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G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testa ent o! t"e de#eased R$%$R$N& 'AN()* A+A&IA.

'$%$RINA A. %&A. &$ $NRI $ , $T AL., petitioners-appellees,vs./IG $L A+A&IA, $T AL., oppositors-appellants.

Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula forappellants.C. de la Victoria for appellees.

/*NT$/A0*R, J. :

On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisa , !eb",e#ec"ted a doc"ment p"rportin$ to be his %ast &ill and Testament no'mar(ed )#hibit *A*. +esident of the !it of !eb", he died on an"ar 1 ,19 3, in the m"nicipalit of Alo$"insan, !eb", 'here he 'as an evac"ee. eleft properties estimated at /0, in val"e. On October 2, 19 6, one Andres)nri "e , one of the le$atees in )#hibit *A*, filed a petition for its probate inthe !o"rt of First 4nstance of !eb". Some co"sins and nephe's 'ho 'o"ldinherit the estate of the deceased if he left no 'ill, filed opposition.

5"rin$ the hearin$ one of the attestin$ 'itnesses, the other t'o bein$ dead,testified 'itho"t contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of hisco-'itnesses, Father Sancho 'rote o"t in lon$hand )#hibit *A* in Spanish'hich the testator spo(e and "nderstood that he 7testator8 si$ned on he lefthand mar$in of the front pa$e of each of the three folios or sheets of 'hich thedoc"ment is composed, and n"mbered the same 'ith Arabic n"merals, andfinall si$ned his name at the end of his 'ritin$ at the last pa$e, all this, in thepresence of the three attestin$ 'itnesses after tellin$ that it 'as his last 'illand that the said three 'itnesses si$ned their names on the last pa$e afterthe attestation cla"se in his presence and in the presence of each other. Theoppositors did not s"bmit an evidence.

The learned trial co"rt fo"nd and declared )#hibit *A* to be a holo$raphic 'illthat it 'as in the hand'ritin$ of the testator and that altho"$h at the time it'as e#ec"ted and at the time of the testator s death, holo$raphic 'ills 'erenot permitted b la' still, beca"se at the time of the hearin$ and 'hen thecase 'as to be decided the ne' !ivil !ode 'as alread in force, 'hich !ode

permitted the e#ec"tion of holo$raphic 'ills, "nder a liberal vie', and to carro"t the intention of the testator 'hich accordin$ to the trial co"rt is thecontrollin$ factor and ma override an defect in form, said trial co"rt b orderdated an"ar 2 , 19:2, admitted to probate )#hibit *A*, as the %ast &ill andTestament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealin$ from thatdecision and beca"se onl "estions of la' are involved in the appeal, thecase 'as certified to "s b the !o"rt of Appeals.

The ne' !ivil !ode 7+ep"blic Act ;o. 3068 "nder article 01 thereof providesthat a person ma e#ec"te a holo$raphic 'ill 'hich m"st be entirel 'ritten,dated and si$ned b the testator himself and need not be 'itnessed. 4t is afact, ho'ever, that at the time that )#hibit *A* 'as e#ec"ted in 1923 and at thetime that Father Abadia died in 19 3, holo$raphic 'ills 'ere not permitted,and the la' at the time imposed certain re "irements for the e#ec"tion of'ills, s"ch as n"mberin$ correlativel each pa$e 7not folio or sheet8 in lettersand si$nin$ on the left hand mar$in b the testator and b the three attestin$'itnesses, re "irements 'hich 'ere not complied 'ith in )#hibit *A* beca"sethe bac( pa$es of the first t'o folios of the 'ill 'ere not si$ned b an one,not even b the testator and 'ere not n"mbered, and as to the three frontpa$es, the 'ere si$ned onl b the testator.

4nterpretin$ and appl in$ this re "irement this !o"rt in the case of 4n re )stateof Sa$"insin, 1 /hil., 0ent"ra /rieto. The noncompliance 'ith section 2 of Act ;o. 26 : bthe attestin$ 'itnesses 'ho omitted to si$n 'ith the testator at the leftmar$in of each of the five pa$es of the doc"ment alle$ed to be the 'ill


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of >ent"ra /rieto, is a fatal defect that constit"tes an obstacle to itsprobate.

&hat is the la' to appl to the probate of )#h. *A*? @a 'e appl theprovisions of the ne' !ivil !ode 'hich not allo's holo$raphic 'ills, li(e)#hibit *A* 'hich provisions 'ere invo(ed b the appellee-petitioner andapplied b the lo'er co"rt? "t article


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G.R. No. L-5 24 3e ruar 67, 195

+I$N%$NI&* A. I+ARL$, plaintiff-appellant,vs.$' $RAN A /. *, defendant-appellant.

"uirico del Mar for appellant.#aniel P. $u%ula& and Conc'ita (. Miel appellee.

T A'*N, J. :

This action commenced in the !o"rt of First 4nstance of !eb" to ann"l a deedof sale conve in$ to the defendant, in consideration of /1,< , one "ndividedhalf of a parcel of land 'hich previo"sl had been sold, alon$ 'ith the otherhalf, b the same vendor to the plaintiff s $rantors. B"d$ment 'as a$ainst theplaintiff.

The case 'as s"bmitted for decision "pon an a$reed statement of facts, thepertinent parts of 'hich are th"s s"mmari ed in the appealed decision=

1st. C That %eonard B. &instanle and !atalina ;avarro 'ereh"sband and 'ife, the former havin$ died on "ne 6, 19 6 leavin$heir the s"rvivin$ spo"se and some minor children

2nd. C hat "pon the death of %. . &instanle , he left a parcel of land

described "nder Transfer !ertificate of title ;o. 2391 of the +e$istr of 5eeds of the /rovince of !eb"

3rd. C That the above mentioned propert 'as a conB"$al propert

th. C That on April 1:, 19 6, the s"rvivin$ spo"se !atalina ;avarro>da. de &instanle sold the entire parcel of land to the spo"ses @aria!ano , alle$in$ amon$ other thin$s, that she needed mone for thes"pport of her children

:th. C That on @a 2 , 19 da. de &instanle sold the entire parcel to the !ano spo"ses, one-half of italread belon$ed to the seller s children. ;o formal or B"dicial declarationbein$ needed to confirm the children s title, it follo's that the first sale 'as n"lland void in so far as it incl"ded the children s share.

On the other hand, the sale to the defendant havin$ been made b a"thoritof the competent co"rt 'as "ndeniabl le$al and effective. The fact that it hasnot been recorded is of no conse "ence. 4f re$istration 'ere necessar , still


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the non-re$istration 'o"ld not avail the plaintiff beca"se it 'as d"e to no other ca"se than his o'n opposition.

The decision 'ill be affirmed s"bBect to the reservation, made in said decision,of the ri$ht of the plaintitff andDor the !ano spo"ses to brin$ s"ch actiona$ainst !atalina ;avarro >da. de &instanle as ma be appropriate for s"chdama$es as the ma have inc"rred b reason of the voidin$ of the sale intheir favor.

Paras, C.J., (eria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Monte%a!or, e!es, Jugo,Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., conc"r.

G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987

MATILDE S. PALI TE, petitioner,vs.!"N. #"SE ". RAM"LETE $% Pre%&'&() #*')e o+ o*rt o+ &r%tI(%t$( e o+ eb*, r$( / III, $(' MAR EL" S"TT",A'm&(&%tr$tor, respondents.

G TIERRE , #R., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the thenCourt of First Instance of Cebu declaring the deed of redemptionexecuted for the petitioner null and void and denying thepetitioner's motion that the Registrar of eeds of the City of Cebu bedirected to transfer the !wner's uplicate Certi"cates of Title to #ot$os. %& (, %&)%, and %&)* from Filemon +otto to her and to issue anew !wner's uplicate Certi"cate of Title to #ot *% (-C in her name.

!n uly ), %( (, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writof execution issued on February ), %( ( by the respondent /udgeand to a court order dated une , %( ( in the case of 0ilar Teves, etal. vs 1arcelo +otto, 2dministrator, Civil Case $o. R-%&&* , for thesatisfaction of /udgment in the amount of 0 *),* &.&&.

The following properties belonging to the late on Filemon +otto andadministered by respondent 1arcelo +otto were levied upon3

%. 0arcel of land on #ot $o. %& (, covered by TCT $o.* 4 & of the 5anilad Friar #ands 6state, Cebu City7

*. 0arcel of land on #ot $o. %&)*, covered by TCT $o.* 4 * of the 5anilad Friar #ands 6state, Cebu City7


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8. 0arcel of land on #ot $o. %&)%,covered by TCT $o.* 4 % of the 5anilad Friad #ands 6state, Cebu City7

. 0arcel of land on #ot $o. )*)8 of the CebuCadastre, Cebu City, covered by TCT $o. * 48(7

). 0arcel of land situated at 1antalongon, alaguete,Cebu, covered by T $o. &%&44%, with an area of 4-

&97 :sic;

4. 0arcel of land on #ot $o. 98( of the uare meters more or less7

. Residential =ouse of strong materials, situated on a?overnment lot at #ahug, Cebu City7

9. Residential =ouse of strong materials, situated atCentral, Cebu City. @ :Rollo, p. &;

+even of the above-described properties were awarded to 0ilar Teves, who alone bid for them for the amount of 0*% ,8&&.&&.

The residential house situated on a government lot at #ahug, CebuCity, was awarded to lone bidder 2suncion Aillarante for the amountof 0%&,&&&.&&.

Bithin the period for redemption, petitioner 1atilde +. 0alicte, asone of the heirs of the late on Filemon +otto, redeemed frompurchaser 0ilar Teves, four : ; lots for the sum of 04&,&&&.&&.

2 deed of redemption dated uly *(, %(9&, executed by eputy0rovincial +heri Felipe A. 5elandres and approved by the ClerD ofCourt, 6speranEa ?arcia as 6x-! cio +heri , was issued for theselots3

%. 2 parcel of land or #ot $o. *% (-C-0 I-*)&* CebuCadastre, Cebu City, bid at 0*&,&&&.&&7

*. 2 parcel of land or #ot $o. %&)*, covered by TCT$o. * 4 *, of the 5anilad Friar #ands 6state, CebuCity, bid at 0%),&&&.&&7

8. 2 parcel of land or #ot $o.%&)%,covered by TCT $o.* 4 %, of the 5anilad Friar #ands 6state, Cebu City, at0),&&&.&&7

. 2 parcel of land or #ot $o. %& (, covered by TCT$o. * 4 &, of the 5anilad Friar #ands 6state, CebuCity, at 0*&,&&&.&&. :Rollo, p. *;

!n uly * , %(9&, petitioner 0alicte "led a motion with respondent udge Ramolete for the transfer to her name of the titles to the four: ; parcels of land covered by the deed of redemption.

This motion was opposed by the plainti s in Civil Case $o. R-%&&* ,entitled @0ilar Teves, et al. vs 1arcelo +otto, administrator@ onseveral grounds, principal among which, is that movant, 0alicte, isnot one of those authoriEed to redeem under the provisions of theRules of Court.

2 hearing on the said motion, with both parties adducing evidencewas held.

The lower court held that although 0alicte is one of the declaredheirs in +pl. 0roc. $o. * &4-R, she does not >ualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that thedeed of redemption is null and void. The motion of 0alicte was

denied.

=ence, the present petition.

The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors3

2

R6+0!$ 6$T < ?6 6RR6 I$ R


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+6CTI!$ *(:a;, R


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principal sold on execution because the surety, bypaying the debt of the principal, stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor, and conse>uently isnot a successor in interest in the property. :?. uali"es asa successor-ininterest.

2rt. of the Civil Code states that3

The rights to the succession are transmitted from themoment of the death of the decedent.

2t the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own theproperty, sub/ect to the decedent's liabilities. In fact, they maydispose of the same even while the property is under administration.:5arretto vs. Tuason, )( 0hil. 9 )7 aDosalem vs. Rafols, 8 0hil.4*9;. If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the decedent'sproperty even while it is under administration. Bith more reasonshould the heirs be allowed to redeem redeemable propertiesdespite the presence of an administrator.

The respondents contend that the petitioner must positively provethat the three other co-heirs, the administrator, and the intestatecourt had expressly agreed to the redemption of the disputedparcels of land. Be see no need for such prior approval. Bhile it mayhave been desirable, it is not indispensable under the circumstancesof this case. Bhat is important is that all of them ac>uiesced in theact of redeeming property for the estate. The petitioner contendsthat the administrator and the three other heirs agreed to theredemption. There is, however. no clear proof of such approval.Bhat is beyond dispute from the records is that they did notdisapprove nor reprobate the acts of the petitioner. There is liDewisenothing in the records to indicate that the redemption was notbene"cial to the estate of on Filemon +otto.

It may be true that the interest of a speci"c heir is not yet "xed anddeterminate pending the order of distribution but, nonetheless, theheir's interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery ofits properties is greater than anybody else's, de"nitely more thanthe administrator's who merely holds it for the creditors, the heirs,and the legatees.

The petitioner cites precedents where persons with inchoate orcontingent interest were allowed to exercise the right of redemptionas @successors-in-interest,@ e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton :%&80hil. 99(, 9(*; where a son redeemed the property of his parentssold on execution and Rosete vs. Provincial Sheri of !ambales :()

0hil. )4&, )4 ;, where a wife by virtue of what the Court called@inchoate right of dower or contingent interest@ redeemed ahomestead as successor-in-interest of her husband.

In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that3

... The right of a son, with respect to the property of afather or mother, is also an inchoate or contingentinterest, because upon the death of the father or themother or both, he will have a right to inherit saidcon/ugal property. If any holder of an inchoate interestis a successor in interest with right to redeem aproperty sold on execution, then the son is such asuccessor in interest, as he has an inchoate right tothe property of his father.

The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of theadministrator as the /udgment debtor and as the only @successor-in-interest.@ The estate of the deceased is the /udgment debtor and theheirs who will eventually ac>uire that estate should not beprohibited from doing their share in its preservation.

2lthough petitioner 0alicte validly redeemed the properties, hermotion to transfer the titles of the four : ; parcels of land coveredby the eed of Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon+otto to her name cannot prosper at this time.


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!therwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to adistribution of the estate.

2s held in the case of Philippine "ommercial and #ndustrial $an% vs.&scolin :)4 +CR2 *4 , 8 )- 8 4;3

Indeed, the law on the matter is speci"c, categoricaland une>uivocal. +ection % of Rule (& provides3

+6CTI!$ %. When order for distribution of residuemade . K Bhen the debts, funeral charges, andexpenses of administration, the allowance to the

widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to theestate in accordance with law, have been paid, thecourt, on the application of the executor oradministrator, or of a person interested in the estate,and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residueof the estate to the persons entitled to the same,naming them and the proportions, or parts, to whicheach is entitled, and such persons may demand andrecover their respective shares from the executor oradministrator, or any other person having the same inhis possession. If there is a controversy before thecourt as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceasedperson or as to the distributive shares to which eachperson is entitled under the law, the controversy shallbe heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

$o distribution shall be allowed until the payment ofthe obligations above mentioned has been made orprovided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,give a bond, in a sum to be "xed by the court,conditioned for the payment of said obligations withinsuch time as the court directs.

These provisions cannot mean anything less than thatin order that a proceeding for the settlement of theestate of a deceased may be deemed ready for "nalclosure, :%; there should have been issued already anorder of distribution or assignment of the estate of the

decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will orby law, but :*; such order shall not be issued untilafter it is shown that the @debts, funeral expenses,expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc.,chargeable to the estate@ have been paid, which isbut logical and proper, :8; besides, such an order isusually issued upon proper and speci"c application forthe purpose of the interested party or parties, and notof the court.@

The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months period to /oin asco-redemptioners in the redemption made by the petitioner before

the motion to transfer titles to the latter's name may be granted.

B=6R6F!R6, the petition is hereby ?R2$T6 . The respondentcourt's orders declaring the deed of redemption null and void anddenying the motion to transfer title over the redeemed properties to1atilda 0alicte are R6A6R+6 and +6T 2+I 6, sub/ect to the right ofthe other heirs to /oin in the redemption as stated above.

+! !R 6R6 .

'ernan ("hairman)* 'eliciano* $idin and "ortes* ++.* concur.

G.R. No. 126950 #* 3 2, 1999

NELS"N N A LE, SILM"R N A LE $(' A4 ILINA N A LE,pet&t&o(er%, %. GENER"SA N A LE, IL "R N A LE,MAR EL" N A LE, $(' t/e " RT " APPEALS,re%po('e(t%.


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G"N AGA-RE ES, #.

This petition for review on certiorari seeDs to reverse and set asidethe ecision dated $ovember *), %(() of the Fifth ivision % of theCourt of 2ppeals for allegedly being contrary to law.

The following facts as found by the Court of 2ppeals are undisputed3

6dras $ufable owned at 0oblacion, 1an/uyod, $egros !riental,consisting of ( 9 s>uare meters, more or less. =e died on 2ugust (,%(4) and was survived by his children, namely3 2ngel Custodio,?enerosa, Ailfor and 1arcelo, all surnamed $ufable.


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a; That the parcel of land situated in 0oblacion 1an/uyod, $egros!riental remains undivided for community ownership but respectingconditions imposed therein :sic; in the will7

xxx xxx xxx

:6xhs. @6@ and @6-%@;

Two months earlier, or on 1arch %), %(44, spouses 2ngel Custodioand 2>uilina $ufable mortgaged the entire property located at1an/uyod to the evelopment 5anD of the 0hilippines N 50O :0re-trial !rder, dated anuary , %((*, p. %&8, !riginal Records;. +aidmortgagors became delin>uent for which reason the mortgagedproperty was foreclosed by 50 on February *4, %( 8 :id.;.

!n anuary %%, %(9&, $elson $ufable, the son of 2ngel Custodio$ufable :who died on 2ugust *(, %( 9 NT+$, Testimony of $elson$ufable, =earing of 2ugust %9, %((*, p. % O;, purchased saidproperty from 50 :6xh. @%@;.

?enerosa, Ailfor and 1arcelo, all surnamed $ufable "led with thelower court a complaint dated uly *), %(9) @To 2nnul Fraudulent

Transactions, to uiet Title and To Recover amages' against $elson$ufable, and wife, +ilmor $ufable and his mother 2>uilina $ufable.0lainti s pray3

B=6R6F!R6, plainti s pray this =onorable Court that after trial /udgment be rendered ordering3

:a; That the said eed of +ale :2nnex @C@; executed by theevelopment 5anD of the 0hilippines in favor of the defendants be

declared null and void as far as the three fourths :8P ; rights whichbelongs :sic; to the plainti s are concerned7

:b; That the said three fourths :8P ; rights over the above parcel in>uestion be declared as belonging to the plainti s at one fourthright to each of them7

:c; To order the defendants to pay /ointly and severally to theplainti s by way of actual and moral damages the amount of 0%&,&&&.&& and another 0),&&&.&& as 2ttorney's fees, and to paythe costs.

:d; 0lus any other amount which this Court may deem /ust ande>uitable. :p. 4, !riginal Records;

In their 2nswer, defendants contend3

. 0aragraph is denied, the truth being that the late 2ngel $ufablewas the exclusive owner of said property, that as such owner hemortgaged the same to the evelopment 5anD of the 0hilippines on1arch %), %(44, that said mortgage was foreclosed and the 50became the successful bidder at the auction sale, that ownership


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was consolidated in the name of the 50, and that defendant $elson$ufable bought said property from the 50 thereafter. uring thisperiod, the plainti s never >uestioned the transactions which werepublic, never "led any third party claim nor attempted to redeemsaid property as redemptioners, and that said eed of +ale, 2nnex@5@ to the complaint, is "ctitious, not being supported by anyconsideration7 :pp. *&-*%, id.;

The eed of +ale :2nnex @5@;, referred to by the parties is anotariEed eed of +ale, dated uly %*, %(44 :marDed as 6xhibit @=@;by virtue of which, spouses 2ngel and 2>uilina $ufable, as vendors,sold 8P portion of the sub/ect property to herein plainti s for and inconsideration of 0%,&&&.&& :6xh. @)@;. *

!n $ovember *(, %((), the Court of 2ppeals rendered /udgment,the dispositive portion 8 of which reads3

B=6R6F!R6, the appealed decision of the lower court is R6A6R+6and +6T 2+I 6. 2 new /udgment is hereby entered declaringplainti s-appellants as the rightful co-owners of the sub/ect propertyand entitled to possession of 8P southern portion thereof7 anddefendant-appellee $elson $ufable to %P portion.

$o award on damages.

$o costs.

efendants-appellees' 1otion for Reconsideration was denied forlacD of merit in the Resolution of the Court of 2ppeals dated!ctober *, %((4.

=ence, the present petition. 0etitioners raise the following groundsfor the petition3

%. =onorable Court of 2ppeals erred in considering as controlling the

probate of the #ast Bill and Testament of 6sdras $ufable, theprobate thereof not being an issue in this case7

*. The =onorable Court of 2ppeals erred in not considering the factthat the evelopment 5anD of the 0hilippines became absolute,exclusive, legal and rightful owner of the land in >uestion, fromwhom petitioner $elson $ufable ac>uired the same by purchase andthat, therefore, no award can be made in favor of private respondentunless and until the evelopment 5anD of the 0hilippines' titlethereto is "rst declared null and void by the court.

The Court of 2ppeals, in its decision, stated that the trial court failedto taDe into consideration the probated will of the late 6sdras$ufable be>ueathing the sub/ect property to all his four children. )In the present petition, petitioner present the issue of whether or notthe #ast Bill and Testament of 6sdras $ufable and its subse>uentprobate are pertinent and material to the >uestion of the right of ownership of petitioner $elson $ufable who purchased the land in>uestion from, and as ac>uired property of, the evelopment 5anDof the 0hilippines : 50, for short;. They contend that the probate of the #ast Bill Testament and of 6sdras $ufable did not determine the


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ownership of the land in >uestion as against thirdparties.%Qwphi%.n t

2s a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only topassing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity andthe compliance with the re>uisites or solemnities prescribes by law.+aid court at this stage of the proceedings is not called to rule onthe rule on the intrinsic validity or e cacy of the will. 4 The >uestionof the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the courthas declared that the will has been duly authenticated.

The records show that upon petition for probate "led by the heirs of the late 6sdras $ufable, an !rder dated 1arch 8&, %(44 was issuedby then Court of First Instance of $egros !riental, 5ranch II,admitting to probate the last will and testament executed by thedecedent. Thereafter, on une 4, %(44, the same court approvedthe +ettlement of 6state submitted by the heirs of the late 6sdras$ufable wherein they agreed @:T;hat the parcel land situated in0oblacion 1an/uyod, $egros !riental remains undivided forcommunity ownership but respecting conditions imposed therein:sic; in the will.@ 9 In paragraph 8 thereof, they stated that @theyhave no ob/ection as to the manner of disposition of their sharemade by the testator, the expenses of the proceeding and that theyhave already taDen possession of their respective shares inaccordance with the will.@ Aerily, it was the heirs of the late 6sdras$ufable who agreed among themselves on the disposition of theirshares. The probate court simply approved the agreement amongthe heirs which approval was necessary for the validity of anydisposition of the decedent's estate. (

It should liDewise be noted that the late 6sdras $ufable died on2ugust (, %(4). Bhen the entire property located at 1an/uyod wasmortgaged on 1arch %), %(44 by his son 2ngel Custodio with 50,the other heirs of 6sdras K namely3 ?enerosa, Ailfor and 1arcelo Khad already ac>uired successional rights over the said property. Thisis so because of the principle contained in 2rticle of the CivilCode to the e ect that the rights to the succession are transmittedfrom the moment of death of the decedent. 2ccordingly, for thepurpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the#ast Bill and Testament of the late 6sdras $ufable was admitted on1arch 8&, %(44 or thereafter or that the +ettlement of 6state was

approved on une 4, %(44 or months later. It is to be noted that theprobated will of the late 6sdras $ufable speci"cally referred to thesub/ect property in stating that @the land situated in the 0oblacion,1an/uyod, $egros !riental, should not be divided because this mustremain in common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers and sisters to construct a house therein.@ %& It wastherefor the will of the decedent that the sub/ect property shouldundivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty :*&;years pursuant to 2rticle 9 & %% of the Civil Code.

Thus, when 2ngel $ufable and his spouses mortgaged the sub/ectproperty to 50 on 1arch %), %(44, they had no right to mortgagethe entire property. 2ngel's right over the sub/ect property waslimited only to %P pro indiviso share. 2s co-owner of the sub/ect

property, 2ngel's right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to thatportion that may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. Bell-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can onlyalienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. %*

The Court of 2ppeals did not err in ruling that 2ngel Custodio$ufable @had no right to mortgage the sub/ect property in itsentirety. =is right to encumber said property was limited only to %P


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pro indiviso share of the property in >uestion.@ %8 2rticle (8 of theCivil Code spells out the rights or co-owners over a co-ownedproperty. 0ursuant to said 2rticle, a co-owner shall have fullownership of his part and of the fruits and bene"ts pertainingthereto. =e has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, andeven substitute another person in its en/oyment. 2s a mere partowner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. Theprohibition is premised on the elementary rule that @no one can givewhat he does not have.@ %

1oreover, respondents stipulated that they were not aware of themortgage by petitioners of the sub/ect property. %) This being thecase, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-ownedproperty when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner withoutthe former's Dnowledge and consent %4 as in the case at bar. It hasliDewise been ruled that the mortgage of the inherited property isnot binding against co-heirs who never bene"tted. %

Furthermore, the eed of +ale dated une % , %(44 marDed as6xhibit @=@ executed by spouses 2ngel and 2>uilina $ufable in favorof respondents ?enerosa, Ailfor and 1arcelo wherein the formersold, ceded and transferred bacD to the latter the 8P portion of thesub/ect property bolsters respondents' claim that there was co-ownership. 0etitioner $elson himself claimed that he was aware of the aforesaid eed of +ale. %9

2nent the second ground of the petition, petitioners allege that theevelopment 5anD of the 0hilippines ac>uired ownership of the land

in >uestion through foreclosure, purchase and consolidation of ownership. 0etitioners argue that if petitioner $elson $ufable hadnot bought said land from the 50, private respondents, in order to

ac>uire said property, must sue said banD for the recovery thereof,and in so doing, must allege grounds for the annulment of documents evidencing the banD's ownership thereof. 0etitionerscontend that since petitioner $elson $ufable simply bought thewhole land from the banD, they cannot be deprived of the ownershipof 8P without maDing any pronouncement as to the legality orillegality of the banD's ownership of said land. It is argued that therewas no evidence to warrant declaration of nullity of the banD'sac>uisition of said land7 and that neither was there a "nding by thecourt that the banD illegally ac>uired the said property.

2s adverted to above, when the sub/ect property was mortgaged by2ngel Custodio, he had no right to mortgage the entire property butonly with respect to his %P pro indiviso share as the property wassub/ect to the successional rights of the other heirs of the late6sdras. 1oreover, in case of foreclosure7 a sale would result in thetransmission of title to the buyer which is feasible only if the sellercan be in a position to convey ownership of the things sold. %( 2ndin one case, *& it was held that a foreclosure would be ine ectiveunless the mortgagor has title to the property to be foreclosed.

Therefore, as regards the remaining 8P pro indiviso share, the samewas held in trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto, *% who arethe private respondents herein.

0ursuant to 2rticle % )% of the Civil Code, when land passes bysuccession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put inthe name of another, a trust is established by implication of law forthe bene"t of the true owner. #iDewise, under 2rticle % )4 of thesame Code, if property is ac>uired through mistaDe or fraud, theperson obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of animplied trust for the bene"t of the person from whom the propertycomes. In the case of $oel vs. Court of 2ppeals, ** this Court heldthat @a buyer of a parcel of land at a public auction to satisfy a


14/86

/udgment against a widow ac>uired only one-half interest on theland corresponding to the share of the widow and the other half belonging to the heirs of her husband became impressed with aconstructive trust in behalf of said heirs.@

$either does the fact that 50 succeeded in consolidatingownership over the sub/ect property in its name terminate theexisting co-ownership. Registration of property is not a means of ac>uiring ownership. *8 Bhen the sub/ect property was sold to andconsolidated in the name of 50, it being the winning bidder in thepublic auction, 50 merely held the 8P portion in trust for theprivate respondents. Bhen petitioner $elson purchased the saidproperty, he merely stepped into the shoes of 50 and ac>uiredwhatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.

This brings us to the issue of whether or not the 50 should havebeen impleaded as party-defendant in the case at bar. 0etitionerscontend that 50 was never impleaded and that due processre>uires that 50 be impleaded so that it can defend its sale topetitioner $elson $ufable7 and that it was the duty of privaterespondents, and not of petitioner $elson, to implead the banD andasD for the annulment of documents evidencing the banD'sownership of the disputed land.

In the Re/oinder to the Reply, private respondents that the non-inclusion of 50 as a @necessary party@ was not >uestioned bypetitioners from the time the Complaint was "led until the case was@"nished.@ It was only after the adverse decision by the respondentCourt of 2ppeals that petitioners raised the issue.

2t the outset, it should be stated petitioners never raised this issuein their 2nswers and pursuant to +ection *, Rule ( of the Rules of Court, defenses and ob/ections not pleaded either in a motion todismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

$onetheless, the rule is that indispensable parties, i.e., parties ininterest without whom no "nal determination can be had of anaction, shall be /oined either as plainti s or defendants7 the inclusionas a party, i.e., persons who are not indispensable but ought to beparties if complete relief is to be accorded as between those alreadyparties, the court may, in its discretion, proceed in the actionwithout maDing such persons parties, and the /udgment renderedtherein shall be without pre/udice to the rights of such persons. *)0roper parties, therefore, have been described as parties whosepresence in necessary in order to ad/udicate the whole controversy,but whose interests are so far separable that a "nal decree can bemade in their absence without a ecting them. *4 2ny claim againsta party may be severed and proceeded with separately. *

The pivotal issue to be determined is whether 50 is anindispensable party in this case.

0rivate respondents do not >uestion the legality of the foreclosure of the mortgaged property and the subse>uent sale of the same to50. The sub/ect property was already purchased by petitioner

$elson from 50 and latter, by such sale, transferred its rights andobligations to the former. Clearly, petitioners' interest in thecontroversy is distinct and separable from the interest of 50 and a"nal determination can be had of the action despite the non-inclusion of 50 as party-defendant. =ence, 50, not being anindispensable party, did not have to be impleaded in this case.


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B=6R6F!R6, there being no reversible error in the decisionappealed from, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby

6$I6 .%Qwphi%.n t

+! !R 6R6 .

Aitug, 0anganiban and 0urisima, ., concur.

Romero, ., abroad, on o cial business leave.

G.R. No. 111682 ebr*$r3 6, 1997

ENAIDA RE ES, pet&t&o(er, %. " RT " APPEALS $(' t/ePE"PLE " T!E P!ILIPPINES, re%po('e(t%.

MEND" A, #.

R 6 + ! # < T I ! $

This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated$ovember *(, %((), of the Court, denying the petition for review of the decision, dated 1ay *9, %((8, and the resolution, dated 2ugust8&, %((8, of the Court of 2ppeals % in C2-?.R. CR. $o. &9 %&,a rming the conviction of petitioner Senaida 0. Reyes of falsi"cationof public document. 0etitioner's motion is based on her contentionthat because of her counsel's unexplained absences at the trial shewas prevented from presenting evidence in her defense andtherefore denied the due process of law.

The facts are as follows3

In an information "led on 2pril , %(94 with the Regional Trial Courtof 5ulacan and later assigned to 5ranch ** thereof as Criminal Case$o. (*)*-1, petitioner Senaida Reyes was accused of falsifying adeed of sale of four : ; parcels of land @by feigning and signing thename of 0ablo Floro, who could not a x his signature anymore dueto age in"rmity, on the said document as seller and causing it toappear that said 0ablo Floro NhadO participated in the execution of the said document when in truth and in fact, as said accused wellDnew, said deed of sale was not executed and signed by the said0ablo Floro, nor did he ever appear before any notary public for thepurpose of acDnowledging the deed above mentioned.@ *


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presentation of the defense evidence was scheduled on February 4,%(9(, which, however, was reset @for the last time@ to 1arch %&,%(9( due to petitioner's illness. 8 The hearing on 1arch %&, %(9(was, however, cancelled also because of the absence of both theprivate prosecutor and defense counsel, 2tty. 2naluE Cristal-Tenorio.

The new schedule was 2pril %*, %(9(. =owever, 2tty. Tenorio wasagain absent on 2pril %*, %(9(. 0etitioner was also absent, but herhusband appeared and submitted to the court a medical certi"catethat she was sicD. The hearing on that date was therefore postponedto 1ay % , %(9( @NfOor the last time. @ )

!n 1ay %%, %(9(, 2tty. Tenorio moved for the postponement of thehearing from 1ay % , %(9( to une ), %(9(, allegedly because shehad to leave for 1alaybalay, 5uDidnon to assist in the prosecution of her brother-in-law's Dillers. The trial court, while noting that thehearing on 1ay % , %(9( was @intransferrable in character,@nonetheless granted 2tty. Tenorio's motion and postponed thehearing to une ), %(9( over the ob/ection of the private prosecutor.0etitioner was warned that if she did not present her evidence onthat date, she would be considered to have waived her right to doso. 4 5ut the hearing on une ), %(9( had to be rescheduled againbecause petitioner's counsel, 2tty. Tenorio, was absent.

!n uly %&, %(9(, the new date of hearing, both petitioner and 2tty. Tenorio were absent, so that on motion of private prosecutor, thecourt declared petitioner to have waived the right to present herevidence. 9 Four days later :on uly % , %(9(;, petitioner gave amedical certi"cate ( stating that she was su ering fromhypertension and rheumatism which re>uired bed rest for at least )-

days. The court merely noted the medical certi"cate butmaintained its previous order, on the ground that @the same is not amotion and NasO counsel was also not in Court during the lasthearing, the !rder of the Court dated uly %&, %(9( to the e ect that

the presentation of defense evidence is considered waived, stands. @%&

0etitioner by herself moved for reconsideration, alleging that shefailed to appear in court on uly %&, %(9( because she wasindisposed and had been unable to contact 2tty. Tenorio. +he asDedfor permission to present her evidence. =er motion, however, wasdenied by the court in its order of 2ugust *(, %(9( %% in which italso scheduled the promulgation of /udgment on +eptember *(,%(9(.

!n +eptember *(, %(9(, the court rendered its decision %* "ndingpetitioner guilty of falsi"cation and sentencing her to months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to years and * months of prisioncorreccional, as maximum, and to pay a "ne of 0),&&&.&&.

0etitioner through a new counsel, 2tty. Ronolfo +. 0asamba, "led anotice of appeal. %8 !n 1ay (, %((&, petitioner by herself "led amotion in the Court of 2ppeals for extension of 8& days to "le herbrief as appellant. % 2bout the same time 2tty. 0asamba also "led amotion for an extension of ) days for the same purpose, but laterasDed to be relieved as petitioner's counsel on the ground that

despite his re>uest, petitioner did not give him the records of thecase and confer with him but instead acted as her own counsel by"ling her own motion for time to "le brief.

The Court of 2ppeals granted 2tty. 0asamba's motion and re>uiredpetitioner to submit the name and address of her new counsel withinten :%&; days from notice. 0etitioner instead "led a motion for newtrial in lieu of appellant's brief, claiming that because of the


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negligence of her counsel, she had been deprived of her right topresent evidence on her behalf in the trial court.

2fter the +olicitor ?eneral "led his comment, the Court of 2ppeals inits resolution dated anuary %), %((* denied petitioner's motion fornew trial and gave her 8& days within which to "le her appellant'sbrief. %) The appellate court held3

2ll that appellant is invoDing as ground for new trial is the policy of liberality in the application of the rules and the alleged negligence of her counsel.

2ppellant, who has, in fact, prepared the motion herself, without theassistance of counsel, is probably a member of the 5ar. If she is not,she must have gone through law school as her handiworD is writtenin forensic style and is even better than the pleadings of somelicensed advocates who are handling appealed cases or originalspecial civil actions before this Court.


18/86

termination of a criminal case is tantamount to tri ing with theadministration of /ustice that certainly can not and should not becondoned. :00 vs. 2ngco, %&8 0hil. 887 00 vs. ichoso, (4 +CR2 () ;

0etitioner "led a @very urgent motion@ for (& days from February **,%((* to secure services of counsel to "le her appellant's brief. TheCourt of 2ppeals gave petitioner %) days from February **, %((*,the last day of the extension previously granted her. The Court of 2ppeals stated that it had given petitioner notice to "le brief asearly as 1arch * , %((&, but @petitioner has been tri ing with our

/udicial processes long enough.@

!n 1arch 4, %((*, without the assistance of counsel, accused-appellant "led an appellant's brief. Thereafter the +olicitor ?eneral"led the appellee's brief to which petitioner "led a reply brief. !n1ay *9, %((8, the Court of 2ppeals rendered its decision, a rmingthe trial court's ruling. !n 2ugust 8&, %((8 it denied reconsideration.

0etitioner "led this case for review on certiorari, claiming that herconviction by the trial court was void because she was denied dueprocess, since she was denied the opportunity to present evidencein her behalf. The +olicitor ?eneral "led his comment to which

petitioner "led a reply. !n $ovember *(, %(() this Court denied thepetition for lacD of merit. =ence this motion for reconsideration.

2fter due consideration of the motion and its supplement and theseparate comments thereto by the respondents as well aspetitioner's replies and private respondent's consolidated re/oinder,the Court now resolves to grant petitioner's motion forreconsideration.

First. The issue in this case is whether the trial court properly heldpetitioner to have waived the right to present evidence because of her failure to proceed despite several postponements granted toher. To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow thepresentation of evidence of a party is a matter which lies in thediscretion of the trial court, but it is a discretion which must beexercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtainingin each case and with a view to doing substantial /ustice. %4 In thecase at bar, hearings were scheduled for die presentation of

petitioner's evidence on six di erent dates, to wit3 :%; February 4,%(9(7 :*; 1arch %&, %(9(7 :8; 2pril %*, %(9(7 : ; 1ay % , %(9(7 :); une ), %(9(7 and :4; uly %&, %(9(. 0etitioner was absent thrice, i.e.,on February 4, %(9(, 2pril %*, %(9(, and uly %&, %(9(. !n the "rstdate, petitioner could not come because she was sicD and hercounsel so informed the court. +he was absent also on une ), %(9(and uly %&, %(9( because of illness :hypertension and rheumatism;.

Thus, while petitioner's absences were explained, those of hercounsel were not. 2tty. Tenorio simply disappeared without a trace,despite warning to counsel that her failure to present evidence forher client on une ), %(9( would be considered a waiver of thelatter's right to present her evidence. 5ut counsel failed to heed thewarning. 0etitioner had to soldier on and, by herself, had to pleadwith the court for a chance to present her evidence. Contrary towhat the appellate court thought in a rming petitioner's conviction,this was not the case of a woman who treated the criminal

proceedings against her with cavalier disdain. Indeed, we do notthinD that petitioner's absences were so many, capricious, oregregious as to indubitably indicate an attempt to stall theproceedings of the criminal case as was the case in 0eople v. 2ngco% and 0eople v. ichoso. %9 0etitioner might have tried to delay the"ling of her appellant's brief, but her e ort can be attributed to anunderstandable desire to be allowed to present her evidence.=ence, the "ling of a motion for new trial. 6ven in her presentpetition before this Court petitioner's prayer is not that she be


19/86

exonerated but only that she be given the chance to prove herinnocence by being allowed to present her evidence.

Respondent 0eople and the counsel for the private respondentoppose petitioner's motion. They point out that, unliDe the cases %(which petitioner cites in support of her motion, petitioner herself was negligent. They contend that she could not have been unawareof the absences of her lawyer but despite that she did nothing toprotect her interests. 0rivate respondent argues that @if granted asecond chance to present her side, nothing will stop the petitionerfrom once again engaging the services of her erstwhile absenteecounsel. 2nyway, after another %& years of litigation, she can easilysound her reliable refrain3 'I was denied due processU I was ready topresent my evidence, but my lawyer was absent for "ve consecutivetimes'. . . .@

0rivate respondent's contention is exaggerated. !f course there is alimit to petitioner's credibility should she repeat what had happenedhere /ust for delay, not to mention that she would be taDing a bigrisD of losing her defense. 2s for the private respondent's argumentthat petitioner should have gotten another lawyer, only with thebene"t of hindsight does this course appear to be the only tenableone to taDe. 0etitioner might have thought that her counsel wouldbe more sedulous in her behalf. !r perhaps petitioner tried to getanother counsel, but failed and, left with no choice, stucD it out with2tty. Tenorio and simply hoped for the best rather than be leftwithout a counsel. In any case, the fact that on 1ay % , %(9( and

une ), %(9( petitioner was present even when counsel was absenttends to negate an intention to delay the criminal proceedings.

It was 2tty. Tenorio's absences, then, rather than petitioner's, whichappear to be the cause for the defense's failure to present itsevidence. 2tty. Tenorio's negligence did not consist in error of procedure or even a lapse in strategy but something as basic asfailing to appear in court despite clear warning that such failurewould amount to waiver of her client's right to present evidence inher defense.

Jeeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, thenegligence of counsel was certainly so gross that it should not beallowed to pre/udice petitioner's constitutional right to be heard. The

/udicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction basedsolely on the evidence of the prosecution /ust because thepresentation of the defense evidence had been barred bytechnicality. Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render /ustice where /ustice is due K to secure to everyindividual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crimewith which he or she might be

charged. *&

!nly last year, this Court set aside its decision after "nding that theright of the accused to due process had been violated. In e?uEman v. +andiganbayan, *% this Court set aside its decision

a rming petitioner's conviction by the +andiganbayan and itsresolution denying reconsideration, after being shown thatpetitioner's conviction had been brought about by his counsel'sgross ignorance of law and procedure. The Court held3

0etitioner's present dilemma is certainly not something reducible topesos and centavos. $o less than his liberty is at staDe here. 2nd he


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is /ust about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued acarelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what hasalready become an imprudent remedy, which thus forbadepetitioner from o ering his evidence all the while available forpresentation before the +andiganbayan. uity demand that petitioner be notpenaliEed for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers basedon the same principles why this Court had, on many occasionswhere it granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence ormistaDes of counsel. To cling to the general rule in this case is onlyto condone rather than rectify a serious in/ustice to petitioners

whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence tohis previous lawyers. . . .

The Court remanded the case to the +andiganbayan for receptionand appreciation of petitioner's evidence.

In another case, 0eople v. el 1undo, ** in which the accused wasconvicted of rape in six cases and sentenced to reclusion perpetuaon "ve of them and to death on the sixth, this Court ordered a newtrial after it was shown that complainant had executed prior toaccused's conviction an a davit of desistance, while an $5I medico-legal report given after such conviction found that complainant's@physical virginity preserved.@ The report belied the contrary "ndingof the city health o cer on which the trial court relied in convictingthe accused. 2lthough the $5I report did not constitute newly-discovered evidence, a new trial was nonetheless ordered @on thebroader ground of substantial /ustice NasO the rule for granting amotion for new trial, among others, should be liberally construed toassist the parties in obtaining a /ust and speedy determination of their rights. . . . Court litigations are primarily for the search fortruth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties

are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way toferret out such truth.@

Reconsideration of the resolution in this case is compelled by theseprecedents. Indeed, to deny petitioner the opportunity to presenther evidence on the merest chance that she might be innocentwould be to disregard the wisdom that it is better to ac>uit tenguilty individuals than to convict one innocent person. The Court isas aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases.2t the same time, however, it has ever been mindful of itsresponsibility as the highest tribunal of /ustice to see to it that theparamount interests of /ustice are not sacri"ced for the saDe of speed and e ciency. 2s ustice TeehanDee wrote3 *8

The Court has consistently maintained that although a speedydetermination of an action implies a speedy trial, speed is not thechief ob/ective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for theadministration of /ustice, a genuine respect for the rights of allparties and the re>uirements of procedural due process and anadherence to the Court's standing admonition that the discretiongranted /udges in the granting or denial of motions forpostponement and the setting aside of denial orders previouslyissued @should always be predicated on the consideration that morethan the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in thecase, the ends of /ustice and fairness would be served thereby@ aremore important than a race to end the trial.

+econd. In denying petitioner's plea for a chance to present herevidence, the Court of 2ppeals observed that petitioner has morethan a layman's ac>uaintance with the law, having been able toprepare and "le her own motion for new trial and appellant's brief,


21/86

to be given the bene"t of the doubt. 5ut even lawyers, who areparties in a case, need the guiding hand of counsel. +Dill in draftingpleadings :which is practically the only @lawyerly@ thing petitionerdid; is vastly di erent from sDill needed in the courtroom. 0reparingpleadings can be done at leisure with the luxury of consultation,either of booDs or of people. Trial worD, however, demands more. Itre>uires the ability to thinD fast on one's feet and the psychologist'sfeel for the witness' mood and motive. 2s then Chief ustice 1oransaid for the Court in 0eople v. =olgado3 *

6ven the most intelligent or educated man may have no sDill in thescience of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty butbecause he does not Dnow how to establish his innocence.

It is entirely probable that, forced to be her own lawyer, petitionernonetheless felt some inade>uacy and experienced some momentsof doubt whether she could go through the ordeal of presenting herevidence by her lonesome, and that could be the reason why shehesitated from doing so when she found herself without theassistance of counsel and not because petitioner tried to delay theproceedings and obstruct the course of /ustice.

In sum, it is better to allow petitioner another chance to present herevidence than to let her conviction stand based solely on theevidence of the prosecution. In accordance with Rule %*%, V4, *) theevidence of the prosecution shall be understood preserved, sub/ectto the right of the prosecution to supplement it andPor to rebut theevidence which petitioner may present.

B=6R6F!R6, the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of $ovember *(, %(() is ?R2$T6 and the decision dated 1ay *9,%((8 of the Court of 2ppeals and that of the Regional Trial Court of 5ulacan, 5ranch ** dated +eptember *(, %(9( in Criminal Case $o.(*)*-1 are +6T 2+I 6 and this case is R612$ 6 to the Regional

Trial Court of 5ulacan for a new trial for the purpose of allowingpetitioner to present evidence in her defense with directive to thecourt thereafter to decide the case with all deliberate speed.

+! !R 6R6 .

Regalado, Romero, 0uno and Torres, r., ., concur.

P"STIG" S. "R#AL

1 P/& 2:0


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G.R. No. L-157 7 ebr*$r3 28, 1962

LE"N"R ILLA L"R DA. DE ILLAN E A, plainti -appellant,vs.DEL IN N. # I ", &( /&% $p$ &t3 $% #*'& &$ A'm&(&%tr$tor o+t/e te%t$te e%t$te o+ A STA NEP"M EN", defendant-appellee.

,mado -. Sala ar for plainti /appellant.Sycip* Sala ar* Luna and ,ssociates for defendant/appellee.

RE ES, #. .L., J.:

+ub/ect to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision ofthe Court of First Instance of RiEal, in its Civil Case $o. -*9&(,dismissing plainti -appellant's complaint for the recovery of certainproperties that were originally owned by the plainti 's granduncle,$icolas Ailla or, and which he granted to his widow, oWa Fausta$epomuceno, be>ueathing to her @su uso y posesion mientras viva yno se case en segundas nupcias@.

The following facts appear of record3 !n !ctober (, %(&9, on$icolas Ailla or, a wealthy man of Castille/os, Sambales, executed awill in +panish in his own handwriting, devising and be>ueathing infavor of his wife, ona Fausta $epomuceno, one-half of all his realand personal properties, giving the other half to his brother onFausto Ailla or.

Clause 4th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows3 .

+6HT! K 6n virtud de las facultades >ue me conceden lasleyes, instituyo per mis unicos y universales herederos detodos mis derechos y acc iones a mi hermano . FaustoAilla or y a mi esposa a. Fausta $epomuceno para >uepartan todos mis bienes >ue me pertenescan, en igualespartes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando lasdonaciones y legados >ue, aba/o mi mas expontaneavoluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente3 .

+60TI1!3 K #ego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa a.Fausta $epomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, losbienes, alha/as y muebles >ue a continuacion se expresan7 .

!CT2A!3 K ue estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposaa. Fausta $epomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no

se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a serpropiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta #eonorAilla or.

The %*th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 4th andth thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore

any child with oWa Fausta $epomuceno. +aid Clause %*th reads asfollows3 .

ue tratan de institucion de herederos y loslegados >ue se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de miesposa, en el momento >ue podre tener la dicha de contrarcon hi/o y hi/os legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conformea ley seran mis herederos.

on $icolas Ailla or died on 1arch 8, %(**, without begetting anychild with his wife oWa Fausta $epomuceno. The latter, already awidow, thereupon instituted +pecial 0roceeding $o. *&8 of the Courtof First Instance of Sambales, for the settlement of her husband'sestate and in that proceeding, she was appointed /udicialadministratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted apro/ect of partition, now 6xhibit @6@. In the order of $ovember * ,%(* , now exhibit @C@, the probate court approved the pro/ect ofpartition and declared the proceeding closed. 2s the pro/ect ofpartition, 6xhibit @6@, now shows oWa Fausta $epomuceno receivedby virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a considerableamount of real and personal estate. 5y virtue also of the said pro/ectof partition, she received the use and possession of all the real andpersonal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause th of thewill. The order approving the pro/ect of partition :6xh. @C@;, however,expressly provided that approval thereof was @sin per/uicio de lodispuesto en la clausula 9.o del testamento de $icolas Ailla or.@ .


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!n 1ay %, %()4, oWa Fausta $epomuceno died without havingcontracted a second marriage, and without having begotten anychild with the deceased $icolas Ailla or. =er estate is now beingsettled in +pecial 0roceeding $o. -%)48 in the lower court, with thedefendant el"n $. uico as the duly appointed and >uali"ed /udicialadministrator.

The plainti #eonor Ailla or Ada. de Aillanueva is admitted to be thesame #eonor Ailla or mentioned by on $icolas Ailla or in his will ashis @sobrina nieta #eonor Ailla or@.

0lainti #eonor Ailla or instituted the present action against the

administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta $epomuceno, onFebruary 9, %()9, contending that upon the widow's death, saidplainti became vested with the ownership of the real and personalproperties be>ueathed by the late $icolas Ailla or to clause of hiswill, pursuant to its eight :9th; clause. efendant's position, adoptedby the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid becameabsolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of thefact that she never remarried.

Be agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of thetestator, as manifested in clause 9 of his testament, was to investhis widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the propertiesdescribed in the seventh clause, sub/ect to the further condition:admitted by the appellee; that if the widow remarried, her rightswould thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That thewidow was meant to have no more than a life interest in thoseproperties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from theexpressions used by the deceased @ uso y posesion mientras viva @:use and possession while alive; in which the "rst half of the phrase@uso y posesion @ instead of @ dominio @ or @ propiedad @; reinforces thesecond :@ mientras viva @;. The testator plainly did not give his widowthe full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right totheir possession and use :or en/oyment; during her lifetime. This isin contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she wasinstituted universal heir together with the testator's brother :clause4;. 01wph20.34t

+6HT!3 K 6n virtud de las facultades >ue me conceden lasleyes, instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos detodos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano . FaustoAilla or y a mi esposa a. Fausta $epomuceno para >ueparten todos mis bienes >ue me pertenescan, en igualespartes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando lasdonaciones y legados >ue, aba/o mi mas expontaneavoluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.

The court below, in holding that the appellant #eonor Ailla or, asreversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties be>ueathedby clause of the testament only in the event that the widow

remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression @mientrasviva,@ and considered the words @uso y posesion@ as e>uivalent to@dominio@ :ownership;. In so doing, the trial court violated 2rticle

(% of the Civil Code of the 0hilippines, as well as section )( of Rule%*8 of the Rules of Court.

2RT. (%. The words of a will are to receive an interpretationwhich will give to every expression some e ect, rather thanone which will render any of the expressions inoperative7 andof two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferredwhich will prevent intestacy.@ .

+6C. )(. #nstrument construed so as to give e ect to all provisions . K In the construction of an instrument wherethere are several provisions or particulars, such aconstruction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give e ect toall.@ .

+peculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing theconditions contained in clause of his testament should not beallowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plainwords, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent.It is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as solecondition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words @uso yposesion mientras viva@ would have been unnecessary, since thewidow could only remarry during her own lifetime.


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The Civil Code, in 2rticle (&, p. % :2rticle 4 ) of the Code of %99(;,expressly en/oins the following3 .

2RT. (&. The words of a will are to be taDen in their ordinaryand grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use themin another sense can be gathered, and that other can beascertained.@ .

Technical words in a will are to be taDen in their technicalsense, unless the context clearly indicates a contraryintention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will wasdrawn solely by the testator, and that he was unac>uainted

with such technical sense. :4 )a;

In consonance with this rule, this +upreme Court has laid thedoctrine in In re 6state of Calderon, *4 0hil., *88, that the intentionand wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,constitute the "xed law of interpretation, and all >uestions raised atthe trial, relative to its execution and ful"llment, must be settled inaccordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of thetestator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention wasotherwise. The same rule is adopted by the +upreme Court of +pain:T+. +ent. *& 1arEo %(%97 *9 1ayo %(%97 8& 2bril %(%87 %4 6nero%(%)7 *8 !ct. %(*);.

#a voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantementeexpresada al ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica,imperativa y obligatoria >ue han de obedecer y cumplir"eldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sussucesores, sin >ue esa voluntad patente, >ue no ha menesterde interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, puedasustituirse, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirsepor ningun otro criterio de alguna de los interesados, nitampoco por el /udicial. :Tribunal +upremo of +pain, +ent. *&1arch %(%9; .

The 2merican decisions invoDed by appellee in his brief inapplicable,because they involve cases where the only condition imposed on thelegatee was that she should remain a widow. 2s already shown, thetestament of on $icolas Ailla or clearly and unmistaDably provided

that his widow should have the possession and use of the legacieswhile alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by theexpress provisions of the 9th clause of his will, the legacies shouldpass to the testator's @sobrinanieta@, appellant herein, upon thewidow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime.Conse>uently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of theaforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to thereversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost dueto fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent thirdparties have intervened.

0R61I+6+ C!$+I 6R6 , the decision appealed from is reversed, and

the appellant #eonor Ailla or Ada. de AI##2$uidation, accounting and further proceedingsconformably to this decision. Costs against the 2dministrator-appellee.

$eng on* ".+.* Padilla* $autista ,ngelo* "oncepcion* $arrera*Paredes* Di on and De Leon* ++.* concur.Labrador* +.* too% no part.

A;($r G$r &$ 7 % r$ 95

Facts3

6dward +. Christensen, though born in $ew GorD, migratedto California where he resided and conse>uently was considered aCalifornia CitiEen for a period of nine years to %(%8. =e came to the0hilippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of hisdeath. =owever, during the entire period of his residence in thiscountry, he had always considered himself as a citiEen of California.


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In his will, executed on 1arch ), %()%, he instituted anacDnowledged natural daughter, 1aria #ucy Christensen as his onlyheir but left a legacy of some money in favor of =e len Christensen?arcia who, in a decision rendered by the +upreme Court had beendeclared as an acDnowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of=elen claims that under 2rt. %4 :*; of the civil code, California lawshould be applied, the matter is returned bacD to the law ofdomicile, that 0hilippine law is ultimately applicable, that the shareof =elen must be increased in view of successional rights ofillegitimate children under 0hilippine laws. !n the other hand,counsel for daughter 1aria , in as much that it is clear under 2rt, %4:*; of the 1ew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply,our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. uently atestator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolutedominion.

Issue3

Bhether 0hilippine #aw or California #aw should apply.

=eld3 The +upreme Court deciding to grant more successionalrights to =elen Christensen ?arcia said in e ect that there be tworules in California on the matter.

The con ict rule which should apply to CalifornianXs outsidethe California, and

The internal #aw which should apply to California domiciles incalifronia.

The California con ict rule, found on 2rt. ( 4 of the CaliforniaCivil code +tates that Yif there is no law to the contrary in the placewhere personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow thedecree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.Z

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of hisdomicile, the 0hilippines is ought to be followed.

Bherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case isremanded to the lower court with instructions that partitionbe made as that of the 0hilippine law provides.

G.R. No%. L-11:8 -11:8: ebr*$r3 1:, 1958

I( t/e m$tter o+ t/e Te%t$te E%t$te o+ t/e 'e e$%e' E'ARDE. !RISTENSEN, defendant-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for appellants.Leopoldo M. abellera and ,mado ,. Munda for appellee Maria5eliuen "hristensen -arcia.Pedro P. Suare and 6scar $reva for appellee $ernarda"amporedondo.

ELI?, J.


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From the records of the above-entitled cases, it appears that as of%(%8,6dward 6. Christensen, an 2merican citiEen, was alreadyresiding in avao and on the following year became the manager of1indanao 6states located in the municipality of 0adada of the sameprovince. 2t a certain time, which the lower court placed at %(% , agroup of laborers recruited from 2rgao, Cebu, arrived to worD in thesaid plantation. 2mong the group was a young girl,5ernardaCamporendondo, who became an assistant to the cooD. Thereafter,thegirl and 6dward 6. Christensen, who was also unmarried staringliving together as husband and wife and although the records failedto establishthe exact date when such relationship commenced, thelower court found the same to have been continous for over 8&years until the death of Christensen occurecd on 2pril 8&, %()8. !utof said relations, * children, #ucy and =elen Christensen, wereallegedly born.

-. R. 76. L/00898.


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be>ueath all the rest, remainder and residue of my property,one-half :%P*; to my well-beloved sister, 1rs. C2RRI6 #!Iuired during such cohabitation should begoverned by the rules on co-ownership. This opposition wasdismissed by the probate court on the ground that shehad no rightto intervene in said proceeding, for as such common-law wife shehad no successional right that might be a ected by the probate ofthewill, and liDewise, she could not be allowed to establish her titleand co-ownership over the properties therein for such >uestionsmust be ventilated in a court of general /urisdiction. In view of this

ruling of the Court and in order to attain the purpose sought by heroverruled opposition 5ernarda Camporedondo had to institute, asshe did institute Civil Case $o. %& 4 of the Court of First Instance of

avao :?.R. $o. #-%% 98; which we will consider and discusshereinafter.

In the meantime, 2dolfo CruE 2Enar was appointed specialadminsitrator of the estate after "ling a bond for 0),&&& pending theappointment of a regular one, and letters of special administritionwere correspondingly issued to him on 1ay *%, %()8.

The records further show that subse>uent to her original opposition.

=elen Christensen ?arcia "led a supplemental opposition andmotion to declare her an acDnowledged natural child of 6dward 6.Christensen, alleging that shewas conceived during the time whenher mother 5ernarda Camporendondo was living with the deceasedas his common-law wife7 that she had been in continous possessionof the status of a natural child of the deceased7 thatahe had in herfavor evidence andPor proof that 6dward Christensen was her father7and that she and #ucy had the same civil status as children of thedecedent and 5ernarda Camporedondo. This motion was opposed

/ointly by the executor and 1aria #ucy Christensen aney assertingthat before, during and after the conception and birth of =elenChristensen ?arcia, her mother was generally Dnown to be carryingrelations with 8 di erent men7 that during the lifetime of thedecedent and even years before his death, 6dward Christensenverbally as well as in writing disavowed relationship with saidoppositor7 that oppositor appropriated and used the surnameChristensen illegally and without permission from the deceased.

Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed7 that 1aria

=elen Christensen ?arcia be declared not in any way related to thedeceased7 and that the motion of said oppositor be denied.

2fter due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February *9,%()8, found that oppositor 1aria =elen Cristensen had been incontinous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased6dward Christensen notwithstanding the fact that she was disownedby him in his will, for such action must have been brought about bythe latter's disaproval of said oppositor's marriage to a man he didnot liDe. 5ut taDing into considerationthat such possession of the


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status of a natural child did not itself constitute acDnowledgmentbut may only be availed of to compel acDnowledgment, the lowerCourt directed 1aria #ucy Christensen aney toacDnowledge theoppositor as a natural child of 6dward 6. Christensen. Thewill was,however, allowed the letters testamentary conse>uently issuedto2dolfo CruE 2Enar, the executor named therein. From the portionof the decision re>uiring #ucy Christensen to acDnowledge =elen asa natural child of the testator, the former and the executorinterposed an appeal to the Court of 2ppeals :C2-?. R. $o. %8 *%-R;,but the appellate tribunal elevatedthe same to uaintances as his daughter.Family portraits, greeting cards and letters were liDewise presented

to bolster herassertion that she had always been treated by thedeceased and by #ucy herself as a member of the family.

#ucy Christensen and 2dolfo CruE 2Enar, as executor, tried torepudiate herclaim by introducing evidence to prove that on orabout the period when shewas conceived and born, her mother wascarrying an a air with another man,Sosimo +ilva, a former laborer inher 0aligue plantation. +ilva executed an a davit and even tooD thewitness stand to testify to this e ect. 2ppellants also strived to showthat the defendant's solicitations for =elen's welfare and the helpextended to her merely sprang out generosity and hammered on thefact that on several occasions, the deceased disclaimed any

relationship with her :6xh. !- aney, 6xh. - aney, 6xh. S- aney,6xh. 9-=elen;.

?oing over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appearsindubitable that on or about the period when =elen was born,5ernarda Camporendondo had established residence at herplantation at 0aligue, avao, and that although 6dward Christensenstayed in avao City to manage his merchandising business, hespent the weeDends with the former and their child #ucy in theChristensenplantation. 6ven granting that Sosimo +ilva at his stage"tted himself intothe picture, it cannot be denied that =elen'smother and the deceased weregenerally and publicly Dnown to beliving together as husband and wife. Thismust have been the reasonwhy Christensen from =elen's birth in %(8 providedfor hermaintenance7 shouldered the expenses for her education to theextentthat she was even enrolled as an intern in an exclusivecollege for girls in1anila7 tolerated or allowed her carrying thesurname @Christensen@, and ine ect gaver her the attention and

care that a father would only do to this o spring. Be should taDenote that nothing appears on record to show thatChristensen everentertained any doubt or disputed =elen's paternity. =isrepudationsof her relationship with him came about only after he and5ernardaComperodondo parted ways in 1arch, %()&, and apparently after=elentooD sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despitethat decedent's desire that she continue her studies, =elen ignoredthe same andgot married to a man for Christensen held no highesteem. Be may state at his/uncture that while it is true that hereinappellants introduced witnesses todisprove oppositor'r claim, the


29/86

lower Court that had the opportunity to observe the conduct of thewitnesses while testifying and could better gaugetheir credibilityand impartiality in the case, arrived at the conclusion that 1aria=elen Christensen had established that she had been incontinouspossessions of the status of a natural child of thedeceased. Considering the preponderant evidence on record, Be seeno reason to reverse said ruling.The testator' lastacts cannot bemade the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child ornot, for human frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a person toadopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring child oronewho displeases /ust so the weight of his authority could be felt. Intheconsideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitudeor directacts of the person against whom such action is directed orthat of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetimeif he predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or anisolated occasions but as a whole, must be taDen into account. Thepossession of such status is one of the cases that gives rise to theright, in favor of the child, of coumpulsaryrecognition. :2rt. *98, CivilCode;.

The lower Court, however, after maDing its "nding directed 1aria#ucy Christensen aney, an heir of the decedent, to recogniEeoppositor as a natural child of the deceased. This seems improper.

The Civil Code for * Dinds of acDnowledgement of a natural child3voluntary and compulsory. In the "rst instance, which may bee ected in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court ofrecord or in an authentic writing :2rt. * 9,Civil Code;, courtintervention is very nil and not altogether wanting, whereas in thesecond, /udicial pronouncement is essential, and while it is true thatthe e ect of a voluntary and a compulsory acDnowledgment onthe

right of the child so recogniEed is the same, to maintain the view ofthelower Court would eliminate the distinction between voluntaryacts and those brought about by /udicial dicta. 2nd if Be considerthat in the case, where, the presumed parent dies ahead of the childand action for compulsory recogniton is brought against the heirs ofthe deceased, as in the instant case, the situation would taDe absurdturn, for the heirs would be compelled to recogniEe such child as anatural child of the deceased without a properprovision of the law,for as it now stands, the Civil Code only re>uires a declaration by thecourt of the child's status as a natural child of the parent who, ifliving, would be compelled to recogniEe his o spring as

such.Therefore, Be hold that in cases of compulsory recognition, asin the case at bar, it would be su cient that a competent court,after taDing into account all the evidence on record, would declarethat under any of the circumstances speci"ed by 2rticle *98 of theCivil Code, a child has ac>uired the status of a natural child of thepresumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights granted it bylaw, for such declaration is by itself already a /udicial recognition ofthe paternity of the parent concerned which is her against whom theaction is directed, are bound to respect.

-.R. 7o. L/0089:

Coming now to Civil Case $o. %& 4 of the Court of First Instance ofavao, 5ernarda Camporendondo claimed in her complaint %P* ofthe properties of thedeceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of herrelations with the deceased. +he alleged as basis for action that sheand the deceased 6dward 6. Christensen had lived and cohabitatedas husband and wife, continously and openly for a period for morethan 8& years7 that within said period, plainti and the deceasedac>uired real and personal properties through their common e ortand industry7 and that in virtue of such relationship, she was a co-owner of said properties. 2s the executor refused to account foranddeliver the share allegedly belonging to her despite her repeateddemands, she prayed the court that said executor be ordered tosubmit an inventory and render an accounting of the entire estate of the deceased7to divide the same into * e>ual parts and declare thatone of them lawfully belonged to plainti 7 and for such other reliefsas may be deemed /ust and e>uitable in the premises. In his answer,the executor denied the avermentsof the complaint, contending thatthe decedent was the sole owner of the properties left by him as

they were ac>uired through his own e orts7 thatplainti had neverbeen a co-owner of any property ac>uired or possessed by the late6dward christensen during his lifetime7 that the personalrelationship between plainti and the deceased was purelyclandestinebecause the former habitually lived in her plantation at0aligue, avao, from the time she ac>uired the same in %(*97 thatshe also maintained relations with * other men7 and that the claimof plainti would violate the provisions of 2rticle **)8 of the CivilCode as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of the deceasedwould be impaired. efendant thus prayed for the dismissal of the


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complaint and as counterclaim demanded the sum of0 &.&&&.&&representing actual, moral and exemplary damages.

ue hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties adsubmitted theirrespective memoranda, the lower Court on 2ugust*), %() , rendered /udgment"nding that the deceased 6dwardChristensen and 5ernarda Camporendondo,not otherwise su eringfrom any impediment to contract marriage, lived together ashusband and wife without marital ties continously for over 8&yearsuntil the former's death in %()87 that out of such relations *childrenwere born7 and that the properties in controversy wereac>uired by either orboth of them through their worD or industry.

Relying on +ection % of theCivil Code which said court consideredto have created another mode ofac>uiring ownership, plainti washeld to be entitled to one-half of saidproperties as co-owner thereofin view of her relationship with the deceasedand ordered theexecutor to account for and deliver the same by her. Fromthisdecision, defendant 2Enar, as 6xecutor of the will, perfected anappealto the Court of 2ppeals, but as the property involved in thelitigation exceeds 0)&,&&&.&& said tribunal elevated the case to uestion left for ourdetermination is whether 5ernarda Camporedondo, byreason ofsuch relationship, may be considered as a co-owner of theproperties ac>uired by the deceased during said period and thusentitledto one-half thereof after the latter's death.

0resumably taDing /udicial notice of the existence in our society of acertain Dind of relationship brought about by couples living togetheras husbands and wives without the bene"t of marriage, ac>uiring

and bringingproperties unto said union, and probably realiEing thatwhile same may not beacceptable from the moral point of view theyare as much entitled to theprotection of the laws as any otherproperty owners, the lawmaDersincorporated 2rticle % in Republic2ct $o. 894 :Civil Code of the 0hilippines; to govern their propertyrelations. +aid article read as follows3

2RT. %% . Bhen a man and a woman live together ashusband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriageis void from the beginning, the property ac>uired by either orboth of them through their worD or industry or their wagesand salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership.

It must be noted that such form of co-ownership re>uires that theman and the woman thus living together must not in any way beincapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties realiEedduring their cohabitation be ac>uired through the worD, industry,employment or occupation of both or either of them. 2nd the samething may be said of whose marriages are by provision of lawdeclared void ab intio. Bhile it is true that these re>uisites are fullymet and satis"ed in the case at bar, Be must remember that thedeceased and herein appellee were already estranged as of 1arch,%()&. There being no provision of law governing the cessation ofsuch informal civil partnership, if ever existed, same may beconsidered terminated upon their separation or desistance tocontinue said relations.The +panish Civil Code which was thenenforce contains to counterpart of 2rticle % and as the records inthe instant case failed to show show thata subse>uent reconciliation


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ever tooD place and considering that Republic 2ct$o. 894 whichrecogniEeed such form of co-ownership went into operation onlyon2ugust 8&, %()&, evidently, this later enactment cannot be invoDedas basis for appellee's claim.

In determining the >uestion poised by this action Be may looD uponthe /urisprudence then obtaining on the matter. 2s early as %(*),this Court already declared that where a man and a woman, notsu ering from any impediment to contract marriage, live togetheras husband and wife, an informal civil partnership exists and madethe pronouncement that each of them has an intereat in theproperties ac>uired during said union and is entitled to participate

therein if said properties were the product oftheir +6#7< e orts :1arata vs. ionio ?.R. $o. * (, ec. 8%, %(*);. In another case,this Court similarly held that although there is no technical maritalpartnership between person living maritally without being lawfullymarried, nevertheless there is between them an informalcivilpartnership, and the parties would be entitled to an e;ual interestwhere the property is ac;uired through their +6#7< e orts :#esacavs. FelixAda. de #esaca, (% 0hil., %8);.

2ppellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were theproduct of their /oint industry apparently in her desire to tread onthe doctrine laiddown in the aforementioned cases, would lead uisition of thesame. 5ut such assertionappears incredible if Be consider that she wasobserved by the trialCourt as an illiterate woman who cannot even remembersimplethings as the date when she arrived at the 1indanao 6state, whenshecommenced relationship with the deceased, not even her

approximate age orthat of her children. 2nd considering that asidefrom her own declaration, which Be "nd to be highly improbable,there appears no evidence to proveher alleged contribution orparticipation in the ac>uisition of the properties involved therein,and that in view of the holding of this Courtthat for a claim to one-half of such property to be allowed it must be provedthat the samewas ac>uired through their /oint e orts and labor :Floresvs.Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, \ )& ! . ?aE. %&*(;, Be haveno recoursebut reverse the holding of the lower Court and deny theclaim of 5ernardaCampredondo. Be may further state that even

granting, for the saDe ofargument, that this case falls under theprovisions of 2rticle % of theCivil Code, same would be applicableonly as far as properties ac>uiredafter the e ectivity of Republic 2ct894 are concerned and to no other, forsuch law cannot be givenretroactive e ect to govern those already possessedbefore 2ugust8&, %()&. It may be argued, however, that being a newly createdright, the provisions of +ection % should be made to retroact ifonly toenforce such right. 2rticle **)* of the same Code is explicit inthisrespect when it states3

+6C. **)*. Changes made and new provisions and rules laiddown by this Code which may pre/udice or impair vested or

ac>uired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shallhave ro retroactive e ect.

xxx xxx xxx.

2s it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of thecompulsory heirsof the deceased 6dward Christensen would beimpaired or diminished if the claim of herein appellee wouldsucceed, the answer to such argument wouldbe simply obvious.

Bith regard to appellant 2Enar's contention that the lower Courterred in admitting the testimony of appellee 5ernardaCamporedondo dealing with facts that transpired before the death of 6dward Christensen on the ground that it is prohibited by +ection*4-:c;, Rule %*8 of the Rules of Court. Be deem it unnecessary todelve on the same because even admitting that the court a ;uo committed the error assigned, yet it will not a ect anymore theoutcome of the case in view of the conclusion Be have alreadyarrived at on the main issue.

!n the strength of the foregoing considerations, Be a rm thedecisi

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