Before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan

In C.P. No. 41/2015

Aasim Sajjad Akhtar & others v. Federation of Pakistan & other

REPORT PRESENTED BY TASNEEM A. SIDDIQUI(as directed)

4th September 2015

Dear Lordships,

I am greatly honoured by the trust that you have reposed in me to assist the court in both understanding the phenomenon of katchi abadis and addressing the state’s historic failure in meeting the housing needs of the poor. I had originally requested two weeks to complete the task assigned to me, but on reflection I decided to complete writing this paper in time for you to refer to it in preparation for the next hearing of the case on Monday, 7th September. I believe that outlining the basic issues at hand did not require more than a few days – there is of course a need for the specificities of each province/urban centre to be taken into account to implement the ideas that I have outlined here, but the most important matter at present is for the Supreme Court to assert the basic principles upon which governments and urban planners take up the issue of katchi abadis and housing for the urban poor. I hope that my efforts will prove useful and provide you with some relevant guidelines as you ponder a conclusion to this very important case.

I will, of course, be available to your lordships at any time in the future should any further assistance be required by the court.

Sincerely,

Tasneem Ahmed Siddiqui

Executive Summary

Over the course of almost seven decades, the Pakistani state has failed miserably to fulfil its constitutional obligation of ensuring access of all of its citizens to basic human needs such as education, health, shelter, employment, potable drinking water and sanitation. While this state failure has affected all sectors of society across all geographical regions, the shortage of affordable housing in urban areas stands out as arguably the most glaring failing of all. It is thus that informal squatter settlements, or katchi abadis, now house 40% of the urban population, or approximately 35 million Pakistanis.

The state and urban middle classes have long peddled the idea that katchi abadis are dens of crime and wantonness, as well as a blot on otherwise beautiful city landscapes. It is thus that regular and violent evictions find justification, and the structural bias in the state’s policy against the weakest segments of society continues to be glossed over. The truth is that the working classes of cities for whom katchi abadis are the only site of affordable housing are the most productive segment of society – quite simply, our cities would not function without them.

Over the past few decades a modicum of progress has been made in acknowledging the katchi abadi phenomenon and institutionalising procedures to regularise and upgrade existing settlements. The provinces of Sindh and Punjab have established regulatory frameworks to this effect, even if there has been almost no attempt to redress the long-term planning paradigm that has resulted in a housing backlog of 8 million units. Meanwhile country-wide policies have put a moratorium on summary evictions and made provisions for resettlement of all abadis that need to be removed from their current location.

Unfortunately, the federal capital lags far behind Sindh and Punjab and has wilfully violated existing country-wide protocols such as the National Housing Policy 2001 by engaging in summary evictions. The Capital Development Authority (CDA) only recognised the existence of katchi abadis in 1997. There is still no relevant legislation in place to regularise and upgrade existing settlements nor has the CDA conformed to policy stipulations vis a vis resettlement of katchi abadis that need to be relocated.

This fact was outlined most shockingly on July 30, 2015 when the Pashtun-majority katchi abadi in sector I-11 of the federal capital was brutally demolished by a massive contingent of police, Rangers and CDA personnel. Many residents were arrested during the operation and a case under anti-terrorist legislation was subsequently lodged against 2000 people.

The CDA has outlined plans to demolish another 34 katchi abadis in Islamabad in the coming months. It continues to insist that it is not obligated to fulfil the state’s constitutional mandate to meet the shelter needs of the poor, whilst also making no meaningful attempt to adopt long-term planning measures to account for future generations of working people living in the capital. This neglect is glaring in light of the fact that Islamabad is the fastest growing city in the country, its population having increased from barely 600,000 in 1998 to almost 2 million today.

It is thus of utmost importance that the CDA and Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) administration be restrained from engaging in further summary evictions, immediately institute a regulatory framework for regularisation and resettlement in the CDA Ordinance-1960, undertake planning for low-income housing and initiate the resettlement of the more than

15,000 evictees of I-11 that have borne the most recent brunt of the state’s historic failure to meet its constitutional obligations.

1. The Past & Future: our failed planning paradigm and correcting it

Notwithstanding the guarantees of fundamental rights in our constitution, the state of Pakistan has utterly failed to meet the basic needs of the most vulnerable sections of society. Education, health, employment and housing are indispensable for any citizen to lead a meaningful life; while the rich and powerful have always had access to these requirements of life, those that serve them have been completely deprived of these same requirements. Indeed it would not be incorrect to argue that wilful discrimination against the poor is amongst the most prominent features of our political-economic system.

This structural bias is painfully evident in the housing sector, particularly in urban areas. There is at present a housing backlog of 8 million units in Pakistan – assuming an average household size of 7, this means that there is no formal option available to 56 million people who are actively in search of housing. Needless to say, it is the most vulnerable who bear the brunt of this acute shortage: the poorest 68% of Pakistan’s population can only afford 1% of the total supply of formal housing in the country.

The crisis of low-income housing – a failure of planning

Low-income public housing projects are near non-existent; the Ministry of Housing and Works has been unable to initiate a single housing project in compliance with the prime minister’s low income housing scheme, announced back in 2013. Housing finance in Pakistan is also in tatters; the volume of housing credit stands at a paltry PKR 4 billion a year (compared to over INR 200 billion in India). By the government’s own admission, more than 80 per cent of the total population cannot afford the financing terms provided by the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC) and other housing finance institutions.

It is in this context that the emergence of katchi abadis must be understood. The failure of both the state and private sector to meet the demand for housing by the urban poor has facilitated the development of an informal housing sector – a largely unaccounted system of housing provision in which both state functionaries and small-scale middlemen facilitate the creation of katchi abadis, pocketing whatever the poor are willing to pay for access to land and other facilities.

Informal settlements are a reality not only in Pakistan but in many countries of the world. They are concentrated mostly in metropolitan areas that are characterised by high levels of inequality and where the discriminatory effects of the state’s anti-poor policies can be most obviously observed. In Pakistan’s case close to 40% of the urban population now lives in katchi abadis, a number that has steadily risen over the decades. This ever-present reality has never been adequately acknowledged by those in positions of power, which is why the long-term planning required to address the phenomenon is still conspicuous by its absence.

As such the in-built structural bias of the state’s planning paradigm is most pronounced in rural areas. Over almost seven decades, planners have dedicated neither resources nor technical expertise to villages, and, for that matter, to small towns. Thus smallholders in agriculture have been steadily thrust into the ranks of an already huge landless population (estimates suggest that 30 million people in rural areas are now landless), accelerating

migrations towards metropolitan areas. Until and unless the state conceives of and facilitates the provision of livelihoods as well as other basic needs in rural and peri-urban areas, the labouring poor will continue to move in the direction of cities.

It is worth bearing in mind that the population of Karachi in 1947 was barely 400,000, a figure that is now well over 20 million. Islamabad has emerged as the fastest growing urban centre in the country – its population according to the 1998 census was below 600,000 and has since increased to almost two million. The vast majority of migrants arriving in cities have no physical assets and rely entirely on selling their labour power for a wage to survive.

Where the labouring poor coming into cities do find work – more and more such migrants survive on a day-to-day basis – they subsequently struggle to secure housing and acquire basic facilities such as education, health, clean drinking water, sanitation and other residential amenities. The prices of land in metropolitan areas have increased exponentially over the past decade or so, particularly in Islamabad where dozens of high-end housing schemes have been initiated to the benefit of speculators and upper-middle class investors. Given the complete absence of low-incoming housing options for the labouring poor, and sky-rocketing rents, the only available shelter option for the working-class migrants into cities is in the form of katchi abadis.

This is borne out by the Capital Development Authority’s own statistics. Whereas in 2000 the CDA counted 11 katchi abadis in the federal capital, it now puts the number at 42 (whilst also positing a quite absurd distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ abadis). In Karachi the figures are even more astonishing – more than half of Karachi’s population lives in katchi abadis.

As such the CDA, administrators in other cities and many governments have in the past acknowledged many of these structural failings of the system. However we have yet to witness any meaningful paradigm shift in our planning priorities, whether in rural areas, small towns, or metropolitan centres. It is not enough for the authorities to simply wish away katchi abadis or indeed the millions of working people who continue to migrate to cities. What is in fact needed is concrete conceptualisation of an implementable long-term plan to address this glaring policy lack.

Implementable solutions exist and require political will

It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into wider questions so I will present here only some suggestions (and include some examples from my own experience) that could help in the design of housing policy for the poor in the medium to long-run. In effect, implementing these suggestions requires political will to reorient the state’s priorities away from non-productive and profit-oriented concerns towards people’s welfare. In other words, instead of pandering to the rich and powerful, the authorities must make clear their commitment to meeting the housing needs of the urban poor.

First, all city planners must develop entire residential sectors to meet the housing needs of the poor. So, for instance, the CDA can declare that only low-income plots will be allotted in yet-to-be-developed sectors (or an existing sector in which land is available). It is important

to note that such initiatives have, in the past, been hijacked by speculators and middle-class investors. There are simple ways to protect against such eventualities, including prohibition on sale of allotted plots for a certain time period, e.g. five years; and requiring that allottees immediately occupy their plots so that speculation on empty plots can be pre-empted.

In our ‘Khuda ki Basti’ schemes, amenities such as electricity, gas and water, as well as services such as education and health were introduced over a period of months and years following the initial plot occupations; as residents invest in their homes they also collectively contribute to the development of services, and in the wake of these infrastructural improvements, both the public sector and NGOs start developing education, health and other such facilities. This is what is known the world over as the ‘incremental housing’ model and requires the authorities only to demonstrate commitment by providing access to land, and blocking the way of individual state functionaries and assorted profiteers that could endanger the scheme’s focus on the labouring poor.

Beyond the provision of subsidised land, these schemes can thrive with the financial contribution of low-income families themselves. However, there will always be a segment of the poor that cannot afford even small instalments over a period of time, particularly those with no regular stream of income. By our estimates destitution affects 5% of the total population – around 8-10 million people. The state must take responsibility for this segment of the population as well and make special efforts to provide shelter to them.

This could mean that those who can pay even nominal amounts in an incremental manner are given proprietary rights to land, while ‘public housing’ schemes can be conceived for the absolute poor in which property title is not transferred permanently to the residents of the scheme.

Whatever the permutations, it is important to emphasise that initiatives of this nature have been successful in our experience because they are based on an appreciation for the ‘sociology of the poor’. I can vouch for the fact that many urban planners, experts and social workers – myself included – would support the authorities in both the design and implementation of such initiatives if and when the necessary political will is generated. The CDA in particular needs to be compelled to initiate new sectors/allocate areas within existing sectors for this purpose, as it is arguably further behind than any other Pakistani city in planning for the long-term housing needs of the poor.

In fact, my suggestion is that the CDA and other city administrators be made answerable vis a vis the design and implementation of such housing schemes, and planners, other experts and social workers with experience and a commitment to the shelter needs of the poor be commissioned to oversee administrators’ so as to ensure that the constitutional right to housing that the court has so eloquently defended be recognised and protected over the course of the coming years. According to the CDA, low-income housing initiatives have been planned (either in the past or in the future) in sectors G-7, G-11, I-9, I-10, I-11, I-12, I-14, I-15 and I-16. I do not know of any successful case in the past, so if anything is to happen in the future, we need to see concrete and implementable plans and this can only happen if there is oversight from outside the CDA. I would be happy to be part of this process, and suggest names of other experts who can also be of assistance.

2. The Present: Katchi Abadis need to be regularised, not bulldozed

Redressal of our elitist planning paradigm will take time. It is necessary, therefore, to undertake measures in the short and medium-term to address the shelter needs of the poor – this serves an important demonstrative effect that can contribute to overturning the long-standing structural bias against the poor outlined above.

Katchi Abadis and the needs they fulfil

As a general rule, katchi abadis need to be understood as a successful strategy of the poor in the face of the failure of the state and private sector to meet the poor’s demand for housing. Needless to say ‘informal settlements’ leave a lot to be desired, and are blighted by a lack of planning and adequate municipal services. Perhaps most importantly, the informal nature of katchi abadis represents an ongoing opportunity for individual state functionaries and small-time middlemen to privately profit from the compulsions of the poor in the absence of an affordable formal housing market.

The dominant approach of the authorities towards katchi abadis is highly contradictory. On the one hand the high bureaucracy turns a blind eye to the emergence of the settlements – and the profiteering of the low bureaucracy – due to the fact that labour is needed to service the city. The elite is well aware that its offices and homes could not function without construction workers, sweepers, cooks, drivers, and so on.

On the other hand the katchi abadis that house the labouring poor are periodically subject to inhumane demolitions, sometimes under the pretext of preserving the city’s ‘beauty’, other times under the guise that katchi abadis are ‘illegal’ and still other times in the name of securing citizens from anti-social elements.

In short, the authorities tolerate the existence of informal settlements because they offer easy means of extorting money from the poor, and because the latter provide irreplaceable services that keep cities running. Systematic efforts to provide substantive housing options for the labouring poor remain conspicuous by their absence, and so katchi abadis that come into being are at best under-serviced, and at worst, continually subject to arbitrary evictions. The state and upper middle classes combine to sustain a public discourse of katchi abadi residents as eyesores and criminal, thereby facilitating evictions when deemed necessary.

Regularization and upgradation – a tried and tested solution

Nevertheless, due to the consistent efforts of planners and experts sensitive to the structural bias in state policy, as well as the mobilisations of katchi abadi dwellers themselves, governments have been forced to conform – in some measure – to established international best practices and take steps towards regularisation and upgradation of these settlements.

The most sustained initiatives have taken place in Sindh where the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) was formed by a legislative act (Sindh Katchi Abadi Act) in 1987. SKAA has till now overseen the regularisation and upgradation of more than 600 katchi abadis, mostly in Karachi but also in other urban areas of the province. Property titles have been issued to most of the residents of regularised abadis, and virtually all settlements now enjoy basic

amenities such as electricity, gas and water. Efforts are underfoot to recognize all katchi abadis that came into existence before 1997.

In Punjab too there have been some substantive measures taken by the authorities based on acknowledgment of the katchi abadi phenomenon. A Directorate of Katchi Abadis established in 1992 under the Punjab Katchi Abadi Act has surveyed existing katchi abadis in the province and till now regularised at least 300 – an amendment to the original bill was passed in 2012 so that newer katchi abadis up till 2011 were also approved for regularisation and upgradation.

Islamabad’s failure to understand and address the problem

Islamabad’s elites have been less inclined to recognise katchi abadis and deal with them in a rational and humane manner. A Katchi Abadi Cell was set up inside the CDA in 1997 – a process with which I was closely associated – that then proceeded to survey existing settlements in the city. The original list of 11 katchi abadis recognised by the CDA as a consequence of this mapping excluded the I-11 katchi abadi, even though the latter had been established as early as 1983. For reasons known only to the CDA, I-11 was neither on the list of 6 of katchi abadis slated for regularisation, and later separated from the other 5 that were to be resettled in alternative locations.

In the event, the CDA has been lax vis a vis even the 11 abadis that it had originally committed to regularising/resettling. Property titles have yet to be issued to any abadi residents; upgradation works have been very limited with many abadi residents still unable to acquire electricity, gas and other meters; allocation of plots in the CDA’s one resettlement scheme (at Farash Town) took place haphazardly and excluded hundreds of deserving katchi abadi residents; and, the process of surveying and mapping katchi abadis has completely stopped over the past few years.

As mentioned in the first section, Islamabad is the fastest growing urban centre in the country, its population having tripled over the course of the past fifteen years. Unlike Sindh and Punjab which have updated their policies vis a vis katchi abadis over the passing of the years, the CDA has refused to acknowledge any settlement that has emerged in recent years, choosing instead to coin a new typology whereby the 11 original katchi abadis are deemed ‘legal’ and as many as 34 katchi abadis that have come into existence since 1995 described as ‘illegal’. It is indicative of the arbitrariness of the CDA’s attitude that I-11 katchi abadi (established in 1983) continued to be put into the ‘illegal’ category in the lead-up to its demolition.

As such all existing laws and policies on katchi abadis – whether in the provinces or at the federal level – outlaw summary evictions. The CDA is possibly the only administrative entity in Pakistan that is flagrantly violating established protocols. It insists that 34 other ‘illegal’ katchi abadis will meet the same fate as I-11 katchi abadi, refusing to make any provision for resettlement – which is what existing regulatory frameworks mandate in the event that a particular katchi abadi cannot be regularised at its current location – and also continues to make ludicrous claims about these abadis being dens of crime and unrest.

A population of almost 100,000 people who live in these 34 katchi abadis would have to find shelter elsewhere if they were to be evicted from their homes – and the probability is that

yet more katchi abadis would crop up to accommodate these people. This is precisely why summary evictions can never be a solution and in fact exacerbate an already acute housing crisis. There can be no resolution of this issue if evictions are allowed to continue and the first and foremost priority must be to ensure that existing katchi abadis are surveyed, mapped and eventually regularised – or at most resettled. There can be no instance in which summary evictions are permitted.

Many policy documents, including those that one finds in the CDA, impress on the need to prevent the emergence of katchi abadis in the future through extensive monitoring and strict enforcement. This would appear to be a reasonable goal – planners and administrators do not want informal settlements cropping up all over the city whereas the labouring poor would much rather have formal housing options that are both affordable and guarantee security of tenure.

However, the desire to contain the future emergence of katchi abadis is contingent on the development of long-term housing options for the poor, as discussed earlier. It is remarkable that the CDA has literally outlawed katchi abadis over the past 15 years and at the same time made no effort to facilitate residential plots/sectors for low-income residents of Islamabad (whether recently migrated or otherwise). I find this particularly unfortunate because I was privy to developments within the CDA from 1997 until about 2002 and there appeared to be recognition within the institution of the need to seriously understand and deal with the katchi abadi phenomenon. But over the past 12-13 years the CDA has gone backwards and the predominant opinion of the bureaucrats is once again that katchi abadis are a ‘problem’ that need to be eliminated.

This is not to suggest that other administrators and municipal authorities are ensuring that the constitutional right to housing is upheld in all cases. However there is little doubt that the difference between the CDA and provincial authorities in Sindh and Punjabis is that elected governments exercise at least some control over the bureaucracy in the latter cases. The passing of laws in both the two provinces has been a crucial factor in providing institutional cover to katchi abadis, even if the long-term planning paradigm has yet to be overhauled.

The CDA is, by contrast, an unrepresentative body and no elected government has passed legislation to specifically address the katchi abadi phenomenon in the federal capital. It is possible that local body elections will herald a sea-change in how katchi abadis are conceived and dealt with in Islamabad, particularly if residents of these abadis themselves stand for elections.

The need for lasting institutional solutions

Yet until such a time that elected governments do pass legislation addressing the katchi abadi phenomenon in Islamabad, it is necessary that the CDA Ordinance-1960 be amended to include mention of katchi abadis and outline a regulatory framework to deal with them. Meanwhile, the CDA is obligated to abide by existing country-wide policy guidelines, and cannot, as it often does, selectively name the policies with which it chooses to conform. The last country-wide effort to address the katchi abadi phenomenon was in 2001 during the tenure of General Pervez Musharraf; I was the chair of a committee constituted by Federal Minister Omar Asghar Khan that included prominent members of many development

authorities including the CDA. This committee came up with explicit policy guidelines (which I submitted to your lordships during the hearing on 31 August 2015) prohibiting summary evictions and outlining various aspects of the regularisation and upgradation process for existing katchi abadis whilst also asserting many points similar to what have been noted here with regards to long-term planning to meet the housing needs of the urban poor.

Recommendations from this report were also included in the National Housing Policy 2001. Until a regulatory framework is established – and I believe it could be within two months - it is imperative that the CDA be made answerable to the stipulations of the above-mentioned policy documents. The CDA cannot be allowed to exempt itself from the principles that the provinces have – slowly but surely – accepted.

In this regard I would suggest the setting up of a katchi abadi directorate within the CDA similar to those that exist in the provinces. This would constitute a definite step up from the katchi abadi cell currently operational within the CDA and thereby ensure that the institution dedicates more resources and expertise to the katchi abadi phenomenon.

Alongside a moratorium on evictions, updated surveys and maps of all katchi abadis in Islamabad and a renewed emphasis on regularisation and upgradation, it is also necessary for the CDA to evolve a comprehensive resettlement policy to cater to those katchi abadis that have to be relocated. In this regard the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement can be a guide, and particularly article 55:

Resettlement and rehabilitation (Article 55):

Identified relocation sites must fulfill criteria for adequate housing according to international human rights law. These include: (a) security of tenure (b) services, materials, facilities, and infrastructure such as potable water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services, and to natural and common resources, where appropriate; (c) affordable housing; (d) habitable housing providing inhabitants with adequate space, protection from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural hazards and disease vectors, and ensuring the physical safety of occupants; (e) accessibility for disadvantaged groups; (f) access to employment options, health-care services, schools, childcare centers, and other social facilities, whether in urban or rural area; and (g) culturally appropriate housing. In order to ensure security of the home, adequate housing should also include the following essential elements: privacy and security; participation in decision-making; freedom from violence; and access to remedies for any violations suffered.

In my humble opinion, the court should instruct the CDA to devise a resettlement policy and make the rehabilitation of I-11 its flagship case. It is to this section that we turn next.

3. The I-11 katchi abadi – the demolition and need for resettlement

The case of the recently-demolished I-11 katchi abadi is central to the question of resolving the crisis of low-income housing in Islamabad and beyond, as it has become a symbol for working people’s struggles for housing in Pakistan. In order to move towards a sustainable solution and an end to this reckless and inhumane manner of dealing with the problem of katchi abadis, it is necessary that the particular case of the I-11 katchi abadi is properly understood, tackled and rectified.

History

Around 1983, a katchi abadi started to emerge near the banks of the Leh river close to the Fruit and Vegetable Market in I-11. The majority of the original inhabitants were Pakistani Pakhtuns, migrants into the city come in search of employment or fleeing the ongoing war in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Some Afghan refugees also lived in the area, but were eventually moved out to a separate camp in sector I-12 by the UNHCR in 2009.1 Over time and often with the connivance of officialdom, the abadi grew to accommodate thousands of people who created a thriving low-income community on the outskirts of Islamabad.

The I-11 Katchi Abadi consisted of around 1600-1800 households, with over 15,000 individuals, of whom roughly 52% were female.2 According to data gathered from a 2014 scoping study by researchers at Kings College London, households in the settlement had an average size of 10 members (a typical size for low-income communities for whom multiple offspring are a long-term survival strategy), and an average of roughly 2 earning members per family3. The vast majority of working adults were either daily-wage or fruit sellers in the nearby Fruit and Vegetable market (Sabzi Mandi).

In the aforementioned study of the abadi, nearly 80% of the households in the settlement were classified as being in the low-income bracket (earning less than Rs. 10,000/month), with the rest being placed in the low-to-middle income bracket. The settlement was also characterized by a high degree of illiteracy, with 62% of its residents never having been enrolled in school. Most residents reported either non-existent or poor access to basic services; the settlement had no formal utility provision (including electricity, water, sewerage/sanitation, or waste management). Water supply was being managed through water pumps donated by local NGOs, residents had constructed a drainage system, while a small number of households had purchased solar panels on instalments. In the large part, however, the settlement was bereft of essential services.

Despite the lack of services, the informal settlement at I-11 was in many ways idyllic for its dwellers. Considering most of the adults came to the city from a rural background, this abadi in its scale and layout provided a scenario much like a village. There was a strong sense of community, based on their shared ethno-linguistic background, socio-economic standing as well as physical layout. The residents had not only planned out and self-constructed their homes, but also left communal spaces open and adapted infrastructural

1Zahid, Luavat. 2015, ‘Rendered homeless by slum-clearance in Pakistan: A crisis in the making’, Crisis Response Journal. 2Data is based on comparisons of multiple estimates from polio immunization records, as well as surveys done by Secours Islamique France3Sawas (2014), ‘Urbanization, Gender and Violence in Rawalpindi and Islamabad: A scoping study’

needs in the form of open drains and solar panels. The abadi also demonstrated a considerable degree of social cohesion and served as a social support network for its residents, who could count on members of their clan and neighbors for economic and social support in times of insecurity. This is a pattern that has been witnessed in similar informal settlements in Sindh and Punjab, whereby communal harmony and social cohesion (relative to the rest of the city) develops as a consequence of shared experiences of happiness, suffering and struggle.

The demolition of the I-11 katchi abadi

The CDA was well aware of the growth of this particular settlement and it appears on numerous governmental records in the 80s, 90s and 2000s, usually referred to as Miskeenabad or Afghan Basti (for I-11/1) and Benazir Colony (for I-11/4).4 Up until the early 2000s, this settlement was seen as a katchi abadi earmarked for relocation.5 This was in line with both the National Housing Policy 2001 as well as the Policy Guidelines for Katchi Abadis, Urban Renewal and Slum Upgradation 2001. The settlement also fell within both the CDA’s original cut-off year for katchi abadi regularization (1985) as well as its updated cut-off (1995).

However, despite this recognition in official documentation, the CDA did not undertake the planned resettlement, despite the resettlement of the nearby Haq Bahu colony in I-11/4 to MUSP Farash Town in 2001. Instead, the CDA made several attempts to demolish the abadi from time to time (including in 2005, 2013 and 2014). One of these attempts (in 2005) succeeded in evicting a large number of its residents (though without resettlement in violation of the National Housing Policy 2001); however, most of these residents managed to return to the abadi and re-establish the community in the time following the summary eviction.

The CDA renewed its campaign against the settlement in 2015, in connection with orders issued by the Islamabad High Court during the hearing of two unrelated petitions by katchi abadi residents (not from I-11) for the recognition of their constitutional rights (described in detail in the ongoing petition in the Supreme Court)6. It was claimed by the CDA (though never demonstrated through any sound evidence) that the katchi abadi was situated on plots that had been allotted to government employees. However, this was never proven through the public furnishing of any allotment documents that specified which land in the vicinity of the abadi was allotted and to whom. Furthermore, CDA itself has claimed in its response to the Supreme Court that the land allotment to the private owners was made in the year 1989, seven years after the abadi was first established. However, even if the claim of allotment is to accepted in its entirety, policy guidelines for katchi abadi resettlement clearly outline what is to be done in the case of informal settlements on private land - the government is required to act as a negotiator between private owners and resettlement of the abadi residents is still mandatory.7

4UNDP, 2002, ‘Katchi Abadis and some Viable Alternatives: A Case Study and Operational Guidelines based on the CDA’s approach’ 5Ibid6Constitutional Petition 41/2015 in the Supreme Court of Pakistan 7National Policy Guidelines on Katchi Abadis, Urban Renewal and Slum Upgradation 2001

In early 2015, authorities (including police, CDA and interior ministry officials) increasingly began to refer to the settlement as a security threat that was host to ‘terrorists’, ‘criminals’ and illegal Afghan immigrants, and started issuing threats of demolition.

In response to this intimidation and demonization, residents of the abadi attempted to protest and made several attempts to clear their names of the unproven accusations thrown at them by the authorities. Despite peaceful protests and attempts to negotiate with the authorities for resettlement by the residents, the authorities decided to go ahead with the operation in ignorance of the relevant policies or guidelines as well as past experiences with katchi abadi resettlement in Islamabad and other cities. The abadi was besieged by police, rangers and CDA personnel from 27th July 2015 onward. On the 30th of July, a grand eviction operation was launched in which thousands of security personnel used force, including baton charge and tear-gas,to subdue the abadi residents before proceeding to demolish the settlement.

In the course of the 30th July operation, the entirety of the abadi (over 1300 homes) was destroyed, several people, including women and children, were injured, over 2000 people were booked under charges of terrorism under the Anti-Terrorist Act, while 66 were arrested under the same charges. Since many residents were left unable to retrieve their belongings before the demolition, they also faced heavy material losses. Further to this, authorities also followed many of the residents to their new abodes, where announcements were made for local homeowners to not rent out to evicted katchi abadi residents, thus rendering their efforts to secure housing even more difficult.

Towards resettlement and the establishment of a precedent

The demolition of the I-11 katchi abadi was a deeply destructive and unconstitutional act that pushed several thousand people into homelessness and poverty and endangered the futures of thousands of children. It has resulted in the loss of livelihoods, income and social security for thousands of poor families already struggling at the margins of economic survival. The demolition was avoidable and the situation could have been managed in a number of better and humane ways that have been undertaken across the world, in different provinces in Pakistan and even in Islamabad itself (in the case of the Modern Urban Shelter Project in Farash Town).

While Islamabad does not have a Katchi Abadi Act like Punjab, Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, it is important to remember that legal provisions for the resettlement exist at the federal level - the forced eviction violated the National Housing Policy 2001 and National Policy Guidelines for Katchi abadis, Urban renewal and Slum settlements 2001. However, as is often the case in scenarios of rampant lack of accountability, policies are readily ignored when they are inconvenient for those in charge.

If we are to adequately address the bureaucratic indifference, official complicity and absence of accountability that contributes to the phenomenon of katchi abadis and crisis of low-income housing, it is essential that this particular eviction that has captured the public’s imagination is rectified through the resettlement of the evictees. This would establish an important precedent that undertaking summary evictions of informal settlements that deprive the residents of shelter without regard to the structural circumstances of their

emergence (such as the stark low-income housing shortage) or the economic and social conditions of their inhabitants, are unacceptable and need to be abandoned forthwith.

The proposed resettlement is also an important step in restoring trust between the low-income residents of Islamabad and the state authorities – trust that has been severely eroded in the face of the summary eviction and the threats to remove other katchi abadis in the Capital by force. Poor communities harbor a deep mistrust of the state precisely because it deprives where it should be providing. A timely, successful and expedited resettlement process would go a long way in demonstrating the seriousness of the CDA and government in dealing with the problem of low-income housing in Islamabad. The success of this model could be replicated in the case of future resettlement and low-income housing projects in Islamabad and the rest of the country.

Among the many considerations that need to be taken into account in the design and implementation of a viable resettlement of I-11, the most important question is that of location and available land. Land allocated for resettlement should be situated within Islamabad’s I-11 or I-12 sector, within an 8 km distance from the Sabzi Mandi (which is the main source of livelihoods of the I-11 population).

Based on the 2001 National Housing Policy and Katchi Abadi Policy Guidelines and UN guidelines on slum resettlement, land allotted must be located within access to residents’ livelihoods and in close proximity to their previous site of residence. This will enable families who accessed basic services such as hospitals and schools to maintain proximity to this the social infrastructure, thereby reducing the socioeconomic shocks caused by eviction and significantly reducing the costs of resettlement (as much of the existing city infrastructure can be used and does not need to be re-developed). For these reasons, the location of land has proven to be a key determinant of the effectiveness and sustainability of katchi abadi resettlement projects.

4- Recommendations:

1 - Katchi Abadis are not an aberration, they are a phenomenon, a result of government failure to provide housing. Instead of bulldozing settlements, they should be regularized or, where truly necessary, resettled.

2 – The resettlement of the recently-demolished I-11 katchi abadi should take place on an urgent and priority basis to establish a firm precedent against such forced evictions. The CDA and/or Chief Commissioner of Islamabad need to immediately allot affordable land to the evictees for this purpose in proximity (within an 8 km radius) and with easy and secure access to their main source of livelihood, i.e., Sabzi Mandi, as per accepted international and local resettlement guidelines. This process should be overseen by a credible oversight committee.

3- A regulatory framework for katchi abadis in Islamabad needs to be established under the CDA 1960 Ordinance, within two months. The regulatory framework should be based along the lines of the Punjab and Sindh Katchi Abadi Acts and should have the following features:

a. Provisions for recognition, regularization, upgradation and awarding of property rights to all regularisable katchi abadis in Islamabad based on updated surveys and population records.

b. A section on resettlement that specifies the conditions and modalities of resettlement for all abadis that cannot be regularized on site, along the lines established in the National Policy Guidelines on Katchi Abadis, Urban Renewal and Slum upgradation.

Until a comprehensive regulatory framework has been operationalized, a moratorium on summary eviction should be kept in effect.

4- An independent Directorate for Katchi Abadis needs to be established and adequately capacitated within CDA to replace the existing under-staffed Katchi Abadi Cell. The Directorate will both oversee the creation of the regulatory framework and ensure that the rules established under the new regulatory framework will be followed. If need be, assistance in this regard can be taken from Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi. An Advisory Committee consisting of known professionals and civil society should be constituted for this purpose.

5- There is an over-supply of high-income plots in most sectors of Islamabad. Provisions for a minimum number of plots (at least 30%) for low-income households need to be factored into all future planning and zoning of sectors. At least two exclusive low-income sectors should also be planned for Islamabad and plots allocated to the needy and shelterless following the principle of incremental housing development as demonstrated in Khuda ki Basti projects.

6- A land bank needs to be established to prevent speculative property trading that drives up prices and crowds out low-income users.

7- If funds are required for low-income housing, CDA can approach the federal government or the Apna Ghar Limited (which was created in 2014) for providing 500,000 houses to the

low- income people by the present government. To make land affordable, the tool of cross-subsidization can also be employed.