STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA Dr. Monika Chansoria.
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Transcript of STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA Dr. Monika Chansoria.
STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA
Dr. Monika Chansoria
OUTLINE
Chinese WMD transfers to Pakistan Collaboration in realm of military hardware Further lowering N-threshold in South Asia
[NASR/TNWs] India’s Strategic Restraint in a “two-front”
scenario
CHINA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE TRANSFERS TO PAKISTAN
Geo-political and geo-strategic setting Drawing heavily from tumultuous historical
past Including wars, territorial/boundary disputes Heavily militarized borders China-Pakistan nuclear, missile collaboration
well acknowledged and amply documented Direct nuclear assistance to Pakistan beginning
in the 80s, and Indirect missile transfers through North Korea
CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT
Continuing contacts btw PRC entities & those associated with Pakistan’s NWs program
Chashma N-plant [2 Chinese companies involved in construction]
Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation China Nuclear Engineering Huaxing
Construction Co. Ltd. – a Chinese government-owned company
December 2012; Huaxing pled guilty in a US criminal case
Illegal export of high-performance epoxy coatings for Chashma 2 reactor
MILITARY HARDWARE TRANSFERS Nearly 50% of China’s surplus arms exported to
Pakistan at ‘subsidized’ prices Red Arrow-8 Anti-tank missile (Baktar Shikan) QW-1 Vanguard Portable Surface-to-Air Missile (Anza
2) Type-90-2/ Main Battle Tank (Al Khalid /P-90 version) JF-17 Thunder lightweight multi-role combat aircraft C-801/C-802 (CSS-N-8) Anti-ship missile for JF-17
combat aircraft/Azmat Fast Attack F-22 Frigate (Zulfiquar) K-8 Karakorum-8 lightweight trainer/attack jets A-100 300 mm Self-propelled MRL multiple rocket
launcher Type-041/Yuan Submarine, designation still uncertain
BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH ASIA Pakistan’s first-use N policy and posture, now in addition has ... Battlefield N-weapons including smaller bombs, short-range
missiles Are inherently destabilizing; further lower nuclear threshold Mounting N-warheads on extremely short-range, forward-
deployed ballistic missiles Requiring pre-delegation of the authority to launch – Early release of custody of the warhead to launcher batteries Thus increasing risk of inadvertent/unauthorized use Pre-delegation to battlefield commanders Stationed close to border/on the battlefield Putting C2 & physical security of the weapon under immense
strain Especially in crises/conflict situations Notwithstanding C2 structures in place, delegation of authority
to the field itself creates grave risks and potential escalation thereafter
LOWERING NUCLEAR THRESHOLD
Hatf IX (NASR), 60-km Short-Range Surface-to-Surface Missile
Carrier vehicle: AR1A / A100-E multiple launch rocket system
A100-E chassis with modified launching tube system -- adapted for launching NASR, procured by China
INDIA’S N-POLICY AND POSTURING
India: NWs were, and continue to remain, a political instrument
Not an instrument of war-fighting Sole purpose to deter the use, and threat of
use, of NWs Remain strictly limited in scope & operational
readiness Warheads, delivery systems with key
subcomponents ... not deployed in anyway Verified in forms of force structures, alert
levels, de-mated systems
CLASSIFYING TNWS ?????
Yield / mode of delivery often used as the criteria for classifying NWs as “tactical”
Any NW, of any quality, mode of delivery, yield, used against any type of target, will result in an impact that will be strategic
India’s N-doctrine does not differentiate between a “tactical” and a “strategic” N-weapon strike
The labellabel on a NW, used for attacking India, i.e., strategic/tactical/battlefield, remains remains irrelevantirrelevant from an Indian perspective
“TWO-FRONT” SCENARIO
Sino-Pak nuclear commerce remains politically, strategically driven
China’s growing and permanent strategic presence in PoK
Presence of PLA’s Construction Corps in PoK Pakistan’s strategic posturing coupled with
involvement in terrorist activities directed against India
Dec 2009, General Deepak Kapoor, at Army Training Command Doctrine Seminar “Indian Armed Forces must prepare for a two-
front war”
CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR
CPEC route starts from Kashgar (Xinjiang province)
Enters Pakistan through the 1,300 km KKH
Includes reconstruction, upgrading of Karakorum Highway
Running across Pakistan
Finally reaching Gwadar Sea-Port (South of Baluchistan)
For China, PoK serves strategic, politico-diplomatic objectives
Provides quasi-diplomatic support to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir
IN CONCLUSION …
India has displayed immense strategic restraint
Threshold of India’s tolerance being severely tested
A terrorist strike causing substantial casualties in future…
With proven evidence of state involvement …..