Statment of Facts
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Transcript of Statment of Facts
State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER DUSHYANT TEJIPAL AND MANNA WAZARE ARE GUILTY UNDER SECTION
307,326 READ WITH SECTION 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860?
I. GUILTY UNDER SECTION 326
Under section 326 of the Indian Penal Code voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous
weapons or means1 is an offence punishable with 2[imprisonment for life] or with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
This section applies only to a person who does a substantive act, causing grievous hurt, as
defined in section 320, by some dangerous weapon or means.3
For the commission of offence under section 326 of Indian Penal Code, the essential ingredient is
that the grievous hurt must be caused by means of an instrument of cutting,stabbing, shooting,
etc. The essential ingredients to attract section 326 are:
voluntarily causing hurt;
hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and
the grievous hurt must have been caused by dangerous weapons or means.
To constitute an offence under under this section, the act of the offender must have been done
voluntarily.4 Even if death ensues, an offender can be held guilty under this section unless his
1 Bare Act; Indian Penal code, 1860:- voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means-
‘whoever,except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any
instrument for shooting, stabbing, or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to
cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or
by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which is deleterious to the human body to
inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished’2 Substituted by Act 26 of 1955, s 117 and schedule, for ‘transportation for life’ (wef 1 January 1956)3 Re Ram Sarup Rai 6 CWN 98.4 Balwant Singh v State of Haryana AIR 1972 863.
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State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
intention or knowledge is proved to be such as is required by section 300, or even by section 299,
and the injury inflicted is the direct cause of death.5
In the instant case where Dushyant Tejipal is charged under section 326 for causing grievous
hurt to Jaykant Shikre as it is clear from the circumstances in which Jaykant was found
unconscious with multiple interal injuries and Dushyant was reliably identified by eyewitnesses
coming out of his farmhouse just as the police arrived and Jaykant’s blood was also found on his
shirt. There are two instances in the case that clearly indicate that Dushyant is guilty under
section 326 one is the blood strains of Jaykant on his shirt and the other is Jaykant was found in
unconscious state with multiple injuries caused to him. The circumstances and facts of the case
are clear on Dushyant being the one who caused such injuries to Jaykant. So it is proved here
through the circumstances that Dushyant voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Jaykant and
multiple injuries were caused to him by one of the means mentioned in the section.
It is humbly submitted to the court that the accused Dushyant Tejipal is guilty under section 326
of the Indian Penal Code as it is proved from the circumstances in the case that he is the one who
intended to and voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Jaykant.
II. GUILTY UNDER SECTION 307:
Section 307 under Indian Penal Code talks about attempt to murder.6An attempt is an intended,
but unfinished crime tending but failing to effect its commission. Specific intention to commit
the crime of murder is a necessary requirement of this section. In so far as the offence relates to
an attempt, the overt act must necessarily be left unfinished because otherwise the prosecution
would be for the completed crime. Apart from the necessary mens rea, actus rea must be more
preliminary preparation.7 The attempt must be such that it would result in the commission of the
crime intended unless intervened by the intervention of extraneous circumstances, independent 5 Isher Das v State AIR 1954 J&K 19, p 21.6 Bare Act; Indian Penal code, 1860:- Attempt to murder - “whoever does an act with such intention or knowledge or
under such circumstances that, if he, by that act, caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if
hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such
punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
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State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
of the will of the accused.8 So in order to constitute an offence under this section, it must be
established that the offender did an act (the actus rea) and that an act was accused by an
intention (the mens rea) to go further and to achieve a definite end, which is a specific crime,
namely, murder. Here the prosecution would like to establish both the elements of the crime by
proving that the accused did something, which, in point of law, would be an intention of the
commission of an offence and in taking the step, he was inspired by an intention to achive the
definite objective which constituted the particular crime.9
In the case of Bharat Dube v Emperor,10 it was observed that in order that an act should amount
to an attempt to murder, all that is necessary to prove is that, if the act had caused death, it would
have amounted to murder if it was done with such intention or knowledge as would be necessary
to be proved in the case of murder.
The fact that an act results in minor injuries or even no injuries at all, is not relevant for the
purpose of deciding whether it amounted to an attempt to murder. If, as a result of some injuries
caused to some vital parts of the victim, the possibility of death is not ruled out according to the
medical evidence, the evidence would fall within the purview of section 307.11 Under this
section, the intention precedes the act, and it should be proved independently of the act, and not
merely gathered from the consequences that ensue. All that is important to be established is the
intention with which the act is done, and if once that intention is established, the nature of the act
will be immaterial.12
To constitute an offence under section 307, two ingredients of the offence must be present:
An intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and
The doing of an act towards it.13
The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under section 307 are:7 Mohinder Singh v State AIR 1960 Punj 135
8 Moidu v State of Kerla (1967) Ker LT 223
9 Russel on Crime, 11th edn, p. 187; Mansuri Nizamuddin v state AIR 1955 Pat 330
10 AIR 1941 Pat 51
11 Kamlesh kumar Dixit v State (1981) Cr LJ (NOC) 92 (All)12 Ram Chander v State AIR 1960 Punj. 28213 Parsuram Pandey v State of Bihar (2004) Cr LJ 4978 (SC)
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State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
That the death of a human being was attempted;
That such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the
accused;
That such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause
death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or that the
accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so immediately
dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such
death or injury.14
In the instant case, after Manna’s speech the charged crowd started to head towards Jaykant
Shikre’s farmhouse. Dushyant Tejipal, core team Manna member was directed to go to Jaykant
Shikre’s house by Manna himself. Manna’s clear intention to send Dushyant to his farmhouse
was to make sure that Jaykant Shikre is killed at the spot. The mere presence of Dushyant at his
farmhouse and creating the confusion and excitement among the crowd clears his intention to kill
Jaykant. He was very much aware of the situation at Jaykant’s farmhouse and his words “My
friends, Manna has spoken, this is it. It is now or never!” clearly show that his intention was to
provoke the crowd and to kill Jaykant.
At the time when police reached Jaykant’s farmhouse, the entire house was being ransacked and
Jaykant was found in an unconscious state with multiple internal injuries.15 Dushyant was
identified by the eyewitnesses present at the scene and he was seen coming out of his farmhouse
with the blood strains on his shirt which was later confirmed by the forensic examination that the
blood belonged to Jaykant. The blood strains on his shirt show that the act was committed by
him and he was the one who attempted to kill Jaykant. His act was done with the intention to
cause such bodily injury as he knew to be likely to cause death.
There are three stages in a crime, first is intention to commit crime which is clear in the instant
case that Dushyant had the intention to kill Jaykant, second is preparation to commit it, here
14 State of Maharastra v Kashirao (2003) Cr LJ 4464 (SC)15 Bare Act; Indian Penal code, 1860: Section 320- Grievious hurt- any hurt which endangers life or which causes
sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.
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State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
Dushyant knew what is to be done to kill him and was prepared for it and the third is an attempt
to commit it which he attempted but because of some unavoidable intervention did not succeed.
If at the third stage, the attempt fails, the aim is not complete but law punishes for attempting the
same.16 Here in this case Dushyant failed at the third stage and his attempt to kill Jaykant cannot
be ignored. The Supreme Court in Abhayanand Mishra v State of Bihar,17 observed:
A person commits the offence of ‘attempt to commit a particular offence’ when
i. he intends to commit that particular offence and
ii. he, having made preparations and with the intention to commit the offence, does
an act towards its commission; such an act need not be penultimate act towards
the commission of that offence, but must be an act during the course of
committing that offence.18
Dushyant Tejipal was fully prepared and he took the take advantage of the situation and
circumstances that were intentionally created by him in order to kill Jaykant, though failing in his
act is guilty under section 307 of Indian Penal code, 1860.
In order to bring this case within the ambit of Section 307, the prosecution would like to make
out the facts and circumstances envisaged by Section 300.19 Here the ingredients of Section 300
are not lacking as the intention (or knowledge) of Dushyant was to cause such bodily injury as it
would come within one of the four clauses of section 300, so he is to be held guilty under section
307.20
The prosecution humbly submits that the offence was committed under Section 307 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 as the clear intention and knowledge of Dushyant Tejipal was to kill Jaykant
and from the surrounding circumstances it is established that the offence was committed by
Dushyant with an intention to go further and to achieve a definite end. Here both the elements of
crime are clear, his intention was preceded his act.
16 Sagayan v State of Karnataka (2000) Cr LJ 3182 (SC)17 AIR 1961 SC 1698 reaffirmed in Om Prakash v State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 178218 State of Maharastra v Mohd Yakub AIR 1980 SC 513, p 158.19 20 Naran Swain v State (1981) Cr LJ 106, p 110 (MP High Court Notes) 106.
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State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
iii. COMMON INTENTION OF MANNA WAZARE AND DUSHYANT TEJIPAL
UNDER SECTION 34 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860:
Section 3421 of the Indian Penal Act, 1860 talks about the acts done by several persons in
furtherance of common intention.22 This section has been enacted on the principle of joint
liability in doing of a criminal act. The liability of one person for an offence committed by
another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under section 34 if
such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons to join in
committing the crime.23 When such acts are done in furtherance of the common intention, each
person is liable for the result of them as if he had done them himself.24
The leading feature of this section is participation in action: a common intention connotes
meeting of minds to commit an offence and participation in the commission of offence in
furtherance of that common intention. Participation need not be by physical presence.
Two essential requirements to be satisfied for the applicability of section 34 are:
Existence of common intention in several persons, who commit the criminal act,
and
The doing of the criminal act in furtherance of the common intention.
When these two requirements are satisfied, each of such persons is liable for the entire criminal
act in the same manner as if he alone had done it irrespective of the fact whether he was present
at the spot or not. Thus the essence of section 34 is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the
persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result.25 For applicability
of this section the prosecution is required to prove prior meeting of minds or a prior concert or a
21 Substituted by Act 27 of 1870, s 1, for the original section.22 Bare Act; Indian Penal code, 1860: Section 34- Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention-
[When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons
is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were by him alone.]23 Surinder Singh alias Chhinda v State of Punjab (2007) Cr LJ 49 (SC)24 Barendra Kumar Ghose v King-Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1,p 7 also see Dhansai Sahu v State AIR 1969 Ori 10525 Arjun Thakur v State (1994) Cr LJ 3526 (SC)
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State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
pre-arranged plaint.26 To invoke the aid of this section successfully, it must be shown that the
criminal act, complained of was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the
common intention of all; if this shown, then the liability for the crime may be imposed on any
one of the persons in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone. This being the
principle, the common intention within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan
and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section, it should be proved that the
criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan.27
There are two Principals in Crime :
Those who actually commit the crime i.e. principals in the first degree;
Those who aid in the actual commission i.e. principals in the second degree;
Principle of joint liability: Section 34 embodies this principle on doing of a criminal act, the
essence of that liability being the existence of common intention. Participation in the commission
of the offence in furtherance of the common intention invites its application.28 The leading
feature of this section is, therefore, ‘participation in action’.29 A particular criminal act, done by
an individual, in order to constitute a constructive liability against others, must be one which is
done, in furtherance of a common intention, as a aid to attain it.
Doctrine of combination of crime: According to this doctrine, “when two or more persons
unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical violation of one, or of all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributed to the wrong-doing
is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone.”
The vicarious or constructive liability under section 34 of IPC can arise only where the two
conditions stand fulfilled:
The mental element, called the intention to commit the criminal act conjointly with
another or others; and
Actual participation in one form or the other in the commission of the offence.
26 Megh Singh v State of Rajasthan (1983) 2 Crimes 134, p 140 (Raj)(DB)27 Kartar Singh v State of Haryana (1992) 1 Crimes 924, pp 929-930 (P&H) 28 Noor Mahommad Mohd Yusuf Momin v State of Maharastra AIR 1971 SC 885.29 Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King-Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1
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State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
The Kerala High Court, in Mathai v state of Kerala,30 has held that section 34 does not, by itself,
create an offence; it only lays down the rule of law without creating a definite head of
criminality. And in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor31 Privy council pointed out that
‘section 34 deals with doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several persons; if all are
done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of them all, as if
he had done them himself’
In the instant case Manna Wazare’s intentions are clear and Dushyant Tejipal shared the
common intention with Manna as he participated in the commission of the act. The common
intention here in this case was to kill Jaykant, his intention can be clearly interpreted in his
speech where he was continuously provoking the crowd to remove Jaykant from the equation
completely. In his speech he told how Jaykant was involved in human trafficking and was the
kingpin behind the drugs and prostitution rackets. He clearly revealed his intentions in his speech
as while addressing the crowd he said that “this evil must be killed.” He in his speech purposely
mentioned Jaykant’s farmhouse address with a motive that people should go to his place and kill
him. He wanted people to act for him. Seeing that he was able to convince the crowd to head
towards Jaykant’s farmhouse he according to his plan called Dushyant who shared the common
intention with him asked him to go to his farmhouse and act accordingly. Dushyant’s
participation in the commission of act was in furtherance of the common intention of Manna
make them liable under section 307, 326 read with section 34 of IPC.
It is humbly submitted to the court that in the instant case both the essential requirements are
satisfied for applicability of section 34 of IPC and according to principle of joint liability and
doctrine of combination of crime both Manna Wazare and Dushyant Tejipal are guilty under
section 307 and 326 when read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code,1860.
30 (1983) 1 Crimes 42931 AIR 1925 PC 1
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State of Haryana v. Manna Wazare and others
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