35 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW SPRING 2004

n recent years, the primary locus of value for many corpora-

tions has been found in their intellectual property rights. By

one informed estimate from the late 1990s, some three-quarters

of the Fortune 100’s total market capitalization was represented

by intangible assets, such as patents, copyrights and trade-

marks.1 In this environment, IP management cannot be left to

technology managers or corporate legal staff alone. Given that

the generation of returns from IP rights is a capital-intensive,

long-term activity and that decisions affecting intellectual prop-

erty are usually irreversible at low cost, IP management must be

a matter of concern for functional and business-unit leaders as

well as a corporation’s most senior officers.

Little of the writing on the subject of intellectual property

rights, however, has been directed at top-level executives; instead

it has frequently been done by specialists, for specialists. And

senior managers, in order to effectively govern and exploit their

often huge IP assets, need help to answer these specific ques-

tions:2 How can the company use intellectual property rights to

gain and sustain competitive advantage? How do IP rights affect

the industry’s structure? What options do IP rights offer vis-à-

vis competitors? How can IP rights grant incumbency advantage

and establish barriers to entry? How can IP rights help the com-

pany gain vertical power along the value chain? What organizational design accommo-

dates an intellectual property strategy most effectively?

Enormous knowledge is hidden in the economics literature and in the heads of corpo-

rate IP managers about the way companies have developed answers to these questions.3

Making such information available to top-level management will help lead intellectual

property rights out of their shadowy existence in patent and legal departments and enable

companies to tap into their strategic value. (See “About the Research.”)

Creating and Sustaining Competitive AdvantageIntellectual property rights can help a company gain competitive advantage in various

ways, but three are paramount: They can provide a temporary technological lead (incum-

bency), protect brand names and help form an industry standard. Combinations of

patents and trademarks can help to sustain IP-based competitive advantages.

Strategic Managementof Intellectual Property

Markus Reitzig is an assistant professor at Copenhagen Business School in Denmark. He can bereached at reitzig@cbs.dk.

I

Intellectual property

now makes up a large

proportion of many

companies’ market value,

and IP management

can no longer be left

to technology or legal

departments alone.

Markus Reitzig

SPRING 2004 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 36

The use of patents to enjoy a short-term technological lead is

the best-known way to create competitive advantage with IP

rights, but it is fading in importance in many industries. The

pharmaceutical industry is an exception.

Denmark-based healthcare company Novo Nordisk A/S, for

example, built a dominant market position in Europe with dia-

betes drugs as the result of its license on a technology for manu-

facturing insulin from animal sources.4 “But cases like this are

rare, even in pharmaceuticals,” says Lars Kellberg, Novo Nordisk’s

vice president of business development and patents. “With mod-

ern high-throughput technology, screening methods and the

wide availability of compound libraries, it’s usually just a matter

of time until competitors find an alternative target molecule that

offers a different route to the treatment of a disease from the

patent-protected innovation of the first mover.” According to

Kellberg, “Dominant market positions due to the patenting of

one unique pharmacological solution are most likely to occur

today in the field of naturally occurring hormones; for example,

proteins derived from genome-based research.”

A second way to create competitive advantage with IP rights

involves their relationship to standards. In the mid-1990s,

Motorola Inc. had exclusive control of certain technologies that

gave it a lead in the field of GSM (Groupe Spéciale Mobile) tech-

nology.5 Other players participating in the market at the time,

including Nokia, Alcatel and Philips, held significant shares of

the patents for such technologies as switching technology,

speech coding, radio transmission and encryption. Motorola,

however, built a superior position in Europe with a three-

pronged IP-strategy approach.

First, the company supported the establishment of a common

mobile-telephony standard in Europe from the initial meeting of

the Groupe Spéciale Mobile in 1982, and it has continued to do

so since 13 mobile-phone operators agreed to accept GSM as the

international standard. Second, before and after the establish-

ment of the GSM standard, Motorola pushed its IP activities and

secured patent ownership of various essential technologies that

GSM would depend on. Third, in 1988 Motorola refused to sac-

rifice its exclusive IP rights in phone-procurement negotiations

with operators. This combination of patenting parts of the tech-

nology used in a standard, engaging in a hard-nosed licensing

policy, and making farsighted investments allowed Motorola to

create a competitive advantage in technologies that would usually

be too complex for a single player to dominate.6

Sustaining the kind of advantage that Motorola created with

its focus on GSM is difficult because, after all, technologies

change and patents expire. (Patents usually expire 20 years after

application; in certain specific cases in Europe, after 25 years.) In

the pharmaceutical industry, it is not uncommon for a target

molecule in the form of a commercialized drug to begin earning

profits a decade after the patent was applied for. One way to mit-

igate this limitation is by developing an effective combination of

intellectual property rights.

Leo Pharma A/S, a Denmark-based drug company, follows

this approach with certain skin medications. The patents protect-

ing the company’s blockbuster drug, Daivonex, will expire in

three to four years. Whereas the application of Daivonex is rec-

ommended for the steady treatment of psoriasis, Leo Pharma has

developed a second drug, Daivobet, for the treatment of acute

attacks of the disease. The two drugs are therapeutic comple-

ments, but the patents for Daivobet will last another 17 years. Leo

Pharma is bundling the two products into one therapeutic

approach; joint branding of the products to physicians and

patients assures that sales of Daivonex will benefit from the

remaining patent lifetime of its acute-treatment complement.

The Daivonex-Daivobet example illustrates the complemen-

tary use of identical types of IP rights: two patents. A patent and

a trademark can also be used complementarily, as Bayer AG has

done with aspirin. Bayer’s first patent on aspirin expired at the

beginning of the last century, but the company still earns enor-

mous revenues as a result of the strong brand value. As trade-

marks can, in principle, be renewed indefinitely, managers should

be prepared to shift their focus from patents to trademarks as the

former expire. Recent studies show that the postexpiration patent

value of a drug is enormously affected by the product’s market-

ing during the patent’s life. The returns from originally branded

The article presents first-phase findings of a larger

research study on the managerial use of intellectual prop-

erty rights that is currently being conducted at the Copen-

hagen Business School. Primary data were collected

through in-depth interviews with senior corporate repre-

sentatives responsible for IP matters. Secondary sources

include both scientific publications and publicly available

information about companies as well as information from

patent and trademark databases.

At first, a broad synopsis of the scientific literature was

carried out. Its essence is a distillation of managerially

relevant insights from various sources encompassing theo-

retical and empirical economics as well as applied manage-

ment. Classic strategic aspects were then buttressed by

IP-related findings from these earlier scientific studies,

preferably from large-scale empirical studies. Remaining

strategic aspects not touched upon in prior studies on IP

were addressed by providing real-world examples. A test of

the emerging IP strategy’s comprehensibility for future

managers with other than technical or legal backgrounds

was carried out in a teaching experiment with students at

the Copenhagen Business School.

About the Research

37 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW SPRING 2004

drugs can be significantly higher than expected after patent expi-

ration, despite competition from generic products.7

Finally, substitute patents can be used to sustain a competitive

advantage in certain industries, such as basic chemicals. Compa-

nies can build a “patent fence”; that is, they protect not only a

product’s core invention but also easy-to-build substitutes.8

Patents That Shape Industry StructureGoing back to the 19th century, when international dyestuff

manufacturers used patent rights to form cartels in certain mar-

ket segments (such as alkali), IP rights have been used to shape

the structure of various industries. In 1933, DuPont licensed its

cellophane to Sylvania (a U.S. subsidiary of a Belgian company).

The contract specified that DuPont would earn a 2% royalty on

Sylvania’s sales of cellophane when Sylvania had 20% or less of

the market’s share. But DuPont would earn royalties of 30% on

any sales over that market-share figure, rendering it unprofitable

for Sylvania to exceed its quota.9

In the semiconductor industry today, patents are also licensed

but not primarily for reasons of market sharing. Patent-protected

technology is exchanged mutually between a larger number of

players in the market. The exchanged technology is highly comple-

mentary and enters the products of many players. Since daily pro-

duction costs in the industry are enormous, however, one of the

most dangerous threats for a firm arising from this mutual

dependence is to have its production facility closed — if only for a

few days — as the result of an injunction in the case of pending

patent litigation. The losses can be so severe as to drive a company

out of business. To pose a credible counterthreat, companies seek

to hold patents that are also used by their competitors. Thus the

main purposes of patenting in this industry are not necessarily to

deter entry but to create a market for know-how exchange and to

obviate the threat of being shut down by established competitors.10

Vertical and Horizontal DifferentiationIn cases of head-to-head competition with core products, senior

managers must consider such issues as product design, informa-

tion and timing as they relate to IP rights. Competition along the

dimension of technical IP rights has long been thought of as a mat-

ter of protecting major technological breakthroughs that would

lead to radical innovations in the market (that is, competition with

vertically differentiated products). This perspective is still legiti-

mate in some industries (pharmaceuticals, for example) but not

all. According to a top IP manager at Nokia, one of the company’s

most precious assets is a multiple patent, design and trademark

combination covering Nokia’s unique user interfaces for cellular

phones. A cellphone interface is rarely a radical innovation driving

down the opportunity costs of production. (Competition on this

feature comes much closer to horizontal than to vertical differen-

tiation, well known from the field of branding but almost

unknown in the patent sector.) User surveys confirm, however,

that Nokia’s interface is valued highly by a large share of customers.

Companies can also outwit competitors by conveying IP

information strategically. They may, for example, disclose infor-

mation in legal bulletins about IP rights that confuses competi-

tors about potential technology trajectories they are pursuing.

German companies in the 19th and 20th centuries issued mis-

leading “evasion” patents to render it difficult for competitors to

establish a clear link between dyestuff patents and the dyestuff

products actually sold in the market.11

The timing of IP rights decisions is also important. The key

trade-off lies between the disclosure of technical knowledge and

the assurance of early protection through patents.12 Products

with short life cycles may generate most of their returns before a

patent is granted. If such products are illegitimately imitated dur-

ing this period, patent holders face difficulties in claiming their

real economic losses in courts as opposed to patent infringement

occurring after a patent’s grant.13 For that reason, secrecy may be

more effective than the patent process for technology products

with short life cycles.

Incumbency AdvantagesIncumbency advantages can result from economies of scale,

cumulative investment in a technology, consumer loyalty and

switching costs. Companies can often use intellectual property

rights to obtain incumbency advantages.

Incumbent biotechnology companies in Canada have success-

fully employed cumulative investment. Increases in the level and

concentration of incumbents’ patenting appear to discourage the

founding of new businesses and to enhance incumbency advan-

tages, particularly in human application sectors (such as diagnos-

tics, therapeutics and vaccines) of the industry where development

and approval processes are more costly and time-consuming.14

Companies can also use IP rights to increase switching costs.

In the semiconductor industry, patenting is not necessarily used to deter entry but to create a market for know-how exchange and to obviate the threat of established competitors.

SPRING 2004 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 38

One effect of established standards is that subsequently developed

complementary technology is often designed to be standard-com-

patible. Switching costs for users changing from Microsoft desktops

to Linux do not solely depend on the features of the Microsoft and

the Linux operating system but also on complementary software.

And standards are not the only way to create switching costs.

Novo Nordisk has a trademark-protected insulin-delivery device

called NovoPen. As Lars Kellberg notes, “The most profitable part

of the business in this sector is the refill business — selling insulin

cartridges that fit the base delivery device.” To make sure that

Top-level managers need to answer six pressing questions if they are to turn the use of intellectual property rights (IPRs) into a

strategic weapon.

The Fundamentals of an IP Rights Strategy

Strategic Question

How do IPRs helpcompanies gainand sustain com-petitive advantage?

How do IPRs affectthe structure of anindustry?

Which options doIPRs offer in thecompetition withother industryplayers?

How do IPRs relateto incumbencyadvantage andentry barriers?

How can IPRs help companiesgain vertical poweralong the valuechain?

Which organiza-tional design is necessary toaccommodate an IP strategy?

Strategic Aspect IPRs Options

Create IPR-based technological incum-bency

Create brand name

Create IPR-protected installed base/de facto standard

Sustain competitive advantage throughIPR combination

Use IPRs to amass market share in tech-nologically discrete industries

Use IPRs as bargaining chips in techno-logically complex industries

Use IPRs to differentiate vertically

Use IPRs to differentiate horizontally

Create advantages through cumulativepatenting

Create advantages by combining brandsand patents

Create “learning economies” by identify-ing and binding elite scientists

Support product-space packing withtrademarks and patents

Use IPRs to increase power in a differentsegment of the value chain

Create IP functions at the corporate andthe business-unit level

Examples

Novo Nordisk (insulin)

U.K. industrial product manufacturers*

Motorola (GSM standard)

LeoPharma (psoriasis drugs —comple-mentary patents)

Bayer (aspirin — complementary patentand trademark)

Dyestuff industry in the 19th century

U.S. semiconductor industry

Numerous luxury brands

Patents protecting radical innovations

Kellogg (cereals — trademarks)

Nokia (mobile phone interfaces —trademark, patent and designcombinations)

Canadian biotech industry

Geox (footwear)

German chemical, electronic and engi-neering corporations

Henkel KGaA (detergents)

Nokia (loudspeakers)

Toshiba

* See P. Michell, J. King and J. Reast, “Brand Values Related to Industrial Products,” Industrial Marketing Management 30, no. 5 (2001): 415-425.

Def

init

ion

of

com

pet

itiv

e st

rate

gy

Exte

rnal

co

nte

xt

Ind

ust

ry

stru

ctu

reH

ori

zon

tal c

om

pet

itio

nV

erti

cal

com

pet

itio

n

Inte

rnal

co

nte

xt

39 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW SPRING 2004

competitors cannot enter this market at low cost, the corporation

has taken sophisticated IP countermeasures. “We patent-pro-

tected the cartridge-pen interface,” says Kellberg, rendering it dif-

ficult for rivals to offer cartridges that go with NovoPen.

Consumers face full switching costs — including the purchase of

a new base delivery device — if they want to choose cheaper car-

tridges from another supplier.

IP rights are not solely a matter of technical advantages. Pro-

motional advantages are created through the existence of strong,

trademark-protected brands. And some companies recognize the

value of patents for branding. At least three large shoe manufac-

turers, Teva, New Balance, and Geox, incorporate (pending)

patents directly or indirectly into their marketing by making the

information visible to the customers. Geox even has a top-level

Web site category called “Patents.”

Binding human resources to a corporation is also important

for companies seeking to maintain incumbency advantages with

IP rights. Recent studies show that a small elite of inventors

accounts for the major part of a firm’s patented output.15 Identi-

fying and binding such people to the corporation is essential for

building up “learning economics” in high-tech corporations.

Attracting top scientists from competitors can accelerate the

learning process. And IP rights information services, found in

many large companies today, can help to complete these tasks.

Raising Entry BarriersOptimally, an incumbency advantage can be turned into an entry

barrier for followers. Companies have long used trademarks as

one of several legitimate ways to “pack” a product space to reduce

the number of profitable niches for competitors.

Henkel KGaA Germany, a laundry and home-care company,

has protected a wide variety of laundry detergents with trade-

marks, capturing many preferences consumers may have.16 By

doing so, the company makes further horizontal product differen-

tiation more difficult for its competitors. While the practice of dif-

ferentiating products horizontally and protecting them with

trademarks is well-known (Kellogg’s approach with breakfast

cereal is another example), Henkel’s laundry-product portfolio is

differentiated vertically as well. Several of the detergents exist both

in traditional and advanced patent-protected fast-solubility forms

(which are also protected by trademarks). The goal is “to support

every delivery form and any reasonable concentration range of

innovative active ingredients,” notes Thomas Mueller-Kirschbaum,

CTO of Henkel KGaA’s Laundry and Home Care. “Aside from

patents, a lot of our products and packagings are protected by util-

ity models, design patents, and trademarks,” he says. The strategy

has paid off: Henkel has been ranked among the European market

leaders for detergents for many decades now.

The same rationale explains why Novo Nordisk brings out

patent-protected one-way insulin-delivery devices and partly

cannibalizes its own business of NovoPen. The one-way devices

(not refillable) “patent block” another niche in the product space

for insulin-delivery devices.

Creating Power With SuppliersEven among sophisticated IP managers today, it is commonly

assumed that the use of IP rights is restricted to horizontal com-

petition. But there is little theoretical reason to stick with this

premise, and the real world provides some contradictory evidence.

Consider the effects of Nokia’s patents on loudspeakers. Even

though the company does not engage in the production of cell-

phone components, it keeps a handle on its suppliers by maintain-

ing control of key IP rights in different segments of the value chain.

Nokia has such patents not in order to squeeze suppliers but “to

forearm against price increases in an upstream segment where

competition is not too high as there is only a handful of suppliers,”

according to senior IP manager Peter Halkjær. In more competitive

areas involving, for example, antenna technology, where Nokia can

choose from dozens of suppliers, it is not as important to buttress

its supply chain management by leveraging IP rights. Still, the

company plays it safe, taking out patents in other technologies, and

because of its strong position on the value chain, it can influence

disputes between suppliers and operators of Nokia equipment.

Organizational DesignSince the tasks associated with the execution of a proper IP strat-

egy are many, labor has to be divided and hierarchy and control

have to be established. In addition to filing for and enforcing IP

rights, companies must attend to licensing, technology forecast-

ing, information provision and consultancy regarding the choice

of research trajectories. Reports coming out of IP departments

should help to identify potential strategic allies, select lucrative

market segments, and recruit new personnel.

Researchers agree that Western companies have lagged behind

Nokia keeps a handle on its suppliers by maintaining control of key IP rights in different segmentsof the value chain “to forearm against price increases in an upstream segment.”

SPRING 2004 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 40

in the organizational implementation of IP strategy. The van-

guards are found in Japan, and Hitachi Ltd. and Toshiba Corp.

are two of the leaders.17 At Toshiba, intellectual property depart-

ments exist at both the business-unit and corporate level.

Toshiba’s IP units provide the planning and coordination of

activities related to IP rights; draft and stipulate technology con-

tracts; protect software; file and license designs, trademarks and

patents; and host an information center. The organizational

structure reflects both the importance assigned to IP rights by

top-level management and the company’s comprehensive

approach to the issue. Toshiba’s IP strategy yielded roughly 340

European patent applications per year between 1978 and 2003

over hundreds of technological subgroups.18

The increasing corporate value of intellectual property has a

consequence for senior leaders: They must not leave IP-related

questions to functional management levels alone. Instead, they

must take a strategic approach to the issue. The key lies in treat-

ing intellectual property as they would any other strategic issue

facing their organizations. By thinking through the questions sys-

tematically — about competitive advantage, industry structure,

entry barriers, competitors, suppliers and organization — they

can make IP a strategic weapon in the corporate arsenal.

REFERENCES

1. Peter J. King, managing partner of Arthur Andersen’s IntellectualProperty Asset Management Practice, quoted in the introduction to K.Rivette and D. Kline, “Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the HiddenValue of Patents” (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999).

2. The particular order of the questions is inspired by G. Saloner, A.Shepard and J. Podolny, “Strategic Management” (New York: JohnWiley, 2000), 160, 165.

3. Next to the specifically mentioned references in the following end-notes, this article builds on the following major contributions: G. Rahn,“Patenstrategien japanischer Unternehmen,” Gewerblicher Rechts-schutz und Urheberrecht (international) 5, (1994): 377-382; E. Kaufer,“The Economics of the Patent System” (New York: Harwood AcademicPublishers, 1989); S. Scotchmer, “Standing on the Shoulders ofGiants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,” The Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 5 (winter 1991): 29-42; N.T. Gallini, “PatentPolicy and Costly Imitation,” RAND Journal of Economics 23 (spring1992): 52-63; J.R. Green and S. Scotchmer, “On the Division of Profitin Sequential Innovation,” RAND Journal of Economics 26 (spring1995): 20-33; P.C. Grindley and D.J. Teece, “Managing IntellectualCapital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Elec-tronics,” California Management Review 39 (winter 1997): 8-41; D.J.Teece, “Capturing Value From Knowledge Assets: The New Economy,Markets for Know-How and Intangible Assets,” California ManagementReview 40 (spring 1998): 55-79; R.C. Levin, A.K. Klevorick, R.R. Nel-son and S.G. Winter, “Appropriating the Returns From IndustrialResearch and Development,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity3 (1987): 783-820; and C. Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket:Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard-Setting,” Innovation Policyand the Economy 1 (2001): 119-150.

4. In 1926 Novo Nordisk started exporting insulin to the rest of Scandi-navia and Germany. In 1936 Novo was supplying insulin to not fewerthan 40 countries.

5. For a comprehensive empirical study of this industry, see R.Bekkers, G.M. Duysters and B. Verspagen, “Intellectual PropertyRights, Strategic Technology Agreements and Market Structure: TheCase of the GSM,” Research Policy 31 (2002): 1,141-1,161.

6. Ibid. According to the literature, however, it seems legitimate to saythat Motorola did not fully sustain this advantage to the present.

7. J. Hudson, “Generic Take-Up in the Pharmaceutical Market Follow-ing Patent Expiry: A Multi-Country Study,” International Review of Lawand Economics 20, no. 2 (2000): 205-221.

8. For discussions of patent fences, see O. Granstrand, “The Econom-ics and Management of Intellectual Property: Towards Intellectual Cap-italism” (Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999): 6-8,W.M. Cohen, R.R. Nelson and J.P. Walsh, “Protecting Their Intellec-tual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. ManufacturingFirms Patent (or Not),” working paper w7552, National Bureau of Eco-nomic Research, Cambridge, Massachsuetts, 2000; and M. Reitzig,“The Private Value of ‘Thickets’ and ‘Fences’ — Towards an UpdatedPicture of the Use of Patents Across Industries,” Economics of Innova-tion and New Technology, in press.

9. A. Arora, “Patents Licensing and Market Structure in the ChemicalIndustry,” Research Policy 26, no. 4-5 (1997): 391-403.

10. B.H. Hall and R.H. Ziedonis, “The Patent Paradox Revisited: AnEmpirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,1979-1995,” RAND Journal of Economics 32, no. 1 (2001): 101-128.

11. Arora, “Patents Licensing and Market Structure in the ChemicalIndustry,” 393.

12. See I. Horstmann, G. MacDonald and A. Slivinski, “Patents asInformation Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not ToPatent,” Journal of Political Economy 93 (October 1985): 837-858, fora more fundamental discussion of the trade-off between patenting andsecrecy.

13. C. Heath, J. Henkel and M. Reitzig, “Who Really Profits FromPatent Infringements? Innovative Incentives and Disincentives FromPatent Indemnification,” working paper 2002-18, Center for Law, Eco-nomics and Financial Institutions at Copenhagen Business School,Copenhagen, Denmark, 2002.

14. T.J. Calabrese, A.C. Baum and B.S. Silverman, “CanadianBiotechnology Start-Ups, 1991-1997: The Role of Incumbents’ Patentsand Strategic Alliances in Controlling Competition,” Social ScienceResearch 29, no. 4 (2000): 503-534.

15. H. Ernst, C. Leptien and J. Vitt, “Inventors Are Not Alike: The Dis-tribution of Patenting Output Among Industrial R&D Personnel,” IEEETransactions on Engineering Management 47, no. 2 (2000): 184-199.

16. According to the database of the German Patent Office, Henkel’snational trademark protection in Germany for detergents comprises 64trademarks in connection with Persil, 19 in connection with WeisserRiese, 11 with Spee, 13 with Fewa and 9 with Perwoll — to mentionfive of its nine brands.

17. Granstrand, “The Economics and Management of IntellectualProperty”; see also R.H. Pitkethly, “Intellectual Property Strategy inJapanese and U.K. Companies: Patent Licensing Decisions andLearning Opportunities,” Research Policy 30, no. 3 (2001): 425-442.

18. According to the European Patent Register, Toshiba (whichincludes Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba as well as those corporations bear-ing the fragment Toshiba in their corporate name) had filed for 8,427European patents between 1978 and October 2003. Patents were dis-tributed over 2,430 subgroups.

Reprint 45308. For ordering information, see page 1.Copyright Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. All rights reserved.

MITSloanManagement Review

PDFs ■ Reprints ■ Permission to Copy ■ Back Issues

Electronic copies of MIT Sloan Management Reviewarticles as well as traditional reprints can be purchasedon our Web site: www.sloanreview.mit.edu or you mayorder through our Business Service Center (9 a.m.-5p.m. ET) at the phone numbers listed below.

To reproduce or transmit one or more MIT Sloan Man-agement Review articles by electronic or mechanicalmeans (including photocopying or archiving in anyinformation storage or retrieval system) requires writtenpermission. To request permission, use our Web site(www.sloanreview.mit.edu), call or e-mail:

Toll-free in U.S. and Canada: 877-727-7170International: 617-253-7170e-mail: smrpermissions@mit.edu

To request a free copy of our reprint catalog or order a back issue of MIT Sloan Management Review,please contact:

MIT Sloan Management Review77 Massachusetts Ave, E60-100Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

Toll-free in U.S. and Canada: 877-727-7170International: 617-253-7170Fax: 617-258-9739e-mail: smr-orders@mit.edu