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~ 76-1-S° 8/36

SOVIET POSTURE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

N IN ETY-NIN TH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 28, 1985

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

%

Puma ii. am

JUN 1 71985

m naeesamm

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

46-6250 WASHINGTON I 1985

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48

PREPARED STATEMENT OR DR. CARL G. JACOBSEN, DIRECTOR SOVIET STUDIES,

GRADUATE SCHOOL OR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OR MIAMI

MOSCOW IN CENTRAL AMERICA

How much influence does the Soviet Union really have in Central America? The

Jacobsen Report, funded by the State Department and released this summer,

sought to address this question.

The Jacobsen Report collated data released by West European, Canadian and US

intelligence agencies, as well as other Western and Central American sources,

and conducted in-depth surveys of Soviet media coverage, analyses in Soviet

academic, military and economic journals, and reports in Trade Union, Merchant

Marine and more narrowly professional publications. The final result, an

analytical section of 31 single-spaced pages, plus 80 pages of appendices,

gives the reader access to the full range of available information.

We found that Moscow's presence in Central America is both more extensive and

more multifaceted than generally accepted. Her military and economic

involvement is complemented by a plethora of other contact points, from

student support, cultural and scientific interaction, and parliamentary,

political and military exchanges, to peace congresses, sports and youth

festivals, friendship clubs, and "apolitical" ties among trade unionists,

merchant seamen, aviation personnel and others.

But while Moscow's presence is pervasive, her ability to control events may be

less than some fear. The counterweights to Soviet influence are far-reaching

and varied. Western Europe's presence is often commented upon, as is the still

pervasive influence of the church. But other actors have also moved in.

United Nations agencies fund a large number of Nicaraguan development

projects; Japan's trade with Nicaragua has risen in direct reverse proportion

to Washington's economic disentanglement; Algeria picked up the sugar quota

that America cancelled; the larger South American states have given Nicaragua

significant support; even US and contra—aligned Honduras, El Salvador and

Guatemala maintain trade with Managua. In fact, US trade itself remains

substantial, and politically weighty, though less than in earlier years.

Moscow's authority among revolutionary groups and individuals is, similarly,

less than it is sometimes made out to be, and less than she would wish. In El

Salvador, for example, Moscow (like Washington) focuses on and exaggerates the

role played by the Soviet-aligned faction of the opposition FMLN alliance, and

its leader, Shafik Handal.

The FMN's 1983 choice of Villalobos as over-all leader was telling.

Villalobos' past relations with Soviet allies have been bitter and stormy. He

epitomizes the "ultra-leftist" problem that Moscow identifies as the single

most serious impediment to greater Soviet influence.

In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas' victory had, in like fashion, bypassed and

eclipsed the Soviet-aligned Socialist Party. Moscow then acknowledged that the

revolutionary crest was passing her by and scrambled to catch up. She gave up

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49

the old doctrine that a communist Party was the only possible instigator and

vanguard of revolution. But the doctrinal concession costituted less than full

conversion: Soviet commentaries still insisted that the Party must ultimately

inherit the revolution.

Moscow's ideological ambivalence, and realization of the limits of influence,

was reflected in a startling early-1983 drop-off in Soviet media references to

contacts with revolutionary groups and individuals. The burgeoning of CIA-

supported contra armies, and the intimidating effect of large-scale US

military manoeuvers around Nicaragua's periphery, added a sobering note.

Moscow's focus in Central America switched to narrow state-to-state support

for the Sandinista regime, and the need to give sufficient aid to ward off

accusations that she had betrayed the revolutionary cause. But she

increasingly defers to Havana, allowing Cuba to carry the ball in the region.

The Soviet Union appears to be moving back to its traditional and preferred

emphasis on improved relations with South American regimes. Soviet trade and

other ties with South American officialdom have expanded dramatically.

Attitudes towards the USSR remain wary, but there is today greater acceptance

of Moscow as a legitimate player in the regional arena.

Moscow concedes that Washington's "right" to intervene in Nicaragua is the

same basic security right that she invoked in Afghanistan (though America's

case is deemed more dubious, due to fact that Nicaragua lies a thousand

kilometers from US soil). 'She clearly half-expects that Washington WILL

intervene ever—more—forcefu1ly. She openly states that, in the event of a

full-scale American invasion, the Soviet response will be restricted to

"solidarity", and "full political support". She has striven to give Managua

the means, but the bottom line is that the Sandinistas will have to defend

themselves.

On the other hand, the Soviets appear to calculate that decisive US action

will in fact result in a net gain for their side; the likely boost to anti-

Americanism in Latin America and Western Europe could be worth far more than

the Managua investment that would be lost.

Finally, there is another side to Moscow's posture, reflecting older Russian

fears. During the late 1970s Moscow demanded Marxist—Leninist allegiance in

return for Soviet support to revolutionary movements. Now she embraces the

"Dimitrov" strategy of united fronts. In part this reflects opportunistic

adjustment to changing circumstances. But it also reflects extreme pessimism

in some quarters in Moscow.

Bulgarian Bolshevik Georgy Dimitrov was Comintern spokesman during the 1930s‘

campaign for united fronts against the Nazis. Moscow's analogies are

very deliberate. The allusion to the Nazi era suggests a belief in at least

some Kremlin circles that the Reagan administration is implacably hostile, and

bent on the destruction of Bolshevism.

The existence of such a view testifies to Soviet paranoia, but also to the

dangers that come with a lack of communication and contact. Ignorance has

always spawned misunderstanding and fear.

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50

The report caused some ambivalence in the State Department. Departmental

review processes delayed release of the Report for five months. The delay was

partly due to the normal editing process. The major stumbling-block, however,

was the insistence by certain officials that comparative references be

deleted. Perhaps understandably, they wanted sole focus on Soviet activities.

The authors resisted. Figures out of context can appear more, or less, potent

than they really are, depending on choice of adjective and tone. This has been

a problem in the past. Comparative data, and a proper setting of the larger

context, is essential for balanced judgement. Academic respectability demands

it.

The State Department accepted the argument, and published the Report, -— with

the standard disclaimer, that the Report was a product of its external

research program, and not of official policy.

But few copies were printed, and they are hard to come by. This is unfortunate

because it limits the contribution the report could have made in addressing

the most crucial problem bedeviling analyses. of Central America: the

ignorance gap dividing Latin American and Soviet studies.

Specialists on Latin America tend to be uninformed about Soviet realities,

strengths and weaknesses, and about Soviet thinking and perception. Those who

study the Soviet Union's overseas role and presence, on the other hand, focus

on Moscow's relations with the US, Europe, Asia, or Africa, and ignore Latin

America.

The ignorance—gap is evident in Universities, business and even government

circles. Communication between Latin experts and Soviet experts is

superficial, or non—existent. When a State Department Soviet specialist first

sought transfer to the interest section in Havana, in the mid—70s, there was

much bureaucratic opposition to be overcome.

Commentaries on Moscow's activities in Latin America therefore tend to reflect

prejudice and dogma rather than analysis. Pro-American attitudes translate

into exaggerated spectres of Soviet threat. Anti—American attitudes sometimes

translate into naive acceptance of the innocence of Soviet purpose.

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51

The Defence Department's White Paper 22 Central America, Feb. 1985

The second Reagan administration's first, early 1985 white paper on Central

America embodies and epitomizes all the problems that plagued its precursors.

It is rhetorically aggressive, and tendentious. But it contains few facts.

Some of the hard data that is presented is misleading, because it is presented

out of its proper context; some is mutually contradictory; none is new.

A credible case for reasoned American concern CAN be made. The white paper

does not make it. It makes no reference to the now impressive body of

scholarship that is available, and from which the solid data required for a

realistic, balanced case could be extracted; nor does it refer to the

exhaustively-documented (and State Department funded) Jacobsen Report of June

1984, on Soviet Attitudes Towards, Aid_l2,_and Contacts With Central American

Revolutionaries, which reflects the burgeoning trove of academic research, and

which does make the case. Substitution of a caricature spectre for proper

threat analysis invites disdain, and alienates allies.

The white paper edits an April 1983 discussion between Soviet Foreign Minister

Gromyko and Grenadian Prime Minister Bishop, to suggest deceitful Soviet

masking of aggressive intent. But the full Gromyko quote was cautionary. It

reflected a late 1982 Soviet policy decision to adopt a lower profile --

because of the escalatory dynamic of American military pressure on Managua,

and because of growing realization of the limits of influence. Moscow gave

enough to ward off accusations of betrayal. But she limited investment to one

she could afford to lose.

The white paper figures show that Soviet-bloc military equipment still reaches

Managua, but at a much-reduced rate. Today's administration figures show 1500

Soviet and East European trucks in Nicaragua; by early 1983 there were already

more than 1350. Similarly, the 110 T-55 medium tanks represents only a modest

increase on mid 1983 numbers (it was then that Nicaragua established its

second tank brigade).

The tanks, and most of the conventional equipment acquired by the Sandinistas,

are of considerable vintage, though of course still potent; the T—55s, first

deployed in 1961, are a development of the T—34/85, of late World War II fame.

They are not useful against guerrillas. And the lack of suitable terrain £5

route to, for example, Tegucigalpa, the Honduran capital, severely constrain

their offensive potential. Amphibious capability, the ability to ford a river,

is not useful if mountains and jungle preclude access to the river bank.

The Mi-25 helicopter gunships are modern, and eminently suited for counter-

insurgence operations; they are are not much use in hostile air environments

(as against Honduran or other jets). .\

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52

The spectre of Mig—2ls, and of Bear reconnaissance flights appears unduly

alarmist. The early-model Mig-21s (it entered service in 1959) that a country

in Nicaragua's "ideological bracket" would normally receive would not ensure

air superiority against Honduras. But that is irrelevant. Moscow clearly

appreciates Washington's position that their introduction would constitute a

casus belli. Available evidence suggests Soviet determination not to be cast

in the role of instigator; it would dilute the propaganda harvest that she

expects to reap in the event of final US action.

Hypothetical Bear reconnaissance flights and Soviet naval facilities at

Bluefield Bay fall in the same category; they would give undesired credence to

Washington threat spectres. The most sensitive "targets" on the West Coast, in

particular the Trident base complex in Puget Sound, are in any case nearly as

far from insecure Nicaragua as they are from Soviet Far Eastern territories.

Similarly, no Naval commander with access to Cuban ports would voluntarily re-

deploy to a facility so exposed to sabotage and attack, from such a plethora

of hostile elements.

The white paper is not consistent. Some sections talk of real "Marxist"

military threats and operations; elsewhere the danger is said to emenate from

the "high degree of congruence in Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan foreign policy

goals". The legitimacy of America's posture is said to derive from Nicaragua's

position as a geographical neighbor, but when Nicaragua's force potential is

compared to her "neighbors", US forces in Honduras and off her coasts are

excluded from consideration. (Rather than comparing Nicaragua's active AND

reserve forces with Brazil's active soldiery, it might be more relevant to

note that Nicaragua's composite total is far smaller than Finland's).

The white paper lacks balance. It correctly states that Thomas Borge describes

himself as Marxist-Leninist, but ignores the fact that Nicaragua's government

also includes other tendencies, from "liberation theologians" to Cordova

Rivas, former head of the Conservative Party.'It notes guerrilla alliances in

El Salvador and Guatemala, but ignores the fact that 252 forma unity was

imposed as a precondition for Cuban support, that internecine struggles

continue, and that Soviet-oriented factions do not predominate.

It speaks of peasant alienation and opposition to Cuban and East-bloc

"foreigners", which is real, but ignores the fact that extensive support for

the Sandinistas, and for Salvadorean and Guatemalan rebels, is also real;

"elaborate series of (supply) corridors" through what are heavily populated

regions apparently escape interdiction.

El Salvadorean insurgents are said to have acquired American weapons from

Vietnam, and there is no question that some such arms did indeed arrive,

through a variety of channels, during 1979-82. But there is no evidence that

this persisted. There IS evidence that arms acquired since 1982 came courtesy

of El Salvador’s military; rebels now profess need of boots and medicine, NOT

arms.

The white paper invokes Allied and Church support for El Salvadorean

"elections", and for administration policies throughout the region. But both

these postulates rest on extraordinarily selective snippets of evidence.both

are misleading; both are simplistic.

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53

Nicaragua may be Marxist-dominated and she may incline to authoritarianism,

but she is not (yet) a Soviet "satellite", either politically or economically

-— and a broader look at the evidence in fact suggests that she is not likely

to become one. Moscow is resigned to minimal expectations. She has no

illusions on this score; neither should Washington.

Nicaragua is a garrison state. But Western journalists attest to considerably

more freedom to travel and probe there than in Guatemala. In fact, in terms of

the killing or maiming of Western observers over the last five years,

Guatemala makes Nicaragua look like a veritable haven.

Nevertheless, if the Sandinistas' Nicaragua is not "communist" in either the

pure Marxist sense or in the Soviet sense, she IS anti-American, and she does

espouse an ideology, however diffuse, which does run counter to American

interests. And while Moscow might realize that she cannot control or dictate

events in this region, she does aspire to influence and mischief; she also

views dynamics here not in the abstract, but as integral components of a

global picture, a picture that also includes Afghanistan, and other pressures

closer to home.

The gross exaggerations of the administration's preferred image of the region

invites rebuke, and distracts attention from the real causes for concern.

Caricature invites caricature, not debate. The administration's avoidance of

real debate, indeed, its dg-facto suppression of real debate, is perturbing.

28 Feb. 1985.

Mr. BARNES. Thank you very much, Mr. Jacobsen.

Mr. Valenta.

STATEMENT OF DR. JIRI VALENTA, COORDINATOR, SOVIET AND

EUROPEAN STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

AFFAIRS, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Mr. VALENTA. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our subject

which I understood is the Soviet posture in Latin America. I am

afraid you have to get used to a different accent. Some of the

people on the left stayed, unfortunately nobody on the right; but

we can have an interesting exchange.

Mr. BARNES. From here we are on the right.

Mr. REID. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

IDEOLOGICAL TIES WITH THE SOVIETS

_ Mr. VALENTA. I do believe that we have today spent too much

time on hardware, discussed too many graphs, and so forth. Let me

give a short introduction to geopolitics.

I would like to focus on the larger picture of the struggle in Cen-

tral America, particularly the growing ideological ties linking Nica-

ragua and Cuba with the Soviet Union.

Ibelieve your Congress should take into account those ties, and I

believe my distinguished colleague on my right agrees with me;

there is a threat to American interests in the region and we are

discussing how to cope with that. I would like to spend a few min-

utes on the evidence which we discover in Grenada.

_ From the scholarship perspective, it is a valuable one. I would

like to present the committee with a document. I present this ofﬕ-

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