Spinoza's Distinction

7/27/2019 Spinoza's Distinction

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Philosophical Review

Spinoza's Distinction Between Rational and Intuitive KnowledgeAuthor(s): Spencer CarrSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 241-252Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184754 .

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The PhilosophicalReview,LXXXVII, No. 2 (April 1978).DISCUSSIONS

SPINOZA'S DISTINCTIONBETWEEN RATIONAL ANDINTUITIVE KNOWLEDGESpencer arr

IThere seemsto be a growingconsensus about how Spinoza's distinc-tion between rational knowledge (ratio)and intuitiveknowledge(scientiantuitive)s to be understood.Central to thisbody ofagreementis the view that thedistinction, s it s drawn in theEthics, s one betweentheknowledgeofgeneral truths nd theknowledgeof ndividual things;theformers to be associated withreason, thelatter withintuition.1Wewill soon have occasion to note otherpositions and consequences asso-ciated withthis nterpretation fSpinoza's distinction.But perhaps themoststriking fthese is thenotion that the Ethicsversion of thedistinc-tion differs adically fromthe version Spinoza provides in the Treatiseon the mprovementftheUnderstanding.2 find the evidence forboth thecentral claim and itscorollaryunconvincing; acceptance of themleadsto un-Spinozistic ideas and to the underminingof what I take to beSpinoza's fundamental insight. n what follows will defend the con-stancy and integrity f Spinoza's distinctionby arguing foran alter-native reading of his texts,one which is plausible in its own rightandwhich does not entail that he changed his mind between the Treatiseand the Ethics.It will be necessaryto workfairly lose to Spinoza's texts, o I beginby settingout the crucial passages from,respectively, he Treatise ndthe Ethics.

' See, forexample, G.H.R. Parkinson, Spinoza's Theory fKnowledge London,1954), pp. 182-5, and Errol E. Harris, Salvation romDespair (The Hague,1973), pp. 107ff. More sustained defense of this view may be found inE. M. Curley, "Experience in Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge," inM. Grene, ed., Spinoza (Garden City, N.Y., 1973) and in J. J. MacIntosh,"Spinoza's Epistemological Views," in G.N.A. Vesey, ed., Reason andReality:Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Volume 5 (London, 1972).2This is explicitly claimed by both Curley and MacIntosh. Because theviews I am considering are held and defended most explicitly in these twopapers, I will attend exclusively to them.

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SPENCER CARRReflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge may be reducedto four:

I. Perception arising fromhearsay or fromsome sign which everyonemay name as he pleases.II. Perception arisingfrommereexperience-that is,from xperience notyet classified by the intellect, and only so called because the given event hashappened to take place, and we have no contradictoryfact to set against it, sothat it thereforeremains unassailed in our mind.III. Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred fromanother thing,but not adequately; this comes when from ome effectwe gatherits cause, or when it is inferredfrom ome general proposition that some prop-ertyis always present.IV. Lastly, there s theperception arisingwhen a thing s perceived solelythrough its essence, or through the knowledge of its proximate cause.3From what has already been said, it clearly appears that we perceive manythings and form universal ideas:

1. From individual things,represented by the senses to us in a mutilatedand confused manner, and without order to the intellect [Corol. Prop. 29,pt. 2]. These perceptionsI have therefore een in thehabit ofcalling knowledgefromvague experience.2. From signs; as forexample when we hear or read certain words, werecollect things and formcertain ideas ofthem similar to them,through whichideas we imagine things [Schol. Prop. 18, pt. 2]. These two ways oflooking atthings shall hereafter all knowledge of the first ind, opinion or imagination.3. From our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the proper-ties of things [Corol. Prop. 38, Prop. 39, with Corol. and Prop. 40, pt. 2].This I shall call reason and knowledge of the second kind.Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is a third, as I shall hereaftershow, which we shall call intuitive science. This kind of knowing advances

from n adequate idea of the formal essence ofcertain attributesofGod to theadequate knowledge of the essence of things.4The differences in these formulations lead Curley to conclude that the

distinction between reason and intuition has altered radically.In the Treatise he primarycontrast between reason and intuition seemed to bethat, whereas reason involved an inadequate, because inferential,knowledgeoftheessences ofthings, ntuition involved an adequate and immediate knowl-edge of their essences. And therewere two species ofintuition-one exemplifiedby knowledge ofthe essence or definitionof an attribute,the otherexemplifiedby knowledge of the essence or definition of a mode.

3 Tractatusde Intellectus mendatione.pinoza Opera. Herausgegeben von CarlGebhardt. Heidelberg: Carl Winters.V. II. p. 10. (Translation byW.H. White)This passage appears on p. 7 of John Wild's Spinoza SelectionsNew York,1930).'Ethics in Gebhardt, op. cit. (Translation by Elwes, Bohn) IIP40S2.I.e. Part two, proposition 40, scholium two. In other references,A standsfor "axiom," C for"corollary."

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RATIONAL AND INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGEIn the Ethics ntuition eems to be conceivedmorenarrowly.t includesadequateknowledge f the essences fsingular hings,.e.,finitemodes,butitdoesnot nclude dequate knowledgeftheessences fdivine ttributes.... IntheEthics, houghnot ntheTreatise,hiskindofknowledgesclassified nderthe headingof reason.... Reason isknowledge f the essences fthose hingsthatin the Treatise re described s fixed nd eternal hings-the ttributesand infinitemodesof theEthics. ntuitions knowledge ftheessences fthosethings hat n the Treatisere described s singularmutablethings-the initemodesofthe Ethics. Curley, p. 56-7]

So Curley contends that thecrux of thedistinctionhas changed fromone of inferentialversusdirect knowledge to one ofknowledge of uni-versalsversusknowledge of the essencesof finite hings.This character-ization of the latterdistinction s based to a greatextentupon an asidemade by Spinoza at V36CS.I thoughtt worthwhileormeto notice hishere, n order hat might how,bythis xample,whatthatknowledge f ndividual bjectswhich havecalledintuitive rofthe thirdkind Schol.2, Prop. 40, pt. 2] is able todo, and howmuchmorepotent t is than the universalknowledge,which have calledknowledge fthe secondkind.

Referringto thissame passage, MacIntosh reaches the same conclu-sion. He offers truthsof a general nature vs. insights nto the essenceof individual things" as a slogan to catch the crucial distinction Mac-Intosh, p. 47).There are two crucial elements of thisnew consensus: (1) That thedistinction n the Treatises that between inferential nd direct knowl-edge, and (2) That in the Ethicsthe distinction s that between knowl-edge of universal or general truths nd knowledgeofindividual objects.These two elements ead to a third: 3) That whereasin the Treatise hereare two kinds of intuition (intuitionof an attributenvolves grasping itsessence; intuition of a finite mode nvolves grasping the essence of itsproximatecause), in theEthics ntuition sonlyof modes. I am primarilyconcerned to contest these threepositions.There is no denying that Spinoza's language can suggestsomethinglike the consensus view. But there are a number of problems forthisinterpretation.Consider, forexample, Spinoza's favorite llustrationofthe different inds of knowledge:Let therebe threenumbers iventhroughwhich t is required o discoverfourth hich hallbe to the third s the econd s to the first. merchant oesnot hesitate omultiply he second nd third ogethernd dividethe productbythefirst,ither ecausehe has notyetforgottenhethingswhichhe heardwithout nydemonstrationrom isschoolmaster,rbecausehe has seenthetruth ftherulewith hemore implenumbers,r becausefromhe19th rop.in the7th book of Euclid he understandshecommonproperty fall propor-tionals.

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SPENCER CARRBut withthe simplestnumbers here s no need of all this. f thenumbers1,2, 3, for nstance, e given, very ne can see thatthefourth roportionals6 muchmoreclearly han by anydemonstration,ecause from heratioinwhichwesee byone ntuitionhat hefirsttands othe econdweconclude hefourth.IIP40S2]This example raises two questions. In the firstplace, unless Spinozaholds thatnumbers are finitemodes, it sunclear how any mathematicalknowledge can be intuitive if rational knowledge is of universals andintuitive knowledge is of particular things. And there is the relatedproblem that Spinoza's use of the same example for all the types ofknowledge implies that the same thing can be known in each of theways ofknowing. His classification s presented as one ofdifferentwaysofknowing the same thingand not as one ofdifferentbjects of knowl-edge. Now itispossible that an analysis ofdifferent aysofknowingcanlead to the consequence that only certain objects are appropriate tocertain ways, but according to the interpretationwe are considering,a differencen object is at the heart of the distinction.The example offindingthe fourthproportion strongly uggests that Spinoza did notsee it in thisway.There are other difficultiesfor the interpretation. When Spinozacelebrates the intellectual love ofGod in Part V of theEthics, ntuitiveknowledge is called the highest and most perfectform of knowledge.On the consensus interpretation hisrefers o knowledge of the essencesofsingularmutable things, hat is,thefinitemodes. But this s surprisingsince theknowledge offixed and immutable things s the likeliercandi-date for improving one's relationship with Spinoza's God. Anothersurprisingconsequence, one noted by both Curley and MacIntosh, isthatintuition, hehighest formofknowledge,necessarilydepends uponrational knowledge, the lower form.5Much of this is prima facie puzzling, but there is another, moregeneral, problem to face. If we assume that Spinoza's epistemologicalviewsunderwent substantialchange betweenthe Treatise nd theEthics,we should also assume that he had some good reason forchanging hismind. Even if we accept that the Treatise ersion is unclear and notcompletely thought out, it is difficultto believe that Spinoza wouldundergo a radical change in his beliefs unless he were under the influ-ence of some newly perceived insightor problem. Neither Curley norMacIntosh provide any such motivation.

'For arguments o this onclusion eeCurley, . 58, and MacIntosh,p. 47.244



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RATIONAL AND INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGEII

I turnnow to the task of providing an alternative interpretation fSpinoza's two formulationsand theirrelationship. I shall firstdiscussthe Treatise istinctionbetween reason and intuitionand argue that itis not distinctionbetweeninferential nd directknowledge. shall thentryto show that the Ethicsformulationof the distinction s consistentwith a properunderstandingof the Treatise. hen I shall consider,oneby one, thosepassages from heEthicswhichhave seemed to require theinterpretation f theconsensus. f I am right, close scrutiny f all thesepassages, with special attentionto theircontexts,will allow us to dealwiththem n a way thatwillnotinvolveuswiththedifficultiesttendingto the consensus position.Turning, then, to the Treatise, suggest that the crux here is notthat rational knowledge is inferential nd that intuitive knowledge isnot. In the firstplace, what Spinoza says is that rational knowledgearises "when the essence of one thing is inferredfromanother thing,but not adequately." This suggeststhat theessence ofa thingmightbeinferred rom notherthingadequately,n which case we would not havean instance of rational knowledge. What would we have? Certainlynot imagination or opinion. The only plausible candidate is intuitiveknowledge. If so, thenintuitiveknowledgecan be inferential.The sameconclusion is suggestedby the veryformulationof intuitiveknowledgeitself, or ntuitiveknowledge arises "when a thing s perceived throughitsessence,or throughtheknowledgeof tsproximatecause." Perceivinga thing throughthe knowledge of itsproximate cause amounts to per-ceiving it as followingas a consequence from tsproximatecause. So itlooks as though inferentialknowledge need not be rational and that itcan be intuitive.'What is essential to the distinction Spinoza is drawing is not thepresence or absence of inference.Spinoza's first xample of an inade-quate inference s that of inferring roman effect o its cause, and thegeneralityof his example clearly implies that any such inferencewillbe inadequate. This contrastswith the case of intuitiveknowledge inwhichwe perceivea thingthrough ts proximatecause, that is, nwhichwe inferfromcause to effect. pinoza's point has to do withthe properorderingf our thoughts.That this s the properview to take ofthe distinction s supported bythe overall structure nd argumentof the Treatise. he question iswhich

6Of those I have cited,Parkinson rguesthat intuitiveknowledgemaybe inferential. ee p. 183. Curiouslyenough, he argues this fromthetextoftheEthics. 245



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SPENCER CARRformofknowledge is best,and Spinoza's answer, unequivocally, is thatbased on intuition.That this"best knowledge" is a matterofthedirec-tion of thought comes out many times in the Treatise:[D]oubt alwaysproceeds romwantof due order n investigation.Gebhardt,V. II, p. 30; Wild,p. 32][T]rue cience roceeds romausetoeffect;Gebhardt, . II, p. 32,Wild,p. 34][T]heknowledgef n effectsnothingessthanthe cquisition fmoreperfectknowledge f itscause. [Gebhardt,V. II, p. 34; Wild,p. 36]And, fromthe Ethics, The knowledge of an effectdepends upon andinvolvestheknowledge of itscause" (IA4). Of course,everything hat isnot self-caused s an effect. o, on what I shall call the "ordering" inter-pretation,what is important about knowledge is that it is rooted incauses and moves towardeffects. ince theultimatecause ofeverythingis to be found in substance, or God, intuitiveknowledge must have itssource in attributesof God. Rational knowledge arises when we inferfromthe nature of dependent thingsand not fromthe nature of sub-stance. It starts t thewrongplace and itmoves in thewrongdirection.

What has happened to this distinctionin the Ethics? Spinoza saysthat knowledge of the second kind (rational knowledge) comes "fromour possessingcommon notionsand adequate ideas ofthepropertiesofthings." Intuitive knowledge, however, "advances froman adequateidea of the formalessence ofcertain attributesofGod to the adequateknowledge of the essence of things."What is of special interesthere isthe same notion of a certain source and directionof thought that wesaw,in the Treatise. ntuitive knowledge is an advance rom he formalessenceof an attribute o headequate knowledgeoftheessenceofthings.Rational knowledge,on theotherhand, arisesfromour ideas of things.Spinoza, I claim, is making the same methodological point in bothplaces. He iswillingto grant, t least in theEthics, hatthere s adequateknowledge arising fromour ideas of things;but thisknowledge is lessthan the ideal, according to which "true science" will always movefrom ause to effect, romthe independent to thedependent, from ub-stance to mode, and fromGod to finitethings.7Why, then, fthe two accounts are not fundamentallydifferent,oesSpinoza list two formsof intuitiveknowledge in the Treatise nd onlyone in the Ethics? This is not an inconsistency r a change of mind onSpinoza's part, but only a reflection f the different ontexts n whichthe two classifications arise. In the Treatise pinoza is talking aboutintuitiveknowledge in general. It ariseseitherwhen a thing s perceived'Spinoza's attitude oward headequacyofrationalknowledgemaybe per-

ceived as ambivalent. will considerthis question below in sectionIII.246



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RATIONAL AND INTUITIVE KNO WLEDGEsolely through its essence (this can apply only to attributes) or whenit s perceivedthroughthe knowledgeof ts proximatecause (thisappliesto modes). In the EthicsSpinoza givesonly one case because he is in themidst of a discussionof the relationshipbetweenknowledge and objects,that is, individual thingsor finitemodes. This being so, it would not berelevant to mention the intuitive knowledge of attributes.That this isso is clear from the context,and it may be useful to spell this out.In propositions 37-40 of Part II Spinoza explains that we can formcommon notionsfromour perceptionsofobjects and that thesenotionsare necessarilyadequate. His idea is,roughly,that all bodies, by virtueof involving the conception of the same attribute,agree in certain re-spects; every body and every part of every body has something incommon. Spinoza's view of the relationship between mind and bodyand his doctrineofperception lead him to hold that any such commonnotion can only be perceived adequately. (At IIP13L2 Spinoza gives"being capable ofmotion and rest" as an example ofwhat is commonto all bodies.) The first cholium to proposition 40, the scholium justpreceding the classification, is concerned with distinguishing thesecommon notions from universal ideas drawn fromexperience whichwe might confuse with common notions. Throughout, Spinoza istalking about how we do and how we should handle our experienceof natural objects. He sums up the two main ways in which we haveknowledge of things from experience (imagination or opinion andreason); then he adds that there is another way of knowing things,one which gets to their essence. He describes this intuitiveknowledgeof the essences of things and, naturally enough, he does not mentionintuitiveknowledge of attributes. But it certainlycannot be inferredfrom this that Spinoza now believes that knowledge of attributeswould not be intuitive. This would be an unmotivated change of aradical sort and one contrary to the spiritof Spinoza's thought.Weshould be hesitant to attributesuch a change to Spinoza, and I shallnow try to show that there is no real pressureto do so.So far, then,there seems to be no clear reason to think that the twoformulations are inconsistent.They can both be seen as attempts toarticulate the point about the proper orderingof our thoughts. t re-mains to examine in some detail those aspects of theEthics hat have ledothersto the more complex view of the consensus.(1) In the first lace, why does Spinoza's description f rational knowl-edge insistthat it arises out of common otions and adequate ideas ofthe propertiesf things?The consensus view takes these expressionstocontrast with the individualsmentioned in the descriptionof intuitiveknowledge. In fact, though, Spinoza's arrangement of the types of247



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SPENCER CARRknowledge strongly uggeststhat the descriptionof rational knowledgeis meant to contrastmore tellinglywith that of imagination or opinion.Both reason and imagination or opinion deal with our experience ofobjects; the demand that reason involvecommon notionsand adequateideas ofproperties s a demand thatinworkingfrom xperiencewe takecare tostick o whatmaybe adequate. This is the demand that our expe-riencebe ordered and corrected by reason. It is not a demand that ra-tional knowledgebe knowledgeofuniversalsas opposed toknowledgeofindividuals. As we shall see, rational knowledge may arise out of com-mon notions without being knowledge of general truths or universals.

(2) It may be argued that in introducing n the Ethicsdefinitionsofthe typesof knowledge as a way in which we form"universal ideas,"Spinoza impliesthat rational knowledge s ofuniversals.And if ntuitiveknowledge is of individuals, this would explain why Spinoza curiouslytacks on intuitiveknowledge withoutnumbering it as a fourthway inwhich we perceive many things and form universal ideas. But thisprocedure, fcurious,does not tell against an "ordering" interpretation.For one thing, f t followsfromthisprocedure that rational knowledgeis not of individuals, it would also follow that opinion or imaginationis not of individuals. This is surelynot Spinoza's view. In the secondplace, from the fact that Spinoza is here talking about derivinguniversal ideas fromexperience it actually followsthat rational knowl-edge of individuals is possible. So suppose that one formsa commonnotion fromthe proper application of reason to one's experience ofthings.According to Spinoza (Ethics IP49CS), everyidea involves anaffirmationor negation. The affirmation ssociated with a commonnotion will be the thoughtthateverything ollowingunder the relevantattributehas the given property.But it followsfrom thisthat, foranysuch particular individual, ithas theproperty. take this to be rationalknowledge of an individual. It is certainly adequate, nd it cannot beintuitivesince common notions are no part of the essence of a thing(Ethics IIP37). In a similar way, adequate ideas of properties shouldgive rise to rational knowledge of individuals. And such knowledge ofan individual is fairlydescribed both as being "inferredfrom somegeneral proposition that some propertyis always present" (from theTreatise ersion) and as arising "from our possessingcommon notionsand adequate ideas of the propertiesof things" (fromthe Ethics).(3) But what ofSpinoza's remarks nPartV? Despite theappeal madeto thispassage by both Curley and MacIntosh, it does not support theconsensus view. Spinoza does notsay that intuitive knowledge is nec-essarilyof ndividuals. The crucial line hereis the relative clause "whichI have called intuitive," and the issue turns on whetherthe clause is

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RATIONA AND INTUITIVE KNO WLEDGEinterpreteds restrictivernonrestrictive.nonrestrictiveeadingoftheclausewould supportCurleyand MacIntosh;but therestrictivereading s,I claim,more plausible. t has Spinoza saying hatofthevariouswaysofknowingndividual bjects,t s intuitivenowledgefthem hat s morepowerful.here snosuggestionhat ntuitivenowl-edge sof ndividuals nly.He goeson to contrasthiswayofknowingindividual bjectswith heuniversal nowledgef them,whichhehascalled knowledge f the secondkind. This last "of them" s not inSpinoza; I have added it tomake clearwhat taketobe his ntentionsin thispassage.)Although claimthatmyreading fV36CS ismoreplausible hanthe alternative, neednotdo so to makemy case.Justpointing utthat herestrictiveeadings possible ufficeso show hatwe neednot takeV36CS to support heconsensus.8Itremainsoexplainwhy pinozawould allknowledgef ndividualsuniversal.wo possibilitiesometo mind.One is thatsuchknowledgecan be universal n the sensethat all persons hare in it. Spinozabelievesthat there s such knowledge, nd it may be no accidentthat tspossibilityependsuponthe commonnotionsEthicsIP38C),the doctrineof which is centralto the Ethics ccount of rationalknowledge.More likely, believe, t is thattheknowledgean be saidto be universal n thatit rests pon ur graspingpropertieshatarein all things. his connects ationalknowledge o (some)individuals,but it would not followthat the knowledge s ofuniversals r ofgeneral ruths.t is stillreasonable o insist hattheknowledgean beknowledge fparticular hings.(4) Nowthefact hat nthis amepassageSpinozacontrastshepowerof ntuitive nowledge fobjectswithhis demonstrationsn PartI oftheEthicsmight e thoughtwkward,ince tsuggestshatthisknowl-edge is not intuitive,whereas on my view that the matterofdirectionf nferencescrucial, ll these roofshouldproducentuitiveknowledge. he answer s,again,thatSpinoza is talking boutknowl-edge of individual things.The knowledgeof Part I is intuitive,but t snot ntuitive nowledgef ndividualhings.ntuitive nowledgeof individualthings, f course,mustend in our knowledge f theessenceof the thing;what we knowabout thingsfromPart I isonlywhatis commonto them ll, and whatis commonto themall

8 Those familiar ith hevagaries f17th enturyextswillrecognizehat hisissue annotbe settled yan appeal toGebhardt.t ismyunderstandinghat,in fact, restrictiveeadingof the clause is the more naturalview to takeof the Latin. But this is not decisive.Of moreweightare considerationsof mmediate ontext nd ofconsistency'withne'sgeneralunderstandingfSpinoza'sthought. hus, argumentsmade elsewheren thispaperwillweighin on theside oftherestrictiveeading.249



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SPENCER CARRcan be no part of the essence of any. In a nutshell, n Part V Spinozais not contrasting intuitive and rational knowledge; he iscontrasting ntuitiveknowledgeof ndividual thingswithrational know-ledge of them.Notice that on the Ethicsdescriptionofintuitiveknowledgeofobjectsthereare two ways in which adequate knowledge of a thing can fallshort of intuitive knowledge and, hence, be merely rational. Suchknowledge may not be grounded in the formalessence of an attribute,or, being properlygrounded, it may not advance to the essence of thething. What Spinoza proves of objects in Part I fails to be intuitiveknowledge because it fails the second requirement. It is significantthat the second example of rational knowledge given in the Treatises"knowledge inferred rom ome general propositionthatsome propertyis always present."This is a fairdescriptionof what is shown ofobjectsin Part I, and it is furtherconfirmation that the two accounts ofintuition and reason are not fundamentallydifferent.(5) It would be unfair to finish this surveywithout taking note ofthe largest embarrassmentto what I believe to be the correctway ofseeing Spinoza's distinction. refer o his example of our knowledge ofthe fourth member of a proportion. For when he speaks of knowingthe fourthmember intuitivelyratherthan througha Euclidean proof,it does seem likely that he is thinking of a distinction betweendirect and inferredknowledge. However, it should be noted thatit is notoriously difficultto reconcile any account of the ways ofknowledgewith the examples Spinoza provides.Furthermore, reciselythe same strongsuggestionof the inferential/direct nowledge distinc-tion is present in the example Spinoza gives in the Ethics, n which,on the view I am criticizing, the distinction is supposed to havechanged altogether.So in the Ethicsthisexample is an embarrassmentfor both views. On the strengthof the evidence provided above Isuggest that it makes most sense simply to concede that Spinoza'sexample is misleading on this point. Probably he believed that onceknowledgewas well ordered and rooted in essences,one could "directlyintuit" it in a way in which previously one could not. But this isnot the distinctionSpinoza describesoruseswhen he actually deals withthe distinctionbetween reason and intuition.I conclude fromall this that, considering ust the relevant texts bythemselves, my "ordering" interpretation comes off better thandoes the consensus view. It is consistent with what Spinoza says inthesepassages and makes better ense ofthem than does thealternative.Furthermore, the interpretation of Spinoza offered here avoids theproblems facing what I have called the consensus. (1) If my reading is

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RATIONAL AND INTUITIVE KNO WLEDGEcorrect, hen,with theproviso ust noted, t is appropriate forSpinoza tocitemathematical examples as instancesof ntuitive s well as ofrationalknowledge. It is also appropriate in that it makes clear that thesame things can be known by reason and by intuition. On theconsensus view, Spinoza's example is wildly misleading on thispoint.(2) My reading does not have the consequence that knowledge ofindividual things is most blessed forSpinoza. It places knowledge ofsubstance where it belongs-at the heart of Spinoza's doctrine ofblessedness. The blessedness of the knowledge of things is derivedfrom that of the knowledge of God. (3) Is intuition necessarilydependent upon reason, as it must be for the consensus? No,for ntuitiveknowledge of substance, or God, is not so dependent, andGod's own knowledgewill always be intuitive nd notrational. It is onlyour knowledge of individual things which may, by reason of ourfiniteness, equire reason. And even then,as the passage fromPart Vsuggests,we may later come to know the same thing by intuition.That formof knowledge which constituteshuman salvation does notnecessarily est upon an inferior form of knowledge. (4) Finally,the interpretationpresented here does not have the consequence thatSpinoza's view ofknowledge underwenta drastic change in the Ethics.The distinctionhe draws is consistent,well-motivated,and tied to hisfundamental insight about the universe and the methods we use toobtain knowledge of it: that what is independent and uncaused isontologically prior to what is dependent and caused and that thehighest form of knowledge must be rooted in the former.

IIIApart from the main issue of the reason/intuitiondistinction,bothCurley and MacIntosh argue that Spinoza changed his mind aboutanother matter. They claim that in the TreatiseSpinoza restrictsadequate knowledge to the highest form of knowing and that in theEthics he reverseshimself,allowing that both intuitive and rationalknowledgeare adequate. Actually,in the Treatise pinoza is ambivalentabout the status of rational knowledge. He says of it that "wemay say that it gives us the idea of the thing sought and that itenables us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is notby itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection weaim at" (Gebhardt, V. II, p. 13; Wild, p. 10). Spinoza is not goingto endorse such knowledge; the point of the Treatise s to find the bestform of knowledge, and that is clearly intuitive knowledge. Butneither is he willing to go so far as to say that it may lead

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SPENCER CARRto error. (Perhaps it should be pointed out that the appearance ofthe phrase "not adequately" in Spinoza's definition of rationalknowledge in no way commitshim to the view that theknowledge itselfis not adequate.) In the Ethics, of course, Spinoza is quite forthrightin holding both that rational knowledge is adequate and that itis less desirable than intuition.If this does constitute a shiftof emphasis, there are at least twopossible explanations for it. First, in working out the metaphysicaldetails of the EthicsSpinoza may well have become more aware of usthow deeply committedhe was to theadequacy of forms f nonintuitiveknowledge.This commitmentgrowsout of his theoryof the parallelismof the attributes of thought and extension and out of the doctrineof common notions. Second, Spinoza had to face the problem thatconfronts any philosopher with a special path to knowledge. Whatis to be said of what passes for knowledge among those who arenot privilege to the special method? Do "underprivileged" scientistsand mathematicians reallyknow anything? t is hard to answer in thenegative, but a positive answer seems to undermine the claims of thespecial method. Descartes was willing to take the heroic course ofdenyingfullepistemiccredit to atheistssince, withoutdivine guarantee,they were vulnerable to the overthrow of reason. Spinoza ismore tolerant. He allows that rational knowledge is necessarily true,at least so far as it goes. But his ultimate interest in the ethicalrather than the epistemic allows him to grant knowledge claimsto non-Spinozistswithout undermining the claims of his method. Themethod leads to oy and salvation; he can allow rational thinkers heirclaims to knowledge.9Worcester,assachusetts

'I wish oexpress ppreciationoMarthaBrandtBolton or omments nanearlier aperthatforcedmeto facethe ssues akenup here nd to RobertM.Adamsfor ssistance n dealingwithSpinoza's Latin.252

Spinoza's Distinction

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