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EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy Directorate B - Policy Unit B.2 Evaluation and European Semester

Contact: Marielle Riché E-mail: REGIO-EVAL@ec.europa.eu

European Commission B-1049 Brussels

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4

This report is part of a study carried out by a Team selected by the Evaluation Unit, DG Regional and Urban Policy, European Commission, through a call for tenders by open procedure No 2014CE16BAT002. The consortium selected comprises CSIL – Centre for Industrial Studies (lead partner, Italy), CSES – Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (UK) and ZEW – Centre for European Economic Research (Germany). Subcontracting companies are: CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research (Poland), INFYDE – Informatión y Desarrollo S.L. (Spain), Visionary Analytics (Lithuania) and WIFO – ÖsterreichischesInstitutfürWirtschaftsforschung (Austria). The Core Team comprises: Scientific Director: Massimo Florio, CSIL and University of Milan; Project Manager: Julie Pellegrin, CSIL; Advisory Committee: Brad Graeme Philip Astbury (University of Melbourne), Harvey

Armstrong (University of Sheffield), David Audretsch (Indiana University), Mateja Dermastia (Anteja ECG) and Robert Picciotto (Kings College)

Senior experts: Laura Delponte (CSIL), Georg Licht (ZEW), James Rampton (CSES) and Davide Sartori (CSIL)

Task managers: Silvia Vignetti (CSIL), Mike Coye (CSES), Emanuela Sirtori (CSIL), Mark Whittle (CSES), Julie Pellegrin (CSIL)

Statistical Experts: Donatella Cheri (CSIL), Stefania Pelizzari (CSIL) and Silvia Salini (CSIL and University of Milan)

Junior Experts: Johannes Bersch (ZEW) and Chiara Pancotti (CSIL) Quality manager: Paola Govoni (CSIL). A network of Country Experts provides the geographical coverage for the field analysis. The author of this report is Julie Pellegrin, with research assistance from Chiara Pancotti. The author is grateful to all the programme managers, stakeholders and beneficiaries who provided data, information and opinions during field work. The authors are grateful for the very helpful insights from the EC staff and particularly to Veronica Gaffey, Marielle Riché and other members of the Steering Group. They also express their gratitude to all stakeholders who agreed to respond to the team’s questions and contributed to the realisation of the case study. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors or omissions. Quotation is authorised as long as the source is acknowledged along with the fact that the results are provisional.

5

Table of Contents

1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................. 7 

1.1  Objective and methodology ....................................................................... 7 1.2  Regional context and policy framework ........................................................ 7 1.3  Programme intervention logic and implementation ........................................ 7 1.4  Key findings ............................................................................................ 8 1.5  Conclusions and lessons learned ................................................................. 9 

2  CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND ..................................................................... 10 

2.1  Socio economic context ........................................................................... 10 2.2  R&D basis and innovation potential ........................................................... 12 2.3  Regional industrial fabric and SMEs ........................................................... 13 2.4  Policy Framework ................................................................................... 15 

3  ERDF STRATEGY ON SMES .......................................................................... 18 

3.1  Intervention logic ................................................................................... 18 3.2  Policy Instruments: objectives and priorities .............................................. 21 3.3  Implementation and reprogramming ......................................................... 25 

4  EVIDENCE ON ACHIEVEMENTS ................................................................... 29 

4.1  Measuring achievements ......................................................................... 29 4.2  Policy instruments performance ................................................................ 31 4.3  Characteristics of the assisted SMEs .......................................................... 34 4.4  Mechanisms and conditions for behavioural changes .................................... 35 

5  MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................... 38 

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 40 

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ................................................................................... 42 

6

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR Annual Implementation Report ERDF European Regional development Fund ESF European Social Fund EU28 European Union 28 GDP Gross Domestic Product GVA Gross Value Added ICT Information and Communication Technology MA Managing Authority OP Operational Programme R&D Research and Development RDI Research development and Innovation SMEs Small Medium Enterprises PUI Projet Urbain Intégré DIRECCTE Direction régionale des entreprises de la concurrence, de la consommation du travail

et de l’emploi DRRT Délégation Régionale à la Recherche et à la Technologie FRCI Fonds Régional de Co-Investissement Fonds GFP Fonds de Garantie Fonds Propres CIR Crédit Impôt Recherche FTE Full Time Equivalent FCPI Fonds Communs de Placement dans l’innovation CPER Contrat de Projets Etat Région SRI Stratégie Régionale d’Innovation

7

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1. Objective and methodology

The objective of the present study is to perform an ex post evaluation of the measures implemented by the Operational Programme ERDF Île-de-France 2007-2013 addressed to SMEs. The scope of the analysis is the policy instruments targeted at SMEs aiming to support either innovation or growth – or a combination of the two.

The methodology focuses firstly on the intervention logic underlying the strategy of the Operational Programme (OP), and secondly, on the main achievements obtained as well as on an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms and conditions facilitating or hampering them.

The evidence basis includes hard data and information from strategic and programming documents, project implementation reporting, statistical data, indicators from the monitoring system and other literature, complemented by a number of face-to-face interviews with programme managers, beneficiaries, stakeholders and individual experts.

1.2. Regional context and policy framework

Île-de-France is characterised by its abnormal economic weight: it accounts for 29% of the French GDP, 19% of the French population, and 22% of employment. It is also one of the greatest wealth-producing regions with the highest GDP per capita in Europe. With a high concentration of large research centres, independent laboratories and universities, Île-de-France is among the regions in Europe with the strongest research basis: Research and Development (R&D) represents 3.2% of the regional GDP (1% coming from public research and 2.2% from private research).

Among weaknesses, the region is characterized by intra-regional disparities with areas recording higher unemployment, lower income, and negative trends, which don’t show signs of catching up. Also, many indicators illustrate a slow-down of the dynamism that used to characterize the region. In particular, R&D growth has increased much less than the national average of the past years, which suggests an erosion of the region’s strength in this area. This is furthered by a specific difficulty in nurturing spin offs from academic research (compared to Germany and the US for example). In general, SMEs in Île-de-France innovate less than in other French regions.

The policy framework in support to SMEs is dense and complex. Different types of subsidies support research projects to which SMEs can in principle contribute. Also a network of incubators is active. Since 2005, Competitiveness clusters were established throughout France, of which 11 in Île-de-France that contribute to structure their corresponding sectors or “ecosystem”. Also, in 2010, six “filières” were defined as priority for regional policy (aircraft construction, automotive, eco-industries, industries and health technologies, creative industries, information and communication technology).

1.3. Programme intervention logic and implementation

The OP Île-de-France 2007-2013 had an overall envelope of EUR 314 million of which EUR 152 million of ERDF. ERDF support to SMEs amounts to EUR 60 million i.e. 42% of the total ERDF budget.

The OP established a clear division of labour between the two main axes, dedicated respectively to territorial cohesion, with the promotion of innovation as one of the tool to achieve such objective within 10 “Integrated Urban Projects” and to SMEs innovation and development mostly addressed to innovative SMEs in six filières designed as a priority. The second main characteristic of the intervention logic is its demand-driven character. It was deliberately chosen not to concentrate funding as the best way to deal with the complexity of regional innovation system. Rather than focusing on specific phases of the SME development and innovation process (as is often occurring in practice and called for in the literature), Axis II made available a set of policy instruments covering different types of innovation and different stages of the SME development cycle through different modes of delivery. The allocation was then made on a first-come first-served basis.

8

Another distinguishing trait of the OP intervention logic was its intent to promote indirect forms of support following the precept according to which intermediaries are more knowledgeable and best equipped to deal with SMEs needs, but also to alleviate SMEs from the burden associated with ERDF management.

Given its restricted envelope, the OP drew much of its raison d’être from its complementarity with measures and arrangements already at work in the policy framework. In this respect, rather than making a choice between the two possible modalities of interaction with the existing arrangements, the two modes were combined: at least one instrument filled a gap in the regional support systems and was newly established while others completed the budget envelope of policy instruments already in place.

Some reallocation took place away from Axis I to Axis II, but by definition, there was no formal reprograming between instruments, only a gradual evolution with some measures attracting more funding than others. Among instruments attracting more funding, are a grant financing collaborative research projects (30% of total funding dedicated to SMEs by the OP), and the so-called “collective actions” i.e., a financial envelope granted to an intermediary structure (in general a Competitiveness cluster), which then organise targeted support addressed to their SME members under the form of business services (approximately 20% of total ERDF dedicated to SMEs). Instruments supporting SMEs in distressed areas (Axis I) represented about 15% of total funds allocated to SMEs by the OP. Two financial instruments received 10% of total SME allocation. Finally, two instruments (a small grant complementing a loan available for individual research projects, and an instrument supporting incubators) encountered implementation difficulties or did not attract much interest.

1.4. Key findings

Evidence from the monitoring system provides a partial basis on which to ground the assessment of the OP achievements. Among weaknesses characterising the monitoring system are the facts that it hardly accounts for the SMEs beneficiary of indirect instruments (collective actions in particular), and that indicators in terms of jobs or enterprises creation rely on beneficiary’s declaration with no further check.

Overall, around 200 SMEs received direct support under the form of a grant or capital investment, while an estimate of 4000 SMEs would have taken advantage of indirect support: approximately 3000 participated to business fairs and events while around 1000 took advantage of business services to enterprises in the context of collective actions. In general, beneficiary SMEs are innovative SMEs in high tech or high growth sectors (the “filières”).

The instrument that attracted the largest share of funding, the grant to collaborative research projects, was also the one that clearly palliated a deficiency in the regional support structure (geared to research projects of larger magnitude not always adapted to SMEs needs) and one characterised by high ERDF intervention rate (slightly less than 50%).

On the contrary, instruments with lower endowment experienced sometimes dire implementation difficulties as is the case of the grant to individual research projects. Support to incubators, although particularly appropriate given the challenges at stake in the regional context and the reduced budgets from other sources, failed to enhance technology transfer (contrary to expectations, the instrument mostly targeted generalist incubators without links to public research). As to technological platforms, they correspond to research projects at a rather upstream stage and, although they are expected to have important implications for the economy, no evidence is available to document these at the present stage. Also, SME interventions under Axis I represented a marginal contribution which fell somewhat short of the expectations placed on innovation as a means to foster territorial cohesion. This confirms how difficult in practice it is to reconcile the trade-off identified in the literature between cohesion and competitiveness objectives.

9

Two financial instruments reached their objectives and one shows further prospects of development but it is unsure how decisive this will be for the venture capital market in Île-de-France.

Finally, preliminary and partial evidence on instruments resorting to intermediary bodies, collective actions and the Integrated Urban Projects suggests that differing performance have been recorded, depending on the organism or authority in charge of managing the support (respectively Competitiveness clusters and local public authorities in distressed areas).

1.5. Conclusions and lessons learned

The modest evidence of positive achievements recorded by the policy instruments dedicated to SMEs needs to be placed in the context of the limited budget available. It is indeed legitimate to ask whether some dilution of effects did not in fact take place. The hypothesis is that the OP could have been more effective if it had made stronger strategic choices and concentrated resources either on territorial cohesion objective or on the valorisation of the research potential. Instead, pursuing different objectives through different possible means probably resulted in a waste of resources.

This was possibly exacerbated by the choice to resort to a demand-driven approach. As a result of it, it is in fact the instruments promoted by authorities best prepared to deal with the peculiarity of ERDF management which attracted the largest shares of funding. This did not guarantee per se that those policy instruments were also the most pertinent ones with respect to the challenges at stake in the regional economy.

Other lessons are as follows:

Whether the ERDF measures were reinforcing existing arrangements or palliating deficiency in the regional support structure did not determine how successful an instrument was. In line with the literature, what was decisive, were contextual elements, i.e., in this case, the respective critical size of the support granted. ERDF contribution needs to reach a certain threshold beyond which advantages take over inconvenient arising from complex requirements.

There is no strong evidence that instruments were more successful depending on the stage of the innovation process targeted. Well targeted support to the upstream phases of the research process can have potential important indirect effects on the economic fabrics provided it takes place in a context characterised by strong interactions between research organisations and enterprises (an “ecosystem”).

Entrusting an intermediary to manage a financial envelop to support SMEs paid off when the said intermediary had relevant management capacity. Another important success factor is when SMEs are embedded within an ecosystem which the intermediary is well acquainted with (like Competitiveness clusters, for example).

SMEs absorption capacity under the form of financial and managerial capacity, as well as SMEs embeddedness into a well organised innovation “ecosystem” was an important factor determining whether policy instruments could trigger lasting behavioural changes within SMEs.

In sum, in explaining the overall performance of the instruments reviewed, the intrinsic advantage and inconvenient of instruments come second to the capacity of the authority in charge of their implementation, and the very conditions of such implementation. This shows how the programming process was more concerned with implementation issues rather than moved by an overall strategic design.

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Figure 5. Île-de-France: GDP and Unemployment rate

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That said, marked difference across departments were observable in the capacity of business to face the economic crisis. For instance, while Seine-Saint-Denis recorded a steep fall in business failures for the 1st quarter of 2009 compared with the same quarter in 2008 (-10%), Paris and Val-de-Marne stagnated and Yvelines posted a sharp increase (+55%).

Figure 6. Business failures (% change between 1st quarter of 2009 and 2008)

Source: INSEE Department-level business failures data - For all economic activities.

2.2. R&D basis and innovation potential

Île-de-France is the most important French region for Research and Development activity (R&D) With a high concentration of large research centres, independent laboratories and universities2, a share of R&D spending relative to GDP above 150% of the European average3, a graduation rate and an employment rate in the medium-high technology sector (8.8%) well above the EU average, Île-de-France is among the regions with the strongest innovation potential not only in France but also in Europe.

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15

London and Oxford or Cambridge regions and between 1 and 1,5% in the San Francisco Bay – see Technopolis, 2014b).

the low propensity of medium enterprises in collaborating with other firms, which characterises SME between 50 and 250 employees compared to their counterparts in the rest of France (INSEE, 2010).

the lower recourse to business services and counsel characterising regional SMEs (INSEE, 2010).

There is also a regional difficulty concerning the most innovative SMEs that are (potential) spin offs of academic research. Île-de-France indeed suffers from a particularly low rate of such spin offs: out of 10 000 researchers, 12 create a start-up, compared to 62 and 100, respectively in Germany and the USA.5

Overall, SMEs suffer from a relative isolation: they have loose links with larger enterprises, they do little network among themselves and with research organisation, and they make little recourse to external advices. As a result, they neglect the different factors that might enhance their level of innovativeness. According to the Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2014 / 2015, Île-de-France is ranked as “innovation leader” with an innovation performance well above EU average, but the region is lagging behind in terms of technological innovation.

Figure 11. Innovation performance of Île-de-France, 2007 and 2014

Source: Authors elaboration on RIS data

Thus, Île-de-France is an economically powerful region with a high contribution to the national GDP and a significant resource endowment. Notwithstanding, in the past years there were some signs showing the regional potential was not fully exploited, especially as far as innovation capacity of firms is concerned.

2.4. Policy Framework

Regional development and innovation policy is traditionally designed and implemented in close collaboration between the Regional council and the regional State administration (Prefecture) and is articulated in programming documents such as the State-Region Projects Framework (Contrat de Projets Etat Région, CPER), or the Regional Strategy of Economic Development and Innovation (SRDEI). In 2010, the Prefecture in agreement with the Regional council developed a “regional innovation strategy” to optimise the implementation of the regional, national and European funds dedicated to research and development, innovation and business support. Three strategic axes were defined underlying the regional innovation strategy for economic development and innovation. First, ease technological transfer and start-up creation; second, make Île-de-France a place where experimenting open innovation policies; third, encourage innovation around

5 Conseil Régional (2010) Stratégie Régionale d’Innovation.

0.00

0.20

0.40

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house

InnovativeSMEs

collaboratingwithothers

2014

Île de France

France

EU‐28

16

three thematic areas, i.e. health, mobility and transport, and environment and energy efficiency. In the frame of this strategy, a number of initiatives were implemented.

There is a number of national initiatives which are implemented at regional level or which have an important regional reach. Examples are the R&D tax break (Crédit Impot recherche CIR) is one widely used measure used by companies in Île-de-France – and in particular SMEs to support private R&D6 or a popular measure supporting the integration of young researchers into companies (CIFRE).

Also, since 2005, in line with the new national industrial policy, Competitiveness clusters (“Pôles de compétitivité”) have been created and promoted. They are conceived as clusters bringing together large and small firms, research laboratories and educational establishments, all working together to develop synergies and cooperative efforts. There are 71 Competitiveness clusters in France of which 11 in Île-de-France (see Table below).

Table 1. Competitiveness clusters

Name Field of competence Total members (2011)

SMEs (2011)

Funded projects since the cluster was

founded* Advancity Engineering / Services 175 143 68 ASTech Aerospace / Space 162 124 48 Cap Digital ICT 578 523 247 Cosmetic Valley Consumer goods 215 150 32 Elastopole Materials Chemistry 63 46 9 Finance Innovation Engineering / Services 202 136 27 Medicen Biotechnology/ Health 150 131 110 Mov'eo Transport 238 165 109 Novalog Engineering / Services 62 41 24 Systematic ICT 561 432 257 Vitagora Agriculture/Agribusiness 114 64 119 Source: http://competitivite.gouv.fr/identifier-un-pole/annuaire-des-poles-20.html. Only the projects funded by FUI, Bpifrance Finance and the National Research Agency are included in this table.

The development of poles of competitiveness is backed through different means at national and regional level: 1) calls for projects launched by the Inter-ministerial Unique Fund (FUI) and under the “Invest for the Future Programme” resulting in financial assistance for the best nation-wide collaborative public-private R&D projects; 2) granting loans to member SMEs that wish to embark on the industrialisation and marketing of the results of a collaborative R&D project; 3) helping cluster member firms find international partners and set up technological partnerships with them focused on value creation; 4) supporting the clusters' governance structures; 5) involving in the cluster policy management partners such as the French National Research Agency (ANR), Public investment bank (Bpifrance), the Environment Agency and the energy conservation (ADEME), the Deposits and Consignments Fund (CDC) and Ubifrance.

More recently, regional authorities promoted the so-called “Plans filières”. (value chains) around regional key industries. Thus, six filières were selected: aeronautic and spatial industries, automotive industry, eco-industries, life science, creative industries, software and complex systems. These sectors correspond to the fields also supported by the eleven Competitiveness clusters of Île-de-France and the sectors covered by the "Plans Filière" co-financed by the State, the Regional council and Europe. Strategic Committees of Regional Industry have been set-up bringing together all the actors involved in each flière: large companies, SMEs, European Institute of Innovation & Technology, education stakeholders and training, territories, social and institutional partners.

6 CIR reduced by 30% the cost of R&D by enterprise in 2009 (58% for SMEs below 50 employees). CIR in Île-de-France represented around 2/3 of the CIR nation-wide.

17

The regional innovation system relies on a large number of technology transfer structures and incubators. Among the former are “Institut Carnot” (19 in Île-de-France out of a total of 34), specific infrastructures, common research structures, Technological Diffusion Units (CDT), Technological Resources Centre (CRT), Technological Plarforms (PFT), Associations for the Acceleration of technological transfers (SATT), etc. Also, different categories of incubators (public and private) aim at channelling technology transfer and promoting start-ups. In 1999, in order to encourage the creation of innovative technology companies that could enhance the research potential of public laboratories, the Ministry for Research and Technology and the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry launched a call for projects supporting incubation and seed capital for technology companies (“Incubateurs Allègre”). Since then, Île-de-France has set up a number of business incubators: there are currently three incubators supported by the Ministry for higher education and research, ten linked to training and / or research organisations, two Great Places for Integrated Innovation, and other three incubators.

Overall, the SME support structure in Île-de-France is dense and complex at time. Simplification, accessibility and visibility are different aspects that are in need of improvement.

18

3. ERDF STRATEGY ON SMES

The OP Île-de-France 2007-2013 had an overall envelope of EUR 314 million of which EUR 152 million of ERDF. ERDF support to SMEs under the WP2 codes of expenditure7 amounts to EUR 60 million i.e. 42% of the total ERDF budget. Placed in the regional context described above, this budget appears to be limited, representing 0,05% of the regional GDP). This figures compares to the annual regional budget dedicated to research and innovation which amounts to EUR 89 million in 20128 - and to which should be added national resources available regionally. Bearing this specificity in mind, the present section aims to account for the intervention logic underpinning the mix of policy instruments selected to address SMEs and present preliminary evidence on their implementation.

3.1. Intervention logic

The ERDF strategy was entirely developed by the Prefecture, which also ensured most of its implementation. One specificity of the Île-de-France OP 2007-13 is that the Regional council was not in charge of any global grant as was often the case in other French regions; however, it was involved in different measures targeting SMEs (as detailed further in this section)9.

The intervention logic underpinning the OP can be inferred from the usual programming documents (OP and implementing document or “domo”) complemented with targeted interviews with policy makers (see Annex). It is also interesting to refer to the “Regional Innovation Strategy” developed in 2010 – actually as a part of the OP – which gave a posteriori an updated rationale for the whole OP. A few fundamental features characterise the latter: the concern for both competitiveness and territorial cohesion, a demand-driven allocation and the promotion of indirect instruments along more traditional forms of direct support.

3.1.1. Territorial cohesion and innovation: Axes I and II

The 2007-13 Operational Programme occupies a truly intermediate position between the previous and next programming periods. The focus in 2000-06 was on territorial cohesion: a very small budgetary envelope and rather constraining requirements in terms of localisation (“zonage”) made difficult the implementation of the programme. The 2014-2020 OP instead deliberately places the emphasis on enterprises competitiveness and innovation. In between, the 2007-13 OP tries to combine these two concerns by keeping a territorial logic but bringing in an enterprise perspective with a focus on innovation and competitiveness. As justified in the OP, and later in the Regional Innovation Strategy established in 2010, it has the ambition to combine the two objectives using innovation as an instrument to promote territorial cohesion. The rationale is that the areas characterised by research excellence and urban zones in difficulty are not geographically distant and are even sometimes enmeshed. The objective is thus to make the most of this “paradox” characterising Île-de-France and exploit the proximity of the concerned areas by hanging distressed area to nearby poles of excellence structured around public research laboratories. As such, the intervention logic of the OP takes root in the stream of literature highlighting proximity and clustering process as privileged factors of regional development (Prager and Thisse, 2010). In this process, Competitiveness clusters are indeed expected to play an important role by federating the different relevant stakeholders (enterprises and research organisations mainly). Thus, although it does not explicitly acknowledges it, the OP intends to

7 See the First Intermediate Report. 8 See http://www.arf.asso.fr/observatoire-des-politiques-regionales/observatoire-des-politiques-regionales-en-ile-de-france/innovation-en-ile-de-france 9 The Regional council will take over all responsibility in 2014-2020.

19

overcome what is traditionally thought to be a dilemma between cohesion and competitiveness.10

The OP interventions in favour of SME is thus structured around two main axes, which absorb more than 80% of the OP on a broadly equal footing:

Axis I “Integrated Urban Projects” (approximately EUR 124 million) adopts a clear territorial perspective through the development of ten Integrated Urban Projects (PUI) in distressed area. Each PUI is supposed to pursue a set of objectives, of which the most important relates to “Support innovation, entrepreneurship and the knowledge economy” (Objective 1). In addition, the PUI have some specific pertinence with respect to the “filières” (see below).

Axis II “Innovation and economic fabrics” (approximately EUR 129 million) focuses on SMEs innovation and development in six the six “filières” deemed to be strategic for the region’s development (see section 2.3). It also includes some territorial considerations with some specific requirements in terms of localisation of the beneficiaries in some measures but definitely less constraining than in the preceding programming period.

Table 2. The 10 Integrated Urban Projects under Axis I

PUI Department ERDF (‘000 Euro)

ESF (‘000 Euro)

Pays de Meaux Seine et Marne 4297 50 Seine Aval Yvelines 10567 4000 Lacs de l’Essonne Essonne 3808 1200 Seine Essonne Essonne 5797 1200 Plaine Commune Seine Saint Denis 10150 1500 Clichy Montfermeil Seine Saint Denis 5657 2000 Territoire de l’Ourcq Seine Saint Denis 5297 500 Seine Amont Développement Val de Marne 5638 1200 Val de France Val d’Oise 6303 2800 Argenteuil Bezons Val d’Oise 4297 800 Source: Annual Implementation Report 2013

3.1.2. Demand driven and flexible allocation

A marked peculiarity of the OP Île-de-France 2007-13 is its deliberate intention not to set priorities or concentrate funding. Indeed, besides the objectives of territorial cohesion and SME innovation and development pursued respectively under Axes I and II, the OP proposes a menu of specific forms of actions or instruments under Axis II, but does not provide further indications in terms of budget as no initial allocation were made below axes, at measure level. There was an initial consensus not to concentrate funding. This might appear to be relatively paradoxical with respect to the other peculiarity of the OP, i.e., its overall small budget, but it was considered to be an appropriate way to deal with the complexity characterising the regional setting. To keep choices open, the allocation was “demand-driven” and took place on a first come first placed basis.

3.1.3. The internal coherence of the policy mix

In Axis II, the OP had to deal with a series of challenges in the regional economic context ascribable to the relative isolation of SMEs considered to be insufficiently connected to the research basis – as illustrated for example by the low rate of start-up and spinoffs (see sections 2.1 and 2.2 above). Its main objectives is thus to make the most of the innovation potential that the research of excellence carried out in public labs in the region

10 See for example, Morgan and Nauwelaers (1999). This contradiction is overcome with the formal recognition of territorial cohesion as an explicit objective pursued by the EU (Lisbon Treaty 2007) and the development of a “place-based” approach to Cohesion Policy (Barca 2009).

20

with world-wide reputation represents. To do so, it places the emphasis on the promotion of collaborative networks bringing together research labs and SMEs, it tries to foster entrepreneurial initiatives of researchers and academics, and vice versa to incite SMEs to engage into research activities.

Different types of policy instruments are mobilized: To promote the creation of SMEs To consolidate (high growth / innovative) SMEs development to shape the environment in which SMEs operate To strengthen SMEs capacity To promote R&D by SMEs.

Even if this is not an explicit intention of the OP, instruments are mobilized along a continuum in SME development phases from their creation to their development and innovation activities. Similarly, the OP in principle addresses the different forms of innovation (technological, non-technological, social innovation, etc) and covers the different phases of the innovation process (from research activity upstream to more downstream and close to market phases). In other words, it does not make discriminating choices and rather tries to cover as many facets of the factors underlying SMEs development and innovation.11

One assumption underlying the selected policy mix is the attempt to put forward indirect measures contributing to shape a favourable environment or to strengthen SME capacities. This reflects a certain reluctance for direct support exposing SMEs directly to the ERDF and a preference for resorting to intermediaries. Possible advantages are an overall better knowledge of SMEs real need and a consequent adaptation of the interventions.12 It is also possibly a way to deal with the reduced size of the available budget and to maximise public intervention. The recourse to financial instruments should be seen in the same vein: an innovative solution to bring security to SMEs while avoiding the drawbacks of direct aid (it was also a response to what was perceived as an encouragement by the EC).

3.1.4. The external coherence of the policy mix: two paths to complementarity

Given the small overall envelope available to the OP – it is particularly appropriate to assess the intervention logic governing the OP with respect to the wider regional policy within which it is embedded, i.e., its external coherence. Echoing findings from the analysis of the way Structural funds interact and are integrated within existing national and regional arrangements (Bachtler and Taylor, 2003), two broad modalities of interaction between the OP and the regional arrangements are at work in the case of Île-de-France. Interestingly, these are combined rather than being alternative options:

First the logic of some instruments is to fill gaps in the regional support structure.

For example, the ERDF provides support to small scale collaborative research projects which are not otherwise covered in the regional policy. The ERDF is one rare source for direct subsidy for immaterial investment of a small / medium size adapted to SMEs. For example, the Interministerial Fund (FUI) or the “direct aid to maturation” (Bpifrance) concerns greater amount and projects where SMEs may find it difficult to find a place (see 1.3). Likewise, for technological platforms, the ERDF budget is superior to what is usually engaged by national agencies (ANR) so there’s not really an equivalent. It is also the case of one of the two financial instruments, which made available on the market a new product corresponding to a need.

Alternatively the ERDF completes existing envelopes which are insufficient to cover existing needs

11 This contrasts with strategies which place the emphasis on specific phases of the SME development and innovation process, for example, the promotion of start-ups or New Technologically Based firms. See the OECD reviews of innovation policy (available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/oecdreviewsofinnovationpolicy.htm for example, Mexico) and the literature review included in the First Intermediate report of the present study. 12 See for example, OECD (2009) and the literature review included in the First Intermediate report of the present study.

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22

Table 3. Policy instruments addressed to SMEs Instrument (*) Description Mode of delivery Obj. Category of

instrument (**) I.1 SME creation in distressed area (incubators)

The policy instrument supports entrepreneurship in distressed area through the provision of incubators

Provision of infrastructures

Innov., Growth and terr. Cohes.

Infrastructure and related services

I.2 Support for local enterprises in distressed area

The policy instrument aims at providing services to support entrepreneurship in distressed area

Consulting, advice, technical assistance

Growth terr. Cohes.

Business creation and development

II.2 Support technology transfer (technology platforms)

The policy instrument funds equipment for the diffusion of R&D results, and infrastructure for technology transfer. It does not target SME specifically which are expected to be final users of such facilities.

Provision of infrastructures

Innov. Infrastructure and related services

II.3 Incubators supporting SMEs development

The policy instrument strengthens the supply of services to accompany SME development; it finances immaterial investments or services to SMEs provided by incubators. The objective is to increase effectiveness of incubators, as well as increase the number of incubated projects.

Consulting, advice, technical assistance

Innov. Growth

Infrastructure and related services

II.4 Collaborative R&D projects The objective is to support collaborative R&D projects bringing together at least two SMEs with a research organisation.

Grants Innov. Support for R&D projects

II.5 Collective actions in support of innovation

The policy instruments under this measure aim to provide groups of SMEs with services in areas like: intellectual property protection, ICT, internationalisation, SME networking, technological foresight etc.

Consulting, advice, technical assistance

Innov. Growth

Support for improving capacities

II.6 Collective actions in support of restructuring

It aims to provide groups of SMEs with services delivered by relevant intermediaries helping them to anticipate (defensively or proactively) structural changes in 6 specific sectors ("filières") or areas considered to be at risk. This includes support like awareness raising, R&D partnerships, commercial partnerships, etc. The measure accompanies a measure of the National regional development plan (CPER) called "Plan Filière".

Consulting, advice, technical assistance

Innov. Growth

Support for improving capacities

II.7 Business conventions (promoting relationships between investors and enterprises)

The policy instrument promotes meeting between investors and enterprises, facilitates access to fund, but also helps the formation of technological partnership.

Information campaign, events, seminars

Growth Business creation and development

II.8 Individual R&D projects The policy instrument complements a measure available from Bpifrance (a public innovation agency) which consists in providing individual grants to support SME R&D projects that become reimbursable if the project is successful. The ERDF provides an non reimbursable grant that increases the incentive to resort to the BPI's repayble grant.

Grants Innov. Support for R&D projects

II.9.a Financial instrument to support takeover of existing enterprises (Init. Île-de-France)

The policy instrument finances development plans prepared in the context of takeover projects of existing companies.

Repayable financial support

Growth Business creation and development

II.9.b Financial instrument (Fonds GFP)

It is a guarantee fund set up through a convention with Bpifrance Repayable financial support

Innov. Growth

Generic access to finance

II.9.c Financial instrument (FRCI) It is a regional investment fund established through a convention with the Regional council, covering seed capital.

Equity finance Innov. Growth

Generic access to finance

II.10 Social innovation projects The instrument promotes social innovation projects aiming at developing new practices, especially using ICT.

Grants Growth Support to access to and diffusion of ICT

III.3 Sustainable development approaches and tools for SMEs

The instrument aims at diffusing sustainable development approaches practices and tools within SMEs through the provision of services

Consulting, advice, technical assistance

Innov. Eco-innovation

(*) The numbers refer to the Axes and the measures used in the OP document. (**) These categories were defined on the basis of a review of policy instruments mobilised across 50 OP throughout the EU (see First Intermediate report). Source: authors based on programming documents and interviews

23

3.2.1. Promoting territorial cohesion through innovation (Axis I)

Two types of instruments within the PUI under Axis I are dedicated to enterprises and SMEs in particular. The objective is to link up territories distressed economically and socially to nearby more dynamic and innovative areas structured around public research organisations. The construction of incubators (I.1), completed by the provision of relevant services to SMEs taking advantage of the incubators (I.2) is proposed. In this context, there is significant potential for synergy with the ESF which can contribute to the services made available to SMEs.

3.2.2. Facilitating technology transfer

Under Axis II, two instruments support structures or equipment expected to facilitate technology transfers, i.e., incubators (II.3) and technological platforms (II.2). Their objective is to favour the creation of enterprises out of the R&D potential of the region by addressing the innovation process both upstream (technological platforms) and closer to markets (incubators). They aim at taping into the large R&D potential of the region. They stem from the assumption that specific mechanisms must be in place to stimulate technology transfer leading to enterprise creation. In this case, the expected effects on economic growth are indirect and in fact even somehow unpredictable but no less significant if they at all are to materialise.

One instrument finances technological equipment expected to be used by SMEs (II.2). It follows a “filière logic” i.e., that this equipment is supposed to be developed in conjunction with the needs of enterprises in the filières identified by the Regional council as priority. This is ensured through the certification / validation of projects by Competitiveness clusters which are particularly aware of their respective “ecosystem”.

With support to the functioning of existing incubators that are part of the State / region support programme to promote the intake of research / spinoffs (II.3), the intention is to strengthen and improve the services offered by these incubators to enterprises. This is supposed to enhance the preparation of academics and scientists to business-oriented practices and stance. An example is support to the problématique of Intellectual property rights which is not innate to researchers. In distressed area targeted under Axis I, an equivalent instrument is in place within the Integrated Urban Projects (I.1) but contrarily to their counterparts under axis II, they are not necessarily technology-oriented and support is granted to infrastructures (buildings) rather than the offer of services.

3.2.3. Collective actions and Plans filière

Three instruments aimed at providing SMEs with relevant business services (so called collective actions: II.5, II.6 and II.7), expected to break SMEs isolation and remedy a perceived lack of recourse to external service providers. Two other instruments provided SMEs with business services in distressed area (I.2) and supported SMEs’ adoption of environmentally-friendly tools and approaches (III.3). The objective here is to strengthen SME capacities in different areas considered important for their development.

The OP makes a deliberately wide use of such so-called “collective actions” mobilising a large cofounding (state, region, ERDF, even ESF). Collective actions were developed as part of the so-called Plans Filière in 2010 (see Section 2.3). They have been defined as an appropriate tool for regional development and were adopted in different French regions. They are ascribable to a logic consisting in promoting networking, while privileging indirect form of support. The objective is to address SMEs needs collectively i.e., targeting a specific group of SMEs (even if beneficiaries might in the end be individual SMEs, and they often are). The support granted generally takes the form of a business service. A support or coordination structure identifies the need of a given

24

population of SMEs and proposes relevant services (for example by resorting to experimented consultants).13

In the OP, collective actions are generally managed by Competitiveness clusters which know well the needs of their SMEs members, they offer a diversity of services that are well targeted to SMEs needs. Examples of areas covered are: intellectual property right, internationalisation, IPR, etc. The type of support granted can be: strategic coaching, counseling, diagnosis, partners search, intelligence, etc. There are many different cases: for example the support might be delivered through different phases with an initial collective approach to awareness rising progressing in the following stages to more specific (and customised) support addressed to single enterprises.14 It should be noted that the services are generally not entirely free, but just in part subsidised. Four categories of collective actions were defined in the OP: support to innovation, to restructuring, access to finance, and environment friendly tools and approaches.

3.2.4. Grants for R&D projects

Two instruments are grants offering direct support to finance collaborative R&D projects (II.4) and individual research projects (II.8). A third grant promotes social innovation projects (II.10).

The instrument supporting collaborative research projects undertaken by at least two SMEs together with a research organisation (II.4) is fully in line with the intention to break SMEs’ isolation and the specificity of Structural funds in promoting partnership and networking. While, the Regional council funds the laboratory, the SMEs are supported by the ERDF. In principle, a requirement is imposed on the areas where partners are located, within specific zones in Île-de-France. Like other instruments under Axis II, the R&D projects are to be “labelised” by Competitiveness clusters (e.g. in particular System@tic) before being selected by the authority in charge within the Prefecture (DIRECCTE15). This ensures their connection to one of the priority filière on which the OP focuses. The instrument supports immaterial investment (especially ICT, computer science) like personnel costs – rarely equipment.

The BPI uses the ERDF in the context of one traditional and popular policy instrument, the “Avance remboursable” consisting of a reimbursable grant: a grant that is reimbursed in case of success of the innovation project16. ERDF is mobilised under the form of a small grant, expected to increase the attractiveness of the reimbursable grant through a “booster effect” (II.8). Indeed, given the high risk incurred by innovation / R&D projects and the financial cost of failure, the complement under the form of a non-reimbursable grant in principle reinforces the attractiveness of the reimbursable grants. The ERDF grant should not exceed 50% of the reimbursable grant. Two conventions are signed: one for the reimbursable grant, the other for the ERDF grant. The support addresses the innovation stage addressed immediately after the feasibility study before the start-up phase. The measure targets immaterial investment

3.2.5. Financial instruments

One measure in Axis II foresees the establishment of financial instruments. The rationale is compliance with what is perceived to be a Commission’s recommendation. The objective is again to mobilise skilled (in this case financial) intermediaries, and concentrate on one of the weakness of the regional innovation system, i.e., the low start up rate. Two main instruments were set up.

13 The MA signs one convention with one such coordination structure, then the latter mobilizes service providers. 14 Thus collective actions in fact conceal different policy instruments according to the definition adopted in this study. 15 Direction régionale des entreprises de la concurrence, de la consommation du travail et de l’emploi at the Préfecture. 16 The reimbursement takes place partly or completely depending on the degree of success. Also there is a “remboursement forfaitaire minimum” even when there is no success, supposed to cover the acquisition of competence experienced anyway.

25

For the first one (II.9.b), Bpifrance signed a convention with the Prefecture to set up Fonds “Garantie Fonds Propres” a guarantee fund. Mechanisms are relatively complex but original: the funds guarantees the capital invested in innovative start-ups by a number of organisms (Organismes de fonds propres) such as: risk capital companies (“Fonds Communs de Placement dans l’innovation” or FCPI) and business angels.17 What is unique is that risk capital is guaranteed – and not bank loans as is more frequently the case - which is even more risky. To deal with the high cost of the mechanisms, a specific arrangement is in place with little equivalent, the so-called “stoploss” (the sums used to guarantee investments are reduced in exchange of some decision delegation making the investors responsible in the process of risk taking ..). This activity is very risky and costly (there’s little “amortisation” as risk remains risk until the end of the period covered). As there is little to no prospect for profit, this is clearly a case for public intervention.

The Fonds GFP was initially set up in 2009 on the basis of dotation by State and the Deposits and Consignments Fund. In 2010, the MA proposed an ERDF envelope, warmly welcomed as there was a lot of activity and demand of investment to guarantee not covered by the initial dotation.

For the second financial instrument (II.9.c), the Regional Co-investment Fund (Fonds Régional de Co-Investissement FRCI, see II.9c in Table 3) was established in 2011 (first investments were realised in 2012). It is supported by Cap Décisif, a financial intermediary that finances four other funds, through an ERDF grant of EUR 3 million. The only shareholder of the FRCI is the Regional council of Île-de-France but it will be soon possible to include others. The FRCI invests in the capital of companies and sell the shares usually after a period of about 6 – 7 years.18 Companies are innovative: either technological companies or innovative companies because they focus on a new usage expected to follow high growth trends. One peculiarity is the multisectoral orientation of the funds which is argued to be a strength19 (sectors covered are: software, life science, creative industries, automotive industry, aeronautics.. everything – of which services, except nuclear!). SMEs are at the seed capital stage (they already have a turnover). They must be based in Île-de-France. The “co-investment” formula is specific (it is the main peculiarity): the objective is to involve business angels into the equity participation. The objective assigned by the Regional council to Cap Décisif is both to invest into innovative SMEs and to contribute to structure the regional risk capital market by activating and involving business angels. Also, besides financial perspectives, some socio-economic variables are taken into account in the selection of enterprises (territorial development, environmental issues, jobs creation, etc) – yet the fund is managed according to normal quality standard at work in the market. Contrary to the Fonds GFP, this is a profit oriented activity.

3.3. Implementation and reprogramming

3.3.1 The effects of the crisis

Although the programming period was marked by a severe global financial and economic crisis, there was no strong deviation in terms of strategic options underlying the Operational Programme. This is due to the initial choice to allow for sufficient flexibility between concrete options, setting an overall broad design and specifying instruments but without prioritizing them. Hence, there was some reallocation of resources from Axis I (from EUR 126 to 124 million) towards Axis II (from EUR 126 to 129 million) which is actually telling of the eventual priority placed on the objective of competitiveness over

17 If an FCPI invests EUR 1 million in one SME, the Fonds guarantees EUR 700,000 if the SME is less than 5 years old, and EUR 500,000 it if more than 7 years old over a 10 years period. That means that in case of the SME goes bankrupt (or if the FCPI sells share with losses), the Fonds pays the FCPI EUR 700 or 500,000 (depending on the age of the SME). 18 They start by investing between EUR 50 and 500,000 at the first round (i.e. with co-investors a total between EUR 100,000 and EUR 1 Million). Then investments can go up to EUR 1,5 million. Since the funds has EUR 15 million, investments need to be well targeted. 19 Even a general sectoral expertise is not sufficient, so there’s no strong advantage of being specialised in a specific sector. Also a multisectorial approach makes it possible to diversify and diminish risks.

26

that of territorial cohesion. That said, there was formally no “reprogramming” between instruments within Axis II.

If in general, the effects of the crisis were not felt at a grand strategic level, some instruments were clearly affected more than others. This is the case, for example, of the grant supporting individual research projects managed by Bpifrance (II.8). There were no operations in 2008 but activity already resumed in 2009, then until 2011, about 100 projects were proposed each year. The number of bankruptcies was 11 (out of slightly more than 50 beneficiaries). Also the FRCI (II.9.c) experienced a slow start up phase due to the economic slow down which was inversed more recently with an acceleration in the last couple of years (from 400 files / year to about 800 overall – of which about 12 are selected, and as far as the FRCI is concerned: 6 to 7 selected project / year).

Other instruments were affected by cycles unrelated to the economic crisis. For example, the capital risk guarantee fund (Fonds GFP – II.9.b) ran into disaffection with a reduced demand on the side of FCPI which turned to other investment opportunities.

3.3.2 First come first placed allocation

The absence of allocation below the axis level resulted in a demand-driven, first-come-first-placed allocation. Thus, some measures attracted more demand and resources than others. As illustrated in Table 2, this is the case of support to collaborative R&D projects (II.4) or the collective actions for SME development, structural change and networking between investors and enterprises (II.5 II.6 and II.7).

Table 4. Committed expenditure by policy instrument (april 2015) Instrument Total

committed investment (‘000 Euro)

Committed ERDF

(‘000 Euro)

% ERDF

I.1 SME creation in distressed area (incubators) 16.384,759 5.662,991 9% I.2 Support for local enterprises in distressed area 6.025,393 2.693,479 4%

II.2 Support technology transfer (technology platforms)

19.467,299 8.544,754 13%

II.3 Incubators supporting SMEs development 6.049,041 2.585,961 4% II.4 Collaborative R&D projects 39.554,082 19.508,661 30% II.5 Collective actions in support of innovation 5.312,020 1.819,058 3%

II.6 Collective actions in support of restructuring 22.050,837 7.623,823 12% II.7 Business conventions (promoting relationships between investors and enterprises)

5.394,563 1.586,747 2%

II.8 Individual R&D projects 43.173,246 4.496,411 7% II.9.a Financial instrument to support takeover of existing enterprises (Initiative Île-de-France)

800,000 400,000 1%

II.9.b Financial instrument (Fonds GFP) 6.000,000 3.000,000 5%

II.9.c Financial instrument (FRCI) 6.000,000 3.000,000 5% II.10 Social innovation projects 3.970,003 1.883,742 3% III.3 Sustainable development approaches and tools for SMEs

3.844,925 1.846,585 3%

Total 184.026,17 64.652,21 100% Source: Managing Authority

This was detrimental to measures like incubators or technology platforms (II.2) for which time to instruct projects were (very) long at the beginning of the programming because of a lack of preparation of the administration in charge (DRRT20) and of potential beneficiaries (universities). This is an important factor which should not be neglected since around half of the projects were actually reported to have withdrawn. Other difficulties had to do with an inadequate information campaign (some important research laboratories like Inserm were not informed), imputed to the choice not to publish specific

20 DRRT: Délégation Régionale à la Recherche et à la Technologie at the Préfecture.

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calls for proposals, with a consequent lack of terms of reference and effort to clarify procedures and expectations. These implementation difficulties certainly did not contribute to make easier the process of technology transfer, which is already inherently difficult.

On the face of it, measures like support to collaborative research projects (II.4) recorded much higher consumption rate as projects benefited from more effective support by the administration in charge (DIRECCTE), by Competitiveness clusters which were overall better equipped for project engineering.

That said, while certain measures recorded high commitment rates at the beginning of the programming period at the expense of others, some catch up occurred towards the end of the programing period when the former instruments started to lose momentum. The MA then informally turned to the services responsible for the less endowed instruments (for example support to incubators) and encouraged them to take advantage of the funds still available.

3.3.3 Implementation problems due to legal difficulties

Some minor implementation difficulties were experienced, due to an incorrect interpretation of legal dispositions. Thus, there was a legal issue about public procurement concerning support to incubators (II.2). Also, the zero rate loan instrument (II.9.a) had to be remodeled following the realization that the instrument was used to support takeovers instead of the business plans underlying them as it was designed to do.

A potentially much more disruptive issue was raised on the occasion of the nation-wide retreatment of the aid regime granted to “collective actions” (see box). This was not an issue specific to Île-de-France but it had some repercussions which were actually possibly less dramatic than in other cases (in Île-de-France no reimbursement had to be carried out). The reprocessing (“Plan de reprise”) which terminated beginning of 2015 and was time consuming. It also nurtured some diffidence triggered by the fear of not fully complying with the state aid rules and could explain some delay in paying final instalments to supporting structures (e.g. to the Competitiveness cluster “Systematic”).

Box 1. Requalification of collective actions The issue originated in Champagne Ardennes, where it was noted that contrarily to provisions in the regime on collective actions notified to the Commission, co-funding rates were found to go up to 80% instead of 50%. Plans had to be put in place throughout the regions where collective actions were in place, to “requalify” support (mostly under the de minimis rule) or in the most extreme case, to obtain reimbursements so as to make sure that the ceiling of 50% was not surpassed. Source: DATAR (2012)

3.3.4 Implementation problems due the complexity of the procedures

Some minor implementation difficulties related to the complexity of the procedures proper to the ERDF requirements affecting SMEs are illustrated by the instrument supporting collaborative research projects (II.4). As a matter of fact, even though the instrument rapidly attracted potential candidates through 7 calls for proposal, beneficiary SMEs are sometimes long to ask for reimbursement with some consequent difficulty to close the operations (over the 46 for which the final payment need to be done, 13 are from 2013, 11 from 2014 and 21 from 2015).

Instead, an example of serious implementation difficulties related to the administrative burden associated with the ERDF as supported by both the administration in charge (Bpifrance) and the beneficiary SMEs is given by the grants for individual research projects (II.8). Under criticism was the fact that Bpifrance did not properly adapt its procedures to the ERDF requirements in terms of reporting and controls, and failed to inform potential beneficiaries adequately. Also the dual function of managers within Bpifrance (separation between front and middle office) caused interruptions in the follow up of projects. As a result, controls and audits often found irregularities implying

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corrections which were felt to be disproportionate compared to the ERDF amount engaged (less than 10% of the cost of the projects on average). There were examples of projects with an overall budget of EUR 1.8 million which underwent audits and correction for an ERDF grant of EUR 100000 causing inevitable resentment. Overall, a relevant share of SMEs voluntarily gave up the ERDF grant not to undergo controls (implying reimbursement)21. From the perspective of the administrative authorities in charge, it was estimated that 90 ERDF operations out of 16000 overall occupied 25% of the working time. The difficulties were such that the ERDF co-funding was stopped in 2012 before the entire envelope of the global grant was used (5 million as against 7 foreseen). Reimbursable grants kept going, but without ERDF contribution.

Concerning the Fonds GFP (II.9.b), the ERDF contribution was also very heavy to manage (reporting requirements, conditions to fulfil etc). This was especially so considering the limited financial contribution (EUR 3 million compared to state or regional contribution of EUR 50 million) but it was not overall inhibitive to the extent experienced by the grant to individual research projects.

21 They are 16 out of 26 SMEs that terminated the agreement before the project’s completion.

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4. EVIDENCE ON ACHIEVEMENTS

4.1. Measuring achievements

4.1.1. Monitoring system

A robust monitoring system is in place, structured at measure level, in which the distinction is made between output, results and impact indicators. Targets are systematically included and reference is made to expected values based on applicants’ declaration when signing a “convention” with the MA.

Among the weaknesses characterizing the monitoring system, realised values are available only when operations are over. This means that indicators are not reliable until the operation is closed, preventing from obtaining data in itinere. From the perspective of an ex post evaluation this is a real issue for those measures where a significant share of operations are not over yet. In addition some indicators are not always pertinent or sufficient to monitor the performance of single instruments (e.g. for the Technology platforms - instrument II.2 – from which indirect long term effects are expected), or they are too complex to measure (e.g., investments induced for instruments II.5 and II.8).

Another weakness is that the number of jobs or companies created relies on applicants’ declaration only without further independent control. In this respect, there is an apparent conflict between the MA mission of selecting applicants, and that of assessing the performance of the beneficiary thus selected.

There is also a serious difficulty in tracing the final / indirect beneficiaries (e.g.collective actions, financial instruments) even though evidence is in fact collected, but not properly centralized (see below).

4.1.2. Evidence from the monitoring system

The table below presents evidence on the achievements of policy instruments available from the monitoring system. In extracting evidence from the monitoring system, there is a first difficulty related to the rate of completion of projects (operations). For some instruments, a minority of operations are actually over (in particular, business services to SMEs in distressed areas, collective actions in support of innovation, collective actions in support of restructuring, sustainable development approaches) which means that the reported values of the indicators are only provisional.

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Table 5. Evidence of achievement by policy instruments (april 2015). Instrument Committed

ERDF %

ERDF inter-vention

rate

N. of operations

Of which completed

N. of beneficiary

SMEs (foreseen)

Indicative N. of jobs created

(foreseen))

Indicative N. of enterprises

created (foreseen)

I.1 SME creation in distressed area (incubators) 9% 35% 7 5 349 (109) 55 (105) I.2 Support for local enterprises in distressed area 4% 45% 13 4 114 (869) 74 (55) II.2 Support technology transfer (technology platforms) 13% 44% 14 II.3 Incubators supporting SMEs development 4% 43% 9 6 776 (500) 265 (186) II.4 Collaborative R&D projects 30% 49% 126 80 115 371 (992) II.5 Collective actions in support of innovation 3% 34% 11 4 67 (3928) II.6 Collective actions in support of restructuring 12% 35% 46 8 695 (10601) II.7 Business conventions (promoting relationships between investors and enterprises)

2% 29% 20 15 3305 (2000)

II.8 Individual R&D projects 7% 10% 75 74 56 134 (769) II.9.a Financial instrument to support takeover of existing enterprises (Initiative Île-de-France)

1% 50% 1 1 4

II.9.b Financial instrument (Fonds GFP) 5% 50% 1 1 43 18 II.9.c Financial instrument (FRCI) 5% 50% 1 1 19 19 II.10 Social innovation projects 3% 47% 7 5 21 III.3 Sustainable development approaches and tools for SMEs

3% 48% 9 1 340

Total 100% 35% 77 27 Source: own elaboration based on data from the monitoring system

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Fundamentally, what is striking is an overall lack of clear evidence of positive achievements. As Table 4 above suggests, the overall number of SMEs reached is small (in particular if the number of SMEs attending business fairs is set aside) while the aggregate quantitative results in terms of jobs or enterprises creation are modest and only partially reliable. What is more there is indeterminacy concerning a large number of measures which did not provide direct support to SMEs. Of course, this needs to be placed in the context of the limited available budget.

4.2. Policy instruments performance

4.2.1. Integrated Urban Projects Axis I

In the absence of fully-fledged evaluation dedicated to Axis I, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the approach consisting in addressing territorial imbalances using instruments promoting innovation. This is because the initiatives are decentralised, difficult to track and would require specific fieldwork on the ground. That said, two specific studies provide preliminary evidence. A first report published in 2010 suggests that awareness about innovation has been raising at a strategic level on the occasion of the elaboration of the Integrated Urban Projects but that this was an uneven process across the PUI (ViaRegio, 2010). A second “review” published in 2013 taking stock of the progress recorded since the beginning of implementation argues that the ERDF added value was to encourage the adoption of an integrated vision of urban development and to lay the basis for further cooperative approach bringing together different communes (Réseau In’Europe, 2013). There is also evidence showing that the projects contributed in breaking the isolation of operators in general, and SMEs in particular, opening them up to partnering and networking. However, preliminary evidence also suggests that there is a great deal of heterogeneity characterising the different Integrated Urban Projects. Some good practices or success stories are reported like one incubator (Bond’innov) which contributed to promote entrepreneurship in the area of Bondy or the creation of a mecatronic pole in Argenteuil/Bezons strengthening the basis for technological innovation. But beyond, whether a dynamics linking distressed areas with innovative ones took off is much harder to document. The fact that SME interventions under Axis I represented only 13% of the total committed ERDF suggests that the critical mass for such a dynamics to take place was not reached.

4.2.2. Technology transfer

There are additional difficulties in trying to assess instruments that aim to promote technology transfer. For example, technological platforms (II.2) are expected to yield relevant indirect economic effects but no indicators are available to capture these (it would in any case be premature to try and capture these anyway). On the face of it, indicators about jobs created (incubators) are based on beneficiaries’ declaration and are to be taken with care. Also, following an acceleration of programming, a number of operations are not closed yet rendering available indicators only partially reliable. The concrete example of one project nevertheless shows that the long term impact of support could be significant. The project “Apollon” finances a cutting edge facility which will be opened to the international research community. The laser market is dominated worldwide by two French firms located in the vicinity of the equipment around which a multitude of SMEs operate. There is an important degree of pervasive interactions between the scientific and the business communities which will benefit from the new equipment without any indicators capturing these effects.

As far as incubators are concerned (II.3), a qualitative assessment reveals that out of the 9 operations financed, just a couple involve an university or a research institute and correspond to what was initially planned, i.e., they follow the objective of diffusing entrepreneurship in the academic community through awareness raising, intellectual property right support, technology transfer, etc. The other operations are more growth-oriented. While this is not per se a failure, it is symptomatic of the difficulty to implement the vision initially envisaged.

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4.2.3. The case of collective actions

It is also particularly difficult to assess the achievements of collective actions (II.5, II.6 and II.7) for similar but also different reasons. For a start the rate of operations completion is low. Importantly, there is indeterminacy about the ultimate beneficiaries although the evidence is in principle available. Overall, there is a relative lack of knowledge by the MA concerning the effective structure of Plans filière and their relative operations. For example, the line is blurred between the two instruments II.5 and II.6 with no marked differences between them so that some operations could interchangeably belong to one or the other. Some evidence collected with the Competitiveness clusters show that there is appetite from the SME for this type of support and that the ERDF made it possible to enlarge the supply of such services and was even at time decisive. The Table below shows different relative importance of the Plans in quantitative terms, with two of them attracting 33% of total fund (managed by the Competitiveness clusters Systematic and Cap Digital, respectively).

Table 6. Committed expenditure of the Plans filière (June 2014) Plans Filière Coordinator N.

operation

s

Total committe

d (a)

(‘000 Euro)

ERDF committed (b) (‘000 Euro)

% ERDF (b/a)

Share on

total ERDF

Optics and complex system System@tic Paris Région 5 4940,21 1292,40 26% 18%

CRCI 1 265,00 79,50 30% 1%

CCIE 3 351,00 104,90 30% 1%

Health and biotech POLINVEST 1 178,99 71,60 40% 1%

MEDICEN 2 1247,51 492,58 39% 7%

Paris Europlace 1 161,73 64,69 40% 1%

Creative arts industry BJOP 1 301,27 76,98 26% 1%

CODIFAB 2 438,24 175,10 40% 2%

SPMF 1 301,49 120,60 40% 2%

BOCI 1 147,11 58,84 40% 1%

Mechanics CETIM 2 920,80 276,24 30% 4%

CFI 1 228,00 68,40 30% 1%

Eco-industries ADVANCITY 2 1205,70 602,85 50% 8%

CRCI 2 670,40 335,20 50% 5%

Numerical content Cap Digital 4 2752,47 1046,99 38% 15%

Automotive industry MOV'EO 1 605,89 150,69 25% 2%

Aeronautics and space Association Astech Paris – Région

3 1990,95 597,29 30% 8%

Social economy Paris Europlace 1 129,50 64,75 50% 1%

Multi-filières CETIM 3 1976,57 678,33 34% 10%

CGPME 1 318,00 127,20 40% 2%

CGPME 93 2 1597,51 638,25 40% 9%

Total 40 20728,32 7123,37 34% 100%

Source: monitoring system

4.2.4. Direct instruments: collaborative and individual research projects

For the two instruments providing direct support to SMEs funding either individual or collective research projects, the evidence basis is in principle sounder. Beneficiary SMEs are tracked and identified.

The instrument supporting collaborative research projects (II.4) attracted a relevant share of committed funds (30%). Together with the fact that the instrument fills a gap in the regional support structure (it targets relatively small scale projects which are not otherwise supported) suggests that it responded to a need although it is impossible to

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conclude on possible deadweight which might offset the advantages of the instrument. This relatively positive performance also certainly owes much to the preparedness of the administration in charge (see above). Other indications of the effectiveness of the policy instrument have to do with the critical size of the support granted (average total cost: EUR 300,000, minimum EUR 36,000, maximum EUR 470,000). The contribution of ERDF is important since it represents just slightly less than 50% of the overall total cost on average. Also, there are relatively few cancellations (deprogramming, bankruptcy: 7 in total). A few SMEs were bought by large enterprises, some were liquidated.

On the contrary, the support granted to individual research projects (II.8) records much more mitigated indication of success. While almost all operations are over (as the global grant was terminated in 2012 before the envelope was actually consumed just a couple of operations are still pending), 150 jobs are said to be created which is not per se a negative performance but it is much below expectations. In fact, 3 projects involving important SMEs were expected to create numerous jobs but were deprogrammed. More worrying, 75 operations out of the 91 originally agreed were still in place at the end of the programming period. If the average size of project is significant (EUR 576,000), the contribution rate of the ERDF is just 10% on average (compared to 50% for the collaborative research instrument). The instrument attracted 7% of the committed ERDF in SME-related measures while it was characterized by very important non-ERDF public support. Overall, the expected booster effect did not materialize, and was especially small for very small SME that are most in need.

4.2.5. Measuring financial instruments achievement

The targets set for the indicators defined at the level of the measure were largely unrealistic and consequently unmet (10 new financial instruments and 700 SMEs supported). In fact, measuring the achievement of financial instruments is an issue on its own, the risk being that in the face of complex mechanisms, the MA risks being guided by motivations having to do with a logic of expenditure, rather than an evidence-based approach. The two instruments were reasonably successful, but offer different perspectives for the future.

The Fonds GFP (II.9.b) recorded a high leverage effect: EUR 38 million (corresponding to the sum invested by financial intermediary into SMEs which risk is guaranteed by the Fonds GFP)22 vs 15 for the FRCI (II.9.c) from the same initial endowment of 6 million of which 3 million ERDF. The number of beneficiary SMEs (43) is more than initially planned in the convention (about 30) and more than the beneficiary SMEs of the FRCI (about 20 for the moment). However, five have gone bankrupt. The funds will probably be in equilibrium in 2020/ 2021 when the guarantee period will be over. Indicators in terms of jobs created or safeguarded are available for the Fonds GFP but they are declarative (Bpifrance asks FCPI to ask enterprises) and some mismatch or inconsistency has been found between declared figures and those included in mainstream companies database.

There is a difference in terms of future perspective between the two financial instruments. In the case of the Fonds GFP, the period of guarantee is 10 years (corresponding to the time horizon of the conventions signed between FCPI and Bpifrance). So the Fonds (with support of ERDF) will provide guarantee to two generations of investments / conventions concluded in 2010 and 2011 until 2021. However, there will be no new ERDF intake (extinctive management): the contribution of the State is expected to be sufficient to satisfy the demand for guarantee which is decreasing as FCPI turned to other investments opportunities. On the contrary, additional ERDF injection is foreseen into the FRCI in 2014-2020 and a temporal horizon of 30 years and a portfolio of 40 / 50 enterprises are contemplated. That said a EUR 15 million fund is considered by the fund manager to be under a critical size to generate the means of self-sustainment in the current market conditions in Île-de-France. The fact that the financial intermediary Cap Décisif manages four other funds is decisive in this respect as

22 The sums of the risk thus guaranteed is EUR 38 millions for 43 SMEs (ERDF covers EUR 10,7 million, the State covers EUR 10,7 million.

34

together, the five funds ensure profitability.23 Another weak point has to do with the process of re-financing enterprises which is a delicate issue. Overall, while the Fonds GFP will not be extended under its present form (i.e. with the contribution of the ERDF), the FRCI will in the next programming period. The Regional council argues that this is because in the case of the Fond GFP, there are too many levels of transmission of the initial policy input, with the risk that SMEs, at the end of the chain, see their advantages eroded. On the contrary, beneficiary SMEs of the FRCI are more direct and more visible (or the ERDF is more visible to them). Admittedly, the FRCI is less complex than the Fonds GFP and the MA has the feeling of having a better grasp of what’s going on at a lower cost (less time to invest in understanding complex mechanisms).

4.2.6. Synthesis

One positive issue with respect to the effectiveness of specific policy instruments and their combination is that the ERDF nevertheless concentrated on a relatively successful instrument aimed at promoting collaborative research projects and characterised by critical mass. However, in reference to the specific challenges at work in the regional socio-economic context, the policy instruments promoting technology transfer could have shown clearer indication of performance. Also, relevant SME interventions under Axis I represented a marginal contribution which fell somewhat short of the expectations placed on innovation as a means to foster territorial cohesion (notwithstanding the actual effectiveness of such interventions which remains to be verified).

With respect to the pertinence of the ERDF contribution to the existing policy arrangements at work in the region, another lesson concerns the instrument that promoted collaborative research projects. A relatively successful instrument, it was also the one that occupied a clear position in the regional policy mix since it was one of the few instrument filling a gap in the regional support supply (another example was the FRCI). For the other instruments that tended to bring additional resources to existing measures, performance was apparently related to critical mass issue. This is illustrated a contrario by the instrument promoting SMEs individual research projects.

Besides the position in the regional policy mix and the relative critical mass, what seemed decisive in determining the relative effectiveness of instruments is the respective capacity of administrative authorities in charge of their implementation. As seen above, there were different types of instrument pursuing distinct objective or with distinct rationale (logic of intervention), yet relative effectiveness cut across these categories, i.e., that policy instrument within the same category recorded varying degree of performance (this was particularly patent in the case of the PUI).

4.3. Characteristics of the assisted SMEs

Evidence on beneficiary SMEs is available for direct support instruments as well as financial instruments under Axis II, i.e., approximately 240 SMEs. Their profile, as illustrated in the graphs below are well in line with the characteristics of the SME fabrics and expectations in the intervention logic.

23 Cap Décisif considers that the current demand is largely superior to the actual supply of capital and that the multiplication by 2 or even 3 of the funds could be envisaged, especially that there is a need to ensure the second if not the third roundtables of companies that benefited from a first investment (see Technopolis 2014b).

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anges is hange of is which

d benefit al SMEs. ative by t only in uipment research

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community and tried to promote start-ups by persuading academics to turn into entrepreneurs. Finally, it wanted to induce SMEs to make recourse to external knowledge and expertise, having them benefit from soft support.

As illustrated above, results fell somewhat short of expectations with some results obtained as far as collaborative research or collective actions are concerned, but uneven effects recorded by SMEs in distressed areas or by incubators aimed at generating start-ups. A number of factors explain why and how behavioural changes in some cases materialised and in other cases didn’t. They can be grouped within two main categories: the absorption capacity of SMEs, and the mentoring function played by intermediaries in charge of delivering the support or channelling the funds.

4.4.1. Absorption capacity

SMEs absorption capacity covers different dimensions from financial robustness, to managerial competence, and the ability of SMEs to interact with their external milieu in an optimal manner.

Financial robustness

Evidence gathered from fieldwork shows that financial solidity is a necessary ingredient enabling SMEs to make the most of the support granted and enact behavioural change. The delay in obtaining reimbursement implies that SMEs need to put forward their own capital. In turn, this often supposes that projects are already mature, ready to be financed by the most appropriate and readily available source of funding. In this sense, the ERDF has hardly been triggering new initiatives (although this is a criteria that beneficiary must show to have their project selected). It certainly enabled SMEs to carry out projects which in many cases would not have materialised – at least not under the actual form and within the actual timeframe- but there is little evidence that it actually provoked a radical change in the behavioural patterns of beneficiary SMEs. This is illustrated, a contrario, by the time SMEs that were beneficiary of the collaborative research instrument took in engaging the procedures to obtain the funding: in some cases, it was clearly not a priority of the SMEs.

Managerial capacity

Managerial capacity is necessary to overcome the paper work related to ERDF procedures – which is not necessarily more complex than procedures necessary for obtaining funding from domestic sources, but which is different and requires flexibility and adaptation capacity. When the two regimes are combined (added), as illustrated by the case of the individual research projects, the risk is that this increases complexity and makes the support worthless.

Embeddedness in an (innovation) ecosystem

Support works best in fostering behavioural change when SMEs are embedded in an ecosystem made of other firms, research organisations, institutions that know well each others and are used to cooperate. Evidence from interviews with beneficiary SMEs show that the latter are often already engaged in partnerships with research organisations or at least know them very well. The ERDF would therefore have a role in comforting existing relations but the ambition to contribute create new ones from scratch is more difficult to satisfy.

4.4.2. Coaching by competent intermediaries and authorities in charge

The OP chose to dedicate a large part of support delivered indirectly, via intermediaries intended in a broad way. In this context, SMEs need interlocutors that are well informed, and have a clear understanding and familiarity with the SME environment (see the argument on ecosystems above). They have to be well equipped both to face the specificity of the ERDF requirements and to adapt the intervention to SMEs needs. This applies to all the intermediaries that have been mobilised, across institutional definitions : intermediate bodies holding a global grant (e.g., Bpifrance as far as the individual research instrument is concerned)), financial intermediaries (for the financial instruments), intermediaries that are final beneficiaries from the MA perspective (like

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Competitiveness clusters for “collective actions” or local authorities as far as instruments under Axis I are concerned24). The case of collective actions (II.5 and II.6) is illuminating in this respect. The instruments have high potential in triggering behavioural change because the services delivered were addressed to a well identified SMEs population (belonging to the Competitiveness clusters). The staff of the Competitiveness cluster knows SMEs individually and is in contact with the most competent and adapted service providers. Thus, support can be tailored to SMEs needs in details, and their specificity is taken into account to a high extent. However, the effectiveness of this mechanism depends ultimately on the capacity of the managerial staff of the Competiveness cluster, or of any other authority in charge of an ERDF envelop (whether it is a global grant or not). For example, evidence was gathered documenting the varying capacity of the local authorities managing the PUI under Axis I, with, as a result, different performance. Similarly, the two financial intermediaries in charge of the two main financial instruments used resources at their disposition (the same amount) through very different mechanisms and with different effects.

24 Actually, out of the 10 PUI, 2 of them are managed as a global grant.

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5. MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

With a modest financial envelope the OP Île-de-France concentrated its support to SMEs in two axes. In Axis I, ten “integrated urban projects” in distressed area were expected to support entrepreneurship through dedicated projects conceived and implemented by local authorities, thus contributing to territorial cohesion objectives. As to Axis II, it was mostly addressed to innovative or high growth SMEs in six filières. It made available a set of policy instruments covering different stages of the SMEs development cycle, addressing different possible types of innovation and proposing different modes of delivery. In particular, it put the emphasis on indirect support considered to be an appropriate way to avoid the possible complexity related to the ERDF implementation. Also, it opted for an open, demand-driven strategy thought to appropriately respond to emerging needs. It did both complement existing arrangements and filed gaps in the regional SME support system.

In general, the OP appears to have explored different options and tested different avenues with the deliberate intent not to make strong strategic choices as a way to fit smoothly in an already dense support system. Thus, the Managing Authority availed itself of a role of coordinator making available a menu of opportunities that could be seized – or not. But it did hardly steer the programming process or gave initial strategic impulse.

Against this background, evidence of achievements are moderately positive. Apart from one instrument which recorded a clear failure, all the others instruments can claim to have achieved at least partially some of their objectives. Seen from another angle, this also means that no strong evidence of success was recorded and that the OP “could have done better”.

For a start, one may conjecture that the OP would have been more effective if it had made stronger initial strategic choices and concentrated resources either on territorial cohesion objective or on the valorisation of the research potential. Both options appear valid (with the proviso beneath) but pursuing the two at the same time probably resulted in a waste of resources inasmuch as both objectives are likely to have suffered from the resulting diminution of available resources.

In Axis I, there is some evidence of achievement with operators learning to work cooperatively and some basis laid down to promote entrepreneurship and even some time to establish links between science and SMEs. But unsurprisingly, reconciling cohesion and competitiveness appeared to be an overambitious objective.

In Axis II, which concentrated most of the resources in favour of SMEs, the result of the demand-driven approach was a first-come-first-placed allocation of available funding, in which instruments supported by authorities25 most prepared to deal with the challenges posed by the ERDF requirements attracted most of the available funding. In principle, this did not necessarily promote instruments that were the most pertinent with respect to the challenges at stake in the regional economy or adapted to the needs of SMEs. For example, support to incubators is one specific instrument that could have proven to be particularly adequate given the challenges at stake in the regional context (e.g. low rate of start up creation). Yet, it suffered from implementation difficulties because the authorities in charge were less prepared to push forward projects.

There are other more specific lessons. First, there is no strong evidence that instruments were more successful depending on the stage of the innovation process targeted. In the new programming period (2014-2020), there is an explicit preference for phases downstream close to market. However, the 2007-13 experience shows that well targeted

25 We refer here to administrative bodies with an official role (e.g. Bpifrance managing a global grant, the relevant services of the Prefecture or the local authorities managing the Integrated Urban Projects) but also intermediaries that are in direct contact with the SMEs providing the support (financial intermediaries in the case of financial instruments, Competitiveness clusters in the case of collective actions) – see below.

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support to the upstream phases of the research process (e.g. technological platforms) can have potential important indirect effects on the economic fabrics provided it takes place in a context characterised by strong interactions between research organisations and enterprises (thus forming an “ecosystem”). The 2007-13 experience also shows that it was harder to bring research closer to the business sphere, than the other way around. Turning researchers into entrepreneurs proved to be more difficult than encouraging SME to carry out research activity, for example.

Similarly, whether the ERDF measures were reinforcing existing arrangements or palliating deficiency in the regional support structure did not per se determine how successful an instrument was. True a popular policy instrument, support to collaborative research, clearly filled a gap and satisfied an apparent need for funding small to medium sized collaborative research projects. But other instruments completing existing arrangements were either successful (e.g., collective actions) or not (e.g., support to individual research projects). What was decisive, instead, was the respective critical size of the support granted. The co-funding rate was 50% for the instrument supporting collaborative research and only 10% for the definitely less successful instrument supporting individual research.

Finally, even if in the end, the instrument which displayed the strongest evidence of success turned out to be a rather traditional grant supporting collaborative research, the intention of the OP to promote indirect – sometimes sophisticated as in the case of financial instruments – forms of support appears to be valid provided certain conditions are fulfilled. Entrusting an intermediary to manage a financial envelop to support SMEs paid off when the said intermediary was capable and well acquainted with the “ecosystem” in which beneficiary SMEs are embedded (like Competitiveness clusters, for example). In the absence of these conditions (as in the case of some of the local authorities managing the PUI for instance), performance is lower (and technical assistance could have possibly helped overcome related difficulties). In any case, the central managing authority must be prepared to deal with the fact that it loses grasp over the process (in terms of strategic impulse and of knowledge on the progress of the implementation and on the results achieved).

Overall, in explaining the overall performance of the instruments reviewed, the intrinsic advantage and inconvenient of instruments come second to the capacity of the authority in charge of their implementation, and the very conditions of such implementation. SMEs’ absorption capacity was also an important factor determining behavioural changes within SMEs. This shows how the programming process was more concerned with implementation issues than moved by an overall strategic design. The deliberate choice of the OP not to set strong strategic guidelines ex ante can be explained by the fact that the 2007-13 programming period may have been considered to be a test bed which tried possible options to draw lessons for the next programming period but this possibly had a high cost in the context of a limited financial envelope.

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REFERENCES

ACT Consultants, 2010, Evaluation intermédiaire PO FEDER et CPER Ile-de-France, Focus 2 : Stratégie Régionale d’Innovation

ACT Consultants, 2013, Diagnostic Territorial stratégique de la région Ile-de-France pour la préparation des programmes Européens 2014-2020

Bachtler, J. and S. Taylor, 2003. The added value of the Structural Funds: a regional perspective, IQ-Net report on the Reform of the Structural Funds, Strathclyde

Barca, F., 2009, An Agenda for a reformed Cohesion Policy. A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations’, Independent Report prepared at the request of the Commissioner for Regional Policy, Brussels

Conseil Régional d’Ile-de-France, 2011, Adoption de la Stratégie Régionale de Développement Economique et d’Innovation

Conseil Régional d’Ile-de-France, Préfet de la région Ile-de-France, 2007, Contrat de Projets Etat Région 2007-2013

DATAR, 2012, Plan de reprise des actions collectives cofinancées par le FEDER, dans le cadre des Programmes Opérationnels 2007-2013.

Erdyn, Technopolis, 2015, Evaluation de la politique des grappes d’entreprises

Euroquality, 2009, Etude sur le conseil aux entreprises en Ile-de-France

IGAENR, 2014, Evaluation du dispositif d’incubation issu de l’appel à projets du 25 mars 1999

INSEE, 2010, La machine à innover des PME franciliennes : un rendement perfectible au regard du potentiel élevé

Morgan, K., C. Nauwelaers, 1999, Regional innovation strategies: the challenge for less favoured regions, Lodon Routledge

OECD, 2009, Organising for local development: the role of local development agencies, Paris

OECD, 2014, Review of Innovation Policy – France, Paris

Prager, J.C., J.F. Thisse, 2010, Géographie et Développement Economique, Paris La Découverte

Préfet de la région Ile-de-France, 2013, Document de mise en œuvre pour la gestion du Programme Opérationnel Compétitivité régionale et emploi, FEDER 2007-2013 Ile-de-France

Préfet de la région Ile-de-France, 2013, Programme Opérationnel FEDER 2007-2013 en Ile-de-France

Préfet de la région Ile-de-France, 2014, Etat de la programmation du Programme Opérationnel Compétitivité régionale et emploi, FEDER 2007-2013

Préfet de la région Ile-de-France, 2014, Rapport Annuel d’Exécution

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Réseau In’Europe, 2013 Etude de capitalisation et de valorisation des projets de l’Axe 1 In’Europe du PO « Compétitivité régionale et emploi Île-de-France 2007-13 »

Systematic Paris Région, 2009-2013, Rapports d’activité

Technopolis 2014a, Evaluation du dispositif de soutien aux structures d’aide à la maturation de projets innovants en vue de la création d’entreprises

Technopolis, 2014b, Etude ex ante relative à la mise en place d’instruments d’ingénierie financière, ciblant les TPE/PME et susceptibles de mobiliser des ressources FEDER du Programme Opérationnel 2014-2020

Technopolis, Amnyos, Eurolio, 2013, Réalisation d’un bilan des travaux de la Stratégie Régionale d’Innovation francilienne pour la période 2007-2013 et définition de la déclinaison régionale de la stratégie de spécialisation intelligente pour la mise en place du programme opérationnel francilien 2014/2020

ViaRegio, 2010, La prise en compte de la politique d’innovation dans les zones urbaines en difficulté à l’exemple des 10 sites retenus dans le volet In’Europe du PO Compétitivité régionale et emploi d’Ile-de-France

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Name Position Affiliation Date Rose Marie. Ly Van Tu Chef Bureau Affaires

Européennes Préfecture de Paris et Île-de-France, Secrétaire Général aux Affaires Régionales (SGAR)

18/03/2015 26/03/2015

Vassilije Kujacic Chargé de mission programmes européens et contractualisation

Préfecture de région Île-de-France SGAR

18/03/2015

Cendrine Cruzille Sous directrice de l’innovation et des partenariats

Conseil régional 18/03/2015 26/03/2015

Patrice Dumet Chargé de mission développement économique

Préfecture de Paris et Île-de-France Direction régionale des entreprises de la concurrence, de la consommation du travail et de l’emploi (DIRECCTE)

18/03/2015 1/04/2015

Frédéric Vincent Directeur de la Gestion des Opérations

Bpifrance, Île-de-France 23/03/2015

Christine Kerneis Responsable du Service Immatériel et Innovation

Bpifrance, Île-de-France 23/03/2015

Christine Balian Directrice du développement économique et de l’innovation

Conseil régional 26/03/2015

Martine Fernex Sous directrice du développement économique

Conseil régional 26/03/2015

Bao Nguyen-Huy Délégué Régional Délégation Régionale à la Recherche et à la Technologie DRRT

27/03/2015

Samuel Guibal Délégué Adjoint DRRT 27/03/2015 Anne Puech Déléguée Adjointe DRRT 27/03/2015 Jérémy Corsan Chargé de mission DIRECCTE 1/04/2015 Olivier Lacroux Direction Gestion Banques

Investisseurs Bpifrance 2/04/2015

Patrick Coquet Délégué Général Cap Digital 14/04/2015 Philipe Aubourg Directeur Le 503 15/04/2015 Yvan-Michel Ehkirch Directeur Associé Cap Decisif 15/04/2015 Jérôme Snollaerts Président du Directoire Cap Decisif 15/04/2015 Thierry Louvet Directeur Europe et

International Systematic 7/05/2015

Peggy Vicomte Responsable Service Développement des Entreprises

Systematic 7/05/2015

Brigitte Leloup Directrice Administration et Finance

Systematic 7/05/2015

Rodolphe Gelin Directeur Recherche Aldebaran 2/06/2015 François Amiranoff Directeur LULI Laboratoire d’Utilisation des Lasers

Intenses LULI (Apollon Project) 5/06/2015

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