8/6/2019 Atomic Bombing

1/20

8/6/2019 Atomic Bombing

2/20

98 T S U Y O S H I H A S E G A W A

shima and Nagasaki without provoking an g ry voices of protest from lhe~ l l 1 e r i c a n public. In the meantime, Japan 's prime ministers routinely visit

Yasukuni SlLrine, which houses a museum exhibit that unabashedly glorifies Japa n's involvement in the Pacific \-Var.

A lthoug h postwar U .S.- Japanese relations have been founded on theirclose-knit alliance, mistrust lurks benea th the surface. American m emori es of Pea rl Harbor, reinforced by Japan ese bruta lity in treating PO W s,and Japanese memories of Hiroshima, Nagasaki. and the firebomb ing ofJapa nese cities lie at the core of it. During the Co ld \-Va r, thei r common security and economic interests concealed this mistrust, but the resurgenCeof national ism in Japan :1 fter tbe end of the Cold War and of pa triotic fcvtrin the post-WI! United States may resurrect it. l

In June 2007. Jap an's defense minister KyuI1la Fumio stated that theatomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified because theyprevented the Soviet Union from occupying Jap an. This state menttouched flff an instant storm of protest in Japan . Th e progressive newspapCf Asahi Shimbul1 ed itorialized that Kyuma\ remarks "were not onl ) in sens itive to the feelings of atomic bomb survivors and victims, bu t a lsose riously undermine Japan's 'non-nuclear ' stand." With a chorus of protes tmounting not only from the opposition party but also from within thLKomeito , a coalition partner in the ruling Liberal-Democratic P;lrty,K)' um a was forced to resign. Th e new defense minister, Koik e Yurik o.ca tegorically sta ted that the atom ic bombings by tbe United States shouldnever be condoned.

Across the Pacific, asked about K yuma's statement, Robert Jose ph,President George \V. Bush's neoconservative appointee as th e speci.a lcn\'oy for nonproliferation, justified the atomic bombing as the action l h; lTend ed rhe Pacific W [\r and sa ved not on ly a million A mericans bu t alsomore Japanese. Asked about this opin ion, Prime Minister Abe Sh inzorep lied, "I ha ve not chan ged my view that we shou ld never forgi ve th t:atomic bombings." 0 7.aw a Ichiro , the head of the Democratic Pa rt y, themajor oppos ition party, demanded that the gove rnm en t seek an apo logyfrom the Un itea States for dropping the atomic bornbs.4

W E R E TH E ATOMIC B O M B I N G S JU STI F I ED ? 99

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Soviet Entry into the War, and Japan'sSurrenderTh e lite ra tu re on the en d of th e Pacific \ \far has evo lved in a truncatedfashion along three d ist inct tracks. American historians ha ve generaUybeen preoccupied with the question of the American decision to drop thehombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese historia ns h;we focused onthe political process through w hich Japan ca me to accept surrender. Leastdeveloped has been the Soviet role in ending the war, which beentreated as a sideshow by both American and Japan ese historians. It is im portant, however, that Stalin be brought to center stage, became the SovietUnion played a crucial role in the American dec ision to clrop the bomband was the focus of Japa n 's diplomatic and mili tary policy during the la stmonths oftht: war. Th e atomic bombing of Hiroshima an d N agasaki musthe und erstood in a broader context of int e rnation al histo ry by closely examining, first, how th e atomi c bombs inHuenced the Jap anese decisionmaking process lead ing to th eir acceptance of su rr ender, second. how theSoviet factor influenced President Harry S. Truman's decision to drop thebombs, and third, how Soviet entry into tbe war inHuenced Japan 's decision to surrender.Looking at the end of the Pacific War from the international perspective, thr ee important conclusions ca n be drawn. First, there was fiercecompetition between Truman and Stalin to force Japan to surrender: Tr u man wanted to en d the war before the Soviet en try, an d Stalin wanted tojoin the war before Japan surrendered. Th e atomic bomb played an im portant role in this race.

Second, there was a dispute in Japan among top policy makers aboutwhether and on what terms they should end th e war. Both for th e p(;aceparty and for the wa r party, determining the role that the Soviet U nionwould play had the highest priority during the last months of th e wa r. Tothe Japanese leaders, the specific defin ition of the kokutai (national pol ity)built on th e empe ror system became th e most impo rtant issue, as both parties struggled to come up with acceptable conditions for ending the war.Rejecting th e American demand for unconditional surrender and destruction of the kokutai, the peace party sought Moscow 's rnediation to preserveit. Th e War party insisted on th e need to inAict decisive damage on the expected American in vasion of the homeland in order to gai.n bvorablcpeace terms and considered Sovie t ncutra lity essen tial to wage slIch a bat

http:///reader/full/speci.alhttp:///reader/full/speci.alhttp:///reader/full/speci.al

8/6/2019 Atomic Bombing

3/20

II

100 T S U Y O S H I H A S E G A W A

tic. Both parties thus pinned their hopes for a satisfactory end to the W,lron the Soviet Un ion. Jap an 's po licy, however, was exp loited by Stalin toprolong the war lon g enough for the Soviet Union to join it.

Third, the widely held vie'vv in the United States that th e atomic bomh_ings were the most decis iv e factor that led to Japan 's surrender mu st be rejected. Although the ato mic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6 inj ectedurgenc y :unong Japanese poLicy ma k ers in their attempt to te rminate the\var, it did not res ult in a change in the official policy to achieve this goaltb rou gh Soviet mediation. It was only afte r the Soviet entry into the War inthe early hours of August 9 th at the Japanese policy makers, for the firsttim e, confronted the issue of whether or not th ey s hould accept th e term sspecified hy the Potsdam Proclamation. Although th e So\"iet entr y, li ke th,ltomic bomb on H iroshima, did no t lead to a prompt decision to surrender, the Soviet factor played a rar mo re important role than th e atom icbomb ings.

Th e Soviet entry into the war dashed any hope of bargaining for ter msthrough Moscow's mediation, nuIlifying th e policy that the Japanese ru lershad pursued since the middle of Jun e 1945 and continued even af ter t heyrece ived the Potsdam ultima tum of J uly 26. Furthe rm ore, in ord er to preserve the imperial house, the Jap anese policy makers d ecided to gamb le onthe Americans rather than prolong the war and risk the danger of ex pos ing Japa n to the expanded influence of th e Soviet Union.'

Truman's DilemmaWhen Truman assumed the presidency in April 1945, he ~ l c e two d ilem mas with regard to the Pacific \Var. Th e first was th e danger of Soviet cx. pansion io As ia . Ln February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, Presiden tFranklin D _Roosevelt had been eager to conclude the Yalta Secret Ag reement, \-vhich gave Stalin a ser ies of rewards, such as concessions to th e ra ilways and ports in Manchur ia and occupation of southern Sakhalin and theKurils held by th e Japanese, in return for his pledge to enter the waragainst Japan after the defeat of Germany. Th e U.S. policy ma kers, bothmilitary and civilian, believed then that Soviet participation in the waragainst Japan would be the most important prereq uisite for the successfulAmerican in vasion of Japan's homeland, because this would pin d own theJapanese forces in Man churia and No rth C hin a.

Ho weve r, the political and military situation had drastically chan ged

WERE THE ATOMIC BOMBI N GS JU STI F I ED ? 101

since the Yalta Co nfe rence. By April there emerged a serious conflict between the Soviet Union and the \Veste rn Allies ove r Poland and EasternEurope. Led by W. Averell Ha rriman, the American am bassado r to~ l o s c o w those advisers who had become conce rn ed about Stalin's increasingly hostile attitude toward the \Vcst ove r Poland an d Eastern Europecame to advocate abandoning FDR's policy of concili a tion with the SovietUnion. Harriman was soon joined by Josep h Grew, th e inAuenti a l under secretary or state, an d former p e i n t Herbe rt H oove r, w ho were wor ried about the consequences of Soviet expansion in th e Far East after itentered the war. N avy Secretary Jam es Forrestal an d William Lea hy, chiefof staff to the president , also joined this group.

By April , the military situation had developed favorably for th e U ni tedStates to the extent that th e Joint Chiefs of Staff no longe r conside red Soviet entry essential for an invasion of Japan. N o net heless, Arm y Ch ief ofStaffGeneral George C. Marshall, supported by Secretary of W ar H en ry L.Stimson, continued to believe that Soviet forces would be important tobringing about Japan's sur rend er before the initiation of OperationOlympic, the m ass ive im 'as ion of K yushu, the southern part of Japan'shomeland, scheduled for Novemb er I. Truman wanted to avoid Sovietparticipation, as he became increasingly concerned with its consequencesin Asia, but in order to end the war quickly with a minimal cost in American lives. Soviet entry would still be necessa ry.('

Truman raced a second dilemma. He was commjtted to th e uncond.tiona I surrender demand. This was not mere.ly beca use he wanted to con tinue FDR's legacy, a nd not merely because he fea red that revisin g thisdemand would run coun ter to preva iling public opinion, which took aharsh attitude toward the Japa nese emp ero r, bu t because he him sc!ffirmlybelieved that imposition of unconditional surrl:ncl cr r ep resented just retri hution for the humiliation inflicted on th e A mericans by Japan's dastardlyattack on Pea rl Harb or. Since May, howeve r, there had been a gro w ingvoice within his administration, led by influential a ( i ~ e r such as G rew ,Stimson, Forrestal , and Lea.hy, among others, in favo r of mod ifying- th eunconditional surrender demand by promising th e Jap anese that theycould maintain th e monar chy und er the current d y n a ~ t This group argued that in order to bring th e war to a speedy conclusion, modification ofllnconditional surrender would be necessary because thi s would inducethe Japanese modera te clements ro accept sur rend er before th e country\\",\S completely destroyed. Fo r G rew, Forrestal, and Lea hy, this reco m

8/6/2019 Atomic Bombing

4/20

102 T S UY O SH I HA S E GAWA

mend a tion was also conn ec ted to th eir con ce rns abou t Sovi et ex pa nsion ini a . Truman found hi m self unable to resolve th ese dil emm as befo re the

iPots dam C on fe rence.O n Jun e 18, th e pr esident summon ed his mili ta ry ad vise rs to th e \ Vh ite

H ouse. H e w an ted to know ho w many troop s wo ul d be nee tled to in\"adl;!Japan , ho w Illany U .S. cas ualties would be ex pected in tll e in vasion , an dw het he r So viet ent r y in to the war would be ad visable to end the war.Take n aback by th e c;lsu alty fi g ur es (killed and wound ed ) g iven by A rmy

hi ef of St;ltT Ge o rge Ma rsh a ll (63,000 ou t of 190,000 t roops) in theKy us hu operation alone, th e presid ent appro ved onl y Op e ratio n Ol ym p ic.(th e Ky ushu in vasio n scheduled fo r N ovemb er I) w hil e pos tpon i ng thetl ecision on Op e ratio n Co ron et, th e invasion o f th e Kanto Pl ane (Ja pan'scent ral heartland, \-vhi ch includes Tok yo) in Mar ch [946. Althoug h Ad mir I ra l Er nest J. Ki ng did not conside r Soviet participat ion in th e war nccessa ry, M a rshall told th e p reside nt tha t th e Am e ri ca n in va.s io n o f Jap:lI1 'shom ela nd , combined w ith So viet entry into th e \var, \vo uld lead to Japa

ca pitubtion.A t this \ ~ r h i t Hous e co nfe renc e, Stimson recomm ended that the

U ni ted States revise th e un co nditi onal sur render de m and in such a wayth a t th e moderate elements w ithin the Japa nese gove rn ment wo uld acceptsurrend er b efor e th e Am e.ri ca n in vas ion ofK yushu . John J. McC loy wentfurther than Stimson, reco mm ending that th e United States send th e Japanese a str o ng communicati on demandin g a full surrend e r w ith a provis()that Japa n wo uld be abl e to c()ntinue to exi st as a nation a nd keep th e em pe ro r under a constitutional mon a rchy. If the Japanese rejec ted s uch an o f fe r, then the United States should reveal that it possessed th e a tom ir

o m Two alte rn a tives had th us bee n suggested to th e p res ide nt: (I ) to we l

com e So\ iet ent ry into the wa r a nd (2) to revi se th e un conditional su rrend e r d emand . Truman m ade no d ecision at that po int, except fo r endo rs ingI!! Op e ra tio n O lymp ic. In th e m ea ntime, C hu rchill from Lond o n, an d H arrim an and G rew in s h i n t o l 1 0 11 separate occas io ns ur ged Tr u m an toha sten the co nvenin g oft h e Bi g Th ree mee tin g to fo resta ll fur th e r Sovietex pansion in s t e r n E urope. Each ti m e, Truman demurred , citin g h is obligati ons to Congress fo r bud ge t a t t e r ~ , bu t tllC real reaso n \,vas ma t hewan ted t o postp one th e Po tsda m Co nference unti l the U nit ed S ta tes testedth e first a tomic bomb.

W ER E TH E AT OM I C B O MB I NGS J US T I F I E D ? 103

Stalin's DilemmaStalin also fac ed a dil emm a. I n April, the Soviet go ve rn ment notified th eJ:lpanese governm ent th at it d id not intend to renew th e So vie t-Japanes eNeutrality Pact. Th e pact , sig ned in April 1941 , sti pulated that lIlIless on eparty notLfied the o th e r of i ts int e nti on not to renew one year pri o r to itsexpiration, the pact wo uld a u tomatically be rene \oved fo r an o th e r fi vevcars. Thus d espite th e fac t that th e Soviets re no u nced th e pac t in A pril'1945, it should ha ve bee n in fo rce until A pril 1946. Sta lin and the So\'i etgo\ ernme nt took it fo r g ranted that th eir planned at tack on th e Ja paneseforces in Manchuria in th e s um m e r of [945 would have to be launched in\'iolation o f th e neutralit y pac t. Yet if they intended to \'io late th e pact any way. why did the y ren o un ce it in A pril, taking th e risk of si g nalin g to meJapanese that they mi ght join th e Allies in the war again st Japa n ?

Th ere arc two possible reas()ns. F irst, by ren o un cing t he pact, the Sov ietgovernment diminished th e im pact of th e politica l, if no t lega l , implications of violating it, th us avo id ing th e inevitable comp a riso n with the Ge rman violation of the Na zi-Sovie t N o n -Aggr essio n Pact. In fact, a ft er th ewar. the Soviet g()ve rnment an d So viet historians consi sten t! y took the position that the pact lost its for ce im mediately when renoun ced.

But if no one bu t th e Jap anese car ed abollt th e v iolation of th e pact andif th e \Veste rn allies and th e C hin ese wo uld not ha ve co m ide red Sovi et entry into the a violatio n of th e pac t-and the y d id not- w hy d id th eSoviets bother to renOLll1 Ce it r It is poss ible to int erpret thi s as a signal tothe United States th a t th e Sovi et U ni o n in tend ed to ho nor th e commitment it had made a t Yalta to ent e r th e war aga in st Jap an. It appea rs thatStalin conside red th e Sov ie t commitm ent to e nte r th e w ar against Japan tobe important leverage with th e U nit ed States. It was a ll the m o re important for Stalin to reaffi r m this commitm ent w hen conAi ct betwe en th eUnited States and th e Sov iet U nio n over Poland and Eas te rn E uropeemerged as a major dis cord in th e G rand AllianceY

\; evertheless, th e renu ncia tio n of the neutrality pac t was a ri sk y m ov e.It Was a clea r signal to th e Jap anese that th e So viet U nion wo uld vcr ylikely join th e \Ve ste rn Allies in th e wa r a gainst Japa n. Th is mi ght evenprompt the Japanese to la un ch a p reem pt ive a ttack o n th e Sov iet fo rces inthe Far East befo re pr eparatio ns for wa r were completed . T o avo id thi s,Stalin placed the F ar Easte rn a rm y o n a lert status just in case, w hile th e

8/6/2019 Atomic Bombing

5/20

IIIiii Iii

I:

10 4 TSUYOSH I HASEGAWA

commissar of foreign affairs, Viacheslav Mo lotov, told the Japanese tha t,despite th e Soviet renunciation, th e pact itself was in force until it ful fi lledits term in April 1946. Th e Japanese, who desperately wanted Soviet neu_trality, gullib ly accepted this explanation, and this information was accu_ratdy conveyed to Stalin by th e Soviet ambassador, Iakov Malik . T h while, as Stalin later explained, "lulling the Jap anese to sleep," Stalin be gan frantically transporting troops and equipment from Eu rope to th e F;1[East. This policy, hovveve r, left one major probl em for Stalin and th e So viet governmmt. Although it satisfied the tactical problem of deceivin gthe Japanese into believing that the Soviet Union was to maintain neutra l ity, it created the strategic problem of how to justify the war against Japanin violation of the neutrality pact.

In this respect, the Harry Hopkins-Stalin me eting from May 2() to June6 had major significance. ii Tn the conve rsations ~ d i n g with th e qu estionabout th e war in Asia at the thi rd mee ting on May 28, Hopkins pledgedth,l[ th e question of issuing an ultimatum to Japan wou ld be placed on theagenda of the forthcoming Potsdam Conference. Th e ultimatu m , inwhich the Soviet Union would be invited to join , wou ld justify the \'ioLt tion because the commitment to the Allies wou ld supe rsede its com mi t ment to the neutrality pact, which the Soviet govern ment had alreadyrenounced. This was similar to the logic used by Japan 's for eign ministerMatsuoka Yosuke, who, although instrum ental in nego tiating th e neu tra l ity pact, had a rgued, after the Ge rm an attack on the Soviet Union on June22, ICJ41, that Japan should :lttack the Sm'iet Union in violat ion of the pactit had just concluded on the grounds that Jap an's commitment to the Tripartite Pact should supersede its commitment to th e neutrality pact. Theonly difference was that l\latsuoka's argument did not prevail in 1941,while Stalin did attack Japan in 1945.

Two additional matters of significance were brought up at the H opkimStalin meetings. First, Stalin rea ffirmed the SO\ ' iet commitment to enterthe war against Japan and told Hopkins that preparations would be com pleted by August 8. Although Stalin's statement should not be tak en as apl ulgc to launch an attac k precisely on August 8, as is often asserted . it isimportant to note that Stalin con tinued the policy to maintain th e Yaltaframework . His pledge to enter the wa r against Japan was mea nt to in duce the U.S. government's co ntinued adherence to th e Yalta Agreement.

Second, he supported the U.S. policy to impose unconditional su rr e.nderon Japan. To Stalin the destruction of the emperor system wou ld be necC '

W ERE THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS JUSTI F IED? 10 5

s;lry to eradicate the sou rces of Japanese militarism, bu t also, so long as th eJapanese would resist unconditional surrender, it would serve as a convenient pretext to prolong the wa r long enough for th e Soviet Union to join it."

Japan's DilemmaBv Jun e, Japan's policy make rs came to th e conclus ion that the W ,\ [ wasl;st and that now it was tim e to con template how to end it. Th e army highcommand took the position that the best way to end the war was to wagea last decisiv e battle: against the expected American attack in Kyushu(Kctsu-Go Operation) to secure surrend er terms favorabl e for Japan. Incontrast, th e peace party considered it necessary to terminate the waras quickly as possible if Japan were to maintain its national sovereigntyand ter ritOrial integrity without jeo pardiz ing the kokutai .Th e most important change in Jun e in the relations between the peace party and th e wa rparty was th e emperor's change of mind from "the one - Iast-battle-befo resurrender position" advocated by the war party to " immed iate peace."' ?

It is important to stress tw o factors in Japan's policy to seek terminationof the war. First, despite differences, both parties agreed on one thing: theminimal condition for su rrender should be the preservation of th e kokutai.Without it, they were prepared to conti nue the war to the bitte r end. Butoddly, th e policy makers never clearly defined what specitlc va lues constituted the kokutai. Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda Soemu later testified,"Strangely enough, in spite of the fact that num erous arguments on theeve of surrender took place, concerning the question of safeguarding theNational Polity' Ikol(utai l .. . , those arguments never included any disCllSsion as to what was the meaning of th e term 'N ational Polity' or what sortof conditions were involved in the word 'safeguarding.' ,,1\

Within a small circle around Rear A dmiral Takagi Sokichi , who servedas the brain of th e peace party, how ever, two ingredients of this conceptthe emperor's political role and the presen'arion of the imperial houseWere clearly delineated. Takagi himself was prepared to jettison the first topreserve the second as the minimum condition for surrender. This ideaWas abo shared by th e high officials within the Foreign Ministry as well asthe former prime minister Konoe Fumimaro. Th ere existed, therefore, aVery important common ground between the Jap anese peace party andthose within the U.S. government who advocated th e redefinition of un conditionalsurrendcr.'4

8/6/2019 Atomic Bombing

6/20

10 706 TS U YO S H I HASEG AW A WER E TH E AT OM I C B OMB INGS J US TIFIE D?

Seco nd , desp ite th e diffe rences het wee n th e wa r pa rty and th e pe:\Cepa rt y, th ey ag reed on th e impo rtan ce of keeping the Sovi et Un ion neutral,al beit fo r diffe rent reason s. Fo r th e wa r party, So viet neutrality was tbesine qu a non with out which th e entire Ketsu-Go Op eratio n w ould be im_poss ible. F or t he peace pa rt y, Soviet mediation prov ided th e o nl y hope toend the wa r with out accepting un conditional surrend er, :lnd , as far as tht:For eign Min istry and Foreign Ministe r Tog o Shi geno ri were con cerne . ,th ey wi shed to use Mosco,v as a conduit to th e Allies. )

As th e military situa ti on went from had to worse, the Sov iet U nion occupied a mo re and more impo rtant posit ion in Japan 's foreign and militarypolicy. In Jun e the Foreig n Ministry sen t fo rme r prime min iste r HirotaKoki to Soviet amb assador lakov Malik to ex plo re th e possibili ty of rene go tiatin g th e neutrality pact o r even e le vatin g Soviet-Ja panese o n ~ toa higher level o f coo pe ration. ""/ hile the Japan ese wasted prec ious tim ein these futil e negotiations, th e Sov iets ex ploited the Japan ese e r t u rto ma ke sec ret pr eparations for the wa r against Japan. \Vh en th e Hirota! a l i k negotia tion s fa iled , th e Japanese gove rnm ent , with the tac it app ro\ ';] 1

of th e ;l rm y minister and the arm y chi ef of sta ff, decided to Sm ' iet me d intion to end th e lI':l r, se ndi ng Prince Konoe to o s c o l l ' as th e em peror 'sspecinl en vo y. O n Ju ly 12, five days befo re the Pots dam Con ference bega n,Togo sent a teleg ram instr uct ing Am bassado r Sato Naot

8/6/2019 Atomic Bombing

7/20

108 TSUYOSH I HASEGAWA

of August, and on the following day he even revealed to Truman that theJapanese gove rn ment had requested Soviet mediation to end the wa r,which he said he would ignore "t o lull the Japanese to sleep." Wh a t Sta lir)tried to impress upon Truman as a goodwill gestu re was meant to secu rean American invitation to append S t ~ l i n ' s signature to the joint ul tima_tum, which would se rve as the justification to violate the neut rality pact.

Did Truman welcome S t ~ 1 1 i n ' s pledge to join the wa r' Those who rejectthe vie\Y that the Soviet factor played a role in Truman 's dec ision to dropthe atomic bomb refe r to Truman's own w ritings as evidence. Tr umJnwrote in his diary: "H e [Stalin [11 be in the Japan War on August) 5th. F iniJaps when that comes about." He also vvrote in his m emoir s: "T here weremany reasons for my go ing to Potsdam, but th e most urgent, to my mi nd,was to get from Stalin a personal reaffirmation of Russia's entr y into thewar against Japan, a matter which our military chiefs were most anxiousto clin ch . This I was able to get from Stalin in the very hrst days of the conference." Afte r the first day of th e conference, he wrote to his wi fe, Bess:"Sta lin goes to war Aug ust 15th with no strings on it. T'I1 say that we'll endthe wa r a year sooner now , and think of the kids who won't be killed. Th atis the imp ortant thing."2l

Despite Truman's words, there is a substantial body of evidence tha tTruman and Byrnes decided to drop th e ato mic bombs to end the war bcfore Soviet entry. As ea rly as July 17, Byrnes told Stimson that he a nd Tr uman had worked out a "ti metable. ":!1 Afte r the war, Byrnes told histo rianH e rbert Feis: "having reac hed the conclusion that it would be a d isasterfor the United States and China if the Soviet Union entered th e Pac ificWar. This led to the thought that it would be just as wel l, if not better, ifStal in were not too fully aware of th e potentialiti es of the :ltomic bomb, fo rot herwi se he m ight ha sten Soviet entry int o the w Forrestal wrote:"Byrnes said he was anxious to get the Japancse affair over with before t ht:Russians got in with particular reference to Daircn and Port Arthur.""