Space Safety - Winter 2013

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SPECIAL REPORTRememberingColumbia

Space SaetyMagazine Issue 6Winter 2013

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONFOR THE ADVANCEMENT OFSPACE SAFETY

SPECIAL REPORTRememberingColumbia

What i ThereIS Lie on Mars?Interview withMargaret Race

To the Stratosand BeyondInterview withFelix Baumgartner


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Cover pictures:Columbia Tribute - Credits: Kristhian Mason / photos by NASACentral Region o the Milky Way - Credits: NASA, ESA, SSC, CXC, and STScI

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONFOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF

SPACE SAFETY

Space Saety MagazineKoninklijke Bibliotheek,

n. 12042639 19/12/2012

ISSN: 2214-0379

[email protected]

Postbus 127

2200AC Noordwijk

The Netherlands

The Space Saety Magazineis a joint publication o theInternational Association orAdvancement o Space Saety

(IAASS) and the InternationalSpace Saety Foundation (ISSF)

IAASS

International Associationor the Advancement o

Space Saetywww.iaass.org

Editor-in-ChieAndrea Gini

Managing Editor

Merryl Azriel

Deputy Editor

Phillip Keane

Deputy Manager

Carmen Victoria Felix

News Editor

Matteo Emanuelli

Creative Director

Kristhian Mason

Space SaetyMagazine

Editorial Board and

Scientifc Committee

Tommaso Sgobba

Michael Listener

Joseph Pelton

Executive Secretary

Maria Fischer

Winter2013

Issue 6

ISSF

InternationalSpace Saety

Foundationwww.spacesafetyfoundation.org

Index

3 The Columbia Disasterand Space Program Safety

4 Space Politics,the European Way

7 Building the Worlds First

Automated Space Debris Tracker

10 What if There IS Life on Mars?Interview with Margaret Race

II Lessons Learned

rom Columbia

III Remembering theColumbia Crew,

One Day at a Time

VI Columbia:

A Tragedy Repeated

X The Impact o Columbia

on US Aviation Saety

XII Living with Columbia

Interview with

Mike Ciannilli

XVI Contributors

RememberingColumbia

13 To the Stratos and BeyondInterview with Felix

Baumgartner

16 Under Pressure:A Brief History of Pressure SuitsPart 1

19 Looking Far Into the FutureInterview with Alastair Reynolds

22 Press Clips

Space SafetyMagazine


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Winter2013
http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/mailto:[email protected]://www.iaass.org/http://www.spacesafetyfoundation.org/mailto:[email protected]://www.spacesafetyfoundation.org/http://www.iaass.org/http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/


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The Columbia Disasterand Space Program Saety

Andrea Gini

Editor-in-Chie

LeRoy E. Cain, STS-107 entry ight director, realizes the loss o Columbia. Credits: NASA

This issue is dedicated to one othe most tragic events in humanspaceight: the loss o Space

Shuttle Columbia and its crew. As youwill learn rom the Special Report Re-membering Columbia, the Shuttle wasdestroyed upon reentry by a ux o su-per-heated air coming through a breachin the reinorced carbon-carbon letwing leading edge that caused degrada-

tion o structural properties o the wingitsel. The crew was let with no chanceo survival when the cabin broke apartat an altitude o approximately 42,672m.

The Columbia Accident Investiga-tion Board (CAIB) determined that thebreach had been caused by the impacto the Shuttle let wing with a piece ooam coming o the External Tanks (ET)bipod ftting 81.7 seconds ater launch.

As in all previous atalities in humanspaceight, the Columbia disaster wasnot an accident at all. The ET was de-ective by design, and the phenomenon

o debris shedding was well known. Ac-cording to the CAIB, damage causedby debris has occurred on every Shuttleight, and STS-107 was the seventhtime that a release o oam rom the bi-pod ramp had been recorded.

The organizational ailures that ledNASA to downplay or dismiss all acci-dent precursors as acceptable risksare well documented in the CAIB Re-port. The event that doomed Columbiawas noticed during the second day othe ill-ated mission, upon reviewing

launch camera photography. MissionControl Center even told the crew thatthere was absolutely no concern orentry because the phenomenon hadbeen seen beore.

The general eeling was that a chunko low density oam insulation couldnot cause much damage. In act, theimpact o the acceleration componentto the relative velocity o the two bod-ies was completely underestimated: theoam shredded the reinorced carbon-carbon panel like it was made o paperwhen Columbia literally rammed into it

at 3,000km/h.According to Bryan OConnor, who

at the time was NASA Associate Ad-ministrator, Ofce o Saety and Mis-

sion Assurance, a major cause o theColumbia disaster was complacency.The hardware had been talking to us,and what we had believed at the timeto be rational risk management lookedin retrospect more like rationalization oinconvenient warnings.

With Columbia we lost much morethan the crew and an orbiter; we lost anentire space program and a large part oits engineering knowledge. The SpaceShuttle was a highly complex and inno-vative vehicle, designed to erry back-

and-orth to LEO a crew o up to eightpeople and large military payloads.A set o wrong assumptions about itsreliability and the need to satisy a widearray o mission profles, including thenever utilized ability to y into polar orbitrom Vandenberg Air Force Base, led toan unsae and vulnerable design.

We are witnessing the beginning o anew and promising era in human space-ight, the commercial era.

The ocus o commercial space is verymuch on cost-cutting, while vague as-surances are made about saer vehicles.

Sometimes saety is even presented asa stubborn obstacle to industry devel-opment and progress. The commercialhuman spaceight industry needs to

remember that the primary goal o theShuttle Program was cutting the costo transportation to orbit by an ordero magnitude, a goal at which it ailedmiserably. As with the supersonic Con-corde, the Shuttle was doomed by be-ing both expensive and unsae. Beingexpensive made it in turn unaordableto undertake any urther developmentor saety modifcation. But being expen-sive to operate did not stop either theShuttle or Concorde rom operating orabout 30 years; what ultimately ended

these programs was their inadequatesaety. We hope that the emerging com-mercial operators will keep alive thelessons learned rom Columbia, mak-ing sure not to all into the same illusorytradeo o cost or saety.


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Space Politics,the European Way

By Merryl Azriel

ESAs latest Council at the Ministerial Level held in Naples. Credits: ESA

ESA is holdingits own better

than its partneragencies

Politics and space activities havealways been inextricably bound,to a large extent due to the scope

and cost o system development that upuntil the past ew years, only a govern-mental body could imagine taking on.But governments are notoriously whim-sical, as elected ofcials bend and swayto catch the elusive approval o theirconstituents in the never ending drive

to achieve reelection. The steady tattoorom governments in recent years hasbeen cost-cutting, and space agenciesare among those eeling the squeeze.

Within this context, the EuropeanSpace Agency (ESA) is something likethe story o the little engine that could.A conglomerate o distinct states, eachwith their own priorities and competinginterests, many with their own spaceagencies, the intergovernmental bodyhas become the glue that is holdingmany space initiatives together andpicking up pieces that would otherwise

all through the cracks. While individualmembers certainly have their own po-litical and budgetary woes, the agencyaltogether seems to be holding its ownbetter than many o its partner agen-cies. Here is a look at the most recentdevelopments in the management o theimprobable success story that is ESA.

ESA in 2012

Even as its member states dealt withongoing fnancial woes surround-ing the Eurozone crisis in 2012, ESAjogged along very nicely with progressin its Gallileo, GMES, ATV, astronaut,launch, and to a certain extent spacesituational awareness programs. ESA

welcomed Poland as its 20th memberstate last year. ESA survived the loss oNASAs collaboration on the upcomingExoMars mission, and made overturesto the ambitious and growing Chinesespace program. These successes laid astrong oundation or two critical meet-ings that took place at the end o 2012:the Council Meeting at the MinisterialLevel and the Ninth Space Council withthe European Union.

Council Meetingat the MinisterialLevel

ESA has an advantage in manag-ing its unds in that, unlike NASA,its budgets cover multiple years and

generally provide resource allocationto each project through its comple-tion. This means that unding prioritiescant be changed by mercurial politi-cians quite as quickly, but it also meansthat fnancing decisions may pile upor a while, become raught with politi-cal considerations along the way. Theprocess also leaves ESA vulnerableto nations in crisis which describesa goodly portion o Europe over thepast our years who may have troublemeeting fnancial commitments thatonce seemed within reach.

This past November, ESAs CouncilMeeting at the Ministerial Level met todetermine the next three year budget,in the process deciding several o theaorementioned accumulated issues.Two o those issues were directly a-ected by developments in the UnitedStates: the uture o Arianespace



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ESA member contributions or 2013-2017 as adopted by the 234th Council Meeting on

November 21, 2012. Inset: Annual ESA budget or 2013-2017.

and o NASAs Space Launch Systemservice module.

Arianespace has been hanging in lim-bo or some time with its two major na-tionalities at loggerheads over the bestdirection or the company responsibleor launching roughly hal o the worlds

spacecrat. Beore the advent o newspace, Arianespace, United LaunchAlliance, and Starsem more or less hadthe launch market divvied up among thethree o them. But several SpaceX suc-cesses in 2012 have gotten these com-panies pretty worried. Arianespace of-cials went so ar as to snipe at SpaceXcapabilities, with CEO Jean-Yves LeGalldeclaring that SpaceX speaks a lot,but they dont launch a lot. That is aact, just beore Space-X successullydemonstrated the Dragon resupply ves-

sel. The swipe prompted SpaceX CEOElon Musk to retaliate in a subsequentspeech with theres really no way orthat vehicle [Ariane 5] to compete withFalcon 9 and Falcon Heavy. I I werein the position o Ariane, I would reallypush or an Ariane 6. ESA decided notto push or Ariane 6 this year, insteadsiding with Germany in recommendingdevelopment o the Ariane 5ME (or midevolution), an upgrade to the currentlaunch vehicle that could accommodatetwo large satellites. Theoretically, theAriane 5 ME is to use componentry that

will be easily transerred to the Ariane 6,a more modular and nimble launch vehi-cle in conception. The delay in develop-ment o Ariane 6 could have signifcant

consequences or market competitionin an evolving launch environment. It isalso questionable whether a ocus onaccommodating larger satellites will payo, since standard orbital capabilitiesare ftting into smaller and smaller pack-

ages, with active discussions ongoingas to the possibility o replacing somestandard Earth observation and per-haps even telecommunition satelliteswith CubeSats or the like.

The Ministerial Council also made thecall to support NASAs Orion crew cap-sule, accepting an oer to provide thatvehicles Service Module based on theEuropean Automated Transer Vehicle(ATV) design. The move was expectedbut somewhat controversial, with someviewing it as demeaning or Europe to

serve as a contractor to NASA. But letsace it, while ESA does not have the bud-get or capabilities o NASA at this time,it seems to be stepping up more andmore to shoulder responsibilities its bigbrother in space cant handle ExoMarscomes to mind. This seems to be one othose times. With the agreement, ESAhas secured itsel a spot in the uture ocrewed space exploration beyond the In-ternational Space Station. European as-tronauts may soon fnd themselves wel-come in spacecrat the world over due toESAs ballet-like balance o multinational

interests and ormation o strong and ag-gressive bonds with space contingentsin Russia, China, and anywhere else theycan fnagle a way in.

Some view itas demeaningor Europe to

serve a NASAcontractor

In August 2012, Ariane 5 launched with its largest payload ever, totaling 10,183kg.

Credits: ESA/CNES/Arianespace/Optique Video du CSG


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ESAs ministers managed to retain abudget on the scale o its prior plan;it does not include expansions manywanted, but avoided cuts widely eared.However, setting the budget may turnout to be easier than meeting it. Thereare increasing rumblings o trouble col-lecting payments rom some Europeannations who have gotten caught in the

recent economic morass. Spain in par-ticular has garnered attention or re-ceiving a public ultimatum rom ESA toconfrm contributions to the upcomingbudget. I struggling members are un-able to meet their contributions or can-not obtain legislative confrmation ocommitments, ESAs budget could startto look a lot dierent.

The Ninth

Space CouncilEveryone knows that ESA is the cruxo Europes space presence, but along-simmering amilial struggle withthe European Union (EU) is heating up.Those outside o Europe may be or-given or not realizing that ESA is notactually the space arm o the EU. Itsmembership is comprised o 20 mem-ber states, o which two Switzerlandand Norway are not EU members atall. ESA also counts Canada as an as-sociate member. Seven members o EU

have chosen not to participate in ESA,while the European Union itsel is anassociate member o ESA, contributingover 20% o the agencys fnances.

Most space afcionados would con-ate European Space with the Euro-pean Space Agency, and to a large ex-tent they would be correct. But in 2012

some o the political rumblings under-pinning ESAs unding model began toburble to the surace, promising uturenegotiations and developments thatmay alter the institutions operation.The key question is the current and u-ture relationship between ESA and theEuropean Union.

As with other nationalities, cost is amajor concern or Europe, and thereare increasing signs that the Europe-an Union wants to ex its muscles asboth a European space strategist andfnancier o a fth o ESAs budget. EU

sees itsel as possessing a sharedcompetency in space along with ESAand individual state agencies, despitenot having much to show or that com-petency. EUs particular complaintsrelating to ESA are a lacko transparency, demon-strated by the closed doorMinisterial Council ses-sions in November; use oEU unds to beneft non-EU ESA members Norway,Switzerland, and Canada

whose participation pos-es an obvious problem ingeneral, and an even moreacute problem when itcomes to security and de-ense matters, accordingto a November proposal tothe EU entitled Establish-ing appropriate relationsbetween the EU and theEuropean Space Agency;and objections to ESAsgeographic return policywhich promises to ensure

space spending occurs inindividual member states inproportion to their invest-ment rather than ollowing

EUs contracting policy o purchasingbased on best-value alone.

The Ninth Space Council between ESAand EU ministers was held on Decem-ber 11 and showed where battlelinesin this fght are likely to all. France and

Belgium came out in avor o ESA be-coming an EU agency, Germany and theUK in avor o retaining the status quo,and most other nations were not yet will-ing to commit to one side or the other.In Europe, France and Germany are thebiggest players in space activities, withItaly bringing up third place; France andGermany are usually on dierent sideso the ence no matter what the ques-tion is. The United Kingdoms position isinteresting in that the nation increasedits commitment to space spending in

2012, almost solely enabling ESAs rolein Orion Service Module development.The UK is also seen as keeping the EUat arms length, a trait not likely to en-dear it to EU ministers or to orward itsposition in avor o status quo.

Space Councils are a yearly event,but this conversation will likely not stayon the backburner or another twelvemonths. Whether increased participa-tion some might say intererence rom the EU in European space activi-ties is likely to endanger ESAs ability tosatisy its diverse constituents or weak-

en its international partnerships remainsto be seen.

Where does all this leave ESA? Witha lot o talking and maybe some ying let to do.

ESAs third Automated Transport VehicleEdoardo Amaldi departs the International

Space Station in September.

Credits: NASA

The ExoMars rover, initially a collaboration between

ESA and NASA is now being carried orward by ESA

and Russian Space Agency Roscosmos. Credits: ESA

France andBelgium avor

ESA as an

EU agency,Germany and

the UK avor thestatus quo



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Building the Worlds FirstAutomated Space Debris Tracker

By Hubert Foy

Since the launch o Sputnik I in1957, more than 6,000 space-crat have been successully sent

into Earth orbit. Each launch whether

successul or not contributes to therelease o human-made debris in Earthorbit. This space junk consists o ex-pired spacecrat, spent rocket bodies,mission related objects, and ragmenta-tion debris. A majority o debris remainsin orbit indefnitely, but their orbits dritdue to the eect o Earths atmosphericdrag, a orce that extends ar into space.

Debris poses a real collision threatto deployed spacecrat. NASAs De-bris Ofce estimates that as many as300,000 objects larger than 1 centime-ter are present in low Earth orbit alone.

The U.S. Space Surveillance Network,consisting o 29 optical telescopes andradar sensor sites worldwide, currentlytracks about 20,000 human-made space

objects as big as a baseball (10 centime-ters in diameter) or larger, each capable odestroying a satellite. The only protectionagainst this larger debris is to alter thetrajectory o a spacecrat to avoid a colli-sion, a maneuver that can be expensive in

terms o uel and mission downtime.In 2009, fve dierent NASA robotic

spacecrat, as well as the Space Shuttleand the ISS, conducted collision avoid-

ance maneuvers. The destruction o theoperational U.S. Iridium 33 communi-cation satellite ater a collision with thedecommissioned Russian Cosmos 2251

spacecrat in 2009 showed that colli-sion is not just a statistical probability:it is a reality. The incident underscoresthe inadequacy o current measures andcapabilities to detect and predict

EOS Satellite Laser Ranging and Space Debris Tracking Station at Australias Mount Stromlo Observatory in Canberra. - Credits: EOS

Artists impression o the tracking station

during operations. - Credits: EOS

EOS Satellite Laser Ranging and Space Debris Tracking Station at Australias Mount Stromlo Observatory in Canberra. - Credits: EOS

The Cosmos-Iridium accident

showed thatsatellite collision

is a reality


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collisions, and the importance o im-proving precision orbit determinationand prediction.

Using the reection o laser light tomeasure the distance o space debrisrom a ground-based station is one

possible way to improve debris track-ing accuracy. The Australian companyElectro Optic Systems (EOS) is devel-oping the worlds frst automated lasertracking technology that would trackpotentially damaging debris as smallas a ew centimeters. Once a debrisobject is tracked, satellite operatorswould be able to enact a collision avoid-ance maneuver.

Automated Laser

Tracking System

Aconsortium o scientists and designengineers at EOS developed theautomated laser tracker project in 2010with an AUD 4.04 million (USD 3.6 mil-lion 2010 exchange rate) grant rom theAustralian Space Research Program. Theproject is aimed at upgrading EOS cur-rent manned tracking capability at Austra-lias Mount Stromlo Observatory in Can-berra to reduce operation cost. ProessorYue Gao, Head o Laser Research and

Development Division at EOS SpaceSystems Pty Ltd, is one o the chie de-signers. Space Saety Magazine con-tacted Pro. Gao to get some insight intothe research and development behindthe project.

Pro. Gao, who joined EOS in 1994,has worked on projects and systemsor space, military, and scientifc appli-cations. He was project manager andchie investigator o the laser ablation

study or space debris deorbiting. Hehas led investigations on dierent stud-ies related to solid state laser systems,laser guide star or adaptive optics, andspace debris tracking systems. OnEOS laser projects I have worked as aproject manager and chie designer othe laser systems, and one o the sys-tem designers or the whole trackingsystem, he adds.

EOS is developing the capability oully remote and automated operationo a high perormance tracking station,responsive space debris orbit determi-

nation, and space debris crash de-con-iction, explains Pro. Gao.

The automated tracking system o-ers prospects o a technology break-through that could determine debris or-bits in space with sufcient accuracy to

improve situational awareness o spaceassets and allow cost-eective mitiga-tion o debris risk.

EOS currently has two laser systemslocated in Australia, one Satellite La-ser Ranging (SLR) and one laser sys-

tem or monitoring space debris, saysPro. Gao, adding that the team at EOSis not aware o any competitors to theproject at the moment, although othercountries such as China and Germanyhave been pursuing this technologyin the last ew years.

EOS has a long standing reputationin space surveillance and monitoringservices. Almost all o the critical com-ponents or the tracking system, includ-ing the laser, telescope, timing systemsand control systems were developed in-

house by EOS. According to Pro. Gao,these new eatures are expected toachieve most o the perormance mile-stones in late 2013. He then adds thatthey can signifcantly reduce the costo providing debris protection to satel-lites and would ease the integration othe capability into the operational pro-cesses o key users.

The tracking technology is a com-bination o high pulse energy and highrepetition rate laser system with Elec-tro-Optic technology that can deter-mine space debris orbit with a range

accuracy o 1.5 meters in a second orso, Pro. Gao explains. It can providethree dimensional data, azimuth, eleva-tion, and range rom a single trackingstation, and can provide high orbit de-termination and prediction accuracies.

Tracking andMonitoringDebris

Current ground-based debris sur-veillance and monitoring systems,including the automated laser trackingsystem, have their advantages and dis-advantages. A ground-based sensortracking a space object and determin-ing its position at a given time is re-erred to as observation. For a singlepass o the object in space as it iesin its trajectory, a collection o observa-tions rom dierent sensors constitutea track.

The U.S. Joint Space Operations

Center (JSpOC), which gathers ground-based observations o space debrisrom the Space Surveillance Network,determines how many tracks o

A high energylaser system can

tell the range,azimuth, and

elevation rom asingle station

Illustration o the Cosmos-Iridium collision o 2009. The upper right plot shows trajecto-

ries o Iridium 33 (blue) and Cosmos 2251 (yellow) at time o collision. - Credits: Analytical

Graphics, Inc. (www.agi.com)



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data are nominally required to deter-mine each objects orbit primarily basedon the objects type, size, and rate ochange o its orbit. Because the orbitso debris objects are not stable, the lev-el o positional accuracy obtained withcurrent ground-based tracking systemsare inadequate to sufciently predict in-

orbit collision with a degree o certainty.Ground-based systems are capable

o tracking space objects only whenthe ground area is dark while the objectmust be illuminated by the sun. This re-quirement limits the debris-observationwindow to less than 4 hours or every24-hour period: usually ater sunsetand beore sunrise. Debris observationis urther limited by inclement weather.In order to observe a large debris popu-lation in a short period o time, multipleground stations located around the

world are required, a costly proposition.Pro. Gao acknowledges those limi-tations and explains how they can bemitigated in a laser system.

Although ground-based laser track-ing is negatively aected by the atmo-sphere, it is mitigated in the technol-ogy. The ultimate perormance o thistechnology relies on the ability to ocusa laser beam accurately on the spacedebris, Pro Gao says. The currentlaser system is ground based. But at-mospheric turbulence does deterioratethe laser beam quality and reduce the

system link budget. An adaptive opticssystem helps to overcome this.

Debris that presents a small profle, ei-ther due to actual size or distance rom

Earth, poses bigger technical challeng-es. According to Pro. Gao, there havebeen difculties or the current VHF-band radar-based space surveillancesystem to track objects smaller than 10centimeters and achieve high orbit de-termination accuracy due to the unda-mental limit o the radar wavelength.

He adds that conventional opticaltracking through telescopes cannot tellthe range rom a single station. How-ever, a high energy laser system can tellthe range in addition to the azimuth andelevation rom the single station.

Unlike ground-based radar trackingthat have limited mobility, ground-based laser tracking has good mobil-ity, can move quickly and can thustrack targets in any direction.

Laser technology is already used tomonitor large objects in space. Ground-

based Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR)is currently used to track satellitesequipped with retro-reectors.

That technique involves the fring o la-ser pulses through a telescope at pass-ing satellites and measuring the timetaken or the pulses to return to Earth.The Australian EOS SLR acilities atMount Stromlo in Canberra and the Mo-

blas in Western Australia are part o aglobal network o over 40 observatoriesusing laser light to measure distancesto orbiting satellites.

According to Pro. Gao, SLR is, how-ever, not suitable or tracking space de-bris because its energy level is too lowand the retro-reectors essential or themethod to work are completely lackingon debris objects. Generally speaking,the lasers used or SLR have pico-sec-ond pulse width and generate relativelylow pulse energy. The laser systems

used or SLR are not suitable or track-ing space debris, he clarifes.

Looking Forward

Radar tracking has its own advan-tages, such as the capability otracking a large number o targets,large data volume, and operating dayand night in all weather, Pro. Gao says.Honestly, laser tracking is never go-ing to take over or supersede radarbased systems.

According to Pro. Gao, active lasertracking is complementary to opticaland radar based systems. He addsthat an optimum combination o radarand laser tracking capabilities oers acost eective and ull spectrum solu-tion because each does what they aregood at. For example, radar basedmonitoring system is good or 24/7surveillance and maintaining a largevolume o objects and orbits. For highinterest and potential conjunction ob-jects, radar can hand over to the la-

ser tracking system or a high precisiontracking and orbit update.Looking orward, Pro. Gao explains

how the international aerospace com-munity may beneft rom the technolo-gy. Now our laser based tracking sys-tem can provide 1.5 arcsecond angularaccuracy, better than 5 meter orbitaldetermination accuracy and better than200 meter predicted orbital accuracy(ater 24 hours), he says. With theimproved orbit predictions, the closeapproach can be identifed, avoidancemaneuvers can be conducted, and col-

lision avoided altogether. So space as-sets can be well protected.

A combinationo radar and

laser trackingoers a costeective andull spectrum

solution

NASAs Satellite Laser Ranging Network uses lasers to measure distances rom ground

stations to satellite borne retro-reectors to the millimeter level. Credits: NASA


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What i There IS Lie on Mars?Interview with Margaret Race

By Tereza Pultarova

As prospects o a Mars sample re-turn mission or even a mannedmission to Mars are becoming

increasingly realistic, the danger o bio-logical invasions rom space or, on theother hand, the danger o contaminat-ing other celestial bodies with terrestrialmicrobes attracts more o the scientifccommunitys attention.

There are obviously reasons to wor-

ry. There are many examples rom thepast when a microbe, plant, or animalvirtually harmless in its original habitatcaused havoc when transerred to an-other continent, like rabbits in Australiaor recently, a germ decimating the pop-ulation o North American bats. Eventhe indigenous inhabitants o Americasuered the consequences o beingexposed to European diseases such assmallpox or measles.

There is no doubt that i such a new-comer was a completely alien entity tothe terrestrial environment, the con-

sequences would be impossible topredict. To understand what is beingdone to prevent a possible outbreak ospace ever, or an invasion o spaceparasites, Space Saety Magazine in-terviewed one o the leading experts inthe feld.

Margaret Race is an ecologist and aplanetary protection expert rom theSearch or Extra-Terrestrial IntelligenceInstitute (SETI). Based in Caliornias Sil-icon Valley, SETI Institute is a nonproftorganization that aims to explore, un-

derstand, and explain the origin, nature,and prevalence o lie in the universe.

Space Saety Magazine: You start-ed your career as a biologist studying

invasive species in terrestrial envi-

ronments. What drew your attentionto space?

Margaret Race: In general, my re-search has ocused on ecological dis-ruptions, exotic species, and environ-mental management. My dissertation inecology ocused on an east coast mudsnail that was introduced to San Fran-cisco Bay ater the Gold Rush (it cameinside barrels o oysters shipped onthe TransContinental Railroad!). Later,I worked on the environmental impactreviews at the University o Caliornia in

Berkeley or the frst deliberate outdoorrelease o a genetically engineered or-ganism. At the time it represented theultimate in potentially invasive species(or so I thought). Years later, I beganworking with NASAs Planetary Protec-tion Ofce in analyzing the biosaetyconcerns associated with bringingback Martian materials and helping todevelop scientifc protocols or the test-ing o samples rom Mars. In case thereis anything living in these samples, spe-cial care must be taken to prevent thecontamination o Earth, while also pro-

tecting the samples rom earthly con-tamination that would detract rom theirscientifc value.

SSM: It is a well known act that

invasive species on Earth can cause

havoc in ecosystems where theydont belong. But talking about a

possible space contamination prob-ably takes the whole issue anotherstep urther. What are the biggestconcerns?

MR: From the beginning o the spaceera, the Outer Space Treaty (1967) hasrequired that launching nations takesteps to minimize harmul cross con-tamination during exploration. Not onlydo we want to avoid alse positives inour search or extraterrestrial lie (dontbring lie rom Earth that could be mis-taken or an extraterrestrial discovery),

we also want to avoid uncontained ex-posure to anything that might be bio-hazardous to Earth lie whether toastronauts during uture missions, orto biota on Earth exposed to materialsbrought back or study. Current inter-national policy requires taking a con-servative approach to space missions,including the special handling and test-ing o materials rom other planets, es-pecially when they come rom placeslike Mars with potentially habitableconditions. As there is a level o uncer-tainty involved, we simply have to be

extra careul. The US National ResearchCouncil, when asked about the Martiansample return, indicated that althoughthe risks are likely to be extremely

We want toavoid exposure

to anythingthat might bebiohazardousto Earth lie

Margaret Race, planetary protection expert rom the Search or Extra-Terrestrial

Intelligence. - Photo courtesy of Margaret Race



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Artists conception o a Mars Soil Sample Return Mission. - Credits: NASA JPL

low, they cannot be assumed to bezero. Thereore it is crucial to proceedwith strict containment and quarantineuntil rigorous scientifc testing indicatesthat it is no longer needed.

SSM: How is the current prevention

program structured? What type omeasures does it include?

MR: In the US, all missions are re-viewed by the NASA Planetary Pro-tection Ofcer long beore launch.Missions are assigned to a planetaryprotection category that indicates howstringent the controls will be. These areconsistent with international policy un-der the Outer Space Treaty, and basedon where the mission is going and whatit will be doing. For example, roboticorbiter missions have dierent require-

ments than landers, and also dierentrom missions with instruments thatwould dig into the subsurace. Dier-ent planetary bodies also have moreor less stringent controls. The criteriaare based on the habitability and per-ceived prospects or fnding extrater-restrial lie. The Moons ability to harborlie has already been ruled out by paststudies and research, so the measuresare less strict or lunar missions. Cur-rently, Mars has the strictest planetary

protection controls. Once a mission isassigned its initial level o controls, itis designed and monitored to ensure itmeets the planetary protection require-ments at all stages.

SSM: Are there greater concerns

or invasive species being broughtrom space to Earth or rom Earth to

an extraterrestrial body?MR: Both are important. In general,

missions returning materials to Earthundergo more scrutiny. They also in-clude constraints on their outbound leg;a round trip mission thereore wouldbe extra scrutinized or both orwardand back contamination. However, ia mission is coming back rom a loca-tion that is essentially non-habitable,only ew, i any, planetary protection

requirements apply. For example, theStardust mission that returned samplesrom a comets tail, the Genesis mis-sion that returned particles o solarwind, and certain asteroid missionshave had no Earth return constraints,because none o those locations wasdeemed habitable.

SSM: Are planetary protection is-

sues gaining importance with im-proving prospects or a Mars samplereturn mission?

MR: Planetary protection consider-ations have been important all along.A complete drat protocol or handlingand testing Martian samples has al-ready been developed and reviewed

through a process that involved multipleworkshops and studies over a periodo about our years. It was completedin 2002 when NASA thought sampleswould be returned rom Mars by around2008. At this point, the drat protocolwill be updated when a specifc uturemission is planned.

SSM: What are the biggest con-

cerns or a Mars sample return?MR: The main concern will be to keep

materials contained until a completebattery o scientifc tests will be doneto determine whether or not there are

indications o Martian microbes in therocks, pebbles, and dust. In addition,we have to make sure that we keep thereturned samples in pristine conditionthroughout the testing process so asnot to detract rom their scientifc integ-rity and value. Finally, there is a needto make sure that a complete battery obiohazard tests is done prior to any re-lease o pristine materials outside o thebio-containment lab.

SSM: The return o Apollo 11 rom

the Moon represents a precedent

when it comes to preventive mea-sures regarding possible contamina-

tion o terrestrial environment duringhuman missions. How would thesemeasures stand up to todays stan-

dards?MR: During the Apollo program, there

was an elaborate quarantine or allparts o the missions because we didntknow whether the Moon harbored alienlie. The good news is that we knowtoday rom extensive studies that theMoon is lieless, so strict quarantineand planetary protection measures are

no longer required or lunar missions.However, when humans are involvedin uture missions to Mars, it will bear more difcult. We can sterilize

We cansterilize outgoing

spacecrat butwe obviouslycant sterilize

humans


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outgoing robotic spacecrat and equip-ment to prevent orward contaminationvia the transer o hitchhiker microbesrom Earth to other planets, but obvi-ously, we cant sterilize humans beorelaunch. And humans bring with themtheir complete set o microbes so

some level o orward contaminationcannot be avoided.

SSM: How would planetary protec-

tion measures aect possible uturemanned missions to Mars? What are

the current presumptions regardingsuch a mission and is anything goingon in that area?

MR: When human crews are involvedin long duration missions to Mars, itwill require development o an entirelynew set o planetary protection proto-cols. Since astronauts havent gone

onto a planetary surace since Apollodays, its like starting rom scratch inmany ways. Long duration human mis-sions to Mars will require signifcantupdates in inrastructure, technology,and operations, with planetary pro-tection considerations applying to allaspects o the mission. NASA has re-cently begun updating its earlier De-sign Reerence Architecture or utureMars human missions, and planetaryprotection is viewed almost like a newcomplication since human missionsin Earth orbit over the past 40 years

have not had to contend with planetaryprotection constraints or activities onplanetary suraces.

SSM: Ethical questions also arise

when extraterrestrial lie is dis-

cussed; can you outline what are thebiggest issues in that regard?

MR: Making sure that we do re-sponsible research and exploration.In addition, there are potential ethicalquestions associated with the mean-

ing o any verifed discovery o extra-terrestrial lie. Scientists discuss thescientifc signifcance o discoveriesdrawing rom their varied disciplines.In Astrobiology, we want to know ithere is other lie out there, whetherit is based on DNA or like lie as we

know it, and whether it behaves andevolves in ways we are amiliar with.Other types o signifcance and mean-ing are discussed by philosophers,ethicists, and theologians. What wouldit mean i there is a distinctly dierentother lie discovered? Would it repre-sent a second genesis o theologicalimportance? What should be the rela-

tionship between humans and verifedextraterrestrial organisms? What envi-ronmental management policies wouldapply to planets with verifed, distinctextraterrestrial lie? All lines o ethicalthinking are important to consider, buteach is done by specialists in dierentdisciplines. Each inorms the others,so it is very cross-disciplinary. Peoplehave begun to question the poten-tial ethical issues ahead in space ex-ploration, just as we do with activitieson Earth. In many ways, the ethicalquestions are similar to those asso-

ciated with new and emerging tech-nologies like synthetic biology, nano-technology, artifcial lie, and so on.All have potentially challenging com-plexities in scientifc, policy, and soci-etal realms. It almost makes planetaryprotection seem simple!

All lines oethical thinkingare importantto consider

Apollo 11 crew are visited by US President Richard Nixon while quarantined in a special

Mobile Quarantine Facility. Quarantine was abandoned ater Apollo 14. - Credits: NASA

The Genesis sample return capsule on the ground in Utah. Missions like Genesis, which

returned particles o solar wind, ace less stringent requirements in terms o planetary

protection. - Credits: NASA/JPL



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RememberingColumbiaII Lessons Learned rom Columbia

By Bryan OConnor

III Remembering the Columbia Crew, One Day at a TimeBy Jonathan Clark M.D.

VI Columbia: A Tragedy RepeatedBy Gary Johnson

X The Impact o Columbia on US Aviation SaetyBy Paul Wilde

XII Living with Columbia Interview with Mike CiannilliBy Merryl Azriel

XVI Contributors

SacrifightBy Lloyd Behrendt


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Remembering theColumbia Crew,One Day at a Time

By Jonathan Clark M.D.

Jonathan Clark,

NASA fight surgeon

at the time o Columbia,

his wie Laurel,

STS-107 mission specialist,

and their son Iain.

Courtesy o

Jonathan Clark

Dear Rick, Willie, Mike, KC, Dave, Laurel,and Ilan,

I cant believe its been ten years since Ilast saw you guys. We really miss you a lot.

A day doesnt go by without thinking o youall. At frst it was mostly tears, but now itsabout happier thoughts, all the good times

we had. You would be amazed at how all ous pulled together ater losing you all. It washard on everyone, amilies and riends. We

all changed orever, but I like to think thatoverall, its been in a good way. I have toconess that I eel responsible or what hap-

pened to you all. I worked a shit in MissionControl or STS-107 the week beore you werecoming home and learned about the oam

strike and the debate about what it mightmean. I should have done something.

Laurel, ater the accident our son Iain

asked why you didnt bail out. He knew youhad done a lot o parachute jumps and all thecrew had the right equipment and had prac-

ticed it beore. I told him that you were too

high and going too ast and that it probablywouldnt work out. Then he said he was go-

ing to become a scientist and invent a timemachine and go back and warn you all. I real-ized then that I had to ocus the rest o mycareer making it saer or those ollowing in

your ootsteps.There was a big investigation by the Co-

lumbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)

and they did a really great job fnding outwhat happened and getting the Shuttle backto ying saer than its ever been. NASA had

wanted the section done by the Crew SurvivalWorking Group to be removed rom the CAIB

report because they thought the Columbiaamilies wouldnt like it. We all got togetherand discussed it and sent the CAIB a note,and here is part o what it said:

Laurel Blair Salton ClarkMission Specialist

Laurel achieved an undergraduate degree

in zoology beore earning her doctorate o

medicine. She joined the Navy as a submarine

and diving medical ocer, eventually

becoming a Naval Flight Surgeon beore

serving with the Marines as Group Flight

Surgeon. She became an astronaut candidate

in 1996; STS-107 was her rst spaceight

mission. The launch o Columbia took place

just six weeks ater Laurels whole amily

survived a crash that destroyed their amily

plane. Laurel was never one to sidestep a

challenge, as her husband related ater her

death: One o Laurel's avorite quotes was:"A ship in harbor is sae but that is not what

ships are or."

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In discussion with the Columbia spous-

es we were entirely unifed in our desire

to ensure that all the lessons learned

rom this mishap be applied to prevent

this type o accident rom happeningagain. We discussed the crew survival

section and our desire is to ensure this

inormation is made available to learn

all we can rom it. A undamental aspect

o every aerospace mishap investigation

is the understanding o crew survivabil-

ity issues and there is much still to learn

about survival during upper atmospher-

ic reentry. As sensitive as this issue is, it

is essential that the acts related to crew

survival be disseminated to ensure the

next generation o spacecrat are aord-

ed the maximum protection. This is par-

ticularly apparent with the upcoming Or-bital Space Plane and uture commercial

spacecrat. Perhaps the greatest legacy

o the Columbia crew will be these en-

during lessons applied to uture human

space endeavors.

In 2004 NASA created a ollow on group tolook at crew survival issues, which was calledthe Spacecrat Crew Survival Integrated In-

vestigation Team, and I was a member. Welooked at all the space mishaps includingColumbia, and really came up with a better

understanding o how to make it saer or hu-man spaceight. In 2008 we published ourreport Columbia Crew Survival Investigation

Report. Ive also been involved with the In-ternational Association or the Advancemento Space Saety, which was created in 2004,

and they are dedicated to making it saer toy in space.

In 2009 I wrote an article Crew Survival

Lessons Learned rom the Columbia Mis-hap and kept thinking about what our sonIain had said, Why didnt the crew bail out

rom the Shuttle? Based on what we hadlearned rom the Columbia mishap, the fnal

breakup was below 140,000 eet (42,672m).In 2009 I joined a team that wanted to ex-pand the stratospheric bailout envelopeabove 100,000 eet (30,480m), which

William Willie Cameron McCoolPilot

A Navy man beore joining NASA, Willie

attended the Naval Academy, accumulating

degrees in applied science, computer science,and aeronautical engineering, even as he

deployed as a Navy pilot, and later, test

pilot. He was selected as an astronaut in

1996. Unlike many astronauts, Willie loved

exercising in space. "I'll tell you, there's

nothing better than listening to a good album

and looking out the windows and watching

the world go by while you pedal on the bike,"

he said while aboard Columbia. STS-107 was

his only space mission.

David McDowell BrownMission Specialist

An athletic man, David was a our year

collegiate varsity gymnast and circus acrobat,

unicyclist, and stilt walker, beore graduating

with a degree in biology and achieving his

doctorate in medicine. He joined the Navy

as a ight surgeon. In 1988 he became the

rst ight surgeon in a decade to be selected

or pilot training. David began astronaut

training in 1996. STS-107 was his rst and

only mission. Beore taking of, he told his

girlriend what to do i something went

wrong: "I want you to nd that person that

made the mistake, and I want you to tell that

person that I hold no animosity. I died doing

what I loved."

Kalpana KC ChawlaMission Specialist

Born in Karnal, India, KC moved to the United

States ater undergraduate school, proceeding

to obtain her doctorate in aeronautical

engineering. She began her career at NASA

Ames, researching computational fuid

dynamics relating to aircrat air fows. She was

selected as an astronaut candidate in 1995. Her

rst fight took place in 1996 aboard Columbia

STS-87 as mission specialist and prime robotic

arm operator. KC loved fying and was a licensed

pilot and fight instructor o commercial

land and sea planes and gliders. She was an

inspiration to young girls in her birth country,

where her achievements were much celebratedas the rst Indian-born woman to fy in space.

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was what the Shuttle Advanced Crew EscapeSuit (ACES) was certifed to. The mission wascalled Red Bull Stratos. It was an aggressive

ight test program, with many aerospace ex-

perts and an international team.We built a pressurized capsule, used a pres-

sure suit based on the Shuttle ACES suit, andused large helium balloons to get to the strato-sphere. We tested in the vertical wind tunnel,

vacuum chamber, thermal-vacuum chamber,and made many test jumps beore setting oto the stratosphere. We learned all we could

rom the manned stratospheric balloon ightsconducted by the United States and Russia inthe 1950s and 1960s that supported their im-

pending manned space programs. We studiedthe US Navy Strato-Lab mission, which testedthe Project Mercury pressure suit, the US Air

Force Project Excelsior stratospheric para-chute jumps, which showed that a jump rom102,800 eet (31,333m) was survivable, and

the Russian high altitude balloon parachuteprogram Volga which used a pressurizedcapsule modeled ater the Vostok spacecrat.

We developed new medical procedures todeal with the hazards o space, like exposureto vacuum.

Ater two unmanned ights to test the bal-loon systems, in 2012 we ew three manned

ights into the stratosphere, and on 14 Oc-tober 2012, 65 years to the day ater Chuck

Yeager broke the sound barrier in the X-1,we successully accomplished the higheststratospheric reeall parachute jump rom128,100 eet (39,045m), achieving human

supersonic ight without an aircrat at 837miles per hour (374.3 meters/second), orMach 1.27. Sonic booms were heard on the

ground rom a human breaking the soundbarrier in reeall. We never gave up, despitethe risk, to show that anything is possible i

you believe it can be done.Rick, Willie, Mike, KC, Dave, Laurel, and

Ilan we miss you all so much, but it warms

our hearts to know that your legacy will en-

dure in making it saer or the next genera-tion o space yers. Our sorrow and grie will

pass, and we will meet up with you on thepath ahead.

Michael P. AndersonPayload Commander

A physicist, Michael began his career as an

Air Force Communication Electronics Ocer.

He rose to Director o Inormation SystemMaintenance beore taking up pilot training

and becoming an aircrat commander and

instructor pilot. He was selected as an

astronaut candidate in 1994. His rst mission

was STS-89, the eighth Shuttle-Mir docking

mission. His second and nal ight was

aboard STS-107. Beore his ight, Michaels

minister asked him what would happen i the

shuttle were to not make it back. Dont worry

about me, he responded, Im just going

higher.

Ilan RamonPayload Specialist

An Israeli-born citizen and son o Holocaust

survivors, Ilan became a career ghter pilot in

the Israeli Air Force, where he was known as

the youngest pilot to participate in Operation

Opera, the mission that destroyed the Iraqi

nuclear reactor Osiraq. Ilan was selected as

the rst Israeli astronaut and began training

with NASA in 1998. STS-107 was his only

spaceight. His diary was recovered rom

the wreckage o Columbia; on the last legible

page o the journal, he wrote I have become

a man who lives and works in space.

A memorial plaque

mounted on the back

o the high gain antenna

on the Mars rover Spirit.

Credits: NASA

Rick Douglas HusbandCommander

A mechanical engineer by education,

Rick joined the Air Force and became a

test pilot beore being selected as an

astronaut candidate in 1994. Ater

completing his initial training, Rick served as

Chie o Saety or the Astronaut Oce.

He rst ew to space aboard Discovery

STS-96 in May 1999 , the rst Shuttle mission

to dock with the International Space Station.

His second space mission was STS-107.

For Rick, being an astronaut was a lielong

dream, and he loved every minute o it.

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Columbia:A Tragedy Repeated

By Gary Johnson

The Space Shuttle Columbia STS-107 waslaunched on January 16, 2003 at 10:39

a.m. Eastern Standard Time. At 81.7 sec-

onds ater launch, when the Shuttle was atabout 20,000m and traveling at Mach 2.46(2,655km/h), a large piece o insulating

oam came o the External Tank (ET) let bi-pod ramp area, close to where the orbiterattaches to the ET. The oam impacted un-

der the leading edge o the let wing at 81.9seconds. This incident was not seen by any-one on the ground or in the Kennedy Space

Center (KSC) Firing Room or Johnson Space

Center (JSC) Mission Control Center (MCC);there was no onboard indication to the crew.

The impact was detected the next day dur-ing the detailed review o all launch cameraphotography that is conducted ater every

Shuttle launch. The analysis revealed thatthe debris was approximately 53-68cm longand 30-45cm wide, tumbling and moving at a

A trajectory analysis

that used a computational

fuid dynamics approach

to determine the likely

position and velocity

histories o the oam.

(Re [1] p61) - Credits: NASA

A color enhanced,

de-blurred still rame

o the oam strike,

derived rom

video recording.

Credits: NASA

relative velocity o 670-922km/h at the time

o impact. Neither the crew nor MCC wereaware that on ight day two an Air Force Com-mand review o radar tracking data detected

an object driting away rom the orbiter, that

subsequent analysis suggested may havebeen related to the oam strike. On ight

day eight, MCC emailed the crew that post-launch photo analysis showed External Tankoam had struck the orbiters let wing during

ascent. MCC stated there was absolutely noconcern or entry because the phenomenonhad been seen beore. MCC also emailed a

short video clip o the oam strike. Columbiacontinued its 16 day mission without urtherincident until Entry Interace.

On-orbit

Photo Request

On the second day o the mission, the In-tercenter Photo Working Group Chair contact-ed the Shuttle Program Manager or Launch

Integration at KSC to request imagery o

MCC stated therewas absolutely noconcern for entry

Frame 4925

Debris from foam impact

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The shuttle fight control

room in Houstons Mission

Control Center at JSC right

ater fight controllers lost

contact with the Space

Shuttle Columbia.

Credits: NASA

A rame rom a tape

recording taken by

the crew 4 minutes

beore the breakup.

Credits: NASA

Columbias let wing on-orbit. The ProgramManager agreed to explore the possibility this was the frst imagery request o the mis-

sion. A Debris Assessment Team (DAT) wasormed with NASA and contractor engineers.DAT contractor engineers prompted a NASA

Shuttle manager to make a second imageryrequest. The Department o Deense (DoD)Manned Space Flight Support Ofce beganimplementing the request, albeit with the

assurance rom MCC that this was merelyinormation gathering, not a ormal requestor action. The frst ormal DAT meeting was

held on January 21st, fve days into the mis-sion. Without additional on-orbit pictures,

the DAT was restricted to using a mathemati-cal modeling tool called Crater, that predictsthe depth to which debris will penetrate a

Thermal Protection System (TPS) tile. Crater

was suitable or small debris impacts, on theorder o 49cm3 versus 19,665cm3, the es-

timated size o the bipod ramp oam. Craterwas classifed as a conservative tool basedon its projections o ice projectile damage to

RCC turning out to be more severe than thatachieved experimentally. Because oam isless dense than ice, the DAT used a qualita-tive extrapolation o the test data and engi-neering judgment that a oam impact angleo up to 21 would not penetrate the RCC.

The assumptions and uncertainty incor-porated in this analysis were never ully pre-sented to the Mission Management Team

(MMT). The DAT assigned the NASA Co-Chairto pursue a request or imagery o the vehicleon-orbit constituting the third request or

imagery by going through the Engineer-ing department rather than through ShuttleProgram Managers. The imaging request was

viewed by Shuttle Program Managers as anon-critical engineering desire rather than acritical operational need. Seven days into the

mission, a NASA Headquarters Saety andMission Assurance (S&MA) manager calleda JSC S&MA manager or the Shuttle Saety

apparently conusing the notion o oam pos-ing an acceptable risk with oam not being

a saety-o-ight issue. MMT members weremaking critical decisions about TPS damagetolerance based on little or no knowledge.

Sequence o

Reentry Events

Columbia reentered the atmosphere witha breach in the Reinorced Carbon-Carbon

(RCC) let wing leading edge near Panel 8.This breach allowed super-heated air, es-timated to be about 2,760C, to penetrate

behind the TPS, destroying the insulationthat protected the leading edge supportstructure and melting the aluminum wing

spar. This resulted in thermal degradationo structural properties o the let wing. AtEntry Interace (EI) plus 555 seconds, video

rom the ground shows pieces o materialshedding rom the orbiter, which continuedto y its pre-planned ight profle. Later,

over the Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas area at

about 60,960m, the increasing aerodynamicorces caused catastrophic damage to the

let wing. At EI+613s, when the super-heatedair had penetrated to the outside o the letwheel well, and destroyed the our hydraulic

sensor electrical cables, controllers on theground saw the frst anomalies in telemetrydata. At EI+727s, Mission Control noted an

increase in let wheel well hydraulic line tem-peratures. At EI+790s, the two let main gearoutboard tire pressure sensors began trend-

ing upward, then o-scale low. At EI+834s,a sharp change in the rolling tendency o theorbiter occurred along with additional shed-

ding o debris. In an attempt to maintain at-titude control, the orbiter responded with asharp change in aileron trim, likely due towing deormation. At EI+917s, the data

Columbia reenteredthe atmosphere

with a breach in thereinforced left wing

leading edgeProgram and the Associate Administrator(AA) or S&MA, to discuss a potential DoD

imaging request. The JSC manager or ShuttleSaety program said he was told this was anin-amily event meaning it was normal

and nothing to worry about. The AA or S&MAstated that he would deer to Shuttle man-agement in handling such a request. Despite

two saety ofcials being contacted, saetypersonnel took no actions to obtain imagery.Ater discussion with other MMT members,

the Shuttle Program Manager cancelled theDoD imagery request. The MMT had con-cluded this was not a saety-o-ight issue,

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showed a signifcant increase in positive rolland negative yaw, an indication o increased

drag on and lit rom the damaged let wing.The ight control system attempted to com-pensate or this increased let yaw at EI+921s

by fring two at right yaw Reaction ControlSystem (RCS) jets continuously. By EI+927s,the third RCS yaw jet began fring continu-

ously and at EI+928s the ourth and last rightyaw RCS jet began fring continuously. It isprobable that hydraulic pressure to the aero

control suraces was lost at EI+928s whenhot plasma burned through all our hydrauliclines in the area o the let wheel well. This

loss o control and beginning o orbiter pitch-up marks the transition rom a controlledglide to an uncontrolled ballistic entry with

orbiter aero-thermal breakup at EI+970s.Failure o the crew module resulted rom

the thermal degradation o structural proper-

ties, which resulted in a rapid catastrophic

structural breakdown rather than an instan-

taneous explosive ailure. Separation o thecrew module assembly rom the rest o the

orbiter likely occurred at the interace withthe payload bay. The crew module, pres-surized compartment, and outer orebodyseparated at EI+1004s. Debris assessment

indicates that cabin depressurization prob-ably occurred when the lower cabin structureimpacted the orebody structure. Increasing

aero-thermal loads resulted in the total de-struction o the crew module and orebody by

EI+1021s. From data and analysis it appearsthat the destruction o the crew module tookplace over a period o 24 seconds, beginning

at an altitude o approximately 42,672m and

ending at 32,000m. The death o the crewwas due to blunt orce trauma and hypoxia

(Re[1] pp 70-77; [2] pp 1-63, 72).

The Atermath

NASA commissioned the Columbia Acci-dent Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct

a thorough review o both the technical andthe organizational causes o the loss o theSpace Shuttle Columbia and her crew on Feb-

ruary 1, 2003. To capture lessons learned

or uture vehicle design, the Space ShuttleProgram (SSP) commissioned the Spacecrat

Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team(SCSITT). The SCSIIT was asked to perorm acomprehensive analysis o the accident, o-

cusing on actors and events aecting crewsurvival, and to develop recommendationsor improving crew survival or all uture hu-

man space ight vehicles, (Re[2] p xix).The physical cause o the loss o Colum-

bia and its crew was a breach in the Thermal

Protection System on the leading edge othe let wing, caused by a piece o insulat-ing oam, CAIB reported. CAIB ound that

the design o the orbiter let no possibility ora crew to survive given the resulting condi-tions. Once the breach occurred, the crewsate was sealed.

But there were plenty o opportunities be-ore the breach occurred to have preventedthis tragedy. CAIB cited the organizational

causes o this accident, stretching backbeore the Shuttle program even began:original compromises that were required

to gain approval or the Shuttle, subsequentyears o resource constraints, uctuatingpriorities, schedule pressures, mischaracter-

ization o the Shuttle as operational ratherthan developmental, and lack o an agreednational vision or human space ight. CAIB

particularly called out a NASA culture thataccepted mission success over engineeringunderstanding, the stiing o dierences o

opinion, and evolution o an inormal chaino command (Re[1], p 9).

The same organizational causes were cit-

ed with reerence to the Challenger accident.By the eve o the Columbia accident, institu-tional practices that were in eect at the time

o the Challenger accident such as inade-quate concern over deviations rom expected

perormance, a silent saety program, andschedule pressure had returned to NASA,(Re[1], p 101). Sally Ride, who was on boththe Rogers Commission Challenger

Death of the crewwas due to blunt

force traumaand hypoxia

According to CAIB,

destruction o the crew

module took place over

a period o 24 seconds,

beginning at an altitude

o approximately 42,672m

and ending at 32,000m.

Credits: NASA

Computational fuid

dynamics analysis o the

speed o the superheated

air as it entered the breach

in RCC panel 8 and travels

through the wing leading

edge spar. The darkest red

color indicates speeds o over

6,400 km/h; temperatures

likely exceeded 2,760

degrees Celsius

(Re [1] p69) - Credits: NASA

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investigation and the Columbia Accident In-vestigation Board, stated she was surprisedat how similar the cause actors were or

both accidents. The tile losses went directlyagainst the Space Shuttles original designrequirements that precluded oam-shedding

by the External Tank. Engineers stated thathad they known in advance that the ET wasgoing to produce the debris shower that oc-

curred during Columbias frst launch in 1981,they would have had a difcult time clearingit or ight. As we now know, rom 1981 until

the accident there was ET oam shedding tovarious degrees on every ight (Re[1] p 122).The CAIB noted that while there is a process

or conducting hazard analysis when the sys-tem is frst designed, and a process or re-evaluating them when a design is changed

or a component is replaced, no process ad-

dressed the need to update a hazard analy-sis when anomalies occur.

The CAIB identifed 14 In-Flight Anomalies(IFAs) that had signifcant TPS damage or ma-jor oam loss. Space Shuttle Program per-

sonnel knew that monitoring o tile damagewas inadequate and that clear trends couldbe more readily identifed i monitoring was

improved, but no such improvements weremade, CAIB stated. The process or closingIFAs was not well documented and appeared

to vary. Had the correct inormation beenavailable, it may have led to a concern byNASA management and engineering about

ascent debris damaging RCC (Re[1]; [3]).

Space Shuttle

Return to Flight

The Space Shuttle was grounded ollow-ing the loss o Columbia and did not return

to ight until July 26, 2005. In the interven-ing two and a hal years, the ET TPS was re-

designed and capabilities or detecting animpact were installed: video cameras on the

solid rocket boosters and ET eedline, highspeed cameras at the launch site, aircratmounted cameras and radar, and an im-pact sensor mounted on the backside o the

wings RCC and nose cap. The crew o STS-114

was instructed to inspect their vehicle or

damage and equipped with a limited repairkit to deal with the damage i they ound it.

Meanwhile, NASA was working on its

saety organization. The agency establishedthe NASA Engineering Saety Center (NESC)at the Langley Research Center, charged with

providing independent engineering saetyassessments and testing, and unded by theHeadquarters Ofce o Saety and Mission

Assurance to assure independence (Re[5],p xxiv). A Chie Saety Ofcer or Space Shut-tle was established, and S&MA began using

analytical tools or risk characterization andtrade studies. S&MA developed the capabil-

ity to support real-time operations and orrapid team response to signifcant events or

anomalies, as well as detailed Shuttle Proba-bilistic Risk Assessment models. S&MA andthe SSP made a concerted eort to maintainand continually improve the risk-based deci-

sion making process. This eort was carried

out through the end o the Space ShuttleProgram and in that time avoided the decline

and atrophy that occurred post-Challenger(Re[4]).

Reerences

[1] Columbia Accident Investigation Board,Report Volume 1, August 2003.

[2] NASA/SP-2008-565 Columbia Crew Sur-

vival Investigation Report.[3] NASA JSC Saety and Mission Assurance

Qualifcation Training Program, Columbia

Case Study Course No. BA-601, by GaryW. Johnson/SAIC, February 2008.

[4] JS-2011-025 JSC Saety and Mission As-

surance Space Shuttle Program LegacyReport, October 18, 2011.

[5] NASAs Implementation Plan or Space

Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond, Vol-ume 1, Revision 1.1, November 20, 2003.

There were plentyof opportunities

to preventthis tragedy

A view o Columbia taken at

approximately 7:57 a.m. CST

upon reentry as it passed by

the Starre Optical Range at

Kirtland Air Force Base, New

Mexico. Note debris coming

rom the let wing (bottom).

Credits: SOR/NASA

Let: the External Tank's

bipod ttings covered by

oam ramps, as fown onthe Space Shuttle Columbia.

Center and right:

the redesigned tting.

Credits: Lockheed Martin/NASA Michoud

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OConnorrecommended

investigating if itwas a miracle that

no one was hurt

The Impact oColumbia onUS Aviation Saety

By Paul D. Wilde, Ph.D., P.E

Simulation o Columbia

Breakup to Compute

Probability o Impact

on Aircrat.

Credits: ACTA inc

Columbia changed my personal and proes-sional lie dramatically. The morning o the

accident a ellow Federal Aviation Administra-tion (FAA) employee called me rom the Cape;he said the orbiter was 30 minutes overdueand suggested I pack my bags. Within a week Iwas in Houston, meeting Admiral Gehman andthe rest o the Columbia Accident InvestigationBoard (CAIB) members.

As the leader o the ight saety analysis teamor the Ofce o Commercial Space Transporta-tion, I was one o two FAA employees selectedas an investigator on the Independent AnalysisTeam (IAT). The CAIB put so much value on inde-

pendent analyses that we had an IAT inside theCAIB, which was itsel an independent saetyorganization. Mostly I worked on the technicalanalysis o the accident perormed by Group 3and directed various independent analysesunded by the CAIB, such as the oam impactanalysis perormed at the Southwest ResearchInstitute (SwRI) and the public risk study. As anexample o CAIB thoroughness, the SwRI analy-sis supplemented at least three other techni-cally separate analyses perormed by Boeing,NASA, and the Sandia National Laboratory. Forsix solid months, the CAIB worked seven days

a week, starting with an all-hands sta meetingevery morning except Sunday, at 0700.

Responsibility or

Public Saety

I was ully engaged in fguring out what hap-pened to Columbia and why it happened whenBryan OConnor called me into his ofce on hislast day as an Ex-Ofcio Member o the Board.He recommended investigating the public sae-ty implications o the accident, specifcally to

see i it was a miracle that no one was hurton the ground. He wanted to know the publicsaety implications o the accident; this con-cern was highlighted when NASA Administrator

Sean OKeee testifed beore the US Senate onMay 14, 2003 that stunningly, in as much asthis was tragic and horrifc through a loss o sev-en very important lives, it is amazing that therewere no other collateral damage happened as aresult o it. No one else was injured.

Mr. OConnors recommendation started meon a more challenging quest than I had real-ized. My frst step was to speak with Steve Wal-lace, Director o the FAAs Ofce o AccidentInvestigation and a CAIB member, about thepotential public saety implications, which heagreed were o interest. However, the CAIB wasstill entirely ocused on the cause o the ac-

cident, so not much energy went into a publicsaety investigation until ater NASA brieed theCAIB about the Probabilistic Risk Assessment(PRA) or the STS program, which was almostready or publication just prior to the accident.Toward the end o that briefng, I asked aboutthe potential applications o the PRA to publicsaety. The response was that NASA would notapply PRA insights to any public saety appli-cations because the United States Air Force(USAF) and FAA were responsible or publicsaety during launch and reentry, respectively.As an FAA employee, it was clear to me that

at least some people at NASA had the wrong

impression about responsibility or public sae-ty during reentry. Ater the PRA briefng, SteveWallace agreed that the public saety issuesdemanded a thorough investigation. And theygot one.

Danger Below

Columbia

CAIB directed an independent study o thepublic risks posed by Columbia, which wasperormed by ACTA Inc. and documented in

Volume II o the CAIB fnal report. The resultsdemonstrated a 10-30% chance o one or morecasualties on the ground given that the

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Physical Test to Simulate

Foam Impact on Columbias

Wing Leading Edge. An air

gun is used to launch a 757g

oam piece into a Reinorced

Carbon-Carbon test article

at a speed o 234 m/s, with a

20 degree angle o incidence.

Inset: the test article a

raction o a second ater

being impacted.

Credits: Rick Stiles/ CAIB

accident happened when and where it did.Thus, the absence o serious injuries to peopleon the ground due to the Columbia accidentwas the statistically expected outcome, not amiracle by risk analysis standards. However,the populous city o Houston would have been

hit i that ateul reentry was delayed one orbit.The probability o casualty was much higher,89-98%, i the same debris feld ell on Hous-ton, with two casualties expected.

CAIB published preliminary results on theconditional risks to aircrat: the expected num-ber o plane impacts rom Columbia was ap-proximately 0.03 based on estimated air-trafcnearby. A subsequent FAA study used the ac-tual commercial aircrat trajectory data at thetime o the accident to compute between 0.003and 0.1 expected collisions o Columbia debriswith commercial aircrat [see AIAA 2005-6506].

The highest probability o impact to any in-dividual aircrat was between 1 in 1,000 and 1in 100, depending primarily on the uncertaintyassociated with how many small ragmentssurvived to aircrat altitudes but were unrecov-ered. The consequences o an aircrat impactwith Columbia debris was highly uncertain, butthe act that over hal the recovered debris wasunder 0.5 kg and extremely low density materi-als suggested that many would have been be-nign even i they had impacted.

A Public Saety

Policy

CAIB published a section on public saety(10.1) in Volume I that called out NASA or ail-ing to ollow public risk standards already inplace at other ight institutions. FAA and U.S.space launch ranges have saety standardsdesigned to ensure that the general public isexposed to less than a one-in-a-million chanceo serious injury rom the operation o spacelaunch vehicles and unmanned aircrat, re-ported CAIB. NASA did not demonstrably ol-

low public risk acceptability standards during

past orbiter reentries. The fndings concludedthat NASA needed a national policy or theprotection o public saety during all operationsinvolving space launch vehicles. Columbiabecame a part o this policy development, withthe recovered debris rom the orbiter used toacilitate realistic estimates o the risk to the

public during orbiter reentry.In 2005, NASA issued range saety policy NPR

8715.5 that included public risk acceptability cri-teria or all launches and reentries. This policyregarding collective public risk associated withSpace Shuttle entries required an evaluation oentry trajectories rom the ISS orbit inclinationo 51.6 degrees and the collective public riskassociated with each trajectory. This policy al-lowed the Space Shuttle Program to continueto use Kennedy Space Center as its primarylanding site, and establishes a public saetyrisk threshold to be used when considering al-

ternate landing sites.

Columbias Aviation

LegacyThe impact o the Columbia accident on avia-

tion saety cannot be overstated. In the wakeo the accident, multiple US agencies collabo-rated to develop consensus based aircrat pro-tection standards and models to characterizeaircrat vulnerability to launch and reentry de-bris. Columbia prompted NASA and the FAA todevelop and implement a real-time mishap re-sponse system to alert aircrat and rapidly clearpotentially threatened airspace during subse-quent Shuttle reentries [see AIAA 2010-1349].

The FAA is currently expanding the real-time

aircrat warning system, based on containmentor debris that exceeds aircrat hazard thresh-olds, to more efciently integrate launch andreentry vehicles into the US national airspacewithout compromising saety. The FAA contin-ues to sponsor tests and analyses to producemore refned aircrat vulnerability models.These tests and analyses are part o the on-going eorts to ensure no space vehicle debriscollision will cause an aircrat accident the waythe oam strike destroyed Columbia.

Columbia streaking over

the Very Large Array radio

telescope in Socorro,

New Mexico.

Credits: NASA

Houston would have

been hit if reentrywas delayedone orbit

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Living with ColumbiaInterview with Mike Ciannilli By Merryl Azriel

Mike Ciannilli with his

long-time charge,

the orbiter Columbia.

Courtesy: Mike Ciannilli

Members o a US

Forest Service team

walk a Columbia

recovery search grid.

Credits: NASA

On February 1, 2003, Mike Ciannilli wasa contractor or NASA. He worked as

a test project engineer, responsible or

the engineering systems coming togetherin the fring room. He was assigned toSpace Shuttle Columbia, which seemed

ftting somehow. Ciannilli had a longlove aair with Columbia, dating rom hismiddle school days, when he made a rep-

lica o the ship or his school science air.

At the time o the STS-107 mission, he wasmonitoring issues during processing ow in

the turnaround between landing and launchand he manned the launch countdown. Whenhe talks about listening to your vehicle, its

clear he still hears the rumbles and creaks oColumbia, a decade ater she disintegratedbeore his and everyones eyes.

The Search

Mid-February 2003 ound Ciannilli in the

middle o Texas, overying Columbias fnal

ight path again and again. His job was to lookout the helicopter doors, watching or signs

o anything that might be a piece o the shut-tle. When he spotted something promising,

the copter would land while he attempted

to identiy the bit, bringing it aboard i itlooked to be a likely match. Wed do our ini-tial identifcation, put it on board, and then

launch up again. It was a lot o long days, y-

ing every single day, or weeks on end.He was ar rom alone on this search. We

had to pull o what in the end was the larg-est search in American history, Ciannillisays, describing the 420x16km stretch thatcomprised Columbias ight path. I it wasnt

or the thousands o volunteers the Ameri-can Indian tribes, volunteer frefghters andpolicemen, and everyday people that came

down, he says, with something o wonderstill in his voice, the job would have beennearly impossible. Ciannillis respect or

those volunteers is palpable: These olkscame on buses rom around the country,

lived in tents in reezing rain conditions. Theyworked twelve hour plus days through very,very rough conditions and then their rewardat night was to sleep in a small tent in reez-

ing rain. Ciannilli describes how incredibleit was to interact with these volunteers, whosimply elt that this was something they

owed to their country. And these olks didit with a smile, youd walk around theyd bethanking you or the experience.

"Columbia wasalways personallyvery special to me"

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The debris eld in East Texasspread over 5,179 km2.

The search covered

700,000 acres.

Source: CAIB Report, p 45

"I never want to haveto do it again, but

you cant imagine

not living throughthe experience"

When you wonder i space really matters to

people, Ciannilli says, think o these volun-teers. When you see these olks come downand put their lie on hold to help out the na-

tions space program, it becomes very realwhat space means to people.

It was an extremely bittersweet emotional

experience, says Ciannilli, I never want tohave to do it again, but you cant imagine notliving through the experience because o the

amazing people that you met and the amaz-ing spirit o those people. They wanted tobring Columbia home.

Ater several weeks, Ciannilli became theAir Operations lead: I was helping organizethe ights at that point and trying to coordi-

nate the scheduling. They did not fnish thesearch until May 2003, nearly our monthsater the accident. By the time he got back

to Cape Canaveral, the Columbia Accident

Investigation Board was well on its way toproducing what is now known as the CAIB

Report. It is still one o the defning accidentreports o modern spaceight, what Ciannillidescribes as an awesome tool, one he rec-

ommends everyone, especially anyone in-volved in spaceight, read and reread.

Curating the

Remains

While Ciannilli, his colleagues, and vol-

unteers were out hunting or pieces, a re-construction team was hard at work at the

shuttle landing acility, trying to fgure outwhere those pieces ft. They were recon-

structing Columbia as best they could and

they did a really amazing job o putting herback together, says Ciannilli. When theCAIB Report was delivered to US President

Bush in August 2003, the remains o Colum-bia were turned over to NASA, who movedthem rom the shuttle hangar to the Vehicle

Assembly Building.

Four years later, Ciannilli gained custodyo Columbia when he was appointed Project

Manager o the Columbia Research and Pres-ervation Ofce. It was and is humbling, hesays. Columbia was always personally very

special to me.Managing the ofce gives Ciannilli some-

thing o a pulpit rom which to deliver the

message o Columbia. He recently convincedNASA to require all new co-ops and employ-ees at Kennedy Space Center to tour the Co-

lumbia Ofce Im a huge believer in knowyour history, remember your history, andunderstand your history. I think you really

need to educate your olks on the reality owhat happened.

Hes also proud o the work the ofce isable to do in helping to continue research

based on the shuttle. The ofce has an ac-tive loan program that allows researchers to

borrow artiacts or study. Its really interest-ing because theyll take a look at a piece andyou can watch the wheels turning. They can

see so much into it. The ofce also workswith educational institutions: A university

or a high school can apply to have a pieceo Columbia sent to them and they can use itin the classroom or an engineering orensicsclass or engineering analysis class. Hope-

ully it inspires the younger olks to studyand have Columbia be the catalyst to helpthat conversation.

Listening to

Your Vehicle

The discussion turns to the lessonslearned rom Columbia, and or a momentCiannilli seems not to know where to start.Theres a bunch, he says, and proceeds tolist some o the big ones: keep your models

and tools up to date, understand your materi-als, guard against the o-nominal becomingnormal, continually question and revalidate

your design, and o course, institute a cultureo open communication. But one thing thatCiannilli comes back to again and again is

listening to your vehicle.People say that the vehicles become

alive. They become personalities, explains

Ciannilli. I can tell you how Atlantis behavesand how Columbia starts up in the morn-ing. These quirks, much like those you

might be amiliar with rom your amily

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automobile, can provide important clues tochanges in spacecrat behavior clues thatmay not be present in more ormal types o

data. The vehicles talking to you, the hard-wares talking to you listen to it, urgesCiannilli. Things are happening and they

oten start as very small things. Understandwhats happening. He specifcally notes theissues shuttle managers aced relating totile incidents. Even the last ew years, we

didnt really understand carbon-carbon, itsstrengths and its weaknesses. Acceptingtile incidents as normal without understand-

ing the source o the incidents was a clearpre-Columbia ailure.

Ciannilli gets animated when he describes

what the shuttle program could have beenlike had the Columbia accident never oc-curred. Our plan was to y space shuttle

to 2020 or 2025 even, he says, describingthe extension program and the upgrades tocockpit, engines, instrumentation, comput-

ers, GPS, and a whole host o systems,that were already underway at the beginningo 2003. Even ater the accident, technically

the shuttles were in excellent condition,

In some ways, new vehicles can advancesaety systems, with enhanced opportunities

or designing in saety actors that cannot beretroftted to an existing vehicle. But in otherways, the loss o amiliarity can be a stum-

bling block. Its kind o like buying a new

car, explains Ciannilli. Youre gonna havenew eatures and you dont know how its go-

ing to perorm.But, he says, you can never keep ying

the same vehicle orever.

Standing up to Say

Somethings Wrong

Ciannilli observed clear changes in NASAs

communication culture ollowing release o

the CAIB report. Ater the accident it def-nitely improved a lot and I think it got bet-

ter as time went on ater the accident - moreimprovements were put in place and the cul-ture was established, he recounts. But, he

says, that ear o standing up to say some-thing is wrong will never go away entirely.

Saety in Any

Industry

Clearly, Ciannilli hopes that the lessons o

Columbia and Challenger will be carried or-ward into the next generations o spacecratdevelopment and developers. The prac-

tices, whats good to do, the saety checksthat are important what kind o redundancyis important and necessary, a lot o that is

transerrable, says Ciannilli, despite thedierences in design and approach. And,Ciannilli emphasizes, these lessons are not

isolated to NASA or even commercial crew:aircrat, cars, submarines, its all the samein a lot o ways.

Ciannilli advises those dev

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