SUBJECT: AMENDMENTS  DOMINGO SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur petitioners vs HON. RECARELO CASTILLO, Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur & the Hon. Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur respondents FACTS:Sarcos, an independent candidate, won in the 14 November 1967 elections, as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. Castillo charged Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office. Such act alleged constituted connivance with certain private individuals, to cut and fell timber and selling of the timber cut, for own use and benefit, within the communcal forest reserve of the municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the government.  As early as 18 April 196 there was already a charge under oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing the violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by Municipal Council of Barobo. It was on the basis of this administrative complaint that the Castillo filed petition ordering the immediate suspension of Sarcos from position as Mayor saying that the acts committed by mayor Sarcos affects his official integrity, the petition was in accordance with the Sec.5 of RA 5185- Decentralization Act of 1967.  ISSUES:WON Provincial Governor is vested power to order preventive suspension of Mayor Sarcos under RA 5185 HELD / RATIONALE: No. Castillo as governor lacks authority to order the preventive suspension of the Petitioner, Sarcos. According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly the paragraph dealing with preventive suspension: "…The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipality Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after receipt of such notice." It was the former law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor to order preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by the Decentralization Act of 1967.  The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order by Governor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independent candidate thus of a different political persuasion.  The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The preventive suspension order by Castillo is annulled and set aside. Mayor Sarcos to be reinstated to his position.  *The Decentralization Act, to which the decision in this case is based, amended / repealed Sec. 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. The former law provides that the provicnicla gorvernor, if the charge against a munucupola officaial was municipal official was one affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension. It was repealed by the RA NO. 5185 Sec. 5 which provides that now it is the provincial board which has been granted the power to order preventive suspension.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104528             January 18, 1996

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P. REYES, JORGE C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA, FLORENCIA CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO SANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON, NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD GARCIA, ANA

ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL, represented by their duly authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE LEON AND SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN SEBASTIAN, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree", is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by the Executive Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, "by authority of the President."

Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc. (represented by spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question.

Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.

Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB - without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc. - may collect from private respondents only the "remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with" Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from said subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision. On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.

Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . ." However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.

Petitioner bank raised the following issues:

1. The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975; and

2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-subdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to accept private respondents' remaining amortizations and issue the corresponding titles after payment thereof.

Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieve:

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and, obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;1 (Emphasis supplied).

While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law - as an instrument of social justice - must favors the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers."

The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and condition it sought to remedy, must be enforced. Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on Statutory Construction (quoted with approval by this Court in an old case of consequence, Ongsiako vs. Gamboa2 ), says:

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.3

Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective application of the law. Little people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of their own. As the Solicitor General, in his comment, argues:

Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the vigorous regulation which P.D. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be translated into a feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of the State cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the fortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957. Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because P.D. 957 cannot be applied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The legislative intent could not have conceivably permitted a loophole which all along works to the prejudice of subdivision lot buyers (private respondents).4

Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 2l and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957's enactment:

Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer or shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominiun plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.

Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.

Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.

Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for, the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor, of the owner or developer when the buyer, after, due notice to the owner or developer, desist from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at this option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied)

As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find the following statements of Justice Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the case at bench:

Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract.

Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter, affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order.5

This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez vs. Court of Appeals6 :

The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate the impairment clause. The argument does not impress. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in fact, there are many who now believe it, is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did not affect the community in general. They were indeed purely private agreements then. Any interference with them at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that could properly struck down.

But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have, as a result been removed from the protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come within the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects the public welfare one way or another so as to require the interference of the State, then must the police power be asserted, and prevail, over the clause.

The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et al.7 penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the factual circumstances therein being of great similarity to the antecedent facts of the case at bench:

Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchase on installment a tiny home lot they can call their own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to be able to buy a lot, no matter how small, so that he may somehow build a house. It has, however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living individuals are taken advantage of, with the delivery of titles delayed, the subdivision facilities, including the most essential such as water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant case, after almost completing the payments for the property and after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted by the stark reality, contrived or otherwise, in which another person would now appear to be owner.

xxx       xxx       xxx

We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The BANK could not have closed its eyes that it was dealing over a subdivision where there were already houses constructed. Did it not enter the mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there may even be subdivision residents who have almost completed their installment payments? (id., pp. 7 & 9).

By the foregoing citation, this Court, thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part of this Decision.

The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 and outside the beneficial aegis of P.D. 957, was struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the mortgagee bank's right to foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court declaring the real estate mortgage as null and void.

As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a "total stranger to the land purchase agreement," cannot be made to take the developer's place.

We disagree, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents.

Sec. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without prior written approval of the Authority, Such approval shall not be granted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full payment thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without prejudice to petitioner Bank's seeking relief against the subdivision developer.

Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only on the strictly legal issues involved in this case but also to take another look at the larger issues including social justice and the protection of human rights as enshrined in the Constitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but within the context of existing social, economic and political conditions, law being merely a brick in the up- building of the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for the implementation of state policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These consideration are obviously far more weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the acquisition of any specific property. Thus, as the country strives to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to achieve dreams of "NIC-hood" and social well-being for the majority of our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country,

which has in recent years made record earnings and acquired an enviable international stature, with branches and subsidiaries in key financial centers around the world, should be equally as happy with the disposition of this case as the private respondents, who were almost deprived and dispossessed of their very homes purchased through their hard work and with their meager savings.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioner having failed to show any REVERSIBLE ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Comendador vs. De Villa (as chief of staff of the AFP) – Right to bail of Military Personnel

Facts:

• The case involves 4 consolidated cases of the officers of the AFP who are facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d’ etat on December 1-9, 1989:

G.R. No. 93177-petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus- questioning the conduct of the pre-trial panel and the creation of General Court Martial (GMC No. 14)

G.R. No. 96948-certiorari against the ruling denying them the right to pre-emptory challenge (or that the Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof.)

G.R. No. 95020-certiorari- against the respondent judge on the ground that he has no jurisdiction of GCM No. 14 and no authority to set aside its ruling of denying bail to private respondents

G.R. No. 97454-certiorari- against the decision of RTC in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objection are also raised.

• Charges against them include mutiny, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and various crimes in relation to murder

• The pre-trail investigation (PTI) panel issued several letters of notice to the petitioners for counter-affidavit and of the affidavits of their witnesses. All were moved to delay and the petitioners contend that there was no pre-trail investigation done

• In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail and it was denied by GMC No. 14. The RTC granted him provisional liberty but he was not released immediately, “pending the final resolution of the appeal to be taken.” Then the RTC ruled that the right to bail covers military men facing court-martial proceedings

Issues:

• Whether there was violation of due process

• Whether or not the military personnel are entitled to bail, thus, WON there was a violation of the right to bail

Held:

• The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to be heard when they were asked to submit their counter-affidavits to the PTI. They cannot claim that they were denied due process. “Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence."

• "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction."

• “We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.”

• However, a right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military, where the right to bail does not exist.

• Solicitor General’s explanation of the exception:

• “The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.”

“…soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people.”

“…the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,”

• Neither does it violate equal protection because the military is not similarly situated with others.

• Dispositive part of the case:

• “As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released.”

• “ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.”

Cornelia MATABUENAplaintiff-appellant v Petronila CERVANTESdefendant-appellee

[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971] [G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971]

TOPIC: Nature and concept of statutory construction

FACTS:The stipulated facts agreed upon by both the plaintiff and the defendant assistedby their respective counsels, are:1. The deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question;2. Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos(referring to a transfer or gift made during one's lifetime, as opposed to a testamentary transfer which is a gift that takes effect on death)

in favor of defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parce l o f land in ques t ion on February 20 , 1956 , wh ich same donat ion was accepted by defendant;3. The donation of the land to Petronila (defendant) which took effect immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife, they were married on March 28, 1962;4. The deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962;5. The plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest co l l a te ra l re la t i ve o f the deceased by v i r t ue o f an a f f idav i t o f se l f -ad jud ica t ion execu ted by her i n 1962 and had the land dec la red in her name and pa id t he estate and inheritance taxes thereon. Cornelia (plaintiff-appellant), sister of Felix Matabuena maintains that the donation made by Felix to Petronila Cervantes (defendant-appellee) was void because they were l i v ing w i thou t t he benef i t o f mar r iage (common law mar r iage) . Th is i s in pursuant to Article 133 of Civil Code which provides "

Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.

On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:WON the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship

HELD: The lower cour t dec is ion o f November 23 , 1965 d ismiss ing the compla in t w i th costs is REVERSED. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of p l a i n t i f f a n d d e f e n d a n t a s p r o i n d i v i s o ( f o r a n u n d i v i d e d p a r t ) . T h e c a s e i s remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with theabove opinion.

RATIO:It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. If there is ever any occasion where the p r inc ip le o f s ta tu to ry cons t ruc t ion tha t what i s w i th in the sp i r i t o f t he law i s as much a part of it as what is written, then such would be it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code says clearly that if the policy of the law is (in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court) "to prohibit dona t ions in favor o f the o ther consor t and h is descendants because o f fear o f undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials.

Political Law –  Journals vs Enrolled Bill 

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief , Morales  was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

“Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.”

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:

‘No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.’

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.

HELD:  The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide.  All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground – Lack of essential elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the law itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.

Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, China Banking Corporation

and Greg Bartelli y Northcott

G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

Torres,Jr., J,:

Facts:

On February 4-7, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, detained and repeatedly raped Karen Salvacion, a 12-year old the victim, in the apartment of the accused in Makati City. That, on the 4th day of detention, Karen was finally found by the policemen after a neighbor heard her crying and screaming for help. The accused was immediately arrested within the premises of the building, and eventually brought to Makati Municipal Jail.

After thorough investigation and medical examination, the victim, as represented by her parents, together with the Fiscal filed criminal cases against Greg Bartelli y Northcott for Serious Illegal Detention and for Four (4) counts of Rape. The petitioners also filed a separate civil action for damages with preliminary attachment against the accused that had several dollar accounts in COCOBANK and China Banking Corporation. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a hearing for Bartelli’s petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.

The deputy sheriff served Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation but the latter declined to furnish a copy as it invoked R.A. No. 1405. The sheriff again sent a letter stating that the garnishment did not violate the bank secrecy law as it was legally made by virtue of a court order but China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, that dollar accounts are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. The Central Bank sent a reply after a demand from the court asking if the Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.960 is absolute in nature of which it replied in affirmative.

After the accused was declared in default, the court rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioners based on the heinous acts of the accused and the grave effects on social, moral and psychological aspects on the part of the petitioners. China Banking Corporation refused the Writ of Execution of the court. Thus;

Petitioners file a Petition for Relief in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the dollar accounts of the Accused is absolutely exempt from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court?

Held:

While it is true that the protective cloak of confidentiality over foreign deposit accounts would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits, lending capacity of the government and would help financial stability and the national development, what would be the relief of someone claiming damages against a person with foreign deposit accounts? More so against a person who heinously and feloniously committed an offense in the territory of the Philippines? As in this case, the accused deemed liable for the damages based of the heinous acts according to the testimonies of the victim and the witnesses.

It is the duty of the government to encourage foreign currency deposits and to comply by giving confidentiality but in the correct argument of the Solicitor General, foreign currency deposits of a tourist or transient is not the one encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1305 on the ground that said accounts is temporary and only for a short period of time.

The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. If we rule Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to foreign transient , injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli.

Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail”. Simply stated, when the statute is ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to vehement urge of conscience.

It would be unthinkable that Section 113 of CB circular 960 would be used as a device by the accused for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty as the expense of the innocent. The situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No.960 and PD No.1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of RA 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 RTC Makati, and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Nothcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Case Digest onSalvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines278 SCRA 27FACTS:Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.ISSUE:     Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?HELD:    The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.RATIO:    Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when

enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”

PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ

PEOPLE, petitioner, vs. GUTIERREZ, ET. AL., respondents.

FACTS:

In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to various inhabited houses in barrio Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur.

On the afternoon of the same day, several residential houses were likewise burned in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, which resulted to the destruction of various houses and resulted in the death of an old woman.

Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson with homicide and the other for arson), charging the 17 private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified persons,

“confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or caused to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied.”

Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur.

Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.

The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-mentioned administrative Orders and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason of security and personal safety.

The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious disposal of the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases.

RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, but nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts.

In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to the SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of transfer and to compel the CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary Judicial District.

Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative Order merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command it.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.

RULING:

YES. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the EOs mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to consider Department AO No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon

the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered.

This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.

The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC, and such inferior courts as may be established by law, and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts “can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government”.

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.

Thus, the SC held:

That RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and individual cases;

That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.

That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of th.e said criminal cases of the CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice

[By: ABAD, R.; BALAN, N.; CASUCIAN, J.; DELA CRUZ, L.; DISTOR, K.; LIANKO, K.; REYES, O./ 1S 09-10]

Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970General words construed generally

Facts: Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the Philippines, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR 707 which states that “donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election Code.” The body also issued Resolution RR-731 which states that the ban in Section 46 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover campaign funds and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately preceding a regular or special election.

Petitioner, as a candidate in the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed a complaint with the COMELEC assailing the validity of the both resolutions, alleging that both are violative of Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, which provides that:

No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any manner any elections.

The prohibited active intervention of foreigners thereunder may consist of:(1) aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election;(2) taking part in any election; and(3) influencing in any manner any election.

The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioner’s motion, declaring "that contributions by foreigners to the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of COMELEC billboards are not made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the allocation of space for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result of the election, ... .He then filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said order of the COMELEC is null and void as contrary to law or having been issued in excess of the powers of the Commission on Elections or in grave abuse of its discretion, and praying for a writ of preliminary as well as permanent injunction. No restraining order was issued as COMELEC itself did not implement the said resolution.

Issue:Whether or not the term “any elections,” “foreigner,” and “any candidate;” as well as the terms “aid,” “take part,” and “influence,” as contemplated In Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, had other meanings

Held: The term “any elections” definitely comprehends or applies to election of delegates Constitutional Convention. “Foreigner,” on the other hand, refers to both natural and juridical persons or associations or organized groups, as provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election Code, broadening the application of the term and not limiting the prohibition to natural persons only. “Any candidate” likewise comprehends ‘some candidates’ or ‘all candidates.’ The terms “aid,” “to take part,” and “influence,” were also construed in their general sense- with “aid” referring to to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen or to act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in; and "influence" means to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point, or to exert or have an effect on the nature or behaviour of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to affect; to have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act upon physically, especially in some gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or sway by modifications, feelings or conduct.

There is nothing in the Revised Election Code which impliedly or expressly prescribes a different meaning to the aforementioned terms. Hence, they should be understood in their general sense. There was likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the meaning of the words were to be restricted or limited. Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general meaning, unless it is expressed that they have acquired a special and restricted meaning. Hence, in this case, “generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda” applies.

The billboard contributions may not specifically favor a single candidate, but the effect that all candidates benefit from the contribution amounts to an assistance greater than the aid that may be given to one candidate. Allowing such undesirable alien influence will inevitably lead to a circumvention of the laws protecting our national interest. The practice allegedly condoned by the COMELEC in the subject resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation of the Revised Election Code. The law penalizing corrupt election practices should be given a reasonable construction in the interests of the purity of the elections. The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and 731 promulgated respectively on August 13, 1970 and September 17, 1970 are therefore declared illegal and null and void.

Chua v. Civil Service Commission

Case No. 60

G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)

Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146

Facts:

In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 (2 December 1988) was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees as well as involuntary resignation to those affected due to reorganization. Those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years.

Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over 15 years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with the NIA but was denied and later on with the CSC who was likewise denied. She was instead offered a separation benefits of ½ monthly basic pay for each year of service.

a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee.

Held:

It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental projects.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

FACTS:

RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as

well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who

are qualified:

Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees

of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall

apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless

of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of

government service as of the date of separation…”

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of

the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent

Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to

Respondent Commission yielded the same result.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the

benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

HELD:

The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal

protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain

Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of

government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.

The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.

People v Veridiano Digest

G.R. L-62243, October 12, 1984

Effectivity of laws

At issue in this case is the applicability of BP 22 which was circulated a month after private respondent issued the dishonored check.

Facts:1.             On or about the 2nd week of May 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a check amounting to

P200, 000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and despite repeated demands, the respondent failed to make the necessary payment. Hence, the filing of charges against him for violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Check law.

2.             Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an offence on ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution opposed the motion and contended that the date of the dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense, hence BP 22 is applicable.

3.             The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends however that said publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time.

Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed

NO. 

The penal statute in question was circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that the public can be apprised of the contents of a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. In effect, when the alleged offense was committed there was still no law penalizing it.  If BP 22 intended to make the printed date of issue of the Official Gazette as the point of reference in the determination of its the effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity provision. Finally, the term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning, to make known to the people in general.

MUSTANG LUMBER vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Special Actions and Investigation Division of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. The team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to the Chief of SAID Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days to produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied

the petition. Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR Factoran issued an order confiscating the woods seized in the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard.

Issue:

Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and that petitioner should not be held for illegal logging.

Held:

The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime. On the contrary, the SC rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads: Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wall bond, block board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.

San Miguel Corp.

VS

Mandaue

467 SCRA 107

[Aug. 16, 2005]

 

Facts

-CA affirmes DOLE Undersecretary for Labor Relations, Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, ordering the immediate conduct of a certification election among the petitioner’s rank-and-file employees.

-Federation of Free Workers (FFW/ respondent) filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE Regional Office No. VII. It sought to be certified and to represent the permanent rank-andfile monthly paid employees of the petitioner. The following documents were attached to the petition: (1) a Charter Certificate certifying that respondent as of that date was duly certified as a local or chapter of FFW; (2) a copy of the constitution of respondent prepared by its Secretary, Noel T. Bathan and attested by its President, Wilfred V. Sagun; (3) a list of respondent’s officers and their respective addresses, again prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun; (4) a certification signifying that respondent had just been organized and no amount had yet been collected from its members, signed by respondent’s treasurer Chita D. Rodriguez and attested by Sagun; and (5) a list of all the rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the Mandaue Packaging Products Plants and Mandaue Glass Plant prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun. -SMC (Petitioner) filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election on the sole ground that herein respondent is not listed or included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations based on the certification issued by the Officer-In representative, then right to be represented by a bargaining agent should not be denied to other members of the bargaining unit.”

HELD 

1. NO. Ratio EFFECT NON-PARTICIPIATION PREVIOUS ELECTION. No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections.

2. NO. Ratio RELIGION/PAST NON-PARTICIPATION. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.

6.3.

CERTIFICATION ELECTIONPROCESS

1. The Union as Initiating Party ART. 212. Definitions. -(h) “Legitimate labor organization” means any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof. Charge, Regional Director of the DOLE Regional Office No. VII, Atty. Jesus B. Gabor.

-Respondent submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations the same documents earlier attached to its petition for certification. The accompanying letter, signed by respondent’s president Sagun, stated that such documents were submitted in compliance with the requirements for the creation of a local/chapter pursuant to the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules; and it was hoped that the submissions would facilitate the listing of respondent under the roster of legitimate labor organizations.The Chief of Labor Relations Division of DOLE Regional Office No. VII issued a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter No. ITD. I-ARFBT-058/98, certifying that from 30 July 1998, respondent has acquired legal personality as a labor organization/worker’s association, it having submitted all the required documents.

Malanyaon v. Lising

Full Text: http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1981julydecisions.php?id=19

Facts:

Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides - should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.

Issue:Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal.

Held:No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.