217639114 Tasneem Noorani Review Commission Summary and Recommendations

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE

TASNEEM NOORANI

REVIEW COMMISSION

P.O. Box 1594, Islamabad, Pakistan. Tel: +92 51 227 0744 Fax: +92 51 287 3893 1


INTRODUCTION

Chairman Imran Khan, after having led the party through sixteen years of a lean

period, took the bold decision of having intra party elections in 2012, in order to

base the party on democratic principles and take a quick leap forward, into

converting a political party into an institution. Like a lot of first experiments, the

way the intra party elections were organized, and its timing, could have been

better. To understand all its dynamics there was a need to study the process

carefully, identify the shortcomings and suggest a way forward.

Secondly, there was also a need evaluate and understand the way the general

elections were contested by PTI. There were many complaints regarding ticket

distribution, the organization of the national campaign and the ancillary matters

related to it. These needed to be studied to ensure better results in the future.

To achieve these objectives, the Chairman PTI decided to set up a Review

Commission comprising of three members. They were:

1. Mr. Tasneem Noorani, Chairman.

2. Mr. Ahmad Owais Member.

3. Mr. Yaqoob Izhar Member.

After examining a large number of witnesses and detailed deliberation, the

Review Commission finalized its report. The following summarises its content

and recommendations.



INTRA PARTY ELECTIONS

For the first time in the history of political evolution in Pakistan, a political party

(PTI) held free party elections to elect the partys office bearers starting from the

grass roots, in the form of counselors at the U.C. level. By free it is meant that

the party leadership neither had any favorites, nor made any efforts knowingly to

help any particular person or group. It genuinely wanted the ordinary members

to elect their organizers.

Based on the number of people interviewed, the intra party election exercise as

a whole showed mixed results. The down side was:-

a. The faux pas of the voter lists and the arbitrary manner in which election

issues and complaints were handled by the Election Commission, (who

were pressed for time) left a poor impression of the partys organizational

state and ability with the party workers.

b. The expected utility of having a proper screening process of the

prospective candidates by the District. /Reg. / Provincial body through

unbiased selection, and better local knowledge of the candidates, did not

play out as envisaged.



c. The low participation at the U.C level by the genuine party members/voter

(inadequate voter list) and the maneuvering done by aspirants of District

and Provincial posts created issues with the elected bodies.

d. The rivalries, groupings and personal animosity generated by the

electoral process, did not end with elections. Due to the very short time

between the IPE and General Elections, it very seriously affected the

unity and enthusiasm of PTI, in the party ranks, during the general

election.

The plus side of the IPE was:-

a. Never in the history of the sub continent has a political party conducted

genuine intra party elections. This was a first and has had a huge impact

on the political culture of Pakistan.

b. Party has made a breakthrough in organizing itself and has provided a

lead to the other parties in institutionalizing the political parties.

Recommendations

1) IPE should never be planned near the General Elections. IPE should be

at least one year before the General Election.



2) The party constitution should be suitably amended to take care of the

following issues:

a. The eligibility criteria of becoming a party member. Having a large

number of uninterested members is not necessarily a good option.

Only a voting member should be eligible to context election.

b. Only residents of the U.C should be eligible for contesting in that

U.C.

c. The issue of having to cast dozens of votes in the U.C elections,

should be sorted out, to bring it to manageable level, perhaps

through acknowledging the reality of panels i.e. panels should be

allowed for U.C level elections.

3. Rs. 500/-fees for U.C level election should be withdrawn

4. Voter list should be reconstructed within a reasonable time frame and be

available on the web, to be challenged and corrected, as an on going

process. Confidentiality of member details has not paid off. PTI members

should be known and be proud of their association with the party. Fence

sitter will in any case join and leave according to their advantage.



5. Electronic voting, though attractive on paper, did not deliver effectively. A

third party evaluation of the last experience should be done and a critical

evaluation of the shortcomings be undertaken. Since PTI is a share

holder in the cell voting hardware, its evaluation is necessary to use the

asset effectively in the future. Passing all the blame on the election staff

and EC, will be brushing the matter under the carpet. After third party

evaluation, its performance be tested in a Pilot Project before using it

again in the next IPE.

6. For the reason that it was the first experience of the kind by any political

party and for reasons highlighted in the foregoing paragraphs, the IPE

was not perceived to be a perfect exercise. There is in some circles

continuing resentment and disenchantment with the elected bodies.

Setting the tenures run to the full may not be recommended. Party should

deliberate re election at an appropriate time,in the not too distant a

future.

7. An innovative system should be introduced to improve on the current

system of winner take all to reduce the intense grouping that is sure to

develop after every IPE. One idea would be to have a Panel System and

giving the loosing panel share in the U.C office bearers proportionate to

their votes.



8. International experience needs to be evaluated. Human nature being

similar, more developed democracies must have developed different

systems to take care of the problem of intense groupings after party

elections.

9. Party Office bearers should not be allowed to contest the General

Elections. Members should decide whether they want to be part of party

bureaucracy or be part of the government. This will throw up the

enthusiastic and nazariati cadre of the party to run the party.

TICKET DISTRIBUTION PROCESS

The confusion, pressure for time and a fluid changing process of arriving at

decisions resulted in a number of issues, most of which adversely effected the

partys performance in the general election. Some of these are:

3. In a predominant number of constituency, not even the strongest of

candidates was sure of getting the ticket until the last moment,

compromising his position and reputation in the constituency.

4. The uncertainty, apart from belittling them, sapped the enthusiasm/energy

of those candidates, who eventually got the ticket.



5. False allotment of tickets, which were withdrawn, in the middle of the

campaign and in some cases re-allotted, spread widespread confusion

and belittled the partys management capabilities.

6. In a number of cases, candidates were given their word by person in

position about ticket allotment; They spent money on printing posters etc

and started campaigning, only to be told that their ticket had been

withdrawn. A number of such people left the party and continued their

campaign as independent candidates. This divided the party supporters

and badly affected partys performance.

7. Due to a haphazard method, each candidate, whether for MPA or MNA,

fought his own battle; with the result the final decision had no relevance

to having MPA candidates compatible to the MNA of the constituency.

Resultantly the synergy so essential in the campaign of the MNA

candidates who is in harmony with the MPA under him was lacking. In

most cases rather than supporting each other, they even opposed each

other, resulting in the loss of both.

8. Senior office bearers of other parties, who had a clean reputation and

were welcomed into PTI, and who had staked their political reputation to

join a party more in line with their moral values, were not given the

respect they felt they deserved.



9. The performance of CPB was brought into question, when the list of

invited members became unwieldy with a host of unconcerned

participants..

10.The decision to allot 25 % seats to youth was generally considered

counterproductive, as most youth candidates lacked experience,

resources, or knowledge of their constituency. In most cases they did not

even make this up, with running an aggressive campaign, expected from

youth.

Recommendations:

3. Last time hardly three weeks were allowed for the party to decide party

tickets for 272 NA and 577 PA seats. To decide, input was taken from (a)

an in house committee lead by Mr. Asheer Zohair (b) input of Provincial

Presidents/Provincial Parliamentary Board (c) input of members of the

CPB and (d) input received by Chairman directly. Synthesizing the many

inputs takes time and because of shortage of time, CPB took incorrect

decisions. .

4. This mistake should not be repeated. The question now is how soon

should the party decide the tickets. Party often like to hold their cards

near their chest, till the end, to have the option for the best. This has not



worked for PTI. The hunt for good candidates should start Now, based on

(a) performance in 2008 )b) enthusiasm for party (e) elect ability.

5. To strengthen the party at the district level there is no alternative to the

Chairman himself visiting districts, as frequently as possible, but not less

than once in six months. In these meetings, as different from jalsas,

Chairman should meet 50/100 people in an enclosed space and listen to

the problems of the local leaders and works. There is no requirement for

the Chairman to make any formal speech; listing is more important for

party strengthening. The local squabbles will inevitably be aired in such

gatherings; they have to be heard and coordinated as best as possible,

by second tier national leadership, who should assist the Chairman in

these meetings.

6. A confidential hunt for potential candidates in each constituency should

be undertaken through various means as soon as possible, one of them

could be hiring a specialized private company. Contact with the identified

candidates should be maintained by party leadership (who ever is

assigned the task) to both monitor and groom the potential candidates. A

strategy district wise should also be devised to attract good candidates

from other parties who fit the PTI profile.



7. The process of party tickets allotment should start at least six months

before the elections and tickets should be finalized not later than three

months before election date.

8. National Assembly candidates should be selected first and their input

taken for selecting the Provincial Assembly candidates under him.

9. Policy for tickets for youth should be reviewed. No minimum limit of tickets

to any category be announced. Merit in each case should be determining

factor for each constituency, while best effort should be made to

encourage young people.

10.A PTI lead person be appointed, at least one for each civil division, to

handle the political fall out of ticket awarding and damage control, to

minimize the number of opponents, specially those who turn hostile at not

being given the ticket. This should be done near the elections, before the

start of ticket distribution process.

11.Elected President of District should be co-opted in the CPB for selection

of candidates of his district .

MALADMINISTRATION/CORRUPTION AND ITS IMPACT ON ELECTIONS



Even-though the RC was set up to look into the candidates evaluation

procedure for award of tickets and look into causes that adversely affected the

performance of the party, apart from enquiring into allegations of corruption and

misconduct, most people who contacted us or appeared before the Review

Commission had only corruption on their minds. They thought that was the

biggest factor which harmed the party

Since no substantive evidence of financial corruption was produced, the Review

Commission did not deem it necessary to call the persons complained against to

answer charges. While it can be said that where there is smoke there is bound

to be fire, it can also be said the people in our country, are prone to

exaggerating, especially against those who have hurt them. In some case the

hurt is particularly nasty; especially where it happens after intense friendship,

hurting the other party then becomes a matter of honor.

While the leadership of the party is within its right to form any opinion on the

matter, the Review Commission does not feel competent to pass judgment on

anyone without credible evidence.

Recommendations:

1. A Standing Committee on Disciplinary Matters should be set up to

consider cases of corruption, discipline etc. The SG should be the



authorized person to send such cases, which he feels require

adjudication, to the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee should

record evidence, in the presence of the accused, who should have right to

cross examine, before sending their verdict to the SG, who should then

decide the punishment. Depending on the work load, there can be more

than one Standing Committee.

2. The case of President Faisalabad be put up before the Standing

Committee on Disciplinary Matters for deliberation.

3. Although there was a lot of commotion in the party on corruption after the

IPE, almost no one brought forward any concrete evidence. This is also

because most corrupt persons are careful not to leave any trail. It is

,therefore, recommended that the general reputation of the members

should be given due importance in future decision making.

4. Action should also be take against persons who are found making false

allegations.

Other factors affecting party performance:

There are a number of other factors, which are responsible for less

than expected performance. Some of these are external and other

internal. They are:



EXERNAL

1. There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that PMLN in

Punjab used the state machinery to rig the election wherever it

could. This is borne out by the fact that it has stoutly resisted

any attempt to do biometric recounting in Punjab

constituencies.

2. N manipulated Biradari and cast politics in Punjab much better

than PTI. It was particularly successful in roping in local

influential who used there clout to influence the elections.

INTERNAL

1. Because of inordinate delay in finalizing tickets a number of good

candidates left and joined other parties or preferred to contest as

independents to obviate the insult of being refused the tickets on the

last moment.

2. Some good candidates played one party against the other in giving

them the ticket and left PTI in a lurch leaving PTI with very few

options.



3. All candidates had to wait before being awarded the ticket, right at the

last moment, leaving the minimum time to canvas for their candidature.

4. The youth were also given a high % of tickets, were not known in their

constituencies and also did not have their resources to spend on

publicity or area to mobilize the volunteers.

5. Selection of ticket holders was made on individual bases and very

rarely as a team, in which MNA and MPA candidates were not on the

same wavelength. This deprived the party of the synergy that

candidates of other parties normally pay attention to.

Recommendations:

1. An exercise for pre-qualification of candidates for party ticket should be

done to assess whether their past record is in line with the qualification

acceptable in the Constitution of Pakistan e.g. Article 62-63.The other

information like education, work history etc should only be for information of the

CPB .It should not be quantified or given grading.

2. Advisory Group compromising experienced politicians of the party be set

up formaly, either Region wise or for more than one Region, to make their

recommendations, based on the winning potential of candidates in each

constituency. This Advisory Group would be in addition to the recommendations

of the elected party hierarchy.



3. An assessment of financial resources of the candidate should be made to

see his resourcefulness, specially where party will be unable to make a

significant contribution to the candidates campaign fund.



National Campaign

Tabdeeli Razakar Program

The performance of the Tabdeeli Razakr (TR) was criticized by most

complainants who appeared before is. Their main complaint was that TRs were

nowhere to be seen on the election day. It was a project with a lot of hype but

performance on the ground was poor.

A total of 175000 TR`s were registered. They were all volunteers, who were also

involved in their own jobs/businesses ,so could not be expected to give full time

to PTI. The only physical thing they got out of the party were the printed letters

of IK to be delivered to the voters. A proposal to provide them party caps, to give

them a sense of belonging was not accepted due to financial constraints.

To us it appears that a good idea was poorly executed, due to an unrealistically

unworkable time frame of seven weeks, to recruit, train and provide a huge force

of volunteers, at not only the village level but also the polling station level. It was

to say the least an over optimistic exercise, which had raised peoples

expectation due to hype created through the media.

Recommendations : 1. The TR scheme should be reviewed and re-launched after studying the

shortcomings of the past.

2. T.R should be the partys foot soldiers positioned to help the partys

candidates during the general elections. For this, special effort and



planning should go in to ensure coordination between the candidates and

the TR, lacking last time

3. Funds should be allocated to provide party symbols to the TR like caps

etc and also per-diem for the election day. Amount should be enough to

add to their existing motivation and subject them to discipline, receive

training and ensure continued presence until counting is finished, on the

election day. These funds could be provided by the candidate, but the

party should ensure that they are actually disbursed .

4. Party top leadership including U.C, President, Provincial Presidents

should be allocated geographical areas, to ensure that they campaign

effectively to support party candidates, in area allocated to them.

Campaign Office should coordinate the political activity between the

leaders and candidates.

5. Party should devise a system to ensure that each candidates has done

adequate work on his own, to recruit, train and motivate Polling Agents

and this facet is not being neglected.

6. TRs numbers and capability needs to be specially assessed to ensure

no confusion occurs between what the TRs are able to do and what the

candidates will do.



Women Seats

The issue of women seat allocation has generated a lot of heat and bad blood

amongst prominent female members of the party. It was an issue regarding

which a number deponents, mainly concerning Punjab, appeared before the RC

and pleaded their case passionately

It appears to us that there are a few factors which fuelled the issue of women

reserve seats of Punjab.

(a) No one in the party took the issues of women seats seriously, as there were far more pressing issues, likely ticket distribution for regular seats, national campaign, etc. in the month of March 2013.

(b) The Central Parliamentary Board, which had given itself the task of deciding candidates for 849 NA & PA seats in the country, did not itself find time and priority to decide the precedence order of women reserve seats

(c) Neither women candidates nor the party leadership knew the rules and regulations about these seats.

(d) Women who were down in the pecking order in the lists submitted, did not react violently before the election , as most of them were expecting more seats than the party ultimately got and their disappointment set in when they realized they had missed the opportunity because they were lower in the list.


Other factors affecting party performance:

217639114 Tasneem Noorani Review Commission Summary and Recommendations

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