Spinoza's Mediate Infinite Mode - Tad M. Schmaltz

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Spinoza's Mediate Infinite Mode

Tad M. Schmaltz

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 35, Number 2, April 1997,

pp. 199-235 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.1997.0024

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S p in o z a s M e d i a te I n f in i te M o d eT A D M . S C H M A L T Z

I N PA R T I o f t h e E t h i c s , S p i n o z a a r g u e d t h a t a m o d i f i c a t i o n i s i n f i n i t e j u s t i nc a s e i t e i t h e r f o l l o w s f r o m t h e a b s o l u t e n a t u r e o f a n y a t t r i b u t e o f G o d o r

f o l l o w s f r o m s o m e a t t r i b u t e o f G o d , a s i t i s m o d i f i e d b y s u c h a m o d i f i c a t i o nt h a t i s i n f i n i t e . 1 T h e m a i n p u r p o s e o f t h i s a r g u m e n t i s t o b o l s t e r t h e c l a i m l a t e ri n t h i s t e x t t h a t a f i n i te m o d i f i c a t i o n c a n f o l l o w f r o m a d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e o n l yi n s o f a r a s t h a t a t t r i b u t e i s m o d i f i e d b y a n o t h e r f i n i t e m o d i f i c a t i o n . 2 T h u s i t i su n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h a t i n t h e s e c t i o n t h a t c o n t a i n s t h e a r g u m e n t S p i n o z a d i d n o ta c t u a l l y a f f i r m t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e t w o k i n d s o f i n f i n i t e m o d i f i c a t i o n s h em e n t i o n e d , w h i c h f o l l o w i n g s t a n d a r d p r a c t i c e I c a l l i m m e d i a t e i n f i n i t em o d e s a n d m e d i a t e i n f i n i t e m o d e s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 3 Y e t i n t h i s s e c t i o n h e d i d

' E I P 2 1 , D - 2 2 ,D , G I I 6 5 - 6 6 / C u r l e y 4 2 9 - 3 o . I n t h e t e x t a n d n o t e s o f th i s p a p e r I u s e t h efo l l o wi n g ab b rev i a t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o S p i n o za ' s wr i ti n g s : E: Ethics (Ethica); Ep.: Letters (Epistoke);RD P P: Descartes Princip les o f Philosophy (Renati Des Cartes Princip iorum Philosophiae); CM : Appendixcontain ing Metaphysical Thoughts (Cogita ta Metaphysica); KV : Short Treatise (Korte Verhandeling); T dlE :Treatise on the Em endation of the Intellect (Tractatus de lntellectus Em endatione); G: C . Geb h a rd t , ed . ,Spinoza Opera, 4 v o l s. (He i d e l b e r g : C a r l W i n t e r s , t 9 2 5 ) , c i t ed b y v o l u m e an d p ag e ; C u r l ey : E .C u r l ey , t r an s , an d ed . , The Collected Works o f Spinoza , v o l . I (P r i n ce t o n : P r i n ce t o n Un i v e r s i t y P re s s,1 9 8 5 ) ; W o l f : A . W o l f , t r an s , an d ed . , The Correspondence o f Spinoza ( L o n d o n : G e o r g e A l l e n &Un wi n , 1 9 2 8 ) . I u s e t h e fo l l o w i n g ab b rev i a t i o n s t o r e f e r t o p a s s ag es f ro m b o t h E a n d R D P P :I P 2 2 D = P a r t I , P r o p o s i ti o n 2 2 , D e m o n s t r a t i o n ; I D e f 8 E x = P a r t I , D e f i n i ti o n 8 , E x p l a n a t i o n ;I IP 7 ,C = P a r t I I , P ro p o s i t i o n 7 an d it s C o ro l l a ry ; I IP 4 5 ,D ,S = P a r t I I , P ro p o s i t i o n 4 5 an d b o t h i t sD e m o n s t r a t i o n a n d it s S c h o l i u m ; I I L e m 7 S = P a r t I I , L e m m a 7 , S c h o l iu m ; I I A 2 = P a r t I I , 2 n d o ft h e s e c o n d s e t o f A x i o m s . R e f e r e n c e s t o p a s s a ge s f r o m S p i n o z a 's o t h e r t e x t s t ak e t h e f o l l o w i n gf o r m s : C M I . i = Metaphysical Thoughts , Par t I , ch . i ; K V I . ix . 1 Short Treatise, Part I , ch. ix , sec. 1K V , A p p . I I . l 4 = Short Treatise, Ap p en d i x I I , sec. 1 4 ; Td lE , lo l = Trea t i se , s ec . l o l . T ran s l a t i o n so f t h e p a s s ag es f ro m S p i n o za ' s L a t i n wo rk s (v i z . , E , E p . , R D P P , C M , a n d T d l E ) a re s u b s t an ti a l lym y o w n . T r a n s l a t i o n s o f p a s sa g e s f r o m t h e D u t c h K V a r e b o r r o w e d f r o m C u r l e y .

2T h e c l a i m t h a t a f i n i t e m o d i f i c a t i o n can fo l l o w o n l y i n th i s way is fo u n d i n E IP 2 8 ; a n d i t sDe m o n s t r a t i o n c i t e s b o t h E IP 2 a a n d E IP 2 2 (G I I 6 9 / C u r l ey 43 2 ). I am g ra t e fu l t o an an o n y m o u sr e f e r e e f o r p o i n t i n g o u t t h e m e r e l y s u b s id i a ry r o l e o f t h e a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n f i n i tem o d i f i c a t i o n s .

3S p i n o z a d i d n o t h i m s e l f r e f e r t o t h e i n f i n i te m o d e s i n t h i s way , t h o u g h h e d i d d i s t i n g u i s h i nE I P 2 3 D b e t w e e n m o d e s t h a t f o ll o w f r o m t h e a b so l u t e n a t u r e o f a d i v i n e a t t r ib u t e i m m e d i a t e l yan d t h o s e t h a t s o fo l l o w b y s o m e m ed i a t i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n (G I I 6 7 / C u r l ey 43 1 ) .

[ 1 9 9 ]


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2 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOP HY 35 :9 A P R I L 1997offe r as an example of an immediate infinite mode in the attribute of thoug htthe Idea of God (idea Dei), a mode that plays a crucial role elsewhere in theEthics.4 Moreover, he noted in this text, what he had indicated in his earlierwritings, that such a mode cor resp onds to motion and rest, a basic feature ofthe material world.5

By contrast, his earliest works do not even mention the mediate infinitemodes, and the Eth ics itself cites no e xample of a mod e of this sort. In fact, theonly place in which Spinoza provided an example is in a somewhat obscurepassage from a 1675 letter to G. H. Schuller. Pressed by Schuller for suchexamples, he offe red in response merely the face of the whole Universe(facies totius U nive rsi). 6 He did refer Schuller to a miniature treatise on body inthe Ethics, thus implying that this infinite mode pertains in some manner tothe attribute of extension. But Spinoza did not indicate the significance of thismode with respect to his account of this attribute, and said nothing about thema nne r in which such a mode is reflected in the attribute of thought.

It is tempting at this point to dismiss the remarks to Schuller as a textualoddity peripheral to Spinoza's system, akin to his terse endorsement in an-oth er letter of divine attributes o the r than the two we know, namely, extensionand thought .7 But though I concur in Jonat han Bennett 's jud gme nt thatSpinoza's view of the so-called unk now n attributes .... is negligible because inthe Eth ics it is idle, ''8 I do not think that the same c an be said of his view of themediate infinite mode. While this text offers little in the way of an explicitdiscussion of mediate infinite modes, it does provide the basis for a quiteoriginal and intricate account of this sort of mode as it exists in extension.Such an account in addition serves to alleviate certain difficulties arising fromSpinoza's remarks on the infinite modes. On the other hand, this same ac-count creates difficulties for the very conception of a mediate infinite mod e o fthought, difficulties that go to the core of the Ethics. In light of these consider-ations, it can ha rdl y be said that Spinoza' s view of the medi ate infinite mo de isnegligible.

The first part of my discussion focuses on the more constructive aspects of4E IP2 ~, G II 65-66/Curley 429-3 o. This infinite mode plays a crucial role in E IIP3,D-4,D,G II 87-88/Curley 451-52 as well as in E IIP8,C, G II 9o-91/Curley 452. I consider its role in theformer section in w and its role in the latter section in w I.5See, for instance, E IP32C2 G II 73/Curley 435-36.~Ep. 64, 29 July 1675, G IV 278/Wolf 3o8.7This endorsement is from a letter to Tschirnhaus ( 18 July 1675,Ep. 66, G IV 28o/Wolf31 o).There is an anticipation of this endorsement in KV, App. II. 9, G I 119/Curley 154. See also thereference in E IIP7S to the attribute of Extension, or the attribute of Thought, or any other one(G II 9o/Curley 451).8A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), 79. Bennett's remarks indicate thatthe doctrine is idle in the sense that its denial is consistent with the major doctrines of the Ethics.


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S P I N O Z A S M E D I A T E I N F I N I T E M O D E 2 0 1

this view. Starting naturally enough with the letter to Schuller, I propose anaccount of the example in this letter of the face of the universe that draws onthe quasi-Cartesian treatise on body in the section of the Ethics to which theletter appeals. This section indicates that the mediate infinite mode of exten-sion is an infinite corpore al individual that has its own form or essence.Spinoza's discussion of the infinite individual helps to clarify central featuresof his physics. Even more, it provides the material for the resolution of animportant tension in his metaphysics. In particular, his discussion indicateshow the claim that only something infinite can follow from the absolute n atu reof God's attributes--which is central to the discussion of the infinite modes inthe Ethics can be reconciled with the position, prominent in the section to-ward the en d of this text on the intellectual Love of God, that finite bodilyessences so follow.

In the second part of my discussion, I consider the more destructive as-pects of Spinoza's account of the mediate infinite mode. Comm entato rs haveinsisted quite proper ly that Spinoza is commit ted by his Parallelism, t hat is, hisdoctrine in the Ethics that the order and connect ion of ideas is the same as theor de r a nd connection of things, 9 to the conclusion that there is something inthou ght that corr espon ds to the mediate infinite mode of extension. But whatthey have failed to recognize is that he has weighty reasons, one of whichderives ironically eno ugh fro m Parallelism itself, to say that only one infinitemode has an essence that follows from the attribute of thought, namely, theIdea of God. Drawing on my discussion in the first section, I argue that suchreasons cast serious doubt on the possibility of a fully consistent Spinozisticaccount of the mediate infinite mode of thought. The case of this modeprovides the clearest basis that I have been able to find in the Ethics forchallenging the cogency of its central doctrine of Parallelism. The final ironyher e is that the difficulties that Spinoza's mediat e infinite mod e creates fo r theattribute of thought are so formidable primarily because this mode plays acrucial though also underappreciated role in his account of the attribute ofextension.

1 F A C I E S TO T I U S U N I V E R S Iz. z The Letter to SchuUerThe ultimate source of Spinoza's letter to Schuller on the mediate infinitemode was Eh ren fri ed Walter von Tschirnhau s (16 51-17o8), a German countwho took an interest in Descartes's system during his student days at theUniversity of Leiden. Tschirnhaus was first introduced to Spinoza and his

9E liP7, G II 89/Curley 451.


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2 0 2 J O U R N L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 A P R IL 1 9 9 7w o r k i n 1 6 7 4 b y a f e ll ow c la s s m a t e a t L e i d e n , G e o r g H e r m a n n S c h u l l er0 6 5 1 - 7 9 ), w h o w a s h i m s e l f a m e m b e r o f o n e o f S p i no z a 's D u t c h c i r c le s ? ~D u r i n g a vi si t t o L o n d o n i n A p r i l o r M a y o f th e f o l l o w i n g y e a r , T s c h i r n h a u sr e p e a t e d l y p r e s s e d S c h u l le r i n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t o a s k S p i n o z a o n h is b e h a l ff o r t h e s o l u t i o n t o s e v e r a l d i f fi c u l ti e s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e E t h i c s , o n e o f w h i c hc o n c e r n s t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i n fi n it e m o d e s . S c h u l le r b e l a t ed l y r e l a y e d T s c h i r n -h a u s ' s r e q u e s t i n a l e t te r d a t e d 9 5 J u l y 1 67 5. T h e r e h e a s k e d S p i n o z a i np a r t i cu l a r f o r e x a m p l e s b o t h o f t h o se th i ng s w h ic h a re p r o d u c e d i m m e d i -a t e l y b y G o d a n d o f t h o s e w h i c h a r e p r o d u c e d b y s o m e i n fi n it e m e d i a t i n g[med ia n te ] H m o d i f ic a t io n , a d d i n g t h a t T h o u g h t a n d E x t e n s io n s e e m t o m e t ob e o f t h e f i rs t k i n d , o f th e s e c o n d , I n t e ll e c t i n th e c a s e o f T h o u g h t , a n d M o t i o ni n t h e c a s e o f E x t e n s i o n . '' '2

T h e a d d e d e x a m p l e s r e v e a l s o m e b a si c c o n fu s io n s . M o s t p ro b l e m a t i c a r et h e e x a m p l e s o f t h o u g h t a n d e x t e n s i o n as i nf in i t e m o d e s p r o d u c e d i m m e d i -a t e l y b y G o d . I n P a r t I o f t h e E t h i c s S p i n o z a h a d e x p l i c i tl y d i s t i n g u i s h e db e t w e e n N a t u r a n a t u r a n s , w h a t i s i n i ts e l f, a n d c o n c e i v e d p e r s e , t h a t is , G o d ' sa t t r i b u t e s , a n d N a t u r a n a t u r a t a , w h a t e v e r f o ll o w s f r o m t h e n e c e s s it y o f th en a t u r e o f G o d , o r f r o m a n y o f t h e a t t r i b u te s o f G o d , t h a t is, G o d ' s m o d e s ? 3R e m a r k s f r o m t h e s t a r t o f P a r t I I o f t h i s te x t le a v e l it tl e r o o m f o r d o u b t t h a tt h o u g h t a n d e x t e n s i o n a r e d i v in e a t t r ib u t e s , a n d t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e y a r e n o ta m o n g t h e t h in g s t h a t f o l l o w f r o m t h e n e c es s it y o f t h e n a t u r e o f G o d . ' 4

T h e u s e i n t h e l e t t e r f r o m S c h u l le r o f I n t e l l e c t a n d M o t i o n a s e x a m p l e so f in f i n i te m o d e s is s o m e w h a t l e s s p r o b l e m a t i c , s i n ce s u c h a u s e is g r o u n d e d i nS p i n o z a ' s w r i t i n g s. I n d e e d , t h e e x a m p l e s t h e m s e l v e s a r e a l m o s t c e rt a i n ly b o r -r o w e d f r o m h i s S h o r t T r e a t i s e , d a t i n g f r o m t h e e a r l y 16 6 os , w h i c h o f f e r s M o -t io n i n m a t t e r a n d I n t e l le c t i n t h e t h i n k i n g t h i n g a s e x a m p l e s o f u n i v e r s a lN a t u r a n a t u r a t a . ' 5 H o w e v e r , t h i s t e x t p r o v i d e s n o s u p p o r t f o r t h e v ie w in t h el e t t e r f r o m S c h u l l e r th a t th e s e a r e e x a m p l e s o f t h i n g s p r o d u c e d b y s o m ei n fi n it e m e d i a t i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n o f t h in g s p r o d u c e d i m m e d i a t e l y

,o Fo r biographical information on Sc huller and Tschirnhaus, see W. N. A. Klever, La cM denom: Petrus van G ent (et Schuller) h partir d 'une correspondance, Cahiers Spinoza 6 (1991): 169 -~o~, and Edu ard Winter, E. W. von Tschirnhaus (165z-17o8). Ein L ebe n im Dienste Akade-miegedankens (Berlin: Walther de Gruyter, 1959).HWolf's translation of mediante as 'me diat e' (Wolf 306) is misleading insofar as it suggests thatSchuller was asking fo r examples o f that which is produced by mediate infinite modes. In fact,Schuller was simply following Spinoza's own description of a mediate infinite mo de as that whichfollows from the absolute nature o f a divine attribute by some mediating [mediante] modification(E IP~3D, G II 67/Curley 431).~'Ep. 63, G IV 276/W61f 305-306.'3E IP29S G II 71/Curley 434.'4E IIP1,P~, G I I 86/Curley 448-4 9 .' s K V I.ixA, G I 48/Curley 91.


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SPINO ZA'S MEDIATE INFINI TE MODE 2 0 3by God. Indeed, it directly supports the contrary position, for the S h o r t T r e a -tise refers in strikingly Christian terms to Motion as a Son, produc t or effect,produced immediately by God, and likewise to Intellect as a Son, product orimmedia te creatu re of God, also created by him from all eternity. '16 So evi-dently there is a confusion in the letter from Schuller of the immediate infinitemodes of the Shor t Trea t i se with mediate infinite modes, which are not men-tioned at all in the latter text.

It is worth noting at this point, if only incidentally, that there is somereason to do ubt that Tschirnh aus himself supplied the examples in Schuller'sletter of the two kinds of infinite modes. It is true that Schuller's claim in thisletter that he was merely passing along queries from Tschirnhaus seems toindicate clearly enough that he was in fact the source. Yet elsewhere in hiscorr espon dence with Spinoza Tschirn haus showed himself to be quite percep-tive, drawing attention at several points to subtle features of the Spinozisticsystem.~7 It strikes me as rather uncharacteristic of him to have offered suchfundame nta lly misguided examples of the infinite modes. I there fore t hink itat least possible that the examples are embellishments to his query concern ingthe infinite modes that were supplied by the relatively less astute Schuller? 8

But whateve r the source of the examples, Spinoza politely refra ined fromemphasizing their difficulties. In what seems to have been a hastily composedret urn letter, dated a mere four days after Schuller's original letter, he off eredinstead the following constructive, if also cryptic, response: Finally, the exam-ples for which you ask are of the first kind in Thought, absolutely infiniteintellect; in Extension however motion and rest; o f the second kind however,the face of the whole Universe, which although varying in infinite ways, re-mains however always the same, on which see Schol. of Lemma 7 before Prop.

16KV I.i x.2- 3, G 1 48/Curley 92. Yirmiyahu Yovei has emphasized that the use o f Christianterminology for decidedly non-Christian ends was common in the M arrano community to whichSpinoz a is linked; see Spinoza a nd Other Heretics, vol. I: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton: PrincetonUnversity Press, 1989).

17 It was Tschir nhaus' s objections that pro mpt ed Spinoza's admission of the so-called u n -known attributes (Ep. 65, 12 Aug. 1675, G IV 279/Wolf 3o9- 1o), for instance, and his question sthat led Spinoza to arg ue for a revision of Descartes's conception of extension (Ep. 8o, 2 May1676, G IV 331/Wolf 361).18 See K. O. M einsma's claim that Schuller was not ani mated by the desire to und ert akeserious studies, and that between him and Tschirnhaus, Tschirn haus was the more intelligent ofthe two (Spinoza e t son cercle, trans. S. Ros enbu rg and J.-P. Osier [Paris: j. Vrin, 1983], 432, 435).Ano the r possibility is that Schuller made a mistake in relaying Tschirn haus's remarks. It may bethat Schuller made a similar sort of mistake in a later letter to Spinoza, in which he attrib uted toTschirnhaus the view that the Ethics takes ideata to be the efficient causes of ideas; cf. Ep. 7 o, 14Nov. 1675, G IV 3o2/Wolf 338; and Spinoza' s resp onse in Ep. 72, 18 Nov. 1675, G IV 3o5/Wolf341 .


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2 0 4 J O U R N L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 A P R IL 1 9 9 71 4, p . 2 . ' 9 T h e e x a m p l e s h e r e o f th e i m m e d i a t e i n fi n it e m o d e s d i f f e r o n l yv e r b a ll y f r o m t h e e x a m p l e s t h a t S p i n o z a o f f e r e d i n o t h e r w r i t i n g s; m o t i o na n d r e st is m e r e l y a v a r i a t i o n o n t h e e x a m p l e o f M o t i o n in m a t t e r i n t h eS h o r t T r e a t i s e , ~ ~ a n d a b s o l u t e l y i n f i n it e i n t e ll e c t m e r e l y a v a r i a t i o n o n t h ee x a m p l e o f I n t e l l e c t i n t h e t h i n k i n g t h i n g i n t h e S h o r t T r e a t i s e a n d o f i n fi -n i t e i n t e l l e c t i n t h e E t h i c s . ~ H e t h u s t a c tf u l ly i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e e x a m p l e s o fm e d i a t e i n f i n it e m o d e s t h a t S c h u l l e r o f f e r e d a r e a c t u a l ly e x a m p l e s o f i m m e d i -a t e i n fi n it e m o d e s . T h e r e is n o c o u n t e r p a r t i n th e S h o r t T r e a t i s e , h o w e v e r , o fS p i n o z a ' s e x a m p l e i n t h e p a s s a g e a b o v e o f a m e d i a t e i n f in i t e m o d e , w h i c h ,u s i n g a s o m e w h a t o b s c u r e m e t a p h o r , h e r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e f a ce o f t h e w h o l eU n i v e r s e .

S p i n o z a a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y b o r r o w e d t h e m e t a p h o r f r o m C a b b a li s t ic w ri t-i n gs , w h i c h s p e a k o f t h e m e d i a t e e m a n a t i o n s f r o m t h e I n f in i t e as f a ce s o f t h eu n i v e r s e o f t h e i n f i n it e . T I t w o u l d n o d o u b t b e u s e f u l fo r c e r t a i n p u r p o s e s t oa t t e m p t t o u n p a c k S p i n o z a ' s m e t a p h o r b y l o o k i n g t o th e s e w ri t i n gs . B u t s in c eo u r g o a l h e r e is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s i g n if ic a n ce o f h is e x a m p l e f o rh i s o w n s y s t e m , I t h i n k t h a t it is m o r e u s e f u l f o r u s to i n t e r p r e t t h a t e x a m p l e i nl ig h t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r s c h o l i u m t o w h i c h h e r e f e r r e d S c h u l -l er . T h i s s c h o l i u m is p a r t o f a n e x t e n d e d a s id e o n t h e n a t u r e o f b o d ie s t h a tS p i n o z a i n s e r t e d b e t w e e n P r o p o s i t i o n s x 3 a n d 1 4 i n P a r t I I o f t h e E t h i c s , a na s i d e w h i c h f o l l o w i n g D a v i d L a c h t e r m a n I c a l l t h e P h y s ic a l D i g r es s io n . ~ 3T h i s s e c t i o n o f f e r s a d i s t i n c t i v e v e r s i o n o f C a r t e s i a n p h y s i c s t h a t s e r v e s to f l es ho u t t h e v i e w o f th e f a c e o f th e u n i v e r s e s k e t c h e d i n t h e l e t t e r t o S c h u l l e r . Y e t

9Ep. 64, 29 July 1675, G IV 278/Wolf 3o8.~Th e addi t ion of r e s t (repose) i s s igni ficant given Spinoza 's view --wh ich he b orrow ed fromDescartes's Principles of Philosophy--that rest is not a me re privation, b ut rath er a posi tive force forresist ing motion ( R D P P IIP22D, G I 2o9/Curley 282). Cf. Descartes own remarks in P P I I .43, inA T V II I- l 66/CSM I 24 3-4 4. I use the fol lowing abbreviations pertain ing to Descartes 's wri tings:PP : Principles o f Philosophy (Principia Philosophiae),c ited b y Par t and Art ic le ; A T: C. Ad am an d P.Tannery, eds . , (Euvres de Descartes, i i v ols. (Paris: J . V rin, 196 4-78 ), cited by volum e-par t andpage; CSM: J . Co t t ingham, R. Stoothoff , and D . Murdo ch, t rans , and eds. , The PhilosophicalWritings of D escartes, 2 vols . (Camb ridge: Cam bridge Univers ity Press , 19 84-85) , c i ted by vo lumeand page.2~ See E IP16 , G II 6o/Curley 4 24; E IP31D , G I I 72/Curley 43 4- 35 ; E IIP 4D , G I 88/Curley4 4 9 -5 o. Spinoza's claim in the letter to Schuller tha t intellect is infinite absolutely is intelligiblein l ight o f his view in the Ethics tha t imm edia te infinite modes follow from the absolute na ture ofa divine at tribute (see E IP2x,D, G I I 65- 66 /Cu rley 429-30).~2 See the referen ces in H arry Wolfson, Philosophy of S pinoza (Cambridge: Harvard Universi tyPress, 193 4), vol . I: 24 4-4 5. A s Yovel has pointed ou t , however, Spinoza could hard ly haveaccepted the anthropomorphic implicat ion in these wri t ings that the universe as a whole is a

person wi th hum anl ike fea tures (see Spinoza: Marrano o f Reason, 229 n.5).~a T he Physics o f Spinoza's 'Ethics', in R. W. Shah an an d J. I. Biro, eds., Sp inoza: NewPerspectives (No rman : U niversi ty of O klahom a Press, t978 ) , 75.


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S P I N O Z A ' S M E D I A T E I N F I N I T E M O D E 2 0 5t h e P h y s ic a l D i g r e s s i o n a l s o i n t r o d u c e s i m p o r t a n t c o m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s u c h v i ewt h a t a r e l i n k e d t o t h e t h e o r y o f e s s e n c e in t h e E t h i c s .i . 2 T h e P h y s i c a l D i g r e s s i o nT h e P h y s i c a l D i g r e s s i o n f o l lo w s t h e c la i m in P r o p o s i t i o n 1 3 o f P a r t I I t h a t a na c t u a l l y e x i s t in g b o d y , o r f i n i t e m o d e o f e x t e n s i o n , is t h e o b j e c t o f t h e i d e ac o n s t i t u t i n g t h e h u m a n m i n d .2 4 I n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s d i s c u s s io n o f t h is P r o p o -s it io n , S p i n o z a a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e h u m a n b o d y is n o d i f f e r e n t f r o m o t h e r

I n d i v i d u a l s , a ll o f w h i c h , t h o u g h i n d i f f e r i n g d e g r e e s [ d i v e r s i s g r a d i b u s ] ,a r e h o w e v e r a n i m a t e [ a n i m a t a ] . 2 5 T h e o b s c u r i t y o f t a l k o f i n d i v i d u a l s b e -i n g a n i m a t e s e r v e s t o e x p l a i n w h y S p i n o z a fe l t i t n e c e s s a r y to i n t e r r u p t h i sd i s c u s s i o n in o r d e r t o p r e m i s e a f ew [ t h in g s ] c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e o fb o d i e s . ~ 6

T w o o f t h e t h r e e s e c t i o n s o f th e P h y s i ca l D i g r e s s i o n t h a t f o l l o w s a r e r e l e -v a n t h e r e . T h e f ir s t o f t h e m d e a l s w i t h t h e s i m p l e s t b o d i e s ( c o r p o r a s i m p l i -c i s s i m a ) ; t h e s e c o n d c o n c e r n s c o m p o s i t e b o d i e s ( c o r p o r a c o m p o s i t a ) , t h a t i s ,c o r p o r e a l i n d i v i d u al s .~ 7 T h e b a s i c d o c t r i n e o f t h e f i rs t s e c t i o n is t h a t t h e s i m -p l es t b o d i e s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r b y r e a s o n o f m o t i o n a n dr e s t , s p e e d a n d s l o w n e s s , a n d n o t b y r e a s o n o f s u b s t a n c e . ' '~ s T h e n e g a t i v e p a r to f th i s d o c t r i n e m a y w e ll b e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e v i e w in D e s c a r t e s t h a t t h eb a s ic p a r t s o f a b o d y a r e t h e m s e l v e s d i s ti n c t c o r p o r e a l s u b st an c e s. ~9 Y e t t h ep o s i t iv e p a r t o f t h e d o c t r i n e a p p e a r s t o d e r i v e f r o m D e s c a r te s ' s o w n c l a im t h a t

a n y v a r i a t io n i n m a t t e r o r d i v e r s i t y i n i ts m a n y f o r m s d e p e n d s o n m o t i o n . ' 'a ~W h i l e S p i n o z a m u s t a d m i t t h a t e v e n t h e s im p l e s t b o d i e s h a v e s o m e s o r t o fi n t e r n a l c o m p l e x i t y i n v i r t u e o f t h e i n f i n it e d i v is ib i li ty o f m a tt er ,3 ~ h e c o u l dh o l d , i n l i n e w i t h D e s c a r t e s ' s c l a i m , t h a t t h e s e b o d i e s a r e s i m p l e i n th e s e n s e

,4 G II 96/Curley 457., sE I I h 3 S , G I I 96 / Cur ley 458 .6E IIP13S , G II 97/Curley 458.27 T h e third an d final section consists of a set of six postulates c on cern ing the h um an bod y, aspecial case of a com posite bod y. It is this set of postulates that is relevant to the claim in E IIP 13 Sthat hu m an minds m ust di f fe r in the exce llence of the i r unders tanding given tha t hum an bodiesdiffe r in their capacity to have actions that dep en d o n themselves alone (G II 97-98/Curley 458).Since nei ther this claim nor the third sect ion of the Physical Digression concerns direct ly thena ture o f the face of the universe, however, I set both aside here.' 8E I IL em t , G I I 97 / Curl ey 458 .'9 See, f o r instance, P P I I .55 A T VI II- t 7t/CSM I 246. As Spinoza indica ted in E IIL em lD(G II 97/Curley 459), his reject ion o f such a claim rests on th e arg um en t in Part I of the Eth ics tha tthere can b e only on e substance.3 o p p i i .23, A T V II I- l 52 -53/CS M I 232. Spinoza would have wanted to add tha t variat ion

requires rest as well ; see the passage from the Short Treat ise quo ted in note 41.~' W ith re spe ct to the issue of infinite divisibility, see R D P P I IP5,D,S, G 1 19o -91/Cu rley 268 -69. Cf. the related discussion o f the va cuu m in E IP15S, G II 59/Curley 42 3.


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9 0 6 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 9 A P R I L i 9 9 7t h a t t h e y l a c k t h e i n t e r n a l m o t i o n n e c e s s a r y f o r a n a c t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n a m o n gv a r io u s p a rt s.a 2 In a n y ca se , h e a ssu m ed in th i s in it ia l sec t io n o f th e P h y s ica lD i g r e s s i o n t h a t th e o n l y f e a t u r e o f t h e s i m p l e s t b o d i e s t h a t c a n s e r v e t o d i s t in -g u i sh th em i s th e ir m o t io n o r res t .a 3

I t i s s o m e w h a t s u r p r i s i n g t h at th i s s e c t i o n d o e s n o t m e n t i o n t h e i m m e d i a t ei n f in i t e m o d e o f e x t e n s i o n , m o t i o n -a n d - r e st . Y e t t h e d i sc u s s io n t h e r e o f t h es i m p l e s t b o d i e s c a n b e l i n k e d t o t h e c l a im e a r l ie r i n t h e Eth ics th a t a n in f in ity o ft h i n g s f o l lo w f r o m m o t i o n a n d re st. S p i n o za ' s e n d o r s e m e n t o f D e s c a r te s 'sp o s i t i o n t h a t m o t i o n a n d r e s t ar e q u a n t a i n d ic a t e s th a t h e t o o k m o t i o n - a n d - r e s ti t s e l f t o b e t h e t o ta l s u m o f t h e q u a n t i ti e s o f m o t i o n a n d r e s t i n t h e p h y s i c a lw o rld .3 4 B u t t h e n h e c o u l d s a y t h at i n fi n i te s i m p l e b o d i e s f o l l o w f r o m m o t i o n -a n d -res t in v i r tu e o f th e fa c t th a t th i s to ta l q u a n t i ty i s d i s tr ib u ted in a p a rt i cu la rm a n n e r . T h o u g h S p i n o z a h i m s e l f d i d n o t p u t th e p o i n t in q u it e th is m a n n e r , its e e m s o p e n t o h i m t o h o l d t h a t th e s i m p l e st b o d ie s a r e m o d e s o r a f fe c t i o n s o fm o t io n -a n d -r es t , th a t i s to sa y, w a y s in w h ich th i s in f in i te m o d e exi st s.35

S p i n o z a s h a r p l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e s e c t i o n o f t h e P h y si c al D i g r e s s i o n o n t h es im p les t b o d ies f ro m a sec o n d sec t io n th a t co n cer n s co rp o r ea l ind iv id u al s. 3 6T h e l a tt e r s e c t i o n s t ip u l a t es t h a t s u c h i n d i v i d u a ls a r e g r o u p s o f b o d i e s t h a t a r ec o m p e l l e d b y s u r r o u n d i n g b o d i e s t o r e m a i n i n c on t a ct i n su c h a m a n n e r t h a tt h e y c o m m u n i c a t e th e i r m o t i o n s i n a c e r t a in f i x e d m a n n e r [ra t ione] . 37 T h ecen tra l c la im h ere i s th a t in d iv id u a l s so d e f in ed h a v e a p a rt icu la r n a tu re( n a t u r a ) o r f o r m ( fo rma) re f l ec ted in a u n io n o f in tern a l p a rt s th a t y i e ld s a

32 Thu s the division of t he simplest bodies into parts would be akin to the division into partst h a t Descartes took to occur simply in our t hought, a n d n o t a c tu a l ly b y m e a n s o f m o t i o n PPII.23, AT VI II -l 52-53/ CSM I 232 ).aaSee the remarks a t t h e end o f E IIA 2, at G II 90/Curley 460. It mi ght seem that thesebodies could be distinguished by some other property, for i n s t a n c e t h e i r size. However, onSpinoza's view these other properties are merely derivative, since we c a n a t t r i b u t e t h e m to apart icular body only after we have individuated that body by means of a consideration of itsm o t i o n or rest. Such a view helps to make sense of the otherwise i n e x p l i c a b l e c l a i m i n t h e ShortTreatise that there is no other mode in extension than motion and rest KV,App. II.14, G I 12o/Curley 155 ).Cf. Descartes's c l a i m i n t h e r i n c i p l e s t h a t God by his ordinar y concur rence preserves t h esame amount of motion and rest i n t h e m a t e r i a l universe as he put there i n t h e beginning PP1.36, AT VIII -1 61/CSM I 94o), an d Spin oza's discussion of th i s c la im in RDPP IIP13,S, G I 2oo-2ol/Curley 276-77. Spinoza, however, rejected t h e i m p l i c a t i o n of Descartes's position that thecause of motion is external to t h e m a t e r i a l universe. On t h i s p o i n t s e e t h e discussion toward theend o f w1.3 o f Spinoza's critique o f Descartes i n th e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h Tschirnhaus.

35 To my knowl edge Spinoza did n ot speak o f modes o f modes. Y e t i t s e e m s t h a t he could n o tdeny that modes of particular bodies are modes of modes given his own c l a i m t h a t t h e bodiesthemselves are modes of ex tend ed substance (see E I IDe fl , G II 84/Curley 447).

n6See h i s w a r n i n g a t t h e end ofE IIA 2 that he is moving from a discussion of the simplestbodies to a discussion of composite bodies (G II 99/Curley 46o). For a further reason to dis t ing u i s h the two sections, see note 93.

37 Thi s stipulation is c o n t a i n e d i n t h e D e f i n i t io n f o l l o w i n g E IIA 2, at G II loo/Curley 46o.


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SPIN OZA'S MEDIATE INF INI TE MODE 20 7specific rat io of mot i on an d res t. 3s Onc e aga in Spinoza was work ing wi thmaterial sup pl ie d by Descartes . He fol lowed Descartes in hold ing that the qu an-t ity of mot ion in a body can be det erm ine d by mul i plyi ng the s ize and the speedof that b ody (call this the in te rn al speed),39 and also suggested, as Descartes ha d,that the q uan t i t y of res t in a body can be mea sur ed by the p rod uct of it s s ize andthe speed of the body that impinges on i t (call this the external speed).4o YetSpinoza used th is mater ial to expl icate a not ion of the form of a corporealindiv idua l that i s not pr ese nt in Descartes ' s wri t ings . On the acco unt indicate din the second sect ion of the Physical Digress ion, the for m of such an ind ividu alis expre ssed by some f ixed rat io that holds betwe en the sum of the quan t i t ies ofmot ion (s ize in t ern al speed) an d the su m of the quant i t ies of res t (size external speed) of i ts parts .4l

Spinoza s t ressed in th is sect ion that changes in the parts of an individualneed no t cause tha t in d iv idua l to have a d i f fe ren t ra t io o f quan t i ty o f mot ionand quan t i ty of res t, a re asona ble posi t ion given that an inf ini ty of in tege rs cansatis fy any f ixed rat io . He the n c onc lude d that the i ndivid ual survives those

sSE IILem4D, G II too/Curley 461. The passage says that the union of parts constitutes(constituit) the form of an individual, which seems to indicate that the form is a feature of thetemporal world (cf. E IILem6D, G II lol /Curley 460. I argue below, however, that Spinoza hasreason to say that the form itself, as opposed to its particular instantiation in a union of parts, iseternal in a nondurational sense.sgThis identification is clear from Descartes's remarks in P P II.36, AT VIII-i 61/CSM I 24o.Spinoza seems to have been speaking for himself when he endorsed such an identification inR D P P IIP13S G I 2ol/Curley 277.40 Alexandre Matheron has suggested that Spinoza is best read as identifying the quantity ofrest in a body simply with its size; see his lnd iv id u e t communaut ( chez Sp inoza (Paris: Les Editions deMinuit, 1969), 4~ n. 9. The issue is complicated, however, by Descartes's own account of thequanti ty of rest, or, what is the same, of the force for resisting motion. Descartes did not providean explicit discussion of the nature of this quantity in the Principles, but Garber has shown (inDescartes s Metaphysical Physics [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992 , 240) that his discussionthere of the seven rules of impact indicates that this quantity is measured by the product of thesize of the body at rest and the speed of the body that approaches it (see especially the explanationof the fourth rule at P P 11.49, AT VII1-1 68). Spinoza seems to have conceived the quantity of restin the same manner at R D P P IIP22C1, G I 2o9-1o/Curley 282. While he did not necessarilyendorse all of the views summarized in this work, it is significant that he emphasized in a letter toOldenburg that he had never denied any of Descartes's rules of the transfer of motion in impactexcept the sixth (Ep. 32, 2o Nov. 1665, G IV 174/Wolf 212). This comment is naturally read asindicating that Spinoza in fact accepted Descartes's other rules. Spinoza's rejection of the sixthrule does not preclude his acceptance of the account of the quantity of rest implied in thePrinciples, moreover, since this particular rule does not seem to be required by this account (asGarber has argued in Descartes s Metaphysical Physics , 240.4, That Spinoza had such a ratio in mind is indicated by his claim that the parts of anindividual keep the same ratio of motion and rest to each other as before (E IILem5, G II ~ox/Curley 460. The importance of the fact that this equation includes both motion and rest isrevealed by the comment in the Short Treatise that if there were nothing in extension exceptmotion alone, or nothing except rest alone, there could not be, or be indicated, in the whole ofextension, any particular thing ( K V , App. II.t 4, G I 12o/Curley 155).


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9 8 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 A P R I L 1 9 9 7p a r t i c u l a r c h a n g e s i n its p a r t s t h a t d o n o t b r i n g a b o u t a c h a n g e i n t h e o v e r a l lr a t io o f m o t i o n t o re st .4 ~ S u c h a c o n c l u s i o n i n d i c a t e s a n i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t i nw h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r f r o m t h e s i m p l e s t b o d ie s . S i n ce t h e la t te r c a n b ed i s t i n g u i s h e d o n l y b y m e a n s o f t h e ir m o t i o n a n d r es t, t h e y c a n r e m a i n i ne x i s t e n c e o n l y i n s o f a r a s t h e y p e r s e v e r e i n th e i r s a m e s t a te o f m o t i o n o r r es t.4 3I t is t r u e t h a t t hi s s o r t o f p e r s e v e r a n c e s e e m s t o b e a s s u m e d b y th e C a r t e s i a nl aw o f in e r t i a m e n t i o n e d i n th e f i rs t s e c t io n o f t h e P h y s i c a l D i g r e s s i o n , w h i c hr e q u i r e s t h a t a b o d y a l r e a d y in m o t i o n m o v e s u n t il it is d e t e r m i n e d b y a n -o t h e r b o d y t o r e s t; a n d t h a t a b o d y a t r e s t a l s o r e m a i n s a t r e s t u n t i l i t isd e t e r m i n e d t o m o t i o n . 4 4 I n t hi s s e c t i o n S p i n o z a a r g u e d t h a t s u c h a l aw h o l d ss i n c e it f o l l o w s f r o m t h e r e s u l t e a r l i e r i n th e E t h i c s , n a m e l y , t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c eo f s i n g u l a r t h i n g s m u s t b e d e t e r m i n e d b y o t h e r s i n g u l a r th i n g s , t h a t th e m o -t io n a n d r e s t o f t h e s i m p l e s t b o d i e s ca n b e c h a n g e d o n l y b y s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a lt o t h em . 4 5 T h e d e f a u l t s i t u a t i o n h e r e s e e m s t o b e o n e i n w h i c h t h e s i m p l e s tb o d i e s p e r s e v e r e i n t h e i r st a t e s a n d t h e r e b y r e m a i n i n e x i s te n c e . H o w e v e r , t h ec o n c e p t i o n o f b o d i e s a s p e r s e v e r i n g i n t h is w a y m u s t f o r S p i n o z a i n v o l v e ac o n s i d e r a b l e a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m t h e r e a l w o r ld .4 6 O n h i s C a r t e s i a n v i ew o f t hi sw o r l d , a f t e r a ll , s t a te s o f m o t i o n a n d r e s t i n t h e s i m p l e s t b o d i e s a r e c o n s t a n t l yc h a n g i n g d u e t o p r e s s u r e s e x e r t e d b y s u r r o u n d i n g b o d i e s in t h e p l e n u m .T h e s e s a m e p r e s s u r e s , b y c o n t r a s t , d o n o t n e c e ss a r i ly b r i n g a b o u t a c h a n g e i nt h e r a t io o f m o t i o n a n d r e s t t h a t h o l d s a m o n g c o l l e c t i o n s o f t h e s i m p l e s tb o d i e s . T h u s t h e c o r p o r e a l i n d i v id u a l s m e n t i o n e d i n t h e s e c o n d s e c t io n o f t h eP h y s ic a l D i g r e s s i o n n e e d n o t b e i so l a t ed f r o m t h e i r p l e n a r y e n v i r o n m e n t i no r d e r t o b e c o n s i d e r e d a s r e t a i n i n g t h e i r i d e n t i t y o v e r tim e .4 7

W h i l e t h is s e c o n d s e c t i o n f o c u s e s o n t h e c h a n g e s i n t h e p a r t s o f a n i n d i v i d -u a l t h a t d o n o t d i s r u p t i ts i d e n t it y , h o w e v e r , t h e c l e a r i m p l i c a t io n t h e r e is t h a t

4~ Spinoza se t ou t the kinds of chan ge tha t the individual can survive in Lemm ata 4- 7 of P ar tI I o f t he Ethics. A ltho ug h I have fol lowed Spinoza in speaking o f a simple relation o f quantit ies, i tis l ike ly tha t he h ad som ething m ore com plex in mind. For this point see Don G arre t t, Spinoza 'sTh eo ry of Metaphysical Ind ividu ation, in K. F. Barb er and J. J . E. Gracia, eds., lndividuation andIdentity in Early Mod ern P hilosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 82-87.4~ In E II IP 6 Spinoza o ffer ed the principle that each thing, ins ofar as it is in i tself, strives toperse vere in being (G II 145/Curley 498). T he simplest bodies can persevere in being, however,only insofar as they persevere in the i r par t icular s ta te o f mot ion or rest . This resul t i s confi rm edby Spinoza's claim in an earl ier work, w hich interestingly parallels h is rem arks in E III P6 , thateach thin g insofa r as i t is simple and u ndiv ided, and cons idered in itself alone [quantenus simplex etindivisa est, et in se sola consideratur], always perseveres in the same state as far as it can ( R D P PI IP1 4, G I 2ol /C urley 277)-44E IIL em 3C G II 98/Curley 459.45E IIL em 3C G II 98/Curley 459. Th e earlier result is fro m E IP28, G I 69/Curley 432.

46 It is significant that in the passage fr om the s um m ary o f Descartes 's Principles cited in note43, Spinoz a em pha sized th at a simple and und ivided th ing perseveres in its ow n state only insofa ras it is co ns ider ed in itself alone.471 am in debted here to the discuss ion in Lachterman , Th e Physics of Spinoza 's Ethics, 8 8 - 8 9 .


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S P I N O Z A S M E D I A T E I N F I N I T E M O D E 20 9a n y c a u s e t h a t b r i n g s a b o u t a c h a n g e i n its r a t io o f m o t i o n a n d r e s t m u s t a l s ob r i n g a b o u t t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . I t is s o l el y i n v i r t u e o f p o ss e s s -i n g a c e r t a i n r a t i o t h a t a g i v e n i n d iv i d u a l p e r s e v e r e s i n e x i s te n c e . T h e f o r mt h a t e x p l i c a te s s u c h a r a ti o is t h e r e f o r e m o s t n a t u r a l l y i d e n t i f ie d w i t h t h e l if eo f t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h a t p o s s e s s e s it , a l i fe t h a t S p i n o z a d e f i n e d a t o n e p o i n t a st h e f o r c e [ v im ] t h r o u g h w h i c h t h i n g s p e r s e v e r e i n t h e i r b e in g . '4 8 T h u s o n e p o i n t o ft h e c l a i m i n t h e E t h i c s t h a t a l l i n d i v id u a l s a r e a n i m a t e is t h a t e x i s t in g c o m p o s i t eb o d i e s t h a t h a v e a f o r m t h e r e b y h a v e a p r in c i p l e o f an i m a ti o n .4 9

T h e v i ew i n th e P h y s ic a l D i g r e ss i o n t h a t f i n it e c o r p o r e a l i n d i v id u a l s a r e t ob e d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f th e i r f o r m , a s e x p r e s s e d in t h e i r r a ti o o f m o t i o n a n dr e s t , is a n t i c i p a t e d i n t h e S h o r t T r e a t is e , w h i c h m a k e s th e p o i n t th a t th e h u m a nb o d y is n o t h i n g b u t a c e r t a in p r o p o r t i o n [een zekere proportie] o f m o t i o n a n dr es t. 5 o B u t w h a t is n o t a n t i c i p a t e d i n t h is t e x t is t h e c l a i m i n t h e S c h o l i u m t oL e m m a 7 o f t h e P h y s i c al D i g r e ss i o n , w h i c h S p i n o z a c i te d i n h is l e t te r t oS c h u l l e r , t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l u n i v e r s e a s a w h o l e i s i t s e lf a n i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i tso w n f o r m . A s f a r as I c a n d e t e r m i n e , S p i n o z a f ir s t b r o a c h e d s u c h a p o s i t io n i nt h e I 6 6 3 M e t a p h y s i c a l T h o u g h t s , t h e a p p e n d i x t o his s u m m a r y o f D e s c ar te s 'sP r i n c i p l e s , w h i c h r e f e r s t o t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e w h o l e o f n a t u r e ( a n a l o g i a mto t ius na turce ) , a w h o l e t h a t c a n be c o n s i d e r e d as o n e b ei n g. 5 ' H e d e v e l o p e dt hi s p o si t i o n f u r t h e r i n a 1 66 5 le t te r to H e n r y O l d e n b u r g , w h e r e h e a p p e a l e dt o t h e e x a m p l e o f a w o r m l iv in g in t h e b l o o d s t r e a m t h a t c a n n o t g r a s p t h a tp a r t ic l es o f b l o o d a r e n o t c o m p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t i n d iv i d ua l s b u t r a t h e r c o m -p l e x p a r t s o f a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l, t h e b l o o d a s a w h o l e . S p i n o z a t o o k t h e m o r a lo f t h e e x a m p l e t o b e t h a t , t h o u g h w e d o n o t a lw a y s r e c o g n i z e it , n o n e t h e l e s sa ll b o d i e s b e l o n g t o t h e w h o l e u n i v e r s e i n t h e s a m e w a y a s t h e p a r ti c le s o fb l o o d b e l o n g t o t h e b l o o d st r ea m . 5 2 T h i s l i ne o f t h o u g h t r e s u l t s u l t im a t e l y i nt h e c o n c l u s i o n i n t h e L e m m a 7 S c h o l i u m t h at t h e w h o l e o f n a t u r e is s i m p lya n i n f i n i t e s e r i e s o f n e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t is i t s e lf o n e I n d i v i d u a l , w h o s ep a r t s , t h a t i s, a ll b o d i e s , v a r y i n in f i n i t e w a y s , w i t h o u t a n y c h a n g e o f t h e w h o l eI n d iv i d ua l . 5 3 T h e f a c t t h a t t h e S h o r t T r e a t i s e s ay s n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i n f i n i tei n d i v i d u a l h e l p s t o e x p l a i n w h y i t f ai ls to m e n t i o n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e m e d i a t ei n f in i t e m o d e . O n l y a f t e r S p i n o z a h a d d e v e l o p e d t h e n o t i o n o f t hi s i n d i v i d u a lc o u l d h e h a v e c o m e t o t h e v i e w i n t h e l e t t e r t o S c h u l l e r t h a t t h e r e i s s u c h a n

4 s C M l.vi, G I 26 o/Curley 326. Cf. E IIIP6, P 7, G II t46/Curley 498 -9949 For a similar readi ng of this claim, see Edw in Curley, Be hind the GeometricalMethod (Prince-ton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 72-7 3; and He nry E. Allison, Benedict de Spinoza: A nIntroduction (New H aven: Yale University Press, 198 7; rev. ed.), 97.5~ App. 11.14, G I 12o/Curley 155.5, CM II.vii, G I 264/Curley 3~9.5~Ep. 32, ~o Nov. 1665, G IV 171-72/Wolf 21o -t 1.5~ G I I lo2/C urley 4 62.


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2 1 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 35 :2 APRIL 199 7infinite mode , namely, the face of the whole Universe, which althoughvarying in infinite ways, remains however always the same.

Spinoza did not of fer any detailed account of the man ner in which finitecorp orea l individuals are related to the face of the whole Universe, that is, tothe infinite corpo rea l individual. Yet just as he could say that the simplestbodies are modes of motion-and-rest, so he could hold that finite individualsare modes of the infinite individual. Indeed, such a view of finite individualscan be under sto od in terms of his remark in the letter to Oldenb urg that eachbody i n so far as it exists modi fied in a certain way is simply a part of thewhole universe ( p a t t e rn to t iu s u n ive rs i ) .5 4 Particular bodies, as finite individu-als, are modes in the sense that they are parts of the infinite individual ( thewhole universe ) that exist as modified by a certain ratio of motion and rest.

The letter to Oldenburg also makes the point that the various parts ofnat ure interact in such a way that ther e is prese rved in all together, that is, inthe whole universe, the same ratio [ra t ione] of motion to rest. 55 This point isreflected in the conclusion in the Physical Digression that while the parts ofthe infinite individual undergo an infinite number of variations, the individ-ual itself retains its identity over time. Th e finite individuals that co mpose theinfinite individual can be destroyed because external forces can more or lesseasily change the ratios of quantity of motion and quantity of rest that holdamong the parts of these individuals. But in the case of an infinite individualthat contains all finite individuals as parts, there can be no external force.Given the corollary of Spinoza's law of inertia that only such forces can bringabout changes in the quantities of motion and rest in an individual, it followsthat the continued existence of the infinite individual is assured. Thus it is aconsequence of the Physical Digression that the mediate infinite mode ofextension has a sempiternal or everlasting duration.

Spinoza suggested in the E t h i c s that mediate infinite modes are eternalsimply in the sense that they are sempiternal.56 Yet there are complications forsuch a suggestion that derive from the distinction in the Physical Digressionbetween an individual and its form. To appreciate these complications, weneed to consider the manner in which form is related for Spinoza to bodilyessence. Tha t he identif ied the two is indicated by the refe ren ce in the E t h i c s ofthe essence or [s i ve ] fo rm of a part icul ar thing.57 But such an identificat ion

54 G I V 1 7 3 / W o l f 2 1 1 .55 G I V 1 7 3 / W o l f 2 1 i .5 6E I P 2 1 a s s e r t s t h a t i m m e d i a t e i n f i n it e m o d e s h a v e al w a y s h a d t o e x i s t ( G I I 6 5 / C u r l e y

4 2 9 ), a n d t h e D e m o n s t r a t i o n a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e m o d e s a r e e t e rn a l i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e r e i s n o t i m ea t w h i c h t h e y d o n o t e x i s t ( G I I 6 5 - 6 6 / C u r l e y 4 3 o ) . E I P 2 2 D i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e m e d i a t e i n f i n i tem o d e s a r e e t e r n a l i n th i s s a m e t e m p o r a l s e n se .

5 7E IV P r e f , G I I 2 o 8 / C u r l e y 5 4 6 ; t h e L a t i n t e r m s ive i n d i c a t e s a p p o s i t i o n h e r e , j u s t a s i td o e s i n t h e f a m o u s p h r a s e , D e u s s i v e n a t u r a w h i c h o c c u r s j u s t a f ew p a g e s e a r l i e r ( s ee G I I u o 6 /


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S P I N O Z A ' S M E D I A T E I N F I N I T E M O D E 9 11p r o v i d e s r e a s o n f o r h i m t o h o l d t h a t t h e f o r m o f t h e i n f in i t e i n d i v i d u a l (a so p p o s e d t o t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h is f o r m i n a p a r t i c u l a r r a t io t h a t h o l d s i n t h et e m p o r a l w o r l d ) i s e t e r n a l i n a n o n d u r a t i o n a l s e n s e . I t i s a f a i r l y d e e p v i e w i nh i s w r i t i n g s , a f t e r a l l , t h a t e s s e n c e s i n g e n e r a l a r e e t e r n a l i n th i s s a m e s e ns e .5 8S u c h a v i e w g o e s b a c k a t l e a s t t o t h e M e t a p h y s i c a l T h o u g h t s , w h e r e h e c l a i m e dt h a t d u r a t i o n c a n n o t i n a n y w a y p e r t a i n t o t h e e s s en c e s o f t h i ng s . 5 9 B u t t h ev i e w a l s o is c e n t r a l t o t h e l a t e r E t h i c s . I n t h e C o r o l l a r y to P r o p o s i t i o n 2 4 o f P a r tI o f t h is te x t , S p i n o z a e m p h a s i z e d t h a t e s se n c e s o t h e r t h a n G o d ' s i n v o lv e

n e i t h e r e x i s t e n c e n o r d u r a t i o n i n o r d e r t o s h o w t h a t G o d r a t h e r t h a n t h e s ee s s e n c e s i s t h e c a u s e o f t h e d u r a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e o f t h in g s . 6~ H e l a t e r e m p l o y e dt h is s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e s s e n c e a n d d u r a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e in h i s d i s c u s -s i o n o f P r o p o s i t i o n 4 5 o f P a r t I I . T h e P r o p o s i t i o n i t s e l f s t a t e s : E a c h i d e a o fb o d y , o r s i n g u l a r t h i n g , e x i s t i n g in a c t , n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o lv e s t h e e t e r n a l a n di n f i n i t e e s s e n c e o f G o d . ''6~ I n t h e S c h o l i u m t o t h e P r o p o s i t i o n , S p i n o z a q u a l i -f i e d th e s e n s e i n w h i c h t h e b o d y t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o lv e s G o d ' s e s s e n c e i ss o m e t h i n g e x i s t i n g i n a c t :H e r e b y e x i s t e n c e I d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d d u r a t i o n , t h a t i s, e x i s t e n c e i n s o f a r a s i t i sc o n c e i v e d a b s t r a c tl y , a n d a s a c e r t a i n s p e c ie s o f q u a n t it y . F o r I s p e a k o f t h e n a t u r e o fe x i s t e n c e i t s el f , w h i c h i s a t t r i b u t e d t o s i n g u l a r t h i n g s , b e c a u s e i n f i n i t e [ t h in g s ] f o l l o w ini n f i n it e m o d e s f r o m t h e e t e r n a l n e c e s s i t y o f t h e n a t u r e o f G o d ( see Prop . 16, p . I ) . Is p e a k , I s a y , o f t h e e x i s t e n c e i t s e l f o f s i n g u l a r t h i n g s , a s t h e y a r e i n G o d . F o r , e v e n i fe a c h o n e is d e t e r m i n e d b y a n o t h e r s i n g u l a r t h i n g t o a c e r ta i n m o d e o f e x is t e nc e ,n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e f o r c e [v /s ], b y w h i c h e a c h p e r s e v e r e s i n e x i s t e n c e , f o ll o w s f r o m t h ee t e r n a l n e c e s s i t y o f t h e n a t u r e o f G o d . O n w h i c h m a t t e r s e e C o r o l l . P r o p . 2 4 , p . 1 .62

Cur ley 544) . Sp inoza somet imes spoke in the Ethics of the essence of a k ind , e .g . , the essence ofma n (see E IP7S, G I I 5o- 51/C ur le y 414--15). But i t c lear f rom h is remar ks in the Preface toPa r t I V th a t h e i d en t i f i ed f o r m wi th th e e ssen ce o f a sp ec if ic i n d iv id u a l, o r wh a t G u e r o u l t h a sca l led a s ing ular essence (Spinoza, vol. II : L g~me (Ethique, II) [Hi ldesheim: Georg Olms, 1974] ,5 4 8 - 4 9 ) .5s He r e I f av o r t h e Har d in i s t r ead in g o f Sp in o za , o n wh ich h e accep ted a P l a to n ic so r t o fe t e r n i ty t h a t ex c lu d es t im e , o v e r t h e Kn ea l i s t r ead in g , o n which h e f o r t h e m o s t p a r t r e s tr i c t edh im sel f to an Ar is to te l ian sor t o f e tern i ty tha t involves on ly sempi ternal i ty . Fo r the for me r v iew,see C . L, Ha r d in , Sp in o za o n I m m o r ta l i t y an d T im e , i n Sh ah an an d B i r o , ed s . , Spinoza: NewPerspectives: 129-3 8; fo r the la t te r v iew, see M ar tha Kneale , Etern i ty and Sem pi tern i ty , in M.Gr en e , ed . , Spino za: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York : An cho r Books, 1973) : 227 -4o; anda l so Alan Do n ag an , Spinoza (Chicago: Univers i ty o f Chicago Press, 1988 ) , lo7 -1 3 . How ever , Id em u r to Har d in ' s c l a im th a t Sp in o za a t t r i b u ted to t h e i n f in i t e m o d es an a t em p o r a l so r t o fe t e r n i ty ( S p in o za o n I m m o r ta l i t y an d T im e , 1 3 o - 3 ~ ) . On th e v iew I wan t t o d e f en d , h e h e ldth a t a t em p o r a l e t e r n a l i t y p e r ta in s o n ly to G o d ' s su b s tan ce , t h e d iv in e a t t r ib u te s , an d th e e ssen cesth o se a tt r i b u te s co m p r eh e n d .sgCM I I . i , G I 25o/Cur ley 316 . In th is passage he a lso iden t i f ied essences w i th e ternal t ru ths ,an id en t i fi ca t io n th a t i s f o u n d a l so in t h e Ethics (see E IP17S, G I I 6$/C urley 4z7).6~ II 671Curley 431.6, G II 127/Curley 481.6 , G I I l~7 /C ur ley 48~.


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2 1 2 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 5 : 2 A P R I L 1 9 9 7A t o n e p o i n t i n t h e E t h i c s S p i n o z a e x p l i c it l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e s t r i v i n g c o n a t u s ) o r

p o w e r p o t e n t i a ) b y w h i c h a t h i n g p e r s e v e r e s in i ts b e i n g w i t h t h e a c t u a le s s e n c e e s s e n t i a a c t u a l i s ) o f a t h in g .6 3 I f , a s s e e m s e v i d e n t , t h is s t r i v i n g o r

p o w e r is i d e n t i c a l t o t h e f o r c e r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e p a s s a g e a b o v e , w e c a n t a k et h e v ie w t h e r e t o b e t h a t w h i le s i n g u l a r t h in g s h a v e a s o r t o f a b s t r a c t e x i s t e n c et h a t i n v o l v es d u r a t i o n , t h e i r a c t u a l e s s e n c es c a n n o t h a v e t h is s o rt o f e x i s t e n c eg i v en t h a t t h e y f o ll o w f r o m t h e e t e r n a l n e c es si ty o f th e n a t u r e o f G o d .

S p i n o z a r e t u r n e d t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e s s e n c e a n d d u r a t i o n a l e x i s -t e n c e to w a r d t h e e n d o f t h e E t h i c s , i n P r o p o s i t io n 2 9 o f P a r t V . T h e P r o p o s i -t i o n is a s f o ll o w s: W h a t e v e r t h e M i n d u n d e r s t a n d s u n d e r a s pe c ie s o f e t e r n i t y[ s u b s p e c i e a e t e r n i t a t i s ] , i t u n d e r s t a n d s n o t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i t c o n c e i v e s t h ep r e s e n t a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e o f b o d y , b u t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t it c o n c e iv e s t h e e s s e n c eo f b o d y u n d e r a s p e ci e s o f e t e rn i ty . 6 4 T h e S c h o l i u m t o t h is P r o p o s i t i o n a p -p e a l s e x p l ic i tl y t o t h e p a s s a g e f r o m E I I P 4 5 S j u s t c i t e d : T h i n g s a r e c o n c e i v e db y u s a s a c t u a l i n t w o w a y s , e i t h e r a s t h e y e x i s t w i t h r e l a t i o n t o a c e r t a i n t i m ea n d p l a c e , o r a s w e c o n c e i v e t h e m t o b e c o n t a i n e d [ c o n t i n e r i ] i n G o d , a n d t of o ll o w f r o m t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e d i v i n e n a t u r e . T h a t h o w e v e r w h i c h i s c o n -c e i v e d in t h e s e c o n d w a y as t r u e o r r e a l, w e c on c e i v e u n d e r a s p ec i e s o fe t e r n i t y , a n d t h e i r i d e a s i n v o l v e t h e e t e r n a l a n d i n f in i t e e s s e n c e o f G o d , a s w es h o w e d i n P r o p o s i t i o n 4 5 , P a r t 2 , o n w h i c h s e e al s o t h e S c h o l iu m . 6 5 J u s t a s i nE I I P 4 5 S S p i n o z a h a d d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c tu a l es s e n c es a s t h e y

a r e in G o d f r o m t h e d u r a t i o n o f s i n g u la r th i n gs , s o h e r e h e d i s t i n g u is h e dt h e a c t u a l it y o f th i n g s as t h e y a re c o n t a i n e d in G o d f r o m t h e a c t u a li t y o ft h i n g s t h a t e x i s t w i t h r e l a t i o n t o a c e r t a i n t i m e a n d p l a c e. ''66

T h e i m p l i c a t i o n h e r e , w h i c h i s m a d e e x p l i c it in E V P 2 9 S , i s t h a t b o d i l ye s s e n c es i n s o f a r a s th e y a r e c o n t a i n e d i n G o d a r e p r o p e r l y c o n c e i v e d o n l y

u n d e r a s p e ci e s o f e t e r n i t y , a s p e c ie s t h a t , a n e a r l i e r p a s s a g e e x p l a i n s, c a n n o tb e d e f i n e d b y t i m e o r e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h d u r at io n . 6 7 1 h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h ef o r m o f a n e x i s t i n g c o r p o r e a l i n d i v i d u a l is n a t u r a l l y i d e n t i fi e d w i t h its f o r c e o fp e r s e v e r a n c e , w h i c h S p i n o z a h i m s e l f i d e n t i f ie d i n t u r n w i t h it s a c t u a l e s-s e n c e . B u t t h e n i t f o ll o w s f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t a c t ua l e ss e n c es a r e p r o p e r l yc o n c e i v e d o n l y as e t e r n a l i n a n o n d u r a t i o n a l s e n s e t h a t t h is f o r m is p r o p e r l yc o n c e i v e d o n l y i n th i s w a y . T h u s f o r S p i n o z a t h e r e m u s t b e in a d d i t i o n t o t h es e m p i t e r n a l i n f i n i t e in d i v i d u a l i ts e t e r n a l f o r m o r a c t u a l e s s en c e .

6 :~ E I I I P 7 , G I I 1 4 6 / C u r l e y 4 9 9 .64 G l I 2 9 8 / C u r l e y 6 0 9 .6~ G I I 2 9 8 - 9 9 / C u r l e y 6 1 o .66 M a r g a r e t W i l s o n e m p h a s i z e s t h is c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n E I I P 4 5 C a n d E V P ~ 9 S i n I n f i n i t e

U n d e r s t a n d i n g , Scientia lntuitiva a n d Ethics I . 16, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 ( 1983 ): x8 4 -85 . 6 7 E V P 2 3 S , G I I 2 9 6 / C u r l e y 6 0 8 .


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S P I N O Z A ' S M E D I A T E I N F I N I T E M O D E 2 1 3Spinoza also has reason to say that t he ete rnal f orm o f this infinite individ-

ual is itself infinite. He stipulated toward the start of the thics that somethingis finite just in case it can be limited by ano the r o f the same natu re. ''68 Heconcluded later in this work, in line with this stipulation, that the actual es-sence of a man must be finite since that man's power can be limited by thepower o f othe r singula r things.69 Because the re can be nothing ex ternal to theinfinite corpore al individual that limits its power, however, the fo rm o r actualessence of this individual must be infinite. On Spinoza's own view, moreo ver ,this individual can have a sempiternal existence only in virtue of having aninfinite form. I have in mind here his claim in E IVP4D that the existence ofsome thing that necessarily always exists must follow from God's infinitepower. 7o Just prior to this claim he indicated that the power in God responsi-ble fo r the exist ence of a thing is simply the actual essence of that thing.Y1 Butthen the sempiternal existence of the infinite corporeal individual can deriveonly from an infinite form or actual essence, that is to say, from God' s infinitepower. Spinoza could argue, in a similar manner, that there is always a fixedamo unt of motion and rest in the material world because the mode of motion-and-r est itself has an infinite essence.

I deviate here from Martial Gueroult's influential view that the distinctionbetween immediate and mediate infinite modes is for Spinoza simply thedistinction between the universe of eternal essences, on the one hand, and

the universe of existences, on t he other.72 On this view motion-and-res t, asthe immediate infinite mode of extension, must be identified with the collec-tion o f eterna l finite bodily essences, while the infinite corporeal individual, asthe mediate infinite mode of that attribute, must be identified with the collec-tion of existing finite corpo rea l individuals. This consequence is, however, outof line with the posit ion--w hich I take to ground Spinoza's physics-- that bothmotion-and- rest and the infinite corporeal individual are infinite modes thathave a sempiternal existence in virtue of the fact that they have an eternalform or essence that involves God's infinite power. On my reading, Spinoza

6 8 E I D e f 2 , G I I 4 5 / C u r l e y 4 0 8 .6 9E I V P 3 , G I I 2 1 2 / C u r l e y 5 4 8 . T h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n a p p e a l s to t h e c la i m in

E I V A 1 t h a t f o r e a c h ( f i n i t e ) s i n g u l a r t h i n g i n n a t u r e t h e r e i s a n o t h e r s i n g u l a r t h i n g m o r ep o w e r f u l t h a n i t b y w h i c h i t c a n b e d e s t r o y e d ( G I I 2 l o / C u r l e y 5 4 7 ).

7 ~ I V P 4 D , G I I 2 1 3 / C u r l e y 54 9 .7 1G I I 2 1 3 / C u r l e y 5 4 8 - 4 9 .72Spinoza, vol . I : Dieu Ethique, I ) ( H i l d e s h e i m : G e o r g O l m s , 1 9 6 8 ) , 3 2 1 - 2 2 . F o r a s i m i l a r

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , se e J o e l F r i e d m a n , H o w t h e F i n i t e F o ll ow s f r o m t h e I n f i n i t e i n S p i n o z a ' s M e t a -p h y s i c a l S y s t e m , Synthese 6 9 ( 19 8 6) : 3 8 6 - 9 o , 4 o 2 - 4 o 3 . F r i e d m a n d o e s n o t c i te G u e r o u h ' s w o r k ,b u t d o e s c i te ( o n 4 o 5 n . t 1 ) H e r m a n n d e D i j n 's T h e A r t i c u l a t i o n o f N a t u r e o r t h e R e l a t io n o fG o d - M o d e s i n S p in o z a , Giornale critico dellafilosofia italiana 5 6 0 9 7 7 ) : 3 3 7 - 4 4 , w h i c h a c k no w l -e d g e s t h e i n f l u e n c e o f G u e r o u l t .


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S P I N O Z A S M E D I A T E I N F I N I T E M O D E 2 1 5implicit in the argument from E IVP4D cited above, between God's infinitepower and that power insofar as it is realized in a finite actual essence.

Both the result and the distinction are troubling given the view, repeatedlyemphasized in the Ethics, that finite essences follow from the absolute natureof God's attributes. T he ultimate source of this view is Proposition 16 of Part I,which states: From the necessity of the divine nature, infinite [things] ininfinite mo d e s . . , must follow. 77 Since the divine nature is expressed by thedivine attributes, for Spinoza, to follow necessarily from the divine naturealone is simply to follow from the absolute nature of the divine attributes.Th at E IP16 implies that finite essences so follow is indicated by two passagesfrom the Ethics, quo ted above, to which this Proposition is linked. In E IIP45SSpinoza cited this Proposition in support of the claim that the force by whichsingular things persevere in existence, which as he indicated elsewhere issimply the ir actual essence, follows from [sequuntur] the eternal necessity ofthe nature of God. 78 And in the passage from E VP29S he appealed to EIIP45S in suppo rt of the conclusion that we can conceive our own body u n -der a species of eternity since we can conceive it to be contained in God andto be a consequence of [consequi] the necessity of the divine nature. 79 Thusthere is a line of argumen t leading from E IP~6 to the conclusion in E VP29Sthat the finite essence o f our body follows from the absolute nature o f a divineattribute.

This difficult conclusion cannot be dismissed on the grounds that it isincidental to the Ethics. It is presupposed, after all, by the account in this texto f sc i en t ia i n tu i t i va , or the third and highest kind of knowledge. In Scholium2 of Proposition 4o of Part II, Spinoza explained that knowledge of this kindproceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of some attributes of

God to an adequate knowledge [cognit ionem] of the essences of things.TM Theindication here is that scientia intui t iva proceeds directly from the idea of theattributes to knowledge of the essences, which would seem to be possible onlyif the essences themselves followed from the nature of the attributes alone.And indeed, toward the end of the Ethics Spinoza presented the scientia in-tu i t iva of our bodily essence as involving the conception of this essence insofaras it follow[s] from the necessity of the divine nature. '8~ Such a conceptionclearly is imp or tant for him, since he he ld that it is only in virtue of it that themin d necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is

7 7G I I 6 o / C u r l ey 4 2 4 .7 8 G I I 1 2 7 / C u r l ey 4 8 ~ .7 9G I I 2 9 8 - 9 9 / C u r l e y 6 1 o .8 ~ I I 1 2 2 / C u r l ey 4 7 8 .~ 1E V P 2 9 S , G I I 2 9 8 - 9 9 / C u r l e y 6 1 o .


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2 6 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I ST O R Y O F PH I L O SO P H Y 3 5 : A PR I L ~ 9 9 7c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h G o d , T a n d t h u s a c h i e v e s a n i n te l le c t u a l L o v e o f G o d . s 3T h e c o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s i n t h e Et h i c s , w h i c h p r o v i d e s o m e t h i n g o f a c u l m i n a -t i o n o f t h is w o r k , t h u s d e p e n d o n t h e c la i m t h a t w e c a n c o n c e i v e o f o u r f i n it eb o d i l y e s s e n c e a s f o l l o w i n g f r o m t h e n e c e s s i ty o f G o d ' s n a t u r e , t h a t is t o sa y ,f r o m t h e a b s o l u t e n a t u r e o f a n a t t r i b u t e t h a t e x p r e s s e s t h is n a t u r e . T h e t en -s i o n b e t w e e n s u c h a c la i m a n d t h e a r g u m e n t i n t hi s t e x t f o r t h e i n fi n i ty o f t h ei n f in i te m o d e s s t r i k es m e a s o n e t h a t is d e e p l y e m b e d d e d i n S p i n o z a ' s s y s te m .

N o n e t h e l e s s , I t h i n k t h a t o n e c o u l d b e g i n t o re s o l v e s u c h a t e n s i o n b yd r a w i n g o n t h e p o s i t io n , s u g g e s t e d i n E V P 2 9 S , t h a t f in i te b o d i l y es s e n c e s a r e

c o n t a i n e d i n G o d . W h i l e s u c h a p o s i t io n is i n a s e n s e n o m o r e t h a n a v a r i a n to f S p i n o z a ' s v i e w t h a t t h e s e e s s e n c e s f o l lo w f r o m t h e n e c e s s it y o f th e d i v i n en a t u r e , i t is s i g n i f i c a n t i n s o f a r a s it c a ll s t o m i n d t h e i m p o r t a n t d i s c u s s i o n i nt h e E t h i c s o f n o n e x i s t e n t m o d e s . S u c h m o d e s a r e fi rs t m e n t i o n e d i n t h e E t h i c si n a p a s s a g e f r o m P a r t I t h a t m a k e s t h e s o m e w h a t o b s c u r e p o i n t t h a t a l-t h o u g h n o t e x i s t i n g i n a c t a c t u a l l y e x i s t o u t s i d e t h e i n t e ll e c t, s ti l l n o n e x i s t e n tm o d e s h a v e e s se n c es c o m p r e h e n d e d [comprehendi tur] i n a n o t h e r , s o t h a t t h e yc a n b e c o n c e i v e d t h r o u g h t h e sa m e. 84 H o w e v e r , S p i n o z a e x p r e s s e d t h i s p o i n tm o r e c l e a r l y l a te r i n th i s te x t , in P r o p o s i t i o n 8 o f P a r t I I , w h i c h s t a t e s in f u l l:

T h e i d e a s o f s i n g u l a r t h i n g s , o r o f m o d e s , n o t e x i s t i n g m u s t b e c o m p r e -h e n d e d [comprehendi ] i n th e i n f in i te i d e a o f G o d [De i i n f i n i t a i dea] i n t h e s a m ew a y a s t h e f o r m a l e s s e n c e s o f s i n g u l a r t h i ng s , o r m o d e s , a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h ea t t r i b u t e s o f G o d . ''8 5

H e r e I w a n t t o b r a c k e t t h e p o i n t a b o u t t h e i d ea s o f n o n e x i s t e n t m o d e sb e i n g c o m p r e h e n d e d i n G o d ' s i n f in i te i d e a ( I w i l l r e t u r n i n w t o i ss u e s c o n -c e r n i n g t h is in f i n i t e i d ea ) , a n d t o fo c u s o n t h e c l a im t h a t t h e f o r m a l e s s e n c e s o ft h e m o d e s a r e c o m p r e h e n d e d i n t h e d i v in e a t t r i b u te s . I t is c l ea r e n o u g h w h yS p i n o z a s a id t h a t t h e se m o d e s h a v e a f o r m a l e s s e n c e (e s sen t i a f ormal i s ) , g i v e nh i s v i e w t h a t t h e f o r m a l e s s e n c e o f a t h i n g ( as o p p o s e d t o i ts a c t u a l e s s e n c e )d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e t h e a c t u a l e x i s t en c e o f th a t t h i n g . 86 W h a t r e q u i r e s e x p l a -

8~E VP 3o, G 11 299/Cu rley 61o.8~E VP3~C , G 1I 3oo/Curley 611. Th e a rgu m en t here is as fol lows: Knowledge o f our bodilyessence as following fro m the divine n ature has the idea o f God as i ts cause, and is i tself the causeo f the affec t of joy. Bu t given tha t love is simply a Joy, accomp anied by the idea of an externa lcause, which idea indicates the object of the love (see the sixth o f the D efini tions of the A ffects att h start of E l l I , at G II 192/Curley 533), it fol lows that such knowledge results in a Lov e o fGod.84E IP8S~, G II 5o/Curley 414 .85 G I I 9 o/Cu rley 452. T he re is an anticipation o f the view in this passage in K V, Ap p. I I . 12, GI 119/Curley i54-55. Cf . C M I .i i, G I 2 38-3 9/Cu rley 3o 4-3 o5 .

86 CM I . ii , G I 238 -39/C urley 3o 4-3 o5 Spinoza m ust hold tha t ac tua l essence presupposesactual existence since, as we have seen, he h eld th at the actual essence of a thing is that th ro ug hwhich the thing p erseve res in existence.


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nation, though, is his point that these formal essences are comprehended inGod's attributes. Fortunately, in the Scholium to the Proposition he illustratedthis point by appealing to the example of the infinity of rectangles equal toeach other that can be, but are not actually, drawn in a circle.87 Even thoughsuch rectangles by hypothesis do not have actual durational existence, accord-ing to Spinoza, nonetheless they are contained ( c o n t i n e n t u r ) in the circle inthe sense that the circle is of such a nat ure that rectangles fo rm ed f romsegments of all the straight lines intersecting in it are equal among them-selves. ' '88 Th e sugges tion her e is that just as nonexis tent rectangles are con-tained in the circle in the sense that they must be conceived in terms of thenatur e of the circle, so the forma l essences of nonexistent modes are compr e-hended in the divine attributes in the sense that they must be conceived interms of the absolute nature of such attributes.89

But the central question at this point is how Spinoza could possibly holdthat finite essences are com pr eh en de d in the divine attributes in this manner ,given his arg ume nt that only somethin g infinite can follow from the absolutenatur e of these attributes. While he did not to my knowledge directly addressthis question, I think that there is open to him a two-part response thatconcerns the specific case of finite bodily essences. According to the first partof the response, these essences are contained or comp re he nde d in the face ofthe material universe. According to the second, this face is itself an infinitemode that follows from the absolute nature of the divine attribute of exten-sion. Thus finite bodily essences are comprehended in extension in the sensethat they are contained in an infinite mode that follows from the absolutenature of that attribute.

The first part of this response depends on the identification of the face ofthe material universe with an infinite corporeal individual that has its owninfinite fo rm . In line with this identification, th e essences of finite individualscan be said to be the fo rms of those individuals. T he examp le in E IIP 8S

8 G II 91/Curley 452-53 . Cf. the useful discussions of Proposition and Scholium in Gueroult,Spinoza: L am e, 92-1o2; and Matson, Body Essence and Mind Eternity, in E. Curley and P.-F.Moreau, eds., Spinoza: Issues and D irections (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 199o), 87-9o.88 G II 9]/Curley 452. Spinoza conceded in a 1676 letter to Tschirnhaus that it may well be thecase that only a single property can be deduced from the definitions of beings of reason such asmathematical figures (Ep . 83, 15 July 1676, G IV 335/Wolf 365; cf. Tschirnhaus's remarks in Ep.82, 23 June 1676, G IV 333-34/Wolf 364). This concession perhaps explains the warning in EIIP8S that the example of the rectangles contained in the nature of a circle is not entirelyadequate (G II 91tCurley 45~).s9 On Spinoza's view, of course, even actually existing finite modes must be conceived hrougha divine attribute. But such modes are conceived not through the absolute nature of that attribute,but rather through the attribute insofar as it is modified by the other finite modes that determinetheir existence (see E IP28,D, G II 69/Curley 43~).


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2 1 8 J OURN AL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILO SOPHY 35:~ APRIL 997allows us to understand the manner in which these forms or essences arecontained in the infinite individual itself. According to this example, the circlecompreh ends in its nature the infinite number of rectangles that derive fromthe intersecting chords within that circle. In the same way, the infinite individ-ual could be said to comprehend in its form the infinite number of forms offinite individuals that derive fr om the infinite distributions of the quantities ofmotion and rest amon g the parts of the universe. The Physical Digression thusprovides a readily intelligible sense in which the face of the universe compre-hends finite bodily essences.

Th e claim that Spinoza could accept this first step of the response has beenchallenged principally by Gueroult, who has urge d that it is more in keepingwith Spinoza's thought to hold that the finite bodily essences are compre-hended in the immediate infinite mode of extension, motion-and-rest. Gue-roult has placed particular emphasis on the comment in E VP4oS that eterna lideas of finite bodily essences all at once omne simul] constitute the eternaland infinite intellect of God. 9o The indication in this passage is that theseideas are comprehended directly in the infinite intellect, which is the immedi-ate infinite mode of thought.9~ Gueroult's assumption is that, had he consid-ered the issue, Spinoza would have concluded on the basis of his Para llel ism--that is, the doctrine in E IIP 7 that the order and connection of ideas is thesame as the order and connection of things --that the finite bodily essencesthat cor respond to these ideas are likewise comprehended directly in motion-and-rest, the immediat e infinite mode of extension.9~

As inevitable as this conclusion may seem given Spinoza's Parallelism, how-ever, it is not naturally suggested by his account in the Physical Digression of theforms o f finite corporeal individuals. What this section does suggest is that thenatu re of motion-and-res t pertains directly to the case of the simplest bodies,which Spinoza himself sharply distinguished from the case of individuals.93Whereas the distinction among the simplest bodies depends only on their mo-tion and rest, the distinction among individuals depends on a derivative fea-ture, the ratio of motion and rest. In this section, moreover, Spinoza claimedthat finite individuals are contained in the one infinite individual. But then itseems that the forms of these individuals would be compre hen ded directly not

9~ II 3o6/Curley 615. This passage refer s to an infinite num ber of eternal modes ofthinking as constituting God's infinite intellect. These mode s of thinking are identified in EVP~3D with ideas o f bodily essences.

a~ See no te a 1.9 , S p i n o z a : D i e u , 3 ~ 1 - 2 ~ .9s Math eron has claimed that Spinoza took individuals to include the simplest bodies aslimiting cases I n d i v i d u e t c o m m u n a u t ~ , 4a), but I think that this view is not compatible with the

distinction in E IILem7S between individuals composed of the simplest bodies and individualscomp osed of other individuals (G II lOl-- lo2/Cu rley 461).


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i n m o t i o n - a n d - r e s t , b u t r a t h e r i n th e i n f in i te c o r p o r e a l i n d i v id u a l . G i v e n h i sr e m a r k s i n t h e P h y s i c a l D i g r e s s i o n , S p i n o z a h a s r e a s o n s t o re s is t t h e c o n c l u s i o nt h a t G u e r o u l t w o u l d h a v e h i m d r a w , a n d t o h o l d i n s t e ad t h a t f i ni te b o d i l ye s s e n c es a r e c o m p r e h e n d e d d i r ec t l y i n t h e f a c e o f t h e m a t e r i a l u n i v e r se .

O n t h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h e r e s p o n s e t h a t I o f f e r o n S p i n o z a 's b eh a l f , th ef a c e o f t h e u n i v e r s e is a n i n f i n it e m o d e t h a t f o ll o w s f r o m t h e a b s o l u t e n a t u r eo f t h e d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e o f e x t e n s io n . T h i s p a r t is c r u c ia l t o t he r e s o l u t i o n o f t h et e n s i o n i n t h e E t h i c s , s i n ce i t i s o n l y i n v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f a c e o f t h eu n i v e r s e f o ll o w s f r o m t h e a b s o l u t e n a t u r e o f e x te n s i o n t h a t t h e b o d i l y es s e n ce sc o m p r e h e n d e d i n th e m a t e r i a l u n i v e r s e a s a w h o l e c a n b e sa id s o t o fo l lo wf r o m t hi s a t t r i b u te . T h e c l a im t h a t S p i n o z a t o o k t h e f a c e o f th e u n i v e r s e t o b ea n i n f in i te m o d e is b e y o n d r e p r o a c h ; i n t h e l e t t e r to S c h u ll e r h e h i m s e l fo f f e r e d i t a s h is o n ly e x a m p l e o f a m e d i a t e i n fi n it e m o d e . B u t t h e c l a i m t h a t h et o o k t h is m o d e t o f o ll o w f r o m t h e a b s o l u t e n a t u r e o f a d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e i s m o r ec o n t r o v e r s i a l ; E m i l i a G i a n c o t t i h a s in f a c t r e c e n t l y a r g u e d a g a i n s t it . S h e h a se m p h a s i z e d t h a t w h i l e t h e d i sc u s s io n o f i m m e d i a t e i n fi n it e m o d e s i n E I P 2 1s p e a k s o f t h i n g s t h a t f o l l o w f r o m t h e a b s o lu t e n a t u r e o f a n y o f t h e a t t r i b u t e so f G o d , t h e d i sc u s s io n o f m e d i a t e i n fi n it e m o d e s i n E I P 2 2 m a k e s n o m e n t i o no f fo l l o w i n g f r o m t h e a b s o l u t e n a t u r e o f th e a t t r i b u te s . M o r e o v e r , s h e h a sd r a w n a t t e n t i o n t o th e c o n t r a s t i n E I P 2 3 b e t w e e n i m m e d i a t e i n fi n it e m o d e s ,w h i c h f o ll o w f r o m t h e a b s o lu t e n a t u r e o f s o m e a tt r ib u t e o f G o d , a n d m e d i -a t e i n f in i te m o d e s , w h i c h f o ll o w f r o m s o m e a tt r i b u te , m o d i f i e d b y a m o d i f i c a -t i o n t h a t e x i s t s n e c e s s a r i l y a n d is i n fi n it e . 9 4 O n G i a n c o t t i ' s r e a d i n g , t h i s p a s -s a g e i n d i c a te s t h a t t h e d i s t in c t io n b e t w e e n i m m e d i a t e a n d m e d i a t e i n f in i tem o d e s t u r n s o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f o r m e r f o l l o w f r o m t h e a b s o lu t e n a t u r e o f ad i v i n e a t t r i b u t e w h i l e t h e l a t t e r d o n o t.9 5

A s e r i o u s d i ff i cu l ty f o r t h i s r e a d i n g d e r i v e s f r o m S p i n o z a 's o w n c l a im i nt h e D e m o n s t r a t i o n o f E I P 2 3 t h a t a n in f in i te m o d e c a n f o l lo w f r o m t h e a b s o -l u t e n a t u r e o f a d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e e i t h e r im m e d i a t e l y o r b y s o m e m e d i a t i n gm o d i f i c a t i o n , t h a t f o l l o w s f r o m i t s a b s o l u t e n a t u r e. 9 6 G i a n c o t t i h a s d i s m i s s e dt h is c l a i m o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t m u s t b e r e a d i n li g h t o f E I P 2 3 i ts e lf , w h i c hd o e s n o t s a y t h a t a m e d i a t e i n f i n i te m o d e f o l lo w s f r o m t h e a b s o l u te n a t u r e o fs o m e d i v i n e a tt ri bu t e. 97 B u t t h e r e is n o c l e ar a r g u m e n t h e r e a g a i n s t r e a d i n gt h e c l a im i n E I P 2 3 t h a t a m e d i a t e i n fi n it e m o d e f o ll o w s f r o m s o m e a t t ri b u t e ,m o d i f i e d b y a n i m m e d i a t e i n f in i te m o d e i n l ig h t o f t h e c o n c lu s i o n in th eD e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t t o s o fo l lo w f r o m a n a t t r i b u t e i s t o fo l lo w f r o m i ts a b s o l u t e

94 G II 66/Curley 43 o.0~ O n the P roblem o f Infinite M odes, in Y. Yov el, ed., Go d a n d N a tu re , S p in o za s M eta p h ys i cs( S p in o z a b y 2 o o o - - T h e J e r u sa l em C o n f e re n c e s, v o l. I ) (Leiden: E . J. Brill, 1~91), 1o5-1o6.~6G II 67/Curley 431.97 On the Problem of Infinite M odes, lO3


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2 2 0 J OURN AL OF THE HISTORY OF

Spinoza's Mediate Infinite Mode - Tad M. Schmaltz

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