STRATEGIC BOMBING OF AXIS EUROPE JANUARY 1943 SEPTEMBER 1944_1

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STRATEGIC BOMBING

OF

AXIS EUROPE

JANUARY 1943 SEPTEMBER 1944

BOMB DAMAGETO AXIS TARGET SYSTEMS

-Office o f th e

* *i~ Assistant Chief of A ir Staff, Intell igence

Analysis Division, European Branch

Washington, D.C.

15 November 1944

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MEMC.UAHDU?iFOR Command and General Staff School, A t t : Library

Subject: Koport- » ''Strategic Boinbiaf; o i; Aî y Europt)'*

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c : TKia raoort is ; oroaoatod &s a rac'-url record of theeffect of th o Coabi nad Borabor Offensive uurinj:; 1940 :;nci the i ' i rs t

-'•dine' months of 1944- coapreher.;Sive l iol- of : T?portant damagedpltmr,s,. with the racorcl of attacks on them.., in irioûdsaU

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STRATEGIC BOMBING

OF

AXIS LUROFE

JANUARY 1943 - SEPTEMBER 194-4

BOMB DAMAGE TO AXIS TARGET SYSTEMS

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Office of the

Assistant Chief of A ir Staff, Intelligence

Analysis Divis ion, European Branch

Washington, D. C,

1 December 1944

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«INTRODUCTION

This study is presented as a factual record of the effect

of the Combined Bomber Offensive during 1943 an d the f i rs t nine

months of 1944-. I t is considered that this report w i l l be of

value to the offices of the Assistant Chiefs of A ir Staff and

other interested agencies fo r background, informational and

research purposes.

•

In general, the Combined Bomber Offensive directives assign-

ed to the R.A.F. Bomber Command the task of destroying German

cities, dispossessing the working population and breaking Ger-

man morale. To the U.S. Strategic A ir Forces fell the task of

destroying key industries in the German War Economy.

The results of this combined program of precision and area

bombardment of Germany is the subject of this report. An over-

all evaluation of bombing and statements of results achieved in

each major target system are presented in the following sections.

A comprehensive list of important damaged plants also i s included

in the attached Appendix.

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TABLE OF cbrWf ITO &i* MSmEJ

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-I Introduction

-———• ~ ' '*- i \u25a0 \u25a0

I I Summary 1

IT I Bombing Operations ard Target Pattern . 6—<IV Aircraft 13

, - ^ -Anti-Friction Bearings.-. 19

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V I O il/

22——ardsvards r—» ~— * ~ , ^ - ,VT I Submarine

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25—— —.— „ , ,VITI Rubber and Tires r-.— 26u25a0

,IX Tanks an d Motor Transport -. „ —^, ,-»• 27

X Armaments an d Miscellaneous Engireering ,_ 30—X I Machine Tools and Precision Instruments P

— —31

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X II Electrical Equipment 31,--, X I T I Metals

- Steel an d Non-Ferrous , 32

,„ ,XIV Chemicals an d Explosives — -̂̂ .̂̂ 33—

XV General Level of Industrial Output--, ,, ._ 34.

—- . * . , , - t ~JJ J Transportation 39

XVII M ilitary Installations «^, , . — ^ r — ^ . 42

Appendix A Bomb Damage to Axis Industries^ 43

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i i . SUMMARY

A. Bombing Operations and Target Pattern

At the en d of September 1944 the weight of bombs dropped by-

Allied Air Forces in Europe since the beginning of the war reacheda total of 1,704,470 tons. The RAF Bomber Command accounted fo r 40percent of this total, U.S. Strategic A ir Forces 33 percent, U.S.Tactical Forces 17 percent and RAF Tactical Forces 10 percent.The growth of both U.S. an d 3ritish strategic bombing has been increasingly rapid in the las t two years. US3TAF tonnages averaging73,160 tons pe r month in the summer of 1944 were sixteen times\u25a0greater than in 1943. RAF tonnages of 65,700 pe r month in thesummer of 1944 were more than three times as great as in 1943 •

The target pattern fo r U.S. Strategic A ir Force attacks has involved successive prior i t ies fo r several target systems. These included submarine installations in earl}' 1943, aircraf t and anti-fr ict ion bearing factories in late 1943 and early 1944, an d oil

installations, tank factories and motor transport plants in mid-1944.During the first nine months of 1944 these high-priority industriesabsorbed 27.4 percent of the USSTAF bombing effort. Railway installations absorbed an equivalent amount, while airfields, other tactica l targets an d area attacks accounted fo r the remaining 45 percent,of the tonnage. Bomb- tonnages dropped on targets in Germany havesteadily increased, an d in the third quarter of 1944 amounted to 60percent of the USSTA.F to tal effort .

RAF Bomber Command attacks in 1943 were directed mainly againstGerman ci t ies . During 1944, on the other hand, such attacks werelimited to about 25 percent of the to tal RAF effort. Attacks againstrailway installations in occupied countries, counter measures againstflying borab installations on the Channel Coast and bombing of troopconcentrations absorbed more than half of this 1944 RAF effort. O ilinstallations and miscellaneous targetsabout 20 percent of 1944. t,onnages . accounted fo r the balance of

B. Aircraft

Between late July 1943, when attacks upon the German aircraftindustry were launched, and

30September 1944,

alarge

number ofattacks were made on Gernan assembly, component, repair an d aero-engine factories. Plants damaged by bombing totalled 58 in 1943,and 146 in 1944. Single-engine f ighter aircraft factories bore thebrunt of attacks, but production of twin-engine fighters, bombersand miscellaneous types also was materially reduced. Practicallyall the important aero-engine producers likewise suffered bombdamage .

As a result of bombing attacks i t is estimated that up to 30September 1944 the GAF had been deprived of 10,000 aircraft thatwould hava been produced in the absence of aerial attacks. Bombing

prevented a large planned increase of single-engine f ighter output,and unt i l the summer of 1944 held production below the level prevailin g in mid-1943. From T'arch to September 1944 aircraft output rosesharply from a low of 1320 to 1950 combat aircraft, most of whichwere single-engine fighters. This rise in production, in spite ofgreatly increased bombing of aircraft factories, reflects a successf u l dispersion and expansion of the German aircraft industry followin g the vury successful 1943 attacks. Although this expansion pro-

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gram was in considerable measure successful, the increased outputcame too late to build up a successful aerial defense of Germany,

Combat losses of German aircraft during the period August 1943Soptember 1944 are estimated at about twice the losses of factoryproduction. A sizeable part of this combat wastage, however, wasaccounted fo r by the strategic bombers and their f ighter escorts. i \

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Bombing and strafing attacks on GA F repair depots and airfields alsodestroyed aircraf t and in addition lowered serviceabili ty of remaining aircraft through destruction of hangars, repair facilities, c.-> J

(supplies, etc. The reduction of fuel supplies following successfulbombing of Axis oil installations also contributed to loweredact iv i ty of the GAF.

Attacks against GAF factories and operational installationscan be credited with ( l) holding down production of the latest type

German aircraf t , (2) reducing GAF resistence to a point where widespread strategic bombing of Axis target systems became feasible,(3) forcing a concentration of GA F f ighters in Western Europe at theexpense of Italian and Russian fronts and (4) aiding greatly in thelandings and subsequent invasion operations in Western Surope.

C. Anti-Friction Bearings

Attacks on anti-friction bearing targets resulted in damage to

14 Axis factories. The result ing production loss, together withloss of imports, averaged 20 percent of pre-attack supply during-the period August 1943 February 1944, and 50 percent during thefollowing 7 month period. The cumulative loss of bearings in the14-month period ending 30 September 1944 is estimated at the equivalent of 5 months normal supply.

The effects of these bearing shortages were cushioned to a considerable extent by a reduction of requirements result ing from directdamage to user industries producing aircraf t , tanks, etc. , and by .. .'.

redesign of equipment. Effects were also postponed to some extent byreduction of industrial allocations, use of pipe-line stocks and intensified salvage Nevertheless i t is estimated that only 90 percent oft

v i t a l requirements were covered in the first seven months of this offen-sive and about two-thirds in the period March September19Uu

Theseshortages are believed to have resulted 'in reduced assemblies of tanks,trucks, machine tools, etc., in addition to the losses caused by directbomb damage to these industries.

D. O il

The heavy aerial offensive against Axis oil installations, launchedin Ap r i l 19hk, caused widespread damage and a rapid drop in production.Up to 30 September 2k synthetic plants, 6° refineries, numerous storageinstallations and a number of miscellaneous l iqu id fuel plants weredamaged by aerial attack. Production dropped to 50 percent o f pre-

attack1; output in July

andto

a lowof

23percent in September following

occupation of the remaining refineries in Ploesti, Cumulative losses ofo il products by 30 September are estimated at 3*660,000 tons, or theequivalent of 23 A months pre-attack output .

Reduced production of o il has forced the enemy to lower mili taryand industrial consumption and to draw upon accumulated stocks. Localshortages of fuel have frequently appeared and have been an important

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factor in l imi t ing vehicular t raffic and res t r ic t ing German panzerand a ir force operations. In view of Germany's critical oil stockposition, continued attacks against the industry w i l l further restr ict mobili ty of German ground and a ir forces.

E . Submarines

During the early part of 19ii3 v/hen U-boat installations were toppr io r i ty targets, 12 German shipyards assembling submarines and the 5large operational bases in France were damaged by bombing, Theseattacks v/ere only moderately successful and were abandoned followingspectacular successes of anti-submarine operations at sea f Attackswere resumed in 19hh 9 however, when damage was inflicted on 17 Germanshipyards and several important operational bases. These attacks mayhave reduced serviceability of the remaining German submarine fleet.

F, Rubber and Tires

Synthetic rubber plants a t Kuls, Ludwigshafen and Oswiecim andseveral tire factories have been damaged during Allied bombing missions.In view of Germany's re la t ive ly large synthetic output and excess processing capacity i t is not believed that damage to these factoriesmaterial ly hampered the German war effort.

G, Tanks and Motor Transport

Bombing attacks on this industry, though limited in 19h3 * resultedin widespread damage during the spring and summer of 19hhj Damage to 6of the 9 known major tank assembly factories combined with damage toimportant producers of engines, gear assemblies and other componentsreduced tank production by an estimated 20 to 25 percent during thesummer and early fall of 19U* f

Production o f trucks and other motor transport also suffered in19hh as a result of damage to 23 producers of motorized equipment,including the 5> main truck assembly plants, numerous components plantsand several ordnance depots . Production of trucks , half tracks

4

andmiscellaneous vehicles in mid-l^Ui was reduced an estimated 15 to 20percent below the former rate of l i t , ooo monthly. Occupation of im

portantFrench

andBelgian plants

inAugust

19hhincreased this loss

of trucks and miscellaneous AFV equipment to a t least 140 percent ofprevious production levels f

The effect of these losses on German mili tary operations is diffi-

cult to evaluate since shortages of fuel have already restricted use ofavailable motorized equipment. However, if fuel output is increasedduring the winter months, losses of tanks and trucks as a result of bombdamage v/ i l l constitute serious blows to German forces already operatingwith inadequate equipment .H. Armaments and Miscellaneous Engineering

Production of art i l lery, shells and various other armament andengineering products has suffered considerably from bombing. Atleast hh factories in this category were damaged in 19h3, and 89 in19J414,including such. large plants as Krupp a t Essen and RheinmetallBorsig at Dusseldorf t Losses of engineering equipment 'and armamentscomponents have supplemented specific losses of aircraft, bearings,oil, etc, and have contributed to the overall reduction of Germanf ight ing strength,

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The production losses in these industries result ing from damageto 15 plants in*l°li3and 21 plants in 19hh has intensified reconstruction problems in bomb damaged industries f Lowered machine toolproduction has also l imited normal reequipment of plants and preventedthe use of former excess capacity fo r direct armaments production .J # Electrical Equipment

Damage to 25 plants and 30 plants is estimatedn 1910 in 19hhto have reduced output of the electrical equipment industry by atleast 10 to 15 percent. I t is possible that certain equipment bottlenecks were created, part icu lar ly by the heavy damage inflicted on largeand important plants in B e r l in ,

-X

,Metals Steel and Non-ferrous

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Damage to 16 steel plants in 19h3 and 17 plants in 19hh is believed to have reduced ortput, but only in- moderate degree becauseof the existence of excess capacity in the industry and the generalinvulnerability of steel plants. The loss of industrial plants in'western Europe and loss of imports of iron ore from Sweden and othersources has far overshadowed losses from bomb damage, and must soon

lower Gorman steel production to a fraction of former levels. Nonferrous metal producers also neve been damaged by Allied bombings,but i t is doubtful if German war production has' thereby been material ly damaged, 1

L , Chemicals and Explosives

Fair ly widespread damage has been infl icted on German chemicalfactories. Included in the list of 37 plants damaged in 19hh were6 plants producing hydrogen peroxide, used by rockets and robot a i rcraft. Five large explosives plants in France also were knocked ou tby RAF attacks. Other bomb damage contributed somewhat to the overall decline of Axis industrial output.

M , General Level of Industrial Output

Damage to German industries , as outlined in preceding sections,combined with damage to residential property, public util i t ies andadministrative agencies, has reduced overall industrial output in Germany by an estimated average of 12/15 percent during the period underreview. Factories damaged by bombing in 19h3 included 25 2 of the more

important plants in Axis Europe, In 19hh such damaged plants totalled536,

'In addition, hundreds of small factories, mostly unidentified,

were damaged or destroyed by bombing. Damage to housing by 30 September I9IUIis estimated at a to ta l of 2,600,000 units destroyed or rendered uninhabitable.

German industrial output has been greatly enhanced during thewar by the impressment of foreign labor into service in Germany, byacquisition of strategic resources in conquered te r r i to ry, and byreceipt, of contributions from occupied and satellite countries.Foreign workers have comprised about 20. percent of Germany's laborforce, and contributions from occupied countries, in financial terms,have amounted to as rcuch as 30 percent of the to ta l Axis outlays fo rwar purposes. The recent losses of European territory have deprivedGermany of most of these contributions and pract ica l ly all of certain

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'strategic materials v i t a l l to war production. The combined efTect"o war production. The combined efTect" »-*aoJof heavy bomb damage and the even more important loss of raw materialsan d industrial contributions from occupied countries is rapidly in -creasing Allied superiority in production and must seriously weaken

# German mili tary resistance in corning months.

N. Transpor t a t i on

In addition to the strategic bombing of industrial objectives,the strategic a ir forces have devoted a large percentage of theirefforts to the bombing of rail centers, road and rail bridges andport faci l i t ies . This bombing has supplemented tactical a ir forcemissions in several programs of interdiction.

'In I ta ly, the .Bal-

kans, Southern France and "Western Europe the bombing of transportfacilities has slowed the movement of German supplies and reinforce-ments and materially aided in the success of Allied ground operations.

Air action and mining operations by Brit ish A ir Forces have des-troyed or damaged shipping, por t facil i t ies and inland waterways.This has cost the Axis valuable cargoes, disrupted his industrialplans an d slowed mili ta ry traffic. As the weight of tactical andstrategic a i r force attacks against transport shift into Germanterritory, the enemy's industrial power and economic system,, aswell as bis mili ta ry strength and mobility, wil l be increasinglyimpaired by bombing,

0, M il it a ry Installations

During amphibious landing operations and subsequent advances

# in Italy, Southern France and Normandy, heavy bombers operatingwith medium and f ighter bomber forces have contributed materiallyto the success oi ground operations. Co inter action against launch-in g and supply sites fo r f ly ing bombs required diversion of a- size-able portion of the strategic a ir forces efforts but aided in res-t r ic t ing robot bombing attacks against England.

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111. BOKBING OPERATIONS AND TARGET PATTERN

A. Weight o f Attack

Bombs dropped by Allied A ir Forces

ning of the war reached ? to tal of 1,70k,k70 tons on 30 Sept'mber

19kk« For detailed data see table 1 . This to ta l effort was divided

almost equally between U.S. and British forces,

U.S. Strategic A ir ForcesU.S. Tactical A ir Forces

U.S. Total

RAF Bomber CommandRAP Tactical A ir Forces

RAF Total

Total

Strategic bomber forces accounted for

percent. A considerable par t of t ln is

however, was devoted to tactical bombirg,

in g sections

The monthly weight of attack by t he

showed an impressive increase in 19UU

dropped on Axis Europe by British and

3>0,570 tons in 19U5, an average of 108,990 tons

pedin

the f i r s t half of19141+,

and 177,930 tons

of I9UU. The spectacular incrcrse in weight of

revealed by t ie fact that 70 percent of the tot

dropped in 19kU, compared with 21 percent

pr ior years.

U.S. Strategic A ir Forces. Although p.ttecks

bombers committed to strategic bombardment were on

minor scale u n t i l late in 19U^, these

percent of Allied strategic air force

tons on 30 September 19UU- Attacks by the U.S.

(USSTAF ] increased sharply in 19hh, e.s shown in T



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TABLE1 \u25a0'*'ii'uji jjf""'<" '"'if8 !!, "

BOMBTONNAGE JJALLIED AIR FORCES IN EUROPE JJ

U. S. A ir Forces R. A. F.

*Tacti-; .: \v Bomber, cal kJn :\u2666u2666Perioderiod Bth AFilsth AF:l2th AF:th AFilsth AF:l2th AF: 9th AF:th AF: Total ;otal Command:Command: A F Med.ed. Totalotal

1939-40:939-40: 14,632:4,632: 2,828:,828: 17,4607,460

1941 :941 : 35,508:5,508: 14,317:4,317: 49,8259,825

1942 :'942 :' 1,713:,713: 4,410:*,410:* 6,123-:,123- :':' 51,028:1,028: 249:49: 25,258^5,258^ 76,5356,535

1943943 —————an.an. : 739; —39; — : 1,983: : 2,722:: 4,868: :1,983: : 2,722:: 4,868: : 1,368: 6,236,368: 6,236Feb.eb. : 705: ——705: —— : 1,773: —,773: — : 2,478:: 12,274:-— :2,478:: 12,274:-— : 832: 13,10632: 13,106Mar.ar. ; 1,530: : 2,773: —1,530: : 2,773: — : 4,303:: 11,858: -. - :4,303:: 11,858: -. - : 2,752: 14,610,752: 14,610Apr.pr. : 1,130: —,130: — : 5,042: : 6,172:: 12,843: 83:5,042: : 6,172:: 12,843: 83: 3,332: 16,258,332: 16,258Mayay : 2,677: —,677: — : 7,436: —,436: —

11: 10,134:: 14,460: 52:1: 10,134:: 14,460: 52: 2,978: 17,490,978: 17,490Juneune j 2,468: : 8,409; : 10,877;: 17,101: 282:2,468: : 8,409; : 10,877;: 17,101: 282: 2,938: 20,321,938: 20,321~-Julyuly : 4,103: —,103: — : 13,850: 263: 18,216:: 18,852: 491:13,850: 263: 18,216:: 18,852: 491: 4,688: 24,031,688: 24,031Aug.ug. : 3,779: ——3,779: —— : 02, 460: 1,292: 17,531:: 22,569: 531:02, 460: 1,292: 17,531:: 22,569: 531: 5,429; 28,529,429; 28,529Sept.ept. :. : 5,743: . : 13,941: 2,777: 22,4-61:: 16,642: 1,239:. : 5,743: . : 13,941: 2,777: 22,4-61:: 16,642: 1,239: 4,786: 22,667,786: 22,667Oct.ct. : 5,132: : 8,915: 882: 14,929:: 15,428: 363:5,132: : 8,915: 882: 14,929:: 15,428: 363: 2,829; 18,620,829; 18,620Nov.ov. : 6,868: 3,171: 4,087: 1,444: 15,570:; 16,236: 1,370:6,868: 3,171: 4,087: 1,444: 15,570:; 16,236: 1,370: 2,350: 19,956,350: 19,956Dec.ec . : 12,577: 4,368: 5.815: 1,541: 24,301: t 13.221: 1,054:12,577: 4,368: 5.815: 1,541: 24,301: t 13.221: 1,054: 1,001: 15,276,001: 15,276

Totalotal : 47,451: 7,539:' 86,484: 8,210 i 49,684: -176,352 \ 5,465:47,451: 7,539:' 86,484: 8,210 i 49,684: -176,352 \ 5,465: 35,283:217,1005,283:217,100. m. m

Jan. : 12,397: 11,051: 8,0-46; 1,618: 33,1125: 20,639: 1,696: 2,279: 24,614Feb. : 19,146; 6,747: 4,848: 3,420: 34,161:: 13,500: 1,781: 1,819: 17,100Mar. : 21,346: 10,376: 7,064: 5,193: 43,979:: 31,021: 1,173: 3,240: 35,434Apr.pr . 27,576:7,576: 21,253:1,253: 8,603:,603: 10,964: 68,396::0,964: 37,515:8,396:: 37,515: 1,961:,961: 4,465:. 43,941,465:. 43,941Mayay 38,029:8,029: 30,355:0,355: 15,720:5,720: 18,845:102,949:: 41,722:8,845:102,949:: 41,722: 5,174:,174: 7,150: 54,046,150: 54,046Juneune 59,625:9,625: 24,465:4,465: 11,821:1,821: 26,023:121,934: :6,023:121,934: 64,139:64,139: 5,703:,703: 4,451: 74,293,451: 74,2936 Mo.Mo. : 178,119: 104,247:78,119: 104,247: 56,102: 66,063:404,531:6,102: :208,536:17,485:6,063:404,531: :208,536:17,485: 23,404:249,4283,404:249,428

Julyuly : 46,605: 32,183:6,605: 32,183: 9,586 : 16,457:104,831:: 64,528: 5,124:,586 : 16,457:104,831:: 64,528: 5,124: 7,584: 77,236,584: 77,236Aug.ug. : 49,305: 28 ,230 :9,305: 28,230: 12,441: 18,272:108,248:: 73,760: 6,561:2,441: 18,272:108,248:: 73,760: 6,561: 8,796: 89,117,796: 89,117Sept,ept, : 42,162: 20,971:2,162: 20,971: 8,394:" 8,946: 80,473: : 58>89&:~3,9OO:,394:" 8,946: 80,473: : 58>89&:~3,9OO: 11,082.: 73,8801,082.: 73,880.9 Mo,.9 Mo, ;316,191;316, 185,631:91; 185,631: 86, 523; 109, 738; 698,083:; 405, 722; 33, 073:6, 523; 109, 738; 698,083:; 405, 722; 33, 073: 50,866:4-89,6610,866:4-89,661

'1939-Sept. 1944 *

: : i •:

• •939-Sept. 1944 *: : i •

:• •

Total :365, 355:193,170:177,417:117,948:853, 890; : 683,242;'38,787:*128,552i850,581otal :365, 355:193,170:177,417:117,948:853, 890; : 683,242;'38,787:*128,552i850,581— 1 , L. : : ; ; ; * •1 , L. : : ; ; ; * •

1/ Data from Statistical Control Division, Office of Management Control2/ Includes 9th A ir Force when in Mediterranean Theater

2/ Includes A ir Support Command of Bth A ir Force in early 19434/ Includes Mediterranean Strategic A ir Force.

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percent of the to ta l fo r these air forces was concentrated in the

third quarter of 19hh, 50 percent in the first half of I9kh, and only

10 percent in the preceding 17 months. The monthly average of 73 »160tons of bombs dropped in the summer of 19UU was sixteen times greater

than in 19U3 <-

RAF Bomber Command. Attacks b;/ Brit ish heavy bombers f account

ing fo r 55 percent of the to ta l Allied strategic effor t , up to

30 September 19UU, also increased greatly in 19W4, as- shown in Table 1.

Nearly 30 percent of the RA.F 5-year total was dropped in the third

quarter of 19UU»30 percent in the f i r s t half of the year, 26 percent

in 19U3, a^d 15 percent in preceding years. The monthly average of

65,700 tons reached in the sumner of 19Uil- was more than three times

•as great as in 19U3»

U.S. Tactical A ir Forces. . Attacks by t c U.S. 9th and 12th M r

Forces have accounted fo r nearly two-thirds of the tonnage dropped

by Allied tactical a ir forces in Europe during the war. Although

U.S. tactical a ir force operations were no t begun u n t i l late in 19U2,

the growth of these forces has rapidly overshadowed RAF operations,

particularly in 1914i|-» U.S. tactical forces in the Mediterranean area

dropped about the same tonnage in Vshh as in 19U3» "but the 9"th A ir

Force based in Britain showed large increases to a peak effort of

26,020 tons in the invasion month of June 1914J4. About 25 percent of

the^ to tal U.S. tactical effort was dropped in the third quarter of

19141+,I+l percent in the f i r s t he. lf of 19W+, p.nd 3U percent in the pre

ceding fourteen months.

British Tactical A ir Forces. British forces operating from

•Britain and the Mediterranean area (excluding Coastal Command and

naval forces) have accounted fo r somewhat more than one-third of tac

t ical a ir force tonnages. The long participation of these British

a ir forces in the war is shown- by the fact that only 26 percent of a

C5-5268,AFIH Jsl £w 'ilifi If k^ k L^ v 'i'^ t \ Tj| &J SB



\u25a0*\u25a0u25a0*\u25a0\u25a0u25a0U.. S. ,S. ,STRATEGIC AIR FORChS "W W 'O' *.i ila |JfTRATEGIC AIR FORChS "W W 'O' *.i ila |Jf

(Bth andBth 15th)nd 15th)HEIGHTEIGHT OFF ATTACK BY TYPE OF TARGETTTACK BY TYPE OF TARGET

#' '

f ::

1943943 1944944T _ - _ a_-_ a«\u25a0_ u25a0_«\u25a0_ u25a0_• °°;an-Mar:ian-Mar:i apr-jui Jan- Septan-pr-jui SeptTypeype of Target : Jan-Mar : Apr-of Junean-Mar : Apr- Junearget ne ;i July-e July-cjuiy- Sept :eptuiy- :

Tonson s : Percent:Percent: Tons jon s j Tonsons Tonson s Tons; Percentons; Percent

y--A/C Construction/C Construction : 2,4192,419 4.4.4 9,542,542 19,4319,431 19,323^ 48,7969,323^ 48,796 9.7.7" —Repairepair : 3,2083,208 5.8.8 : 1,5121,512 2,273,273 : 3,7853,785 0.8.8

." Airfields" Airfields s 5,1355,135 9.4.4 ; 8,6238,623 28,7678,767 20,038. 57,4280,038. 57,428 11.41.4

Totalotal ! 10,76210,762 19.69.6 ! 19,67719,677 50,4710,471 39,86i;i10,0099,86i;i10,009 21.91.9

O i lil '! 424! 424 0.8.8 ! 15 015 0 20,4360,436 44,018* 64,6044,018* 64,604 12.92.9

Bearingsearings : 2,2352,235 4.1.1 : 1,9061,906 1,080,080 1,311* 4,297,311* 4,297 0.9.9

I-ST-AFV-Rubber-ST-AFV-Rubber : 1,2231,223 \u25a02.2u25a02.2: 130130 75656 13,366: 14,2523,366: 14,252 2.8.8

Totalotal • 3,8323,832 7.1.1 \ 2,186\ 2,186 22,2722,272 58,695 \ 53, 1538,695 \ 53, 153 16.66.6

• ..

* RR InstallationsR Installations : 8,4408,440 15.35.3 : 22,342: 22,342 64,4084,408 52,003:138,7532,003:138,753 27.77.7«,,

Sub Yds-Navalub Basesds-Naval Bases : 20,49020,490 37.37.3 : 3,4673,467 1,622,622 4,576: 9,665,576: 9,665 1.9.9•

Flying Bomblying Sitesomb Sites : 2,2742,274 4.1.1• 8,4028,402 16,3376,337 9,104: 33,843,104: 33,843 6.7.7

Defenses-

Defenses TroopsTroops 9,131,131 20,832: 29,9630,832: 29,963 6.0.0

Totalotal • 31,20431,204 56.76.7 ; 34,21134,211 91,4981,498 86,515. !86,515. 212,224212,224 42.32.3

-Area T.O.rea Misc..O. Misc. : 9,1429,142 16.66.6 : 24,98924,989 37,0627,062 34,385: 96,4364,385: 96,436

-— 19.29.2

-— —-— —-— —

\u25a0\u25a0! \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0'\u2666\u25a0\u25a0I }l \u25a0u 25 a0 \u 25 a0 ! \ u 25 a0 \u 25 a0 \u 25 a0 ' \ u2 66 6\u25a0\u25a0I }l \u25a0 .....

A ll Targetsl l Targets : 54,99054,990 100,000,0 : 81,063 ,1,063 ,201,30301,303 219,456.501,82219,456.501,822 100.000.0.

Source of da ta ; Statistical Control Division,Office of I4magement Control

1

Prepared by

•Office of the Assistant Chiefof A ir Staff, IntelligenceAnalysis Division,European Branch, Target Section

C5-5268,AF

9



i

TABLE 3ABLE 3 r<<

•RAFAF1 BOMBER COMMANDOMBER COMMAND **—* **

UVEIGHTVEIGHT OB .B .ATTACK BY TYPE 1TTACK BY TYPE 1OF TARGET:—: -L,OF TARGET:—: -L,

1943943 1944944

Type'ype' off Targetarget . ; Jan-Mar: Apr- June; Jan-Mar: Apr- June July— Septuly— rept r Jan-Septan-Sept•Tonsons : Percent: Tons TonsPercent: Tons Tons Tonsonsonsons sjs Tonsons : PercentPercent

Precision Attacksrecision Attacks

A/c RepairA/c Repair«

1,234,234 3,374*:,374*: 50909 5,U7,U7 1.3.3Airfieldsirfields 19797 0 .1.1 3,715:,715: 10,2850,285 14,0004,000 3.5.5O ilil 4,253.,253. 21,7351,735 25,9935,993 6.4.4RR InstallationsR Installations 2,676,676 .1.51.5 6,608,608 54,641

:4,641

:17,6397,639 78,5588,558 19,49,4

-Sub Basesub Portsases Ports 10,9660,966 6.2.2 3,236,236 3,236,236 0.8.8p/A/C Installations/A/C Installations- 50606 0.3.3 1,634,634 20,020:0,020: 48,1118,111 *.. 69,7659,765 17.27.2Defenses Troops : 24,351: 50,277 : 74,628 18 r 4

it hert Industryer Industry 2.0.0 t 238238 1,3X5:,3X5: 2,681,681 : 4,2344,234 1^̂

Totalotal 17,8697,869 10.10.1 \ 9,7149,714 111,674111,6741 154,47354,473 :275,86l275,86l 68.8.

.M a j o r City Attacks

Rhine land : 37,094 21.0 : 11,339: 7,010 : 18,349 4.5

«Ruhr : 29,322 16.7. : 3,042 6,228: : 9,270 2.3Berlin : 21,952 12.5 :16,435 : 16,435* 4.1Hamburg, Kiel , Wil

helmshafen, Bremen-, "s 14,495 8.2 11,824 \u25a0:U,824 2.9Emden :

Stettin, Rostock, ; 1,006 0.6 : 1,252 4,067 : 5,319 1.3Konigsberg : :

Hanover-Kassel 7.0 :12-\»339Brunswick- Magdeburg : "4,513 1,498: 917 j - : 6,928 1.7Frankfurt-Nuremberg :: 10,806 6.1 : 7,711 . .-- •.: 1,712 : 9,423 . 2,3Gtuttgart-Leipzig- :-Munich \u25a0:

•Source of data: Statistical Control Division,

Office of Management Control

Prepared by

Office of thene as si s baa 0 Chiefiiiue ox Assistant o n i e i- rwpa,* "'- '\l of A ir Staff ' ntelligence

if j S-* Analysis Division,llh

g<\

" \^ *'J¥*> TV-' J European Branch, Target Section

10



--

***$'&%$<r i•*5-year to ta l was dropped during the third quarter of 19UU snet!^ « Ljs*ar J^ff

percent in the f i r s t half of 19141+, compared with 50 percent in pre

vious years .# 8 ., Target Pattern

U.S. Strategic A ir Forces. The industrial pattern of U.S

Strategic A ir Force attacks during 191+3 and 19JJ+ is shown in Table 2.

Submarine building yards and naval bases were the chief targets of

these forces during early 19U3* In "the crucial battle against the

U-bost more than37

percent of to ta l 19U3 USSTAF tonnages was drop

ped on naval installations . Of next iirroortance in the 19^3 program

were airfields and aircraft repair depots , accounting fo r 15 percent,

and railway installations also accounting fo r 15 percent of the 19U3

to ta l bomb tonnage.

+The emphasis of USSTAF attacks in I9WI was shifted to railway

installations, synthetic oil plants and refineries, airfields and

repair depots and aircraft factories. As shown in Table 2 , these

target systems accounted fo r 63 percsnt of the to ta l effort in the

first nine months of 1914J1. The balance of the tonnage w*.s directed

at pilotless aircraft installations, troops and coastal defenses,

area and miscellaneous targets.

The geographical pattern of USSTAF attacks in I9UU showed an

increasing concentration of attacks on Germany. In the third quarter

of 19UU about 60 percent of th e to ta l tonnage was dropped in the

greater Reich, compared with considerably less than UO percent in

th e f i r s t he. lf of 19141+and 55 percent in 19U3.

RAF Bomber Command. The industrial pattern of Bomber

•.it

Command attacks in 19U3 a ri d 19UU is shown in Trble 3° Lprge indus

trial cities in Germany bore the brunt of 19U3 attacks, cities in

the Rhineland and Ruhr, Berlin and various other large industrial

centers accounting fo r more then three-fourths of the total 19U3

tonnage. Submarine bases an d various miscellaneous targets accounted

fo r the remaining r"

W^ W\

05^5268, AF



- .-v

'f fl181 « v k, ,„

#

In the first 9 months of 1944, major city attacks involve*!* less J

tonnage than in 1943 and accounted fo r only one— fourth of the total

RAF effort.Bombing of railway installations an d defenses in sup

port of the invasion of -France represented 38 percent of the to ta l

RAF tonnage. Counter action against pilotless aircraft installa

tions forced the diversion of 17 percent

than 6 percent of RAF tonnage was aimed

a program supplementing the heavy USSTAF

installations* The remaining 14 percent

aneous targe ts\

of the RA F total* More

at oil installations in

offensive against o il

was dropped on miscell-

The geographical pattern of RAF Bomber Command attacks in 1943

-showed a heavy concentration of attacks on Germany more than

three-fourths of the to ta l tonnage. however f when supportn 1944*

of the invasion and counter action against f ly ing bombs took f i r s t

priority-, attacks on Germany decreased. Only 40-percent of RAF

W tonnage was dropped on German targets in the f i r s t half of 1944

and only 23 percent in the third quarter.

The effects of these All ied bombing operations upon the out

put of various German war industries are described in following

sections. A list of the priority factories damaged by aerial

attack in 1943 and 1944 also is given, in Appendix A..

•*\u25a0'

u25a0" wVJ 11 C5~526g,AF

12



tm

"/T */5*/IV AIRCRAFT

A» Attacks on Aircraft Factories

Since the middle of 194-3 factories producing German f ighter air

craft have been high pr io r i ty targets fo r tJSTAAFattacks whenever

weather and operational conditions permitted* Up to 30 September

194-4 U.S» Strategic Air Forces had made 254 attacks upon the Axis

aircraft industry, including 177 attacks against assembly and compon

ents factories , 50 against aero-engine plants and 27 against repair

factories . On 53 occasions the RAF damaged aircraft factories in the

course of area and precision bombing attacks. In addition to these

factories a large number of engineering industries producing minor

components such as spark plugs, oil f i l t e r s , propellors, metal cast

ings, etc. , also were attacked.

By 30 September a to ta l of 56,450 tons had been dropped by U.S.

bombers on GAF factories; large RAF tonnages also had been dropped

on French plants and German aircraf t centers. The weight of USTAAF

attacks against the German aircraft industry averaged only 400 tons

monthly in the second half of 1943 bu t increased to 6,500 tons pe r

month in 1944. Th^ maximum weight of U.S. attacks occurred In Apri l

1944 when 9,850 tons were dropped on German aircraft plants.

As a result of this offensive against aircraft production a

to ta l of 58 aircraft plants were damaged in 1943 an d 146 plants in

1944. A list of these damaged factories is given in Appendix A.

Single-engine f ighter aircraft have borne the brunt of USTAAF

attacks against the Axis aircraf t industry. Seven SEF plants damaged

by US bombing in 1943 were increased to 38 plants during the f i r s t

9 months of 1944. These included twenty-one factories producing com

ponents fo r or assembling ?!e 109s and seventeen producing FW 190s.

A ll the important known SEF aircraf t factories were attacked from

one to seven times and production materially reduced at all locations.

" G5-5 26&,AFm m



-->J

**a m a g e l i s tamage list be-"" 1 I aBTwin-engine wfir f i addedddfiri tn th ethe be-"ighter factories were to aß *<*&

ginning in January 1944. By 30 September 16 TEF factories had been

attacked from one to five times each. Seven long-range bomber plants

# producing He 177 and He 111 aircraft were damaged during 194-4 attacks.

Production of transports, dive bombers and I tal ian f ighters and bom

bers also yras curtailed as a result of a number of attacks on plants

producing these aircraf t . In early 1944 aero-engine factories also

became pr io r i ty targets fo r USSTAF attacks. In the following months

21 of 22 factories producing BI.IW, Daimler Benz and Jumo engines were

damaged, and supplies of this major A/C component restricted for both

installation in new aircraft .and replacement in older aircraft.

•

B , Results of Attacks- on Aircraft Factories

Attacks upon German aircraft production have prevented a large

planned increase in output and u n t i l the summer of 1944 held production

below the level prevailing in mid-1943 when attacks were in i t iated.

I t is estimated that up to 30 September 1944 the G.A.F. has been de

prived of 10,000 new planes that would otherwise have been produced

in the absence of aerial attacks. Most of the aircraft thus los t to

the GAF have been single-engine f ighters . Output of twin-engine

f ighters also has been cut, however, and bomber output likewise mat

er ia l ly reduced both through direct damage to plants and through con

version of faci l i t ies to sorely needed f ighter production.

Tilhen strategic attacks were launched against the German aircraft

industry in July 1943, German production of operational types had in

creased to about 1740 monthly, including 910 single-engine fighters.

Having recognized the threat of Allied strategic bombing, the GAF had

launched a program of expansion that called fo r a monthly output

r is ing to nearly 3,000 operational planes in late 1944, including

# about 1,700 single-engine f ighters .

-'*• :; .;\u25a0. 'Mi

C5-5268,AF

14



#

•

•

rT'r-.knn n n th p suocpss ofof nvprisinn bnmbi n? .his schedule did not reckon on the success precision bombing,

however. As a result of aerial attacks output of combat types was re -

-duced below the July level to a low of 1,320 planes in I arch 1944. 24

percent below July output and less than half of planned production.

From !'arch 1944 onwards production of operational planes rose sharply

to 1950 aircraft in September, of which 1400 were single-engine f ighters .

The weight of aircraf t produced was no greater than in July i 43, how

ever, fo r the gain in f ighter production was offset by a reduction of

heavy bomber output. The estimated output of combat types by months

is shown in the following table ;

Month A ll Combat Types Single-engine Fighters

:: Est. Outputl./: %of Planned Est. Output i6s of Planned: » Output : t Output

1943July . 1740 100 910 100Aug. : 1530 85 675 70Sept. . 1520 81 630 63•Oct. -. 1540 79 645 61Nov. . 1550 77 690 63

Dec. : 1480 71 740 65

19440

Jan. .: M5O 67 805 68Feb. 1430 64 785 63Mar. j 1320 58 680 53Apr. : 1385 59 705 50•May

49480 61 790June : 1665 67 : 925 51July : 1740 68 1100 55Aug. j 1930 73 1375 63Sept. t 1945 72 uoo 58Oct. : 2015 72 1500 59

Total#

25,720 71 14,355 60

1/ Based on British A ir Ministry Figures.

-The rise in aircraft production since "'arch 1944 in spite of a-large increase in weight of Allied bombing attacks reflects a suc

cessful reorganization of the German aircraft industry, "i/hen attacks

were initiated in 1943, the German aircraft industry was organized

C5-5268,AF



#

«

•

)-'i . '";' - 'm .fri** en :"\

into a re la t ive ly few highly integrated complexes of assNs&hly jand coispJ/M

ponents plants ut i l i z ing mass production methods . The 194-3 precision

attacks, involving a to tal of only 2,420 tons, resulted in very con

siderable damage and large production losses. These attacks proved

the vulnerability of the existing industrial plan, and compelled a

wholesale reorganization of the German aircraft industry. In an e f-

f o r t to expand single-engine f ighter output, production of components

was dispersed to many small plants, including unused textile m i l l s .

GAF airfields were pressed into use fo r assembly. New facilities were

developed underground. Bomber plants were converted to production of

f ighter aircraf t . New plans raised production goals fo r single-engine

f ighters to more than 2,000 pe r month in late 194-4 •

Expansion of German SE F production, however, came too late to

save the German war effort from heavy Allied bombing. The reduction

of output of defensive f ighter planes forced upon the GAF a policy of

conservation to retain an a ir force in being. Lack of adequate re -

sistance in turn made possible successful strategic bombing of Axis

industries producing oi l , bearings and other v i t a l war materials.

C. Fa c to ry Losses in Relation to Combat Losses

-The loss of aircraf t production at bombed factories estimated

-at 10,000 planes between 1 August 1943 and 30 September 1944 was

roughly half of the somewhat more than 20,000 aircraf t los t to the

GAF in combat in this period. The bomber offensive accounted fo r a

considerable part of these combat losses, however. Heavy wastage

was inflicted on the GAF by Allied bombers and by escorting f ighters

during bombing missions. Allied bombing of GAF airfields and re -

pair depots accounted fo r additional sizeable losses of German a i r-

craft, as well as a lowering of serviceability. The remainder of the

GAF wastage resulted largely from aerial combat with tactical a ir

forces, strafing of airfields and capture of GAF airfields with im

mobilized aircraf t .

C5-52^8,AF



_Sat OB iA NJt,^ ! ty l

, .w& 0 i£sf&

The damage to aircraft factories was qual i ta t ive ly of greater

importance than the 1:2 rat io of "lost" production to combat losses

indicates.. Factory attacks in conjunction with other counter .air

m force -action (l) reduced German defensive resistance to a point where

strategic attacks on Axis target systems could be made without undue

losses, (2) forced the GAF to concentrate f ighter aircraft in Western

Germany at the expense of German military capabilities on land fronts

in Russia and the Mediterranean, (3) aided in whit t l ing down the GAF

to a point where i t could no t combat All ied land invasions, and (4)

assured unhampered Allied lines of communications and minimum losses

of men and material atf the vast mili tary depots b u i l t up in Britain

fo r continental invasion.

R e p a i r De po t sD. Attacks on GAF Bases and

<J

Since the early part of 1943 , 34 factories repairing aircraf t

and producing spare parts have been damaged by USAAF and RAF aerial

attacks involving a to tal of 12,100 tons of bombs. Damage to these

factories, most of which were French or Belgian, has slowed the re -

turn of repaired aircraft to front-line units and has reduced GAF

strength thru loss of planes and parts.

Attacks upon airfields up to 30 September 194-4- have accounted

fo r a material part of the Allied bombing effort-

76,700 tons.

Since the f i r s t of 1944 U. S. Strategic and RAF bombers made 531

attacks on

135 air f ie lds in i i1 ranee and the Low Countries" "75 "t Germany and Austria47 H !I I ta ly and the Balkans

"

•257 it Total

These attacks have destroyed aircraft, and by damaging or destroy

ing repair facilities, hangars and other airfield installations

have seriously lowered the' combat serviceabili ty of aircraf t re -

maining to the GAF. Numerous strafing attacks, in addition, have

been made on airfields, with resultant claims of several thousand a ir

craft destroyed.

» v*-% a % I*®} * C5-52£8,AF



'pon GAF s£ren|;ftr j^s*&'£ r,-,-\ Tff E. Effectecx. ofj. .Bombingpomping . a v o a c K sttacks upon uax 1 DurengwH' «&% « Ei > .\ ,*» .

r

\u25a0"HL>. .''

#

rf H /

As a result of the Allied Bomber Offensive since July 1943 "***\u25a0»\u25a0

the GAF has been decisively weakened. This has been accomplished

through the combined effect of (1) bomb damage to aircraft fac-

tories, (2) bomb damage to repair factories and airfields, (3)

combat losses imposed on the GAF during strategic bombing and

strafing attacks, and (4) reduction of aviation fuel supplies

through bombing of synthetic oil plants and refineries .' The inferiority of the GA F has become increasingly evident in

its reduced resistence to Allied a ir and ground forces. In the

summer of 1944 f ighter aircraft strength of the GAF was great enough

to permit an estimated 1,200 sorties pe r day, but actual sorties

flown were far below this level . The inab i l i ty of the GAF to fly

%

the sorties permitted by available numbers of German aircraf t may

be traced to a forced policy of conservation, low serviceabili ty of

planes, and shortages of fuel and suitable pi lo t s . The overwhelm-

in g superiority of Allied a ir power and th e disorganization caused

by abandonment of airfields during rapid Allied ground advances also

contributed to the decline of the once great GAF.

I t may be concluded that the Allied bomber offensive has ac-

complished the task of reducing the GAF to a state where i t has

been unable to oppose effectively either the amphibious and ground

operations of land forces or the increasingly heavy bombing of

German industry.

•1

C5-5268,AF

7 J&>jsr



'""

'\u25a0' •\u25a0' n»n»u25a0u25a0

P-<

P- tt

[TI-FRICTIJNTI-FRICTIJN I BEAJTOGSBEAJTOGSNTI-FRICTIONNTI-FRICTION BEAfiINGSEAfiINGS

A. Attacks. Attacks on Bearingn factoriesearing factoriesnaa

On 17n .7 .August 194-3 Bth A irugust 194-3 Bth A ir io rce bombers opened an offensiveo rce bombers opened an offensive

against thegainst the : Axis anti-frictionxis anti-friction bearing indus t ry by bombing Schwein-rearing indus t ry by bombing Schwein-r

fur t , center of European bearing production. Between this date and

30 September 1944 a to tal of 26 attacks on bearing factories was

made by U.S. a ir forces. Bombs dropped totalled tons., or 1.26^530

percent of the to tal U.S. Strategic A ir Force effort in this fourteen-

month period. RAF attacks also were made on Schweinfurt and Stuttgart

and two French -factories.

This offensive against the bearing industry infl icted considerable

damage on 14 factories which before damage accounted fo r about 84 per

cent of to tal Axis bearing supplies. U.S. S t r a t e g i c A ir Force at

tacks accounted fo r all or most of the damage suffered by 12 of these

plants .B. Pre-Attack Bearing Position

In the building and maintenance of a war machine Germany used

large numbers of ba l l arid ro l ler bearings. Every type of mobile

mili tary equipment and the industrial machinery needed fo r the pro

duction and distribution of war materials and civil ian goods utilized

anti- f r i c t ion bearings. Prior to attacks on this industry Germany's

bearing supply position was a comfortable one according to available

evidence. Bearings were widely used in military equipment and there

was no apparent attempt to economize through substitution or elimi

nation of bearings. The considerable time* la g between production and

use of bearings in finished equipment indicated an easy stock posi

t ion . Available sources of imports were no t f u l l y uti l ized as would

have been the case with inadequate production.

The anti-fr ict ion bearing industry was nevertheless selected as

a high-pr ior i ty target system because of several outstanding character

ist ics :

£5-5268,AF-

19



UliiilLiriw»w -- nd^ll1 . Attacks on bearing plants offered possibilities of cutting

•across German industry and, with the l imited forces

available, affecting output ol items not easily reached

by direct aerial attacks. /

2. Production was concentrated in a relatively small number of

plants readily accessible to Allied bombers, ro r example,

Schweinfurt plants alone accounted fo r approximately 40

percent of Axis supplies. f .

3- The industry used a great deal of highly specialized machinery

di ff icu l t of replacement and vulnerable to f i re and high

explosives.

C. Results of Aerial Attacks

-Bombing attacks on the Axis bearing industry combined with the

gradual loss of imports that had accounted, fo r 9 percent of Germany 1 s

-pre-attack supply reduced Axis bearing supplies as shown in column

# >2 of the following, table.

Supply as Per-

Month Requirements"* cent of Requirements

\u2 5a 0 •1) (2) (3) (4 ) .(i n percent of pre-attack level)

1943August 93 97September 95 99

October 92 87November 89 80December 35 911944January 85 87

February 85 84Average 89 90

March 79 73Apri l 599

•May 74 64June

7367

July 78 63August 81 59September 84 _62

Average 78 v

1/ Requirements reduced through attacks on user industries suchas aircraft, etc., and lower civil- industrial allocations.

C5-5268,AF



- -

W' '-i r* M l&iiHft lH »tl l«li i?iF it'll

V I OIL

A. Attacks Upon, the Industry

-19U^ Attacks Prior to Aprii IQU'-t. attacks upon the Axis oil

industry/were small scale

o r sporadic. Ir,

theearly years

of the

war Brit ish bombers made numerous b u t re.lativelv ineffective attacks

\u25a0upon oil storage an d refining; installations in Western E u r o p e . Dur

in g 19U3 damage was confined to two of th e smaller synthetic oil

plants, si x refineries in Western Europe, end refining installations

at Ploesti. These latter refineries in Romania were targets fo r a

spectacularlow-level attack on 1

August19U-3?during which an esti

mated k, 000, 000 tons o f ref in ing capacity was knocked ou t fo r varying

periods. The chief result of the damage inflicted by this attack

\u25a0was to eliminate temporarily a large cushion of excess refining ca

paci ty. Except fo r an estimated 7 0,000 tons of oil and refined pro

ducts destroyed by f i r e , output was no t materially affected.

-191411-Attacks

InAp

r ii 19LJ4allied bomber Forces launched a

smashing aerial offensive against Axis sources of oil products.

Following initial bombing of ref i r. ery and ra i lway installations a t

Ploes t i , the pattern o f attacks spread over li/urone to include other

"Balkan refineries an d oil stores, German synthetic; plants, refineries

in Germany, an d storage installations in France. During the ensuing

five month period, a to tal o f 9?, 780 tons of bombs were dropped on

Axis oil installations. U.S* Strategic A? r Forces dropped 6h$U5Q

tons , or 1?«3 percent of t h e i r to tal bombing effort in th e l a y -

September period. RAF bombers dropped 2r,3302r ,33O tons , chiefly in a t

tacks against Ruhr synthetic plahts and French oil stores.

As a result of 270 attacks on oil-producing installations, a

to tal o f 2)4 synthetic oil plants and 69 crude oil refineries have

been damaged. In addition, numerous storage depots in western and

southern 'France, Romania erd Germany, and a number of coal ta r and

vegetable oil plants have sustained' damage from aerial attacks.

C5-5268,AF

22



B . Results of Attacks on 4xis O il Industries-

Pre-Attack Position In the first quarter of 19UU Axis pro-

du-ction of synthetic fuels and refined petroleum products reached a

# level estimated at 1,3U4-,000 tons monthly, made up as follows:

•Synthetic O i lynthetic 1+30,000il 1+30,000 tons 35 »7 percentons 35 »7 percent

698,00098,000 51.91.9efined. Crudeefined. CrudeBenzol, Alcohol, Etc. 166,000enzol, Alcohol, Etc . 166,000 12 .k2 .k" ""

1,31^,000 .,31^,000 . 100.000.0

This production was sufficient to meethis production was sufficient to meet ; Germany's nee^s fo r mili taryGermany's nee^s fo r mili tary

and civil ian purposes a.nd still permitnd civil ian purposes a.nd still permit , accumulation of oil reserves.accumulation of oil reserves.

These reserves, variously estimated athese reserves, variously estimated at ; 3 to U mil l ion tons on 1 Apri3 to U mil l ion tons on 1 Apri

-19^4 including quantities tied up in9^ 4 inc luding quant it ie s tied up in i the distribution system werthe distribution system wer

distributed throughout Europe in accordance with anticipated mili ta ry

and industrial needs. While o il was never plentiful fo r German

armed forces and industrial users, supplies were sufficient to ' support

heavy f ight ing and a high level of industrial production.

-Post-Attack Position The offensive against oil, mounted at a

time when Allied a ir strength permitted heavy, concentrated and re

peated attacks, cut deeply into Axis oil output. During I9hh, pro

duction is estimated as follows:

I'onth Production Consumption Difference

(percent of pre-at tack production)Farch 100 95 * 5-Apri l 85 90 5!<ay 76 82 . 6

June 5U 82 -28July 50 69 -19August 39 52 -13September 23 U5 -22October 30 ko -10-November 3U ko 6

A ye . April-Fov. U9 63 -11+

• Output of gasoline and lubricating oi l s , of particular importance

fo r GAF and Panzer operations, was reduced to a greater extert than

these averages fo r all products.

C5-5268,AF



m

•

•

s*f?

_ _ ,_._>

\u0084. . . . . ** "

Cumulative losses of oil products by 30 September 19UU are

estimated at 3»660 >000 tons, o r the equivaleht of 2 3A- months

normal output. This reduction of o il production has forced the

enemy to restr ict consumption by a ll possible means, ar^ to d^sW

upor stocks to meet minimum requirements. It is estimated that by

30 September stocks were thus drawn upon to the extent of at least

1,200,000 tons. Local fuel shortages have frequently appeared and

have been a most important factor in limiting, German vehicular traf

f ie in France and other war theaters and in restricting* operations

of the GA.F . Continued shortages of oil as a result of sustained

aerial attacks w i l l force depletion of repairing stocks an d w i l l

further l i m i t mobile warfare on the part of the Herman army.

- '•> C5-5268,AF... r ft *^^^^PV

I



-I

By ''tS 7 I'^f "'i JP^^i ißi mi1W

fil E? l' *% F% ly & 3^l im .

V II SUBMARINE YA.RDS

During the early par t of 19U3>when the German U-boat menace was

a t its peak, submarine building yards an d operating bases became top-

priori ty targets fo r Allied borbing attacks. Twelve German ship

yards assembling submarines were subsequently damaged, mainly by Bth

A ir Force bombing. Allied air forces also directed a heavy weight

of attacks against th e ori rc ipal submarine bases a t Brest, Lor ien t ,

St. Nazaire, La Pallice and Bordeaux in Western France. These ef

forts against naval installations absorbed nearly two-fifths of U.S.

Strategic f ir Force tonnages in 19U5, an d nearly one-fifth of RAF

bomb tonnages.

Bombing of submarine installations was abandoned as a primary

objective in the summer of 19U3, par t i / because of the relrt ive in

effectiveness of such attacks b u t mainly because of th e spectacular

success of anti-submarine warfare a t sea. Attacks were resumed in

the summer of 19UU, however, and considerable additional damage in

f l icted on submarine installations during both U.S. precision and

RAF area attacks. In the f i r s t nine months of 19^4 Allied bomber

forces damaged 17 shipyards in G rmnny and 2 operational bases in

the Mediterranean area, as well s the French bases which the Allies

stormed during the invasion of W stern Euro D e.

Since the enemy had already greatly reduced construction o f TJ-

boats prior to these 19^1- attacks i t is doubtful if U-boat building

was materially hampered by th e recent bombing. Naval operations

may have been restricted somewhat through the destruction of U-boats

and the lowering of serviceability of that part of the underseas

f leet which th e Nazis shifted from the los t Fremch ports to safer

German North Sea bases . <

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- -

VIII RUBBER AT D TIRES

During, a period in 19Uj> when rubber factor ies constituted a

* high pr ior i ty target system, an especially successful attack was

made on Germany's second largest synthetic rubber producer at Huls.

Several other processing plants were damaged in varyirg degree. Dur-

ing V^\\h, damage was corfir.ed to h, Axis t i re plants and synthetic

rubber plants at Ludwigsnafen and Osweicim.

Attacks on the rubber industry apparently have had little ef-

fect on German mili tary operations. P- large excess of t i re making

capacity has been available in Germany an d France. Though lack-

in g natural crude rubber, supplies of synthetic and. reclaimed rubber

apparently have been adequate fo r all mili ta ry needs, particularly

in view of th e reduction of requirements following bomb damage to

aircraft and motor vehic le industries.

>

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26



JV.

>5 ^̂ *£*!)19U39U3 Percent 19Uhercent 19Uh Percentercent m

Septembereptember 7 MarchMarch 2UUOctoberctober 5 Apri lApr i l 211

'Novemberovember 11 May1 May 199Decemberecember lU JuneU June

177# JulyulyJanuary-anuary- 13 August13 August 2kkFebruaryebruary 15 September15 September 233Averageverage 11 Average1 Average 200

B. Trucks ard Miscellaneous AFVs

Production of t rucks , armored cars, half-tracks , and tractors

was cut somewhat during 19U3 by damage to 11 assembly factories

'and various plants producing; minor components . This dsra^e was

#

considerably amplified in 19' 'L when 25 of the 55 princ ipal producers

of motor transport were damaged, including the 5 main p l an t s . As a

result of damage to these t>larts and to various corroorerts producers

and ordnance depots, output in the third quarter of 19UL was reduced

an estimated 15 to 20 percent below tV e previous monthly rate of

about l[;,000 trucks and miscellaneous AFV equipment. Production of

personnel cars was reduced an estimated 20 percent below former levels

of about 3*500 monthly.

•

Losses through bomb damage were overshadowed during August 19^*U

by Allied occupation of French ard "Belgian plants. A number of impor

tant factories in these countries formerly accounting fo r more than

U0 percent of Axis l igh t trucks, 25 percent of medium trucks and 20

percent of heavy trucks were lost to Germany during Allied advances.

As a combined result of terr i torial losses and bomb damage to Herman

factories,, output of Axis trucks and miscellaneous AFV equipment dur

in g the summer and early fall of 19^U was reduced more than J.iO per

cent below former production levels.

The effects of these losses of tanks, trucks and other AFV

equipment on German mili ta ry operations is somewhat di ff i cu l t to



- -

evaluate in view of the restrictions already^niosecr ay shortages of

fuel following attacks upon the Axis oil industry. Losses of mech

anized equipment through aerial attack may in fact have bu t little

\u2666 effect on the duration of German defense if fuel shortages prevent

the full use of the equipment that is already available. However,

should production of fuel recover during th e winter mortbs, the loss

of badly needed tanks and the depletion of the Axis truck dool must

constitute serious blows to German mili tary forces already operat-

in g with inadequate AFV equipment.

#

#

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29



- -

'

X ARMAMEHTSAND ICISCELLANEOUS ENG TIBERTN G |J|lfSff j§4 ll ~' \ 38*I

X kProduction of armaments and various engineering products has

suffered heavily from bobbing, particularly as a result of RIF area

attacks. Forty-four factories in th is category, most of them rated

as priori ty targets by the MEW, suffered bomb damage in 19U3• I? 1

19141+a t least 89 important factories were damaged. Included in th i s

category were plants such as the large armament works of TfruDp at

Essen and Rheinmetall Borsig at Dusseldorf, steel fabrication plants

producing guns, shells, e t c . , heavy engineering plants producing loco

motives and railway equipment, boilers, diesel engines, e tc . , and

l i gh t engineering plants manufacturing motor transport components,

small arms and various other engineering products. Many of these

plants could be considered part of specific industries such as air

craft and motor transport, were i t no t fo r the fact that several

products are usually produced and t h a t definite information on o u t p u t

is usually lacking.

Losses o f output of these engineering industries have supple-

Pmented the specific damage to industries producing aircraft , oil,

bearings, tanks, e t c . Practically all branches o f German war produc

t ion have been affected. although no critical shortages of armaments

and mili tary equipment have appeared, the fighting strength of German

armed forces has been impaired an d the task of Allied ground forces

thus made easier.

:n** p\u25a0

C5~5268,AF

30



—lEMs%mn l* l f « a B AXI. I ACFIIB TOCLS MD PHEC7SIOTST INSTRUMENTS ijiu' gf /I % %

'^ * ff*f^Fifteen factories producing rachine too ls , abras^ y e S^^'Tahe^^ jP

and various precision instruments y o r e damaged in 1,9^3 during RfiF

a t t a c k s , Twenty one plants, including; several of those damaged in

191|3» suffered bomb damage in the f i r s t nine months of 19 4--.

The resulting loss of production in this industry ha.t intensi-

fied th e difficulties of r<3pla6in£ irachine tools an d equipment in

factories damaged b y aerial attacks. I t is estimated that sirce early

IPJ+3 mo-re than half of the machine tool industry's o u t p u t has been

used to r ep lace bomb -damaged equipment. The lowering of" machine tool

production es s r: suit o f direct damage to the i n d u s t r y has no t only

restricted such re-equipment of de.maged slants but hag also limited

normal replacement of tools and removed any surplus industrial capa

city t h a t might have boon used fo r direct production o f armaments.

XII* ELECTRICAL EQ U TPI^NT

Plant? producing various types o f electrical equipment have been

frequently damaged during tic course of a ir a t tacks , particularly ir.

Berlin, Twenty-five i m p o r t a n t plants in this indus t ry i? 'ere damaged

in 19U5 a n--l about 30 plants in the first nine months of l^l+'-i.

Between 1 I/arch 19U3 &&d 30 June I9LLI i t is estimrted by the

planBritish Minist ry o f Fome Securi ty that about 20 percent o f th e

rea. of German electrical equipment factories was seriously damaged

by bombing. Output of th e industry over this period was reduced 10

15 percent below th t I q v © l that probably would have prevailed in th e

absence of bombing. The production of particular item? has suffered

more than th i s average, part icu lar ly in the Berlin area, and may have

led to bottlenecks in the production of certain mili tary equipment.

C5-5268,AF-

31



"\u25a0u25a0 /^ *3a^ *3a

\u25a0 t

wmju#XIV CHEMICALS AMD EXPLOSIVES 9 Ll

The German chemical industry, though not a pr ior i ty target

system, has suffered considerable damage, mainly through RAF

aerial attacks. A to ta l of 14- rated or important chemical

plants were damaged in 194-3 compared with 37 plants, two-thirds

of which have MEW ra t ings , in 1944. Included in this lat ter

group were 6 plants producing hydrogen peroxide, used by rocket

and robot aircraf t . Five large explosives plants in France,

taken over by the Germans fo r propellant manufacture, also were

knocked out by devastating RAF attacks .I t is doubtful if damage to the chemical industry has

created any significant bottlenecks in German war production.

Bomb damage to chemical plants has contributed, however, to

the overall decline of German industrial output.

- C5-5268,AF- -

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- -

rm

XV GENERAL LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT XI I IAllied strategic bombing of Germany has seriously impaired her

war making potential. Attacks have resulted in enormous industrial

damage, widespread devastation of residential and commercial property

in an ever increasing list of German ci t ies , and the loss of millions

of man hours of productive effor t . In addition to creating shortages

of aircraft , oil and other specific items, every branch of Germany's

war effort has been affected, and the level of to tal war production

reduced. The reduction of general industrial output may be attri-

buted in large measure to RAF attacks against the larger German

ci t ies .

A , Industrial Damage

Damaged industrial installations in Axis Europe include 252

re la t ive ly important factories damaged in 1943 and 53& i 1944.

Most of these plants have been "rated" as priori ty targets by the

Brit ish Ministry of Economic Warfare. A classified list of these

plants and a statement of the extent of damage appear in Appendix A

according to the following categories:

34



Tlll^^l ail^^I*^ ®^

mostlyIn addition to these factories, hundreds of small plants,

•unidentified, have been damaged or destroyed during area attacks.

In 1943 a t least 1,200 such plants sustained varying degrees ofI

damage, and in 1944 i t is believed that comparable damage has been

inflicted. In view of the total gearing of the German economy to

war production, damage to almost any plant would affect her war ef-

fo r t in some degree.

B. Residential and Commercial Damage

The destruction of civic and residential property in German

cities has steadily spread under the impact of growing Allied a t-

tacks. Damage in the more heavily damaged cities on 30 June 1944

(in terms of the percentages of buildings destroyed or rendered un

inhabitable) was as follows:

•Percent ofercent Propertyf Property Populationopulation

City Seriously Damagederiouslyity Damaged ( Pre-war )re-war )

216,00016,000asselassel 544Remscheidemscheid 107,00007,000Hamburgamburg

535 i535 i 1// 1,800,000,800,000

Aachenachen 499 164,00064,000Cologneologne 466 906,00006,000Dusseldorfusseldorf 444 530,00030,000Hannoverannover 44 .4 . 450,00050,000

\Frankfurtrankfurt 42 y42 y 570,00070,000Augsburgugsburg 400 186,00086,000

Munchen Gladbachunchen Gladbach 377 130,00030,000Ludwigshafenudwigshafen 430,00030,000377Friedrichshafenriedrichshafen 366 25,0005,000Wuppertaluppertal 333 411,00011,000Schweinfurtchweinfurt 322 60,0000,000

Leipzigeipzig 288 720,00020,000Dortmundortmund 255 550,00050,000Krefeldrefeld 255 170,00070,000Essenssen 244 1,139,000,139,000Berlinerlin 4,400,000,400,000

•233

Mulheimulheim 233 136,00036,000

Stettintettin 2001 // 380,00080,000

-Total 21otal cities1 cities 333 13,480,0003,480,000

18 additional8 citiesdditional cities 10 (est.)0 (est.) 5,336,000,336,000

35454 additionaldditional citiesities 2 (est.)est.) 13.957.0003.957.000

Totalotal 39393 Germanerman citiesities 166 32,773,0002,773,000

Totalotal Germanerman Reicheich 9 69.622,0009.622,000

1/ Attacked by RAF between 1 JuLy^a|K| 3D September 1944



the specific shortages of aircraft, oil and bearings. Although no

industry has been damaged to a critical degree by area attacks, the

general losses of industrial output have weakened the Wehrmacht and

# contributed thereby to mil i ta ry successes of the All ies .

D. Non-German Contributions

The industrial might of Germany has been enormously enhanced

during the course of the war by the acquisition of satellites and

occupied territories.- foreign labor impressed into service in

Germany has accounted fo r an estimated 20 percent of the total gain-

ful ly employed in Germany. . Occupied countries have exported large

amounts of goods to Germany, supported German forces of occupation

and satellite mili ta ry forces, and provided labor fo r tasks such as

building coastal defenses. These contributions, in financial terms,

•have amounted to as much as 30 percent of the Axis outlay fo r war

production, as shown below (data from FEA):y.

Expenditures (Billion R. !,'!.) Other Europe as

German Other Europether Europe Total % of Total

70.0 22.6 92.6 : 24.475.0 30.5 105.5 28.9

40,03.0 133.0 ; 30.195.0 19.0 114.0 : 16.6

While contributions from occupied countries qualitatively were

of somewhat less importance than indicated in financial terms, the

assistance exacted by Germany was nevertheless very considerable.

The loss of most of the occupied terri tories and of the strategic

materials essential to German industry consequently constitute a

body blow to German war production. These losses of strategic sup-

plies of 30 Septembers 1944 include:

#

C5-5268,AF

$S « k}l&aF%.%3%$ £ , I'i-&*\L$



355 percentercent of Axisf Axisft itt it355

ttt ft itt it800tii it itt it600 manganeseanganese

n itit700 nickelickel

755itt M ftft

chromehromeftt 't IIt II# 600 copperopperM ft ftt ft200 aluminumluminumIII tt ttt tt500 bauxiteauxiteftt It ttt tt355 wood pulpood pulpftt It ttt tt300 motor vehiclesotor vehicles

100 Itt ft Itt It bearings .earings .The combined effect of bomb damage and the even greater losses

of raw materials and industrial Contributions from other countries

is steadily and rapidly increasing Allied superiority in production

an d must seriously weaken German military resistance during the corn

in g winter months.

• f

• llMfl^ P-^^'^^l

C5-526a,AF

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XVI TRANSPORTATION

A. Rai l and Road Installations

Attacks on transportation objectives, though pr imar i ly the

task of tactical a ir forces, have accounted fo r more of the

bomb tonnage of the Strategic A ir Forces than any other target

system. The 217,000 tons dropped on rail and road transpor-

tation targets in the first nine months of 194-4- represented

28 percent of the U.S. Bth and 15th Air Forces effort and 20

percent of RAF bombing a t t p c k s . The main targets in this offen-

sive against transportation were rail centers and rail and road

bridges in France, Belgium, I t a ly and the Balkans. Up to 30

September 194-4- * the transport system in Germany had not been

heavily attacked, although some damage had been infl icted on

transport installations, mainly by area attacks. These affected

the German transport situation chief ly by increasing transport

requirements fo r relief, reconstruction and evacuation of devas-\

tated areas.

As a result of damage to ra i l , shipping installations and

motor vehicles, the transport system supplying Axis f ight ing

fronts has been unable to carry adequate mili tary supplies fo r

even defensive f ight ing . Damage to transport, including bridge

interdiction v/hich is acknov/ledged to be the most effective

form of attack on enemy transport, has been most effec t ive ly

accomplished by medium and f ighter bombers. The strategic a ir

forces, however, have done effective work in attacking rail

centers, por t facilities, bridges at extreme operational ranges

and heavily defended objectives.

In I t a ly the strategic a ir forces have supplemented tacti-

ca l a ir force interdiction by attacking ports and rail instal-

lations beyond the primary interdiction zone. In the Balkans,

C5r5268.,AF



- IJllv

•

responwhere the Mediterranean Strategic Air Forces have been

sible for all operations except in Yugoslavia, the bombing of

rail installations and mining of the Danube disrupted the flow

of German supplies to the Russian front and slowed the movement

of oil and other v i t a l raw materials to central Europe. In

Western France and Belgium the All ied Air Forces, including

strategic bombers, were assigned the task of slowing enemy rein

forcements to the beachhead and battle area by attacking his

transport and transportation facilities . Prior to t)-day the

princ ipal contribution of the Strategic A ir Forces to the accom

plishment of these objectives was a series of attacks which

rendered 37 selected r a i l centers unusuable and heavily damaged

23 more. After D-day,- the restriction of enemy movement in

the battle zone was la rge ly the work of the tactical a ir forces,

while the heavy bombers combined with tactical bombers to

# attack rail centers and bridges in order to seal o ff the battle

zone from supply and reinforcement. The bombing of rail centers

and bridges in Southern France, most of which was done by stra*

tegic a ir forces, denied freedom of movement to the Nazi forces

and thereby greatly aided in the occupation of this part of the

continent.

Following the All ied advance to the frontiers of.the Reich

the major weight of attacks against transportation targets fal ls

fo r the first time on German rail centers, bridges and inland

•

waterways. Attacks on the German transport system affects both

the enemy's mili tary strength and deployment, and the output of

his war industries . Whereas the first impacts of previous a ir

attacks fell upon the economic t r a ff i c of occupied or satellite

countries, or in some cases upon a cushion of excess transport

capacity, any reduction of t r a ff i c in the Reich affects vital

war production or the health and morale of the German homeland.

40 C5-S26B,AF



09 ttf

B . Ports and Naval Bases

Attacks against por t cities such as Smden,s Smden, Hamburg^amburg, w'jpjkiinaval bases at Ki e l , Toulon, etc. , and inland waterway ports and

# canals have constituted a significant par t of the bombing offen

sive against Axis transport. Although the bomb tonnages directed

against docks and shipping have been re la t ive ly small, the loss

of ships and harbor facilities and the interruption of water

borne t raff ic have affected both industrial output and mili tary

movements .C , Minelaying

I'ines la id by RAF Bomber Command since the beginning of the

war totalled nearly 4-0,000 on 30 September 1944. Known casual

ties from this effort included more than 450 ships sunk 'and

nearly 400 damaged. Other casualties were infl icted on Axis

transport by mining operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the

# Danube River, and by surface operations of the RAF Coastal Com

mand and other a ir forces. The loss of vessels by mining and by

a ir action has cost the Axis valuable cargoes and shipping, slowed

the movement of other industrial cargoes and disrupted the enemy's

mili tary transport.

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XVII

Heavy ftomber forces operating in conjunction w ith medium and

f ighter bombers have played a v i t a l role in amphibious landing

operations in S ic i ly, Italy, Normandy and Southern France. The

breakthrough in Normandy found heavy bombers contributing to the

success of Allied ground advances. In such operations Allied

Strategic A ir Forces dropped 101j.,600 tons of bombs in th e four

month period 1 June-30 September 19i-|i4-« About 6 percent of USSTAF

efforts and 19 percent o f RAF efforts in the first nine months of

191+Uwere devoted to the task of ground support.

B. Pilotless A i r c r a f t Installations

Defensive operations against launching an d supply sites used

fo r flying bomb attacks ag?inst England required the diversion of

a considerable part of the strategic bombing effort . About

106,14.00 tons of "feombs ""/ere dropped by Allied Strategic Forces in

this campaign. During the f i r s t nine months of 19hh> about 7 per-

cent o f USSTAF tonrages and 17 percent of WA F tonnages were dropped

on such installations. As a result of these attacks construction

was delayed and numerous s i tes rendered unusable, including four

very large installations intended fo r heavy rockets. Robot bomb

in g attacks on England were restricted although no t eliminated by

these Allied bombing operations.

P i%S

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\u25a0

\u25a0i l ky , BA J» -^ I 1 wtAPPENDIX A wl l & §m il Ullil i Ll#BOMB D A M A G E TO AXIS INDUSTRIES

The following table l is ts important Axis plants that have been sig

nif icant ly damaged by Allied aerial attacks in 19U3 an <3- the first 9 months nand indicates the relative importance and the damage suffered byf 19^1-*

'each of these plants. The "MEW ratings

I

shown fo r most industrial plants

f o l l o w s ;re defined as-

Class 1 Plants of primary importance in Germany's war effort

- and possessing bottleneck characteristicsClass 1 Major factories in industries of major importance.-Class 2 Minor factories in industries of major importance,

or major factories in minor industries.-Class 3 Subsidiary factories of small output.

Not included in the list of damaged plants a re very large numbers of

unrated an d unidentified factories. At least 1,200 of these small plants

sustained varying degrees of damage in 19U3 during the course of R^F area

at tacks; hundreds of similar plants were damaged or destroyed in 19^4-N

Though individually small, these plants in th e aggregate account fo r a

significant part of German industrial output.

Damaged plants in the following tables are listed as follows:

I AircraftA. GAF Single^Engine FightersB. GAP Twin-Engine FightersC. GAF Jet-Propelled FightersD. Bombers, Transport, Misc.E . I ta l ian AircraftF . RepairG. Aero-EnginesH. Minor Aircraft Components

I I Anti-Friction Bearings111 Oil

A. Synthetic PlantsB. RefineriesC. Miscellaneous

IV Rubber and TiresV Submarine Yards and Bases

VI Tanks and Motor Tra ns por t

V II Armaments an d Misc. EngineeringVI I I Machine Tools and Precision Instruments

IX Electr ical Equipment-X Metals Steel and Non-ferrousXI Chemicals an d Explosives

i

STRATEGIC BOMBING OF AXIS EUROPE JANUARY 1943 SEPTEMBER 1944_1

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