To what extent did Castlereagh achieve the aims of the British Government at

the Congress of Vienna 1815?

Statement of Aims

Contents

Statement of Aims..........................................................................................................2Contents.........................................................................................................................3Introduction....................................................................................................................4

Perceptions of Castlereagh.........................................................................................6Structure of analysis...................................................................................................8

Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont..........................................................................9Memorandum of 26th December................................................................................9The Treaty of Chaumont..........................................................................................12

Châtillon abandoned – The Peace of Paris...................................................................15Orders to abandon negations at Châtillon................................................................15Castlereagh role in the Peace of Paris......................................................................17

Castlereagh and Poland................................................................................................18Castlereagh’s proposal for negotiations...................................................................18Russian influence over Polish settlement.................................................................20

Disobedience and a fear of war....................................................................................22British isolationism..................................................................................................22The Defensive Alliance January 1815.....................................................................25

Conclusion...................................................................................................................27Bibliography......................................................................................................................................... 27

Introduction

By December 1813 the only obstacle to a victory for Sixth Coalition, in the protracted Napoleonic Wars, was their own diplomatic and military disunity.1 Until this point Britain had acted as paymasters of the coalition against the French Emperor, but now sought to have a greater diplomatic influence on the end of the war and the subsequent settlement of Europe.2 The Secretary of Sate for Foreign Affairs, Viscount Castlereagh, was chosen by the British Cabinet to represent Britain in the allied negotiations on the continent. The British government deemed it essential to dispatch a senior minister to secure their primary objectives, particularly after terms had been offered to Napoleon at Frankfurt in November that endangered some key interests.3

Thus Castlereagh spent the majority of his time on the continent between January 1814 and February 1815, acting on behalf of the British government at the allied negotiations at Châtillon, Chaumont, Paris and Vienna. 4 This study asserts that Castlereagh continually and consistently acted to fulfil the aims of the British government during this period. It argues that despite briefly defying the orders of his Cabinet at the end of 1814, Castlereagh predominantly followed the wishes of his government and successfully guaranteed their aims by January 1815.

Castlereagh departed for the continent with a clear set of objectives, agreed by the Cabinet on 26th December 1813.5 The primary evidence will illustrate that the foreign minister followed these instructions and any further orders from Lord Liverpool, Prime Minister, and his Cabinet implicitly until October 1814. At the Congress of Vienna however, Castlereagh’s perception of how to successfully guarantee these aims differed from the other members of his government, particularly during the negotiations over the Polish and Saxon settlements. The challenges faced in negotiating a settlement for Poland appeared to cause Castlereagh to develop a vested interest in the fate of central Europe.6

1 C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (London, 1937), pp.1-11.2 ibid, pp. 10-11. 3 M. Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon (London, 2013), p. 50.4 J. W. Derry, Castlereagh, (London, 1976), p. 135 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1913, Foreign Office: Continent Conferences: Delegation Archives (henceforth F.O. Cont.), The National Archives (henceforth TNA), FO 139/1.6 H. G. N. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947), P.122.

The focus of the topic is that of a British perspective. This will help to comprehensively support the notion that Castlereagh consistently acted within the interests of his government, helping to secure lasting peace in Europe, and allow Britain to consolidate its status as an international hegemonic power.7 The importance of the Russian, Prussian, Austrian and French ministers in the negotiation process cannot be understated and an appreciation their influence on Castlereagh’s thoughts and actions will be included if only in a secondary nature. The focus of the investigation has also contributed to the selection of evidence, which will primarily focus on the correspondences between Castlereagh and other senior officials in the British government. Liverpool and Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, took charge of the domestic discussions of British foreign policy and were Castlereagh’s principle contacts at home.8 Thus the correspondences between these men offer the greatest insight into Castlereagh’s thought process and actions while on the continent.

Most primary material been selected from collections of these regular communications. The General Correspondence before 1906: Continent Conferences (FO 139) and Continent Conferences: Delegation Archives (FO 92) are both incredibly useful collections of Foreign Office Records, which include the correspondences, memoranda and protocols between the ministers in Europe and the British government in this period.9 Individual dispatches will illustrate Castlereagh’s thoughts and actions during his time in Europe, and also indicate the response and orders of his government on aspects of the negotiations. The investigation will also utilise correspondences found in other collections to add depth to the analysis of Castlereagh’s actions as a representative of Britain, such as the Correspondence, Despatches, and other papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry (1853) and Supplementary Despatches, Correspondences and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington (1862).10 These include, for example, Castlereagh’s communication to Wellington regarding indirect importance the Polish settlement to British securities. Despatches hold the primary significance to this evaluation, as they will best help to understand to what extent Castlereagh followed the aims of British government from Châtillon to Vienna.

The influence of parliamentary and public opinion grew substantially during Liverpool’s government, as publications and pamphlets such as Tory Quarterly, Whig Edinburgh, Radical Westminster and The Times were often explicitly sceptical of government policies.11 While evidence of this nature contributes to a wider understanding of policy formulation, it had a minimal effect on Castlereagh’s actions while on the continent. It even took two weeks for news to reach the foreign minister when at Vienna.12 Public sentiment would be relayed to Castlereagh by correspondences from Bathurst or Liverpool. An understanding of whether Castlereagh actions were effected by public opinion can be extracted from these communications alone. 7 P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848 (London, 1996), p. 537. 8 N. Thompson, Earl Bathurst and the British Empire 1762-1834 (1999), p. 72.9 F.O 10 reference11 D. Beales, From Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815-1885 (London, 1969), p.75.12 G. Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo (London, 2001)

The focus of the study is such that parliamentary debates do not contribute to an understanding of Castlereagh’s actions on the continent. Although Castlereagh held the position as Leader of the House of Commons after Spencer Perceval’s assassination in 1812, his extended absences from England meant that he faced few interrogations of his negotiation policy from the Commons. 13 As the sources will illustrate Castlereagh’s actions were subject to approval in parliament, but this was generally just part of the ratification process. The Cabinet faced little resistance to sending Castlereagh to Europe, and as Bew highlights, even a Whig MP, Sir Robert Heron, argued that the pressing continental matters should be placed in the hands of Liverpool’s ministers at this time. 14 Once again Castlereagh’s primary source of news of any public or parliamentary development were his correspondences from London, and thus they are understandably the central focus of this study.

This investigation is unique in nature in discussing Castlereagh’s agency in securing British aims between December 1813 and January 1814. By predominantly examining correspondences between Castlereagh and the Cabinet, the investigation can suggest more assertively that Castlereagh did follow the direct desires of his government and achieve success for Britain. It will profit from a narrower focus that other works have lacked, and be less influenced by its contemporary environment for it.

Perceptions of Castlereagh

Castlereagh’s career as a whole was criticised by contemporise and later liberals, who wished to exaggerate the juxtaposition between George Canning, the liberal, and Castlereagh, the reactionary.15 He was perceived as a repressor of liberalism and nationalism and ‘repelled contemporary poets.’16 Lord Bryon and Percy Bysshe Shelley memorialised him harshly after his suicide in 1822.17 Lord Robert Cecil failed to redeem his reputation in the Quarterly Review in 1862, and this meant that Castlereagh was generally viewed with ignominy in the nineteenth century.18 The publication of his correspondences, by half brother Charles Stewart, also failed to improve this perception, because there was ‘little historical explanation or analysis through its twelve volumes.’19

The historian responsible for changing this was C. K. Webster, who in his various works on the foreign secretary and the Congress of Vienna expatiates the central role Castlereagh had in securing British aims on the continent.20 Webster wrote these texts 13 Derry, Castlereagh, p.714 Bew, J. Castlereagh: From Enlightenment to Tyranny (London, 2011), p. 331.15 Derry, Castlereagh, p.11.16 C. J. Bartlett, Castlereagh (London, 1966)17 G. G. Byron, ‘Epigram’, The Works of Lord Byron; with his Letters, Journals and his Life, (ed.) Thomas Moore Esq., (London, 1832), v. VII, p. 72: Shelley, P. B. The Mask of Anarchy: A Poem, (ed.) Leigh Hunt (London, 1832). 18 R. Cecil, ‘Castlereagh’, Essays by the late Marquess of Salisbury: Biographical (London, 1905), pp. 1-69: S. R. Graubard, ‘Castlereagh and the Peace of Europe’, Journal of British Studies 3.1 (1963), p.7919 Derry, Castlereagh, p.3.20 Webster, C. K. The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (London, 1919): British Diplomacy 1813-1815: Select documents dealing with the reconstruction of Europe (London, 1921): The foreign policy of Castlereagh 1812-1815 (London, 1931)

with close analysis of the communication archived in the Foreign Office Continental Records, the collection of Castlereagh’s correspondences and Wellington’s despatches. The sophistication of Webster’s works has warranted it to be a ‘definitive’ study of the subject.21 This investigation therefore follows Webster’s methodological approach to primary material, and even corroborates that Castlereagh’s role at Vienna was pivotal for Britain. It will however challenge two aspects of this seminal work’s argument.

Webster wrote that Castlereagh attempted to emulate the foreign policy of William Pitt the Younger; arguing that these men both prioritised a balance of power in Europe instead of advancing the hegemony of the British Empire.22 Nicholson endorses this view in a narrative summery of Webster, The Congress of Vienna: A study in Allied Unity (1946), which has been criticised for a lack of independent thought.23 Importantly there has been recognition that these views were formulated in proximity to both World Wars.24 Graubard observed that not enough historians were challenging the notion that Castlereagh followed Pitt’s policy in a doctrinal matter.25

The investigation will endeavour to challenge this notion, and illustrate that while Castlereagh appreciated Pitt’s plans for Europe, he negotiated in his own manner to secure British aims above all objectives.

Historians have continued to illuminate the complexities of the negotiations, especially at Vienna. Henry Kissinger credited Castlereagh for securing British interests as a representative of a nation that had a ‘tradition of isolation.’ 26 The analysis of Castlereagh’s correspondences will highlight that the British government, after securing peace in Europe, had become increasingly preoccupied with the on-going Anglo-American war.27 Historians have often considered the importance of the notion of the balance of power in Castlereagh’s actions at Vienna. Castlereagh has been branded an idealist for over pursuing an over calculated solution for Poland, and that his pursuit of equilibrium caused his priorities to change. 28 Indeed even Kissinger describes Castlereagh’s Polish solution as ‘mechanical’.29 Castlereagh’s priorities did not change however, and as the sources will indicate, he believed that creating equilibrium in Europe was crucial to safeguarding the securities he had obtained at the beginning of 1814.

More recently Schroeder has argued that balance of power politics failed, and that ‘under the lead of the hegemonic powers’ the ministers returned to practices of political equilibrium.30 The sources will substantiate Schroeder’s perception of this

21 D. Perkins, ‘Review: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-15: Britain and the Reconstruction of Europe, Webster’, The American Historical Review 37 (2) (1932), pp. 323-324. 22 Webster, The foreign policy of Castlereagh, p. 491.23 Graubard, ‘Castlereagh’, p. 82.24 R. Langhorne, ‘Reflections on the significance of the Congress of Vienna’, Review of International Studies 12.4 (1986), pp. 313-324. 25 Graubard, ‘Castlereagh’, p. 82- 83.26 Q. Wright, ‘Review: A World Restored, Kissinger’, The American Historical Review 63.4 (1958), pp. 953-54 27 Thompson, Bathurst, p. 83-4.28 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 155.29 H. A. Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal’, World Politics 8.2 (1956), pp. 264-280.30 P. W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of power?’, The American Historical

period at Vienna, and argue that although Castlereagh lost Poland to Russia, he succeeded in resisting Prussia over Saxony. Castlereagh did achieve equilibrium in Europe, although not in the manner he hoped, and successfully ensured Britain’s that Britain retained its status as a world power.31 This perception of the negotiations in central Europe is more nuanced, and helps to illustrate that Castlereagh did have an important perception of how his actions were directly contributing to British success in this final stage of the negotiations. Castlereagh did defy orders to achieve this security however, as the correspondences indicate, and it is at this point where Castlereagh appears to be acting of his own accord and not those of his government.

Castlereagh, up until November 1814, had secured the majority of British aims since his great success at the Treaty of Chaumont, and this more delicate area of the negotiations caused a divide between him and the Cabinet. The complications of the Polish and Saxon arrangements almost led to the crisis of war, and resulted in a secret defensive alliance between France, Austria and Britain on the 3 January 1815.32 The threat of war against Russia and Prussia illustrated a clear disregard by Castlereagh of the interests of the Cabinet, Parliament and the British public.

Structure of analysis

The investigation intends, in the two opening chapters, to illustrate Castlereagh’s complete alignment with the aims of his Cabinet in the first two phases of the peace negotiations. Chapter one, ‘Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont’, illustrates Castlereagh’s immediate success on the continent as he secures military partnership amongst the Allies for an extended period. ‘Châtillon abandoned – The Peace of Paris’ further indicates that Castlereagh pursued terms that agreed with both government and public sentiments, particularly after Bathurst informs him of Wellington’s findings in Southern France. The Peace of Paris successful ended any chance of peace with Napoleon directly and forced his abdication at Fontainebleau 11 April 1814.33 Thus by the summer of 1814 Castlereagh had followed the wishes of his government, and secured the objectives prioritised by his government in the memorandum of 26th December.

Next Castlereagh’s expectations of the organisation of the Congress of Vienna will be evaluated, to illustrate that he, unlike his government, initially failed to appreciate the complexities of the Polish settlement. This is critical to understand how he become entrenched in these negotiations, and how his greater perspective meant that he was still negotiating with Britain’s major securities in mind. This chapter, ‘Castlereagh and Poland’, also discussed how the foreign minister moved away from his position of ‘natural mediator’ and began to seek an alliance against Russia from the other Allies.34

Review 97.3 (1992), p704. 31 Schroeder, The transformation of European politics p. 578.32 Schroeder, ‘Vienna Settlement’, p. 702. 33 Schroeder, The transformation of European politics p. 578.508.34 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 169.

The final chapter, ‘Disobedience and fear of war’, addresses the growing concern of the government over the Polish negotiations, and analyses the significance their orders for Castlereagh to withdraw from the discussion. The possibility of war over the Saxon settlement is also central to this chapter, highlighting that although Castlereagh ignores orders is ordered to avert war, his alliance with France and Austria was borne out of a desire to safeguard British interests in Europe. Thus this final chapter of the evaluation will reject any notion that Castlereagh acted without the interests of the British Government and public in mind at this stage of the Congress, and that his greater perspective on the situation, allowed him to secure peace on the continent and the majority of the criteria outlined in the Memorandum of the Cabinet 26th December 1813.

the evaluation will succeed in a more focused analysis of Castlereagh’s actions over the 14-month period of negotiations, and demonstrate that the minister acted to achieve the aims of his government throughout.

Departure and the Treaty of Chaumont

Memorandum of 26th December

The Foreign Secretary did not begin his continental journey without prior instruction, and the details of these instructions are of particular interest to outlining what the Prince Regent, Prime Minister and the Cabinet expected of Castlereagh at the continental negotiations. The memorandum of the 26th of December includes certain criteria that the Cabinet wanted Castlereagh to fulfil, additional instructions and a memorandum for Maritime Peace.35 The memorandum, written by Castlereagh, finalised the aims of the Cabinet after six weeks of ministerial conference.36 This source is significant for two reasons. First, it states aims of the British government in relation to both shared continental peace and security, and securities specific to Britain herself. Second, the memorandum helps to contextualise the thought process of the Cabinet, and how they perceived the situation in Europe.

The most important aims of the Cabinet come first in the memorandum, and unsurprisingly they are of specific interest to British security. Put simply the Cabinet

35 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1913, Foreign Office: Continent Conferences: Delegation Archives (henceforth F.O. Cont.), The National Archives (henceforth TNA), FO 139/1.36 H. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947), p. 65.

desired the restriction of French maritime power ‘within due bounds by the effectual establishment of Holland, the Peninsula, and Italy in security and independence’.37 Evidently the maritime security of Britain, by weakening a competitor is beneficial to the financial, commercial and military global hegemony of Britain. The memorandum for Maritime Peace helps to reiterate the importance of this securing this aim. Webster believes it can be considered as part of the overall document, and that it was probably of more interest to some of the ministers than the details of the continental settlement.38 Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was a critic of Castlereagh and has suspicions over extended European negotiations and involvement.39

The details of the continental settlement was of utmost importance to Castlereagh however, who would have to secure certain territories to ensure British security and maritime freedom. The memorandum instructs that Britain must obtain the ‘absolute exclusion of France from any establishment on the Scheldt, and especially Antwerp’; secure Holland with ‘a barrier under the House of Orange’ including Antwerp; and that Spain and Portugal be ‘independent under their legitimate sovereigns’ with a guaranteed protection against future French attack.40 These aims were achievable but the barrier for Holland would require sacrifice, particularly as the allies had accorded Napoleon territories in Belgium at this point of their peace negotiations.41

The Cabinet appreciated this, and Castlereagh is instructed to state that Britain ‘is willing to purchase it by a double sacrifice, by cession to both Holland and France.’42 Although the document states that this objective is ‘most deeply interesting to all the Allies’, the exclusion of the French Navy from this region would benefit Britain above all others.43 Similarly the memorandum of Maritime Peace also states that Britain their colonial concessions were for the ‘welfare of the continent’ and that they would not retain colonies ‘for their mere commercial value’.44 The Cabinet perceived themselves as the ‘lynch pin’ of the continental alliance, and therefore felt that they appeared ‘moderate and unselfish’.45

The memorandum is in fact selfish in relation to their allies. The most significant multilateral aim of the British government outlined in this memorandum is for a continued alliance after the war that includes ‘defensive engagements with mutual obligations’ to resist future French expansion.46 The document indicates that it is hard to stipulate what territories would be conceded, without knowing if France will be reduced ancient limits, and that if Britain’s three aims are not secured then it will

37 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.38 C. K. Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1815: Select documents dealing with the reconstruction of Europe (London, 1921), n.1 p.123. 39 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.65: J. Bew, Castlereagh: From Enlightenment to Tyranny (London, 2011), p. 330.40 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.41 ? 42 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

43 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.44 Memorandum for Maritime Peace, Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.45 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.6846 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.

‘preserve her colonial conquests as a counterpoise to the dominion of’ France.47 Indeed other continental arrangements relating to Italy and Germany are included but are ‘not made conditions sine quibus non’.48 The memorandum states that the Cabinet affords the allies powers of mediation over a German settlement.49 This vague instruction is noteworthy, as it illustrates the naivety of the British ministers, and a possible reason for Castlereagh’s embroilment in the Saxon and Polish issues (as discussed in chapter 3).

The memorandum therefore offers an insight into the Cabinet’s perception of themselves in relation to foreign affairs. The aims set out in this document certainly do ensure British security, and there is even an instruction to declare peace with the United States.50 As Webster and subsequently Nicholson have observed, these aims may be unrealistic and based on inadequate information on the main objectives of the other allies.51 The focus of the ministers appears to concentrate on their wider international hegemony and not the aims of their allied ministers. Indeed the memorandum states that securing the freedom of Spain and Holland ‘may justify to the British public and the allies so great an exertion on the part of Great Britain’.52 Despite this, the memorandum is essential to understanding the aims of the British government at the end of 1813. The primary instructions to safeguard the Scheldt and Antwerp, to secure Holland as a barrier and to emancipate Spain and Portugal from French influence, have been identified and Castlereagh’s attempts can be discussed.

Finally it is worth highlighting some British interests that are not included in the memorandum, and how they may be important in the overall assessment of Castlereagh’s agency in successful British negotiations. The memorandum, for instance, does not include any instructions in negotiating an agreed abolishment of the slave trade. Organised pressure from figures like Wilberforce, and a British public ‘fanatically determined’ for France to give up the salve trade meant that it was a central aim of Lord Liverpool’s cabinet.53 That said, historians have argued that the cabinet viewed this as separate and complicated issue.54 Castlereagh was thus free from this contentious issue, and faced little resistance from the opposition on his departure for Basle; Bew highlights even a Whig MP, Sir Robert Heron, stated that the pressing continental matters should be left to Liverpool’s cabinet at this time.55

Another noteworthy omission from Castlereagh’s instructions is over the dethronement of Napoleon, which was another imperative desire of his cabinet and the British public.56 The memorandum, then, does indicate Castlereagh’s primary objectives for securing Britain’s security and an extended alliance against France. The

47 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.48 C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (London, 1937), p. 16.49 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.50 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.51 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 14: Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 68.52 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.53 J. Reich, ‘The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna – A Study in English Public Opinion, The Journal of Negro History 53.2 (1968), p. 129: W. Hinde, Castlereagh (London, 1981), p. 21654 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 68: Riech The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna’, p. 129.55 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 331.56 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 18.

missing objectives, and perhaps the more contentious ones, are not entrusted to Castlereagh at this point. Castlereagh had to negotiate both with his own government and the allied ministers in March 1814, as France’s future monarch became central to the discussions of the Peace of Paris.57 Thus, upon his departure to Basle to meet Metternich in early 1814, the foreign secretary had ‘remarkably free hand’.58 Castlereagh was never able to secure the aims of the Cabinet’s memorandum in complete seclusion from Napoleon’s influence; such was the nature on-going war with France. By March 1814, however, Castlereagh orchestrated an opportunity to secure the majority of his government’s wishes, whilst adhering closely to the instructions of the memorandum, at Chaumont. This was to be ‘Castlereagh’s first great diplomatic achievement.’59

The maritime rights secured at Langres protocol

The Treaty of Chaumont

The Treaty of Chaumont, signed on March 9 1814, assured many of Britain’s primary objectives at a point when allied victory was practically assured.60 The treaty was significant for two reasons. It ensured the continued commitment of each party to the alliance against France, at a point when Castlereagh seriously feared its disintegration.61 Next the terms of the treaty and its context in the war meant that the allies could escape from frustrating and complicated negotiations for peace with Napoleon’s minister Caulaincourt at Châtillon. Finally, and most significantly for Castlereagh, the treaty fortified Britain’s position amongst the allies and made them indispensable to the coalition.62 The treaty, and its importance to securing British aims, has been modern historians collectively, who describe it as one of Castlereagh’s grandest achievement.63

A co of the Treaty, and its three secret articles are enclosed in a letter from Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool on March 10 1814, where the foreign secretary asserts in confidence that the treaty ‘will have the most decisive and beneficial influence’ in the allied union against France.64 The first two parts of the Treaty, ‘Traité Defensif’ and ‘Traité d’Alliance’, essentially agree the continued support of the alliance by Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia in the war against France.65 Article XVI in the treaty of defence concerns the duration of the alliance against France, and this is the first instance where Castlereagh secures on of the aims outlined in the memorandum

57 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 86-91: Webster 36-758 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 65.59 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 81.60 J. W. Derry, Castlereagh (London, 1976), p. 209.61 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 70.62 P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848 (London, 1996), p. 502.63 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 32: Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 81: Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 208: Schroeder, The transformation of European politics, p. 501. 64 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, Foreign Office: General Correspondences before 1906: Continent Conferences (henceforth F.O. Cont. Con.), TNA, FO 92/3.65 Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

of December 26 1813.66 As Bew translates, the articles states that the Defensive Alliance has been agreed for a period of twenty years that intends to ‘maintain the equilibrium of Europe’, ensure the independence of its states, and prevent the invasions which for ‘so many years have desolated the World’.67 This agreement between the allies secured one of the Cabinet’s most desired aims, and Castlereagh therefore can be rightly credited for obtaining it.

Castlereagh also managed to secure most of his government’s territorial aims in the ‘Articles Séparés et Secrets’.68 The agreement secures the independence of Spain and Switzerland, within their ‘anciennes limites’, with the former ruled by Bourbon Ferdinand VII.69 Castlereagh therefore had effectively secured the independence of the peninsula states ‘under their legitimate sovereigns’, which is outlined as one of the key aims of the memorandum of 26 December.70 Less importantly; Italy would become an arrangement of independent states, and a confederated Germany would be created.71 These did still align with his instructions however, and can be considered as a success. The secret articles also indicate that Castlereagh ensured the independence of Holland under the Prince of Orange; a key security for his government.72 This success must be quantified in relation to the concessions and fiscal reimbursement that he agreed to.

The despatch of the 10 March 1814 additionally includes a ‘Most Secret’ letter to Lord Liverpool, where Castlereagh explains the financial memorandum attached to the Treaty of Chaumont.73 As Castlereagh writes, the treaty necessitated considerable subsidiaries on Britain behalf, paying a total of five million pounds to her allies in order to continue the war with France.74 Britain will also supply 150,000 troops to the war effort.75 This was considerably more than the other allied parties, and even Castlereagh remarks, in a letter to Mr. Hamilton, that Britain effectively supplies 300,000 men after paying the financial subsidiary, which is equal to the combined total of Prussia, Russia and Austria.76 The substantial commitment is believed to secure the agreement over the Holland settlement, and the reasons for Britain’s extra financial burden.77 In this note Castlereagh requests that Liverpool quickly puts this before parliament so that the treaty can be ratified.78 The Finance Accounts for Great Britain and Ireland for the financial year that ‘ended 5th Jan 1815’, indicate that

66 Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.67 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 370.68 Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.69 Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.70 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.71 Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.72 Secret and Separate Articles, Treaty of Chaumont, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.73 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.74 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.75 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.76 Castlereagh to Mr Hamilton, March 10th 1814, 77 T. Chapman, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results (Abingdon, 1998), p. 2978 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

Britain paid Austria and Prussia £972,222, and Russia £1.25 million and £500,000 for their fleet, thereby honouring the Chaumont agreement.79 Thus, Castlereagh, gained the support of parliament for this sacrifice, and guaranteed Britain’s most important territorial security in Europe.

The foreign minister’s jubilance at the Treat of Chaumont is evident, as he writes to Liverpool that he feels he has ‘exceeded’ his instructions in relation to financial subsidiary.80 Castlereagh ensured a ‘precaution’ that Britain can choose to honour the treaty in ‘either men or money.’81 Here, Castlereagh’s appreciation of British public opinion can be observed, as he allowed his government to choose to substitute money for manpower if public and parliamentary opinion disputes military involvement in the war. The treaty as also meant that Britain arrived at the negotiation ‘table as an equal combatant.’82 This is a significant moment in the course of the war and for the negotiations, particularly with faltering agreements at Châtillon, and Castlereagh illustrates its significance to Britain in a letter to the under-secretary of the foreign office, William Hamilton.83 The letter is less formal than Castlereagh’s despatches to Liverpool or Bathurst, and can therefore be seen to be a better reflection of his sentiments. Castlereagh writes that he ‘was determined not to play second fiddle’ at Chaumont, and trusts that the British subsidiaries will end doubt that Britain has less claim to ‘have an opinion on continental matters’.84 Interestingly, Castlereagh’s feelings indicate that he must have felt that Britain had an inadequate claim to discuss the terms of peace prior to this. For that reason Castlereagh did excel himself at Chaumont, securing British influence in future negotiations when his fellow Cabinet ministers were ignorant of their stock falling in the alliance.85 In securing this, and the three key terms of the memorandum, Castlereagh had, as he put it, negotiated ‘an extraordinary display of power’ on behalf of his government.86

The despatch of the 10 March 1814 certainly supports the notion that Castlereagh adhered to his instructions during his first months of negotiation, and that he was ‘content to safeguard Great Britain’s immediate interests’ at Chaumont.87 The letter to Hamilton of the same day suggests that he was extremely satisfied with the achievement. One must also consider the signals for future issues in the negotiations, as although the Treaty of Chaumont outlines an agreement for a confederated Germany, there is no mention of Poland.88 Chapman argues that this was a missed

79 ‘Finance Accounts of Great Britain and Ireland; Also, Accounts of Increase and Diminution of Salaries, &c. In the Public Offices of Great Britain, Session 8Novemebr – 12 July, 1814-1815’, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons and Command, Vol VIII, (digitised by Google http://bit.ly/1pcth9L) 80 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.81 Secret note, Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 10th 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.82 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 346. 83 R. Jones, The British Diplomatic Service 1815-1914 (Waterloo, 1983), p. 57.84 Castlereagh to Mr. Hamilton, March 10th 1814, Correspondence, Despatches, and other papers (henceforth C. C.), (ed.) Charles William Vane, Marquess of Londonderry (London, 1853) (henceforth Vane Collection), Exeter University Library (henceforth EUL), V. IX, p.33585 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.6886 Castlereagh to Mr. Hamilton, March 10th 1814, C.C. (ed.), Vane Collection, EUL, v. IX, p.33587 F. G. Marcham, ‘Castlereagh: The Balance of Power in Europe’, Current History 27 (1954), 340.. 88 Chapman, The Congress of Vienna, p. 29-30.

opportunity for Tsar Alexander to secure Russia’s territorial desires in Poland.89 Castlereagh’s attitudes towards this issue will be discussed in chapter three, but it is worth noting this omission because it may reflect the foresight of Castlereagh to avoid this issue when securing Britain’s primary aims, or his naivety of the magnitude of this problem.

Overall Castlereagh’s actions at Chaumont amount to a diplomatic triumph. He succeeded in restoring the alliance and the pursuit of peace, something that Metternich had actively threatened to abandon through frustration at Châtillon.90 Castlereagh’s work to secure plans to protect Holland, and to liberate the peninsula states of Bonaparte rule was also approved by his government. A letter from Earl Bathurst to Castlereagh, 19 March 1814, confirms this approval and instructs Castlereagh’s next actions.91 Bathurst states that the Prince Regent ‘entirely approves’ of the treaty and will immediately prepare the ratifications of the treaty.92 The War Secretary also indicates the indignation of the Prince Regent towards France and Caulaincourt, and that any continued delay in the negotiations at Châtillon will result in Britain rescinding its colonial offerings to France.93 Britain’s current position on the continent, already made stronger in the Treaty of Chaumont, had improved immeasurably with Napoleon’s capture on 9 March.94 Britain therefore could afford to be more forceful, and Castlereagh’s next objective was to secure the peace of France as part of the alliance.

Châtillon abandoned – The Peace of Paris

Orders to abandon negations at Châtillon

It was Alexander, however, who acted decisively and entered Paris as leader of the victorious allied forces on the 31 March.95 Castlereagh remained at Dijon and wrote to his government about his view of the peace arrangements from there.96 The allied powers had to agree upon who was suitable to rule France. During these months four options had arisen: Napoleon could remain on the throne but with his Empire reduced, France could be ruled under a regency of Marie Louis, Bernadotte could reign, or Louis XVIII could be resorted.97 The British government supported the restoration of the Bourbons; and Liverpool, Bathurst and the Earl of Buckinghamshire even met with Louis XVIII, while in exile in England.98 A letter from Castlereagh to Liverpool of 22 March indicates his doubts about supporting the Bourbon cause strongly.99

89 Chapman, The Congress of Vienna, p. 29-30.90 Jarrett, M. The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon (London, 2013), p. 57.91 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 19 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.92 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 19 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.93 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 19 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.94 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p.82.95 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 38.96 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 87-88. 97 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.53. 98 Thompson, Earl Bathurst, pp.73-499 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.

The despatch includes two memorandums; one from Baron de Vitrolles requesting the allies stop negotiations with Napoleon and support the Bourbon cause, and another by Metternich asserting that French public allegiance was not to the Bourbons.100 At Chaumont, Castlereagh probably thought Napoleon was the most suitable option, despite the public outcry this would cause in Britain.101 Yet Napoleon’s re-proposal, offered by Caulaincourt at Châtillon on 15 March, was absurd in its terms, and therefore effectively ended these negotiations.102 As this letter illustrates, Castlereagh, now believed that the Bourbons were the suitable option but was hesitant, wanting to make sure that Britain was perceived ‘as the ally and auxiliary of the continental powers’ rather ‘than as charging herself chief’ and imposing Louis XVIII upon the French people.103 Nicholson attributes Castlereagh’s attitude to the Pitt doctrine, but this may well be presumptuous.104

Historians have consistently continued Webster’s perception that Castlereagh was Pitt’s protégé, and Dallas more recently supports this notion.105 Graubard feels that this perception is largely unchallenged, and contends that Castlereagh’s notion of a European balance of power is inherited from eighteenth century figures such as Burke and Vatell.106 It is hard to discern directly from this despatch what the origins of Castlereagh’s views are. What is more significant is that he and Metternich, while at Dijon, did not feel that the French people were ready to support a Bourbon government. Castlereagh, on the value of this letter, appears to be at odds with the view of his Cabinet on this issue. When the foreign minister receives information from Bathurst 26 March, which contradicts opinion held at Dijon, he realigns himself with the British government and supports Louis XVIII’s restoration. 107

Bathurst’s despatch to Castlereagh first indicates that inhabitants of Bordeaux have ‘assumed the White Cockade’ of the Bourbon House, and also instructs Castlereagh to terminate the negotiations at Châtillon.108 This knowledge has been obtained in correspondence with Wellington, whose letter of the news is enclosed. Bathurst writes that the general insists ‘the sentiments manifested at Bordeaux to be general throughout that part of the country’, and more significantly that Wellington’s instructions to Marshal Beresford, also enclosed, highlight that British forces offered ‘no encouragement to the people to adopt this proceeding.’109 This news relieved Castlereagh’s anxiety over this issue, and he gave a dinner on 28 March at Dijon, to celebrate the restoration of Louis XVII to Metternich, Stadion, Hardenberg and other representatives of the allied powers, including Holland and Spain.110 Castlereagh’s letter suggests that he was unaware of the progress of the British military in Southern

100 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.101 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 504.102 ibid.103 Castlereagh to Liverpool, March 22nd 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/3.104 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 87. 105 G. Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo (London, 2001), pp. 43-48. 106 Graubard, ‘Castlereagh and the Peace of Europe’, pp. 86-7.107 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 89. 108 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.109 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.110 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 89.

France, as the Bathurst letter, also written on the 22 March, reports events that took place on 12 March in Bordeaux.111 Bathurst’s communication should be credited, as he was also principally concerned with British militarily engagement with the United States.112 It was important to relay this information to Castlereagh after the events in Southern France had become publically known.

The news that Bourbon support had swelled in Southern France was published in The Times on 25 March, which stated that two ‘deputies from the Royalists’ had landed in Falmouth to report the news.113 One of these messengers reportedly proclaimed that ‘Now, the White Flag and the Old British Union are flying amicably together.’114 The author of the article champions the Bourbon cause and refers to the enemy, Napoleon, as the ‘villain.’115 A solution, where Napoleon remained on the French throne, had therefore become an impossibility. The British public, as confirmed by this newspaper article, would not tolerate this outcome and this sentiment even extended to attempting to negotiate peace directly with Bonaparte.116 The sentiment of the public and the government’s frustration explain the instructions given by Bathurst to Castlereagh in the letter of 22 March. Bathurst states that the cabinet believes that the delay to the Châtillon negotiations can be ‘solely ascribed to the French government’ and orders Castlereagh, on behalf of the Prince Regent, ‘to use your utmost efforts with the Allied powers to break of the negotiations.’117 Wellington’s news from Southern France helped to ease Castlereagh’s worries over the future of the French throne, and meant that he could help to secure the desired outcome for Britain.

Castlereagh role in the Peace of Paris

Castlereagh’s agency in obtaining this outcome for Britain was minimal though. Alexander was the only senior allied official in Paris between the 1st-6th April, a crucial period, where the Tsar helped Talleyrand to restore the Bourbon monarchy.118 With Châtillon abandoned and his views now aligned with that of the British government and public, Castlereagh had no obvious reason to hesitate. Nicholson observes that Sir Charles Stewart, who had accompanied Alexander to Paris, wrote to Liverpool to express his concern for Castlereagh’s absence because of the advantage it gave Russia in the negotiations for the upcoming Paris treaty.119

As it transpires Britain did not suffer as a result of this absence. The Peace of Paris, signed on the 30th May, ensured peace with France and cemented the territorial

111 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.112 Thompson, Earl Bathurst, p. 78.113 Times, 25th March, 1814. 114 ibid. 115 ibid. 116 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 47.117 Bathurst to Castlereagh, March 22nd 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.118 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 86.119 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 86.

agreements published in the Treaty of Chaumont.120 Thus Britain had ensured the security of the territories outlined in the memorandum of 26th December, apart from Hannover.121 Castlereagh’s principal work to achieve the aims of his government had been achieved at Chaumont. As the correspondences illustrate Castlereagh, his government and the British public shared a desire restore the Bourbons when the allies entered Paris on 31 March. Conversely Alexander was not sure of his preferred candidate, and the first week of April was period of tension and uncertainty in Paris.122 Castlereagh was wary of Alexander, and Schroeder argues that perhaps this explains his delayed journey to Paris.123 This is mere speculation however, and it is hard to know why Castlereagh avoided direct negotiation with the Tsar. The foreign secretary had certainly been less influential at Paris than in Chaumont, but his loyalty to the orders of his government was unwavering, and he had still succeeded in fulfilling their aims. Unlike Paris, Castlereagh was to have a more influential role at Vienna in the autumn of 1814, as he attempted to negotiate with Alexander, the other allied ministers, over the settlement of central Europe.

Castlereagh and Poland

Castlereagh’s proposal for negotiations

The next two chapters analyse Castlereagh’s actions and experience at the Congress between September 1814 and February 1815, and attempts to understand, from his correspondences to the British government and Wellington, whether his involvement in the Polish and Saxon settlements were driven by personal motives or his continued efforts to secure British territorial aims in central Europe. There was an interval between Alexander’s to London in the summer of 1814, and the beginning on the Congress in October, during which Castlereagh considered how the Congress might progress.124

The correspondence between Castlereagh and the British government have been illuminating thus far, and will continue to provide a significant insight into Castlereagh’s actions in the continental negotiations. This chapter approaches the foreign minister differently and concentrates on extracting Castlereagh’s own perception of his role at Vienna, and his primary concerns. His despatches to Wellington are therefore also important to this understanding, as the general was ‘the confident in many respects of Castlereagh’s feelings.’125 ….

120 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.87.121 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p.87.122 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 506123 ibid.124 Webster, Congress of Vienna, pp. 50-51. 125 Derry, Castlereagh, p. 171.

Castlereagh’s initial expectations of the Congress are outlined in a letter to Wellington on 7 August 1814, where he states that the allied ministers believe the Congress will take place on the 1st October, shortly after Alexander’s arrival on 27 September.126 As a result Castlereagh expects that the allied ministers will ‘have time to discuss the more difficult matters’ prior to the assembling of the Congress, having already agreed upon the simpler matters.127 This remark is particularly interesting because Castlereagh had essentially agreed upon all British territorial securities. The ominous difficulty in question was the Polish settlement, which Alexander had postponed until he had returned to Russia after his trip to England.128 Castlereagh’s recognition of this issue meant that he could attempt to prepare for it. He is anxious about Russian aggrandisement, and stresses to Wellington that ‘it is equally important to Prussia, Holland, and Hanover, that a Russian dependency should not be established’ in this part of Europe, which in this case is Denmark.129

Castlereagh’s anxiety over the Polish issue may perplex, considering that the majority of his cabinet would happily adopt an isolationist policy; due to their concerns over the American war and tax reduction and debt.130 Indeed British aims had been agreed at Chaumont and cemented at Paris, and Liverpool’s cabinet had to address the suffering economy and find employment for 300,000 demobilised soldiers upon their return to England.131 There is an assertion by historians that Castlereagh, due to his early success, now strove to ‘play the part of impartial mediator in the settlement’.132 This view can be substantiated by Castlereagh’s early correspondences from Vienna.

A despatch to Liverpool on the 22 September 1814, illustrates that Castlereagh did perceive himself as a mediator, who could contribute to the organisation of the proceedings.133 Castlereagh encloses a memorandum, ‘unofficially and confidently’, to the Prime Minister that should be read ‘rather as a throwing out of ideas than containing a formal opinion.’134 The unofficial nature of this memorandum can be firstly observed from the pencilled corrections of the documents, and can thus be viewed to reflect the thought process of the foreign minister.135 Castlereagh believes that ‘no effectual progress can be made in business’ until some plan of the proceedings is made; and proposes that France and Spain, in addition to the allied powers, should negotiate the important matters of the settlement because these six countries are ‘most considerable in population and weight.’136 Not only does this memorandum show that Castlereagh believes that he has some authority in dictating the organisation of the congress, but that he believes that the allied powers should be inclusive in agreeing the territorial settlements in Europe.

126 Castlereagh to Wellington, August 7th 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 76. 127 Castlereagh to Wellington, August 7th 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 76.128 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 106.129 Castlereagh to Wellington, August 7th 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 76.130 Shroeder, The transformation of European Politics, pp. 520-521.131 Beales, From Castlereagh to Gladstone, p. 38.132 Marcham,. ‘Castlereagh’, p. 334.133 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.134 ibid. 135 Castlereagh memorandum, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.136 ibid.

Baron Humboldt also drew up a memorandum, which excluded Spain and France, and this was chosen instead of Castlereagh’s, until challenged by Talleyrand on the 30th September.137 Castlereagh does inform Liverpool of this possibility, commenting that the allied powers ‘feel equal jealousy of admitting France to either arbitrate between them or to assume any leading influence.’138 He even highlights his own efforts to mediate this situation by endeavouring ‘to effect a confidence of sentiment between the French and allied ministers.’139 Castlereagh obviously felt that a conciliatory approach was necessary, but was unfortunately in the minority.140 He adds a note to his memorandum stating that he disagrees with the exclusive right for the four allied powers to arbitrate, and asserts that France and Spain should be treated as ‘friendly and not hostile parties.’141

As these despatches illustrate, Castlereagh had started to assume a new role prior to the opening of the Congress. He believed himself to be a mediator between the parties, and this would become increasingly significant after Talleyrand rejected Humboldt’s proposals and increased the formal negotiating committee to eight powers, that would include France, Spain, Portugal and Sweden.142 Agreeing territorial settlements would now necessitate the agreement of eight parties, each of whom had their own territorial demands and ambitions in Europe. Castlereagh wanted to create equilibrium in Europe based on ‘a mechanical expression of the balance of forces.’143 As the negotiations faltered throughout October, it became clear that Alexander would resist this.

Russian influence over Polish settlement

Castlereagh’s fundamental obstacle to successfully mediate the Polish settlement was Alexander, and the pair had engaged in a number of contentious meetings at the end of September 1814.144 Alexander proposed to support plans for Poland independence that included ceding some Polish territories to Russia.145 During their discussions the emperor asserted that by liberating Poland and granting it a constitution he was acting with moral duty.146 Castlereagh could offer little resistance to Alexander’s claims for the reason that the British public opinion would support this outcome in Poland.147 Alexander could afford to resist any objections to his proposals, particularly as his forces were still travelling through Europe.148

Castlereagh’s frustration with the Russian attitude to the Polish increased throughout October. In a letter to Wellington on 25 October, he expressed his exasperation at the 137 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 222.138 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.139 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.140 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 222.141 ‘Note annexed to the Protocol of the 22nd of September’, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22nd September 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.142 Webster, Congress of Vienna, pp. 65-66.143 Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna’, p. 276.144 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 169.145 Jarrett, Congress of Vienna, p.100.146 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 169.147 Jarrett, Congress of Vienna, p.101.148 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 519.

degeneration of the negotiations and the possibility of war.149 He writes that he hopes that the powers ‘might have enjoyed some repose…but the tone and conduct of Russia have disappointed this hope and forced upon us fresh considerations.’150 Here, Castlereagh demonstrates his frustration with the Tsar’s position over Poland. This significantly supports Nicholson’s notion that Castlereagh’s own position over Poland changed because of Russia.151 As mentioned, Castlereagh had been ‘anxious’ about the Russian Emperor’s attitude at Vienna as far back as August.152 However, this anxiety and transformed into an insurmountable obstacle, as this letter indicates.153 The prospect of Russian aggrandisement necessitated Castlereagh to consider other methods for creating a balance of power in Europe.

The foreign minister anticipated that if Russia could not be persuaded over Poland, that the other allies would seek territorial compensation. Castlereagh’s duty at the conference was to ‘avoid accidents’ and to ensure a balance of power that his government had paid for with subsidiaries and colonies.154 His government, due to Castlereagh’s assurances in September that he could mediate between the powers, expected this balance to be settled without serious difficulty. As mentioned the Tsar had a strong reputation with the British public, and Castlereagh’s superiors in government did not recognise the danger of Russian aggrandisement.155 Castlereagh however, expresses his strong concerns to Wellington throughout October, that the consequences of the Polish settlement could endanger the security of Holland.

Russian expansion in Poland, Castlereagh believes, will encourage Austria and Prussia to come ‘pressing in other directions’ territorially.156 Castlereagh astutely appreciates that Bavaria might have to expand into Dutch territory as a consequence of this, and comments that this ‘is less liberal, in a territorial point of view, to the House of Orange, than can be wished.’157 Importantly Castlereagh recognises that this would aggrieve the Dutch, a close ally of Britain, but views this as a ‘secondary danger’.158 This eventuality is placed in context of Britain’s major aims and thus illustrates Castlereagh’s continued concern to follow the wishes of his government. He explains to Wellington that an enlarged Bavaria, a ‘higher military power’, would protect better against future French aggression in these territories and thus preserve the security of the Low Countries.159 Castlereagh, therefore, still recognises ‘our first object’, and this focus remains in place despite continued frustration with the other ministers.160

149 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 150 ibid. 151 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 128.152 Castlereagh to Wellington, August 7th 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 76.153 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 154 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 448. 155 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 173.156 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142157 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142158 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142159 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142160 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 1st 1814, C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 142

Castlereagh’s exasperation is not limited to Alexander in his letter of 25 October, as he illustrates the difficulty in working with Talleyrand to resist Russian demands.161 Kissinger is correct in observing that Castlereagh misunderstood what the other powers conceived a balance of power to be; for them it meant ‘a reconciliation of historical ambitions’ in some areas of Europe.162 Castlereagh sees minor territorial grievances as ‘subordinate’ to establishing a peaceful balance of power in Europe, while he reports that Talleyrand argues with other states over the Saxon and Neapolitan issues ‘at the expense of the more important Poland.’163 At the beginning of October Castlereagh had been unable to change Alexander’s mind on the Polish issue, despite their strong friendship.164 At the end of October he had also lost patience with Talleyrand; and relays to Wellington that his considerations for alliance in the outcome of war.165 What is most interesting is that even Castlereagh’s considered alliances are still weight against their suitability to ensuring British securities in Holland. Castlereagh recognises the likely possibility for an alliance between France, Austria and Britain against Russia and Prussia, but comments that Holland and the Low Countries would then be dependant on France and not Prussia.166 They would be easily susceptible to ‘re-occupation by French armies’, which contradicts one of Britain’s major aims, and therefore Castlereagh asserts that Britain ‘ought not to risk so much upon French connection.’167

These letters highlight that Castlereagh primarily held the Russian Tsar accountable for the difficulty of these negotiations, but it also highlights that his desire to establish equilibrium was inhibiting his skills as a mediator. He had failed to influence the Tsar over Poland, and to press upon Talleyrand the importance of solving the Polish ahead of the Saxon and Italian settlements. Prussia did not fear to demand Saxon territories because they had no need to fear Russia, as Alexander and King Frederick of Prussia had loyal relationship.168 The lack of progress threatened war, and Castlereagh’s letter of 25th October illustrates his fear that this may affect the security of Holland. British aims remained at the forefront of Castlereagh’s concern in his attempts to establish equilibrium. However his assurances to Liverpool that he could mediate upon this outcome, expressed in his despatch on 22 September, had not come to any result. As the letters to Wellington show during October, Castlereagh was failing to affect the progress of these negotiations, despite his best intentions to safeguard British aims. Nicholson expresses the difficulty for historians to discern how they progressed, even though the ‘we possess almost all the documents in the case.’169 The possibility of another war was unacceptable to the British government, and Castlereagh was soon to be notified of this fact.

161 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 162 Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna’, p. 276.163 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 164 Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna’, p. 268.165 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 166 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 167 Castlereagh to Wellington, October 25th 1814. C.C., Vane Collection, EUL, v.X, p. 173. 168 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 528.169 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 165.

Disobedience and a fear of war

British isolationism

The British government informed Castlereagh of their growing concern regarding the polish issue in a despatch from Liverpool on the 28 October 1814. In this letter Liverpool orders the foreign secretary to refrain from challenging Russia on the Polish issue, pointing to the fact that Britain had more pressing preoccupations.170 To reiterate this sentiment in the British cabinet, the Prime Minister enclosed a memorandum, written by Vansittart, that highlights what the consequences of Castlereagh’s continued action might be.171 The instructions carried significant weight because Castlereagh played a more reserved role at the Congress hereafter.172 Castlereagh accepts his instructions, in a letter to Liverpool on 11 November, and explains to his superior that his actions were borne out of a continued desire to secure Britain’s principle aims for the congress.173

Liverpool writes to Castlereagh that it is ‘the impression of our other colleagues…that we have done enough on the question of Poland’, with the reasoning that because of the Russian position ‘no agreement respecting Poland can now be either creditable or satisfactory.’174 This view is substantiated in Vansittart’s memorandum, which commends Castlereagh’s attempt support ‘the endeavours of Austria and Prussia’, but contends that ultimately Britain had now ‘fully performed all that could be expected’ from them.175 Vansittart, as already stated, had a reputation for supporting isolationist policy in Europe.176 That said Castlereagh’s failure thus far in negotiating with the Tsar also clearly resulted in a loss of faith from Liverpool. Liverpool and the rest of his cabinet were preoccupied with the protracted war with America.177

The strain of the Anglo-American is one of the reasons for withdrawing from the Polish discussions asserts Liverpool; who writes that continued aggravation of Russia might result in their support of the American cause.178 The Vansittart memorandum instructs Castlereagh ‘to avoid irritating Russia’, as it may be regarded in Europe that

170 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, Supplementary Despatches, Correspondences and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, (ed.) by his son The Duke of Wellington (London, 1872) (henceforth W. S. D.), Harvard University Library Online (henceforth HUL), v. IX, p.382. 171 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.172 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 103 : Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.173 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.174 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.175 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.176 Bew, Castlereagh, p.330.177 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.178 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.

Britain act out of ‘jealousy to Russia.’179 While Castlereagh attempts to counteract Russian aggrandisement in Europe, his government clearly intends preserve British international hegemony that follows an imperialist and maritime foreign policy. The two international hegemonies were Britain and Russia, and following Napoleon’s defeat, they both wanted to preserve their own supremacy over the other.180 As discussed in the first two chapters, Castlereagh had essentially ensured all Britain’s main securities by the Peace of Paris. Vansittart worries that the aggravation of Russia could cause them to reintroduce the question of maritime rights to the Congress, and therefore undermine this achievement.181

Conversely these letters do indicate that the British government took a simplified view of the Polish issue. Liverpool writes that Britain ‘should withdraw ourselves from the question altogether, and reserve ourselves for points on which we have a more immediate and direct interest.’182 Similarly Vansittart argues that the future of Poland is ‘of no great political importance to us anyway.’183 Here, as Castlereagh points out in his letter to Liverpool on 11 November, is where a greater appreciation of the other allies is required.184 Castlereagh explains that he too was induced ‘to undervalue the importance attached by the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets to the polish question’; until it became clear, because of Alexander’s position, that the battleground for ‘negotiation would then turn upon Saxony.’185 The future of Saxony was of no immediate interest to the British government, and Castlereagh had even been granted permission to mediate of a German settlement before he departed England in December 1813.186

The reality of the Saxon issue would have implications to Britain however, and Castlereagh is at pains to explain this to Liverpool. If Prussia absorbed all of Saxony to compensate for the polish settlement, there was a possibility that a German League would cover and potential ‘expose’ the Low Countries.187 Thus, as Castlereagh, argues; by consequence the Polish issue could affect the security of Holland and the Low Countries, which amounts to a ‘particular interest’ of the British government.188 This observation is of paramount importance, as it illustrates that although Castlereagh’s perceptions of the Polish issue differed greatly to his Cabinet, he still believed that his actions were necessary to cement the securities he had achieved earlier in 1814. It suggests that Castlereagh was the only member of the British government, with the exception of perhaps Wellington who he had corresponded with regularly in October, knew that more work had to be done to achieve British aims.

Nevertheless the British government, as Liverpool’s despatch of 25th October illuminates, felt that Castlereagh had become embroiled in these negotiations and that

179 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.180 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 534. 181 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.182 Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.183 Vansittart Memorandum, Liverpool to Castlereagh, October 28th 1814, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.382.184 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.185 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.186 Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1813, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/1.187 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.188 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

required orders of restraint. Castlereagh even states that he became ‘more involved than 189I should have permitted myself.’ Perhaps, as Dallas argues, he became so central to the negotiations that he did not know how to retreat from the crisis.190 Significantly Castlereagh ends his correspondence with a warning that the peace ‘which we have so dearly purchased, will be of short duration.’191 War was not an option for Great Britain, and the government duly issued Castlereagh with his sternest instructions to date.

Alexander’s demands in Poland had created a deadlock in the negotiations by the 21st November.192 The strain this put on the Saxon negotiations has already been made clear. Bathurst wrote to Castlereagh on the 27 November to inform him of the sentiments of the Prince Regent, who ‘cannot contemplate the present state of Europe.’193 The War secretary relays that the Prince Regent ‘deeply laments the course which the discussions at Vienna have taken respecting Poland’, and ‘entirely approves of the firm and decided manner’ in which Castlereagh has attempted to resist Russian aggrandisement.194 The tone of Bathurst’s message seems to convey that the Prince Regent, who had a close relationship with Castlereagh, understood the difficulty of Castlereagh’s position at Vienna.195 George was also a European at heart and would have supported Castlereagh’s efforts until war threatened.196

For this reason the remainder of his message is all the more compelling. Bathurst paraphrases that His Royal Highness has ‘the most serious apprehensions of the consequences which would result from the renewal of war on the Continent under present circumstances.’197 The preoccupations of the British government have been indicated above, and need not be reiterated. The significance is that even those who share Castlereagh’s view for Europe, and appreciate his position in the negotiations, are now ordering him to withdraw from the Polish and Saxon issues. Bathurst’s final message, on behalf of the Prince Regent, is to explain the expectation that Castlereagh will aim ‘to prevent, by all the means in your power, so great an evil’ as war.198

These correspondences sufficiently illustrate that Castlereagh had lost the confidence in his government to reach a settlement over the Polish issue, and that they were prepared to command him to adopt a different approach to the negotiations. Castlereagh, as he himself admitted, had become too heavily involved and was endeavouring to achieve the ‘establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe’ that seemed an impossibility.199 From the end of November Castlereagh had to endeavour to prevent European war to follow his government wishes. Circumstance dictated the opportunity to continue to preserve British interests, with an entirely different course

189 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.190 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 217.191 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.192 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 173. 193 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6. 194 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.195 Bew, Castlereagh, p. 469.196 Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo, p. 458.197 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.198 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.199 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov 11th 1814, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/8.

of action. Alexander had relinquished leader status by double-dealing over Poland, and subsequently lost Austrian trust.200 By the middle of December the Saxon Castlereagh understood that Poland was lost but that he still had an opportunity to save Saxony.201 In order to achieve this he would have to deliberately disregarded his instructions of his government, and threaten war against Russia and Prussia.

The Defensive Alliance January 1815

Castlereagh’s resistance to Prussian desires in Saxony came after Prussia had deserted Britain in their attempts to object to Russian plans for Poland; this action coincidently aligned with British public opinion, which had favoured Saxon independence since November.202 Talleyrand sufficiently enraged the Prussians with two notes on 19th and 26th December where he insisted that the dethronement of the Saxon king undermined traditional principles of legitimacy.203 On the 29th December Hardenberg threatened war.204 Castlereagh wrote to Liverpool on the 1st January explaining these volatile developments, and illustrates his fruitless attempts to abate the Prussians.205

Castlereagh reports that the language of the Prussians ‘is very warlike, and strongly against yielding any part of Saxony, and that Humboldt actually refuses ‘to discuss such alternatives as might be proposed.’206 Prussia had supported Russian plans for Poland, and therefore would expect reciprocal support over Saxony, which explains their threatening attitude.207 The Prussians certainly gave the impression that they were prepared to go to war over this issue. The letter supports this and Castlereagh reports that the Prussians were ‘organising their army for the field…and are employed in fortifying Dresden’, and from this point onwards the Prussian Cabinet regard that an opposition to their annexation of Saxony ‘as tantamount to a declaration of war.’208

Although the British public desired an independent Saxony, this was subordinate to the priority to avoid war, and Castlereagh was well aware of the ‘impossibility’ for European hostilities from Bathurst’s letter of 27th November.209 The foreign secretary, as he has endeavoured to do throughout the continental negotiations, still explains to Liverpool how these new developments could affect British securities. In this case the military occupation of Saxony and presence ‘on the left bank of the Rhine has been extremely vexatious of late towards the Prince of Orange’s government.’210 The security of Holland was therefore endangered by Prussian militarisation and Castlereagh felt that this was a sufficient danger to ignore his instructions from London.211 It is significant to note that Castlereagh asserts that he attempted to pacify the Prussians and called their actions ‘most alarming’; he even suggested that because 200 Marcham, ‘Castlereagh’, p. 340. 201 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 225. 202 Webster, Congress of Vienna, p. 107-8.203 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, p. 177.204 ibid. 205 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.206 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.207 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 528.208 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.209 Bathurst to Castlereagh, 27th Nov 1814, F.O. Cont. Con., TNA, FO 92/6.210 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.211 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 226.

of their aggressive attitude ‘it would be better to break up the congress.’212 It is difficult to know if Castlereagh did truly attempt to pacify the aggressors before preparing alliances for war, or whether he sought to excuse his actions to ‘concert with the French and Austrian plenipotentiaries a Treaty of Defensive Alliance.’213 Regardless of this, and his justification for forming the alliance, Castlereagh had, for the first time since leaving Britain, deliberately flouted the orders of his government.

An alliance between Britain, France and Austria against Prussia and Russia was signed on the 3rd January 1815, with the invitation for the United Netherlands, Hannover and Bavaria invited to accede.214 The third article of the treaty ‘provided that an attack upon Hanover or the Low Countries would be regarded as an attack on Great Britain’ and the other signatories would support military resistance to Prussian aggression in these territories.215 This was a significant agreement, as it illustrates that although Castlereagh was ignoring his overriding command to avoid war, his aims were still centred on securing the British securities that had been outlined by the Cabinet a year earlier. Castlereagh specifically indicates on the 1st January that he sought an alliance ‘confined within the strict necessity of this extraordinary case.’216 This comment indicates that he recognised that he continued to avoid aggravating Russia, as instructed by the despatch of 27th October, and that the treaty specifically related to Prussian military threats that had recently emerged.

There is some contention to who should be accorded credit for the Defensive Alliance of 3rd January, and Nicholson credits Talleyrand for this security.217 Kissinger however criticises historians for exaggerating Talleyrand’s role.218 Indeed Castlereagh writes that he planned to consult the other parties ‘as an act of imperative duty.’219 Certainly Hinde credits the foreign secretary for this tripartite alliance, as does Thompson.220 Castlereagh certainly had a central role to play, and undeniably defied the wishes of the Prince Regent, Liverpool and his government. Castlereagh was fortunate though, and his actions did not receive the negative reaction one might assume. Castlereagh writes to Liverpool on 5th January 1815, stating ‘I have every reason to hope that the alarm of war is over.’221 The treaty had effectively frightened Alexander, who knew that his military were exhausted from the war with Napoleon, and he subsequently betrayed Prussia.222 Prussia, as Castlereagh writes, then sought compromise and agreed to discuss ‘a suitable modification of the Saxon question.’223 This achievement and Castlereagh’s actions did not persuade the British government

212 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.213 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.214 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 535.215 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 178.216 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.217 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 177.218 Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna, p. 267.219 Castlereagh to Liverpool 1st Jan 1815, F.O Cont., TNA, FO 139/6.220 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 226: Thompson, Bathurst, p. 87.221 Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.222 Schroeder, The transformation of European Politics, p. 535.223 Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.

to the course of action taken, but Castlereagh does allude to what did; ‘our pacification with America.’224

As it transpired an Anglo-American peace was also signed, by coincidence, on the 3rd January.225 The relief of this extended war meant that Castlereagh’s actions were praised by Bathurst, and later approved by the Prime Minister.226 Metternich formally agreed the terms for the Saxon and Polish settlements on 28th January.227 The difficult issues had been resolved, and Castlereagh had had a varying degree of influence in this process. Liverpool, facing considerable pressure from the Whigs and the Radicals over British foreign policy, required Castlereagh’s presence before parliament assembled in February.228 Castlereagh’s duties at the Congress of Vienna was completed, and although in the final months of negotiations he actively defied the wishes of his government and threaten war, his letters indicated that his priority was always to ensure that British aims were achieved. In the end the Polish and Saxon issues were resolved fortuitously, with Castlereagh acting in line with the aims of his government until the last.

Conclusion

Bibliography

224 Castlereagh to Liverpool 5th Jan 1815 1815, W. S. D., HUL, v. IX, p.527.225 Hinde, Castlereagh, p. 226.226 Thompson, Bathurst, p. 87.227 Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 177.228 Derry, Castlereagh, p. 173