THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Over-all Report

(European War)

September 30, 1945

THE UNITED STATESSTRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Summary Report

(European War)

September 30, 1945

II

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

FOREWORD

The United States Strategic Bombing Sur-vey was established by the Secretary of Waron November 3, 1944, pursuant to a directivefrom the late President Roosevelt.

The officers of the Survey were:

Franklin D’Olier, Chairman.Henry C. Alexander, Vice-Chairman.George W. Ball,Harry L. Bowman,John K. Galbraith,Rensis Likert,Frank A. McNamee,Paul H. Nitze,Robert P. Russell,Fred Searls, Jr.,Theodore P. Wright, Directors.Charles C. Cabot, Secretary.

The Table of Organization provided for300 civilians, 350 officers and 600 enlisted men.The Survey operated from headquarters inLondon and established forward headquar-ters and regional headquarters in Germanyimmediately following the advance of theAllied armies.

It made a close examination and inspectionof several hundred German plants, cities andareas, amassed volumes of statistical anddocumentary material, including top Germangovernment documents; and conducted inter-

views and interrogations of thousands ofGermans, including virtually all of the sur-viving political and military leaders. Ger-many was scoured for its war records, whichwere found sometimes, but rarely, in placeswhere they ought to have been; sometimes insafe-deposit vaults, often in private houses,in barns, in caves; on one occasion, in a henhouse and, on two occasions, in coffins. Tar-gets in Russian-held territory were not avail-able to the Survey.

Some two hundred detailed reports weremade, including an Over-all Report, of whichthis is a summary. During the course of itswork, the Survey rendered interim reportsand submitted studies and suggestions in con-nection with the air operations against Japan.

While the European War was going on, itwas necessary, in many cases, to follow closelybehind the front; otherwise, vital recordsmight have been irretrievably lost. Surveypersonnel suffered several casualties, includ-ing four killed.

The Survey is now studying the effects ofthe air attack on Japan. When that studyis completed further reports will be sub-mitted to the Secretary of War and the Sec-retary of the Navy.

1

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

SUMMARY REPORT

The new relation of air power to strategy pre-sents one of the distinguishing contrasts betweenthis war and the last. Air power in the last warwas in its infancy. The new role of three-dimen-sional warfare was even then foreseen by a fewfarsighted men, but planes were insufficient inquality and quantity to permit much more thanoccasional brilliant assistance to the ground forces.

Air power in the European phase of this warreached a stage of full adolescence, a stage markedby rapid development in planes, armament, equip-ment, tactics and concepts of strategic employ-ment, and by an extraordinary increase in theeffort allocated to it by all the major contestants.England devoted 40 to 50 percent of her war pro-duction to her air forces, Germany 40 percent, andthe United States 35 percent.

Nevertheless, at the end of hostilities in Europe,weapons, tactics and strategy were still in a stateof rapid development. Air power had not yetreached maturity and all conclusions drawn fromexperience in the European theatre must be con-sidered subject to change. No one should assumethat because certain things were effective or noteffective, the same would be true under other cir-cumstances and other conditions.

In the European war, Allied air power wascalled upon to play many roles—partner with theNavy over the sea lanes; partner with the Armyin ground battle; partner with both on the inva-sion beaches; reconnaissance photographer for all;mover of troops and critical supplies; and attackerof the enemy’s vital strength far behind the battleline.

In the attack by Allied air power, almost 2,700,-000 tons of bombs were dropped, more than 1,440,-000 bomber sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sortieswere flown. The number of combat planes reacheda peak of some 28,000 and at the maximum 1,300,-000 men were in combat commands. The numberof men lost in air action was 79,265 Americans and

Note: All RAF statistics are preliminary or tentative.

79,281 British. More than 18,000 American and22,000 British planes were lost or damaged beyondrepair.

In the wake of these attacks there are great pathsof destruction. In Germany, 3,600,000 dwellingunits, approximately 20% of the total, were de-stroyed or heavily damaged. Survey estimatesshow some 300,000 civilians killed and 780,000wounded. The number made homeless aggregates7,500,000. The principal German cities havebeen largely reduced to hollow walls and piles ofrubble. German industry is bruised and tempo-rarily paralyzed. These are the scars across theface of the enemy, the preface to the victory thatfollowed.

How air supremacy was achieved and the resultswhich followed from its exploitation are the sub-ject of this summary report. The use of air powercannot properly be considered, however, except inconjunction with the broad plans and strategy un-der which the war was conducted.

The German Strategic PlanInterrogation of Hitler’s surviving confidants

and General Staff and Field Generals of the Wehr-macht confirms the view that prior to the winterof 1941 Hitler hoped to realize Germany’s ascend-ancy over Europe, and possibly the world, largelyby skillful strategy. Time and timing were the se-cret weapons in the German war plan that tookshape after 1933. Hitler hoped to build Germany’sstrength more quickly than that of any potentialopponent. Ity rapid mobilization of a powerfulstriking force, by exploiting the political and ideo-logical strains that he conceived to exist in the restof the world, and by overwhelming separately inlightning campaigns such of his enemies as choseto resist, he hoped to secure for Germany an invul-nerable position in Europe and in the world.

What Germany lacked in numbers of divisions,in raw materials and in basic industrial strength,it planned to compensate with highly trained

2

ground units of great striking power. These wereto be equipped and ready to march while Ger-many’s enemies were merely preparing. Essentialin this strategy was a technically well-developedair force in being. Emphasis was not placed uponthe development of an air force that would destroythe sustaining resources of the enemy’s economy.In the German plan it was anticipated that anenemy’s entire country would be so quickly over-run that little concern need be had for industrialand war production that was merely potential.The air force was, primarily, an arm of the blitz-krieg.

The success of Hitler's strategy, until the battleof Britain, was complete; his more cautious ad-visers and generals still confess to their astonish-ment. And by common report of the survivingNazi leaders even the setback over Britain wasconsidered of minor importance. The attack onRussia was next on the calendar—the decision tomake this attack was taken in the autumn of 1940—

and this, according to plan, was to be a brief fourmonths’ adventure. There would be time there-after, if necessary, to deal with Britain. By Sep-tember 1941 Hitler was so confident that he hadsucceeded in Russia that he ordered large scalecut-backs in war production.The German War Economy

Study of German war production data as wellas interrogation of those who were in charge ofrearmament at the time, leaves no doubt that untilthe defeat at Moscow German industry was incom-pletely mobilized and that in fact Germany did notforesee the need for full economic mobilization.German arms production during 1940 and 1941was generally below that of Britain. When thefull meaning of the reverses at Moscow becameapparent the German leaders called for all-outproduction. The conquests of the previous yearshad greatly strengthened Germany’s economy;with the exception of oil and rubber, supplies ofvirtually all the previously scarce imported mate-rials were or had become accessible. Great reservesof foreign labor only awaited voluntary or forcedrecruitment. The industrial plant of France, theLow Countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia hadbeen added to that of Germany. After the defeatat Moscow early in 1942, armament production in-creased rapidly. However, such increase was more

the result of improvements in industrial efficiencythan of general economic mobilization. Studiesof German manpower utilization show thatthroughout the war a great deal of German indus-try was on a single shift basis, relatively fewGerman women (less than in the first war) weredrawn into industry and the average work weekwas below British standards.

Germany’s early commitment to the doctrine ofthe short war was a continuing handicap; neitherplans nor state of mind were adjusted to the ideaof a long war. Nearly all German sources agreethat the hope for a quick victory lasted long afterthe short war became a long one. Germany’s arma-ment minister Albert Speer, who assumed office inearly 1942, rationalized German wT ar productionand eliminated the worst inefficiencies in the pre-vious controls. A threefold increase in armamentproduction' occurred under his direction but theincrease cannot be considered a testament to theefficiency of dictatorship. Rather it suggests thedegree of industrial undermobilization in the ear-lier years. An excellent case can be made thatthroughout the war top government managementin Germany was not efficient.

“The Fuehrer could not stand the climateof Russia; he complained of constant head-aches.”

Jodi, Chief of Staff of GermanHigh Com-mand, to Survey Interrogators.

Because the German economy through most ofthe war was substantially undermobilized, it wasresilient under air attack. Civilian consumptionwas high during the early years of the war andinventories both in trade channels and consumers’possession were also high. These helped cushionthe people of the German cities from the effectsof bombing. Plant and machinery were plentifuland incompletely used. Thus it was comparativelyeasy to substitute unused or partly used machineryfor that which was destroyed. While there wasconstant pressure throughout for German man-power for the Wehrmacht, the industrial laborsupply, as augmented by foreign labor, was suffi-cient to permit the diversion of large numbers tothe repair of bomb damage or the clearance ofdebris with relatively small sacrifice of essentialproduction.

3

The Allied Strategic PlanIn both the RAF and the United States Army

Air Forces there were some wdio believed that airpower could deliver the knockout blow againstGermany, and force capitulation. This view, how-ever, was not controlling in the overall Allied stra-tegic plan. The dominant element in that planwas invasion of the Continent to occur in thespring of 1944. Plans called for establishing airsuperiority prior to the date of the invasion andthe exploitation of such superiority in weakeningthe enemy’s will and capacity to resist.

The deployment of the air forces opposing Ger-many was heavily influenced by the fact that vic-tory was planned to come through invasion andland occupation. In the early years of the war,to be sure, the RAF had the independent missionof striking at German industrial centers in aneffort to weaken the German economy and themorale of the German people. However, theweight of the RAF effort, compared with tonnageslater employed, was very small—16,000 tons in1940 and 46,000 tons in 1941 compared with 676,000tons in 1944. Soon after the United States enteredthe air war in 1942, replacements for the new (andstill small) Eighth Air Force were diverted to sup-port the North African invasion. During 1943,target selection for the Eighth Air Force and theFifteenth Air Force (based on the Mediterranean)reckoned always with the fact that maximum con-tribution must be made to the invasion in the com-ing year. And the Ninth Air Force in WesternEurope and the Twelfth Air Force in the Medi-terranean were developed with the primary mis-sion of securing the sky in the theatre of combatand clearing the way for ground operations. Inthe spring and early summer of 1944, all air forcesbased on England were used to prepare the way forthe invasion. It was not intended that the air at-tacks against Germany proper and the Germaneconomy would be a subordinate operation, butrather a part of a larger strategic plan—one thatcontemplated that the decision would come throughthe advance of ground armies rather than throughair power alone.

Early Air Operations—City Area RaidsThe pioneer in the air war against Germany was

the RAF. The RAF experimented briefly in 1940

with daylight attacks on industrial targets in Ger-many but abandoned the effort when losses provedunbearably heavy. Thereafter, it attempted tofind and attack such targets as oil, aluminum andaircraft plants at night. This effort too was aban-doned; with available techniques it was not pos-sible to locate the targets often enough. Then theRAF began its famous raids on German urban andindustrial centers. On the night of May 30, 1942,it mounted its first “thousand plane” raid againstCologne and two nights later struck Essen withalmost equal force. On three nights in late Julyand early August 1943 it struck Hamburg in per-haps the most devastating single city attack of thewar—about one third of the houses of the city weredestroyed and German estimates show 60,000 to100,000 people killed. No subsequent city raidshook Germany as did that on Hamburg; docu-ments show that German officials were thoroughlyalarmed and there is some indication from interro-gation of high officials that Hitler himself thoughtthat further attacks of similar weight might forceGermany out of the war. The RAF proceeded todestroy one major urban center after another. Ex-cept in the extreme eastern part of the Reich, thereis no major city that does not bear the mark ofthese attacks. However, no subsequent attack hadthe shock effect of the Hamburg raid.

“I reported for the first time orally to theFuehrer that if these aerial attacks con-tinued, a rapid end of the war might be theconsequence.*’

Speer to Survey Interrogators on theHamburg attacks.

In the latter half of 1944, aided by new naviga-tional techniques, the RAF returned with part ofits force to an attack on industrial targets. Theseattacks were notably successful but it is with theattacks on urban areas that the RAF is most prom-inently identified.

The city attacks of theRAF prior to the autumnof 1944, did not substantially affect the course ofGerman war production. German war productionas a whole continued to increase. This in itself isnot conclusive, but the Survey has made detailedanalysis of the course of production and trade in10 German cities that were attacked during this

4

period and has made more general analyses inothers. These show that while production receiveda moderate setback after a raid, it recovered sub-stantially within a relatively few weeks. As a rulethe industrial plants were located around the per-imeter of German cities and characteristicallythese were relatively undamaged.

Commencing in the autumn of 1944, the tonnagedropped on city areas, plus spill-overs from attackson transportation and other specific targets,mounted greatly. In the course of these raids,Germany’s steel industry was knocked out, itselectric power industry was substantially impairedand industry generally in the areas attacked wasdisorganized. There were so many forces makingfor tlie collapse of production during this period,however, that it is not possible separately to assessthe effect of these later area raids on war produc-tion. There is no doubt, however, that they weresignificant.

The Survey has made extensive studies of thereaction of the German people to the air attackand especially to city raids. These studies werecarefully designed to cover a complete cross sec-tion of the German people in western and southernGermany and to reflect with a minimum of biastheir attitude and behavior during the raids.These studies show that the morale of the Germanpeople deteriorated under aerial attack. The nightraids were feared far more than daylight raids.The people lost faith in the prospect of victory, intheir leaders and in the promises and propagandato which they were subjected. Most of all, theywanted the war to end. They resorted increas-ingly to “black radio” listening, to circulation ofrumor and fact in opposition to the Regime; andthere was some increase in active political dissi-dence—in 1944 one German in every thousand wasarrested for a political offense. If they had beenat liberty to vote themselves out of the war, theywould have done so well before the final surrender.In a determined police state, however, there is awide difference between dissatisfaction and ex-pressed opposition. Although examination of offi-cial records and those of individual plants showsthat absenteeism increased and productivity dimin-ished somewhat in the late stages of the war, by andlarge workers continued to work. However dis-satisfied they were with the war, the German

people lacked either the will or the means to maketheir dissatisfaction evident.

The city area raids have left their mark on theGerman people as well as on their cities. Far morethan any other military action that preceded theactual occupation of Germany itself, these attacksleft the German people with a solid lesson in thedisadvantages of war. It was a terrible lesson;conceivably that lesson, both in Germany andabroad, could be the most lasting single effectof the air war.

The First Daylight Operations

“When Pearl Harbor came, the Fuehrerand myself, of course, showed to the outsideworld a happy face, but we were not pleased/’

Ribhentroj) to Survey Interrogators.

The U. S. Army Air Forces entered the Euro-pean war with the firm view that specific indus-tries and services were the most promising targetsin the enemy economy, and they believed thatif these targets were to be hit accurately, theattacks had to be made in daylight. A word needsto be said on the problem of accuracy in attack.Before the war, the U. S. Army Air Forces hadadvanced bombing techniques to their highestlevel of development and had trained a limitednumber of crews to a high degree of precision inbombing under target range conditions, thus lead-ing to the expressions “pin point” and “picklebarrel” bombing. However, it was not possibleto approach such standards of accuracy underbattle conditions imposed over Europe. Manylimiting factors intervened ; target obscuration byclouds, fog, smoke screens and industrial haze;enemy fighter opposition which necessitated de-fensive bombing formations, thus restricting free-dom of maneuver; antiaircraft artillery defenses,demanding minimum time exposure of the attack-ing force in order to keep losses down; and finally,time limitations imposed on combat crew trainingafter the war began.

It was considered that enemy opposition madeformation flying and formation attack a necessarytactical and technical procedure. Bombing pat-terns resulted—only a portion of which could fallon small precision targets. The rest spilled over

5

on adjacent plants, or built-up areas, or in openfields. Accuracy ranged from poor to excellent.When visual conditions were favorable and flak de-fenses were not intense, bombing results were attheir best. Unfortunately, the major portion ofbombing operations over Germany had to be con-ducted under weather and battle conditions that re-stricted bombing technique, and accuracy sufferedaccordingly. Conventionally the air forces desig-nated as “the target area” a circle having a radiusof 1000 feet around the aiming point of attack.While accuracy improved during the war, Surveystudies show that, in the over-all, only about 20%of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell withinthis target area. A peak accuracy of TO% wasreached for the month of February 1945. Theseare important facts for the reader to keep in mind,especially when considering the tonnages of bombsdelivered by the air forces. Of necessity a farlarger tonnage was carried than hit Germaninstallations.

Although the Eighth Air Force began opera-tions August IT, 1942, with the bombing of mar-shalling yards at Rouen and Sotteville in north-ern France, no operations during 1942 or the firsthalf of 1943 had significant effect. The force wassmall and its range limited. Much time in thisperiod was devoted to training and testing theforce under combat conditions.

In November and December of 1942, the U-boatattack on Allied merchant shipping was in itsmost successful phase and submarine bases andpens and later construction yards became thechief target and remained so until June 1943.These attacks accomplished little. The subma-rine pens were protected and bombs did not pene-trate the 12-foot concrete roofs. The attack onthe construction yards and slipways was notheavy enough to be more than troublesome.

In January 1943, at Casablanca, the objective ofthe strategic air forces was established as the “de-struction and dislocation of the Germany military,industrial, and economic system and the undermin-ing of the morale of the German people to thepoint where their capacity for armed resistance isfatally weakened.” Specific target systems werenamed.

In the spring of 1943, Allied naval and airpower scored a definite victory over German sub-

marines. Surface craft teamed with long-rangepatrol bombers equipped with radar raised Ger-man submarine losses to catastrophic levels in thespring of 1943. Interrogation of members of theHigh Command of the German Navy, includingAdmiral Doenitz, has confirmed the scope of thisvictory. When the Combined Bomber OffensivePlan was issued in June of 1943 to implement theCasablanca directive, submarines were droppedfrom first priority and the German aircraft in-dustry w’as substituted. The German ball-bearingindustry, the supplier of an important component,was selected as a complementary target.The Ball-Bearing Attack

The German anti-friction bearing industry washeavily concentrated. When the attack began, ap-proximately half the output came from plants inthe vicinity of Schweinfurt, An adequate supplyof bearings was correctly assumed to be indispen-sable for German war production.

In a series of raids beginning on August IT,1943, about 12,000 tons of bombs were dropped onthis target—about one-half of one per cent of thetotal tonnage delivered in the air war. In anattack on August IT by 200 B-lT’s on Schwein-furt, the plants were severely damaged. Recordsof the industry taken by the Survey (and supple-mented and checked by interrogation) show thatproduction of bearings at this center was reducedsharply—September production was 35% of thepre-raid level. In this attack 36 of the 200 attack-ing planes were lost. In the famous and much-discussed second attack on October 14, 1943, whenthe plants were again severely damaged, one ofthe decisive air battles of the war took place.The 228 bombers participating were strongly at-tacked by German fighters when beyond the rangeof their fighter escort. Losses to fighters and toflak cost the United States forces 62 planes withanother 138 damaged in varying degree, some be-yond repair. Repeated losses of this magnitudecould not be sustained; deep penetrations withoutescort, of which this was among the earliest, weresuspended and attacks on Schweinfurt were notrenewed for four months. The Germans madegood use of the breathing spell. A czar was ap-pointed with unlimited priority for requisitioningmen and materials. Energetic steps were takento disperse the industry. Restoration was aided

6

by the circumstance—which Survey investiga-tions show to have been fairly common to all suchraids—that machines and machine tools weredamaged far less severely than factory structures.German equipment was redesigned to substituteother types of bearings wherever possible. Andthe Germans drew on the substantial stocks thatwere on hand. Although there were further at-tacks, production by the autumn of 1944 was backto pre-raid levels. From examination of the rec-ords and personalities in the ball-bearing indus-try, the user industries and the testimony of warproduction officials, there is no evidence that theattacks on the ball-bearing industry had anymeasurable effect on essential war production.The Attack on German Aircraft Plants

The heavy losses over Schweinfurt caused animportantrevision in the tactics of daylight bomb-ing. Until then it had been believed that unes-corted bombers, heavily gunned and flying in welldesigned formations, could penetrate this deeplyover the Reich. At least, so far as a small forcewas concerned, this was proven wrong. For theremainder of 1943 after the Schweinfurt raids,daylight penetrations beyond fighter escort weresharply circumscribed. Meanwhile the U. S. heavybomber force increased substantially in strength.In December of 1943, the P-51 (Mustang) long-range fighter first became available and in theearly months of 1944 the numbers increased. Withthis plane, in some respects the most importantaddition to Allied air power during the Europeanwar, augmenting the P-47 (Thunderbolt) escortswhich in the meantime had materially increasedtheir range, daylight operations in depth wereagain launched.

The attack on the German aircraft industry—-primarily on airframe plants—was opened in thesummer of 1943. The German aircraft industryhad been well distributed over the Reich with aview to the possibility of air attack. Isolated raidsearly in 1941 and 1942 had caused some furthershift in production to eastern territory but onlylimited steps had been taken to disperse individualplant units in order to reduce their vulnerability.The industry was found to have had substantialexcess capacity. The efficiency of the industry waslow. Unlike other armaments, procurement wasnot under the direction of the Speer Ministry butunder the Luftwaffe.

Production in the early years of the war wassmall, primarily because Luftwaffe requirementswere modest—in 1941 according to captured min-utes of German staff conferences, General Jeschon-neck, then chief of theair staff, opposed a suggestedincrease in fighter plane production with the re-mark that he wouldn’t know what to do with amonthly production of more than 360 fighters.However, in the autumn of 1943 plans then currentcalled for a steadily increasing output of fighters.

In the 1943 attacks, 5,092 tons were dropped on14 plants, primarily on airframe plants. The rec-ords slioav that acceptances of the Me-109, Ger-many’s standard single-engine fighter, droppedfrom 725 in July to 536 in September and to a lowof 357 in December. Acceptances of Focke-Wulf190’s dropped from 325 in July to 203 in December.As a result of the attacks the Germans began amore vigorous program of subdividing and dis-persing aircraft plants and this caused part of thereduction in production. A further but undeter-mined part was the result of poor weather whichcut down acceptance flights; it is probable thatsome planes produced but not accepted duringthese months were added to acceptance figures inthe months following. The Germans as a result ofthese attacks decided to place increased emphasison the production of fighter planes.

The culminating attacks on the German aircraftindustry began in the last week of February 1944.With the protection of long-range fighter escort,3,636 tons of bombs were dropped on German air-craft plants (again, airframe rather than engineplants) during that week. In that and succeed-ing weeks every known aircraft plant in Germanywas hit.

Detailed production data for this period, as forothers, were taken by the Survey, and German airgenerals, production officials, and leading manu-facturers, including Messerschmitt and Tank (ofFocke-Wulf) were interrogated at length. Pro-duction was not knocked out for long. On thecontrary, during the whole year of 1944 the Ger-man air force is reported to have accepted a totalof 39,807 aircraft of all types—compared with8,295 in 1939, or 15,596 in 1942 before the plantssuffered any attack. Although it is difficult todetermine exact production for any single month,acceptances were higher in March, the month after

7

the heaviest attack, than they were in January, themonth before. They continued to rise.

Part of the explanation was the excess capacityof the airframe industry which, as noted, was con-siderable. Excess capacity in airframes was con-siderably greater than in engines. Studies of indi-vidual plants by the Survey show that althoughbuildings were destroyed the machine tools showedremarkable durability. And the Germans showedcapacity for improvising their way out. Imme-diately after the attacks, responsibility for pro-duction was shifted from the Luftwaffe to theSpeer Ministry. A special staff was organized forthe reconstitution and dispersal of the industry.This staff (the Jaegerstab or Fighter-Staff) ap-pears to have done an effective job of mobilizingunused capacity and undamaged machines, reor-ganizing inefficient managements, reducing thenumber of types of planes and, most important ofall, in subdividing production into small units thatwere comparatively immune from attack. It wasaided by previous plans for expansion and it cutsharply into available inventories of parts. Al-though the testimony on the point is conflicting,the Jaegerstab may have sacrificed quality and anadequate complement of spare parts, for quantityproduction. Nevertheless the attack on the air-craft plants, like the attack on the ball-bearingplants, showed that to knock out a single industrywith the weapons available in 1943 and early 1944was a formidable enterprise demanding continu-ous attacks to effect complete results. Recoverywas improvised almost as quickly as the plantswere knocked out. With the shift in priority forstrategic attacks—first to marshalling yards andbridges in France in preparation for invasion, im-mediately followed by the air campaign againstoil—the continued attacks on the aircraft industrywere suspended.The Defeat of the German Air Force

The seeming paradox of the attack on the air-craft plants is that, although production recoveredquickly, the German air force after the attacks

“I believe the Fuehrer was not very muchelated at the loss of efficiency of our airforces.”

Kesselring to Survey Interrogators.

was not again a serious threat to Allied air superi-ority. The attacks in the winter of 1944 were es-corted by P-51’s and P-47’s and with the appear-ance of these planes in force a sharp change hadbeen ordered in escort tactics. Previously the es-cort planes had to protect the bomber force as theirprimary responsibility. They were now instructedto invite opposition from German fighter forcesand to engage them at every opportunity. As aresult, German fighter losses mounted sharply.The claimed losses in January were 1,115 Germanfighters, in February 1.118 and in March 1,217.The losses in planes were accompanied by losses inexperienced pilots and disorganization and loss ofthe combat strength of squadrons and groups. Bythe spring of 1944opposition of the Luftwaffe hadceased to be effective.

German air generals responsible for operationsin Franee stated under interrogation that on D-daythe Luftwaffe had only 80 operational planes withwhich to oppose the invasion. At no time be-tween D-day and the breakthrough at St. Lo didreinforcements offset losses and increase the sizeof this force.

German fighter production continued to increaseduring the summer of 1944, and acceptancesreached a peak of 3,375 in September. Althoughit has studied the problem with considerable care,the Survey has no clear answer as to what hap-pened to these planes; the differences of opinionbetween German air generals, it might be added,are at least as great as between those who havesearched for the explanation. Certainly only aminority of the planes appeared in combat. Pos-sibly the remainder were lost in transit from fac-tory to combat bases, destroyed on the fields, orgrounded because of a shortage of gasoline orpilots. Conceivably some are part of an inflationof German production figures. The answer is notclear.

“The more I have been asked about thesethings, the clearer they become.”

Goering to Survey Interrogators.

After September, German aircraft productiondeclined gradually until December, when 3,155planes were accepted, and in January 1945, be-cause of the shortage of gasoline, production of

8

all except jet types was virtually discontinued.The jet planes, especially the ME-262, were themost modern planes which any belligerent hadin general operation at the end of the war. Ac-cording to manufacturers and other competent ob-servers, their production was delayed because ofthe failure of the Luftwaffe to recognize in timethe advantages of the type. It was also delayedbecause Hitler intervened in 1944with an ill-timedorder to convert the ME-262 to a fighter-bomber.Virtually every manufacturer, production official,and air force general interrogated by the Survey,including Goering himself, claimed to have beenappalled by this order. By May 1945, 1,400 jetshad been produced. Had these planes been avail-able six months earlier with good quality pilots,though they might not have altered the course ofthe war, they would have sharply increased thelosses of the attacking forces.

“At every conversation with the Fuehrer Iused to ask, ‘When will the Luftwaffe ar-rive?’ ”

Kesselring to Survey Interrogators.

The Attack on OilWith the reduction of German air power, oil

became the priority target in the German economy.The bomber force for several months had beenadequate for the task. A preliminary attack waslaunched on May 12, 1944, followed by another onMay 28; the main blow was not struck, however,until after D-day. In the months before D-dayand for a shorter period immediately following,all available air power based on England was de-voted to insuring the success of the invasion.

Virtually complete records of the German oilindustry were taken by the Survey. In addition,major plants that were subject to attack and theirrecords were studied in detail.

The German oil supply was tight throughoutthe war, and was a controlling factor in military©Derations. The chief source of supply, and theonly source for aviation gasoline, was 13 syntheticplants together with a smallproduction from threeadditional ones that started operations in 1944.The major sources of products refined from crudeoil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and theHungarian fields which together accounted for

about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuelsin 1943. In addition, there was a small but signifi-cant Austrian and domestic production. The re-fineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with adaring and costly low-level attack in August 1943.These had only limited effects; deliveries increaseduntil April 1944 when the attacks were resumed.The 1944 attacks, together with mining of theDanube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries.In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminatedthis source of supply and dependence on the syn-thetic plants became even greater than before.

Production from the synthetic plants declinedsteadily and by July 1944 every major plant hadbeen hit. These plants were producing an aver-age of 310,000 tons per month when the attacksbegan. Their production fell to 107,000 tons inJune and 17,000 tons in September. Output ofaviation gasoline from synthetic plants droppedfrom 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in Julyand 5,000 tons in September. Production recov-ered somewhat in November and December, butfor the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic.In a series of letters to Hitler, among docu-ments seized by the Survey, the developing crisisis outlined month by month in detail. On June 30,Speer wrote: “The enemy has succeeded in increas-ing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percentby June 22d. Only through speedy recovery ofdamaged plants has it been possible to regain partlysome of the terrible losses.” The tone of the let-ters that followed was similar.

As in the case of ball-bearings and aircraft, theGermans took the most energetic steps to repairand reconstruct the oil plants. Another czar wasappointed, this time Edmund Geilenberg, andagain an overriding priority on men and materialswas issued. Geilenberg used as many as 350,000men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal ofthe bombed plants and for new underground con-struction. The synthetic oil plants were vast com-plex structures and they could not be easily brokenup and dispersed. The programs of dispersal andunderground construction that were undertakenwere incomplete when the war ended.

The synthetic oil plants were brought back intopartial production and in remarkably short time.Rut unlike the ball-hearing plants, as soon as they

9

were brought back they were attacked again. Thestory of Leuna is illustrative. Leuna was thelargest of the synthetic plants and protected bya highly effective smoke screen and the heaviestflak concentration in Europe. Air crews vieweda mission to Leuna as the most dangerous anddifficult assignment of the air war. Leuna washit on May 12 and put out of production. How-ever, investigation of plant records and interroga-tion of Leuna’s officials established that a force ofseveral thousand men had it in partial operationin about 10 days. It was again hit on May 28but resumed partial production on June 3 andreached 75 percent of capacity in early July. Itwas hit again on July 7 and again shut down butproduction started 2 days later and reached 53percent of capacity on July 19. An attack onJuly 20 shut the plant down again but only forthree days; by July 27 production was back to 35percent of capacity. Attacks on July 28 and 29closed the plant and further attacks on August 24,September 11, September 13, September 28 andOctober 7 kept it closed down. However, Leunagot started again on October 14 and althoughproduction was interrupted by a small raid onNovember 2, it reached 28 percent of capacity byNovember 20. Although there were 6 moreheavy attacks in November and December (largelyineffective because of adverse weather), productionwas brought up to 15 percent of capacity in Janu-ary and was maintained at that level until nearlythe end of the war. From the first attack to theend. production at Leuna averaged 9 percent ofcapacity. There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF.Due to the urgency of keeping this plant out ofproduction, many of these missions were dis-patched in difficult bombing weather. Conse-quently, the order of bombing accuracy on Leunawas not high as compared with other targets. Towin the battle with Leuna a total of 6,552 bombersorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tonsof bombs were dropped and an entire year wasrequired.

“Today we have finished rebuilding theplants and tomorrow the bombers will comeagain.' 5

Saying attributed to German workers en-gaged inrebuilding synthetic oil plants.

Consumption of oil exceeded production fromMay 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidlyused up, and in six months were practically ex-hausted. The loss of oil production was sharplyfelt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from twohours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilottraining, previously cut down, was further cur-tailed. Through the summer, the movement ofGerman Panzer Divisions in the field was ham-pered more and more seriously as a result of Jossesin combat and mounting transportation difficul-ties, together with the fall in fuel production. ByDecember, according to Speer, the fuel shortagehad reached catastrophic proportions. When theGermans launched their counter-offensive on De-cember 1C), 1944, their reserves of fuel were insuffi-cient to support the operation. They counted oncapturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, manypanzer units were lost when they ran out of gaso-line. In February and March of 1945 the Germansmassed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead atthe Vistula to check the Russians. They wereimmobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun.

Further Dividends From the Oil AttackThe attack on the synthetic oil plants was also

found to have cost Germany its synthetic nitrogenand methanol supply and a considerable part of itsrubber supply.

Germany, like other industrial countries, reliedon synthesis for its supply of nitrogen and thesynthetic oil plants were by far the largest pro-ducers. Sixty percent of the nitrogen productionand 40 percent of the methanol production camefrom two synthetic plants. Monthly output ofsynthetic nitrogen in early 1944, before the syn-thetic plants were attacked, was about 75,000 tons.It had been reduced by the end of the year to about20,000 tons.

Nitrogen, besides being indispensable for ex-plosives, is heavily used in German agriculture.Allocation for the 1943-44 crop year was 54 per-cent of the total supply; allocation for 1944-45was first planned at 25 percent and later elimi-nated altogether. Nitrogen for munitions wasmaintained by reducing the allocation to agricul-ture, but by the end of 1944 this cushion had beensubstantially exhausted. The supply of explosivesthen declined with the reduction in supply of ni-trogen. It became necessary to fill shells with a

10

mixture of explosives and non-explosive rock saltextender. There was a general shortage of am-munition on all fronts at the end of the war. Therewas an equally serious shortage of flak ammuni-tion ; units manning flak guns were instructed notto fire on planes unless they wT ere attacking the in-stallations which the guns were specifically desig-nated to protect and unless “they were sure of hit-ting the planes!”

It is of some interest that a few weeks beforethe close of hostilities the Germans reallocated ni-trogen to agriculture at the expense of ammuni-tion. This was the result, according to ProductionMinister Speer, of an independent decision of hisown that the war was lost and the next year’s cropshould be protected.

Methanol production, necessary among otherthings for TNT, hexogen and other high explo-sives, was as severely affected as nitrogen produc-tion. Allocations to the principal consumers washeavily cut, and eventually the production ofhexogen was abandoned. The loss of methanolcoupled with the reduction in nitrogen was fol-lowed by a precipitate decline in production ofexplosives.

The synthetic rubber industry also suffered fromthe attack on oil. Official German records on rawmaterial supplies show that stockpiles of rubberAvere small at the beginning of the war—at themost sufficient for only two or three months’ con-sumption. Imports through the blockade were un-important. The supply came from four syntheticplants, one of which was a small pilot plant; andtAvo additional plants Avere under construction dur-ing the Avar. One of the major plants, located atHuels, was attacked as a primary target by theEighth Air Force in June 1943 and closed for amonth; it required three months to get back to 72percent of capacity and seven months to get backto full production. However, it operated on gasfrom synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr; Avhen theseAvere knocked out in the summer of 1944, produc-tion Avas again reduced substantially. Productionat Schkopau, the largest of the synthetic rubberplants, Avas lost because it Avas dependent on hydro-gen from Leuna. Investigation of the tAvo remain-ing plants reA7ealed that production was largelyeliminated because ofattacks on oil plants of Avhichthey were a part. By the end of 1944 over-all sta-

tistics for the industry show that production ofsynthetic rubber had been reduced to 2,000 tons amonth or about one-sixth the Avartime peak. Hadthe Avar continued, Germany’s rubber positionAvould have become critical. No indication Avasfound, hoAvever, that the rubber shortage had be-come a limiting factor on German war productionor the movement of the German armjr before theAvar ended.

Except for oil and associated nitrogen, metha-nol, and rubber production, no parts of theGerman chemical industry were a priority targetof the Combined Bomber Offensive.

SteelBy mid-1944 the air Avar had entered a new

phase. Its most important feature, apart fromof the air, Avas the greatly increased

weight of the attack that could be brought to bear;in the second half of 1944, 481,400 tons of bombswere dropped on Germany as compared with150,700 in all 1943. The RAF and the UnitedStates Army Air Forces during this period wereteamed in a fully coordinated offensive and theRAF Avasreturning to theattack of specific indus-trial targets. A target that was attacked with poorresults in 1943 might have yielded major returnsin 1944 for the simple reason that an attack in1944 Avas certain to be enormously heavier. Withimproved bombing techniques it was also likelyto be considerably more accurate. IncreasedAveight was a major feature of the raids that re-duced the German steel industry.

Germany began the Avar Avith approximately23,000,000 metric tons per year of steel capacity,about 69 percent of which was in the Ruhr. The1940 victories added another 17,000,000 tons prin-cipally in Lorraine, Belgium and Luxembourg.However, official records and those of the industryfor the Avar years, supplemented by interrogation,shoAv that the 40,000,000 tons theoretical capacityAvas never reached. Production in the occupiedcountries was ahvays troublesome and deficient.In spite of the considerable efforts to develop low-grade ores in Germany proper and medium gradeores in Austria, Germany throughout the war con-tinued to be primarily dependent on Swedish,NorAvegian and French ores.

Unlike the United States, Germany did not haveto find steel to build a large merchant fleet or for

11

a program of heavy naval construction. Nor didshe have to build a complete munitions industry inthe middle of the war. For these reasons the Ger-man steel supply for finished munitions was onlyslightly less liberal than that of the United States.Although steel was considered a bottleneck by theGermans, a detailed examination of the controlmachinery together with interrogation of officialsin the Speer ministry and its predecessor organiza-tions, reveals that the trouble was partly an in-efficient allocation system and partly, in the earlyyears of the war especially, an unwillingness tocut out nonessential construction and civilian con-sumption. German industrialists were also foundto have had a marked propensity to hoard steel.

Throughout the war there was considerable de-bate whether the German steel industry was a de-sirable target—and especially whether steel millswere vulnerable to the type of attack that couldbe made. In 1943 the RAF made a modest attackon the steel industry of the Ruhr but the attackwas given up because it was believed to have beentoo costly for the results achieved. Productionrecords taken by the Survey show, in fact, that ithad some effect; production in the Ruhr declinedby approximately 10 percent during the attackand did not fully recover during the remainder ofthe year. German steel producers were requiredby the government to keep records of productionlosses and their causes. These records show thatair raid alerts in 1943 were a more serious causeof the lost production than the actual damage fromthe raids.

“The Fuehrer ordered that a news item inthe ‘New York Times’ reporting that pro-duction in the Ruhr had been cut 50 percentby bombing be not contradicted. TheFuehrer said this was precisely the impres-sion lie wished to create.”

From secret minutes, taken by the Survey,of meetings between Hitler and war 'pro-

duction officials.

During the last half of 1944 both the cities andthe transportation system of the Ruhr were thetargets of extremely heavy attack, primarily bythe RAF. Production of steel in the Ruhr wasreduced by 80 percent between June and the endof the year. Loss of production of high-grade steel

in the Ruhr was greater than the loss of Bessemersteel and high-grade steel became a bottleneck bythe middle of 1944. German steel production forall the Reich and occupied countries declined from2,570,000 metric tons in July to 1,000,000 metrictons in December. Of this loss about 490,000 tonswas the result of loss of territory.

Examination of the steel plants showed that,although the attack damaged some blast furnaces,open hearths and rolling mills, it was primarilyeffective through damage to utilities (electricity,gas and water) and communications within theplants and to utilities and transport supplying theplants.

Although steel production had been reduced tocritical levels by the end of 1944 and continued tofall until the end of the war, Survey studies donotindicate that the steel shortage (unlike the oilshortage or even the ammunition shortage) wasdecisive. It might have been decisive if the warhad continued, and if this specific shortage had notbeen overshadowed by the disintegration of thewhole economy. As it developed at the end of thewar, certain German industries had inventoriesof steel that ranged from comfortable to generous.

The Secondary CampaignsDuring the course of the air war, and partic-

ularly during 1944 and 1945, a number of otherGerman industries were attacked, some of themin force and others merely as secondary targets,or as targets of opportunity when the main objec-tive could not be reached or found. The Surveyhas examined each of these industries. Individualplants and records were examined and analyzedin conjunction with over-all industry data whichwere also located.

“All these figures, the Fuehrer had in Idshead.”

Keitel, Chief of German High Command,to Survey Interrogators.

Plants producing tanks and armored vehicleswere attacked occasionaly in 1943 and early 1944,They were attacked more strongly in August, Sep-tember and October 1944 in an effort to providedirect support to ground operations. BetweenOctober 1943 and July 1944, the period of the first

12

attacks, the industry produced 14,000 tanks andrelated vehicles. Analysis of production sched-ules suggests that these attacks cost the Germansseveral hundred units. By the time of the heavierattacks, production, especially production of en-gines and components, had been considerably ex-panded and dispersed. The effect again may havebeen to cause the industry to fall short of achiev-able production. Production dropped from 1,616in August to 1,552 in September. However, itrose to 1,612 in October and to 1,770 in November,and reached its wartime peak in December 1944,when 1,854 tanks and armored vehicles were pro-duced. This industry continued to have rela-tively high production through February 1945.

In the last half of 1944German truck productionwas attacked. Three plants produced most ofGermany’s truck supply. One of these, Opel atBrandenburg, was knocked out completely in oneraid on August 6, 1944, and did not recover.Daimler Benz was similarly eliminated by attacksin September and October. Ford at Cologne, thethird large producer, was not attacked but rec-ords show that production was sharply curtailedduring the same period by destruction of com-ponent suppliers and the bombing of its powersupply. By December of 1944, production oftrucks was only about 35 percent of the averagefor the first half of 1944.

In November of 1944, the Allied air forces re-turned to an attack on the submarine buildingyards. In the months that had elapsed since thespring of 1943, the Germans had put into produc-tion the new Types 21 and 23 designed to operatefor long periods without surfacing and so escaperadar equipped aircraft patrols as well as surfaceattack. And an ambitious effort had been made toprefabricate submarine hulls and turn the slipwaysinto mere points of final assembly. The programwas not working smoothly. Though nearly twohundred had been produced, difficulties with thenew type, together with the timerequired for train-ing crews, had prevented all but eight from becom-ing operational. These delays cannot be attributedto the air attack.

The attacks during the late winter and earlyspring of 1945 did close, or all but close, five of themajor yards, including the great Blohm and Vossplant at Hamburg. Had the war continued, these

attacks, coupled with the attack on transportation,would have removed the threat of further pro-duction of the new submarine.

Many more German industries were hit—mostlyin the course of the city attacks of the RAF, butsome as secondary targets of daylight attacks, orin spill-overs from the primary target. Industriesso attacked included optical plants, power plants,plants making electrical equipment, machine toolplants, and a large number of civilian industries.There were also special enterprises. The bombingof the launching sites being prepared for theV weapons delayed the use of Y-l appreciably.The attacks on the Y-weapon experimental stationat Peenemunde, however, were not effective; V-lwas already in production near Kassel and V-2had also been moved to an underground plant.The breaking of the Mohne and the Eder dams,though the cost was small, also had limited effect.Certain of the attacks—as for example the Berlinraids that cost the Germans a good half of theirclothing industry—caused the Germans manifestdiscomfort and may have delayed war production.Also, in the aggregate, they caused some diversionof resources from essential war production, al-though this effect was minimized by the substantialcushion in Germany’s war economy until the clos-ing months of the war.

The Attack on the Railways and WaterwaysThe attack on transportation was the decisive

blow that completely disorganized the Germaneconomy. It reduced war production in all cate-gories and made it difficult to move what was pro-duced to the front. The attack also limited thetactical mobility of the German army.

The Survey made a careful examination of theGerman railway system, beginning as soon as sub-stantial portions were in Allied hands. Whilecertain important records were destroyed or lostduring the battle of Germany, enough were locatedso that together with interrogation of many Ger-man railroad officials, it was possible to constructan accurate picture of the decline and collapse ofthe system.

Germany entered the war with an excellent rail-way system; it had general overcapacity in bothlines and yards (built partly in anticipation of mil-itary requirements), and, popular supposition tothe contrary, the system was not undermaintained.

13

Standards of maintenance were higher than thosegeneral in the United States. The railway systemwas supplemented by a strong inland waterwayssystem connecting the important rivers of northernGermany, crisscrossing the Ruhr and connectingit with Berlin. The waterways carried from 21to 26 percent of the total freight movement. Com-mercial highway transport of freight was insig-nificant; it accounted for less than three percentof the total.

Although the investigation shows that the rail-road system was under strain—especially duringthe winter campaign in Russia in 1941-42 whenthere was a serious shortage of cars and locomo-tives—it was generally adequate for the demandsplaced upon it until the spring of 1944. New con-struction and appropriation of equipment of oc-cupied countries remedied the locomotive and carshortage. The Reichsbahn had taken no importantsteps to prepare itself for air attack.

The attack on German transportation was in-timately woven with the development of groundoperations. In support of the invasion a majorassignment of the air forces had been the disrup-tion of rail traffic between Germany and the Frenchcoast through bombing of marshalling yards innorthern Franee. At the time of the invasion itselfa systematic and large-scale attempt was made tointerdict all traffic to the Normandy beachhead.These latter operations were notably successful; asthe front moved to the German border the attackwas extended to the railroads of the Reich proper.Heavy and medium bombers and fighters all par-ticipated.

Although prior to September 1944, there hadbeen sporadic attacks on the German transporta-tion system, no serious deterioration in its abilityto handle traffic was identified by the Survey. Thevastly heavier attacks in September and October1944 on marshalling yards, bridges, lines, and ontrain movements, produced a serious disruption intraffic over all of western Germany. Freight carloadings, which were approximately 900,000 carsfor the Reich as a whole in the week ending August19 fell to 700,000 cars in the last week of October.There was some recovery in early November, butthereafter they declined erratically to 550,000 carsin the wT eek ending December 23 and to 214,000 carsduring the week ending March 3. Thereafter thedisorganization was so great that no useful sta-tistics were kept.

“The German economy is heading for in-evitable collapse within 4-8 weeks.”

Report of Speer to Hitler,March 15,1955.

The attack on the waterways paralleled that onthe railways; the investigation shows that it waseven more successful. On September 23, 1944, theDortmund-Ems and Mittelland canals were inter-dicted stopping all through water traffic betweenthe Ruhr and points on the north coast and in cen-tral Germany. By October 14, traffic on the Rhinehad been interdicted by a bomb that detonated aGerman demolition charge on a bridge at Cologne.Traffic in the Ruhr dropped sharply and all watermovement of coal to south Germany ceased.

The effect of this progressive traffic tie-up wasfound, as might be expected, to have first affectedcommodities normally shipped in less-than-train-load lots—finished and semi-finished manufacturedgoods, components, perishable consumer goodsand the less bulky raw materials. Cars loadedwith these commodities had to be handled throughthe marshalling yards and after the Septemberand October attacks this became increasingly dif-ficult or impossible. Although output of manyindustries reached a peak in late summer and de-clined thereafter, total output of the economy wason the whole well-maintained through November.Beginning in December there was a sharp fall inproduction in nearly all industries; week by weekthe decline continued until the end of the war.

Although coal traffic (about 40 percent of all thetraffic carried by the German railways) held upbetter than miscellaneous commercial traffic, thedecline was both more easily traceable and moredramatic. The September raids reduced coal-carplacements in the Essen Division of the Reichs-bahn (the originator of most of the coal traffic ofthe Ruhr) to an average of 12,000 cars daily ascompared with 21,400 at the beginning of the year.Most of this was for consumption within the Ruhr,By January, placements in the Ruhr were down to9,000 cars a day and in February virtually completeinterdiction of the Ruhr District was achieved.Such coal as was loaded was subject to confisca-tion by the railroads to fuel their locomotives; evenwith this supply, coal stocks of the Reichsbahnitself were reduced from 18 days’ supply in October

14

1944 to 4% days’ supply in February 1945. ByMarch some divisions in southern Germany hadless than a day’s supply on hand, and locomotiveswere idle because of lack of coal.

The German economy was powered by coal; ex-cept in limited areas, the coal supply had beeneliminated.

Military (Wehrmacht) traffic had top priorityover all other traffic. During the period of attackthis traffic came to account for an ever-increas-ing proportion of the declining movement.Through 1944 the air attack did not prevent thearmy from originating such movements althoughthe time of arrival or even the arrival of unitsand equipment became increasingly uncertain.Couriers accompanied detachments and even ship-ments of tanks and other weapons; their task wasto get off the train when it was delayed and reportwhere it could be found. After the turn of the yeareven military movements became increasingly dif-ficult. The Ardennes counter-offensive, the troopsand equipment for which were marshalled overthe railroads, was probably the last such effort ofwhich the Reichsbahn would have been capablein the west.

Electric PowerThe German power system, except for isolated

raids, was never a target during the air war. Anattack was extensively debated during the courseof the war. It was not undertaken partly becauseit was believed that the German power grid washighly developed and that losses in one area couldbe compensated by switching power from another.This assumption, detailed investigation by theSurvey has established, was incorrect.

The German electric power situation was in factin a precarious condition from the beginning ofthe war and became more precarious as the warprogressed; this fact is confirmed by statementsof a large number of German officials, by confi-dential memoranda of the National Load Dis-patcher, and secret minutes of the Central Plan-ning Committee. Fears that their extreme Vulner-ability would be discovered were fully discussedin these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stationsin Germany would have caused a capacity loss of1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capac-ity, both public and private. The destruction of

45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would havecaused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have elim-inated over one-half of the entire generating ca-pacity of the country. The shortage was suffi-ciently critical so that any considerable loss ofoutput would have directly affected essential warproduction, and the destruction of any substantialamount would have had serious results.

Generating and distributing facilities were rela-tively vulnerable and their recuperation was diffi-cult and time consuming. Had electric generat-ing plants and substations been made primary tar-gets as soon as they could have been brought withinrange of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates thattheir destruction would have had serious effects onGermany’s war production.

The CiviliansA word should perhaps be added on the effect

of the air war on the German civilian and on thecivilian economy. Germany began the war afterseveral years of full employment and after thecivilian standard of living had reached its highestlevel in German history. In the early years ofthe war—the soft war period for Germany—civil-ian consumption remained high. Germans con-tinued to try for both guns and butter. The Ger-man people entered the period of the air war wellstocked with clothing and other consumer goods.Although most consumer goods became increas-ingly difficult to obtain, Survey studies show thatfairly adequate supplies of clothing were avail-able for those who had been bombed out until thelast stages of disorganization. Food, thoughstrictly rationed, was in nutritionally adequatesupply throughout the war. The Germans’ diethad about the same calories as the British.

German civilian defense was examined by Sur-vey representatives familiar with U. S. and Britishdefenses. The German system had been devised asprotection against relatively small and isolatedattacks. The organization had to be substantiallyrevised when the attacks grew to saturation pro-portions. In particular, arrangements were madeby which a heavily bombed community might callon the fire-fighting and other defensive resourcesof surrounding communities and, as a final resort,on mobile reserves deployed by the central govern-

15

ment through the more vulnerable areas. In theattacks on German cities incendiary bombs, ton forton, were found to have been between four and fivetimes as destructive as high explosive. Germanfire defenses lacked adequate static and other waterreserves replenished by mains independent of themore vulnerable central water supply. However,in the more serious fire raids, any fire-fightingequipment was found to have been of little avail.Fire storms occurred, the widespread fires gener-ating a violent hurricane-like draft, which fedother fires and made all attempts at controlhopeless.

German shelters, so far as they were available,were excellent. In England the policy was to builda large number of shelters which protected thosetaking refuge from bombs falling in the area andfrom falling and flying debris but which were notsecure against a direct hit. The Germans, by con-trast, built concrete bunkers, some of enormoussize, both above and below ground, designed to pro-tect those taking shelter even against a direct hit.One such shelter in Hamburg, named the “HolyGhost” for its location on Holy Ghost Plaza, shel-tered as many as 60,000 people. There were not,however, enough such shelters; at the close of thewar shelter accommodation was available for onlyabout eight million people. The remainder shel-tered in basements, and casualties in these places ofrefuge were heavy. After raids the Germans didnot attempt systematic recovery of all bodies oreven of all trapped persons. Those that could notreadily be removed were left.

Official German statistics place total casualtiesfrom air attack—including German civilians, for-eigners, and members of the armed forces incities that were being attacked—at 250,253 killedfor the period from January 1, 1943, to Jan-uary 31, 1945, and 305,455 wounded badly enoughto require hospitalization, during the period fromOctober 1, 1943, to January 31, 1945. A carefulexamination of these data, together with checksagainst the records of individual cities that wereattacked, indicates that they are too low. A re-vised estimate prepared by the Survey (which isalso a minimum) places total casualties for the en-tire period of the wT ar at 305,000 killed and 780,000wounded. More reliable statistics are availableon damage to housing. According to these,

485,000 residential buildings were totally destroyedby air attack and 415,000 were heavily damaged,making a total of 20 percent of all dwelling unitsin Germany. In some 50 cities that were primarytargets of the air attack, the proportion of de-stroyed or heavily damaged dwelling units isabout 40 percent. The result of all these attackswas to render homeless some 7,500,000 Germancivilians.

It is interesting to note some of the effects of airattack upon medical care and military casualtiesduring the war. The aerial warfare against Ger-many forced the German military and civilianauthorities to recognize that national health andmedical problems Were a joint responsibility. Thedestruction of hospital equipment, pharmaceuticalproduction, and medical supplies, incident to arearaids, forced a dispersal of medical supply in-stallations and the removal of hospitals from cityto suburban and country sites. This programcame in late 1943 at a time when air raids on citieswere causing increased casualties among civiliansand resulted in shortages in ether, plasters, serums,textiles, and other medical supplies. At the sametime the increased tempo of tactical air action washaving an effect on military casualty rates, and isreflected in the fact that, according to German re-ports, war casualties from aerial weapons movedfrom third place in 1942 to first place in late 1943,1944, and 1945, followed in order by artillery fireand infantry weapons. The casualty effects of airaction are shown by the fact that the proportion ofAvounded to killed shifted from a ratio of eight toone in 1940 and 1941 to a ratio of three to one in1944 and 1945. Personnel wounded by air actionsuffered as a rule multiple Avounds and shock, re-sulting in longer periods of hospitalization andconvalescence, and in a decided reduction in thenumber of patients Avho could be returned to eitherfull or limited military duty.

CONCLUSIONThe foregoing pages tell of the results achieved

by Allied air power, in each of its several roles inthe war in Europe. It remains to look at theresults as a whole and to seek such signposts asmay be of guidance to the future.

Allied air power Avas decisive in the war inWestern Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests

16

that it might have been employed differently orbetter in some respects. Nevertheless, it was deci-sive. In theair, its victory was complete. At sea,its contribution, combined with naval power,brought an end to the enemy’s greatest navalthreat—the U-boat; on land, it helped turn thetide overwhelmingly in favor of Allied groundforces. Its power and superiority made possiblethe success of the invasion. It brought the econ-omy which sustained the enemy’s armed forces tovirtual collapse, although the full effects of thiscollapse had not reached the enemy’s front lineswhen they were overrun by Allied forces. Itbrought home to the German people the full im-pact of modern war with all its horror and suffer-ing. Its imprint on the German nation will belasting.

Some Signposts1. The German experience suggests that even a

first class military power—rugged and resilient asGermany was—cannot live long under full-scaleand free exploitation of air weapons over the heartof its territory. By the beginning of 1945, beforethe invasion of the homeland itself, Germany wasreaching a state of helplessness. Her armamentproduction was falling irretrievably, orderlinessin effort was disappearing, and total disruptionand disintegration were well along. Her armieswere still in the field. But with the impendingcollapse of the supporting economy, the indica-tions are convincing that they would have had tocease fighting—any effective fighting—within afew months. Germany was mortally wounded.

2. The significance of full domination of the airover the enemy—both over its armed forces andover its sustaining economy—must be emphasized.That domination of the air was essential. Withoutit, attacks on the basic economy of the enemy couldnot have been delivered in sufficient force and withsufficient freedom to bring effective and lastingresults.

3. As the air offensive gained in tempo, theGermans were unable to prevent the decline andeventual collapse of their economy. Nevertheless,the recuperative and defensive powers of Germanywere immense; the speed and ingenuity with whichthey rebuilt and maintained essential war indus-tries in operation clearly surpassed Allied expecta-tions. Germany resorted to almost every means an

ingenious people could devise to avoid the attacksupon her economy and to minimize their effects.Camouflage, smoke screens, shadow plants, dis-persal, underground factories, were all employed.In some measure all were helpful, but without con-trol of the air, none was really effective. Dis-persal brought a measure of immediate relief, buteventually served only to add to the many prob-lems caused by the attacks on the transportationsystem. Underground installations prevented di-rect damage, but they, too, were often victims ofdisrupted transportation and other services. Inany case, Germany never succeeded in placing anysubstantial portion of her war production under-ground—the effort was largely limited to certaintypes of aircraft, their components, and the Vweapons. The practicability of going under-ground as the escape from full and free exploita-tion of the air is highly questionable; it was soconsidered by the Germans themselves. Such pas-sive defenses may be worth while and important,but it may be doubted if there is any escape fromair domination by an enemy.

4. The mental reaction of the German peopleto air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazicontrol they showed surprising resistance to theterror and hardships of repeated air attack, to thedestruction of their homes and belongings, and tothe conditions under which they were reduced tolive. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victoryor satisfactory compromise, and their confidencein their leaders declined, but they continued towork efficiently as long as the physical means ofproduction remained. The power of a police stateover its people cannot be underestimated.

5. The importance of careful selection of targetsfor air attack is emphasized by the German expe-rience. The Germans were far more concernedover attacks on one or more of their basic indus-tries and services—their oil, chemical, or steelindustries or their power or transportation net-works—than they were over attacks'on their arma-ment industry or the city areas. The most seriousattacks were those which destroyed the industryor service which most indispensably served otherindustries. The Germans found it clearly moreimportant to devise measures for the protection ofbasic industries and services than for the protec-tion of factories turning out finished products.

17

6. The German experience showed that, what-ever the target system, no indispensable industrywas permanently put out of commission by a singleattack. Persistent re-attack was necessary.

7. In the field of strategic intelligence, there wasan important need for further and more accurateinformation, especially before and during the earlyphases of the war. The information on the Ger-man economy available to the United States AirForces at the outset of the war was inadequate.And there was no established machinery for co-ordination between military and other govern-mental and private organizations. Such machin-ery was developed during the war. The experi-ence suggests the wisdom of establishing sucharrangements on a continuing basis.

8. Among the most significant of the other fac-tors which contributed to the success of the aireffort was the extraordinary progress during thewar of Allied research, development, and produc-tion. As a result of this progress, the air forceseventually brought to the attack superiority inboth numbers and quality of crews, aircraft, andequipment. Constant and unending effort was re-quired, however, to overcome the initial advantagesof the enemy and later to keep pace with his re-search and technology. It was fortunate that theleaders of the German Air Force relied too heavilyon their initial advantage. For this reason theyfailed to develop, in time, weapons, such as theirjet-propelled planes, that might have substantiallyimproved their position. There was hazard, onthe other hand, in the fact that the Allies werebehind the Germans in the development of jet-propelled aircraft. The German development ofthe V weapons, especially the Y-2, is also note-worthy.

9. The achievements of Allied air power wereattained only with difficulty and great cost in men,material, and effort. Its success depended on thecourage, fortitude, and gallant action of the officersand men of the air crews and commands. Itdepended also on a superiority in leadership,ability, and basic strength. These led to a timelyand careful training of pilots and crews in volume;to the production of planes, weapons, and suppliesin great numbers and of high quality; to the se-curing of adequate bases and supply routes; tospeed and ingenuity in development; and to co-

operation with strong and faithful Allies, Thefailure of any one of these might have seriouslynarrowed and even eliminated the margin.

Of the FutureThe air war ‘n Europe was marked by continu-

ous development and evolution. This process didnot stop on VE-day; great strides have been madesince in machines, weapons, and techniques. Nogreater or more dangerous mistake could be madethan to assume that the same policies and practicesthat won the war in Europe will be sufficient to winthe next one—if there should be another. The re-sults achieved in Europe will not give the answerto future problems; they should be treated ratheras signposts pointing the direction in which suchanswers may be found.

The great lesson to be learned in the batteredtowns of England and the ruined cities of Ger-many is that the best way to win a war is to preventit from occurring. That must be the ultimate endto which our best efforts are devoted. It has beensuggested—and wisely so—that this objective iswell served by insuring the strength and the secu-rity of the United States. The United States wasfounded and has since lived upon principles oftolerance, freedom, and good will at home andabroad. Strength based on these principles isno threat to world peace. Prevention of war willnot come from neglect of strength or lack offoresight or alertness on our part. Those whocontemplate evil and aggression find encourage-ment in such neglect. Hitler relied heavilyupon it.

Suggestions for assuring the strength and secu-rity of the United States are by no means intendedas a recommendation for a race in arms with othernations. Nor do they reflect a lack of confidencein the prospect of international relationshipsfounded upon mutual respect and good will whichwill themselves be a guarantee against futurewars. The development of an intelligent and coor-dinated approach to American security can andshould take place within the framework of thesecurity organization of the United Nations.

In maintaining our strength and our security,the signposts of the war in Europe indicate thedirections in which greater assurances may befound. Among these are intelligent long-range

18

planning by the armed forces in close and activecooperation with other government agencies, andwith the continuous active participation of inde-pendent civilian experts in time of peace as well asin war; continuous and active scientific researchand technical development on a national scale intime of peace as well as in war; a more adequateand integrated system for the collection and evalu-ation of intelligence information; that form of or-ganization of the armed forces which clarifies theirfunctional responsibilities and favors a higher de-gree of coordination and integration in theirdevelopment, their planning, their intelligence,and their operations; and, finally, in time of peaceas well as in war, the highest possible quality andstature of the personnel who are to man the postswithin any such organization, whatever its preciseform may be—and in this, quality, not numbers,is the important criterion.

The air has become a highway which hasbrought within easy access every point on theearth’s surface—a highway to be traveled in peace,and in war, over distances without limit at ever-increasing speed. The rapid developments in theEuropean war foreshadow further exploration of

its potentialities. Continued development is indi-cated in the machines and in the weapons whichwill travel the reaches of this highway. The out-standing significance of the air in modern warfareis recognized by all who participated in the war inEurope or who have had an opportunity to eval-uate the results of aerial offensive. These arefacts which must govern the place accorded airpower in plans for coordination and organizationof our resources and skills for national defense.

Speed, range, and striking power of the airweapons of the future, as indicated by the sign-posts of the war in Europe must—specifically—bereckoned with in any plans for increased securityand strength. The combination of the atomicbomb with remote-control projectiles of ocean-spanning range stands as a possibility which isawesome and frightful to contemplate.

These are some of the many factors which willconfront our national leaders who will have pri-mary responsibility for correctly reading the sign-posts of the past. It is hoped that the studiesof the German war, summarized here, and studiesbeing conducted by the Survey in Japan, will helpthem in their task.