Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–05–1 July 2005 Vol. 18, No. 1

SFQC Phase II:Building the SF

Warrior

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

One of the most dramatic changes inthe transformation of the Special ForcesTraining Pipeline has occurred in PhaseII of the SF Qualification Course. DuringSF Assessment and Selection, which wediscussed in the last issue of SpecialWarfare, we select students who havethe requisite physical and mental attri-butes for success in SF training andoperations — the “whole man.” DuringPhase II, we begin the training they willneed to be effective members of SFdetachments.

Phase II has always concentrated onsmall-unit tactics, but now it includesother combat skills, too — hand-to-handcombat; marksmanship; and SF tactics,techniques and procedures. The demandfor SF Soldiers has increased, but we arecommitted to maintaining our stand-ards, which requires us to train smarter.Accepting the challenge, Phase II cadremembers in the 1st Special WarfareTraining Group developed a modularsystem that not only allows us to traingreater numbers of Soldiers but alsoincludes lessons learned from currentoperations and gives more instructorattention to the students. Close associa-tion with these veteran SF operators is asignificant factor in the students’ devel-opment of a warrior mindset and theinstillation of the SF core values.

Other changes to Phase II instructioninclude the addition of a two-week blockof language training. It is imperativethat our SF soldiers learn to communi-cate with the populace of the regions inwhich they will operate. It has alwaysbeen the hallmark of SF Soldiers thatthey possess warrior skills and cross-cul-tural communication skills, as both arenecessary in the performance of SF mis-sions. Warrior skills, alone, will not beenough for SF Soldiers who need to workby, with or through indigenous forces or

who need to train host-nation forces.They must have the language skills andthe cultural sensitivity that will allowthem to communicate and build rapportwith members of other cultures.

As trainers, we have a duty to prepareour SF Soldiers for the demands of thebattles they will face — and they almostcertainly will face them, most within sixmonths of graduation from the SFQC.The changes in Phase II training havebeen made possible through the innova-tion of the NCOs in the cadre. Studentsneed to learn to analyze problems,adapt, and solve the problems innova-tively, and the cadre has set an examplefor them to follow.

Major General James W. Parker

Features2 SFQC Phase II: Building a Warrior

by Major Jonathan A. Blake

7 Understanding Training, Transformation and Warfareby Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner

8 Military Cultural Education: Necessary Part of Soldier-Development Programsby Colonel Maxie McFarland, U.S. Army (ret.)

16 The SF Intelligence Sergeant: Ensuring His Continuity andEffective Trainingby Major Marshall V. Ecklund

20 CA and PSYOP: Major Changes in Personnel, TrainingUpcoming for Officers, NCOsby Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Boyd

24 SF Command Addresses Joint-Fires Shortfalls at the SFGroup, Battalion Levelsby Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Kent

28 Gunfire Detection System Brings the Enemy Out of the Shadowsby Master Sergeant Francis Vangel

30 Special-Ops Imperatives Guide ODA 972 in Afghanistanby Major Vincent Martinelli

Departments35 Letters

36 Warrant Officer Career Notes

38 Officer Career Notes

39 Enlisted Career Notes

40 Update

42 Book Reviews

Cover: Photo by K. Kassens

PB 80–05–1 ContentsJuly 2005 Special Warfare Vol. 18, No. 1

Commander & CommandantMajor General James W. Parker

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorJanice L. Burton

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and shouldbe addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, FortBragg, NC 28310.Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910)432-5703, fax -3147, or send e-mail to steelman@soc.mil.Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Sandra R. RileyAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0513003

Headquarters, Department of the Army

The transformation of the SpecialForces training pipeline is affectingvirtually all areas of the training,

from selection to graduation. If the newlydesigned Special Forces Selection andAssessment, or SFAS (Phase I), is designedto select a candidate who is as strong phys-ically as he is mentally — the “whole man,”then Phase II is designed to train that manas a “whole warrior.”

It is during Phase II that the NCOs ofCompany C, 1st Battalion, 1st Special War-fare Training Group, build the foundationof combat skills that are essential for everySpecial Forces Soldier. The NCOs focus onhow to increase the lethality of each Sol-dier, viewing the individual not as a repos-itory of basic skills, but as a weapons plat-form — one that can function well with anyweapon, whether it’s his hands and feet, aknife, a stick, a pistol or a rifle. The goal isnot only to develop essential physical skillsand teach tactical drills, but also to instillin Soldiers the mindset and the core valuesthat are required of every Special Forces

Warrior. In truth, the shaping of the mind-set is as important as the development of aSoldier’s combat skills. It’s this warrior-ori-ented perspective that prepares a Soldierto function as an entry-level operator on anSF detachment.

Phase II did not always have this war-rior focus; however, the growing demandfor SF Soldiers on today’s battlefield hasbrought about changes not only to what istaught in Phase II, but when and how oftenit is taught.

In August 2004, Phase II Class 04-04,the largest in the history of the SpecialForces Qualification Course, or SFQC,arrived at Camp Mackall, N.C. The class —458 students in all — was 33-percent larg-er than the previous class and more thandouble the size of other classes taught dur-ing 2003 and 2004. The sheer amount oflogistics and personnel support needed toaccommodate larger classes was one ofthree factors that prompted the cadre tochange the way the course is conducted.

The cadre had only 16 team sergeantsavailable for training Class 04-04’s 458 stu-dents. Generally, Phase II maintains a 1-15instructor-to-student ratio, which wouldwould require 30 15-man student detach-ments for Class 04-04. In order to accommo-date the high number of students and main-tain training quality, the 1st Special WarfareTraining Group tasked 14 SF NCOs fromother battalions within the U.S. Army SFCommand and the JFK Special Warfare Cen-

2 Special Warfare

SFQC Phase II: Building a Warrior

by Major Jonathan A. Blake

In the February 2005 issue of Special War-fare, Lieutenant Colonel David P. Fitchitt’sarticle, “Raising the Bar: The Transformationof the SF Training Model,” gave an overviewof the transformation of the SF training pro-gram. This is the second in a series of articlesexamining the individual aspects of thattransformation in greater detail. — Editor

ter and School to serve as temporary cadremembers for two months, bringing theinstructor-to-student ratio to an acceptablelevel. In addition to the need for instructors,resource requirements for transportation,mess, training areas, ranges, classrooms,time to train Soldiers and ammunitionincreased greatly. If the larger classes were tocontinue, the increased costs across the boardwould make it unfeasible to run Phase IItraining on a quarterly basis.

Acknowledging that in light of the cur-rent global situation, the larger classes arehere to stay, the NCOs of Company Clooked at developing a better way of train-ing Soldiers to the standard, and in thequantities that the SF Regiment needs.Sergeant First Class Frank Enriquez, oneof the cadre team sergeants from the 7thSF Group, was the first to express the ideaof dividing the program of instruction, orPOI, into five six-day blocks and assigningeach block to a specific cadre group.

First Sergeant Steve Davidson picked upon Enriquez’s idea, comparing it to the way

the business world deals with the sameissue of increasing throughput while main-taining quality. Davidson said, “In everycase where production needed to beincreased while maintaining the samequality, yet without increasing support, thecompanies always turned to specializationas the answer.”

Davidson, and later First Sergeant BobJohnson, led the cadre of Company C in amission analysis to identify a modularcourse of action. The modular training con-cept was later briefed to the 1st SpecialWarfare Training Group commander,Colonel Manuel Diemer, and, after hisapproval, to Major General James W. Park-er, the SWCS commander, who approvedthe concept for execution.

The innovative change to the trainingschedule was driven by necessity. The SFNCOs within Company C creatively solvedthe problem of quantity vs. quality whileminimizing the requirements for personneland logistics.

Another factor besides cost — relevance

U.S. Army photo

SFQC Phase II training builds the combat skills that are essential for the Special Forces Soldier. It places equal empha-sis on instilling the SF core values and the warrior mindset, both of which are needed for successful SF operations.

July 2005 3

of the POI — led to changes in Phase IIinstruction. From 2002 until 2003, instruc-tion was oriented primarily on convention-al small-unit tactics, using the infantrysquad and Army Field Manual 7-8,Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, as amodel. The POI focused almost exclusivelyon an ambush based on techniques fromthe Ranger Handbook, with limited atten-

tion devoted to marksmanship and to pla-toon operations. This focus, althoughessential, had become the whole of PhaseII, to the exclusion of any training thatmight better prepare Soldiers for operat-ing as part of an SF detachment on today’sbattlefield.

The final factor for making the changes toPhase II training is the reality that all of thegraduates of the SFQC will see combat. Mostgraduates are being deployed within 180days of being assigned to an SF group —some deploy in as few as seven days. More-over, many of the SFQC students are notformer combat-arms personnel, whichmeans that Phase II may be the first timethat they fire a weapon, fight as an indi-vidual, conduct battle drills, conduct apatrol or experience close-quarters battle.These conditions made the question oftraining priority crucial and led to theaddition of new skill sets in Phase II.

Historically, Phase II was taught from fourto six weeks, once a quarter, and it coveredsmall-unit tactics. In the past, the curriculumalso included survival skills, land navigationand fieldcraft. Phase II is now broken downinto five six-day blocks of training, called“modules.” One set of five modules, called a“track,” covers all of the material in thePhase II POI. Company C teaches five tracksper quarter, or 20 tracks per year.

Each Phase II module focuses on specificcritical tasks, with one group of five to

4 Special Warfare

Module 5 of Phase IItraining trains studentsin basic urban operationsat the SF-detachmentlevel.

U.S. Army photo

Common Task Training

TLP/WARNO

MON TUE WED THU FRI SATWEEK

2

3

4

5

MOD1

SF Tactics ClassesABN INFIL

M-4 MarksmanshipAdvanced Marksmanship

M-4/M-9/Barricades/Transition Basic MOUT/Simmunitions CULEX

Special Forces Tactics FTX

SUT FTX 1 SUT FTX 2 Recovery

TLP/WARNO Cadre-Led Ambush Cadre-Assisted Ambush

Light Infantry Tactics/Battle Drills/Small Unit Tactical SOP Training

Subject/Track Training Calendar

CLASSROOM/Team Room RANGE FIELD TRAINING

seven cadre members assigned the respon-sibility for conducting the module of train-ing. In other words, it is training by a com-mittee that specializes in certain skills.

Module 1. Module 1 trains Soldiers toperform SF detachment-level battle drills(react to contact, break contact, make ateam attack), tactical standard operatingprocedures (linear danger areas, patrolbases, halts, etc.), movement formationsand techniques and hand and arm signals.This module also introduces the sequenceand mechanics of reconnaissance andambush operations.

Module 2. Module 2 builds on the tacticalbase of knowledge students acquired dur-ing Module 1, including troop-leading-pro-cedures. Through cadre-led exercises, stu-dents learn to plan and execute reconnais-sance and ambushes, then they are repeat-edly drilled in the execution of those oper-ations during cadre-assisted exercises.

Module 3. In Module 3, the entry-level SFSoldiers are trained through multiple field-training exercises, or FTXs, that ensure thatthey have demonstrated warrior skills, canapply the principles of patrolling commen-surate with their rank and experience, andcan plan and execute a portion of a combator reconnaissance patrol while in a leader-

ship position.Module 4. Soldiers learn the “conven-

tional tactical box” during the first threemodules, repetitively drilling the ambush,reconnaissance and team-level standardoperating procedures. During Module 4,they learn to modify the principles ofpatrolling in order to compensate for a lackof resources, time or personnel.

In this module, students perform theirfirst tactical airborne combat-equipmentinfiltration as member of an SF detach-ment, jumping into a tactical FTX. Duringthe FTX, they are introduced to selected SFcore tasks and supporting missions (directaction, special reconnaissance, and recov-ery of a cache or of personnel) in a time-constrained, asymmetrical environmentthat is designed to force them to analyzeand solve problems.

Students are given the freedom to failand a chance to learn from their mistakes.Adversity has always been the bestteacher: Rarely do people really learn whena task is too easy or simple for them —they most often learn the hard lessonsfrom their mistakes. That’s the opportuni-ty they’re afforded in Module 4 — the chal-lenge to accomplish a mission without allthe assets they need or have grown used to.

U.S. Army photo

During Phase II, Soldiers learn principles of ambushes, patrolling and SF core tasks. During a field-training exercisein Module 4, they learn to adapt those principles to the constraints of an asymmetrical environment.

July 2005 5

It’s their plan, and they execute it. Later,cadre members coach them through whatthey did well and how they can become bet-ter, more efficient and more lethal.

Module 5. During Module 5, they capi-talize on those lessons. Training in thismodule focuses on building marksmanshipand getting the Soldier to the point atwhich he’s safe and confident with hisorganic weapons systems. Students shootan average of 340 rounds of 9 mm ammu-nition and 760 rounds of 5.56 mm over asix-day period, building from basic combatmarksmanship to transition drills to basicclose-quarters battle. Every student willbecome proficient in M-9 and M-4 marks-manship and be able to qualify with bothweapons systems.

Students also learn to safely execute com-bat marksmanship tasks and to move as amember of a team in an urban environment.Training introduces students to basic tac-tics of military operations on urban terrainat the SF-detachment level: single-team,single-room clearing; movement through

streets and intersections; hallway and stairmovement; rudimentary building-climbing;and strong-pointing buildings.

Overall, our future Special Forces Sol-diers now shoot more rounds and spendmore time in the field during Phase IIthan they ever have in the history of theSFQC. But the change in Phase II train-ing is not one merely of numbers: Thebeauty of the modular system is that itestablishes the conditions for studentsuccess in a variety of ways. First, thesystem dramatically reduces the classsize, thereby reducing the weeklyrequirements for all resources. Secondly,it enables the cadre to become true sub-ject-matter experts. Whereas the cadrehad previously been responsible for all35 days of training, the cadre teamsergeant for each module is now respon-sible for six days and can produce a moredetailed and thorough training modulefor his students.

The system also lends itself to moreaccurate reviews of a Soldier’s perform-ance, because more than one cadre membertrains and observes each Soldier. This givesa more fair and balanced appraisal of astudent’s overall performance.

Moreover, the cadre has designated Sun-day as the day for the student detachmentsto train and rehearse SOPs, to recover, and toaddress training deficiencies on their own,under the guidance of the student tacticaladviser counselors, or TACs, for their specifictrack. This allows the seasoned TACs to trulyget to know each detachment — theirstrengths and weaknesses — and then

6 Special Warfare

U.S. Army photo

Phase II emphasizes the combat skills and the warriorethos that Special Forces Soldiers will need as a mem-ber of a Special Forces detachment.

U.S. Army photo

Phase II students now fire more rounds of ammunitionthan they have in the history of the SFQC.

July 2005 7

address them on the spot with cor-rective training. All of these effortstranslate into a foundationalcourse that produces entry-levelSOF warriors at the standard andin the quantity that the SF Regi-ment requires.

Future SF Soldiers are not beingtrained simply to “survive” ontoday’s battlefield; they are beingtrained to dominate it — both mili-tarily and politically — and to pos-sess the savvy to leverage the condi-tions made available to them toachieve our nation’s goals inambiguous environments. Theymust have a collection of founda-tional combat skills, such as conven-tional small-unit tactics, SF tactics,hand-to-hand-combat skills andcombat marksmanship, to get themthere, but just as important is thewarrior ethos that will enable themto function as a member of a teamin an elite brotherhood.

Major Jonathan A. Blake hasbeen the commander of Company C,1st Battalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group, since 2003. In1989, while assigned to the 20th SFGroup as an SF engineer sergeant,he graduated from the University ofMaryland at College Park with abachelor’s in English. Later, heenlisted onto active duty with the10th SF Group at Fort Devens,Mass., and was assigned to Compa-ny B, 3rd Battalion, as a engineersergeant. He graduated from Offi-cer Candidate School in 1994 andwas assigned to the 82nd AirborneDivision as a rifle and scout pla-toon leader. His most recent assign-ment was with the 2nd Battalion ofthe 7th SF Group, where he servedas commander of SF ODA 744 from2000 to 2002, and as chief of cur-rent operations during OperationEnduring Freedom.

Understanding Training, Transformation and Warfare

By Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner

As the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School works to meet the challengesof Army transformation and to supportthe Global War on Terrorism, we mustremember that our number-one priorityis training Soldiers for war — that isnon-negotiable.

We must never underestimate theenemy when preparing our Soldiers forwar. We face a formidable opponent whouses up-to-date technology, is highlymobile, is very selective in his recruitingefforts, is flexible and adaptive, and has shared beliefs and values.We must clearly understand that the enemy is patient and that hecan and will use any means necessary to attack United Statesforces, interests, allies or coalition partners. The enemy will employa variety of tactics, including military operations, economic strate-gies, Internet chat rooms, news articles, radio and television broad-casts, and diplomatic pressure. Discontented groups, such as al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, will make any sacrifice inpursuit of their goal, which is to take away or destroy our freedom,our ideals, our way of life and our nation.

The threat we face on today’s battlefield compels us to makechanges immediately. Throughout its history, the JFK Special War-fare Center and School has adapted its training methodology manytimes to defeat our nation’s enemies. SWCS must continue to changerapidly, incorporating new ideas and lessons learned into trainingthat will empower the Soldiers we train to win the Global War on Ter-rorism. We need cadre members who are adaptive, who understandand support our transformation initiatives, who can keep pace withtechnology and who are aware of the changing battlefield. Our train-ing in tactics, techniques and procedures must adapt quickly toremain relevant to our changing enemy. I charge everyone assignedto SWCS to continue to look at the way our Soldiers will fight, bothnow and in the future, and to execute change. If SWCS cannot adaptas quickly as special-operations forces change the way they fight onthe battlefield, we may become irrelevant. We must work now to findinnovative solutions; we cannot be held back because we fear leavingour comfort zone regarding the way we train Soldiers.We cannot takea “time out” or use peacetime processes for change — we are at war!

Veritas et Libertas!

Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner is the commandsergeant major for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

CSM Dave M. Bruner

Over the past decade, the Armyhas increasingly engaged inlengthy overseas deploy-

ments in which mission performancedemanded significant interface withindigenous populations.The way thatinterface affects military operationsis important. In fact, engagementwith local populaces has become socrucial that mission success is oftensignificantly affected by Soldiers’ability to interact with local individu-als and communities. Learning tointeract with local populaces pre-sents a major challenge for Soldiers,leaders and civilians.

Lengthy deployments to areas withother cultures are not new. Since theend of World War II, the Army hasexperienced many long-lasting opera-tions on foreign soil. The Armyattempts to instill in deployed forcesan awareness of the societal and cul-tural norms of the regions in whichthey operate. While these programshave proven useful, they fall far shortof generating the tactile understand-ing necessary for today’s complex set-tings, especially when values andnorms are so divergent that they clash.

Working with diverse cultures intheir home element is more a matterof finesse, diplomacy and communi-cation than of the direct applicationof coercive power. Success demandsan understanding of individual, com-munity and societal normative pat-terns as they relate to the tasks Sol-diers perform and to the environ-ment in which the tasks are per-formed. Cultural education is nownecessary as part of Soldier- andleader-development programs.

During the Persian Gulf War, theUnited States demonstrated anawareness of cultural issues and theway they affect military operations.The potential for friction and a clashbetween ideas, behaviors, values andnorms led to adjusting paradigms forcultural engagement. For example,the significant differences betweenU.S. and Saudi Arabian culturescaused active isolation of U.S. troopsfrom the population. The risks posedby differing or competing culturalnorms were too great to overcome.

Cultural friction is certainly amore complex issue today than it wasin the past. During the Cold War, abias existed on the part of nationswishing to align themselves witheither the East or the West. Sidingwith one or the other was necessaryin a bipolar world in which the major

powers’ ideologies competed throughaligned or nonaligned states. Nationssought identity by becoming morelike the Big Brother of their choice.

The end of the Cold War forced anew paradigm on prevailing ideas ofnational identity. States, individualsand societies felt free to reconnectwith their own cultural and socialnorms. In addition, U.S. and Westerneconomic and cultural valuesovershadowed those of societiesbased on more traditional or religiousvalues. This basic competition of cul-tural norms resulted in a retreatfrom Western values in many regionsof the world, becoming a source offriction rather than a means ofachieving common understanding.

The emerging importance of cultur-al identity and its inherent frictionsmake it imperative for Soldiers andleaders — military and civilian — tounderstand the societal and culturalnorms of populaces in which theyoperate and function. They mustappreciate, understand and respectthose norms and use them as tools forshaping operations and the effectsthey expect to achieve.

Defining cultureThe first step in solving any

problem is to define it. Defining

8 Special Warfare

Military Cultural Education: Necessary Part of Soldier-Development Programs

by Colonel Maxie McFarland, U.S. Army (ret.)

This article is reprinted from theMarch-April 2005 issue of MilitaryReview.

“culture” usually consists ofdescribing origins, values, rolesand material items associated witha particular group of people. Suchdefinitions refer to evaluativestandards, such as norms or val-ues, and cognitive standards, suchas rules or models defining whatentities and actors exist in a sys-tem and how they operate andinterrelate.1

Everyone has a culture thatshapes the way they see others, theworld and themselves. Like an ice-berg, some aspects of culture arevisible; others are beneath the sur-

face. Invisible aspects influenceand cause visible ones.

Ethnography, a qualitativeresearch method that an-thropologists use to describe a cul-ture, attempts to fully describe acultural group’s various aspectsand norms. The intent behind mil-itary cultural education is to helpSoldiers be more effective in theenvironments in which they mustfunction. They must be culturallyliterate and develop culturalexpertise in specific areas andregions. When balanced with studyin potential areas of application,

proficiency in cultural literacy andcompetency aids the understand-ing of cultural factors in areas ofoperations.

Literacy, competencyOur cultural background is one

of the primary sources of our self-definition, expression and relation-ships within groups and communi-ties. When we experience a newcultural environment, we are like-ly to experience conflict betweenour own cultural predispositionsand the values, beliefs and opin-ions of the host culture.2 Cultures

July 2005 9

Army News Service

Understanding and respecting the importance of the village elder in countries such as Afghanistan helps special-operations Soldiers in performingtheir various duties. Here, Major Wes Parker, 486th Civil Affairs Battalion, greets an Afghan village elder prior to entering the village to give medicalcare and food assistance.

often experience alterations in cul-tural identity (which might createsignificant insecurity in both inter-acting cultures), and in values(which might result in an adver-sarial relationship).

Culturally literate Soldiersunderstand and appreciate theirown beliefs, behaviors, values andnorms, but they are also aware ofthe way their perspectives mightaffect other cultures’ views.Achieving self-awareness of ourown cultural assumptions enablesus to use this understanding in ourrelations with others.

Cultural competency, which ismore than just a framework forindividual interaction, is necessaryfor managing cross-cultural ormixed-cultural activities of groups,organizations or communities. Itdemands a more in-depth andapplication-oriented understand-ing of culture than cultural litera-cy requires. Competency is demon-strated through organizationalleadership capable of crossing cul-tural divides within organizationsand establishing cooperativeframeworks between communitiesand groups from different cultures.Competency is about building suc-cessful teams with a commonvision, effective communicationsand acceptable processes that ben-efit from cultural diversity.

Military leaders are trained tomake decisions rapidly, with littletime available for discussion,debate or consideration of dissent-ing views. Events involving poten-tial destruction or violence de-mand one-minute managers orleaders, but making quick deci-sions entails rapidly obtaining keyfacts and essential information,internally processing them andthen choosing and implementingan appropriate course of action.

Encouraging participation of avariety of people in all activities isdifficult against this backdrop.

However, encouraging participa-tion is a key value in the frame-work of cultural competency.Recognizing differences as diversi-ty rather than as inappropriateresponses is a challenge in tacticaland operational environments.Cultural competency accepts andcreates an environment thatallows each culture to contributeits values, perspectives and be-haviors in constructive ways toenrich the outcome.

Cultural literacy is about under-standing your individual culturalpatterns and knowing your owncultural norms. Understanding theway your culture affects someoneelse’s can profoundly affectchances for success. Military lead-ers have an additional challenge:They must understand and appre-ciate their own military culture,their nation’s culture and the oper-ational area’s culture.

To effectively manage thedynamics of differences, leadersmust learn effective strategies forsolving conflict among diverse peo-ples and organizations. They must

also understand how historic dis-trust affects current interactions,realizing that one might misjudgeothers’ actions based on learned expectations.

Integrating information andskills for interacting effectively invarious cross-cultural situationsinto staff-development and -educa-tion systems helps institutionalizecultural knowledge. Incorporatingcultural knowledge into the main-stream of the organization andteaching the origins of stereotypesand prejudices also helps.

Diversity might entail changingthe way things are done toacknowledge differences in indi-viduals, groups and communities.One must develop skills for cross-cultural communication andunderstand that communicationand trust are often more importantthan activity. Institutionalizingcultural interventions to solve con-flicts and confusion caused by thedynamics of difference might alsobe necessary.

With the increase in coalitionand multinational cooperative mil-

10 Special Warfare

Army News Service

Delegation members from Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States meet at a remote site justinside Pakistan to discuss issues affecting border security in the region. Border security is a crit-ical issue that is affecting the stability of the region and the process of reconstruction inAfghanistan. Understanding the historic conflicts and tribal loyalties in these border regions iskey in the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism.

itary efforts, cultural competenceis a critical leadership require-ment. Stability-and-support opera-tions demand adept leaders whocan work with community, interna-tional and private organizationswhose members come from widelydivergent cultural backgrounds.The Army’s description of theobjective force describes the needfor conventional forces with Spe-cial Forces qualities, includingbeing culturally competent.

The Army has many programsthat are designed to build culturalcompetency, including multina-tional and partnership training-exercise programs; liaison officers;foreign students integrated intoleader-education and -trainingprograms; and officer-exchangeprograms, to name a few. Theseprograms are useful, but un-fortunately, they are mostly craft-ed around educating the foreignstudent about U.S. cultural normsand operations rather than theinverse. Perhaps liaison officerscould be charged with instruction-al duties, and exchange programscould bring more foreign instruc-tors and experts into the schoolsystem.

A need for cultural literacy andcultural competency is clear, but itis also clear that the educationalprocess for achieving both willtake some time to establish. Thekey question is, Where do we start?

Cultural differencesCulture, which is learned and

shared by members of a group, ispresented to children as theirsocial heritage. Cultural norms arethe standard, model or pattern aspecific cultural, racial, ethnic,religious or social group regards astypical. Cultural norms includethoughts, behaviors and patternsof communication, customs, be-liefs, values and institutions.3

As individuals, groups and soci-eties, we can learn to collaborateacross cultural lines. Awareness ofcultural differences does not haveto divide or paralyze us for fear ofnot saying the “right thing.” Cul-tural awareness puts a premiumon listening and comprehendingthe intent behind others’ remarks.Becoming more aware of cultural

differences and exploring similari-ties helps us communicate more effectively.

With so many diverse culturesand the enormous amount of studyrequired to become expert on anygiven one, how do we narrow thefield to find the right focus for gen-erating cultural skills in Soldiers?Certainly specific cultures repre-

Culturally Literate Soldiers:• Understand that culture affects their behavior and beliefs and

the behavior and beliefs of others.• Are aware of specific cultural beliefs, values and sensibilities that

might affect the way they and others think or behave.• Appreciate and accept diverse beliefs, appearances and lifestyles.• Are aware that historical knowledge is constructed and, there-

fore, shaped by personal, political and social forces.• Know the history of mainstream and nonmainstream American

cultures and understand how these histories affect current society.• Can understand the perspective of nonmainstream groups when

learning about historical events.• Know about major historical events of other nations and under-

stand how such events affect behaviors, beliefs and relationshipswith others.

• Are aware of the similarities among groups of different culturalbackgrounds and accept differences between them.

• Understand the dangers of stereotyping, ethnocentrisms andother biases and are aware of and sensitive to issues of racismand prejudice.

• Are bilingual, multilingual or working toward language proficiency.• Can communicate, interact and work positively with individuals

from other cultural groups.• Use technology to communicate with individuals and access

resources from other cultures.• Are familiar with changing cultural norms of technology (such as

instant messaging, virtual workspaces, e-mail, etc.), and caninteract successfully in such environments.

• Understand that cultural differences exist and need to beaccounted for in the context of military operations.

• Understand that as Soldiers they are part of a widely stereotypedculture that will encounter prejudices that will need to be over-come in cross-cultural relations.

• Are secure and confident in their identities and capable of func-tioning in a way that allows others to remain secure in theirs.

July 2005 11

sent states or groups that might bemore likely to develop an adver-sarial relationship with the UnitedStates. Perhaps it would be best tolearn more about states or cultureswith whom we are most likely toform a coalition or participate in amultinational campaign. Unfortu-nately, history demonstrates theuncertainty of predicting where,when and with whom Soldiersmight be required to operate. Ofcourse, this would not rule out theneed to study high-probability cul-tures. Adopting an approach, atleast initially, oriented towardsome foundational cultural norms,with broader application across awider range of settings, mightprove to be more prudent, however.

Foundational normsFoundational cultural norms are

normative values and factors hav-ing the greatest effect on militaryoperations and the relations of Sol-diers with the populations theyencounter. Researchers identifyfour cultural syndromes — com-plexity, individualism, collectivismand tightness — that are patternsof beliefs, attitudes, self-defini-tions, norms and values organizedaround some theme that can befound in every society. Using cul-tural syndromes as a frame of ref-erence, we can develop foundation-al normative values having com-mon application across all cul-tures, which should provide thestarting point for a cultural educa-tion program.

Cultural norms are often sostrongly ingrained in daily lifethat individuals might be unawareof certain behaviors. Until they seesuch behaviors in the context of adifferent culture that has differentvalues and beliefs, they mighthave difficulty recognizing andchanging them.4 Usually, our ownculture is invisible until it comes

into contact with another culture.People are generally ethnocen-

tric: They interpret other cultureswithin the framework of theunderstanding they have of theirown. Six fundamental patterns ofcultural norms have greatly affect-ed relations between differing cul-tures: communication styles, atti-tudes toward conflict, approachesto completing tasks, decision-mak-ing styles, attitudes toward per-sonal disclosure and approaches toknowing.

Communication styles. Commu-nicating between two culturesinvolves generating, transmitting,receiving and decrypting codedmessages or bits of information. Itis about much more than lan-guage, although language is cer-tainly key to communication andshould be a part of any cultural-training program.

The early focus, however, shouldbe more on effective use and appli-cation of language than on makinga Soldier a linguist. Someone strug-gling to communicate in an unfa-miliar language cannot com-municate complex issues. The goalshould be to orient language-skilldevelopmental programs, at leastinitially, on effectively conveyingsimple terms rather than on lin-

guistic competence — learning tomake the most out of simple mean-ings. The Army needs to find simpleways of communicating that willspeak to other cultural norms andthat will require listening. Commu-nication is a two-way street.

Common, universal languagesare available that almost all cul-tures understand. Other types oflanguages include mathematics,music, computing, physics andengineering. Although such are notimmediately useful in most mili-tary tasks, they offer a commonframe of reference of possible valueunder special circumstances.5

One of the most overlooked andeffective communication tools isthe use of pictures, drawings orphotographs. A great deal of truthis behind the expression “a pic-ture is worth a thousand words.”Creating graphic and pictorialaides for cross-cultural communi-cation is much easier and oftenmuch more effective than linguis-tic aids. However, in any form ofinformation transmission, mean-ings are not always clear, and cer-tainly, missing presentationskills, timing and context can beconfusing and counterproductive.Using a culture’s iconography,such as religious symbols — thecross for Christians or the cres-cent moon for Islamics — can leadto developing means of symboliccommunication.

Another major aspect of commu-nication is the degree of importancegiven to nonverbal communication,including facial expressions and ges-tures, as well as to seating arrange-ments, personal distance and senseof time. Different norms regardingthe appropriate degree of assertive-ness in communicating can add tocultural misunderstandings.6

Attitudes toward conflict. Somecultures view conflict as a positivething; others view it as somethingto be avoided. In the United States,

12 Special Warfare

Another major aspect ofcommunication is thedegree of importancegiven to nonverbal com-munication, includingfacial expressions andgestures, as well as toseating arrangements,personal distance andsense of time.

conflict is not usually desirable,but people most often deal directlywith conflicts as they arise. Forexample, a face-to-face meeting isa customary way to work throughproblems. In many Eastern coun-tries, open conflict is consideredembarrassing or demeaning. Dif-ferences are best worked out quiet-ly. A written exchange might bethe favored means of addressingthe conflict. Another means mightbe enlisting a respected thirdparty who can facilitate com-munication without risking loss offace or humiliation.

American military culture dealswith problems head-on. As in agame of checkers, the intricacies ofsubtle and indirect moves are moreoften than not relegated to civilianand military strategists. Manyother cultures, however, employindirect approaches and subtlemeans as part of day-to-day activity.When Soldiers trained in the directapproach encounter these cultures,communication is difficult and canlead to profound misunderstand-ings and miscalculations.

Approaches to completing tasks.From culture to culture, peoplehave different ways of completingtasks. They might have differentaccess to resources, differentrewards associated with task com-pletion, different notions of timeand different ideas about how rela-tionship-building and task-orient-ed work should go together. Asianand Hispanic cultures tend toattach more value to developingrelationships at the beginning of ashared project, with more empha-sis on task completion toward theend, as compared to European-Americans. European-Americanstend to focus immediately on thetask at hand, allowing relation-ships to develop as they worktogether.

Decision-making styles. Theroles individuals play in decision-

making vary widely from cultureto culture. In America, decisionsare frequently delegated; that is,an official assigns responsibilityfor a particular matter to a subor-dinate. In many southern Euro-pean and Latin American coun-tries, strong value is placed onholding decision-making responsi-bilities oneself. When groups ofpeople make decisions, majorityrule is a common approach inAmerica. In Japan, consensus isthe preferred mode.

Attitudes toward personal disclo-sure. In some cultures, it is notappropriate to be frank about emo-tions, about the reasons behind aconflict or a misunderstanding, orabout personal information. Ques-tions that might seem natural to usmight seem intrusive to others.(What was the conflict about?What was your role in the conflict?What was the sequence of events?)

Approaches to knowing. Notabledifferences occur among cultural

groups when it comes to epis-temologies — that is, the ways peo-ple come to know things. Europeancultures tend to consider informa-tion acquired through cognitivemeans, such as counting and mea-suring, more valid than other waysof coming to know things. Africancultures prefer affective ways ofknowing, including symbolic imag-ery and rhythm. Asian culturestend to emphasize the validity ofknowledge gained through strivingtoward transcendence. Recent pop-ular works demonstrate thatAmerican society is paying moreattention to previously overlookedways of knowing.

Obviously, different approachesto knowing can affect the way weanalyze or find ways to solve acommunity problem. Some groupmembers might want to conductlibrary research to understand ashared problem better and toidentify possible solutions. Othersmight prefer to visit places and

July 2005 13

Army News Service

In Muslim countries, female Soldiers play a key role in dealing with the women of the villages.Special-operations units knew this going in; however, traditional Army units didn’t, and theyencountered many problems because they had male Soldiers trying to interact with the females.

people who have experienced sim-ilar challenges and touch, tasteand listen to what has workedelsewhere.

Specific cultures to studyIn the future, key powers in a

regional or global context will mostlikely be the United States, theEuropean Union, China, Japanand Russia. Future alliances, coali-tions and partnerships will mostlikely be tied to these nations. Keyregional powers, whose activitiesor issues have the greatest possi-bility for creating global conse-quences, are most likely to beIndonesia, India, Iran, Pakistan,Turkey, Egypt, South Africa,Brazil, Algeria and Mexico. Inaddition, natural resources in theCaspian Basin, off the coast ofeast-central Africa, and inVenezuela, will certainly increasethose regions’ importance. Thesenations might offer a good startingpoint for a program of study ofother cultures.

Cultural expertise takes time.Cultural literacy and competencyskills will enable us to cope with

almost any circumstance of cultur-al difference. Areas of specificexpertise deepen those skills andprovide context to their applica-tion, but programs designed toachieve expertise in a given regionor culture must begin early and becontinuous.

The officer corps should begintraining while in precommissioningprograms. Prescribed courses inregional studies and some languagetraining would be a great begin-ning. We could certainly look atexpanding summer opportunitiesfor travel and study in specified for-eign countries. A program of thisnature, involving West Point cadets,currently exists within the ForeignMilitary Studies Office. We couldexpand the program to includeselect Reserve Officer TrainingCorps students. Branch schoolscould coordinate with local universi-ties for instructors, course materialsand expertise.

The country-studies program ofthe Army War College, or AWC,could certainly serve as a model forcultural education at lower levels.Using electronic connectivitybetween schools and individuals

would allow the creation of virtualteams with AWC, the Commandand General Staff College, oradvanced-course students, arounda specific country or regional area.The AWC students could serve asstudy directors, orchestrating andfacilitating team members’ effortsin other schools.

Another possibility is to leveragebusiness and industry programsfor cultural education, makingthem available through distrib-uted learning. We should also notforget the expertise available fromthe Special Forces. The bottom lineis that there are many ways avail-able to achieve our goals if we canagree on the focus and end state.

Three other factors play into cul-tural differences that influencecommunication: religion, tribalaffiliations and nationalism.

Religion. Religion, one of themost important aspects of the res-olution of cross-cultural conflict, isa powerful constituent of culturalnorms and values, and because itaddresses the most profound exis-tential issues of human life (free-dom and inevitability, fear andfaith, security and insecurity, rightand wrong, sacred and profane), itis deeply implicated in individualand social conceptions of peace. Totransform current conflicts, wemust understand the concepts ofpeace within diverse religious andcultural traditions while seekingcommon ground.7

An exploration of religious cultur-al norms could take the form of com-parisons of foundational culturalvalues as they apply to the world’sprominent religions (Christianity,Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Bud-dhism, Taoism). Tribal cultures,prevalent in developing countries,are often the only structure inungoverned areas. Tribal culturesdiffer, but at their core, they share acommon foundation. They arisefrom a social tradition that often

14 Special Warfare

Army News Service

Religion, education and many other factors affect the way cultures interact. In many Third World coun-tries, subjects as simple as hygiene become an opportunity for Soldiers to interact with the people.

lacks written histories or philoso-phies and independent perspec-tives, and they espouse ideas andbeliefs held unanimously by theentire tribe. Tribal leaders are notaccustomed to external challenge.

Regardless of region, tribes alsoshare foundational norms withrespect to decision-making, knowl-edge and disclosure. Studyingnorms for tribal structures mightwell prove to be the only way tounderstand these cultures becauseof the absence of written material.

Nationalism. To study national-ism is to study cultural norms andvalues as driving factors. Separat-ed from the context of states,nations embody the importancethat people place on culture andheritage without respect to geogra-phy. Nationalistic movements havecommon aspects in the way theyrelate to other cultures and theway their behaviors are governed.This area of study would be partic-ularly useful in understanding anddealing with transnational organi-zations, whether they are legiti-mate, criminal or terrorist.

Cultural education is not a newsubject or issue. Over the years, theArmy has introduced internal andexternal programs to address cul-tural factors within its organizationand during long-duration deploy-ments. The programs effectively cre-ated an Army value of culturalacceptance as a standard, but onlyso long as differing values did notcompete with Army values or stand-ards. These same programs, modi-fied and refocused, could serve asthe foundation for an expanded cul-tural-education program to createbetter skills for dealing with othercultures during conflicts, partner-ships, or stability-and-support oper-ations. Resources associated withsuch programs could be the nucleusfor a rapid startup and foundationfor expansion.

Cultural education is a growing

concern among major businessesoperating in the global market. Forthis reason, there are a wide varietyof commercial, academic and gov-ernment programs for cultural edu-cation. In many cases, courseware isavailable, and training-develop-ment work has been completed.Assessing and, where practical,using these programs offers signifi-cant cost savings in developing edu-cational materials and courses.

The Army can expand on the edu-cational base by ensuring that tacti-cal and operational training pro-grams address cultural factors. Atthe national training centers, oppos-ing-force role players should beskilled in emulating key culturalnorms that might affect militaryactions and activities. All leadersshould be exposed to these factorsand receive appropriate feedback onhow well they manage differencesand accomplish tasks. Perhaps theArmy should also consider introduc-ing cultural-awareness traininginto the Battle Command TrainingProgram and combat training cen-ters, where, with allies and part-ners, commands and staffs would becombined to foster development ofcultural-competency skills.

As the Army moves to an agent-based construction, models andsimulations in support of trainingand education should begin toinclude cultural factors, which willincrease the number of variablesand complicate environments sothat they more closely approxi-mate reality. This type of program,which is already being worked bythe Defense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency, is one that weshould seek to guide and direct.

In generalized study areas, theArmy should educate Soldiers andleaders on foundational culturalnorms and values and teach themskills used to understand andbridge cultural differences, lookingat religious, tribal and nationalis-

tic factors in representative andnonrepresentative societies. Overtime, specialized study shouldenable Soldiers to build expertisein specific regions concerning specific societies.

Colonel Maxie McFarland, U.S.Army (ret.), is a defense intelli-gence senior executive and thedeputy chief of staff for intelligenceat the U.S. Army Training and Doc-trine Command, Fort Monroe, Va.He received a bachelor of sciencefrom the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga; a master of educa-tion from Southern Arkansas Uni-versity; and a master of sciencefrom the Naval War College. He isa graduate of the U.S. Army Com-mand and General Staff College.

Notes:1 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of

National Security: Norms and Identity inWorld Politics (New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press, 1996).

2 Nancy E. Briggs and Glenn R. Harwood,“Furthering Adjustment: An Application ofInoculation Theory in an Intercultural Con-text,” Eric Reproduction Services, no. ed.,225, 221, 1983.

3 Lisa Castellanos, “Hispanic/LatinaWomen: Cultural norms and prevention”;project director, Abriendo Puertas, 1986,Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Associa-tion, Tallahassee, online at www.fadaa.org/resource/justfact/hispnorm.html, accessed9 March 2005.

4 Jean Willis, “Understanding Cultural Dif-ferences,” American Society of AssociationExecutives, Washington, D.C., 1 March 2001.

5 A growing perception in many circles isthat military cultures are moving towardestablishing an artificial or formal language.

6 Marcelle E. DePraw and Marya Axner,“Working on Common Cross-Cultural Com-munication Challenges,” A More Perfect UnionGuide, online at www.wwcd.org/action/ampu/crosscult.html, accessed 5 November 2004.

7 Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk,“The Role of Faith in Cross-Cultural ConflictResolution,” presentation at the EuropeanParliament for the European Centre forCommon Ground, September 2001, online athttp//shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V9N1.pdf, 37, accessed 5 November 2004.

July 2005 15

The position of Special Forcesintelligence sergeant, or18F, is finally beginning to

get the recognition and the atten-tion that it deserves.

For many years, some membersof the community have viewed theposition as the weakest on the SFdetachment for several reasons,including the timing of training inthe life cycle of an SF Soldier’scareer, problems with career man-agement, and the mindset that theposition was merely an additionalduty rather than an essentialfunction of the detachment.

Recent changes initiated by theJFK Special Warfare Center andSchool, or SWCS, have greatlyenhanced the 18F position, butmore can and needs to be done toensure not only stability and con-tinuity but also effective trainingfor this key position.

In September 2002, for exam-ple, SWCS took the first steptoward bringing more stabilityand appropriate prominence to

the 18F position by creating the13-week Special Forces Intelli-gence Sergeant Course, or SFISC.Before the SFISC was created, anSF NCO had to meet only two pre-requisites in order to reclassify tothe military occupational special-ty, or MOS, 18F: graduate fromone of the three operations-and-intelligence, or O&I, courses1; andserve an assignment to the single18F billet on an SF detachment.The SFISC now focuses its cur-riculum on training the intelli-gence-specific aspects of the 18Fposition, with most SFISC gradu-ates receiving MOS 18F as a pri-mary MOS.2

The SFISC lays the foundationfor producing competent SF intelsergeants, but it is not the onlyway to address the underlyingproblems inherent with the SFdetachment’s only dedicatedintelligence position. With addi-tional resources, SWCS couldtransform the new course into onethat is focused on properlypreparing what could become oneof the most critical members ofthe detachment.

Education alone does not makeone an expert, and the trainingprovided by the SFISC is noexception Only through extensive

experience, usually gained overconsiderable time, can an SF intel-ligence sergeant gain and refinethe skills necessary for him to befully effective and productive forthe detachment. The same can besaid of the other SF MOSs. Unfor-tunately, SF intel sergeants haverarely had sufficient opportunityto acquire intelligence-specificexperience.

Before the creation of theSFISC, the SF intel sergeants notimmediately selected for promo-tion to master sergeant were usu-ally senior sergeants first class.By virtue of being among thesenior members of the detach-ment, NCOs requesting andobtaining reclassification to MOS18F were likely nearing the end oftheir normal tours and due tomake a permanent-change-of-sta-tion move. The 18F position thusrotated more often than any otheron the detachment.

Unit command sergeants majorrecently sought to resolve theissue by asking the Army’sHuman Resources Command, orHRC, to evaluate the feasibility ofgranting 24-month job stabiliza-tions for Soldiers who graduatefrom the SFISC. HRC could notsupport such a policy for every

16 Special Warfare

The SF Intelligence Sergeant: Ensuring His Continuity and Effective Training

by Major Marshall V. Ecklund

Opinions expressed in this articleare those of the author and do notreflect the plans or policies of theJFK Special Warfare Center andSchool. — Editor

SFISC graduate because of “18Frequirements across the force.”3

HRC determined that it couldgrant the exception to policy onlyon a case-by-case basis. Manage-ment practices such as these dolittle to bring stability to the SFintelligence-sergeant position.

Because of the importance ofthe 18F to the detachment’s intel-ligence operations, it seems unrea-sonable to treat MOS 18F as anafterthought or an additionalduty. SF intelligence sergeantsneed to be trained in the samemanner as Soldiers in all other SFMOSs; that is the only reasonableand practical solution for resolv-ing the issues of time, experienceand duty-position stability.4

Of the 150 Soldiers who gradu-ated from the SFISC during itsfirst five iterations, 28 were mem-bers of National Guard SF groups,18 were SF warrant-officer candi-dates, and one was already an SFwarrant officer. Thus, 47 of those150 SFISC graduates, nearly one-third, will not serve as active-dutySF intel sergeants on SF detach-ments and thus will not contributeto increasing the stability of theposition.

Until SF is able to rectify itsactive-duty shortages in MOS 18F,the allocation of course slots toSoldiers in other categories shouldbe kept to a minimum. Moreover,the SF Warrant Officer Courseshould either change its require-ment for all candidates to be grad-uates of the SFISC or provide thenecessary training using its ownresources and instructors. Send-ing personnel to the SFISC whowill never perform the duties of anSF intel sergeant is a grossly inef-ficient use of already scarceresources.

SF can adequately address thestability problem only by identify-ing its source — the timing ofMOS 18F training in the SF per-

sonnel-development pipeline. Oneof the ways SWCS attempted tobring more stability to the intelli-gence position was by removingthe ANCOC prerequisite andallowing SF Soldiers to attend theSFISC earlier in their careers.Instead of training senior

sergeants first class, the SFISCnow accepts staff sergeants, who,in theory, have more SF-detach-ment time remaining in theircareers and have several yearsremaining before they can be pro-moted to master sergeant.

It would further enhance SF-

detachment intelligence capabili-ties if SF intelligence sergeantswere trained during the SF Quali-fication Course, or SFQC. If SWCSwere to integrate the SFISC intothe MOS phase of the SFQC, andthe SF Branch pursued actionthat would allow staff sergeants toclassify or to reclassify into MOS18F,5 the SF Branch could take acritical step toward transformingthe SF detachment, over the longterm, into a more capable fightingforce.

Along with providing SF intelli-gence sergeants training at aneven earlier time in the SF per-sonnel-development pipeline,SWCS needs to modify the SFISCbefore making it part of theSFQC. In order to fully developthe concept of intelligence andoperations working together, theSFISC would have to alloy its cur-rent focus on intelligence withinstruction in operations — remi-niscent of the approach of the for-mer O&I Course. Younger SFISCstudents, who would not yet haveattended SF ANCOC, would haveinsufficient appreciation for theneed to, or the knowledge of howto, integrate operations withintelligence. The SFISC shouldalso strongly emphasize inter-agency, or IA, cooperation andintelligence fusion. SWCS could

July 2005 17

The SF IntelligenceSergeant Course,created in 2002,teaches studentstraditional ands ta t e -o f - the -a r ttechniques in intel-ligence-gathering.

U.S. Army photo

The SFISC now acceptsstaff sergeants, who, intheory, have more SF-detachment time remain-ing in their careers. … Itwould further enhanceSF-detachment intelli-gence capabilities if SFintelligence sergeantswere trained during theSF Qualification Course.

best accomplish this intelligenceintegration by facilitating anddeveloping students’ relation-ships with other governmentagencies, or OGAs, early duringtheir intelligence training.

As an integral part of trainingat the apprentice level, the SFISCshould provide more training withOGAs and other Department ofDefense, or DoD, intelligenceagencies. SWCS needs to thor-oughly integrate these agenciesinto the course so that they canfully appreciate the mutual bene-fits of sharing information withSF. At the journeyman level, thereshould be internships with OGAsand with DoD intelligence organi-zations, similar to the mandatory“continuing training” certificationprogram for SF medical sergeants.Because these internships wouldfurther solidify relationships criti-cal to the success of intelligencefusion in support of future opera-tions, SWCS should integrateinternships into a larger “creden-tialing” program for SF intelsergeants.

Other areas of the SF intelsergeant’s training, utilizationand employment that the SFBranch should consider includemandatory Level 3 training inadvanced special-operations tech-niques, placing emphasis onadvance-force operations andoperational preparation of theenvironment, and integrating acounterintelligence course similarto the one run by the Army’s Mili-tary Intelligence Branch.

The increasing emphasis onintelligence operations at the tac-tical level may require largernumbers of SF intel sergeants.Studies have been conducted onincreasing the size of the SFdetachment to 13 in order toassign two intelligence sergeants.6This increased authorizationcould allow SF detachments to

focus sufficient attention to thecritical areas in which intelligencesupports operations at the tacticallevel. The increase is equallydefensible for the same reasonsthat there are two members ofother MOSs on SF detachments.

MOS 18F should not be treatedas an additional duty, and by inte-grating the SFISC into the SFQC,SWCS could effectively put an endto the perception that the SFISCis a prerequisite for promotion tomaster sergeant. Since the

course’s inception, some sergeantsmajor and command sergeantsmajor have advised their seniorNCO leaders, “Send E7s whomyou want to be team sergeants tothe SFISC.” Such a misuse of thenew course would be counterpro-ductive to its intent and wouldonly contribute to making the SFintel sergeant position the “weaklink” on the detachment. “Intelli-gence drives operations,” yet, com-pared to most other members ofthe detachment, the SF intel

sergeant typically has the leastamount of experience in his MOS.This will not change unless the SFBranch considers the training ofSF intel sergeants to be a long-term investment in the health ofthe branch.

SWCS has already modified theduty description of the SF intelsergeant, removing the institu-tional bias of “seniority” associat-ed with the SF intel sergeant andthe additional duty of being theassistant detachment operationssergeant. This shift in focus willallow SF intel sergeants to focuson their primary mission of tacti-cal intelligence, and it will makethe assistant detachment opera-tions sergeant position an addi-tional duty for the most compe-tent NCO on the detachment —one who has demonstrated thegreatest potential for serving as adetachment operations sergeant.Assignment to that duty shouldnot be based entirely on seniorityor on the possession of a specificMOS. Master-sergeant promotionboards should properly focustheir attention not on whether aSoldier holds MOS 18F or hasgraduated from the SFISC, buton how well he performed theadditional-duty position of assis-tant detachment operationssergeant.

A recurring theme since thenational and strategic “intelli-gence failures” that resulted inthe successful terrorist attacks of9/11 has been the admission bythe federal government that itmust improve the collection, proc-essing, analysis, disseminationand fusion of intelligence. At thepoint of the spear, where intelli-gence directly supports tacticaloperations (such as firebases inAfghanistan and forward operat-ing bases in Iraq), SF’s selection,preparation and management ofthe intelligence-sergeant position

18 Special Warfare

This shift in focus willallow SF intel sergeantsto focus on their primarymission of tactical intelli-gence, and it will makethe assistant detachmentoperations sergeant posi-tion an additional duty forthe most competent NCOon the detachment — onewho has demonstratedthe greatest potential forserving as a detachmentoperations sergeant.

has many comparable shortcom-ings. SWCS has taken the firststeps in the right direction —focusing on improving intelli-gence operations on the detach-ment. If SF had had more proper-ly trained intelligence personnelat the lower levels of commandduring the early stages of Opera-tion Enduring Freedom inAfghanistan, operations mighthave been more efficient. It wasthe rank-and-file SF NCOs whomade it happen — even with lit-tle or no training in IA opera-tions. If IA operations are theway of the future for SF, then itwould make sense to train SFintel sergeants to meet or exceedall expectations.

The NCOs in SF are the best inthe world, and there should neverbe any doubt about the quality ofthe majority of the NCOs selectedto serve as SF intel sergeants —they will accomplish the missioneven when they are not set up forsuccess. But through its less-than-optimal employment of MOS18F, SF is not fully exploitingmany opportunities that couldgreatly increase the effectivenessof the SF detachment. If qualityintelligence is vital to SF’s opera-tional success, then the SF intelsergeant is as critical as any othermember of the detachment, if notmore so, and he should be trainedaccordingly.

There is now a compellingargument for training SF intelsergeants earlier in their careers,even during the SFQC. By provid-ing the right training at the righttime, SF could eliminate many ofthe problems associated withmanaging the senior NCOs whoare currently SF intel sergeants.Reclassifying NCOs to MOS 18Fearlier would eliminate the “addi-tional duty” mindset, and itwould correct the perception thatgraduation from the SFISC is a

prerequisite for promotion tomaster sergeant. These changescould help SWCS and the SFBranch meet the objective for18Fs envisioned by the SWCSSpecial Forces Evolution SteeringCommittee: producing a vital andfunctioning member of thedetachment, while simultaneous-ly transforming the SF detach-ment into a more lethal fightingforce.

Major Marshall “Vito” Ecklundis assigned to the 7th SF Group.In 2005, he became the first SFofficer to be presented the GeneralGeorge C. Marshall Award as thedistinguished graduate of theArmy Command and GeneralStaff Officer Course, Fort Leaven-worth, Kan. His previous assign-ments include company executiveofficer and assault detachmentcommander (SF ODA 794) inCompany C, 3rd Battalion, 7thSF Group in Puerto Rico; detach-ment commander (SF ODA 763),Company C, 2nd Battalion, 7thSF Group; and battalion air-oper-ations officer, company executiveofficer and rifle-platoon leader inthe 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry,101st Airborne Division. MajorEcklund holds a bachelor’s degreein foreign-area studies (LatinAmerica) from the U.S. MilitaryAcademy, a master’s degree indefense analysis (irregular war-fare) from the Naval Postgradu-ate School, Monterey, Calif., amaster’s in military art and sci-ence from the Command and Gen-eral Staff College at Fort Leaven-worth and a master’s in adminis-tration (human resource adminis-tration) from Central MichiganUniversity.

Notes:1 The three were the O&I portion of the SF

Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC O&I), the

“O&I Transition Course” and the O&ICourse. ANCOC O&I was accepted until2001, but during 2001, only those who hadgraduated from either the O&I TransitionCourse or O&I could be reclassified intoMOS 18F.

2 “Due to current 18D strengths, 18Ds whograduate the 18F course will not [author’semphasis added] receive 18F as a primaryMOS. As a result, SWCS has recentlyannounced they will no longer accept 18Dsinto the 18F Course until 18D strengthsincrease. No Skill Level 3 [SSG] graduatewill be reclassified to 18F until they are pro-moted to Skill Level 4 [SFC] (MOS 18F3does not exist).” From the CMF-18 EnlistedBranch Web site, https://www.perscomon-line.army.mil /epsf/CMF-18(HOT%20TOP-ICS).htm, last accessed 6 June 2004.

3 From the CMF-18 Enlisted Branch Website, https://www.perscomonline.army.mil/epsf/CMF-18(HOT%20TOPICS).htm, lastaccessed 6 June 2004.

4 It is worth noting that only the SFdetachment operations sergeant (MOS 18Z)does not attend any special training beforebeing awarded the MOS, in contrast to allother positions on the SF detachment. Atthis point, the SF Branch should consider apost-ANCOC course for those mastersergeants-select before they assume dutiesas detachment operations sergeants. Simi-lar in concept to the U.S. Army SergeantsMajor Academy’s First Sergeants Course,this course could offer beneficial training onthe administrative nuances inherent in themanagerial facets of the position (e.g., writ-ing NCOERs and recommendations forawards), with which most NCOs on an SFdetachment typically have little experienceprior to working as a detachment operationssergeant.

5 Currently, MOS 18F is a “one-grade” or“single-grade” MOS, open only to skill-level4 NCOs. One-grade MOSs are much moredifficult to manage than multiple-gradeMOSs.

6 One such study, the for-official-use-onlypost-war-game draft of TRADCOM Pam525-x-xx, entitled Military Operations:Special Forces Operational and Organiza-tional Plan, dated 31 December 2001, is asupporting document to the pamphlet, U.S.Army Objective Force O&O Concepts forArmy Special Operations Forces. The pro-ponent for the pamphlet, SWCS’s ArmySpecial Operations Battle Lab, proposedthat objective-force SF detachments shouldhave a 13th man. This SFC/MSG “SF oper-ations & intelligence sergeant (area spe-cialist)” was in addition to the SFC “SFoperations & intelligence sergeant” on theSF detachment.

July 2005 19

As the Army is immersed in atransformation, so, too, arethe roles of Soldiers in Civil

Affairs, or CA, and PsychologicalOperations, or PSYOP. As the Glob-al War on Terrorism, or GWOT,continues, the demand for CA andPSYOP’s unique skills and serviceshas also increased, highlightingthe important role both groupsplay not only in fighting the warbut in winning the peace.

In recognition of that key role, theArmy has major changes in theworks for officers and enlisted Sol-diers in both fields, including the cre-ation of CA and PSYOP branchesand the creation of Career Manage-ment Field 38B, Civil Affairs Special-ist for private through commandsergeant major in the Army Reserveand sergeant through commandsergeant major in the active Army.

Branch initiativeA proposal for the creation of two

distinct nonaccession officer branch-es for CA and PSYOP has beenapproved by the Department of theArmy and will be effective Oct. 16,2006. The branch activations willeliminate the current CA and PSYOPfunctional areas. For CA and PSYOPofficers, the initiative has been a long

time coming, as functional areaswithin the Army have understand-ably taken second priority to regularArmy branches. CA and PSYOP offi-cers believe they will have greatercareer potential, more rewardingassignments and receive greaterrecognition for their unique expertiseunder the branch concept.

It is important to note that CA isalready an officer branch for theUnited States Army Reserve, but notfor the active Army. By contrast,PSYOP is a functional area in both.Inevitably, formation of branches forPSYOP and CA will recognize theimportance of each career field. Bothhave made historic contributions tocountless military operations, andtheir continued presence and note-worthy performance can be seen incurrent operations in Afghanistan,Iraq and elsewhere. Moreover, theirreadiness and relevance will be anintegral component in the drive toextend the reach and influence of theU.S. military and eliminate sources ofinstability in the GWOT.

Training the branchKey to the implementation of the

branch concept is an extensivereview and transformation of train-ing for active-Army and reserve-com-

ponent officers. Accordingly, the CAand PSYOP branch proposal reflectsoperational need and changes to therequirements in support of theGWOT. Moreover, the expansion inthe roles of U.S. Army CA andPSYOP officers in the active Armyand reserve components underlinesthe importance of having a CA andPSYOP officer corps with skills,regional and cultural expertise, lan-guage abilities, mediation/negotia-tion skills, analytical talent and tech-nical assessment skills to draw upon.

The Army has completed a thor-ough staff analysis and extensivecoordination to assure the accuracyand credibility of the branch propos-al. The two areas that received themost scrutiny were training qualifi-cation and force structure. If we areto meet transformation objectivesand expeditionary goals and achievemodularity, it is imperative that wehave a more inclusive and compre-hensive CA and PSYOP force struc-ture and more operationally relevantCA and PSYOP force.

The credibility and legitimacy ofthe branches will depend heavily on acorps of CA and PSYOP officers andenlisted Soldiers who have theknowledge, competency and skill nec-essary to deliver their requisiteexpertise anywhere and anytime to

20 Special Warfare

CA and PSYOP: Major Changes in Personnel, Training Upcoming for Officers, NCOs

by Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Boyd

satisfy today’s and tomorrow’s CAand PSYOP requirements.

The CA and PSYOP trainingpipelines have been revitalized tosecure competencies commensuratewith promotion, utilization andstandards of grade. Skills previouslycharacteristic of the active-Army CAand PSYOP training pipelines havenow been incorporated earlier in thetraining path and made available toreserve-component officers, as well.The training has been divided intothree phases to appropriately dedi-cate time and resources to standardsof performance and core competenciesat each level and during each phase.

Phase I, company-grade qualifica-tion, enables the branch officer to besuccessful at the tactical team anddetachment level. This phase hasexpanded the current program ofinstruction, or POI, for the CA andPSYOP officers’ courses, including amore in-depth lecture series, semi-nars, more training in the militarydecision-making process, an opera-tional-unit orientation, practical exer-cises and a culmination field exercise.The culmination exercise includes allCA and PSYOP critical tasks, each of

which is reinforced during training bya module on adaptive leadership,negotiation, political-military analy-sis and interagency orientation.

Phase II, field-grade officer qualifi-cation, will transition from the cur-rent 16-week Regional StudiesCourse into a 10-to-12-weekAdvanced Regional Analysis Coursethat is more operationally relevantand situationally focused. The courseis designed to weave effects-basedtargeting and theater-level opera-tional challenges into the instruction.

Phase III is language and otherspecialized training, as required. Themove to incorporate language train-ing throughout the pipeline is beingdriven by the new language programof the Department of Defense, or DoD,which seeks to tie language skills toan officer’s promotability. The DoDlanguage program seeks to produceSoldiers who are more culturallysavvy and are capable of operating inconstantly changing environments.The changes are much like thosebeing made to the Special Forces lan-guage program.Soldiers participatingin the CA and PSYOP programs willbe gradually exposed to more lan-

guage training in each phase and willbe offered the opportunity to take theDefense Language Proficiency Test,or DLPT, to meet qualification stand-ards early. “Head-start” materials willbe made available in Phase I.Phase IIchanges will include scheduling a lan-guage elective that is commensuratewith regional/targeting instruction,and the addition of a more intensive18- to-24-week language instructionfor those who do not score 1/1/1 on theDLPT.

Maintaining the branchThe active-Army branch officer will

complete all phases of his trainingwithout interruption, but the reserve-component branch officer may com-plete Phase I for initial company-grade qualification and return laterfor Phase II, field-grade qualification.Reserve-component branch officersare not required to complete PhaseIII. DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commis-sioned Officer Development andCareer Management, and DA Pam-phlet 611-21, Military OccupationalClassification and Structure, havebeen revised to include the trainingqualifications that are tied to promo-tion eligibility and utilization assign-ments. Ultimately, implementation ofthe branch concept will seek officerinterchangeability within the activeand reserve branches. The origin ofone branch officer must be indistin-guishable from another. The credibili-ty and competence of our officers willoriginate in training, be reinforced inregulation and enforced in utilization.

To ensure career progression andproper personnel management, theArmy has scrutinized grade and force-structure pyramids as closely as it hastraining standardization and qualifi-cation. Each of the CA and PSYOPcareer paths and promotion pyramidshave been reassessed to secure a cred-ible career path, a viable promotionpyramid and a career model that pro-vides officers the competitive advan-

July 2005 21

Army News Service

The continued relevance of Civil Affairs officers is evident in Afghanistan, where CA officers workto extend the influence of the U.S. military and eliminate sources of instability in the region.

tage necessary for above-average pro-motions and access to senior-levelpositions within the Army.

Transforming the current struc-tures from functional areas to viablebranch pyramids has included theArmy’s modularity requirements forCA and PSYOP presence in conven-tional structures. Developers of thebranches have also coordinated withforce developers in the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command, orUSASOC, and the U.S. Army CivilAffairs and Psychological OperationsCommand during recent force-designupdates. Inevitably, the establish-ment of separate branches will allowthe CA and PSYOP communities tooperate successfully in the futureoperational environment, ensuringnearly identical active-Army andreserve-component capabilities, cre-ating the capacity for seamless tran-sition and promoting professionalismin each career field.

Headquarters, Department of theArmy, has accepted the CA andPSYOP branch initiative for consid-

eration and Army-wide staffing.Pending the outcome of Armywidestaffing, the target date for HQDA’sformal recognition of the active-Armyand reserve-component CA andPSYOP branches is Oct. 1, 2006.

CMF 38B, CA SpecialistOct. 1, 2005, is the date that the

active Army will officially have anactive-Army Civil Affairs NCO. Morethan 100 positions within the 96thCivil Affairs Battalion and the 3rd Bat-talion, 1st Special Warfare TrainingGroup, will be recoded 38B from theirprevious 11-, 21- or 18-series billets.The Army’s transformation of CA NCObillets to official 38B-coded authoriza-tions is expected to take three years,which will be necessary for in-servicerecruiting, training development (ini-tial reclassification and NCOES) andpromotion qualification.

As recognition of the importance ofCivil Affairs has grown Armywide, so,too, has the need for NCO career pro-gression beyond USASOC.According-

ly, the Army has introduced the 38Binto its modular structure, which willinclude NCO growth concurrent withthe 38B authorizations acrossUSASOC modified tables of organiza-tion, as well as within Army struc-tures at the brigade combat team,unit of execution, and corps of theArmy land component.

Meanwhile, for the U.S. ArmyReserve, current 38A enlisted billetswill be recoded to 38B, which willimprove standards of trainingacross the active Army and reservecomponents and will achieve thedesired interchangeability acrossthe Total Army Career ManagementField 38. By the year 2008, CMF38B NCOs will be integral membersof CA teams in operational unitsand will serve as staff NCOs on thestaffs of brigade combat teams andhigher-level organizations.

Joining the CA teamActive-Army or reserve-component

NCOs interested in reclassifying to

22 Special Warfare

CA NCO Reclassification PacketNCOs desiring to reclassify into Civil Affairs must provide the following documents to determine their eli-

gibility for selection:• DA 4187 requesting reclassification to MOS 38B.• Memorandum stating why they desire to reclassify into Civil Affairs.• Two letters of recommendation (O4 or above and one endorsement from the CSM of the 96th CA Battal-

ion; for those Soldiers who are currently serving in the 96th CA Battalion, one recommendation needs tocome from outside USASOC).

• Copies of NCOERs. Soldiers must submit, at a minimum, their last three NCOERs and all NCOERsreceived while they served in the 96th CA Battalion.

• Current ARSOF medical examination PUHLES 222221.• DA Form 705, Army Physical Fitness Test, with a minimum APFT score of 229.• Verification of security clearance.

NCOs will be screened and evaluated in accordance with DA Pamphlet 611-21 on an individual basis. Anevaluation of the above documentation will be considered subject to:• Overall strengths of CMF 38, including the MOS in which the Soldier is qualified at the time of the

request.• Amount of time Soldier has spent out of the CMF, if the NCO is reclassifying back into Civil Affairs.• Anything the board determines to be inconsistent with the integrity, professionalism and proper conduct

of a Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations Soldier

CMF 38 must meet the prerequisitesas prescribed in DA Pamphlet 611-21, para. 10-123, and the JFK SpecialWarfare Center and School, orSWCS, policies as applicable:

• USAR Soldiers reclassifying intoCMF 38 must complete airbornetraining (if necessary); military occu-pational specialty, or MOS, reclassifi-cation training; additional skill iden-tifier, or ASI, training; and the BasicNoncommissioned Officer Course, orBNCOC, (if they are staff sergeantsor sergeants first class) conductedunder the auspices of SWCS or one ofthe ARSOF TASS battalions.

• Active-Army Soldiers must be in

the grade of sergeant and have atleast five years of active federal serv-ice or be a sergeant who is pro-motable to staff sergeant. Soldiersmust be or be willing to become air-borne-qualified, complete MOSreclassification training and ASItraining, and attend a BNCOC con-ducted under the auspices of SWCS.

• Exceptions to grant MOS 38B toactive-Army Soldiers in the grades ofstaff sergeant (promotable) orsergeant first class can be authorizedonly with the written approval of theproponent, the commanding generalof SWCS, in accordance with DAPamphlet 611-21.

• Reserve-component Soldiers whoare reclassifying into MOS 38B willbe restricted to the grade of staffsergeant and below, in accordancewith AR 14-158.

CA specialists must possess the fol-lowing physical-demands rating andqualifications for the initial award ofthe CA MOS:

• A physical-demands rating of“moderately heavy,” with a physicalprofile of 222221.

• A minimum score of 100 in apti-tude area ST of the Armed ServicesVocational Aptitude Battery adminis-tered prior to Jan. 2, 2002, or 96 fortests administered after Jan. 2, 2002.

• Be able to obtain a minimumsecurity clearance of secret (or eligi-ble for top secret).

• A U.S. citizenship.

Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Boydis the deputy director of the JFKSpecial Warfare Center andSchool’s Directorate of SpecialOperations Proponency. He was for-merly commander of SWCS’s 3rdBattalion, 1st Special WarfareTraining Group. Commissioned asan Infantry officer in 1984, heserved tours with Infantry units inGermany and at Fort Bragg, N.C.In 1995, he began his operationaltours in the 4th Psychological Oper-ations Group, where he served as adetachment commander, groupoperations officer and battalionexecutive officer. He has served in avariety of operations, includingJust Cause, Desert Shield, DesertStorm, Uphold Democracy, JointEndeavor and Enduring Freedom.In addition to holding a bachelor’sdegree in interdisciplinary studiesfrom Norwich University, Lieu-tenant Colonel Boyd is a 1992graduate of the Naval PostgraduateSchool’s special operations andlow-intensity conflict curriculum,and he is a 1994 graduate of theDefense Language Institute.

Army News Service

In the ongoing engagements of the GWOT, CA NCOs are not only waging the war but also win-ning the peace. The establishment of CMF 38B will increase promotion potential and standardizetraining for these highly sought-after Soldiers.

July 2005 23

Lessons learned during recent oper-ations in Afghanistan and Iraqshow that Special Forces groups

and battalions lack the manpower andcapability they need for the effectiveplanning and integration of joint fires.

To address that shortfall, the UnitedStates Army Special Forces Command, orUSASFC, is taking a two-pronged ap-proach: achieving a long-term manpowersolution through the process of the Depart-ment of the Army’s force-design update, orFDU; and pursuing shorter-term measuresthat offer a more immediate, although tem-porary, solution.

Compelling needSpecial Forces groups require preci-

sion joint fires (lethal and nonlethal)that have virtually unconstrained reach,but the SF groups have limited organiccapabilities for joint-fires integrationand planning. SF units have always hadto build a JFE capability from a coldstart — building a joint-fires elementfrom scratch via augmentation and thejoint-manning-document process. Inmany operations, the SF group and itsbattalions have been dependent uponArmy, Air Force, Navy and other joint-fires assets for supporting fires. Experi-ence and lessons learned during Opera-tion Enduring Freedom and OperationIraqi Freedom have clearly displayed

that SF groups require enhanced capa-bilities for synchronizing and integrat-ing the multitude of lethal and nonlethaljoint fires available to them on today’sbattlefield.

The SF group also requires experi-enced staff officers and NCOs who areexperts in Army- and joint-level fire sup-port. These leaders must understand thejoint-targeting process and have theability to plan for direct lethal and non-lethal fires from all sources and at alllevels of conflict, from major combatoperations through stability-and-sup-port operations. Fire-support personnelin Field Artillery, or FA, have the rightexperience base for this mission. Withproper training, they can perform thatrole superbly, in coordination with aselect group of Air Force liaison person-nel and organic staff officers and NCOs.Experienced fire-support personnelwould have the right expertise in thetactics, techniques and procedures, orTTPs, of joint fires and effects, signifi-cantly enhancing the capability of SFunits.

ESFG bands I, II and III To address shortfalls in personnel and

manning, USASFC has adopted an ini-tiative called the Enhanced SpecialForces Group, or ESFG. For the activecomponent, ESFG Band I will add 97

24 Special Warfare

SF Command Addresses Joint-Fires Shortfalls at the SF Group, Battalion Levels

by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Kent

positions per SF group in Fiscal Year2006, and ESFG Band II will add 158positions per SF group in FY 2008. Forthe reserve component, ESFG Band Iwill add 97 positions per SF group in FY2006 and ESFG Band II will add 156positions per SF group in FY 2008.1

ESFG Band III will address the JFErequirement. The FDU is engaged in theTotal Army Analysis, or TAA, to competefor manpower in the FY 2008-2013 timeframe. For the active component, ESFGBand III2 will add 457 positions, whichwill constitute five additional SF battal-ions and a joint-fires element, or JFE, inthe group and battalion S3 sections. Forthe reserve component, ESFG Band IIIwill add 14 positions, which will consti-tute a JFE in the group and battalion S3sections.

The ESFG Band III FDU is being staffedand is pending approval by Headquarters,Department of the Army. If the FDU isapproved and resourced by the U.S. SpecialOperations Command, or USSOCOM, inthe FY 2008-13 Major Force Program-11program objective memorandum, or POM,the earliest date that the ESFG Band IIIforce structure can be implemented is FY2008.

ESFG Band III will address SF opera-tional shortfalls and capability gaps forjoint-fires planning, coordination andexecution. Based on ongoing operationsand lessons learned, SF subordinate

units require JFEs within the battalionand group S3 sections. The JFE wouldadvise the commander on the use of jointfires, on joint-fires support, on the allo-cation of resources via air-taskingorders, on the distribution of close-air-support sorties, on logistics considera-tions, on target acquisition, on reducingthe risk of fratricide, and on meteorologyand survey conditions.

JFE compositionThe JFE will provide experienced staff

officers and NCOs who are experts inArmy- and joint-level fire-support. SFgroup commanders will then have attheir disposal a wide range of joint oper-ational TTPs with which to influence theconduct of actions. The JFE will alsoincrease the joint capabilities, interoper-ability and combat effectiveness of ArmySF.

The SF groups’ manning requirementsfor joint-fires support are depicted inFigure 1. The four-man JFE will consistof an FA major (the JFE officer); an Avi-ation major (the rotary-wing close-air-support officer); an FA chief warrantofficer 3 (the targeting officer); and anFA E7 (the JFE NCO).

The SF battalion’s manning require-ments for battalion joint-fires supportare depicted in Figure 2. The three-manJFE will consist of an FA captain (the

July 2005 25

JFE officer); an Aviation captain (therotary-wing close-air-support officer);and an FA E7 (the JFE NCO).

JFE capabilitiesThe JFE will provide SF group and

battalion commanders with the follow-ing capabilities:• Tactical integration of fires.• Leveraging of lethal and nonlethal joint

fires and effects for battlefield dominance.• Fires integrated with the joint-force

commander’s scheme of maneuver.• Facilitation of timely fires, and a

reduction of “sensor-to-shooter” timethat will significantly increase theunit’s capability for classifying andengaging targets of interest.

• Joint-fires expertise at all critical junc-tures (coordination and operations).

• Total coverage of the ground battlespace.• Increased joint-fires expertise for

planning future operations.• Reduction of the risk of fratricide.• Coordination of joint attack of targets,

synchronization of fires with maneu-ver, land fires to support aviation,synergistic fires and effects, and time-sensitive targeting.

JFE proof of conceptWith the support of the U.S. Army

Field Artillery Center and School,USASFC initiated a proof of concept

during the third quarter of FY 2004:USASFC placed FA and Aviation person-nel in SF units. The 7th SF Group hasone FA warrant officer and four FANCOs attached to its organization, andthese Soldiers have deployed with thegroup to Afghanistan in support of Oper-ation Enduring Freedom. In addition toproviding critical JFE expertise to thecombined joint special-operations taskforce, these Soldiers have provided valu-able after-action reports and lessonslearned that will ultimately provideadditional justification for support ofESFG Band III.

The Army Human Resources Com-mand, or HRC, has also approved adirected-military-overstrength, or DMO,request to assign one FA major andthree FA captains to the 7th SF Group inorder to fully integrate the JFE withinthe organization. The intent is to fullyexercise the group and battalion JFEduring the next operational deployment.

The way aheadThe FDU process is the long-term JFE

resourcing solution, but even thoughUSASFC has captured the JFE require-ment in ESFG Band III, it will not beimplemented before FY 2008. The near-term solution for providing the JFEcapability to all SF groups and battal-ions is to establish a memorandum of

26 Special Warfare

agreement, or MOA, as a stopgap untilthe FDU can be approved and resourced.USASFC’s goal is to get the MOA signedand work out the personnel require-ments with U.S. Army Forces Commandand HRC. The command understandsthat the JFE requirement may not beimmediately resourced — it may beresourced and implemented in phases,with the priority given to providingJFEs to units supporting operationsEnduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.The MOA would provide a great mecha-nism for a proof of concept and provideadditional justification in the conceptand organization plan and the opera-tions plan for the FDU. The MOA willtransition to a DMO once the FDU hasbeen approved and funding has beensecured within the POM process.

Conclusion Within ESFG Band III, the joint-fires

element is the most important priorityfor USASFC, and the JFE meets one ofthe USASFC commanding general’s vec-tors: Transform for the future fight.USASFC will remain on the leading edgeof doctrinal and technological develop-

ments that will enhance mission readi-ness and the war-fighting capabilities ofits units. The joint-fires element is acritical piece of the command’s transfor-mation strategy, and it is a combat mul-tiplier that the SF groups cannot dowithout.

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey L. Kent isthe assistant chief of staff G7 (force man-agement) for the U.S. Army SpecialForces Command. His previous SFassignments include staff assignments inthe U.S. Army Special Operations Com-mand and USASFC, and command andstaff assignments in the 3rd and 10th SFgroups.

Notes:1 Reserve-component funding was disapproved by

USSOCOM in the FY 2006-11 MFP-11 POM.USASFC will renominate this requirement forresourcing in the FY 2008-13 MFP-11 POM.

2 ESFG Band III does not include the force-struc-ture numbers for combat-service-support transfor-mation, or CSST. CSST is the transformation of theactive-component group-support company into agroup-support battalion.

July 2005 27

Army News Service

An OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopter from the 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, provides close air support during a raidin Al Shahabi, Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Unlike the battlefields of the past,today’s battlefield is far fromdefined, often leaving Soldiers

wondering exactly who and where theirenemy is. Soldiers assigned to theUnited States Army Special OperationsCommand, or USASOC, have recentlyreceived a new tool that will help answerthose questions — the Gunfire DetectionSystem, or GDS.

The GDS is designed to quickly andaccurately detect and locate sniper andsmall-arms fire. The GDS is an acousticdetection system that determines, with-in three seconds, the azimuth, elevationand range to the origin of a shot. Withina 360-degree, 1,200-meter surveillancezone, the system can detect and identifythe location of shots fired from subsonicand supersonic weapons whose caliber isbetween 5.56 mm and 20 mm.

Information concerning the origin ofthe shot is displayed on a computerscreen. Optical systems that give dayand thermal visual data are being inte-grated with the current acoustic system.Each optical system, which includes theday and thermal cameras, is attached toa pan/tilt mechanism that is mounted ona tripod. The GDS has two variants: afixed-site system and a vehicle-mountedsystem.

Funded entirely through Congression-al plus-ups, or additions to the budget,the system costs $65,000, with an addi-tional $165,000 per optical system. Con-gressional funding for the system

28 Special Warfare

Gunfire Detection System Brings the Enemy Out of the Shadows

by Master Sergeant Francis Vangel

The vehicle-mounted gunfire detection system will helpSoldiers pinpoint sniper fire when they are movingthrough hostile territory.

When put into use by a headquartersbrigade at a forward operating base, thesystem was able to quickly locate thesource of sniper fire and give reliable infor-mation to a quick-reaction force, which wasable to find its target approximately 40 to 50percent of the time.

Photo courtesy USASOC G8

allowed USASOC to procure, test andmodify the systems as necessary, with-out using any USASOC operationalfunds.

All active-duty Special Forces groups,as well as the reserve-component 20thSpecial Forces Group, have received theGDS and have been trained on it. The19th SF Group is next in line for fieldingand training on the equipment.

The systems are in use in Afghanistanand Iraq by both ARSOF and conven-tional Army units. USASOC fielded 20systems to conventional units for use inIraq in July 2003. Soldiers were trainedin theater on the use of the systems.

Utilization of the system by the con-ventional forces has had positive results.When put into use by a headquartersbrigade at a forward operating base, thesystem was able to quickly locate thesource of sniper fire and give reliableinformation to a quick-reaction force,which was able to find its target approx-imately 40 to 50 percent of the time.

The executive officer of a brigade com-bat team noted that the GDS with opticshas proven to be a combat multiplier foroperations in Iraq. His comments fol-

lowed the use of the GDS by his unit ona mission to an Iraqi army compound.

The unit came under fire within hoursof setting up at a compound that was fre-quently a target of sniper fire. Datareceived from the GDS enabled the bat-talion to locate the source of the sniperfire and to initiate a raid that resultedin the detainment of two individualssuspected of being snipers associatedwith the attack. The unit has now inte-grated the GDS into a variety of its mis-sions and looks forward to receiving themobile system.

Master Sergeant Francis Vangel is acombat developer in the United StatesArmy Special Operations Command G8.He specializes in night-vision and laserweaponry. Prior to moving to USASOC,Master Sergeant Vangel served in the 3rdSpecial Forces Group, the 1st SpecialForces Group and at the U.S. Army JohnF. Kennedy Special Warfare Center andSchool.

The optical pivot of the Gunfire Detection System, attached to a pan/tilt mechanism and mounted on a tripod, pro-vides daylight and thermal cameras.

Photo courtesy USASOC G8

July 2005 29

The special-operations imper-atives provide a guide for theworldwide strategic activities

of United States Special Forces Sol-diers.The first two special-operationsimperatives — understand the oper-ational environment and recognizepolitical implications — were partic-ularly useful for the 19th SF Group’sSF Operational Detachment Alpha972 in its work with the 2nd Battal-ion of the Afghan National Army(now known as the 3rd Kandak) fromOctober 2002 to April 2003.

Up to that time, U.S. special-opera-tions forces operating in Afghanistanhad concentrated largely on taking thefight to the enemy, operating inde-pendently or with ethnically-basedmilitias. While active, hostile forcesstill existed in Afghanistan — particu-larly in the Pakistan border regions —ODA 972 had a foreign internaldefense, or FID, mission that focusedon training Afghan soldiers to defeathostile forces indirectly, by establish-ing security and stability for the pop-ulace.FID has much greater potentialfor long-term success, because itallows U.S. forces to influence andshape the battlespace and to becomeforce multipliers. Indeed, FID pro-vides the only realistic path for reach-ing the conditions that will eventual-ly allow the U.S. to achieve its nation-

al objectives and leave Afghanistan.Success in FID missions required

patience and flexibility on the part ofODA 972, first to rid itself of thedirect action, or DA, mindset itbrought to Afghanistan, then to graspthe new operational environment,recognize the political implications ofits actions, and devise and implementa strategy accordingly.

ODA 972’s mission, the first of itskind in Afghanistan,was in essence toextend the authority of the centralgovernment of President HamidKarzai into the Province of Bamian.

The events playing themselves out inBamian (of which the 3rd Kandakplayed a central role) are representa-tive of the larger sweep of issues fac-ing the rest of Afghanistan — issuesthat will be encountered repeatedlyas disarmament and the establish-ment of national authority is attempt-ed in other areas.

The simple truth in Afghanistan isthat the people want peace, stability,prosperity, disarmament and civilianauthority. They are proud of the new,professional, multiethnic nationalarmy and inspired to hope by the pos-

30 Special Warfare

Special-Ops Imperatives Guide ODA 972 in Afghanistan

by Major Vincent Martinelli

Photo courtesy Todd Harrell

A group of soldiers from the Afghan National Army trains at the Kabul Military Institute under thedirection of Soldiers of the 19th SF Group.

sibilities inherent in the nationalgovernment. Understanding thisreality, and adopting tactics to lever-age the existing environment in apositive way was the mission of U.S.special-operations forces.

Another task was to grasp how, inthis environment, seemingly insignif-icant decisions and actions by U.S.forces could have immediate and pro-found political implications. Under-standing the variety of groups whoare vying for influence, and theirmethods for attempting to use orinfluence U.S. forces or the Afghanarmy to further their own purposes,was vital. The primary concernsvoiced by civilians to the NationalArmy and ODA 972, and the cause ofmuch hesitation over turning inweapons, was that people were afraidthe National Army would takeweapons from the civilians and leave,exposing the civilians to retributionfrom local commanders. If special-operations forces could employ theAfghan National Army to provide asecure environment, the Afghanswould have the justification andassurance they sought for turningover their weapons and ordnance,and for supplanting their reliance onlocal commanders with a reliance ona national authority.

Before ODA 972 arrived inAfghanistan, the 3rd Kandak hadreceived basic training at the KabulMilitary Training Center; however, ithad not completed the full program ofinstruction, or POI. In the interim,3rd Kandak soldiers had moved intobarracks at the presidential palace,where they had stagnated withoutfurther training, guidance orresources. The soldiers had no gov-ernment-issued standard gear.Morale was low, and attrition washigh. Out of an authorized strengthof around 600, only 220 soldiersremained. The ODA’s first task wasto establish a 10-week POI thatbegan with squad tactics. The train-ing, designed to be a refresher, turned

out to be something more. The teamfound that the months of inactivityhad taken their toll on the soldiers —training would need to start from thebeginning (individual movementtechniques) and proceed to the man-dated goal of achieving a companylive-fire assault.

With all its problems, the 3rd Kan-dak had one thing in its favor — acohesive,experienced officer cadre thatbelieved in the purpose of the NationalArmy. One of the finest and most com-mitted officers was the battalion com-

mander, Colonel Aminulla. In wordsthat were supported by his actions, hepassionately espoused the goals andideals of a National Army that wasethnically diverse and free from politi-cal leanings and aspirations.

Aminulla, a Nuristani, is in an eth-nic minority, and having been absentfrom the country for much of the civilwar, he was able to maintain a neu-tral position while implementing theideals established for the NationalArmy. He picked strong companycommanders, maintained a balancedethnic mix within his officer andenlisted cadres, and was very recep-tive to the suggestions and ideas ofU.S. trainers. The SF NCOs earnedthe respect of the Afghan soldiers

through hard work and a willingnessto understand, respect and workwithin the Afghan Islamic culture.That willingness allowed them toestablish an amazing rapport withthe Afghan soldiers and officers.

Completing the 10-week POI inDecember, the Kandak started a con-tinuation-training course. This train-ing allowed the SF Soldiers to furtherdevelop a strong rapport with theAfghan soldiers and to more fullyunderstand their strengths and weak-nesses. The Kandak’s future deploy-ment provided the focus of this contin-uation training, which was designedto teach the Afghan soldiers to conductconfidence and combat missions (pres-ence patrols, checkpoint operations,cordon-and-search operations andhumanitarian-assistance and securityoperations). Foremost in ODA 972’sassessment of the requirements forthe Kandak’s mission success was theability of the 3rd Kandak to conductliaison operations with the AfghanMilitia Forces, or AMF, and the civil-ian populace in any region. To thatend, the SF Soldiers held formal andinformal training in these subjects.

Before it deployed, the Kandakconducted two high-visibility battal-ion-level live-fire assaults — one forthe chief of the Office of MilitaryCooperation-Afghanistan, or OMC-A,Major General Karl Eikenberry, andthe other for Deputy Secretary ofDefense Paul Wolfowitz.

The majority of the Kandak wasordered to the Madr/Khamard val-ley region as part of Operation RollTide, under Advanced OperatingBase, or AOB, 2030. The remainderof the battalion was detailed toconstruct an Afghan army base inBamian, farther south. Upon com-pletion of Roll Tide, the battalion,based in Bamian, was scheduled toconduct follow-on operations foranother two weeks. However,because of conditions in the Madrand Khamard valleys, OMC-A andthe Afghan administration decided

July 2005 31

While active, hostileforces still existed inAfghanistan … ODA 972had a foreign internaldefense mission thatfocused on trainingAfghan soldiers todefeat hostile forcesindirectly, by establish-ing security and stabili-ty for the populace.

to maintain elements of the battal-ion in the area around the city ofMadr, establishing a permanentNational Army presence not onlyin Bamian, but in Madr, as well.

The 3rd Kandak was only the sec-ond Afghan battalion to deploy out-side of Kabul. This was the first timethe Afghan National Army had par-ticipated as an equal partner in aU.S.-conceived, -planned and -exe-cuted combat operations. TwoAfghan officers were, in fact, isolatedwith U.S. forces during the missionplanning. While they were not giveninformation about all aspects of themission, they were able to providevaluable intelligence to assist U.S.Soldiers in developing the plan.Complicating the mission was thevariety of ethnic and political groupsvying for power, influence andresources in the area.

The SF AOB’s mission in RollTide was based on intelligence thatindicated that there were a num-

ber of Hesbi Islami Gulbaddin, orHIG, and former Taliban com-manders still operating (albeit notunder those banners) in theMadr/Khamard valley. Thesegroups were allegedly suppressingthe population, committing crimesand stockpiling weapons andammunition. The mission of theAOB was to insert into theMadr/Khamard valley, seize theweapons caches and certain localcommanders in the area, establishsecurity and disarm the local popu-lation. The Kandak’s initial limitedrole was to assist with security,searches and other confidence andcombat missions.

Three things became clear at theoutset of Operation Roll Tide: first,that the soldiers and officers of theKandak far exceeded mission expec-tations regarding their ability to dealeffectively and positively with thelocal population; second, that theKandak was successful and better

adapted than U.S forces to effect dis-armament and collect weapons; andfinally, that the political and socialsituation in Madr/Khamard was farmore complex than anticipated. Thisis where the special-operationsimperatives became valuable in thedecision-making process for continu-ing operations.

The operational environment inmost of Afghanistan is permissive.SF’s goal was to leverage the detach-ment’s abilities by being a force mul-tiplier — implementing the AfghanArmy, developing intelligence-assetnetworks and employing othermeans. Three suspected HIG/Tal-iban commanders disappeared priorto the ODA’s arrival in the area. TheSF Soldiers entered the area withoutany resistance, to a mostly welcomereception from the civilian popula-tion. Having adopted a realistic viewof the operational environment freedthe team to identify and focus on themost important issues — introduc-ing the Afghan army and achievingcivilian disarmament.

The Kandak proved to be far moreeffective than the Americans at con-vincing the population to surrendertheir weapons, as evidenced byevents in Madr, the first town theteam entered to effect disarmament.Thereafter, the AOB put the Kandakin the main effort. The model theAOB adopted was to move into thetowns with the Kandak soldiers trav-eling in the front and rear of the con-voy. The Kandak, with ODA 972,established security elements oneither edge of town, and other ODAssecured a command post within thetown. The remaining American andAfghan forces moved to secureknown or suspected weapons caches.

Town elders approaching the com-mand post began a dialogue with theKandak and the ODA. The Kandakcommander and the ODA 972 com-mander talked with the villagers.The Kandak commander discussedthe role of the National Army, its eth-

32 Special Warfare

Photo courtesy Todd Harrell

One of the goals of the 19th SF Group was to get villagers to turn weapons in. They found thattheir efforts were more successful when the Afghan National Army battalion commander spoketo the villagers first.

nic diversity and the need to “burythe hatchet” in order to achievepeace, security and disarmament.The audience often gave vocal inter-jections of support during the com-mander’s speech.

The ODA commander echoed theKandak commander’s comments, buthe approached the issue from aslightly different angle. This addedcredibility and strength to the Kan-dak commander’s words because ofthe respect given to Americanstrength, ability to vouchsafe peaceand security, and potential for deliv-ering Civil Affairs assessors andaccomplishing humanitarian projectsin the area.

Variations on this routine includedthe Kandak commander explainingto the villagers how the Americansused satellites and computers to pin-point and verify the AK-47 that a cer-tain old man had buried in his homebut was reluctant to admit that hewas hiding. The ODA commander,looking significantly from his GlobalPositioning System to the close-air-support aircraft circling overhead,confirmed this technological capabili-ty in the villagers’ minds.

The elders would go to their homesalone, or with Afghan soldiers andofficers, and they would return bear-ing weapons. This process would con-tinue over the next few days until theKandak and U.S. forces were satis-fied that they had secured a largepart of the ordnance in the town. Thesame process was repeated through-out the valley.

These methods were successfuland efficient, having a more positiveeffect on the civilian population thanU.S.-led efforts by teams searchinghouse-to-house with guns at theready. There were too many homes,too many hiding spots and insuffi-cient intelligence and manpower torely on that course of action. Theharsher methods were reserved forrare instances in which intelligenceindicated a large cache or very hostile

environment. Working with theelders in a firm but respectful wayhelped the ODA develop a foundationof leadership and establish contactsthat furthered efforts to collect infor-mation and shape the message in thetowns.The majority of the populationshowed overwhelming support forthe national government and army;for U.S. forces; and for peace, securityand disarmament. The villagers alsowanted to see AMF and local com-manders replaced by the NationalArmy and civilian authorities, includ-ing civilian-led police forces.

The second special-operationsimperative — understand the politi-cal environment, allowed the team toovercome its greatest obstacle to mis-sion success — AMF and ethnic rival-ry and turf battles in the operationalarea. The southern portion of theBamian province, which includes thetown of Bamian, is dominated by eth-nic Hazarans. Hazarans make up 19percent of the Afghan population. AnAMF “division” exists there, com-manded and manned mostly by Haz-arans. During the civil war, the Haz-arans and Tajiks, a group that makes

Photo courtesy Todd Harrell

A medic from the 19th SF Group treats the hand of village elder in Afghanistan. The SF Soldiersrelied on their ability to gain the trust of the villagers by meeting some of their most basic needs,such as health care.

July 2005 33

up 25 percent of the country’s popu-lation, fought each other fiercely, andmany Tajiks sought safety in thenorthern part of Bamian province,where they formed an AMF “brigade”composed and led mainly by Tajiks.While their role in supporting theU.S. should not be minimized, thesesoldiers usually have no formal train-ing, lack equipment and uniformsand generally are not considered tobe a professional military force.

Initial intelligence reports,which provided the basis for theplanning for Operation Roll Tide,came from sources in the Bamianarea. Being on the ground in Madrallowed the ODAs to develop amore balanced, complex view andan understanding of the politicalenvironment throughout theprovince and of the political effectsof their actions. The ODA learnedthat many of the AMF command-ers were opportunists who tradedtheir loyalty to the Taliban forpower over the people, using their

authority to deal in drugs, weaponsand organized crime. The ODAfound that the senior AMF com-mander had a deep personal rival-ry with the deputy commander ofthe AMF Division in Bamian.

Both commanders had the backingof powerful leaders from differentparties in the Afghan national gov-ernment, and the politically motivat-ed rivalry led to problems for theODA and the Afghan battalion it wasadvising. Supporters of the AMFcommander from the Bamian areaoften provided intelligence on cachesin the Madr and Khamard valleys,the base of support for the other AMFcommander. Because of their success-es in disarming civilians and discov-ering weapons caches in the Madrarea, and because of their missionmandate, the SF Soldiers applied farless pressure on the Bamian area.That upset the Afghan governmentleader, a member of the Ministry ofDefense, whose political allies werebeing disarmed. Through Afghan

channels, he indicated to ColonelAminulla that perhaps the team wasbeing too partisan in its disarma-ment efforts. In effect, the ODA’s dis-armament successes were undercut-ting Aminulla’s position within theMinistry of Defense, and he wasexactly the type and quality of com-mander that the U.S. needed to sup-port and help to succeed.

Having achieved success at disar-mament in the villages of the Madrvalley and the western half of theKhamard valley, and recognizing thenew political landscape and stakes,the team turned its attention to theeastern half of the Khamard valley,which was still under the firm controlof the AMF commander who wasallied with the key leader in the Min-istry of Defense.

The ODA switched its tacticswith that commander to “hard-nosed” cooperation and communi-cation, and blunter communicationwith his rival in Bamian. The

34 Special Warfare

Photo courtesy Todd Harrell

A member of the Afghan National Army’s 3rd Kandak, or 2nd Battalion, pulls security while villagers listen intently to requests by the 19th SF Groupand the Kandak for information and weapons.

(See ODA 972, next page)

SOF-specific pay scaleneeded

There are many bonuses, etc.,bandied around these days. Mythoughts are that a sliding, SOF-spe-cific pay scale is what we need. Orsimply a separate pay scale along thelines of what USSOCOM has set upfor the 150k bonus (Army SF, SEALs,and AFSOC). In any case, pay theoperators what they are worth, anddon’t wait until they are at 20 yearsof service.

Maybe [with a SOF pay scale] wewon’t perpetuate a “gray” force. Mycompany warrant [officer] has grand-children! Good on him, but he is actu-

ally so long-toothed he is past the 26years service eligibility for any of the150k bonus.

So in short, the benefits would betwofold: to prevent folks from leavingthe force for contract jobs, and to keepa younger force (that whole “warrior”frame of mind). The solution is com-ing, who will be the first to grasp it?

SFC Troy H. Thomas1st Battalion/10th SF Group

July 2005 35

LettersSpecial Warfare

team’s efforts included establish-ing a regional peace council madeup of elders from all the villages inMadr/Khamard. The council wouldmeet once a week to discuss peace,security, disarmament and civil-affairs projects in the valley.

The U.S. and the 3rd Kandakhosted two peace conferences, onein Madr, the other in Bamian,involving both of the rival com-manders, the Bamian provincialgovernor and police chief and theirassistants, advisers and sub-com-manders. The conferences resultedin a written, signed pact specifyingdisarmament and confidence-building actions both sides wouldtake to decrease tensions.

The SF Soldiers supervised theestablishment of the governor’s civil-ian authority in Madr/Khamard,including the fair and open electionof a Madr/Khamard sub-governor

and police chief by elders from all thevillages, and the establishment of acivilian police force in Khamard.

The National Army and AMFforces continue to co-exist in theprovince. Both groups maintain secu-rity and peace, but the role of theAMF vis-à-vis the Kandak is stillambiguous at best. The opportunitymay still exist for a comprehensivepeace in the Bamian-Khamardregion, building on the progress ofthe initial peace agreements, whichwill provide the model for similarpeace agreements in other areas ofAfghanistan between rival ethnic,political and government groups.

The Afghan National Army, byestablishing security, inspiring confi-dence among the Afghan civiliansand setting a positive example of theability of multi-ethnic groups to worktogether, will be key to the process.The experiences of the SF Soldiers of

ODA 972 show how U.S. SpecialForces, by understanding the envi-ronment and recognizing the politicalimplications of their actions, can playa critical role in bringing stability toAfghanistan.

Major Vincent Mar-tinelli served with the19th Special ForcesGroup in Afghanistanduring 2002 and2003. He has since re-turned to active dutyand is serving as a foreign-area offi-cer. His previous assignments includeservice in mechanized-infantry andlong-range surveillance units. His SFassignments include service as adetachment commander in the 10thand 19th SF groups. Major Martinel-li is a graduate of the U.S. MilitaryAcademy.

ODA 972

Special Warfare is interested inreceiving letters from its readerswho would like to comment onarticles they have read in Spe-cial Warfare or who would liketo discuss issues that may notrequire a magazine article.Include your full name, rank,address and phone number.Address letters to Editor, Spe-cial Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-DM; JFK Special Warfare Cen-ter and School; Fort Bragg, NC28310; or send e-mail to steel-man@soc.mil.

36 Special Warfare

Warrant Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

SF warrant officersapproved for CSRB

The Department of Defense has authorized a critical-skills retentionbonus, or CSRB, for Special Forces warrant officers (military occupationalspecialty 180A) who have between 19 and 25 years of active federal serv-ice and who are fully eligible for continued service. Warrant officers inMOS 180A must have at least 18 years and six months of service beforesubmitting their CSRB request; they may request the CSRB entitlementup to their 25th year of active federal service. The approval of the CSRBterm will be the authority to retain the Soldiers up to their mandatoryretirement date, which is specified in other provisions of law. Warrant offi-cers will be required to obligate themselves for at least two additionalyears of service, without exceeding 25 years of service. An exception to theminimum obligation will be made for Solders who have completed at least23 years of service. Those Soldiers may be offered a one-year CSRB con-tract, providing that they will not have completed 25 years of service priorto the end of their contract. Bonuses will be paid as follows:

Years obligation: 6 5 4 3 2 1*CSRB amount: $150K $75K $50K $30K 18K $8K

*One-year contract option only for Soldiers who have completed 23 years of service.

Soldiers can elect to receive their CSRB in a lump sum or in installments.Those who elect to receive their bonus in installments will receive equal annu-al payments based on the number of full years (12 months) of their obligation.The date of the annual payment will be based on the effective date establishedin the memorandum from the Army Human Resources Command, or HRC,that approves the request. A Soldier’s active-duty service obligation will bedetermined from the effective date of the HRC approval memorandum.Enlisted Soldiers who are serving an enlisted CSRB commitment and who areappointed as SF warrant officers will not be required to repay their previous-ly awarded CSRB; however, they will be required to sign an agreement to com-plete the remaining portion of their CSRB period. Tax-exempt status will bedetermined by the Defense Finance Accounting Service, or DFAS, based on thewarrant officer’s location on the date of the HRC approval memorandum.War-rant officers who have approved retirement orders and are within the 19-to-25-year service period are eligible to apply for the CSRB. They must requestwithdrawal of their retirement in conjunction with their request or beforeprocessing of their CSRB is complete. The CSRB request cannot be approveduntil the approved retirement has been withdrawn. Warrant officers servingin MOS 180A who are under a CSRB obligation cannot be approved for sepa-ration or retirement without HRC approval.Applicants should submit a CSRB request memorandum through their chainof command. A chain-of-command recommendation, signed by a lieutenantcolonel or above, must be submitted on a separate memorandum. Requestsshould be mailed to: HRC; Attn: ARC-PLP-I; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria,VA 22332; or faxed to: DSN 221-6389 or commercial (703) 325-6389.The CSRBrequest memorandum, the endorsement from the chain of command and the

July 2005 37

approval from HRC establishing the effective date are the documents that willobligate the warrant officer to the terms of the agreement and will be used byDFAS as the authority for disbursing payment of the bonus. For additionalinformation, telephone the SF Service Career Manager, Chief Warrant Offi-cer 3 Albert Buchinski, at DSN 221-5231 or commercial (703) 325-5231, orsend e-mail to: albert.buchinski@hoffman.army.mil.

In an effort to attract and retain Soldiers in the Special Forces WarrantOfficer Branch, the Department of Defense has authorized an accessionbonus of $20,000 to SF NCOs in grades E6 through E8 who are selectedand appointed as SF warrant officers (military occupational specialty180A). As of May 18, qualified SF NCOs will receive a lump-sum paymentupon their technical certification as SF warrant officers or upon comple-tion of the Warrant Officer Basic Course for MOS 180A. The accessionbonus is available to Soldiers with not more than 15 years of active feder-al service. Enlisted Soldiers currently serving under a commitment for aselective re-enlistment bonus or a critical-skills retention bonus who areselected and appointed as warrant officers will not be required to repay thepreviously awarded disbursements; however, they will have to sign anagreement to complete the remaining portion of their SRB/CSRB period.SF warrant officers who are obligated under an accession-bonus contractwill not be approved for separation or retirement without the approval ofthe commander of the Army Human Resources Command, or HRC. War-rant officers who elect to receive the accession bonus will be counseled onthe eligibility criteria, the service obligations, and the amount and pay-ment of the bonus before they sign an agreement. The agreement will beforwarded to the Pay and Incentives Branch, HRC, for execution. A copy ofthe agreement will be placed in the warrant officer’s military personnelrecords jacket, and a copy will be provided to the officer for his personnelrecords. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School will inform HRC bymemorandum of qualifying graduations from the Warrant Officer BasicCourse. The Soldier’s eligibility will be confirmed by HRC and reported tothe Defense Finance and Accounting Service to enable the disbursement offunds. For additional information, telephone the SF 180A accessions man-agers, Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Santoro or Chief Warrant Officer 3Charles Moritz, at DSN 239-7597, commercial (910) 432-7597, or send e-mail to: santorom@soc.mil or to moritzc@soc.mil.

In May, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Douglas Frank became the new chief war-rant officer of the SF Branch and the MOS 180A proponent manager,replacing Chief Warrant Officer 5 Bill McPherson. CW4 Frank has morethan 20 years of SF experience, having served in operational positions atthe SF detachment, company, battalion and group levels. He has served asan SF warrant officer in the 7th and 3rd SF groups. CW5 McPherson hadserved as the chief warrant officer of the SF Branch since early 2003. Dur-ing his tenure, he was instrumental in the advancement of the WarrantOfficer Education System, as well as in securing approval for SF warrant-officer pay and acquisition incentives. CW4 Frank may be reached by tele-phoning DSN 239-1879/7597 or commercial (910) 432-1879/7597, or bysending e-mail to: frankd@soc.mil.

SF warrant officer accession bonus

authorized

New chief warrant officer of SF Branch named

38 Special Warfare

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The proposal by the commander of the JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool for the creation of a Civil Affairs officer branch in the active Armyand a Psychological Operations officer branch in the active Army and thereserve component has been approved by the Department of the Army. Theeffective date for the new branches will be Oct. 16, 2006.

On Oct. 1, Functional Area 39, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations,will realign its codes to more accurately differentiate its component func-tions. Psychological Operations, now FA 39B, will be redesignated FA 37A.Civil Affairs, now FA 39C, will be redesignated FA 38A. The changes willmore accurately align officer and enlisted career fields, with the intent ofcreating a more committed, cohesive and professional officer and NCOcorps. For questions pertaining to this realignment and the eventualtransformation of the functional areas to branches, contact LieutenantColonel Curt Boyd, deputy director of the SWCS Directorate of SpecialOperations Proponency, at DSN 239-7576, commercial (910) 432-7576, orsend e-mail to curt.boyd@us.army.mil.

Reserve-component officers in Civil Affairs or Psychological Operationswho desire to complete the Civil Affairs Qualification Course or the Psy-chological Operations Qualification Course using the distant-learningoption and attend the two-week resident Phase II at the JFK Special War-fare Center and School will have until July 1, 2006, to do so. The residentPhase II courses will be scheduled on an as-needed basis to support thepopulation of officers in the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and PsychologicalOperations Command who have completed Phase I. As mobilizations forIraq and Afghanistan continue, a 29-day intensive Mobilization CivilAffairs Course will provide deploying U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psycho-logical Operations Command officers the qualifications required to beoperationally successful. USAR officers eligible for Branch 38A or Func-tional Area 37A qualification must be captains or majors, have completedthe Captains’ Career Course and meet the standards outlined in DA Pam-phlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management.USAR CA or PSYOP officers desiring further attendance at the active-component pipeline courses (Advanced Regional Analysis Course, former-ly Regional Studies and Language Training) can do so on a space-availablebasis. For questions regarding course prerequisites, telephone Major KevinShackleford at DSN 239-6406, commercial (910) 432-6406, or send e-mailto: shacklke@soc.mil.

Distant-learning qualification for CAQC,

POQC to end in 2006

DA approves creation of CA, PSYOP officer

branches

PSYOP, CA functional-areacodes to change

July 2005 39

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The commander of the United States Special Operations Command, orUSSOCOM, has directed the United States Army Special Operations Com-mand to initiate and manage the U.S. Army Special Operations ForcesAssignment Incentive Pay, or AIP, program. AIP went into effect in May andwill be paid at the rate of $750 per month. The program is open to SF war-rant officers, SF enlisted Soldiers in grades E6 to E9, and enlisted membersof special-mission units in grades E6 to E9, who are serving in USSOCOM-approved billets and have at least 25 years of active-duty service. To apply forAIP, eligible Soldiers must sign a written contract to remain on active dutyfor at least 12 months. Soldiers may be allowed to obligate themselves onlyuntil their mandatory retirement date. The contract, DA Form 4187, will bemaintained in the Soldier’s service record. The following statement must beused on the DA Form 4187:I volunteer to remain on active duty in a United States Special Operations Command-designated assignment, (specify billet) for (state number of months), from the date of thisagreement, and I agree to accept Assignment Incentive Pay of $750 per month for eachmonth I serve in this assignment under this agreement.I understand the consequences for voluntary or involuntary termination of this AIPcontract:(1) If I should terminate the AIP assignment or the actual contract I am now signing, allAIP will be stopped immediately.(2) If my AIP tour is curtailed by HRC or curtailed for other, no-fault-of-mine reasons,AIPwill be adjusted on a case-by-case basis.(3) If I am placed in an AWOL or confinement status prior to completion of this assign-ment, AIP will be stopped. Furthermore, I understand that if I am absent from thisUSSOCOM-designated operator billet on a temporary additional duty assignment, I willcontinue to receive AIP.

For additional information, Soldiers should contact their unit S1.

To meet the manpower requirements of active-component Civil Affairs units,the Army Human Resources Command; the Special Operations RecruitingCommand; the Training Development Division, or TDD, of the Special WarfareCenter and School’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine; and the SWCS Direc-torate of Special Operations Proponency have undertaken a coordinated effortto access, recruit, train and manage in-service active-duty enlisted NCOs whowill be among the first active-duty NCOs in the new Civil Affairs military occu-pational specialty, 38B.TDD has completed the critical-task selection board andtask analysis for MOS 38B and is designing the six-week reclassificationcourse. For information, telephone Master Sergeant Robert Crite at DSN 239-5379, commercial (910) 432-5379, or send e-mail to: ca-psyoprecruiting@soc.mil.For reclassification instructions, contact the enlisted personnel manager,Sergeant First Class J.A. Cassel, at DSN 221-3899.

Assignment Incentive Payauthorized for selected SF

NCOs, warrant officers

Army seeks NCOs for new Civil Affairs MOS

SWCS producing newPSYOP publications

The United States Army John F.Kennedy Special Warfare Centerand School’s Directorate of Train-ing and Doctrine, or DOTD,announces the publication of FM3-05.30, Psychological Operations.

The manual was released April15. Emerging trends resulting fromArmy transformation initiatives,current operational procedures,force-design updates and newequipment are a few of the changesthat precipitated the revision ofthis keystone manual for psycho-logical operations, or PSYOP.

In rewriting the manual, theDOTD Psychological OperationsTraining and Doctrine Divisionsought to precisely define the mis-sion, roles and functions, and core

tasks of PSYOP. The manual intro-duces a newly refined seven-phasePSYOP process, which will appearin greater detail in subsequentmanuals. FM 3-05.30 capturesthose changes that are having aprofound impact on the planningand execution of PSYOP, particu-larly in support of the Global Waron Terrorism, or GWOT.

Two additional manuals thatfocus primarily on tactics, tech-niques and procedures, or TTP, forPSYOP forces are also priorities forthe PSYOP Division. A new manu-al, FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psycho-logical Operations Tactics, Tech-niques and Procedures, is beingreadied for release during the sum-mer of 2005. This manual will pro-vide PSYOP Soldiers with the nec-essary information to facilitate theplanning and conduct of tactical-

level PSYOP.Much of the contents of FM 3-

05.302 were derived from exhaus-tive research and analyses of cur-rent Army doctrine and concepts,and direct observations of TTPsand lessons learned from the field.The increased demand for tactical-level PSYOP forces, the implemen-tation of Army modularity and thenumber of tactical lessons learnedfrom operations Enduring Free-dom and Iraqi Freedom, or OEFand OIF, made the need for a sepa-rate tactical PSYOP TTP evident.Included in the manual is anexpansion of the seven-phasePSYOP process introduced in thekeystone manual and a discussionof the role of PSYOP in stabilityoperations.

The PSYOP Division has begunthe revision process of FM

40 Special Warfare

UpdateSpecial Warfare

MakingfriendsA Soldier from the Asadabad Provin-cial Reconstruction Team of the Com-bined Joint Civil-Military OperationsTask Force is greeted by a little boy inManoi, Afghanistan.

Army News Service

3-05.301, Psychological OperationsTactics, Techniques and Procedures(December 2003). Although a goodportion of the contents of this man-ual remains fresh, there are a suf-ficient number of changes to war-rant an early revision. Rapid modi-fications to operating tactics andprocedures; changes in relation-ships of command and control; andthe fielding of new equipment, allbrought about by OEF/OIF, provid-ed ample justification for revisingthe TTP manual.

With the creation of a separatetactical PSYOP TTP manual, FM3-05.301 will now focus more onPSYOP TTP at the operationallevel and above. It will also includeemerging TTP for the newest field-ed PSYOP system, the Wind Sup-port Aerial Delivery System.

Finally, in addition to the revi-sion of the keystone manual andthe development of the tacticalPSYOP TTPs, the PSYOP Divisionhas developed and released anoth-er new product; PsychologicalOperations Handbook: EquipmentTypes, Specifications and Capabili-ties. This pocket-sized handbookwas printed in April 2005 and isbeing shipped to PSYOP units.

The handbook replaces the for-mer version of this handbook,SWCS Pub 525-5-16. The initialintent was to produce a graphictraining aid; however, to expediteits release and delivery to deployedPSYOP Soldiers, the handbook wasprinted locally.

Another pocket-sized handbook,the PSYOP Leader’s PlanningGuide, is in production and isscheduled for release during Julyand August 2005. OEF/OIF lessonslearned indicated the need for astandardized “smart book” thatcould be kept in a Soldier’s cargopocket for quick reference.

The handbook incorporatesinformation found in other tacticalreference guides and contains per-tinent excerpts from FM 3-05.301,Psychological Operations Tactics,

Techniques and Procedures, andthe new FM 3-05.302, Tactical Psy-chological Operations Tactics, Tech-niques and Procedures.

The PSYOP Division continuesto strive to anticipate and meet theneeds of the community throughthe development of relevant andtimely products. The field manualsand handbooks are only a few ofthe products being produced by thedivision at this time. In addition tothe products mentioned, a numberof training videos that depict newdoctrine are also being developed.These products will be used to sup-plement PSYOP initial-entry train-ing for enlisted Soldiers and offi-cers, as well as to serve as profes-

sional-development products forrefresher training. Informationregarding the videos will be provid-ed in the future.

For additional information, tele-phone Dave Farrington, DOTDPSYOP Division, at DSN 239-7257,commercial (910) 432-7257, or sende-mail to: farringd@soc.mil.

July 2005 41

Changingof theguardThe commander of theU.S. Army Special Oper-ations Command, Lieu-tenant General Philip R.Kensinger, passes theguidon and control of the160th Special OperationsAviation Regiment toColonel Kevin Mangumduring a June 3, 2005,ceremony at Fort Camp-bell, Ky. Mangumreplaced Colonel AndrewMilani, who will becomethe USASOC chief ofstaff.

Army News Service

42 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

Beyond Terror: Strategy in aChanging World. By RalphPeters. Mechanicsburg, Penn.:Stackpole Books, 2002. ISBN: 0-8117-0024-0. 353 pages. $22.95.

Retired Lieutenant ColonelRalph Peters’ book, Beyond Terror:Strategy in a Changing World, isan anthology of thought-provokingarticles Peters wrote for variousperiodicals between 1998 and2001. These articles focus on strat-egy, foreign policy and militaryaffairs. He wrote the book with thegoal of sharing his observations onnational security and to be an hon-est witness to recent events thathave challenged U.S. leaders whoset policy as well as the service-members who are tasked with car-rying it out.

To get an appreciation for thecomprehensiveness of the book, weshould first remind ourselves ofone of the enduring strategistsPeters writes about, Sun Tzu, whosaid, “Know your enemy, knowyourself, and your victory will notbe threatened. … Know the terrainand your victory will be complete.”This admonition frames the book.Peters looks critically at the enemy(terrorists and other transnationalactors), ourselves (the U.S. nation-al-security apparatus) and the ter-rain (the urban environment andthe heart and soul of man).

Peters devotes much of his bookto the strategic issues involved incombating terrorism. Peters useshis background in military intelli-gence and his broad experiencefrom worldwide deployments towrite cogently about terrorist moti-vation and psychology (know your

enemy). He explains differenttypes of terrorist organizations andhow ideology, religion, culture,mass behavior and hatred affectthem. After giving the reader a bet-ter understanding of the threat,Peters suggests concise and opera-tional ways of dealing with it.

To improve capabilities forsuccessfully confronting trans-national and ambiguous threats,Peters examines the U.S. (knowyourself). He speaks about thepower of information manage-ment and how populations differin their abilities to discern qual-ity information. Peters is alsointerested in preparedness,pressing for the need for align-ment between strategic goalsand the military capabilities andtraining that are needed to suc-cessfully fulfill national objec-tives. These capabilities includelithe expeditionary and constab-ulary forces that are prepared

psychologically for a violentworld. In terms of improving thenation’s ability to fight terror-ism, Peters is not afraid to takeon sacred cows, criticize bureau-cratic careerists or confront self-serving intellectuals.

Having written about knowingthe enemy and knowing oneself,Peters then describes the envi-ronment in which conflicts occur(know the terrain). He dedicatesa portion of the book to terrain,especially urban terrain. Heassesses the challenges of urbancombat and suggests new waysof thinking about it.

Peters also takes the conceptof “terrain” to a different level.For intelligence and militaryoperations to be successful, onemust understand the terrain ofthe human mind and heart. Todo so also means ensuring thatthe military personnel systemrewards and promotes those whoare willing to challenge, adaptand improve systems, proceduresand ways of doing business in anuncertain environment.

Whether or not one agreeswith Peters’ views, one must givehim credit for his deep apprecia-tion for the threat of terrorismprior to 9/11, as well as for hisuncanny eye for much-neededmilitary capabilities. GivenPeters’ breadth and grasp of mil-itary affairs, history, culture andpolitics covered in his articles,his recommendations for furtherreading in those areas wouldhave been welcome. Peters takesthe reader beyond the tradition-al paradigm of strategy to offersome of the most innovative

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thinking available on the securi-ty challenges confronting theUnited States. Beyond Terror is agreat read for anyone interestedin intelligence, national security,military strategy or terrorism.

LTC Fred KrawchukSOCPACCamp H.M. Smith, Hawaii

Secret Commandos: BehindEnemy Lines with the EliteWarriors of SOG. By John L.Plaster. New York: Simon andSchuster, 2004. ISBN: 0-684-85673-5. 366 pages. $26.

John Plaster has become thepremier chronicler of the Viet-nam-era Studies and Observa-tion Group, or SOG. Prior to thepublication of his earlier books,there was little known about thisoutfit, and considerably little ofthat was in the public domain.

A few files were held in theSpecial Operations Division ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, defend-ed for a quarter-century by asuccession of special-operationsstaff officers who recognized thehistorical value of this trove andresisted repeated efforts to sendit to classified destruction. A bitmore was to be found in the U.S.Army Military History Insti-tute’s senior-officer interviews.The official SOG annual histori-cal reports, cryptic to the point ofbeing understandable only by acognoscente, were buried yetelsewhere.

The bulk of the available knowl-edge, however, was in the memoriesof the widely dispersed survivingSOG veterans. Many of the last,recalling the classified nature of theoperations and their long-ago secre-cy oaths, spoke little of their experi-ences, and then usually only toother SOG veterans.

Plaster hunted down the dis-persed and obscure documentarysources — often pursuing the mere

rumors of sources. Of equal impor-tance, he pressed the Department ofDefense, or DoD, to declassify theremaining records. This was compli-cated, not because DoD wanted toretain classification, but becausethese were old files, and the person-nel demands of daily administrativeduties took priority over the down-grading of what were essentiallyhistorical materials.

Declassification was further com-plicated by the fact that as SOG haddisappeared near the end of theVietnam War, there was no succes-sor organization to pass on thevalidity of the downgrades andredacts. But Plaster’s persistencepaid off, and the documents wereeventually declassified.

Then, armed with a statement byDoD to the effect that it was nolonger necessary to maintainsilence on SOG activities, Plasterwent in search of the veterans. Hisfirst book based on his accumulatedmaterials, SOG: The Secret Wars ofAmerica’s Commandos in Vietnam,was well-received, doing very wellboth in individual and book-clubsales. It also provided an incentivefor some very imaginative but dis-honest TV writers to produce theCNN “Tailwind” fiasco.

On a more positive note, Plaster’sefforts were instrumental in theDepartment of the Army, 29 yearsafter SOG’s demise, awarding theunit a laudatory and richlydeserved Presidential Unit Cita-tion. Plaster subsequently producedSOG: A Photo History of the SecretWars. Nominally a coffee-tablephoto book, it was exceptional bothbecause of the impressive numberand content of the photos of whathad been an obscure and highlyclassified subject, and because of itsexcellent and extensive accompany-ing text.

Secret Commandos, Plaster’s lat-est effort, is his best. Unlike his firstbook, which was essentially a collec-tion of vignettes, Secret Comman-dos is a personal memoir of his

three years in SOG — almost half ofthe organization’s operational life.It records his infiltration of SOG, forwhich he had minimal training andno experience, his near deploymenton a disastrous mission, his subse-quent training and experience as ateam member and team leader, andfinally, his time as a SOG airbornecontroller or covey rider.

The memoir format gives thebook a personal character and acontinuity that was impossible withPlaster’s earlier books. His descrip-tions remain vivid, but here, theyare enhanced by his personal narra-tive, often including his thoughtsand emotions. His descriptions of histraining, preparations and opera-tions provide a mental movie of SOGteam operations.

The book presents a number oflessons, intended or not. The mostimportant has to be the necessity ofhaving quality personnel in suchdemanding operations. One aspect ofthis is the quality of the team leaders(called one-zeros) and their dedica-tion, decisiveness, independence andstrength of character. Another aspectis the unimportance of pay grade ina deadly environment in which theonly real criterion of worth was aman’s ability to do the job.

In recent Special Forces cam-paigns, the total dependence on avi-ation for communications, fire sup-port and exfiltration may havebecome commonplace, but at thetime of SOG’s operations, it was bothnew and unique. It was also a prod-uct of the professionalism of the avi-ators, not of their senior headquar-ters, which were largely opposed toproviding support.

Plaster describes some eventsduring stand-down periods thatcould most kindly be described asimmature. The reader should recog-nize these revelations as evidence ofthe honesty of the book. The readershould also recognize that these menwere living in the total absence ofdomesticating influences, were dailylosing comrades who were as close asbrothers, were operating with arecognition that the odds of surviv-ing were prohibitively negative, andabove all, that many of them werevery young. Plaster himself was only22 at the end of his three years ofcombat in SOG.

Secret Commandos is highly rec-ommended as a valued addition toany Soldier’s professional libraryand as an exceptionally enjoyableread. It contains Vietnam War histo-ry, Special Forces heritage, examplesof both tactical and supervisory lead-ership, and operational accountsthat are far more exciting than anyfictional yarns.

That the SOG reconnaissanceteams performed their missions withcourage, wit, panache and a defiantmorale in the face of enormous casu-alties is both a wonder and a proudheritage. It is best summed up intheir self-devised motto:

You’ve never lived till you’ve almostdied.

For those who fight for it,Life has a flavorThe protected will never know.

COL J.H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna, Va.

From People’s War to People’sRule: Insurgency, Interventionand the Lessons of Vietnam. ByTimothy J. Lomperis. Chapel Hill,N.C.: The University of North Car-olina Press, 1996. ISBN: 0-8078-4577-9 (paperback). 440 pages.$21.95.

This is a book about the non-les-son “lessons” of the Vietnam War.Published in 1996, it could be con-sidered the most horribly confusingbook about political-military strat-egy ever conceived. It is basedtightly on articulating researchbounded inside a “paradigmaticpresupposition,” and many earlyreaders would venture to believethat Lomperis wasted a decade ofresearch to make sense of a society“in the throes of a revolutionaryinsurgency struggling to form andconsolidate an independent andmodernizing state.” But readingthis book in 2005 makes it all rele-vant. It actually makes perfectsense, so much so that when readand digested properly, it can beused to predict not only how thenewly formed Iraqi governmentwill stabilize and prevail, but alsoto predict when it will happen, bymonth and year, and that willdetermine the U.S.- exit strategy.

Like wine, this book definitely gotbetter with age! Lomperis grew upas a missionary kid in India and,like how most MKs grow up (thisreviewer included), become pre-scient long-range thinkers, groomedby years of thinking multi-cultural-ly, in multiple languages, and know-ing multiple theories of what consti-tutes rebellion and change in non-democratic societies. Using thattype of upbringing, Lomperis askshis readers to understand two sig-nificant ideas. First, what are theingredients of a successful insur-gency (and, conversely, of a success-ful counterinsurgency) and second,what is the optimal level of a West-ern intervention in either thwarting(or aiding) an insurgency?

These two conceivably simplequestions form both an empiricalquestion and a policy question inwhich the United States currentlyfinds itself, again, in Iraq andAfghanistan. Lomperis’ non-lessons about Vietnam now ringtrue when overlaid onto our cur-rent situation. The empirical ques-tion has been answered: Cannations involved in an insurgencyconduct free, fair and competitiveelections? Obviously the answer is“yes,” since it was so admirablydemonstrated in both war-tornnations. Elections are the key non-lesson learned from Vietnam sincethey were never accomplished cor-rectly, fairly, freely or even compet-itively. Lomperis states, thenproves conclusively, that electionsare the “true Achilles heel” of theinsurgent’s strategy to destroy popu-larly-elected government.

As for the concept of involvement,Lomperis demonstrates that once alegitimate government has beenempowered, the building of respectfor it must be undertaken. From apolicy viewpoint, our inter-vention/involvement with a nationstruggling to overcome a fullyenveloped insurgency must be athreefold arrangement.

44 Special Warfare

First, Lomperis argues that soci-ety’s fundamental “constitutional”arrangements and historical tradi-tions must be upheld; second, bybeing itself duly constituted bythese arrangements and perform-ing the group functions prescribedfor it; and, finally, by being accept-ably competent in the discharge ofits duties and policies. An insur-gency, which is a challenge to con-stituted authority, will attempt toundermine the police forces firstand foremost because they are themost conspicuous targets. However,the more legitimate the governmentand the more corrosion that can beplaced on the insurgent forces, thesooner the insurgency will be bro-ken and stability returned. Thesummary of this concept is policy inaction: belief, opportunity, interest.

To bring about the change of gov-ernment from turmoil due to insur-gency and into a sphere of stability,

Chapter 11 is the most interestingand useful because it demonstrateshow to create a timeline for an exitstrategy. Using lessons from sixcase studies: Mao’s long march inChina from 1920-1949, Greece1941-1949, the Philippines 1946-1956, Malaya 1948-1960, Cambo-dia-Laos 1949-1975, and SenderoLuminoso’s Peru 1970-1992, Lom-peris benchmarks insurgent suc-cesses and defeats in a smartly laidout timeline that identifies factorsimportant to legitimate govern-ments. He then plots categories andpossible futures which are laid outfor policy analysts to mull over.Lomperis’ work shows that afterlegitimate national elections, victo-ry will take approximately fiveyears to achieve, if all involved willstay the course.

This book is an important addi-tion to the body of knowledgeregarding insurgency in nations

that have undergone Westerninterventions. While the authormay have struggled to make senseof the Vietnam War and couldn’t,he definitely makes sense of thecurrent wars in Iraq andAfghanistan. It would behoovethose who quantify and codify“lessons learned” for special war-fare instructional purposes to readthis book, again, and develop thewherewithal and policies to ensurethat Iraq and Afghanistan surviveand prosper and that our exit fromthose nations be seen as a victoryover those who believe in anarchy.

Dr. David BradfordMerritt Island, Fla.

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