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G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner, vs.HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner. REGALADO, J.:It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their desire to devote their remaining years to the service of their Creator by forming their own civic organization for that purpose, should find themselves enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a community member allegedly without the required permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information 1 was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information 2 on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied 3 by the trial court, and

petitioner's motion for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment 4 finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial court recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should not have been criminally liable were it not for the existence of Presidential DecreeNo. 1564 which the court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case.Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10. However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno. On May 21, 1993, respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act committed which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner Centeno to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 5 The motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the court. 6

Thus it is that a fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial hierarchy eventually reached this highest tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final adjudication.Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes;

(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to State regulation solicitations made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law), provides as follows:Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disapprove the application. In the interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under Act 4075.The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable purposes" should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 7

It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words "charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three

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descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that "charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; andSection 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government Code.That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the legal sense of the term. 9 Although the term "charitable" may include matters which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which are not "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the two terms are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done away with by statute.10 The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it

has a very wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly against the taxpayer. However, there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for "religious purposes" have been liberally construed as covered in the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the term "charitable purposes," within the meaning of a statute providing that the succession of any property passing to or for the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes.11 A gift for "religious purposes" was considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption from inheritance tax. 12

On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of "charitable" purpose which under Presidential DecreeNo. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and Development, under paid of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its

provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment. 13

The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a matter of description rather than of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. 15 The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given which include the words "charitable" and "religious" make use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or" as used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately. 16 Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious," which are integral parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive "or" should be given different, distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law for, otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and, consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the regulatory powers of the State

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may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protectedfreedom. 17

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience. 18

It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily

invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.21

Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried on by persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who manipulate them. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for charity is lessened or destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. 24

To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for increasing the penalty imposed by the trial court, premised on the supposed perversity of petitioner's act which thereby caused damage to the complainant. It must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the dispositive portion of its decision, even recommended executive clemency in favor of petitioner and the other accused after finding that the latter acted in good faith in making the solicitation from the complainant, an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and difficult question of law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.There is likewise nothing in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or otherwise, that petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This could be reflective upon her objectivity, considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge of the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, 25 should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence, and must resist any pressure from whatever source. 26

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J. and Puno, JJ., concur.  Separate Opinions MENDOZA, J.:I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for "charitable or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold.

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First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution.Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it

violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.Padilla, J., concurs. # Separate Opinions

MENDOZA, J.:

I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered by P.D. No. 1564 which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for "charitable or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold.First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does not engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution.Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.

Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify requiring a permit before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an ordinance requiring payment of a license fee before one may engage in business could not be applied to the appellant's sale of bibles because that would impose a condition on the exercise of a constitutional right. It is for the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from the requirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public parks and streets. 2 To read the Decree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the Constitution, when what we are called upon to do is to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is not fairly possible by which a constitutional violation may be avoided.For these reasons, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from and to acquit petitioner.Padilla, J., concurs.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias WARPAN, appellant.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms.Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.The Case

Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the September 17, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him.Filed against appellant were four Informations,[2] all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information[3] was for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4] this City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.[5]

The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. We quote it below:

That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law.[7]

The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members of the Philippine National

Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has remained at-large.[9]

In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.[10]

On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive part of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN -1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;

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2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs;4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs. (emphasis in the original)Hence, this appeal.[12]

The Facts

Prosecutions Version

In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant.The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were

designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were

going upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79

7

rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had been to appellants house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of shabu from appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all stood and entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape because the police are already here. They scampered and ran away because there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).

An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)[14]

Defenses Version

Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court.[15] Hence, we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the

Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was arrested. He said he was arrested xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who arrested him considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate. He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were] the one[s] who fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die [b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not

8

belong to him. He said that the policemen just produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said: that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name. They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).

Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months and five

days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one house between her parents house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May

9

8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id).[16]

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense,[17] in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[18] The court a quo ruled:It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot warrant - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and void.[19] (emphasis in the original)Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the testimonies of several police officers,[20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant.[21]Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must

prevail over appellants narration that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant.[23]

As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition)[24] used by appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines.[25] The trial court observed that these items were in plain view of the pursuing police officers.Moreover, it added that these same items were evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure[26] since appellant had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his residence.[27]

For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police officers

wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]

The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as follows:The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers.The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the extension house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other document showing that the

10

extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.[29]

In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner:x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in plain view of the police officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition respectively considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other

firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the National Treasury.[30]

The Issues

In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:IThe trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.IIThe trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.IIIThe trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.[31]

In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection

Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime.[32] We do not agree.We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies of

the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular that the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellants house.[34] Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge.[36] Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion.[37]

Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.[38] Suffice it to state that the trial courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality.[39] After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellants claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general rule.[40] Quite the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:PROSECUTOR NUVAL:Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?A: Yes.Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?A: Yes, Your Honor.COURT:Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said you were fired upon?A: More or less, five (5) meters.x x x x x x x x xPROSECUTOR NUVAL:Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question.Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.

11

Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?A: Yes.Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?A: Yes.Q: What did you see inside the house?A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two old woman.x x x x x x x x xPROSECUTOR NUVAL:Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?A: Yes.Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house.x x x x x x x x xCOURT:Reform. That is leadingQ: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.x x x x x x x x xPROSECUTOR NUVAL:Q: Were you able to go down?A: Yes.

Q: What happened when you were there?A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.[42]

What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos,[43] as follows:Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?A: At the sala set.Q: This sala set where is this located?A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?A: Yes.Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?A: Yes.Q: Why can you identify that?A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.FISCAL NUVAL:This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round [ammunition].Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I turned it over to the investigator.Q: Where did you turn it over?A: At the crime scene.Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?A: Yes.Q: Why?A: I put x x x markings.

x x x x x x x x xCOURT:So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?A: Empty.Q: How about the M14?A: Found with [ammunition].x x x x x x x x xQ: So, where are the three M16 magazines?A: In the corner.Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.Q: Can you identify them?A: Yes, because of my initials[.]Q: Where are your initials?A: On the magazines.Q: RJL?A: RJL.[44]

These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14 which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro explained in open court:Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun powder nitrates.Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person [would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?A: Yes.

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x x x x x x x x xPROSECUTOR NUVAL:Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were] black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?A: It indicates that the gun was fired.Q: Recently?A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the incident x x x.COURT:Q: There is also black residue?A: Yes.Q: What does it indicate?A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?A: This one.PROSECUTOR NUVAL:May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.COURT:Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?A: Yes.Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?A: Yes, Your Honor.[45] (emphasis supplied)Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements[46] of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecutions Certification[47]stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence.[48] Further, it should be pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this

weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.[49]

Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up

From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were planted, and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.[50] Absent any showing of an improper motive on the part of the police officers,[51] coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much credence.[52] Indeed, after examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.[53] He testified thus:Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?A I could not remember.Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten nameFISCAL NUVAL:Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?(Showing)A Yes, Sir. This is mine.Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard gunshots?A Our house.

Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this correct?A They were not there.Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your neighbors[] house at that time when you heard gunshots?A I was in the house near my house.Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.[54]

Crime and Punishment

The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.Maintenance of a Drug Den

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecutions story.Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault[55] with multiple counts of attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted such complex crime.[56]

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We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty ofprision correccional.[57] Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.[58]

Illegal Possession of Firearms

Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot

be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time.[60]

Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide.It did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso[61] in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[62] In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with

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attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997.[64] In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that no other crime was committed.Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained, however, that the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration.Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault.While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense,[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight physical

injuries,[68] both of which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.SO ORDERED.Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-69344             April 26, 1991REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES ANTONIO and CLARA PASTOR, respondents.Roberto L. Bautista for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:The legal issue presented in this petition for review is whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private respondents on October 23, 1973 bar an action for recovery of deficiency income taxes under P.D.'s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.On April 15, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, Branch XVI, to collect from the spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 in the amount of P17,117.08 with a 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest, and costs.The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied.1âwphi1 On August 2, 1975, they filed an answer admitting there was an assessment against them of P17,117.08 for income tax deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of the tax amnesty under P.D.'s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting to P10,400 or 10% of their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23, P2,951.20 or 20% of the reported untaxed income under P.D. 213, and a final payment on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Government's Official Receipt No. 1052388. Consequently, the Government is in estoppel to demand and compel further payment of income taxes by them.The parties agreed that there were no issues of fact to be litigated, hence, the case was submitted for decision upon the pleadings and memoranda on the lone legal question of: whether or not the payment of deficiency income tax under the tax amnesty, P.D. 23, and its acceptance by the Government operated to

divest the Government of the right to further recover from the taxpayer, even if there was an existing assessment against the latter at the time he paid the amnesty tax.It is not disputed that as a result of an investigation made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1963, it was found that the private respondents owed the Government P1,283,621.63 as income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959, inclusive of the 50% surcharge and 1% monthly interest. The defendants protested against the assessment. A reinvestigation was conducted resulting in the drastic reduction of the assessment to only P17,117.08.It appears that on April 27, 1978, the private respondents offered to pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue the sum of P5,000 by way of compromise settlement of their income tax deficiency for the questioned years, but Assistant Commissioner Bernardo Carpio, in a letter addressed to the Pastor spouses, rejected the offer stating that there was no legal or factual justification for accepting it. The Government filed the action against the spouses in 1980, ten (10) years after the assessment of the income tax deficiency was made.On a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Government, which the spouses did not oppose, the trial court rendered a decision on February 28, 1980, holding that the defendants spouses had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not under P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under P.D. 213, as shown in the Amnesty Income Tax Returns' Summary Statement and the tax Payment Acceptance Order for P2,951.20 with its corresponding official receipt, which returns also contain the very assessment for the questioned years. By accepting the payment of the amnesty income taxes, the Government, therefore, waived its right to further recover deficiency incomes taxes "from the defendants under the existing assessment against them because:1. the defendants' amnesty income tax returns' Summary Statement included therein the deficiency assessment for the years 1955 to 1959;

2. tax amnesty payment was made by the defendants under Presidential Decree No. 213, hence, it had the effect of remission of the income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959;3. P.D. No. 23 as well as P.D. No. 213 do not make any exceptions nor impose any conditions for their application, hence, Revenue Regulation No. 7-73 which excludes certain taxpayers from the coverage of P.D. No. 213 is null and void, and4. the acceptance of tax amnesty payment by the plaintiff-appellant bars the recovery of deficiency taxes. (pp. 3-4, IAC Decision, pp. 031-032, Rollo.)The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant Court (AC G.R. CV No. 68371 entitled, "Republic of the Philippines vs. Antonio Pastor, et al."), alleging that the private respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available only to persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending assessment against them, they were precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.'s Nos. 23 and 213. The Government further argued that "tax exemptions should be interpreted strictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer."The respondent spouses, on the other hand, alleged that P.D. 213 contains no exemptions from its coverage and that, under Letter of Instruction LOI 129 dated September 18, 1973, the immunities granted by P.D. 213 include:II-Immunities Granted.Upon payment of the amounts specified in the Decree, the following shall be observed:1. . . . .2. The taxpayer shall not be subject to any investigation, whether civil, criminal or administrative, insofar as his declarations in the income tax returns are concerned nor shall the same be used as evidence against, or to the prejudice of the declarant in any proceeding before any court of law or body, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative, in which he is a defendant or respondent, and he shall be exempt from any liability

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arising from or incident to his failure to file his income tax return and to pay the tax due thereon, as well as to any liability for any other tax that may be due as a result of business transactions from which such income, now voluntarily declared may have been derived. (Emphasis supplied; p. 040, Rollo.)There is nothing in the LOI which can be construed as authority for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to introduce exceptions and/or conditions to the coverage of the law.On November 23, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing the Government's appeal and holding that the payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the acceptance thereof by the Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to further recover deficiency income taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the existing deficiency tax assessment against them. The appellate court held that if Revenue Regulation No. 7-73 did provide an exception to the coverage of P.D. 213, such provision was null and void for being contrary to, or restrictive of, the clear mandate of P.D. No. 213 which the regulation should implement. Said revenue regulation may not prevail over the provisions of the decree, for it would then be an act of administrative legislation, not mere implementation, by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.On February 4, 1986, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed this petition for review of the decision dated November 23, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the dismissal, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, of the Government's complaint against the respondent spouses.The petition is devoid of merit.Even assuming that the deficiency tax assessment of P17,117.08 against the Pastor spouses were correct, since the latter have already paid almost the equivalent amount to the Government by way of amnesty taxes under P.D. No. 213, and were granted not merely an exemption, but an amnesty, for their past tax failings, the Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax

assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax.A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it, and in this sense, prejudicial thereto, particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to do so and thereby become a part of the new society with a clean slate (Commission of Internal Revenue vs. Botelho Corp. and Shipping Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 487).The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are required by law to file income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be disturbed except under exceptional circumstances which have already become familiar (Rule 45, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; e.g., where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence in which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absense of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Thelma Fernan vs. CA, et al., 181 SCRA 546, citing Tolentino vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), none of which is present in this case.

The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in this case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares (Commission of Internal Revenue vs. La Tondena, Inc. and CTA, 5 SCRA 665, citing Manila Railroad Company vs. Collector of Customs, 52 Phil, 950).WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. 108524 November 10, 1994MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS, INC., petitioner, vs.DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY, COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), AND REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, BIR MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents.Damasing Law Office for petitioner. MENDOZA, J.:This is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner organization. 1

Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11, 1991, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution.Respondents represent departments of the executive branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts.The pertinent provision of the NIRC states:Sec. 103. Exempt Transactions. — The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:(a) Sale of nonfood agricultural, marine and forest products in their original state by the primary producer or the owner of the land where the same are produced;(b) Sale or importation in their original state of agricultural and marine food products, livestock and poultry of a kind generally used as, or yielding or

producing foods for human consumption, and breeding stock and genetic material therefor;Under §103(a), as above quoted, the sale of agricultural non-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or entity, like a trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the other hand, under §103(b) the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution regardless of who the seller is.The question is whether copra is an agricultural food or non-food product for purposes of this provision of the NIRC. On June 11, 1991, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the circular in question, classifying copra as an agricultural non-food product and declaring it "exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the Tax Code, as amended." 2

The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an agricultural food product under §103(b) of the NIRC. Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47-91 on various grounds, which will be presently discussed although not in the order raised in the petition for prohibition.First. Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of the Department of Health and not the BIR is the competent government agency to determine the proper classification of food products. Petitioner cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be considered "food" because it is produced from coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible.On the other hand, the respondents argue that the opinion of the BIR, as the government agency charged with the implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect.We agree with respondents. In interpreting §103(a) and (b) of the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict construction consistent with

the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state. Indeed, even Dr. Kintanar said that his classification of copra as food was based on "the broader definition of food which includes agricultural commodities and other components used in the manufacture/processing of food." The full text of his letter reads:10 April 1991Mr. VICTOR A. DEOFERIO, JR.Chairman VAT Review CommitteeBureau of Internal RevenueDiliman, Quezon CityDear Mr. Deoferio:This is to clarify a previous communication made by this Office about copra in a letter dated 05 December 1990 stating that copra is not classified as food. The statement was made in the context of BFAD's regulatory responsibilities which focus mainly on foods that are processed and packaged, and thereby copra is not covered.However, in the broader definition of food which include agricultural commodities and other components used in the manufacture/ processing of food, it is our opinion that copra should be classified as an agricultural food product since copra is produced from coconut meat which is food and based on available information, more than 80% of products derived from copra are edible products.Very truly yours,QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, M.D., Ph.D. DirectorAssistant Secretary of Health for Standards and RegulationsMoreover, as the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his power under § 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws,including

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rulings on the classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes."Second. Petitioner complains that it was denied due process because it was not heard before the ruling was made. There is a distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and interpretative rules. 3 There would be force in petitioner's argument if the circular in question were in the nature of a legislative rule. But it is not. It is a mere interpretative rule.The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. 4

In addition such rule must be published. 5 On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the

validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. 6

In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within the meaning of § 103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners considered it so, is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors. 7 To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.Third. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers.The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently. 8

It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to § 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of services. Under § 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra producer as the sale is VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale of copra by other

traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if the sale is made by the producer.Fourth. It is finally argued that RMC No. 47-91 is counterproductive because traders and dealers would be forced to buy copra from coconut farmers who are exempt from the VAT and that to the extent that prices are reduced the government would lose revenues as the 10% tax base is correspondingly diminished.This is not so. The sale of agricultural non-food products is exempt from VAT only when made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which the same is produced, but in the case of agricultural food products their sale in their original state is exempt at all stages of production or distribution. At any rate, the argument that the classification of copra as agricultural non-food product is counterproductive is a question of wisdom or policy which should be addressed to respondent officials and to Congress.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur. #Footnotes1 The value-added tax is a percentage tax on the sale, barter, exchange or importation of goods or services. (NIRC, §99) Insofar as the sale, barter or exchange of goods is concerned, the tax is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor. (§ 100(a)) The tax is determined as follows:(d) Determination of the tax. — (1) Tax billed as separate item in the invoice. If the tax is billed as a separate item in the invoice, the tax shall be based on the gross selling price, excluding the tax. "Gross selling price" means the total amount of money or its equivalent which the purchaser pays or is obligated to pay to the seller in the consideration of the sale, barter or exchange of the goods, excluding the value-added tax. The excise tax, if any, on such goods shall form part of the gross selling price.

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(2) Tax not billed separately or is billed erroneously in the invoice. — In case the tax is not billed separately or is billed erroneously in the invoice, the tax shall be determined by multiplying the gross selling price, including the amount intended by the seller to cover the tax or the tax billed erroneously, by the factor 1/11 or such factor as may be prescribed by regulations in case of persons partially exempt under special laws.(3) Sales returns, allowances and sales discounts. — The value of goods sold and subsequently returned or for which allowances were granted by a VAT-registered person may be deducted from the gross sales or receipts for the quarter in which a refund is made or a credit memorandum or refund is issued. Sales discounts granted and indicated in the invoice at the time of sale may be excluded from the gross sales within the same quarter. (§100(d))2 This circular is based on VAT Ruling No. 190-90 dated August 17, 1990 which revoked VAT Ruling No. 009-88 and VAT Ruling No. 279-88, June 30, 1988, classifying copra as an agricultural food product.3 See Victorias Milling Co. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555 (1962); Philippine Blooming Mills v. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499 (1966).4 Bk. VII, Ch. 2, § 9.5 Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986). See Victorias Milling Co. v. SSC, supra note 3.6 K. DAVIS, Administrative Law 116 (1965).7 Petitioner's claim that RMC No. 47-91 erroneously revoked irrelevant VAT rulings of the BIR is not correct. RMC No. 47-91 revoked VAT Rulings No. 009-88 and No. 279-88, which dealt with the question whether copra is an agricultural food or non-food product. VAT ruling No. 009-88 held that "copra as an agricultural product is exempt from VAT in all stages of distribution." On the other hand, VAT Ruling No. 279-88 treated "copra . . . as an agricultural food product in its original state" and, therefore, "exempt from VAT under Section 103(b)

of the TAX Code, as amended by EO 273 regardless of whether the sale is made by producer or subsequent sale."8 Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988) (sustaining the validity of E.O. 273 adopting the VAT); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 653 (1984) (sustaining the validity of B.P. Blg. 135 providing for taxable income taxation).

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G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994RAMON CORPORAL, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents.Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. QUIASON, J.:This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which denied petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.INorma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On November 28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves Memorial Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and premature ventricular contractions.On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk three kilometers to and from said school as no transportation was available to ferry her and other teachers from the national highway to the school. During her fourth pregnancy, Norma suffered a complete abortion and was hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial Hospital. After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work.In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in September of the same year, she was transferred to the Kilicao Elementary School, where she had to walk more than one kilometer of rough road. On December 2, 1984, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a "hilot." An hour later, she was rushed to the Immaculate Conception Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same day due to "shock, severe hemorrhage" resulting from a "prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old when she died.Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation benefit with the

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioner's claim thus:Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and evidences (sic) submitted to the System, the cause of death of your wife, Shock secondary to Severe Hemorrhage, Uterine PROLAPSE is not considered an occupational disease as contemplated under the above-mentioned law (P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any showing that her position as Teacher, MECS, Albay had increased the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 23).Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no avail, because a re-evaluation of the claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group of the GSIS showed that there was "no basis to alter its previous action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of death is non-work-connected as contemplated under the law" and neither did her job as a teacher increase the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 25).Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). The ECC requested the GSIS to re-evaluate petitioner's claim and to finally determine compensability, with instruction that in case the claim is denied once more by the System, the entire record of the case be elevated to the ECC. The GSIS reiterated its denial of petitioner's claim.On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also denying petitioner's claim. It said:Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus may occur in infants and nulliparous women as well as multiparas. Defects in innervation and in the basic integrity of the supporting structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first two and childbirth trauma for the latter. The cervix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging vaginal tissues pulls it downward, whereas the attached but weak cardinal ligaments tend(s) to support it. In third degree or complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the body of the uterus have passed through the introitus and the entire vaginal canal is inverted. (Obstetrics and Gynecology, Wilson, Beecham, Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585).

On the other hand Acute Coronary Insufficiency are terms often used to describe a syndrome characterized by prolonged substernal pain, usually not relieved by vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a more severe inadequacy of coronary circulation. The symptoms in this condition are more intense and prolonged than in angina pectoris, but abnormal ECG and other laboratory findings associated with myocardial infarction are absent. The syndrome is covered by a temporary inability of one's coronary arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy, pp. 100-101).Based on the above medical discussion of the subject ailments, we believe that the development of the fatal illness has no relation whatsoever with the duties and working conditions of the late teacher. There is no showing that the nature of her duties caused the development of prolapse of the uterus. The ailment was a complication of childbirth causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late stage. We also consider Acute Coronary Insufficiency as non-work-connected illness for the reason that it is caused by temporary inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to supply oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is no damage to heart muscle. In view thereof, we have no recourse but to sustain respondent's denial of the instant claim (Rollo, pp. 29-31).Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, asserting compensability of the death of his wife.IIPetitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim should proper under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim on the fact that as early as January 1984 or before Norma's fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which appeared like a tomato protruding out of Norma's vagina and rectum. He avers that such condition was attributable to Norma's long walks to and from her place of teaching — Banadero Elementary School, which is situated on the side of the Mayon Volcano. Moreover, the roads leading to the school are full of ruts and rocks, and, during the rainy season, are

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flooded and slippery. Petitioner asserts that inspite of these, Norma continued to discharge her duties as a public servant, notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus.Petitioner also contends that the findings of the respondents contravene the constitutional provision on social justice. He alleges that since the workmen's compensation law is a social legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally in favor of the employees whose rights it intends to protect.Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (a) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Santos v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182 [1993]; Quizon v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old Workmen's Compensation Act no longer applies (Latagan v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 213 SCRA 715 [1992]).Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the ECC and he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk of contracting Norma's illness was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the onus imposed by law.The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the veracity of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and rectum.Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child,

and quite beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child — she was already forty years old.Novak's Textbook on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus (descensus uteri) as follows:An extremely common condition, being far more frequent in elderly than in young patients. This is explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial structures in later life. The effects of childbirth injuries may thus make themselves evident, in the form of uterine prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy. Pregnancies in a prolapsed uterus may lead to numerous complications, as noted by Piver and Spezia.The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly injury or overstretching of the pelvic floor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments (Mackenrodt) in the bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with this there is usually extensive injury to the perineal structures, producing marked vaginal relaxation and also frequent injury to the fascia or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with the production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually, various combinations of these conditions are seen, although at times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated with the prolapse.Occasional cases are seen for that matter, in women who have never borne children, and in these the prolapse apparently represents a hernia of the uterus through a defect in the pelvic fascial floor(Emphasis supplied).The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also describes the condition as follows:Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth injury to the pelvic floor (particularly the transverse cervical and uterosacral ligaments). Unrepaired obstetric lacerations of the levator musculature and perineal body augment the weakness. Attenuation of the pelvic structures with aging and congenital weakness can accelerate the development of prolapse.The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma's uterus developed before or after her fifth pregnancy is therefore immaterial since this illness is

the result of the physiological structure and changes in the body on pregnancy and childbirth.With the evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, (Tria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there is also the rule that such liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as amended, are clear and leave no room for interpretation.The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a loved one. We also recognize the importance of the services rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of their meager salaries which are not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the values and character of the youth in this country (De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]).But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner's wife.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., concur.Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

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G.R. No. L-44899 April 22, 1981MARIA E. MANAHAN, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GSIS (LAS PIÑAS MUNICIPAL HIGH SCHOOL),respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.:This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0070 (Nazario Manahan, Jr., deceased), entitled "Maria Manahan, Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System, (Las Piñas Municipal High School), Respondent" affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim for death benefit. 1

The claimant, petitioner herein, Maria E. Manahan, is the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric Fever" while employed as classroom teacher in Las Piñas Municipal High School, Las Piñas Rizal, on May 8, 1975.The petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance for death benefit under Presidential Decree 626. In a letter dated June 19, 1975, the Government Service Insurance denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoid fever, is not an occupational disease.The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the deceased, Nazario Manahan, Jr., was in perfect health when admitted to the service and that the ailment of said deceased was attributable to his employment.The Government Service Insurance System affirmed the denial of the claim on the ground that enteric fever or paratyphoid is similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella organisms.The petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System on a finding that the ailment of the deceased, enteric fever, was not induced by or aggravated by the nature of the duties of Nazario Manahan, Jr. as a teacher. 2

To support her theory that the disease of Nazario Manahan, Jr., enteric fever, resulted from his employment as classroom teacher of the Las Piñas Municipal High School, the petitioner cites the following authority:EPIDEMOLOGY AND PATHOLOGYOF ENTERIC FEVERTHE SOURCE OF INFECTION is feces or urine from patients and carriers. Family contacts may be transient carriers and 2 to 5% of patients become chronic carriers. In poorly sanitized communities, water is the most frequent vehicle of transmission; food, especially milk, is the next most important. In modern urban areas, food, contaminated by healthy carriers who are food handlers, is the principal vehicle. Flies may spread the organism from feces to food. Direct contact infection is infrequent.The organism enters the body through the gastrointestinal tract, invading the blood stream by way of the lymphatic channels. There is hyperplasia and often ulceration of Pyeris patches, especially in the ileum and cecum. When the ulcers heals, no scar results. The kidneys and liver usually show cloudly swelling and the latter may reveal a patchy necrosis The spleen is enlarged and soft. Rarely, the lungs show pneumonic changes. (Merck Manual 10th Edit., P. 842) 3

The factual findings of the respondent Commission indicate that the deceased was in perfect health when he entered government service on July 20, 1969, and that in the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever on May 8, 1975.Enteric fever is referred to in medical books as typhoid fever (Dorlands Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th Ed., p. 548) or paratyphoid fever (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 6th Ed., p. 817). Its symptoms include abdominal pain (id., p. 810). In discussing the clinical manifestations of the disease, Mr. Harrison states that recovery (from enteric or paratyphoid fever) may be followed by continued excretion of the causative organism in the stools for several months (id., p. 817). This lingering nature of the species producing enteric fever points

out the possibility that the illness which afflicted the deceased in 1974 was the same as, or at least, related to, his 1975 illness.The medical record of the deceased shows that he had a history of ulcer-like symptoms (p. 3, ECC rec.). This butresses the claimant's claim that her husband had been suffer from ulcer several months before his death on May 8, 1975. This is likewise sustained by the medical certificate (p. 12, ECC rec.) issued by Dr. Aquilles Bernabe to the effect that "Nazario Manahan was treated for epigastric pain probably due to hyper-acidity on December 10, 1974." Epigastric pain is a symptom of ulcer, and ulcer is a common complication of typhoid fever. There is even such a thing as "typhoidal ulcer" (p. 812, supra).Because of these circumstances, the illness that claimed the life of the deceased could have had its onset months before December 10, 1974. Such being the case, his cause of action accrued before December 10, 1974.In the case of Corales vs. ECI (L-44063, Feb. 27, 1979), We ruled that:... Article 294, Title III (Transitory and Final Provisions) of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title 11 Prescription of Offenses and Claims, workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period from November 1, 1974 up to December 31, 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action accrued. Hence, this Court applied the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioner's claim.Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.In any case, We have always maintained that in case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislations – like the

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Workmen's Compensation Act and the Labor Code – should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury.Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of social justice and protection to labor make Us take a second look at the evidence presented by the claimant.As a teacher of the Las Piñas Municipal High School at Las Piñas Rizal, the deceased used to eat his meals at the school canteen. He also used the toilet and other facilities of the school. Said the respondent Commission," ... it is not improbable that the deceased might have contracted the illness during those rare moments that he was away from his family, since it is medically accepted that enteric fever is caused by salmonella organisms which are acquired by ingestion of contaminated food or drinks. Contamination of food or water may come from the excretion of animals such as rodents flies, or human beings who are sick or who are carriers, or infection in meat of animals as food. Meat, milk and eggs are the foods most frequently involved in the transmission of this type of species, since the organism may multiply even before ingestion. ..." These findings of the respondent Commission lead to the conclusion that the risk of contracting the fatal illness was increased by the decedent's working condition.In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is meritorious.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside the Government Service Insurance System is ordered:1. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as death compensation benefit;2. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) as attorney's fees;3. To reimburse the petitioner expenses incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased Nazario Manahan, Jr., duly supported by proper receipts; and

4. To pay administrative fees.SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.  Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:I concur. Although enteric fever is not an occupational disease, considering the cause of said illness, the risk of contracting it could have been increased by the working conditions of the deceased, a teacher, who used to eat his meals at the school canteen and used the comfort room and other facilities of the school.   Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:I concur. Although enteric fever is not an occupational disease, considering the cause of said illness, the risk of contracting it could have been increased by the working conditions of the deceased, a teacher, who used to eat his meals at the school canteen and used the comfort room and other facilities of the school.  Separate OpinionsMELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:I concur. Although enteric fever is not an occupational disease, considering the cause of said illness, the risk of contracting it could have been increased by the working conditions of the deceased, a teacher, who used to eat his meals at the school canteen and used the comfort room and other facilities of the school.

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G.R. No. 110170 February 21, 1994ROLETO A. PAHILAN, petitioner, vs.RUDY A. TABALBA, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE JUDGE SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., BRANCH 28, MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN, respondents.Pimentel, Apostol, Layosa & Sibayan Law Office for petitioner.Marciano Ll. Aparte, Jr. for Rudy A. Tabalba. REGALADO, J.:This original action for certiorari impugns the Order 1 of respondent Commission on Elections, dated January 19, 1993, dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner Roleto A. Pahilan for the latter's failure to file a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court of Mumbajao, Camiguin, and, necessarily on the same rationale, the Resolution 2 promulgated by said respondent on May 6, 1993 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.Petitioner Pahilan and private respondent Tabalba were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban, Camiguin during the local elections held on May 11, 1992. On May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Tabalba as the duly elected Mayor of Guinsilban, the latter having garnered 1,087 votes as against 806 votes for Pahilan.Thereafter, Pahilan filed an election protest 3 which he sent by registered mail on May 23, 1992, addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, attaching thereto P200.00 in cash as payment for docket fees. In a letter 4 dated May 28, 1992, the OIC-Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28, informed Pahilan that the correct fees that where supposed to be paid amounted to P620.00, and that, accordingly, the petition would not be entered in the court docket and summons would not be issued pending payment of the balance of P420.00.On June 16, 1992, upon receipt of the latter, Pahilan paid the required balance in the total amount P470.00. 5

Subsequently, on June 22, 1992, Tabalba filed his answer with Counterclaim, 6 alleging as one of his affirmative defenses lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court to entertain the election protest for having been filed beyond the ten-day period provided by law.On August 17, 1992, Pahilan filed a Motion for Inhibition, dated August 14, 1992, because of alleged serious and grave doubts that the presiding judge could impartially hear and decide his election protest with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, as the latter allegedly belongs to and had supported a political group adverse to the candidacy of petitioner.On August 18, 1992, the trial court proceeded with the pre-trial conference, heard the defense on the allegation of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of docket fees, and thereafter ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.Tabalba filed his Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defense of Lack of Jurisdiction, 7 dated September 4, 1992. Under date of September 22, 1992, Pahilan filed a Memorandum 8 as well as a Motion to Resolve Motion for Inhibition Prior to Resolution of Affirmative Defenses. 9

On October 2, 1992, the trial court issued an Order 10 denying the motion for inhibition and dismissing the election protest for "non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading." Pahilan's counsel received a copy of said order on October 12, 1992 in Cagayan de Oro City.On October 17, 1992 and within the 5-day period to appeal, Pahilan filed a verified appeal brief 11 in respondent Commission on Elections, with copies duly served on the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin and the counsel for herein private respondent.On December 12, 1992, the Comelec Contests Adjudication Department directed the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Camiguin, Branch 28, to immediately transmit the complete records of EP case No. 3(92) which was being appealed by herein petitioner. 12 Thereafter, in a letter 13 dated January 7, 1993, the said Clerk of Court informed respondent Commission that "to this very late date, this office

has not received any notice of appeal from the aggrieved party." As a consequence, respondent Commission, in an Order dated January 19, 1993, dismissed Pahilan's verified appeal for failure to appeal within the prescribed period.Pahilan filed a motion for reconsideration 14 of the order dismissing his appeal. Both parties were required by respondent Commission to file their respective memoranda. Finally, on May 6, 1993, respondent Commission issued its aforestated resolution denying Pahilan's motion for reconsideration.Hence, this petition on the bases of the following assigned errors:1. Whether or not respondent Commission validly dismissed the verified "Appeal" of petitioner which contains all the elements of a "notice of appeal" and more expressive of the intent to elevate the case for review by said appellate body, and furnishing copies thereof to the respondent trial judge and counsel for the adverse party, aside from the incomplete payment of the appeal fee; and2. Whether or not the respondent trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fee.We find cogency and merit in the petition.The bone of contention in this petition is the alleged erroneous dismissal of petitioner's appeal by respondent Commission because of the failure of petitioner to file a notice of appeal before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin which, in turn, dismissed the election protest of petitioner for non-payment of docket fees.The COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE provide for the manner in which appeals from decisions of courts in election contests shall be made, to wit:RULE 22 — Appeals from Decisions of Courtsin Election Protest CasesSec. 1. Caption and title of appealed cases. — In all election contests involving the elections, returns, and qualifications of municipal or barangay officials, the party interposing the appeal shall be called the "Appellant" and the adverse party the "Appellee", but

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the title of the case shall remain as it was in the court of origin.xxx xxx xxxSec. 3. Notice of Appeal. — Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.Sec. 4. Immediate transmittal of records of the case. — The Clerk of the court concerned shall, within fifteen (15) days from the filing of the notice of appeal, transmit to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department the complete records of the case, together with all the evidence, including the original and three(3) copies of the transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings.Sec. 5. Filing of briefs. — The Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt of the complete records of the case, shall notify the appellant or his counsel to file with the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department within thirty (30) days from receipt of such notice, ten (10) legible copies of his brief with proof of service thereof upon the appellee.Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the brief of the appellant, the appellee shall file ten (10) legible copies of his brief with proof of service thereof upon the appellant.xxx xxx xxxSec. 9. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — The appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the following grounds:(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the appeal fee;(b) Failure of the appellant to file copies of his brief within the time provided by these rules;(c) Want of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief; and(d) Failure to file notice of appeal within the prescribed period.In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the trial court's order dismissing his election protest on October 12, 1992. As earlier stated, herein petitioner, instead of filing a notice of appeal as required by the rules, filed with respondent Commission a verified

appeal brief within the five-day reglementary period by registered mail under Registry Receipt No. 43093, dated October 17, 1992. It will be noted, however, that on even date, petitioner likewise sent by registered mail copies of his appeal brief to the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, under Registry Receipt No. 43091, and to the counsel of herein private respondent, under Registry Receipt No. 43092. 15

The question now posed by the foregoing factual situation is whether the notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. We firmly believe and so hold, under the considerations hereinunder discussed, that the same may be allowed.First, in cases where a record on appeal is required under the Rules of Court, it has been consistently held that the filing or presentation and approval of the record on appeal on time necessarily implies or involves the filing of the notice of appeal, 16 because the act of taking or perfecting an appeal is more expressive of the intention to appeal than the filing of a mere notice to do so. 17

If the courts can deign to be indulgent and lenient in the interpretation of the rules respecting ordinary civil actions involving private parties representing private interests, with more reason should the rules involving election cases, which are undoubtedly impressed with public interest, be construed with the same or even greater forbearance and liberality.It has been frequently decided, it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one whose right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be

immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure with protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. 18

For this reason, broad perspectives of public policy impose upon courts the imperative duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected in as expeditious a manner as possible, without being fettered by technicalities and procedural barriers to the end that the will of the people may not be frustrated.19

It is true that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. 20Nevertheless, in some instances, this Court has disregarded such unintended lapses so as to give due course to appeals on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. 21

It is our considered opinion that public interest is of far greater importance than the justifications of substantial justice and equity in seeking an exception to the general rule. Hence, election cases, by their very nature, should and ought to merit a similar exemption from a strict application of technical rules of procedure.Second, it has been shown and it is not even denied that the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin, as well as the counsel for private respondent, was furnished copies of the appeal brief which were sent by registered mail on October 17, 1992, within the reglementary period to appeal. This fact was never refuted by the Solicitor General in his Comment. Concomitantly, although the Clerk of Court claimed that he had not received any notice of appeal from herein petitioner, it would be safe to assume, under the circumstances, that the appeal brief duly directed

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mailed was received in the regular course of the mail 22 and was, therefore, deemed filed with the trial court as of the date of mailing.Third, applying suppletorily the provisions of the Rules of Court, 23 particularly Section 4, Rule 41 thereof, the requirement is that a notice of appeal shall specify the parties to the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; and shall specify the court to which the appeal is taken. A perusal of herein petitioner's appeal brief will disclose the following information: that the parties to the case are Roleto A. Pahilan as protestant-appellant and Rudy A Tabalba as protestee-appellee; that appellant therein is appealing from the order of the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, dismissing the petition for election contest in Election Case No. 3(92); and that the appeal is being made pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7166, that is, before the Commission on Elections.Accordingly, there is no gainsaying the fact that the particulars which ought to be reflected in the notice of appeal have been specifically and categorically spelled out in the appeal brief of petitioner. Perforce, and in light of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.We now proceed to resolve the issue anent the dismissal of petitioner's election protest by the Regional Trial Court for non-payment, or more accurately the incomplete payment, of docket fees. Ordinarily, with the reversal of the respondent Commission's questioned order, this case should be remanded to said court for adjudication on the merits. Considering, however, the exigencies of time appurtenant to the disposition of election cases, and considering further that the issue has at any rate been squarely raised in this petition, it is now incumbent upon this Court to act on the propriety of the trial court's order dismissing the election protest for failure of petitioner to pay the correct amount of docket fees.In dismissing petitioner's action, the trial court relied on the rulings enunciated in the cases of Malimit

vs. Degamo24 (an action for quo warranto), Magaspi, et al. vs. Ramolete, et al. 25 (a suit for recovery of possession and ownership of land), Lee vs. Republic 26 (a petition for declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen), Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 27 (an action for a sum of money and damages), Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) et al. vs. Asuncion. 28 (a suit for a sum of money and damages), and Tacay, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, etc., et al. 29 (an action for damages). It bears emphasis that the foregoing cases, except for Malimit vs.Degamo, are ordinary civil actions. This fact alone would have sufficed for a declaration that there was no basis for the dismissal of petitioner's protest for the simple reason that an election contest is not an ordinary civil action. Consequently the rules governing ordinary civil actions are not necessarily binding on special actions like an election contest wherein public interest will be adversely affected.The case of Malimit vs. Degamo, on its part, is not on all fours with the present case. In that case, the petition forquo warranto was mailed to the clerk of Court on December 14, 1959 and was received by the latter on December 17, 1959. The docket fee was deemed paid only on January 5, 1960, because the petitioner therein failed to prove his allegation that a postal money order for the docket fee was attached to his petition. Hence, the petition for quo warranto was correctly dismissed.In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the sum of P200.00 was attached to the petition mailed to the Regional Trial Court of Camiguin and this fact was even acknowledged by the Clerk of Court thereof when he requested herein petitioner to pay the balance of the correct docket fee. In Malimit, there was no docket fee paid at all at the time of mailing; in the present case, the docket fee was paid except that the amount given was not correct. Considering the fact that there was an honest effort on the part of herein petitioner to pay the full amount of docket fees, we are not inclined to insist on a stringent application of the rules.

Furthermore, there are strong and compelling reasons to rule that the doctrine we have established inManchester and cases subsequent thereto cannot be made to apply to election cases.As we have earlier stated, the cases cited are ordinary civil actions whereas election cases are not. The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the purpose of election cases, especially if we consider the fact that election laws are to be accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation and application, bearing in mind always that the will of the people must be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would generally involve private interests while all elections cases are, at all times, invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere procedural or technical infirmities.Again, the Court in Manchester made its ruling in view of its finding that there existed the unethical practice of lawyers and parties of filing an original complaint without specifying in the prayer the amount of damages which, however, is stated in the body of the complaint. This stratagem is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees by misleading the docket clerk in the assessment thereof. Thus, the court therein held that jurisdiction shall be acquired only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.That ruling was later relaxed in the case of Sun Insurance which allowed the subsequent payment of the correct docket fees provided it is made within the reglementary period or before prescription has set in. The reason given was that there was no intent on the part of the petitioners therein to defraud the government, unlike the plaintiff in the case of Manchester.In Tacay, et al. vs. Tagum, et al., it was stated that this Court, inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester,issued Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988, which was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of their complaints any specification of the amount of damages, the omission being clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees by deluding the docket clerk in his assessment of the

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same. In all these cases, the rule was applied for failure of the plaintiff to include in the prayer of the complaint the total amount of damages sought against the defendant. The reason for this, according to the Tacaycase, is because the amount of damages will help determine two things: first, the jurisdiction of the court; and, second, the amount of docket fees to be paid.In the case now before us, and in election cases in general, it is not the amount of damages, if any, that is sought to be recovered which vests in the courts the jurisdiction to try the same. Rather, it is the nature of the action which is determinative of jurisdiction. Thus, regardless of the amount of damages claimed, the action will still have to be filed with the Regional Trial Court. In such a case, the evil sought to be avoided in Manchester and like cases will never arise. Peremptorily, there will be no occasion to apply the rulings in the cases mentioned. In addition, the filing fee to be paid in an election case is a fixed amount of P300.00. There will consequently be no opportunity for a situation to arise wherein an election contest will have to be dismissed for failure to state the exact amount of damages and thus evince an intent to deprive the Government of the docket fees due.Finally, in Manchester, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the plaintiffs therein to evade payment of the correct docket fees. In the case of petitioner, he already explained, and this we find acceptable and justified, that "since the schedule of the new rates of court fees was not then available and the filing of the petition for election contests was done thru the mails, the old rates readily came to mind, and this was the reason why only two hundred pesos was remitted at the same time with the petition." 30

To summarize, the evil sought to be avoided in Manchester and similar cases can never obtain in election cases since (1) the filing fee in an election cases is fixed and not dependent on the amount of damages sought to be recovered, if any; and (2) a claim for damages in an election case is merely ancillary to the main cause of action and is not even

determinative of the court's jurisdiction which is governed by the nature of the election filed.WHEREFORE, the Order of the Commission on Elections dated January 19, 1993, as well as its Resolution promulgated on May 6, 1993, both in EAC No. 24-92; and the Order of the Regional Trial court of Mambajao, Camiguin, dated October 2, 1992, in Election Case No. 3(92) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the records of this case are hereby ordered REMANDED to the court a quo for the expeditious continuation of the proceedings in and the adjudication of the election protest pending therein as early as practicable.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.