollution, noise dust and contamination) during construction. They also seriously downplay the role.

142. Operational Phase – Emissions: Much more seriously, we strongly dispute the assertions made in AmeyCespa’s paragraph 5.6.6 (the same para number in the original and updated versions). The ‘atmospheric emissions’ will have markedly more significant and widespread effects than AmeyCespa care to admit. There is a considerable body of evidence and expert opinion that points to a range of unacceptable health risks including cancer. This, and evidence from the European Environment Agency that we cited in our Environmental Insults chapter makes it clear that AmeyCespa’s conclusion that that “the impact of atmospheric emissions from the facility are not significant” is entirely wrong. There are significant impacts, at least Moderate Adverse.

143. In conclusion, AmeyCespa continue to downplay the environmental consequences of their proposed AWRP. There is nothing in their revised chapter 5 to alter our original conclusion that the evidence they offer is wholly inadequate. The Precautionary Principle implies that it would be wrong to take the risks that building AWRP would impose on the environment, ecosystems and aquifers, especially when there are cleaner and cheaper alternatives that use proven technology. Thus, planning permission should be refused.

A6: AIR POLLUTION (Appendix B13)

144. AmeyCespa’s Appendix B13 Additional Environmental Information: Additional Air Quality Assessment updates the air quality assessment in the original planning application for AWRP to take account of the Environment Agency’s (EA) updated assessment methodology for determining the impact of emissions of Group 3 metals. It also gives an assessment of the impact of emissions when the AWRP operates at the short term WID

145. Crucially, it still relies on the air quality assessment presented in AmeyCespa’s Chapter 10 of their Environmental Statement. Thus the new assessments are subject to the same deficiencies as those in the original Planning Statements and detailed in our chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment. These include:

Lack of any assessment of likely modelling errors; Uncertainty on the data on the wind (which is insufficient for reliable estimation) and on the

pollutants to be dispersed; Modelling errors arising from erroneous assumptions. For example, inadequate spatial resolution

and inadequate spatial coverage both make it is easy to get misleading results. Also, the representation of buildings appeared inadequate;

No allowance for periods of suboptimal operation. Local meteorological conditions are complex and not well represented in a grid of only 4.5km by

4.5km. The Vale of York is in the rain shadow of the Pennines so has a lower rainfall total than areas to the west. It is also subject to more fog and frosts in winter than other areas because of the tendency of cold air to drain into the Vale from surrounding higher ground. Thermal Inversion is a feature of the Vale of York yet was not taken into account19. Also, during periods of lee-wave activity

19 In the case of the Vale of York it would be necessary to have adequate modelling of thermal inversions (an atmospheric condition in which the air temperature rises with increasing altitude, holding surface air down and preventing dispersion of pollutants). In any season, rapid ground-level cooling can lead to night-time fogs when air temperatures are lowered beyond the dew point. Such radiation fogs develop beneath local temperature inversions but are usually dispersed by the Sun’s heating during the following day but may persist when deep and well-developed. Any extensive low-lying area such as the Vale of York is notably subject to these conditions.

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in westerly flow, the Vale is often subject to high degrees of near-surface horizontal wind shear and gusty winds whose strength is poorly forecast by numerical weather prediction (NWP) modelsv. Trapped lee waves commonly occur in westerly flow in this region and experimentally apparent flow separation indicates the formation of lee-wave rotors. Again no attempt is made to take this into account.

A6.1: Group 3 Metals

146. The metals assessment follows essentially the same approach as used in AmeyCespa’s Chapter 10, albeit updated, for a range of pollutants. However, its relative brevity makes the methodology somewhat clearer. Comparisons are made against the specific Environmental Assessment Level (EAL for each metal. It comprises three steps: Stage 1 - predict the impact of each metal, assuming it is emitted at 100% of the emission level, and

compare against the screening criteria. Here arsenic and chromium (VI) were found to exceed the long-term EAL criterion (greater than 70% of the EAL) while concentrations of all other metals considered were less than 70% of the EAL. AmeyCespa therefore considered that they posed no risk of exceeding the EAL, This is not necessarily true for manganese and nickel since they reached 41% and 48% of EAL respectively and the probable error in the air dispersion model results (see our chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment) are significantly above the factor of two that would take these metals above the 70% limit for long-term EAL. Likewise the 10.2% figure for vanadium could easily exceed the 20% limit for short-term EAL so these metals (manganese, chrome and vanadium) were ruled out prematurely by AmeyCespa.

Stage 2 comprises consideration of a “worst case” scenario based on currently operating plant, assuming each metal comprises 11% of the total group (i.e. 5.60 ng/m³ apportioned across the nine metals). This assumed proportion is unjustified since measurements could and should be used to give actual proportions while the presumption that AWRP would reflect other incinerators is, at best approximate and some new plant have been a great deal worse than the average (as detailed elsewhere in our objection chapters). AmeyCespa admit that “”neither arsenic nor chromium (VI) can be screened out, using the worst case scenario”.

Stage 3 comprises consideration of site specific assumptions. This includes assumptions on the performance of the flue gas treatment system to remove heavy metals from the gas stream and background data for the levels of the two metals (chromium and arsenic) that AmeyCespa consider at this stage. Table 5 shows that the only local measurement (2007/08) for arsenic was substantially above the maximum UK figure for each of 2008, 2009 and 2010. This is not given due weight while the use of data from Redcar (some 59 miles away and in a totally different type of environment) is wholly unjustified, especially as it is typically only a tenth of the only local measurement. Bearing in mind the many uncertainties in this chain of reasoning and the very high local values that already exist, the conclusion in para 2.1.24 that “the predicted environmental concentration is less than 70% of the EAL and it is therefore considered that there is no risk of exceeding the EAL for these metals” cannot be justified. Also, the arguments for chromium are based on exceedingly sparse data and uncertainties in the air dispersion modelling results and the actual plant performance mean that the process contribution could be much higher than the 3.9% of the EAL claimed. Moreover, the natural variation in chromium background levels which one might expect between rural and urban sites means that the process contribution could well be the cause of the EAL being exceeded locally.

147. Following the logic of the above three stages, it is readily apparent that the relevant criteria are, or could be, exceeded at each stage and that the range of metals that breach the relevant criteria is likely to be greater than AmeyCespa admit once modelling and data uncertainties are taken into account. This adds

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to the many reasons why AWRP is unacceptable from an environmental standpoint and planning permission should be refused.

148. At para 2.1.34 AmeyCespa quote Environment Agency H1 Guidance which states:

“If an EU Environmental Quality Standard is already exceeded, or may be exceeded as a result of an additional contribution from an IPPC activity, consideration of further control measures needs to be taken. This should take into account the practicality and reasonableness of going beyond indicative BAT...Where a new installation would only make a minor contribution to a breach, it will normally be more desirable for Regulators (and local authorities, where relevant) to consider controls on other major sources of pollution rather than imposing excessive costs or refusing a Permit.”

Clearly, AmeyCespa hope that the last sentence should be applied to them but this is unjustifiable for a number of reasons: it is by no means clear that the process contribution is minor; cleaner and cheaper alternatives exist that would not cause or exacerbate any breach; and, the sources of the background pollution levels are not known and may be a multitude of small intrinsically difficult to control sources (i.e. traffic on the A1M and A168). We reiterate that AWRP is environmentally unacceptable and planning permission should be refused

149. Before leaving this topic, it is worth examining AmeyCespa’s logic flow at a higher (less detailed) level since the methodology used in Appendix B5 has been used elsewhere in AmeyCespa’s environmental statements. Essentially it comprises three stages (1, 2, 3 above), each of which has an associated set of criteria (1, 2, 3 respectively). The flow from each stage to the next is such that if a pollutant passes the criteria associated with that stage then no further consideration is given to that pollutant. If it fails that stage then the criteria at the next stage are applied but the crucial point here is that they may be less stringent. This leads to a “now you see it, now you don’t” approach to risk. Thus the flow can be:

Apply Stage 1 / Criteria Set 1o If passes then OK – If fails then pass to set 2

Apply Stage 2 / Criteria Set 2o If passes then OK – If fails then pass to set 3

Apply Stage 3 / Criteria Set 3o If passes then OK – If fails then seek to find mitigating arguments favouring development

(e.g. Environment Agency H1 Guidance quoted above).

150. The proper way to look at it is very different. Each of the criteria sets represents one view of the acceptable emissions based on scientific evidence of the probability of harm to the environment and human health. Their very existence and the different degrees of stringency that they represent imply that there is a range of scientific uncertainty over the risks of harm.

151. Recall that under EU law (binding in this country), the application of the Precautionary Principle has been made a statutory requirementvi,vii and the European Commission has issued a Communication on the Precautionary Principleviii in which it adopted a procedure for the application of this concept (see our chapter on Health Risks for more details). Paragraph 2 of article 191 of the Lisbon Treaty ix states that

"Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the Precautionary Principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay."

152. The 2 February 2000 European Commission Communication indicates that the Precautionary Principle should be considered within a structured approach to the analysis of risk which comprises three

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elements: risk assessment, risk management, risk communication and that it is particularly relevant to the management of risk. It is presupposed that potentially dangerous effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have been identified, and that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty. We contend that this applies to risks associated with emissions from the AWRP EfW (incinerator) plant.

153. The EU Treaty Article 174(2) as amended at Nice 2004 recognized that scientific evaluation can be inconclusive and accorded priority to public health:

“A precautionary approach must be paramount, as opposed to acting only where proof or very strong suspicion of harm can be demonstrated. The Precautionary Principle should be applied where the possibility of harmful effects on health or the environment has been identified and preliminary scientific evaluation proves inconclusive for assessing the level of risk. Account should be taken of social and environmental costs in examining the level of risk, but the protection of public health, including the effects of the environment on public health, must be given priority”.

154. Under these circumstances, the Precautionary Principle should be applied to the emissions considered in Appendix B5, as it should be to all emissions from AWRP where there is any potential for harm. In practice this means that acceptability should be firmly based on the most stringent of criteria sets identified above or such other scientifically justifiable criteria that exist. Likewise this should be applied to judgments of other pollutants accorded similar treatment to those in Appendix B5.

155. Applying the Precautionary Principle gives proper weight to potential harm to the environment and human health and means the planning permission for AWRP )and especially the EfW(incinerator) plant) should be refused.

156. It is noticeable that AmeyCespa do not discuss the environmental risks associated with any of the emissions from AWRP either in Appendix B5 or in Chapter 10 and treat the health risks in a somewhat cavalier fashion. They nowhere acknowledge the possibility of synergistic effects between the various emissions either on human health or on the environment and wildlife. Neither do they acknowledge the possibility of errors and uncertainty in the model results (all mathematical modeling of environmental processes is necessarily subject to uncertainty) and the limited data on which their arguments depend. Indeed, their approach can be characterized as a “tick box” one in which their objective is to show that every emission is benign.

157. This approach flies in the face of the Precautionary Principle whose objective is to take full and proper account of all the potential risks in a manner that fully acknowledges the higher end of the scientifically established or credible range of uncertainty. The Applicant’s approach therefore pays scant respect to the risks imposed on local people and on their environment. In the face of this apparent indifference to the reality of the risks being imposed in the Application, one might reasonably ask whether or not the Applicant would display a similar indifference were the plant to be built and operated. This is a risk that local people should not be asked to run, especially when cheaper and cleaner alternatives exist. Planning permission should therefore be refused.

A6.2: Short Term WID Limits

158. Section 3 of Appendix B5 considers Short Term WID (half-hourly average) limit values for nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide, hydrogen chloride and hydrogen fluoride. AmeyCespa claim that AWRP would operate at or near the Short Term WID limits for brief period of time only and state that the Short Term

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WID limits allow for brief peak emissions which all facilities are likely to experience during operation, whether it is due to variations in the waste or other factors. They further claim that the likelihood of a well run and maintained facility (they see AWRP as such a facility, albeit without proof) operating at the Short Term WID limits for any significant amount of time as highly unlikely. Bearing in mind the history of pollution offences at other incinerators (discussed in our chapter on Harmful Emissions), this is not necessarily true.

159. As elsewhere, AmeyCespa present their results from the air dispersion modelling as being totally accurate whereas in reality there are considerable uncertainties in the model results. This means that the numbers presented in Tables 9,10 and 11 should have a range attached and are likely to be too low (see our chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment).

160. Allowing for such uncertainties, emissions of hydrogen fluoride and hydrogen chloride are probably not significant. However, the situation for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide is less clear-cut than AmeyCespa recognise and there is a reasonable chance that emissions could exceed the AQO/EAL.

161. Although AmeyCespa claim that their assumptions are “worst case” this is not so. Thus:

Modelling uncertainties mean that ground level concentrations are likely to be significantly higher than their model predicts.

There can be no guarantee that the plant will operate below the maximum emission limits allowed under the WID at all times, let alone that actual emissions will be less than the limits (too many examples of problems exist elsewhere to be able to guarantee this).

The issue of compliance is at the highest ground level concentrations found, not at some site elsewhere, perhaps several miles away

The assumption that AWRP operates for the whole year may be conservative as the plant will be offline for about 10% of the year for maintenance and there may be unplanned outages. However, emissions of some pollutants are likely to be much higher during start-up and shut-down when operating conditions are necessarily sub-optimal. Thus the AmeyCespa assumption could even understate the emissions in some cases.

The assumption that each metal comprises 11% of the total group (i.e. 5.60 ng/m³ apportioned across the nine metals) is without foundation and therefore there is an additional uncertainty over the actual amounts of each metal emitted. This could lead to limits being exceeded in some cases.

162. In a strange sense, we have to agree with the conclusion stated in AmeyCespa’s para 4.1.3 that “this additional assessment does not alter any of the conclusions from the original air quality assessment”. The main conclusions that still stand are that the earlier assessment was flawed and many of its conclusions in error. Thus all the previously identified criticisms concerning the earlier work still apply and that it is impossible to be as sanguine as AmeyCespa are. The overriding conclusion remains: planning permission should be refused in view of the environmental and health risks.

A7: Travel Plan

163. AmeyCespa’s Travel Plan document at least recognises that local availability of public transport travel modes is limited and that public transport will not offer a realistic option for regular travel to / from the AWRP site. We agree that “the relatively limited number of staff to be employed at AWRP and the shift system to be operated by many technical staff” means a site specific public transport / minibus service would prove probably be impractical. They therefore key focus on initiatives such as car sharing and efficient working practices for encouraging sustainable staff / visitor travel.

164. The success of car sharing is at best uncertain and, given the wide area from which workers may come and the small numbers of individuals involved, the practicality is at best strictly limited. Promotional

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brochures are all very well but will they interest anyone? Matching people by post-code is no guarantor of acceptability for the individuals concerned even if it makes finding potential car-sharing partners easier. Cycling is only likely to be a serious option for those who are already keen cyclists and live within a reasonable cycling distance of AWRP (this will vary between individuals). In other words, the probabilities of success stated by AmeyCespa appear overly optimistic and the Transport Plan may be little more than wishful thinking and no reliance can be placed on it at this stage.

165. It is highly uncertain what “efficient working practices” can contribute to sustainable transport options on the public roads off-site. Home-working for office staff offers some amelioration on travel, though the cost of getting laptops via Amey IT will put some people off. We accept it could have a limited effect on the amount of commuting done.

166. Ultimately, workers are free individuals who cannot be coerced into travelling to and from work in a particular manner and visitors (if any) will come how they choose.

167. What is clear from the data given is that there may be insufficient provision made for parking on-site (it is not an efficient working practice to limit this) and this could enhance accident risks for workers and visitors alike while they search for parking. Moreover, providing only one parking place for the disabled seems unduly limited.

168. We are not objecting to the aims of the Travel Plan but feel that the extent to which they are likely to be achieved is very limited. For this reason, we consider that it has to be assumed that it will have very little influence on traffic volumes arising from either visitors or workers and that any traffic assessment should take the worst case scenario (the Travel Plan fails) as its base case.

169. The aims of the routing strategy to minimise “HGV traffic impact on the immediate local settlements of Grafton, Marton and Arkendale and avoid the potential for HGV traffic to access inappropriate local rural route corridors” are welcome. However:

While probably enforceable for MSW delivered by local authorities, the strategy may not be enforceable for commercial operators bringing C&I waste since these have alternatives and will not take kindly to their drivers being banned;

Community liaison with AmeyCespa has so far proved ineffectual and they have lost the trust of many local people. This is likely to prove no different.

The number of additional HGVs and concomitant congestion on critical routes, particularly the A59 will slow traffic and add to queuing at some junctions. This, and perceived safety issues, will almost certainly force some drivers to consider other routes – the well-known “rat-run” phenomenon. This will increase traffic through local villages and is beyond the control of AmeyCespa (or anyone else).

170. Similarly, the promise to limit AM (08:00-09:00) and PM peak (17:00-18:00) peak hour AWRP related traffic movements at A1(M) J47 to less than 30 two-way movements per hour ignores the contiguous A59/A168 junction. Indeed, if the claim that “typically 55% of total AWRP hourly development trip demand could be expected to access the A1(M) J47 junction” is correct then a substantially higher proportion would use the A168/A59 junction since York-bound traffic does not use J47. We object to the fact that traffic on this dangerous junction will be allowed to reach higher levels.

171. In principle, AmeyCespa’s ‘vehicle cap’ approach would be helpful but we must question whether in practice it could be secured through the proposed mechanism of “appropriate HGV delivery agreements between the site operator and haulage contractors during these key ‘rush hour’ demand periods and careful timing of staff shift changes”. Even if this works to a considerable extent, the “vehicle cap” should take account of the traffic at the A59/A168 junction.

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172. Ultimately, the question s whether the Travel Plan will work, at least in part. Indeed, it may have some effect but not enough. As with much else at AWRP, it is best seen as a sop which does little to mitigate the unacceptable risks arising from the traffic the plant would generate. Much of the blame for this rests with the inappropriate single-site strategy and therefore with the technology choice. Refusing planning permission would remove these traffic risks and the associated accident risk.

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PART B: ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS

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B1: NYWAG Views on the Vision Statement

Letter from NYWAG dated 3 April 2012

Minerals and Waste Development FrameworkPlanning ServicesNorth Yorkshire County CouncilCounty HallNorthallertonNorth Yorkshire DL7 8AH

3 April 2012

Dear Sir

Waste Core Strategy Consultation

I am writing to you as Chairman of the North Yorkshire Waste Action Group (NYWAG), a pressure group of concerned residents that favours a sustainable solution to waste management. You may be aware that we have submitted a petition of over 10,000 signatories as part of our objection to the Allerton Waste Recovery Park (AWRP) proposal (Planning Application Y/2011/0328/ENV) and that NYWAG therefore represents a substantial body of opinion.

The “Minerals and Waste Development Framework: Minerals Options and Waste Vision Consultations – March 2012” document asks a deceptively simple question – do you agree or disagree with the Vision Statement presented on page 8? Since the Vision Statement cannot be seen in isolation from the AWRP planning application, it is not possible to give a simple yes/no answer.

All the documents put out by NYCC regarding the Waste Core Strategy (WCS) have said "this assumes that the incinerator already exists". That was the baseline for the workshop NYWAG representatives attended at Northallerton on October 19th. This presumption is without foundation as it appears to pre-empt the outcome of the AWRP planning application and any subsequent public inquiry. It begs the question of whether or not the current WCS development is merely a public relations exercise intended to act as a “smoke screen” behind which a highly controversial proposal can proceed.

Setting aside this important issue for the moment, we feel that the Vision Statement partly reflects the outcome of the meeting we attended on 19th October 2011. We can agree with some of the Vision Statement with two important exceptions:

The first two words "by 2030" were not agreed at the Oct 19th meeting. It should read "From today North Yorkshire will move substantially.....”

National targets in England for recycling and diversion of waste from landfill fall well short of best practice and targets in the rest of Britain. We feel suggest that the Vision Statement should reflect best practice by introducing specific targets consistent with those in Scotland and Wales This means recycling of municipal waste should reach 60% by 2020 (leading English authorities already achieve this) and 70% by 2025.

This suggest that the first paragraph should read

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“From today, North Yorkshire will move substantially closer to a Zero Waste Economy, through producing less waste per person and using waste as a resource. Waste disposal via landfill will only be taking place as a last resort once opportunities to re-use, recycle or recover have been exploited. National targets for recycling and diversion of waste from landfill will, as a minimum, have been met, and will be being exceeded where practicable. Specifically North Yorkshire will achieve 60% recycling of municipal waste by 2020 and 70% by 2025.”[New text is in italics]

Even without these suggested changes, the AWRP proposal is wholly incompatible with the Vision Statement. It relies on old technology (incineration) which carries well-known health and environmental risks and is the worst waste management technology (other than landfill) for greenhouse gas emissions. The transport implications of the AWRP site (or any other single site) are contrary to the proximity principle and the transport strategy in the Vision Statement. Finally, the AWRP proposal is not compatible with the waste hierarchy as it does not enable re-use and recycling to be maximised and would result in waste being treated further down the hierarchy than is necessary or appropriate.

This begs a simple question - How can you have a vision statement that is so completely at odds with the current plan?

Finally, if AWRP is built, it would exist in 2030 and have another 10-15 years of the contract still to run so most of the Vision Statement is invalid. If the current Waste Core Strategy development exercise is to mean anything then it is absolutely essential that no decision on the current planning application is taken until after the new Waste Core Strategy has been developed independently of current proposals and accepted by the Council and, if necessary, an appropriate inquiry before an inspector.

The importance of this last point cannot be over-emphasised. For that reason, I am copying this letter to Mr Shaun Robson. In doing so, I am asking him to register this as an objection to a decision on AWRP being taken before the new WCS is agreed.

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B2: Additional Material on Harm that AWRP will cause

47. This section summarises and extends why the AWRP will cause harm, contrary to the applicant’s claims, and includes the following sections:

1. Over-Capacity Issues2. Financial harm3. Traffic impacts4. Emissions and Abnormal Operations5. Implications of the NPPF

B2.1 Over-Capacity Issues

48. There are already issues of over-capacity in parts of the European Community coupled with the imminent onset of over-capacity both regionally and nationally in the UK. These are explored below.

B2.1.1: The European Dimension 49. There are already issues of over-capacity in some EU countries such as Germany and Hollandx. This is

beginning to have commercial consequences. This was exemplified at a recent seminar organized by the European Federation of Waste Management and Environmental Services20 (FEAD). As an example, Frans Beckers of the Van Gansewinkel Group waste business in Holland has stated that the company closed down an incinerator due to overcapacity and advised others to do the same:

“We closed one of our incineration plants in the Rotterdam area. There is overcapacity in Germany and we hope some of our colleagues will follow suit. We hope more [incineration] capacity will be taken out of the market. In the end we could harm recycling performance”.

50. Beckers also claimed that these problems also relate to biomass, stating that: “There is a lack of fuels. Too much is being burnt. We need to ensure we do not invest in too many biomass energy installations as we won’t have the fuel any more”.

51. At the same meeting, Michel Sponar, policy officer with the European Commission’s Environment Directorate emphasized the importance of moving waste up the waste hierarchy and said that all member states should prioritize waste prevention – and must produce Waste Prevention Plans by the end of 2013. He also said that “member states such as Germany and Denmark which are heavily reliant on incineration need to change their focus too, by sending more waste for recycling and composting”.

52. These comments should be set in the context of the Environment Agency recently granting SITA a permit to export 600,000 tonnes of UK RDF to Amsterdamxi a quadrupling of RDF export licenses xii, calls from the European Commission for the UK to avoid sending recyclable material to incineration (see below) and the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment calling for “the phasing-out, by the end of this decade, of incineration of recyclable and compostable waste”.

53. A European Commission spokesman has admitted to some concern that an over-reliance on incineration could lead to some recyclable material being burned and called on the UK to ensure that recycling and reuse remain the priority for waste treatmentxiii. “The big challenge is to reduce the amount of waste that is sent for incineration, which could be recycled instead" the spokesman remarked. "In the UK there is a decrease in the proportion of waste that is going to landfill, which is good, but this is still a high proportion of the total waste. To solve this, the UK should look to reuse and recycling and not to over-

20 The seminar was held alongside the IFAT ENTSORGA trade fair. of 72

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2F%2FEP%2F%2FTEXT%2BREPORT%2BA7-2012-0161%2B0%2BDOC%2BXML%2BV0%2F%2FEN&language=EN

capacity of incineration, countries like Denmark and Switzerland are burning much more than they should and that’s not good. There is an opportunity for the UK to take positively; I hope they will move in the right direction.”

54. As might be expected, overcapacity in countries such as Holland and Germany places downward pressure on the cost. According to a recent reportxiv the tonnage of waste processed in the Netherlands has fallen significantly as incineration has replaced landfill, with most of the fall in waste tonnage taking place in the decade from 1993 (Figure B2.1). Today there is an overcapacity of 1.5 MT or 19%.

Figure B2.1.1: Tonnage of Waste Processed in Netherlands

55. In Germany there is some 20 MT of treatment capacity out of a total of 29MT (the remainder is largely RDF). There is an overcapacity of 5 MT, some 17%. As Figure B2.1.2 shows, this long-term overcapacity has driven down gate fees in Germany.

Figure B2.1.2: Falling Gate Fees in Germany

56. This decline in Gate Fees makes the export of waste from the UK commercially attractive while the overcapacity suggests there is a significant market. While Local Authorities such as NYCC are unlikely to benefit (especially where they are determined on an in-county solution), commercial organizations need have no such inhibitions. This could impact on the availability of C&I and so-called “trade waste”, especially given the reasonable proximity of major ports (with good rail links) to part of the region.

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57. Overcapacity and its interaction with increased re-use and recycling is not confined to Europe. Yokohama, the largest city in Japan reduced waste by 38.7% between fiscal years2 2001 and 2007, despite a growth of 165,875 people in the city’s populationxv. This reduction in waste is attributable to the city’s success in raising public awareness about environmental issues and the active participation of citizens and businesses in Yokohama’s 3Rs program (reduce, reuse, and recycle). As a consequence, Yokohama was able to shut down two incinerators. The incinerator closures saved US$6 million in annual operating costs and US$1.1 billion that would have been needed to renovate them.

58. Overcapacity in Europe and the drive to move waste up the waste hierarchy has implications for the viability of the proposed AWRP. The example of Yokohama (and the many other examples cited in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices) shows that incineration is the least attractive option. To avoid the financial harm that AWRP would bring with it, planning permission should be refused.

B2.1.2: Regional Capacity

59. In our chapter on Need and Technology Choices we showed that the projections of waste arisings on which the alleged need for AWRP was based are implausible; waste arisings both locally and nationally are falling while re-use and recycling are increasing. These could manage 70% of waste as is already targeted in Scotland and Wales for 2025. In consequence AWRP is not needed.

60. It is instructive to consider the picture nationally. Many Local Authorities may take similar decisions at about the same time without giving consideration to national or international factors; e.g. the Landfill Directive has led to a large number of MSW incineration projects at various stages of development. This could mean overcapacity, something already seen in some European countries. For example Germany and Holland. There are already examples in the UK where there is local overcapacity, for example in Hampshire.21

61. So, is the over-capacity problem seen in Germany and Holland and some localised areas in the UK likely to be repeated nationally? There is research that suggests this will be the case. Eunomia’s National Residual Waste Infrastructure Review – Issue 2xvi is the second bi-annual review of residual waste treatment capacity. It covers a range of waste management technologies at both national (Great Britain) and regional level. The latter includes Yorkshire and Humberside.

62. At a Great Britain (GB) level they report (see Figure B2.1.3) that:

GB had over 28.3 million tonnes of residual waste arisings from local authority collected (LAC), C&I sources in 2011/12;

Currently, GB has around 14.8 million tonnes of residual waste treatment capacity either ‘operating’ or ‘under construction’. It comprises 32 dedicated incineration facilities, 5 gasification facilities, 29 pre-treatment facilities (using either MBT or autoclave technologies), 11 Waste Incineration

21 Hampshire County Council’s Joint Municipal Waste Management Strategy (JMWMS) resulted in the construction of three large Incineration plants at Marchwood, Portsmouth and Chineham. The original Planning consents were specific to only allow waste from within the County of Hampshire to be burnt. This has now changed. The Project Integra & Hampshire JMWMS waste volume projections to keep those incinerators at full capacity have since proved to have been inaccurate. Indeed, by April 2006 Waste Management News reported that Hampshire's incinerators were being topped up with residual waste material from household waste recycling centres to help meet any shortfalls in "black bag" household waste. By October 2009 BBC Radio Solent reported that Veolia (who run Hampshire’s incinerators) was asking Hampshire County Council’s planning committee to set aside a condition under which planning permission was granted, namely, that the incinerators should only use waste from Hampshire, in order to allow the importation of waste from surrounding counties. Today, despite local opposition, the Marchwood incinerator is obliged to import waste from outside Hampshire to keep the plants fully operational.

For details see Fact Sheet 12 which accompanied our initial letter OUTLINE OBJECTIONS TO AMEY CESPA PROPOSAL dated November 2011.

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Directive (WID) compliant biomass facilities and 6 cement kilns processing solid recovered fuels (SRF).

In 2011/12 there was a ‘capacity gap’ of around 13.5 million tonnes (per annum) between the quantity of residual waste arisings and the amount of treatment infrastructure capacity either ‘operating’ or ‘under construction’;

Without any change in residual waste quantities, there would be overcapacity of 4.7 million tonnes (per annum) if the 18.2 million tonnes of waste treatment capacity that has planning consent reaches financial close and begins construction; and

Planning consent is being sought for a further 4.5 million tonnes of waste treatment capacity. If, on top of the 18.2 million tonnes already with planning consent, this was consented and constructed and residual waste quantities remained constant, there would be overcapacity in GB of around 9.2 million tonnes (per annum).

Figure B2.1.3: Residual Waste Arisings and Treatment Capacity - Great Britain

Note: This Figure and Figure B2.1.4 are presented without allowing for the fact that outputs from some facilities may be inputs to others. As such, the capacity in this figure is not simply ‘additive’.

63. Figure B2.1.4 shows the key regional data for Yorkshire and Humber:

Currently Yorkshire and Humber has over 900,000 tonnes (per annum) of residual waste treatment capacity either ‘operating’ or ‘under construction’; It comprises 3 incineration facilities, 2 pre-treatment (MBT) facilities and 4 WID-compliant biomass facilities;

Planning consent has been granted to over 2.6 million tonnes of new incineration, gasification, pre-treatment and WID-compliant biomass capacity;

Applications for planning consent have been submitted for a further 1.1 million tonnes of incineration and pre-treatment capacity.

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Figure B2.1.4: Residual Waste Treatment Capacity – Yorkshire and Humber

64. Eunomia suggest a range of assumptions to estimate excess capacity and use several scenarios in view of the many incertainties in projections. Their central scenario for GB projects around 1.2 million tonnes in 2015/16, as shown in Figure 3. The extent of this overcapacity rises to almost 9.2 million tonnes in 2020/21. Note, however, that this does not include potential future capacity, which has not yet entered the planning system, and which may result in earlier overcapacity,

65. The Eunomia ‘high’ infrastructure scenario projects the onset of overcapacity is in the same year (2015/16) as in the central scenario, but at a higher level of around 6.6 million tonnes. Their ‘low’ infrastructure scenario is predicated on a far lower level of capacity becoming operational in which case the onset of overcapacity would be delayed until 2017/18.

66. This means that it is highly likely that AWRP would be operating in an over-capacity situation for all or much of its operational life. This is a buyers’ market; people who want waste disposal services would have the upper hand. This adds to the financial risks faced by AWRP and, in particular, NYCC.

67. We appreciate that there are limitations in the ability of waste to be moved significant distances at low cost, and that capacity is unevenly spread across GB so there will be some variation between regions in the time overcapacity is reached. Even so, the situation in the Yorkshire and Humber region is one of projected overcapacity at some fairly near time. This places risks on the council tax payer if AWRP is built. There needs to be a thorough review both of technology choices and local alternatives before planning permission is even considered.

68. Financial harm, and risk of still greater harm (e.g. through over-capacity) is but one if the many reasons why planning permission should be refused. This being so, it is essential to refuse planning permission now to avoid further nugatory expenditure.

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B2.1.3: Overcapacity in North Yorkshire

69. Section 2.1 of our chapter on Need and Technology Choice reveals that AWRP is seriously over-sized to meet the likely demand to treat MSW (the original purpose of AWRP). This fact appears to be to some extent appreciated by NYCC but their response is inappropriate.

70. Inspection of the revised waste forecasts available on NYCC’s website shows that, when compared with the forecasts used by NYCC at the time of the December 15th 2010 decision to award the contract to AmeyCespa, the Council has revised down its overall predictions of waste. This shows that the previous predictions were unreliable and that our view that AWRP is far too large for the needs of NYCC and CYC is the correct one.

71. We note that the predictions for the NYCC Districts now include a new waste stream called “Trade Waste”. This new waste stream was not part of the original 2010 projections on which the Councils took their December 2010 decision. It is therefore essential to examine the credibility of this new assumption in detail, not forgetting that it takes AWRP beyond its original purpose.

72. For all Districts the annual growth in Trade Waste is assumed to be 0% for the period 2010/11 to 2015/16 inclusive. However, in 2016/17 growth rates suddenly rise by a suspiciously identical amount for Craven, Harrogate, Ryedale, Scarborough and Selby. These rates are 28.5% (2015/16), 40.1% (2016/17), 23.49% (2017/18) and 20.11% (2018/19). In the years that follow, rates of growth for Trade Waste for these Districts falls to less than 2% until 2039/40. These startling assumptions are unexplained, as is the fact that there are no equivalent changes to the Trade Waste predictions provided by City of York.

73. These unexplained changes would markedly increase the projected MSW volumes. Without this change, the MSW predictions for NYCC by 2039/40 would be c. 380,000 tonnes. If we assume an implausibly low 50% recycling rate, only some 190,000 tonnes of waste would require treatment, far lower than the 320.000 tonne capacity of the EfW (incinerator) at AWRP. This far exceeds the demand for MSW, even at the end of the contract period.

74. While the “Trade Waste” stream is unspecified, it is possible to speculate that it reflects the assumption in Mr Bowe’s recent letter to Members that: “The repeal of LATS from 2013 means that future estimates of commercial waste to be collected by the local authorities in York and North Yorkshire have been revised upwards as the authorities’ services become more attractive to local businesses”. This apparently unfounded assumption requires full explanation due to its major consequences for the nature of the AmeyCespa contract. We understand that these Trade Waste estimates were not provided by the Collection Authorities (CAs). Indeed, the new NYCC waste flow model makes clear that the data listed against years 2016/17 onwards is not provided by the CAs – they appear to be a product of NYCC officers’ assumptions concerning what the CAs might do in a post-LATS world. There can be absolutely no guarantee that their assumed spectacular growth projections will be realised. Indeed, in view of the regional and national over-capacity discussed above, CAs should be aware that there will be a highly competitive market for waste treatment in the coming years and that a facility such as AWRP with its high gate prices would not be attractive to commercial firms.

75. The next section explores, among other things, how overcapacity of waste management facilities in the region and nationally could lead to financial harm.

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B2.2: Financial harm

76. We have argued, not least in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices that AmeyCespa’s application should be refused because it will cause financial harm to the people of NYCC and CYC who will pay for it and bear the risk for the next 25 years. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, AWRP is intended to deal with residual waste from NYCC and City of York Council and it is on this purpose alone that the need for AWRP must be judged. The projections used in the by the Councils/AmeyCespa in the Joint Municipal Waste Management Strategy (JMWMS) assume a rising trend in waste arisings despite the fact that waste arisings have actually fallen year on year for a number of years. Moreover they assume reuse and recycling only reaches 50% despite much higher figures being achieved elsewhere (for details see our chapter on Need and Technology Choices) and the plans for 70% in Scotland and Wales22. Thus the rising projections of waste arisings in the JMWMS used to size the AWRP facility are seriously out of line with both local and national trends which show the amount of waste produced is on a falling trend both as total waste produced and waste per capita. As a result, AWRP is grossly oversized and therefore not needed.

Second, AWRP projections are misleading and falsely inflate the claimed savings. NYCC forecasts against an unrealistic “Do nothing” option and against increasing waste volumes and rising landfill tax. This is at best guesswork. For example, NYCC assumes landfill tax will increase in real terms to £100 by 2020 and £170 by the end of the contract – there is no evidence for this. The low (50%) target for municipal waste recycling falsely exaggerates the savings forecast.

Third, the 25-30 year contract to amortise the capital cost locks NYCC into incineration technology and prevents flexibility to take advantage of technological developments and the concomitant cost savings.

Fourth, as described in our chapter on Need and Technology Choices, there are already proven technologies that are markedly cheaper. The gate fee charged to NYCC and CYC will be c. £130 per tonne, which is significantly higher than the existing market price. AWRP will therefore cost £65 per tonne more than alternatives23 - £13 million more per annum and over £300 million more over the 25-year contract. These costs ignore the huge capital costs of the facility and its debt servicing.

77. For these reasons, there are significant financial risks in making the alleged savings, because they would mostly occur late in the contract period and only if the forecasts are correct. Moreover, if a proper financial appraisal using discounted cash flow techniques had been carried out the alleged savings would have been largely discounted in any Net Present Value24 calculation and greater emphasis placed on the role of up-front costs.

78. A NYCC Working Party which reported to the full council did not look properly at value for money but argued that the PFI process automatically ensures value for money. This is not true as it excludes

22 Wales intends to reach the equivalent of 70% by 2024/25, and Scotland plans to achieve a 70% rate, but measured using the Scottish carbon metric, by 202523 One clear alternative to the technology mix proposed at AWRP would be to use a Thermal Mechanical Biological Treatment (MBT) plant, as used currently to process Darlington’s municipal waste at a gate fee of £65 per tonne (nearly half the cost for AWRP).24 The net present value (NPV) of a time series of incoming and outgoing cash flows is the sum of the present values (PV is the value on a given date of a payment or series of payments made at other times with future payments discounted to reflect the time value of money and other factors such as investment risk. NPV is a central tool in discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, and is a standard method for using the time value of money to appraise long-term projects. Used for capital budgeting and widely used throughout economics, finance, and accounting, it measures the excess or shortfall of cash flows, in present value terms, once financing charges are met. NPV can be described as the “Difference Amount” between the sums of discounted; cash inflows and cash outflows. It compares the present value of money today to the present value of money in future, taking inflation and returns into account. If n is the number of cash flows in the list of values, the

formula for NPV is given by: of 72

comparison with the most recent best practice. Moreover, as the Treasury Select Committee reportxvii shows, PFI is not always the cheapest option for a given scheme.

79. Despite NYCC’s claims to the contrary, the scheme is not risk-free. The Treasury Select Committee report (op cit) states (Paras 38 and 39) that:

“Allocating risk to the private sector is only worthwhile if it is better able to manage the risk and can pass on any subsequent savings to the client. The main benefit highlighted to us by PFI providers was the transfer of construction risk. However a PFI contract which lasts for 30 years is not necessary to transfer this risk. There are also other methods such as turnkey contracts which can be used for the same ends. We have seen evidence that PFI has not provided good value from risk transfer—in some cases inappropriate risks have been given to the private sector to manage. This has resulted in higher prices and has been inefficient.

Some of the claimed risk transfer may also be illusory—the government is ultimately accountable for the delivery of public services. Therefore it would not be able to allow a number of services provided under a PFI contract to cease for any length of time”.

80. NYCC’s Assistant Director of Resources at NYCC stated (3 December 2011) that “With PFI, the whole transfer of risk goes over to the private sector. It gives us certainty over a long period of time”. This is wrong. In the event of failure of the applicant or its heavily indebted Spanish parent company the responsibility for loan repayment devolves on NYCC and therefore the people of the county and penalties will be substantial.

81. In addition, council tax payers don’t want the ongoing certainty of paying over the odds for a guaranteed 25 years. The AWRP proposal is rather like signing for a fixed rate mortgage for 10% APR when the going rate is 5% and probably falling. It is the economics of the madhouse.

82. By seeking planning permission for a plant to treat all North Yorkshire’s municipal waste, the applicant is seeking to achieve a monopoly position which will be incapable of challenge for 25 years. This is unacceptable in terms of the damage to competition by local businesses. Any profit from the PFI will also leave Yorkshire as AmeyCespa is a Spanish-owned company.

83. The applicant claims that AWRP will create new jobs. This is incorrect, because the plant would displace people currently working in the quarry and in landfilling and waste treatment across the county (see our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability?). These job losses could exceed the 70 to be employed at Allerton. In a time of austerity, it would also reduce council services and employment.

1. The disparity between the circa £130/tonne gate price at AWRP and the typically £65/tonne at other facilities is so large that it would put people off using AWRP. This means that NYCC’s confidence that it could replace the shortfall in MSW with C&I waste is likely to be misplaced, especially as there is over-capacity in the region (see section B3). Put simply, why should a business choose an expensive option when much cheaper ones are available? These don’t have to be in North Yorkshire or York because the cost disparity is so large. This means that it may not be possible to fill AWRP and this could in turn mean that the Councils have difficulty in meeting their contractual obligations.

2. Thus there are commercial risks in trying to source C&I waste as it will be becoming a very competitive market. NYCC seem not to have factored these risks into their simplistic economic case, nor acknowledged the possibility of penalties being paid if the EfW (incinerator) does not get its regular ‘feed’ as Stoke-on-Trent found to their costxviii. Much depends on the terms of the contract which are shrouded in mystery under the blanket of commercial confidentiality.

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84. This situation is complicated by the building overcapacity on the Yorkshire and Humber region and nationally – a classical “bubble” situation. Inevitably, this will lead to a highly competitive market for providers of waste treatment below the recycling level of the waste hierarchy. Pricing will be an important part of the ability to compete. The AmeyCespa contract with NYCC/CYC will mean that these councils are paying well above the going rate, and doing so for 25 years. However, that part of the capacity of AWRP that in not used for the NYCC/CYC MSW must compete on the open market where the going rate is already far lower and will be subject to downward pressure due to the growing over-capacity regionally and nationally and due to the probable greater effectiveness and lower costs of new and emerging technologies.

85. The consequence of this is that AWRP would have to reduce its costs for C&I waste services – probably something akin to marginal cost pricing. Since one cannot run away from sunk costs for ever, this carries risks for the operator and those whom they borrow from – but then so does running at part-load or on a low load factor. It also means that the high price to which the Councils are committed might be used to subsidise the price paid under other contracts. This possible cross-subsidy from the Councils looks suspiciously like a form of state aid and is morally repugnant to us and unacceptable financially as council tax payers.

86. In conclusion, the excessive cost of AWRP brings with it financial harm and the various risks that NYCC appear not to have considered in their economic case could add substantially to that harm. This is not in the interests of council tax payers. Accordingly, planning permission for AWRP should be refused.

B2.3: Traffic impacts

87. The application should also be refused due to traffic impacts – see our chapter: Environmental Insults: Environmental Risks, Traffic and Visual Impact.

88. AmeyCespa admits that AWRP would increase traffic on the A168 but fails to address the most serious risk which will arise at the already hazardous A59/A168 junction and the closely associated A1(M)/A59 junction which are contiguous and should be treated as part of the same system.. Treating only the A168/A59 junction in isolation is inappropriate and ignoring the remainder of this junction system is not valid and would seriously underestimate the potential for accidents. There will be an increase of 2 very large HGVs per minute at this junction. This will cause overloads and restrict vision and, in turn, will increase the risk of accidents.

89. AWRP therefore fails to comply with the following regional and local policies as set out in our chapter: Environmental Insults: Environmental Risks, Traffic and Visual Impact. The primary reason for this failure are that

AWRP would generate considerable additional traffic, particularly HGVs. This would add to CO2 emissions and other pollutants including particulates. HGVs contribute 19.2% of total emissions from transport nationally, by far the largest proportion per unit of vehicle type.

The large number of extra HGVs associated with the development would harm the safety and security of residents and North Yorkshire road users across the county.

90. AWRP fails to apply the Proximity Principle, contrary to Government recommendations, and will also increase GHG emissions. A single site to treat the county’s waste does not make economic sense. Transporting waste from all over the county is folly; it creates many miles of unnecessary HGV travel, incurs additional transport costs and adds unnecessarily to CO2 emissions and other pollutants.

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Manifestly, AWRP is not the nearest possible location for much of North Yorkshire and a site within the city boundaries would be more appropriate to York’s waste.

91. The Transport Analysis in Appendix 11A may well depend on erroneous assumptions in that “In reality, once a site has been chosen for development, the individual collection authorities will determine whether waste will be direct delivered to the site, or be subject to bulking prior to onward transmission .”

92. Therefore, if local authorities (or suppliers of C&I waste) decide to send their waste directly to the site instead of bulking, the AmeyCespa’s Transport Assessment and all its conclusions would be largely meaningless since traffic volumes may well be considerably in excess of estimates. The Transport Plan does not obviate this risk yet AmeyCespa fail to take it into account.

93. We understand that the applicant was asked by NYCC to provide a full Traffic Assessment. It has failed to do so. There is not one single map showing what routes the waste would travel to get to Allerton Park.

94. AmeyCespa claim that ‘the assessment of the proposed development demonstrates that there are no significant environmental effects from traffic and transport associated with this development’. Manifestly, this is untrue. The extra 302 HGV movements in and out of the site daily will have major adverse impacts on local roads, particularly as many of these HGVs will be large (20+ tonnes). Other traffic will add to this impact.

B2.4: Emissions and Abnormal Operations

95. The air pollution control equipment in modern incinerators undoubtedly reduces emissions markedly compared to earlier incinerators. A sufficiently high stack would ensure sufficient dispersion to reduce the concentration of pollutants to levels adequate to meet current air quality objectives. However, this begs several important questions:

Given the many flaws in the analysis in AmeyCespa’s Chapters 10 and 12, (as discussed in our Chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment), are the stacks sufficiently high, especially for the incinerator?

Given that AmeyCespa’s calculations are based on incinerating MSW, how far will the inclusion of Trade Waste (an undefined waste stream) and other known waste streams alter the emissions profile and quantity?

Given the trend towards more stringent regulations since the original Clean Air Act, should the stack height be set at a height sufficient to meet the likely future regulations? Given that it is easier to design and build a stack of suitable height ab initio than to add to an existing stack, why is this not done?

96. For the people living around AWRP, the systems that control emissions are safety-critical systems. Yet there appears to be no failsafe mechanisms and no built-in redundancy. It is therefore important to consider what happens if one or more of these systems fails.

97. AmeyCespa’s application to the Environment Agency for an Environmental Permit contains a paper by Fichtner entitled “Air Quality Addendum: Abnormal Emissions” which makes an attempt to do this. They consider the following examples of abnormal operating conditions:

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98. Fichtner based their assumed abnormal emission levels primarily on data from modern plants or used what they call “conservative assumptions”, though these are undefined. Moreover, they also claim that they assumed “worst case” weather conditions, again without defining them. In reality, the worst case weather conditions are likely to be during conditions of thermal inversion, something that the air dispersion models have not taken into account. Even with these caveats, emission levels exceed permitted levels greatly as shown in Fichtner’s Tables 1 and 2 which are reproduced below.

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99. It is very clear that under various assumed conditions of abnormal operation, emissions greatly exceed the permitted maximum. Correcting for the deficiencies in AmeyCespa’s methodology (outlined in our Chapter Air Quality and Health: A Critique of AmeyCespa’s Assessment) is likely to increase calculated ground level concentrations even further. During conditions of thermal inversion these concentrations are likely to build up fairly quickly due to the trapping effect. This largely invalidates the calculations reported in Fichtner’s Table 3 which already shows that concentrations are above those in the Waste Incineration Directive. The reality is that they could be substantially higher.

100. As if these results were not bad enough, they ignore the possibility of two or more of the occurrences happening at the same time. Such eventualities are commonly taken into account in safety engineering. Doing so in this instance would increase emissions significantly above those calculated. The duration of such elevated emissions is a significant parameter that is not even discussed. Possible failure of instrumentation leading to the fault going undetected for some time

101. One might normally think of dual sets of instruments with appropriate control rules automatically closing the system down as the failsafe option. This may be inappropriate because emissions are generally high during shut-down. We have already mentioned the possibility of adding electrostatic precipitation to the system and this would do much to overcome the failure of bag filters (as well as potentially improving particle capture). Dual instrumentation and electrostatic precipitation are examples of the concept of built-in redundancy of systems (though the latter could perform a useful function during normal operation.

102. Electrostatic precipitators have been a reliable technology since the early and are found mainly on large power plants, cement plants, incinerators, and various boiler applications. Why are they not being installed together with filters in order to improve the removal of particulates and to protect the environment and the public in the event of one of the filters failing?

103. Not being specialist engineers, we are not aware of whether or not it would be possible to fit an alternative route to the stack to give the option of back-up air pollution control systems. If this is possible then the SNCR system could be matched by an alternative proven technology, namely catalytic reduction. The activated carbon system would have to be duplicated.

104. Power stations commonly use flue gas desulphurisation equipment which is a proven technology of long standing. Surely it should be fitted to reduce SO2 emissions.

105. In conclusion, there are a number of possible abnormal operation modes which feature failure of part of the air pollution control system leading to permitted emission levels being substantially or greatly exceeded. There appears to be inadequate safety engineering to avoid or minimise these risks. Moreover, emissions of some harmful substances could be reduced by the inclusion of proven technologies. These issues mean that planning permission should be refused in view of the possibility of substantial harm to the environment and human health.

B2.5: Implications of the National Policy Planning Framework

106. The introduction of the National Policy Planning Framework changes much and places greater emphasis on sustainable development and on the need for decisions to be made locally. This section discusses these and other issues. In essence, it responds to the invitation to comment on the effects of the new NPPF on our objections.

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NPPF and Sustainable Development

107. The NPPF is seen by the Government as a key part of their reforms to make the planning system less complex and more accessible, to protect the environment and to promote sustainable growth. It introduces a presumption in favour of sustainable development, which we have discussed above. The key issue here is that there can be no presumption in favour of AWRP because it is not a sustainable development, as is made clear above and in our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability?

108. In our chapter Sustainability, What Sustainability? we used the Brundtland Commission25 definition of sustainable development, one of the best known and widely accepted definitions. The NPPF states that “Resolution 42/187 of the United Nations General Assembly defined sustainable development as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. The two definitions are identical so our earlier evidence in the still stands.

109. AWRP fails to meet the Resolution42/187 criterion because the contractual commitment on which it is based commits present and future citizens of the whole of North Yorkshire to a single waste treatment plant, at a single site at huge and demonstrably excessive cost to the exclusion of all other solutions for at least 25 to 30 years. It also compromises the ability of future generations to meet their future needs by denying them resources for which they will then have to exploit virgin resources. It also causes irreversible environmental damage (e.g. climate change) as well as damaging human health (especially vulnerable are babies and young children, the future generation whose interests a sustainable development would protect).

110. Decommissioning represents an additional cost burden, as discussed in Section 3.1.2. Under AmeyCespa’s proposal NYCC would be committed to the (currently unknown) costs of decommissioning the plant and re-instatement of the site. This would apply even if AWRP were to be forced close prematurely for any reason; this substantial financial risk would negate any alleged financial benefit from AWRP and leave the council with a large and un-resourced bill to pay.

111. The NPPF also states:

“Sustainable development is about change for the better” AWRP is low down the Waste Hierarchy, being only slightly better than landfill and significantly below the recycling and value for money performance of more recent systems (e.g. Thermal MBT systems such as used by Darlington).

There are three dimensions to sustainable development: economic, social and Environmental use natural resources prudently, minimise waste and pollution, and mitigate and adapt to climate change including moving to a low carbon economy. AWRP burns 80% of the waste entering the site, thereby wasting valuable resources rather than maximising material recovery and recycling. The heat generated cannot be fully utilised; CHP is unrealistic due to the lack of a nearby market. Having a single site means unnecessarily long trucking distances and results in higher levels of GHG and other emissions. It fails to contribute to a low carbon economy.

112. Granting planning permission would be wrong as it would most certainly compromise “the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

25 The Brundtland Commission, formally the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), was convened by the United Nations in 1983. It was created to address growing concern "about the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic and social development." In establishing the commission, the UN General Assembly recognized that environmental problems were global in nature and determined that it was in the common interest of all nations to establish policies for sustainable development.

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113. The NPPF also states “Sustainable means ensuring that better lives for ourselves don’t mean worse lives for future generations.” AWRP does not do this – not even for ‘ourselves’ because of cost, inferior recycling capability, increased GHG emissions (including from waste transport distances), damage to the local landscape and increased risk of pollution from the incineration element. All of these unnecessary outcomes would be worse for future generations. The development of increased recycling would be seriously undermined meaning that future generations would have to exploit virgin resources thereby denying them to later generations.

Local Determination and Democratic Deficit

114. The change in the Government’s approach to planning introduced in the NPPF document places greater emphasises on local determination. As its Forward says:

“This should be a collective enterprise. Yet, in recent years, planning has tended to exclude, rather than to include, people and communities. In part, this has been a result of targets being imposed, and decisions taken, by bodies remote from them. Dismantling the unaccountable regional apparatus and introducing neighbourhood planning addresses this”.

115. This statement challenges the old ways. The emphasis on more local decision making could be argued to challenge the NYCC presumption that it should determine this application. It is certainly consistent with the view that the very body that has voted for AWRP should also determine the planning application. Why should one body act as judge, jury and executioner on this highly controversial proposal? They will be seen to lack the independence to do so. This is exemplified by the consultation on the WCS and its presumption that AWRP will be built (discussed above) In this NYCC’s approach has been far from that of a “Collective enterprise”. By contrast, views expressed by the public in the WCS Review are from the community and therefore should be given significant weight. This has not happened to date; recall that the last time there was a questionnaire of the public (BPEO) there was a huge majority in favour of more than one site and to reduce transport – quite the opposite of the AWRP proposal. The current WCS consultation is clear in wanting waste to be treated as a resource, close to where it is produced; again out of line with the AWRP proposal. Ignoring public opinion in this way introduces a democratic deficit where none need exist.

116. The NPPF suggests that planning should be a collective enterprise including rather than excluding people and communities. It deplores decisions taken by “remote bodies”. This suggests that:

A body less remote from the people surrounding the Allerton site should judge the planning application. This implies either that the decision should be taken locally by HBC or at a Public Inquiry where full representation of local views is possible.

NYCC should heed this and give very considerable weight to the objections of the communities in the Harrogate Knaresborough Boroughbridge area who have pointed out the obvious shortcomings of the scheme. NYCC should also give great weight to the objections of Harrogate and Knaresborough Borough Councils and local parish councils.

117. The NPPF suggests that planning should be a collective enterprise including rather than excluding people and communities. We agree and welcome its recognition that “people have been put off from getting involved because planning policy itself has become so elaborate and forbidding – the preserve of specialists, rather than people in communities” Although some of our arguments, for example on health, require specialist knowledge, at heart our arguments are about the harm that AWRP will cause and such arguments should not have to depend on knowledge of copious numbers of planning documents. While we have had, perforce, to relate them to some of these documents and the things the Applicant has said concerning them, the basic message is a simple one: AWRP will cause harm in a large number of ways that are unacceptable.

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Health and Pollution

118. Paragraph 120 of the NPPF states that

“To prevent unacceptable risks from pollution and land instability, planning policies and decisions should ensure that new development is appropriate for its location. The effects (including cumulative effects) of pollution on health, the natural environment or general amenity, and the potential sensitivity of the area or proposed development to adverse effects from pollution, should be taken into account.”

119. This makes pollution and health risks an important issue in planning decisions, irrespective of whether it has been in the past.

120. Our chapters on Harmful Emissions and on Health Risks discuss the unacceptable imposition of pollution and the health risks AWRP would bring. Health impacts arising from waste incineration (the main technology at AWRP) is a contentious subject for many reasons (complexity, uncertainty, vested interests, the nature of the ‘scientific method’, difficulties ‘proving’ causal relationships, ‘confounding factors’ including both social factors and other sources of pollution, etc.). However, there is a substantial body of scientific opinion showing that there are reasonable grounds for concern about potentially dangerous effects of incinerator emissions on human health, with babies and young children being amongst the most vulnerable. The precautionary principle suggests that as there are less costly, more environmentally friendly systems such as MBT one must ask – “Why take the risk of incineration when you do not have to?”

121. We therefore object to the unacceptable health risks that AWRP would impose. In line with para 120 of the NPPF and the Precautionary Principle, the health risks arising from AWRP mean that planning permission should be refused.

Other Conclusions from the NPPF Document

122. The NPPF also states “We must respond to the changes that new technologies offer us.” AWRP fails this test because its proposed technology is obsolescent and does not offer the best solution to maximising recycling nor the best value for money. The high capital cost and longevity of the contractual commitment would deprive future generations of responding to and benefitting from emerging new technologies, locking the people of North Yorkshire out of the cost savings they might otherwise be able to benefit from.

123. The NPPF emphasises that planning should be genuinely plan-led, empowering local people to shape their surroundings, with succinct local and neighbourhood plans setting out a positive vision for the future of the area. Plans should be kept up-to-date, and be based on joint working and co-operation to address larger than local issues. They should provide a practical framework within which decisions on planning applications can be made with a high degree of predictability and efficiency.

124. Unfortunately NYCC as failed to meet these standards. It has been without a Minerals and Waste Strategy for some years and is now belatedly consulting on a Strategy. This has two consequences:

NYCC should not be taking the most significant contractual and planning decision ever until after it has a valid strategy to guide it.

The public views expressed in the consultations about emerging strategy should be given very great weight. Significantly those views emphasized

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o A preference for maximising recycling and the reuse of materialso A preference for a number of treatment centres rather than oneo A preference for waste treatment facilities to be located close to the major waste producing

conurbations, rather than a single remote siteo A desire to minimise the distance waste is carried to reduce carbon pollution.o A view that Energy from Waste systems should be used only where the heat output can be

fully utilisedo A recommendation that NYCC should review and take advantage of waste treatment

opportunities outside its county boundaries

125. The NPPF recommends a planning framework within which local people and their accountable councils can produce their own distinctive local and neighbourhood plans, which reflect the needs and priorities of their communities. This reinforces the view that this planning application should not be determined in the absence of a Waste Core Strategy. The completion of the Waste Core Strategy would be a first step towards the development of locally accepted waste treatment plants.

126. The NPPF states that authorities should conserve heritage assets in a manner appropriate to their significance, so that they can be enjoyed for their contribution to the quality of life of this and future generations. The applicants admit that the proposed development would cause harm to the landscape that cannot be adequately screened or mitigated. This further demonstrates that the proposed development fails the sustainability test and the application should be dismissed.

127. The NPPF confirms that the Government is committed to ensuring that the planning system does everything it can to support sustainable economic growth, supporting existing business sectors and particularly economic growth in rural areas in order to create jobs and prosperity by taking a positive approach to sustainable new developments. AWRP conflicts with this in that:

It does not support the existing business sector where small local firms are handling North Yorkshire waste There has been no assessment of the potential impacts of this scheme on the existing local waste providers in North Yorkshire. The negative impacts of this scheme have therefore not been assessed. By seeking to draw in commercial and industrial waste from the County and beyond, the impacts of this are also not assessed.

A multi site approach to waste treatment adjacent major producers would result in employment opportunities in rural parts of the county.

128. The NPPF requires that all developments that generate significant amounts of movement should be supported by a Transport Statement or Transport Assessment. The AmeyCespa scheme will result in a significant increase in the distances waste will be transported and an increase in vehicle movements on the dangerous A59/A168 junction yet the planning application does not include a Transport Statement.

129. The scheme also fails the NPPF requirements that:

Plans and decisions should ensure developments that generate significant movement are located where the need to travel will be minimised.

Proposals are visually attractive as a result of good architecture and appropriate landscaping. Should not increase urban sprawl or the impact of light pollution from artificial light on local

amenity, intrinsically dark landscapes and nature conservation. Plans for new development should be in locations and ways which reduce GHG emissions. The

technology choice and increased waste transport distances do the reverse of this. The basic solution is worse than landfill. Transport costs in terms of CO2 are important, but also are the pollution they bring and the cost of fuel.

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The NPPF also advises that permission should be refused for development of poor design that fails to take the opportunities available for improving the character and quality of an area and the way it functions. AWRP fails on all these counts and permission should therefore be refused.

The NPPF states that Minerals are essential to support sustainable economic growth and our quality of life. It is therefore important that there is a sufficient supply of material to provide the infrastructure, buildings, energy and goods that the country needs. However, since minerals are a finite natural resource, and can only be worked where they are found, it is important to make best use of them to secure their long-term conservation. Authorities should put in place policies to ensure worked land is reclaimed at the earliest opportunity

130. Mineral Extraction is an important contributor to the NYCC rural economy and reinstatement requires landfill. NYCC has not quantified the impact of trying to eliminate landfill on this important rural North Yorkshire industry.

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ANNEX A - Letters to Knaresborough Post – April 2012

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References

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i European Environment Agency, EEA Technical report No 12/2011, Air quality in Europe — 2011 report, ISBN: 978-92-9213-232-3, ISSN Annual report series: 1977-284X, ISSN EEA Technical report series: 1725-2237, doi:10.2800/8321

ii A speech by HRH The Prince of Wales at the 150th anniversary of the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA), Royal Gala Evening at Hampton Court Palacehttp://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/speechesandarticles/a_speech_by_hrh_the_prince_of_wales_at_the_150th_anniversary_1876801621.html

iii http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_cycle#Efficiency_of_CCGT_plants

iv http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fossil-fuel_power_station

v P. F. Sheridan, V. Horlacher, G. G. Rooney, P. Hignett1, S. D. Mobbs and S. B.VosperInfluence of lee waves on the near-surface flow downwind of the PenninesQ. J. R. Meteorol. Soc. (2006), 1, pp. 1–24http://www.eol.ucar.edu/projects/trex/publications/papers/Pennines_QJ_revised.pdf

vi Recuerda, Miguel A. (2006). "Risk and Reason in the European Union Law" European Food and Feed Law Review 5.

vii Europa, Summary of EU Legislation, The Precautionary Principlehttp://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/consumer_safety/l32042_en.htm

viii http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52000DC0001:EN:NOT

ix Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 191, paragraph 2

x Commission calls for move up waste hierarchy, Caelia Quinault, 16 May 2012http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/legislation/commission-calls-for-move-up-waste-hierarchy

xi Agency issues largest ever permit to export RDF,8 May 2012, http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/energy/agency-issues-largest-ever-permit-to-export-rdf-1

xii RDF exports quadruple in five months, Caelia Quinault, 7 March 2012, http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/energy/test

xiii UK edges up European recycling league table Will Date, 1 March 2012, http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/waste-management/uk-creeps-up-european-recycling-league-table

xiv Measuring Waste Markets In the UK and EU, Adrian Judge, Director , Tolvik Consulting, January 2011

xv GOOD PRACTICES IN CITY ENERGY EFFICIENCY: Eco2 Cities: Waste Use and Recycling in Yokohama, http://www.esmap.org/esmap/node/1229

xvi Eunomia Research and Consulting, National Residual Waste Infrastructure Review – Issue 2http://www.eunomia.co.uk/documents/Eunomia_Residual_Waste_Infrastructure_Review_High-level_Version.pdf xvii House of Commons Treasury Committee, Private Finance Initiative, Seventeenth Report of Session 2010-12

xviii Stoke council faces £645k bill for incinerator tonnage shortfall http://www.mrw.co.uk/news/stoke-council-faces-645k-bill-for-incinerator-tonnage-shortfall/8607111.article

http://www.mrw.co.uk/news/stoke-council-faces-645k-bill-for-incinerator-tonnage-shortfall/8607111.article

http://www.mrw.co.uk/news/stoke-council-faces-645k-bill-for-incinerator-tonnage-shortfall/8607111.article

http://www.eunomia.co.uk/documents/Eunomia_Residual_Waste_Infrastructure_Review_High-level_Version.pdf

http://www.eunomia.co.uk/documents/Eunomia_Residual_Waste_Infrastructure_Review_High-level_Version.pdf

http://www.esmap.org/esmap/node/1229

http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/waste-management/uk-creeps-up-european-recycling-league-table

http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/waste-management/uk-creeps-up-european-recycling-league-table

http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/energy/test

http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/energy/agency-issues-largest-ever-permit-to-export-rdf-1

http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/energy/agency-issues-largest-ever-permit-to-export-rdf-1

http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/legislation/commission-calls-for-move-up-waste-hierarchy

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52000DC0001:EN:NOT

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/consumers/consumer_safety/l32042_en.htm

http://www.eol.ucar.edu/projects/trex/publications/papers/Pennines_QJ_revised.pdf

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fossil-fuel_power_station

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_cycle#Efficiency_of_CCGT_plants

http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/speechesandarticles/a_speech_by_hrh_the_prince_of_wales_at_the_150th_anniversary_1876801621.html

http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/speechesandarticles/a_speech_by_hrh_the_prince_of_wales_at_the_150th_anniversary_1876801621.html

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