Stronger, Smarter, More Secure and Resilient Cyber-Physical Power Grid Congressional Research and...

Stronger, Smarter, More Secure and Resilient Cyber-Physical Power Grid

Congressional Research and Development Caucus B-369 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC

Friday, May 15, 2015, Noon– 1:30pm

Dr. S. Massoud Amin*– Chairman, IEEE Smart Grid– ASME Energy Pubic Policy Task Force– Chairman, Board of Directors, Texas Reliability Entity (TexasRE)– Board of Directors, Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO)– Director, & Endowed Chair, Technological Leadership Institute; Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University Distinguished Teaching Professor; Univ. of Minnesota

* Support from EPRI, NSF, ORNL, Honeywell and SNL is gratefully acknowledged.

Electric Power Infrastructure: Interdependencies, Security, and Resilience

Presidential Policy Directive 21: “Energy and communications infrastructure especially critical because of their enabling functions across all critical infrastructure areas”

DOE: “A resilient electric grid… is arguably the most complex and critical infrastructure.”

The vast networks of electrification are the greatest engineering achievement of the 20th century

– U.S. National Academy of Engineering

Adaptive Infrastructures

The Smart Infrastructure for a Digital Society

Excellent Power System Reliability

Exceptional PowerQuality

IntegratedCommunications

A Secure Energy Infrastructure

A Complex Set ofInterconnected Webs:

Security is Fundamental


Threat Evolution: Malicious Code

Hours

Time

Weeks or months

Days

Minutes

Seconds

Class IIHuman response: difficult/impossibleAutomated response: possible

Early 1990s Mid 1990s Late 1990s 2000 2003

Class IIIHuman response: impossibleAutomated response: unlikelyProactive blocking: possible

Co

nta

gio

n T

ime

fram

e

File Viruses

Macro Viruses

e-mail Worms

Blended Threats

“Warhol” Threats

“Flash” Threats

Class I Human response: possible

source: Massoud Amin, EPRI, January 27, 1998


Critical System Dynamics and Resilience CapabilitiesVariability and uncertainty are inherent in complex networked interdependent socio-technological systems

A system of systems view is necessary to measure, monitor, understand and manage complex work.Necessary to understand “normal”

• Anticipation of disruptive events

• Look-ahead simulation capability

• Fast isolation and sectionalization

• Adaptive islanding

• Self-healing and restoration

re·sil·ience, noun, 1824: The capability of a strained body to recover its size and shape after deformation caused especially by compressive stress; An ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change

Resilience enables “Robustness”: A system, organism or design may be said to be "robust" if it is capable of coping well with variations

(internal or external and sometimes unpredictable) in its operating environment with minimal damage, alteration or loss of functionality.


September 11, 2001 Tragedies


Infrastructure Security

We are “Bullet Proof”

“The Sky is Falling”The Truth

Source: EPRI Infrastructure Security Initiative (ISI) and Enterprise Information Security (EIS) ProgramMassoud Amin, EPRI, September 27, 2001


Infrastructure Security: The Threat

• Electric power systems constitute the fundamental infrastructure of modern society and therefore an inviting target for three kinds of terrorist attacks:

• Attacks upon the system– Power system itself is

primary target with ripple effect throughout society

• Attacks by the system– Population is the actual

target, using parts of the power system as a weapon

• Attack through the system– Utility networks

provide the conduit for attacks on broad range of targets



Steps Toward Ensuring Security

• EPRI’s Electricity Infrastructure Security Assessment considers six broad areas:

– System-Wide Vulnerability Assessment

– Grid Security– Cyber and Communications

Threats– Distribution System, Disaster

Mitigation & Recovery– Generation/Environment– Power Markets



ISI Areas: Addressing System Vulnerability to Various Attack Modes, Reducing Their Impact, and Rapid Recovery

• Strategic Spare Parts Inventory: Reducing recovery time from terrorist attack or natural disaster by providing spare parts of existing equipment and by developing standardized “recovery transformers” with multiple voltage taps

• Vulnerability Assessment (VA): Determining the impact of potential terrorist attacks on power system components throughout the end-to-end electricity supply chain

• “Red Team” Attacks: Launch mock assaults on the computer and information networks of selected utility systems, probing for weaknesses in a manner similar to the FAA’s Red Team efforts

• Secure Communications: Scoping study to determine how to develop a secure, private communications network for the electric power industry, as an alternative to Internet-based systems

Source: EPRI Infrastructure Security Initiative (ISI) and Enterprise Information Security (EIS) ProgramMassoud Amin, EPRI, October 8, 2001


What can be Done? Vulnerability Assessment

Profile Threats(Determine Intent & Capabilities)

Develop Attack

Scenarios*

Assess Vulnerabilities to each Attack

Apply War GamingTheory

Assess Risks(probability ofsuccessful attack x impact)

Identify Likely Targets

DevelopCounter-measures

*Evolving spectra of targets and modes of attack


Smart Grid InterdependenciesSecurity, Efficiency, and Resilience

The National Plan for Research and Development In Support of Critical Infrastructure ProtectionThe area of self-healing

infrastructure was recommended in 2005 by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as one of three thrust areas for the National Plan for research and development in support of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)

Technology development, transition and Implementation: … the really hard part

2. Transmission Grid

3. “Smart” Self-Healing Grid

4. Electricity Market Grid

5. Ownership/Investor Grid

6. Regulatory Grid

1. Customers Grid

Demand/ResponseReliableDelivery

EconomicDispatch

FACTSControl

Self-Healing

Investment Signals

Standard Market Design

© 2003 KEE Intl.

Seven Dynamically Interacting GridsSeven Dynamically Interacting GridsSeven Dynamically Interacting GridsRev 2.2

7. Economy Grid

Natural Gas Prices

2. Transmission Grid

3. “Smart” Self-Healing Grid

4. Electricity Market Grid

5. Ownership/Investor Grid

6. Regulatory Grid

1. Customers Grid

Demand/ResponseReliableDelivery

EconomicDispatch

FACTSControl

Self-Healing

Investment Signals

Standard Market Design

© 2003 KEE Intl.

Seven Dynamically Interacting GridsSeven Dynamically Interacting GridsSeven Dynamically Interacting GridsRev 2.2

7. Economy Grid

Natural Gas Prices

• Steps in STEM-based R&D to enable secure, efficient, resilient and adaptive infrastructure

• Markets and Policy framework, implementation, and evaluation

• Wind-tunnel testing of designs, markets and policy

• Making the business case for the opportunity

• Decision Support Dashboard: Have a plan …

Regional Cooperation:

Hybrid Networks

Centralized & Microgrids

Local/Nearby… Regional/National

International/Faraway

Decentralized Centralized

Possible Transitional and Hybridization Options in a Wide Range of Assessed Scenarios: Short- and Long-term Strategies, Decision Pathways, ROI, Economic and Societal Objectives, Policies, and Disruptions (including dollars, watts, GHG emissions, risks/benefits – private and public)

Depending on assessments noted herein, we: • Modernize, Retrofit, and Hybridize

Legacy Infrastructure• Leap-Frog for Isolated Localities or

for Clean Slate Designs

Local Microgrids

InternationalCooperation:

Primarily Large

Centralized Generation

Over the next five years, smart microgrids will play a growing role in meeting local demand, enhancing reliability and ensuring local control of electricity. Emerging developments and challenges the smart grid community must address:

For a brief overview and some details on microgrids, and this transition, please see:http://smartgrid.ieee.org/search?searchword=Microgrids&category=smart_grid&x=0&y=0

http://www.govtech.com/technology/Infographic-5-Years-Into-the-Microgrid-Future.html




http://smartgrid.ieee.org/search?searchword=Microgrids&category=smart_grid&x=0&y=0

Examples of SG Technologies & Systems

New Challenges for a Smart GridNeed to integrate:

– Large-scale stochastic (uncertain) renewable generation

– Electric energy storage– Distributed generation – Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles– Demand response (smart meters), AMI, Data

Analytics, …

Need to deploy and integrate:– New Synchronized measurement technologies– New sensors– New System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS)

Critical Security Controls

Paradigm Shift – Data at MN Valley Coop

Before smart meters– Monthly read– 480,000 data points per year

After smart meters – 15-60 minute kWh– Peak demand – Voltage– Power interruptions– 480,000,000 data points per year

Battery Powered1B Water Meters1B Gas Meters

Industry Needs to Connect 50 Billion Devices by 2020An unsolved problem costing billions per year in wasted resources requires radically improved wireless performance and lower cost

Courtesy of On-Ramp Wireless, Inc. All rights reserved.

UndergroundMillions of miles of Pipelines & Circuits

In Vaults100M meters

Indoors1B sensors

Security needs

Physical Security– Transmission Equipment – System Security: Preventing system

impact and Protecting critical substations

– Standards

Cyber Security

Security: What should we be trying to protect

Fuel Supply and Generation AssetsTransmission and DistributionControls and CommunicationsOther Assets

Security: What issues impede Protection

Inability to share informationIncreased cost of securityWidely dispersed assetsWidely dispersed owners and operatorsFinding training and empowering security personnel

• Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) controls and communications

• Siting constraints• Long lead-time

equipment• Availability of

restoration funds• R&D focused on

vulnerabilities

Electrical-Gas Interdependency

There has been a proliferation of natural gas This has resulted in a shift to use gas for generation, especially as older plants using other fuels are retiredPipeline capacities are an issue during cold weather New England governors and other parties are bringing forward creative ideas to make long-term commitments to build new capacity Additional gas pipeline capacity, accompanied by supply

contracts, is required to meet the growing demand for natural gas for power generation

Recommendations – Security, Privacy, and Resilience 1 (4)

Facilitate, encourage, or mandate that secure sensing, “defense in depth,” fast reconfiguration and self-healing be built into the infrastructure.Continue developing regional planning of a more redundant and less vulnerable transmission gridContinue developing operational tools to more accurately forecast the availability of natural gas supply for generators and improve unit commitment decisions


Mandate consumer data privacy and security for AMI systems to provide protection against personal profiling, real-time remote surveillance, identity theft and home invasions, activity censorship and decisions based on inaccurate data

Support alternatives for Utilities that wish to eliminate the use of wireless telecom networks and the public Internet to decrease grid vulnerabilities– Include options for utilities to obtain private

spectrum at a reasonable costs


Improve the sharing of intelligence and threat information and analysis to develop proactive protection strategies, – Includes development of coordinated hierarchical

threat coordination centers – at local, regional and national levels

– May require either more security clearances issued to electric sector individuals or treatment of some intelligence and threat information and analysis as sensitive business information, rather than as classified information


Speed up the development and enforcement of cyber security standards, compliance requirements and their adoption. Facilitate and encourage design of security from the start and include it in standardsDesign communications and controls systems for more limited failures including better EMP withstand capabilitiesIncrease investment in the grid and in R&D areas that assure the security of the cyber infrastructure (algorithms, protocols, chip-level & application-level)

Recommendations – Markets and Policy 1 (2) Use the National Institute of Standards and

Technology Smart Grid Collaboration or the NARUC Smart Grid Collaborative as models to bridge the jurisdictional gap between the federal and the state regulatory organizations on issues such as technology upgrades and system security

More transparent, participatory and collaborative discussion among federal and state agencies, transmission and distribution asset owners, regional transmission operators and independent system operators and their members and supporting research to improve understanding of mutual impacts, interactions and benefits

Recommendations – Markets and Policy 2 (2)

Continue working at a federal level on better coordination of electricity and gas markets to mitigate potential new reliability issues due to increasing reliance on gas generation

Update the wholesale market design to reflect the speed at which a generator can increase or decrease the amount of generation needed to complement variable resources

Recommendations1. Facilitate, encourage, or mandate that secure sensing, “defense in depth,” fast

reconfiguration and self-healing be built into the infrastructure2. Mandate security for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure, providing protection

against Personal Profiling, guarantee consumer Data Privacy, Real-time Remote Surveillance, Identity Theft and Home Invasions, Activity Censorship, and Decisions Based on Inaccurate Data

3. Wireless and the public Internet increase vulnerability and thus should be avoided4. Bridge the jurisdictional gap between Federal/NERC and the state commissions on

cyber security 5. Electric generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption need to be safe,

reliable, and economical in their own right. Asset owners should be required to practice due diligence in securing their infrastructure as a cost of doing business

6. Develop coordinated hierarchical threat coordination centers – at local, regional, and national levels – that proactively assess precursors and counter cyber attacks

7. Speed up the development and enforcement of cyber security standards, compliance requirements and their adoption. Facilitate and encourage design of security in from the start and include it in standards

8. Increase investment in the grid and in R&D areas that assure the security of the cyber infrastructure (algorithms, protocols, chip-level and application-level security)

9. Develop methods, such as self-organizing micro-grids, to facilitate grid segmentation that limits the effects of cyber and physical attacks

Energy Infrastructure, Economics, Efficiency, Environment, Secure Communications and Adaptive Dynamic Systems

Adaptive Systems (self-healing)

Economics

EfficiencyIncentives

Private Good

Electric Power

ReliabilityPublic Good

Complex, highly nonlinear infrastructure Evolving markets, rules and designs

“if you measure it you manage it if you price it you manage it even better”… Technologies, Designs, Policies, Options, Risks/Valuation

“Prices to Devices”

Society (including Policy & Environment)

IEEE Smart Grid http://smartgrid.ieee.org

http://smartgrid.ieee.org/



Summary Recommendations

Support holistic, integrated approach in simultaneously managing fleet of assets to best achieve optimal cost-effective solutions addressing the following: – Aging infrastructure– Grid hardening (including weather-related

events, physical vulnerability, and cyber-physical security)

– System reliability

Urgently address managing new Smart Grid assets such as advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and intelligent electronic devices

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