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International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 714– 726

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

International Journal of Intercultural Relations

j ourna l ho me pag e: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / i j in t re l

ulticulturalism in Malaysia and Singapore:ontesting models

oraini M. Noora,∗, Chan-Hoong Leongb

International Islamic University Malaysia, MalaysiaNational University of Singapore, Singapore

a b s t r a c t

alaysia and Singapore are good examples of multicultural societies albeit with different acculturation ideologies. Both countries comprisehree main ethnic groups but in diametrically opposite proportion. In Malaysia, 50.4% of the population is Malay, 23.7% Chinese, 11%ndigenous peoples, 7.1% Indian, and 7.8% other races. In Singapore, the ratio is 74.1% Chinese, 13.4% Malay, 9.2% Indian and 3.3% otheraces. Due to its colonial past, “ethnicity” has been the central policy issue in Malaysia and remains so up to this day. The dominancef communal politics can be understood in Stephan and Stephan’s (2000) model of integrated threat theory. In Singapore, the city-stateoes not believe in affirmative action and it prefers to manage cultural identities on the basis of a multicultural ideology (Berry & Kalin,995; Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977). In this article, multiculturalism is used to refer to public policies carried out by the two countries toanage their plural societies. We will discuss the development of the multicultural models that have evolved in the two countries. Whilealaysia’s model of multiculturalism is based on policies that have been instituted to manage inter-group tensions, prevent violence,

nd pursue social justice between the ethnic groups as a result of its past, Singapore’s model is guided by pragmatic realism and marketundamentals associated with the needs of a global city. Both models will face challenges in the coming years as they each adapt to theeismic shifts in the geo-economic landscapes.

© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

. Introduction

The term “multiculturalism” was introduced by the Canadian Royal Commission in 1965, to show its progressive politicalystem in accepting immigrants from diverse cultural, ethnic, racial, religious, and language backgrounds into the countryAng, 2005). In subsequent years, other Western countries have also witnessed large-scale immigration across its bordersnd it is in this context that the term has been used—to manage the unintended social and cultural consequences of thismmigration into a relatively homogeneous host country. This response was taken on the premise that by acknowledging andelebrating ethnic differences (Berry, 1984; Takaki, 1993), harmony and equality between groups can be increased (Fowers

Richardson, 1996). This assumption was supported by studies in social psychology that have found positive implicationsf multiculturalism for intergroup relations (e.g., Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007;erkuyten, 2005). However, the reverse has also been reported in some studies where immigration has a destabilizing impactn social relations (e.g., Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Thomas & Plaut, 2008).

The concept of “multiculturalism” has been used in several different ways. It has been employed to refer to the demo-

raphic description of a society, an ideology that accepts and recognizes diversity (race, culture, or religion), and programmesr policies that have been carried out by the state or a specific theory that underlies how diverse societies should be governedBerry, 2013; Berry et al., 1977; Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008; Vasu, 2012). In this paper, we have used it to refero policies that have been carried out by the state to manage its plural society.

∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, International Islamic University Malaysia, Jalan Gombak, 53100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.el.: +60 3 6196 5131; fax: +60 3 61964870.

E-mail address: noraini@iium.edu.my (N.M. Noor).

147-1767/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2013.09.009

N.M. Noor, C.-H. Leong / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 714– 726 715

Fig. 1. Acculturation strategies for dominant and non-dominant groups.

Berry (2001, 2005).

According to Berry (2001, 2005), the quality of intercultural relations is underscored by three fundament principles.First, mutual respect and acceptance towards increased cultural pluralism is predicated by the degree of confidence in one’ssocio-economic security. When individuals and groups lack confidence in their identities, whether in terms of cultural oreconomic status, they would be more likely to view intercultural relations as competitive rather than complementary. Berrycoins this condition as the Multicultural Hypothesis and posits this to be a cornerstone for building harmonious and cohesiveintercultural ties.

Second, both dominant (majority or host nationals) and non-dominant (minority or immigrants) groups face similarissues associated with cultural maintenance and intercultural contact. The first dimension focuses on heritage conti-nuity whilst the latter on engagement with members of other ethnocultural groups. Several intercultural strategiesare possible (see Fig. 1) depending on the socio-cultural and political orientation of the individuals or communities.Studies have shown that minority group members do well in terms of psychological well-being when they are ableto combine their respective ethnic identities with a new national identity (integration strategy) as opposed to eitherassimilation (where minority group members abandon their respective ethnic identities to adopt a new national iden-tity), or separation strategies (where minority group members renounce the new national identity to maintain theirrespective ethnic identities). In a similar vein, dominant host members are shown to be more inclusive and acceptingof cultural plurality if they embrace both dimensions, i.e., multiculturalism. Berry labels this as the Integration Hypothe-sis.

Lastly, Contact Hypothesis postulates that intergroup contact will engender a more favourable outgroup attitude in anenvironment where all groups are treated fairly and with sincere, mutual respect. The three hypotheses constitute thefoundation pillars of a harmonious and cohesive society, and they form the hallmarks of the multicultural ideology.

In Malaysia and Singapore, the social construct of “culture” or “many cultures” is primarily defined in the realm of racialidentity or “ethnic pluralism.” It is a legacy that the two countries had inherited from the British colonial masters of thetime. This variant of pluralism was created by the British based on a secular capitalist system of the West that “. . .recognizedpriorities (for example, entrepreneurial and technical over farming skills) and emphasizes new hierarchies that could besystematically manipulated (for example, religious and ethnic differences, new status and wealth differences, and ultimatelyclass differences). . . to respond actively to the open world economy of the 20th century” (Wang Gungwu, 2001, p. 26). Froma demographic point of view, both countries are multicultural by default, consisting of a heterogeneous mix of ethnic groups,with the three main groups of Malay, Chinese and Indian, but the composition of the groups is diametrically opposite inthe two countries (50.4% Malay, 23.7% Chinese, 7.1% Indian in Malaysia versus 74.1% Chinese, 13.0% Malay, 9.2% Indian inSingapore).

The British structurally segregated the groups by dividing labour by ethnicity making them unable to unite across ethniclines, i.e., segregation (Lim, 1980), leading to prejudice and stereotypes which later formed the basis of interethnic conflict.In both countries, the British essentialized the concept of “ethnicity” and formally accepted only these three groups. Anyindividuals who do not fit these three categories were pushed into the “Others” group.

This paper examines how inequality, ethnic differences and economic growth intersect and inform the managementof intergroup relations and the “multiculturalism” models that result. To do so, we teased out the past by (i) consideringthe shared history of the two countries, (ii) examining the different policies that they have taken after the two separate in1965, (iii) analysing the implications of the policies taken (or currently being pursued) on the kind of “multiculturalism”models, and (iv) discussing emerging issues (notably immigration and intra-ethnic differences) in light of these policies.

In doing so, we hope to shed light on how the two countries have dealt with the perennial issue of managing culturaldiversity.

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.1. The shared history of Malaysia and Singapore: British rule, independence and separation

Though Singapore and Malaysia shared a common colonial past, the former joined the Federation of Malaya togetherith Sabah and Sarawak only in 1963. But, the union was short-lived due to racial tensions from the economic and political

ronts. After separation in 1965, both countries have taken very different approaches in the management of interethnicelations. At present, there is also the added concern of a significant influx of migrants into the countries, especially for themall city-state of Singapore.

Both Malaysia and Singapore are demographically multicultural societies due to the make-up of their people. To under-tand how each has evolved with respect to the management of ethnic relations, some historical information is pertinent.efore the arrival of colonial powers in the region, the Malay Archipelago was a trading route spanning India, Arabia and ChinaAndaya & Andaya, 2001). There was a mix of indigenous (Malay and Orang Asli—indigenous tribes) and non-indigenousChinese, Indian, Arab) people creating a form of cultural pluralism which was an integral part of the local reality at the time.

The British created a plural society based on a capitalist system that emphasized ethnicity. By dividing labour by ethnicity,alay in the unwaged peasant sector and non-Malay (term used collectively for Chinese and Indian in Malaya) in the waged

apitalist sector, the British ensured that the groups did not have much contact with one another. Thus, the plural societydvocated under British rule was the “. . .construction of essentialized ethnic categories” (Shamsul, 1999, p. 52). The samepproach was used in education (Hirschman, 1979), with the English system overlaying the other three—Malay, Chinese, andamil. Each differed in the medium of instruction and course contents, further separating the groups. The different “races”ived in different places, rural versus urban areas in Malaya, and different parts of the island in Singapore (Turnbull, 1977).rawing on Berry’s acculturation framework, the communities were highly segregated—with little or no intergroup contact,ith unequal economic status, and each maintaining separate cultures.

The Japanese occupation during World War II drew inter-ethnic relations further apart. Malay policemen were deployed toght the Chinese-dominated Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army, pitching one ethnic community against the other (Zainalbidin, 1970). In post World War II, political parties were formed along ethnic lines. In Malaya, the United Malays Nationalrganization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) collectively formedn alliance known as the National Front to bargain for independence from the British. Independence in 1957 was grantedased on a power-sharing working relationship of the Alliance, based on a politics of difference—the political supremacy ofalays and the economic dominance of non-Malays (especially Chinese)—which has continued till the present day.The new Malayan government aimed to create a multicultural nation, assimilating the groups with a common ingroup

dentity via a common language and a shared educational system. Malay was chosen over English as the national language,ecause of the latter’s association with colonial rule and also as “a patriotic nationalist sentiment that was instrumental inesisting the imperial hegemony and restoring the consciousness of the ‘disadvantaged people”’ (Quayum, 2003, p. 184). Inddition, it was proposed to be the common medium of instruction in all schools, moving away from a fragmented colonialystem to one which was seemingly more integrated along national lines (Razak Report, 1956).

The implementation of the policy, however, failed because of the resistance by non-Malays who felt symbolically threat-ned by the dominant group. Non-Malays feared that they would be assimilated into the Malay ethnic national identity,osing their cultural identities and even their economic dominance (Abdullah Hassan, 2004).

Singapore, on the other hand, was developed as a trading post since the early 19th century. Many Chinese from southernhina flocked to the island to escape economic hardships in China and by 1827 they were the largest ethnic group, followedy Malay and Indian. Due to its strategic geographic location, the island state was a key outpost for British Empire in Southeastsia. Like Malaya, Singapore was briefly occupied by the Japanese during WWII, but its sovereignty was quickly revertedack to the British by the end of the war. In 1963, it was part of the short-lived Federation of Malaya that broke apart afternly two years due to racial tensions from the economic (Singapore was perceived as an economic rival to Kuala Lumpur)nd political fronts (Singapore was advocating equal treatment of all races as opposed to the pro-Malay policy in Malaysia).his different political ideology (Malay special rights vs equal treatment of all races) was believed to be the cause of the964 race riots in Singapore between Chinese and Malays.

Under the authoritarian leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, the city-state opted for aragmatic, market-driven approach because entrepreneurship was what they do best. This policy of equal treatment wasggressively pursued with respect to Singapore’s modernization programme. The small size of the city-state and the lackf natural resources meant that Singapore had to focus on harnessing human capital and traditional work ethics associatedith self-reliance and hard work are promulgated as the only accepted ethos to enhancing one’s standard of living (Goh,

002). But, as in Malaysia, the distinctions between the three groups remained clear, in part, due to the colonial legacy ofacial politics inherited from the British. Indeed, as argued by Vasu (2012), in trying to achieve harmonious relationshipsetween the groups, the state has advocated for a “governance by difference,” with the elite managing “. . .a fractious racialnd religious mass that makes up the Singaporean polity” (p. 736). In this case, the government’s pro-market policies areuperimposed within a politics of difference, similar to that of Malaysia.

.2. Policies in managing inter-ethnic relations post-1965

In Malaysia, the 1969 inter-ethnic violence between Malays and Chinese was a result of multiple factors, but economicnequality was singled out as being the most important (Tarling, 1999). Thus, the state came up with a radical solution of

N.M. Noor, C.-H. Leong / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 714– 726 717

implementing affirmative action programmes (New Economic Policy, NEP) that positively favour the Malay ethnic groupin many aspects of society, including politics and civil service, economics and business, education and language, as well asreligion and culture (Haque, 2003). Religion and culture, under the National Culture Policy, introduced in 1971 entrenchedthe primacy of Malay culture, making it non-negotiable with anyone raising questions against it prosecutable under theSedition Act (Lee H.G., 2000).

Why did the Malay-dominated Alliance introduce this pro-Malay policy? Because it diagnosed the cause of the vio-lence as economic, though it was equally political; i.e., Malays feared their political power was being threatened byChinese’s economic might. However, at that point in time, it could be argued that affirmative actions were needed tocorrect for past structural inequalities—to lessen the sense of “relative deprivation” among Malays. In peace psychol-ogy, this is referred to as peace building or “. . .the pursuit of social justice” (Christie, Wagner, & Winter, 2001, p. 7).Without that aid, the economically disadvantaged Malays would never stand a chance against the more urbanized andentrepreneurial Chinese. The two goals of the NEP were clear—to eradicate poverty regardless of race, and to restructuresociety to eliminate the identification of race with economic function. The NEP was meant to run for 20 years (1971–1990)but has since continued under different names (National Development Policy, 1991–2000 and National Vision Policy,2001–2010).

The implementation of these policies has not only intensified interethnic tensions but also highlighted intra-ethnicinequities (Singh & Mukherjee, 1993). Under the modernization programmes in the 80s and 90s, a select few well-connectedMalays emerged as elites overseeing state-owned businesses (intimately intertwined with politics). These new elites, how-ever, lacked the business acumen and entrepreneurial experience of the Chinese, so they formed partnership with thelatter (known popularly as the ‘Ali-Baba’ arrangement)—resulting in the political economy of “elite bargaining” (Lee, 2011).The materialism and immorality of these Malay elites, seen to be against the teachings of Islam (Malays are constitutionallydefined also as Muslims), prompted many Malays to move their support to the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), a religiousparty, in recent years. To regain lost ground, UMNO became increasingly even more “Islamic” in its approach.

The 90s also saw some softening of the authoritarian structures and preferential policies where the cultural practices ofthe other ethnic groups were accorded more public space (Ting, 2009), providing more opportunities for cultural mainte-nance, and consequently inspire greater sense of status security among minority group members. In essence, it recognizesthe importance of socio-cultural confidence in nurturing positive intercultural relations, i.e., multicultural hypothesis, andacculturation orientation tilted towards multiculturalism as opposed to forced assimilation. The Education Act of 1995 liber-ated the education system by allowing the establishment of private institutions using English as the medium of instruction.More scholarships were allocated to non-Malays in public universities (Syed Husin Ali, 2008). In reality, these liberalizationswere part of the ‘back-door’ elite bargaining between different ethnic political leaders within the National Front (Ting, 2009).The non-Malays were able to do so because of their economic power and sizable number (Fenton, 2003).

When Najib Razak became Prime Minister in 2009 after the UMNO-led National Front lost its two-thirds majority inthe 2008 election, he put forward his New Economic Model. He attributed that loss to the long-standing affirmative actionpolicies that are threatening the country’s economic future and called for a revision of those policies by promoting the1Malaysia concept, a more plural and inclusive approach to national economic unity and racial blindness. This concept aimedto combine both a common ingroup identity while at the same time maintaining cultural diversity. While this 1Malaysiaframework is the closest to Berry’s (2001, 2005) multiculturalism model, it has remained as mere rhetoric because thenecessary conditions for such a model are yet to be in place (such as doing away with pro-Malay policies).

These seemingly endless contestations between the ethnic groups as well as within the Malay ethnic group were preciselythe reasons Singapore opted to choose a different path. It advocated equal treatment for all and it was able to move forwardwith its pragmatic, market-driven ideologies because of its majority Chinese population, and the strong realization thateconomic survival was undoubtedly the key priority for the two million people living on an island with no natural resources(Chua, 1994; Lee, 1978). For the small and vulnerable nation to survive, the citizenry must stay united, adopt a commonethos on mutual respect and self-reliance, and embrace market-driven, pro-business economic policies (Lee, 1974; Ow,1986). It was the firm belief that a tolerant and inclusive society can be fostered without incurring the racial rhetoric seenin its northern neighbour.

Singapore manages its cultural diversity by recognizing and championing heritage maintenance within the differentethnic and religious groups even as it embraces principles of secularism and meritocracy (Benjamin, 1976; Lai, 1995). Itbelieves that a cohesive and harmonious society is predicated on having a strong cultural identity embedded in a pluralisticand non-threatening social climate, and at the same time partakes in the larger society, or what Berry claimed to be themulticultural hypothesis (Berry, 2013; Berry & Kalin, 1995; Berry et al., 1977; Chua, 2005).

Singapore’s national language policy exemplifies this emphasis on cultural continuation. The educational system requiresevery child to master two languages—the first in English and a second, native language used by the community that he/shebelongs, otherwise known as the ‘mother tongue’ (Gopithan, 1991; Lee, 2008). The native language carries with it the valuesassociated to one’s racial identity and this facilitates the retention of the ethnic heritage (Lee K.Y., 2000). This dual languagepolicy on one hand creates a common linguistic platform for intercultural contact (using English), and on the other, reassures

the cultural identity of each “race” (Clammer, 1985; Lee, 2008).

The bicultural language policy forms the cornerstone of Singapore’s integration policy by fostering a policy environmentthat emphasizes equality and mutual respect. It is the building block of a truly multicultural society. Beyond linguisticpolicies, Singapore’s multicultural landscape is supported by three other pillars.

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First, there is a strong emphasis on a hyphenated identity in the public discourse, e.g., Chinese-Singaporean, Malay-ingaporean (Lee, 2008). Ethnic and national identities are not regarded as mutually exclusive but complementary (Chew,987; Hill & Lian, 1995; Lee, 2008). This hyphenated label reaffirms equal status and at the same time aims to forge a common

ngroup identity everyone could relate to (Brown, 2000; Chew, 1987; Clammer, 1998). In line with the contact hypothesisAllport, 1954), equal status and recognition of ethnic heritage creates the optimal condition for meaningful intergroupontact to take place. Studies have shown that Singaporeans hold a strong sense of national pride and citizenship among theeveloped economies (Tan & Koh, 2010).

The second defining feature of multiculturalism in Singapore involves the concept of “Collective Ownership”, or self-helprganizations differentiated by racial identities. These are created to address issues that are known to be prevalent within theifferent ethnic communities. The Chinese Development Association Council, Mendaki, and Singapore Indian Developmentssociation offer socio-economic assistance to the Chinese, Malay, and Indian constituents, respectively. The State provides

unding to the various groups but the latter decide how the resources are to be spent. The distribution of resources is notiewed as a zero-sum allocation and it serves as a critical framework to meet the social security needs for the different ethnicommunities.

These institutions are managed by distinguished members of the ethnic community and they tackle ethnic-linkedocio-economic problems through job retraining, education subsidies, and career, marriage and family counselling. Mostmportantly, they address issues that are unique to each racial group in a non-threatening and empathetic manner. It reduceserceptions of intergroup bias since the respective institutions look after their own ethnic communities.

Third, there is a strong political resolve to foster multicultural participation deriving from ingenious policies tar-eted at promoting inter-racial interaction. Examples include the imposition of a strict ethnic quota in public residentialstates and the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) electoral system (Elections Department Singapore, 2012; Housingevelopment Board Singapore, 2012). The former requires the racial background of tenants in every apartment block to beroportionate to the national ethnic distribution (i.e., ratio between Chinese, Malay, and Indian) so as to safeguard againsthe formation of residential enclaves and stereotypes.

In national elections, the Constitution mandates selected electoral seats to be contested as a group constituency consistingf four to six candidates and of which at least one member must be an ethnic minority (Attorney-Chambers Singapore,012). This process ensures there is political representation for Malay and Indian Parliamentarians regardless of politicalffiliation.

Thus, both Malaysia and Singapore adopted the policies that they do to manage their multicultural society. Both countriesssentialized ethnicity and recognize that racial identity is a deeply entrenched aspect of life in this part of the world due tohe historical colonial legacy. But while Malaysia used the groups’ differences against one another (by pitting each other’sear of one another—Malay fear Chinese economic power and Chinese fear Malay’s political might), Singapore used theseifferences to manage the groups to embrace market-driven, pro-business economic policies.

.3. Policy implications on multiculturalism

Singapore’s principles of governance—enshrined in the defining hallmarks of multiculturalism (i.e., superordinate andyphenated identities, collective ownership, and multicultural participation)—have mitigated intergroup symbolic threatsommonly observed in plural societies. These social values and practices have overtime inspired confidence and acceptanceetween the racial communities (Chua, 2005; Koh, 2004). The collegial inter-ethnic landscape today is a marked improve-ent considering the acrimonious and arduous racial climate which existed for more than half of the last century (Chan,

002; Chin & Vasu, 2012; Lee, 2009). The transformation also reflects the political ideology, policies, and consequences inridging the multicultural divides (Chin & Vasu, 2012; Goh & Holden, 2009).

Chin and Vasu’s (2007, 2012) studies on ethnic relations provide a strong testament to the successful management ofacial diversity. The respondents in their surveys were asked if they would interact with someone from their own andther racial backgrounds, at both public and private levels. In particular, whether the respondent would accept a personrom another racial background as a friend, spouse, and sibling-in-law, whether he/she would voluntarily speak to a doctor,eighbour, or co-worker from a dissimilar ethnic status, and whether they would support them as a Member of Parliament,rime Minister, and President of Singapore. Respondents were also probed if they would trust a policeman or soldier fromnother racial group to defend and protect them.

Among the Chinese sample, 31% said they would marry a non-Chinese, 91% indicated they would support someone outsideheir race for political office, and well over 95% were confident that a security officer from another ethnic background willrotect them in times of need. Interestingly, Malays articulated a more inclusive perspective. Forty-six percent said theyould marry a non-Malay, 97% were comfortable with non-Malays as Parliamentarians, Prime Minister or President, andearly all of them (98%) indicated they have faith in law enforcement officers from other races.

The outcome for Indian Singaporeans was marginally better than their Chinese counterparts, though a slightly lower thanhe Malays; 35% said they would marry someone outside their race, and at least 96% have no objection to having people

rom another ethnic background taking up political leadership. Nearly all (99%) believed that non-Indian law-enforcementfficers will protect them in times of needs.

Singapore’s evolving multicultural landscape is also reflected in its inter-racial marriages. In 2010, an average of one invery five newly married couple involve a cross ethnic partner. This figure has steadily increased in the 40 years, particularly

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Table 1Percentages of inter-racial marriages.

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

% of marriages under Muslim Law 12.1% 14.8% 16.5% 24% 33.3%

% of marriages under Civil Law 3.06% 3.26% 5.73% 9.5% 17.5%

Source: Singapore Department of Statistics.

among the Malay community, where one in every three marriages is outside of the race. In Singapore, there is no legalcompulsion for the non-Muslims to convert to Islam when they marry a Muslim (see Table 1).

In all, Singapore’s commitment and respect for multicultural orientation forms the bedrock for a harmonious, stable,and prosperous city-state (Chua, 2003). It has served the country well and earned itself international admiration for itsmanagement of socio-cultural diversity. However, there are others who have argued that this is only possible so long as thegovernment ‘delivers the goods’—achieves impressive economic development and employment, effective educational andhealth provision (Nichol & Sim, 2007).

Compared to Singapore, Malaysia’s policies and their implementations have deepened the division between the ethnicgroups. Over the years, with the growing institutionalization of these policies within the state, non-Malay resentment againstMalays has intensified. They feel marginalized by these policies that keep on being continued, resulting in a sense of injusticeand collective resentment among them towards the Malay ethnic group.

Drawing on Stephan and colleagues’ intergroup threat theory (Stephan & Mealy, 2012; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan,Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2009), intergroup threats—realistic or symbolic—contribute to conflict and violence by influencingperceptions, emotions, and behaviours of the group members. In this case, both Malays and Chinese feel threatened by eachother, not only by realistic threats (i.e., economic) but also symbolic ones (i.e., socio-cultural). For the Chinese, the monopolyof the public and government sectors, the set ownership target (30%) for Malay participation in the economic sector, and thepreferential policies in higher education are examples of realistic competition, whilst symbolic threats include the mandatoryMalay National Language Act that requires all schools to use Malay as the primary medium of instruction. In addition, theculture and religion of the Malays are given prominence over other cultures and religions.

In contrast, for Malays while the main threat is realistic threat—the dominance of the Chinese in the economic sector andtheir success in education—increasingly symbolic threat is gaining prominence. As argued by Muzaffar (2002), each group isdetermined to retain its cultural and religious identities. Malays fear that “. . .if they opened up too much to the non-Malay,non-Muslim communities, especially in matters pertaining to Islam—its most potent identity symbol—‘the others’ wouldgain control over their land, given their perceived economic superiority” (p. 5). Malays have always regarded Malaya as theirhome, that they were the “original” people, while at the same time perceiving non-Malays as immigrant. The fear exemplifiesthe anxiety over their economic security and it is assumed that by having a right to the land, via political control, the threatcould be counterbalanced.

Non-Malays, on the other hand, “. . .are afraid that if they do not protect their identity, expressed through language morethan religion, the Malay majority, which enjoys political pre-eminence, will emasculate them totally” (Muzaffar, 2002, p.5). Compared to the Malays, the angst is largely symbolic threats. This analysis may be correct to some extent becausethe affirmative action policies have, in general, decreased the economic disparity between the groups. And, this is currentlyhappening, as indicated by several recent inter-religious clashes. The pressure towards greater Islamization and assimilationby the state is perceived by many non-Malay to curtail their religious liberties. These include the propagation of Islamic valueswithin state institutions and schools (Ting, 2009), and upholding the decisions of Islamic religious courts in sensitive issuessuch as when one spouse in an existing marriage converts to Islam and makes the other members of the family subject toIslamic law on matters such as child custody (Heim, 2004).

Though these policies were meant to promote and strengthen interethnic relations between the groups, they have notresulted in bringing the groups closer together, though some would argue otherwise. While the 1Malaysia’s framework of“Unity in diversity and inclusiveness” seemed to advocate Berry’s multiculturalism model, so far, the results have not beenencouraging. In fact, both Malays and non-Malays view the 1Malaysia concept with wariness; the Malay right-wing group,Perkasa, sees the concept as undermining Malay rights while non-Malays view it as another ploy by the state to win theirvotes, not as a genuine effort to unite the ethnic groups in Malaysia (Merdeka Center Survey, 2010). Caught between thegroups, the state hesitated from making drastic reforms to affirmative action policies. Interestingly, when the groups werequeried on their understanding of the concept, 64% of Chinese think 1Malaysia should be about treating all races as equalcitizens compared to only 39% Malays. Though 1Malaysia outlines several areas to be tackled to achieve its aims, changewould not be forthcoming based on mere enunciations by the governing elites because practices favouring Malays havebecome entrenched within state institutions (Lee, 2011; Ting, 2009). Institutional reforms are what would be required butbecause of the political costs that these would incur, even the current Prime Minister Najib is backing away from his initial1Malaysia recommendations.

Another Merdeka survey on perception towards ethnic relations among 1013 registered voters (using random stratifiedsampling by state, ethnic group, gender and age) showed that 64% of Malays identify with religion first, compared to 11%Indians and 6% Chinese (Merdeka Center Survey, 2011a). On the other hand, 71% of Indians identified as Malaysians firstfollowed by 55% Chinese and 26% Malays. In contrast, a study on inter-ethnic relations using a student sample (Verkuyten &

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20 N.M. Noor, C.-H. Leong / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 714– 726

han, 2012), found that members of all three ethnic groups already endorsed a strong feeling of being one national commu-ity, providing some support for the 1Malaysia concept. Members of all three ethnic groups did not consider national andthnic identifications as incompatible. For Malays and Indians, national identification was stronger than ethnic identificationnd for Chinese the two group identifications were equally positive. While all groups had some sense of national identity,alays, due to their more politically dominant position showed higher national and ethnic identification, saw their own

roup as more indispensable for the national category, more strongly endorsed an inclusive national representation, andad higher in-group bias, consistent with past studies (Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002; Noor, 2007). These results,evertheless, may be different if religious identity is considered; as shown by the Merdeka survey where Malays tend to

dentify more with religious than national identity. It would be interesting to include these three different identities in futureesearch and see the groups’ endorsement.

Comparing the 2011 Merdeka survey findings with the one conducted in 2006, results on perceptions of ethnic relationsre not encouraging. The survey showed a 12% points decline from 2006 to 2011 in respondents who reported that ethnicelations are getting better. Only one in three think ethnic unity is sincere and friendly, down by a 19% point from 2006, with

higher percentage reporting it to be superficial (44% from the previous 29% in 2006). In addition, the results indicated aecrease in the percentage reporting “that they are happy to live in a multi-ethnic society,” “Malaysian society was maturenough to discuss race and religious issues openly,” and “that government policies were improving ethnic integration.” Thisast point is particularly revealing because it stands to indicate that 1Malaysia may not really be getting the results it desires.lmost all respondents (96%) mentioned that inter-ethnic interaction remains an important factor in Malaysian life.

On a positive note, however, the younger generation living in urban areas are more likely to report having friends fromther races (Merdeka Center Survey, 2011b). This intergroup friendship normally occurs within the school or workplaceettings. While there is increasing evidence that shows individual members of the Malay or Chinese groups have friendsrom the other group, somehow these friendships have not progressed to the group level. For example, Mohd Noor (1999)escribes five studies with Chinese and Malay participants by asking them to respond to a number of hypothetical situations

n which a Malay or Chinese must decide whether to interact with someone of the same or different ethnicity. His resultsuggest that while individual Malaysians welcome friendly relations with those from the other groups, at the group levelistrust is still common. The results were obtained by comparing Malay and Chinese responses to hypothetical individualersonal interactions (where they must decide whether to interact with someone of the same or different ethnicity whoffer a better outcome) to their actual pattern of interethnic contact at the group level (where results showed that about0% of Malay and Chinese had frequent interethnic contact at the workplace, 22% in their residential area and 5% at thehopping place). Therefore, increasing contact at the interpersonal level may not necessarily reduce distrust, anxiety orrejudice at the group level as proposed by intergroup contact theory, because relationships among the groups are still notqual.

Noor’s (2007) study on polarization and inequality between Malay and Chinese students found both groups to showngroup bias but the Chinese to be more tolerant and accepting of the Malays than vice versa. The author explained thendings in terms of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) where ingroup favouritism is to be expected as well as theontext of the country where Chinese favour the outgroup because they see themselves as a threatened group and given theolitical climate, may feel that it is in their best interest to be politically correct.

.4. Emerging issues

.4.1. Intra-ethnic differencesThough interethnic conflict is perceived as central to Malaysian politics, in recent years intra-Malay politics is increasingly

ecoming to be just as important, triggered by the weaknesses of the political system, with its “money politics”, cronyism,epotism and corruption. In fact, a portion within the Malay group has become very politically powerful and economicallyell-off at the expense of the masses, turning many Malay middle-class professionals and grassroots to Islam as a solution

o these imperfections and injustices (Martinez, 2001). This is creating a rift between Malay support for UMNO and thepposition (PAS—an Islamic party, and PKR—People’s Justice Party). The Opposition Party (also made up of several parties)re brought together by their concerns for social justice, eradication of poverty and gross inequalities, and the restraintsn political debate. Their agenda is in line with a recent survey (Merdeka Center Survey, 2011b) that shows the majorityf voters, 38%, indicated that the most important issue that needs to be solved in the country is economic-related (like theising cost of living, low wages and high unemployment, and poverty), rather than politics and race-related issues whichas endorsed by only 9% of voters. This finding is reinforced by an earlier survey carried out by the Merdeka Center Survey

2010) that found 72% of youth aged between 19 and 24 years are more concerned with real issues that affect them suchs quality education, employment and the increasing intra-ethnic income disparity, rather than interethnic differences orefending “Malay rights.”

A survey carried at the end of last year (Merdeka Center Survey, 2012) again reinforces the finding that economic concernsnd crime/social problems are of higher priority than racial issues. Fig. 2b shows a time series data on people’s main concerns

rom 2009 to 2012.

The Merdeka Center Survey (2010) indicated that even among Malays, they are divided as to whether affirmative actionrogrammes have benefited them and whether these should be continued. While 40% of Malays said that all Malaysianshould receive equal treatment regardless of ethnicity or religion, 45% indicated that the policies only benefited the rich and

N.M. Noor, C.-H. Leong / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 714– 726 721

Fig. 2. Issues of concern, 2009–2012.Merdeka Survey (2012).

politically connected. The results of the 2008 general election also highlighted many cases of younger voters voting for crossethnic candidates (Syed Husin Ali, 2008).

In Singapore, George (2000) argues that the development of citizens’ appreciation of cultural diversity is top-down. Whilebefore Singaporeans were assured that public schools and HDB estates would provide opportunities for mixing and thuspromote multiculturalism, many are now getting more affluent with a greater number of resident households living in gatedcommunities (16.9% in 2010 and 11.4% in 2000; Source: Department of Statistics). Singapore’s social fabric has come undertremendous pressure over the last 10 years as the level of income has widened (see Fig. 3). With a Gini coefficient of 0.465(2010), the city-state has one of the highest income disparities in the world. There is a concern that the affluent segment willnot have adequate contact with the less privileged communities and consequently, there is a danger that social cohesionwill be eroded if the successful elites could not empathise with their less fortunate fellow countrymen.

The impact of a widening income gap is evident across all races but Malays are seemingly more affected. According to the

2010 population census, the national median household income was reported as S$5000/month. The median incomes forChinese, Malay, and Indian households per month were S$5100, S$3844, and S$5370, respectively. The average real annualincome growth rate for the past decade was said to be 1.1%, 1.9%, and 2.9%, respectively. Thus, the issue of intra-groupdifference is also observed in Singapore, though it is not as salient as in Malaysia.

Fig. 3. Singapore’s Gini coefficient among employed households, 2000–2010.Source: Department of Statistics.

722 N.M. Noor, C.-H. Leong / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 714– 726

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.4.2. The immigration quagmireSingapore has always maintained a liberal open-door policy for immigrants and sojourners long before it became a

overeign state. From the 1960s to the late 1990s, there was a steady though sustainable influx of foreigners, including newermanent residents and citizens, averaging 30,000 new permanent residents a year (see Fig. 4). Since the turn of the lastentury, the rate of inbound migration accelerated exponentially. Within a 10-year period between 2000 and 2010, the totalumber of permanent residents and migrant labour, or non-residents, had doubled.

The influx of immigrants and migrant labour is underpinned by several social and economic imperatives. Firstly, it is means to complement the domestic workforce and to augment Singapore’s economic competitiveness. Immigrants areeeded in professions that require specialized skills which Singaporeans lack, or to fill in jobs that Singaporeans shun.econdly, due to the anaemic birth rate and the rapid ageing demography, the city-state needs to replenish its residentopulation to stem the decline in old-age support ratio. Without immigration, it is estimated that by 2030, there would beewer than three working-age adults available to support one Singaporean who is aged 65 or older; there will be severeconomic (e.g., higher taxes to fund social expenditure) and social repercussions if the problem is not resolved before thesunami of aged citizens takes its toll (Saw, 2007).

Similar to Singapore, Malaysia has been, and continues to be, a major destination country for immigrants, notably since the970s, when the industrialization programmes accompanying the NEP again made Malaysia dependent on migrant labouro work in the labour-intensive manufacturing production, land settlement schemes, construction, and in the running ofouseholds (Huling, 2012; Kaur, 2008). By the 90s, it was the biggest labour-importing country in Southeast Asia. Accordingo Huguet (2008), Malaysia is home to 2–3 million documented and 1–2 million undocumented immigrants (labelled asillegal immigrants” or “aliens”). Malaysia is attractive to these immigrants because of its high employment rate, low birthate, ageing population, and apathy among the locals to do jobs categorized as 3D (Dirty, Difficult and Dangerous). In 2010,he majority of these migrant workers are from Indonesia (50.9%) followed by Bangladesh (17.2%, cited in Ahmad, 2012).

As in Singapore, the Malaysian government differentiates between two categories of migrant workers—skilled profes-ional and technical and semi-skilled or unskilled. The former group is small, regulated and usually without much problems.t is the latter group that poses socio-economic threat to the host. They make up the majority of immigrant workers inhe country, and among them is a large pool of undocumented workers who either enter the country in an unauthorized

anner or turn into “illegal” workers due to a number of reasons (see Jones, 1996). Compared to Singapore, the Malaysianovernment is not fully in control of the inflow of these workers as indicated by the large number of undocumented migrantorkers. Policies have been perceived to be ad-hoc (Piper & Iredale, 2003), but since the 1970s, there has been more regula-

ion, especially after the 1997 economic crisis (Kaur, 2008). That crisis resulted in more illegal workers being in the countryespite reduced legal inflows because of deteriorating economic conditions in the workers’ home countries. The huge num-er of illegal workers can also be attributed to the government’s attitude—in the past they were needed to fill the 3D jobsnd the state’s apathy has encouraged their numbers to multiply (Abubakar, 2002).

.4.3. Imperatives and repercussionsFrom Singapore’s pro-business standpoint, the open door policies make perfect sense. It is a pragmatic solution to both

he economic needs and the low fertility rate. Within policymaking circle it was further assumed that Singaporeans shouldave little difficulty accepting in-bound migrants as Singapore and Singaporeans are after all, an immigrant society with aich and diverse, multicultural background (The Straits Times, August 23, 2006).

But this assumption has not been supported. The sizeable increase in immigrants and non-residents has triggered intenseebates over a broad range of issues pertinent to immigration, integration, and the meaning of citizenship. The groundswellf resentment can be heard from a wide spectrum of sources, including research surveys, media reports, and online forums.he resentment against immigrants and migrant labour incur both economic and symbolic threats—the relentless influx hasesulted in more intense resource competition and the cultural encroachment to social norms and values.

On the economic front, many Singaporeans feel that their job security has been compromised and they now have toompete harder with immigrants. The competition for resources is not confined to employment alone; foreigners are viewed

s the root cause of escalating housing prices and congestion in public infrastructure. Parents with school-going childreneel displaced by the scholarships awarded to international students.

On the symbolic end, the significant presence of foreigners is seen to have affected social cohesion and devalued the statusf citizenship. Although the majority of new immigrants and migrant workers are of ethnic Chinese and Indian origins, their

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cultural values and behaviours are dissimilar to the ones practiced by the local Chinese or Indian communities. Moreover,some are not familiar with the multiracial make-up of Singapore’s society and are not cognizant of the cultural taboos inthe multicultural environment. The lack of English language proficiency is a major impediment for interaction betweenimmigrants from non-English speaking background, e.g. from China, and native Singaporeans who are well-versed in thelanguage.

For many Singaporeans, their antagonism reflects a deeper sense of insecurity, and the enduring perception that thegovernment favours immigrants over native-born for political gains (Lai, 2012). In recent years, increasing number of Singa-poreans have called for a tighter regulation on the immigration number and a more inward looking, exclusionary approachto managing cultural diversity from immigration (The Straits Times, June 2, 2012). This is a stark contrast to the collegialinter-racial climate that Singapore is known for. Drawing from the multicultural hypothesis (Berry & Kalin, 1995), it appearsthere are two distinct dimensions of intercultural confidence in Singapore, one between the established “races” which isrelatively firm and unwavering, and the other, between immigrant and native communities which has shown to be fragileand unstable. In essence, multiculturalism as a racial discourse has given way to one rooted in nationality. Globalization,the uncertain economic outlook, and the diluting of the Singapore identity have all but overshadowed racial identity asthe stumbling block in intercultural confidence. The fluidity of multiculturalism is a theoretical facet that deserves moreattention in empirical research.

Similarly in Malaysia, where prior to the 1997 economic crisis, locals’ perceptions towards immigrant labour were gener-ally favourable with the majority of respondents (80%) indicating that they were not bothered by their presence because ofthe country’s labour shortage (Zehadul Karim, Abdullah, & Mohd, 1999). However, after the economic crisis, locals increas-ingly became more hostile towards these workers due mostly to economic insecurity (competing for scarce jobs), more sowhen these immigrants started to penetrate into other economic sectors like petty-traders or taxi drivers due to a slowdownin their designated economic sectors. These activities bring them into direct competition with the low-income locals lead-ing to negative perceptions and hostility against immigrants as locals feel that they have to strive harder to survive. Thus,in addition to the existing divide between the ethnic groups, these low-skilled (including illegal) immigrants have addedanother dimension to the picture—the question of citizenship including legal status, rights, participation, and belonging. Atthe moment, they are basically excluded by the locals.

There are, however, differences between Singapore and Malaysia on the issue of immigration. First, being a small city-state, Singapore has better regularization policies on the inflow and outflow of immigrant compared to Malaysia with itsextensive and porous borders. Second, the Singapore government takes proactive steps to improve multicultural relationsbetween the native-born and the naturalized residents compared to Malaysia that has been repeatedly criticized for abusingmigrant labour (see for example, Huling, 2012). Third, the impact of immigration has affected Singapore more than Malaysiaas the effect was more pronounced in the small city-state.

1.5. Management of cultural diversity in Malaysia and Singapore: a work-in-progress

In this paper, we have delineated how two countries have dealt with the perennial issue of managing their culturaldiversity. Cultural plurality in Malaysia and Singapore is not a matter of choice; both countries are bounded by a com-mon historical past and the legacy of the British colonial masters. “Demographic multiculturalism” therefore, reflects onlya superficial facet of the landscape. Public policies and social attitudes play a much crucial role in defining and shapingthe state of multiculturalism. Though Malaysia and Singapore have a similar eclectic mix of ethnic or racial groups, themanagement of cultural diversity in each country reflects the core issues that matter to each, despite having a shared past.The policies that Malaysia has taken are related to ethnic politics based on ethnic identity, which is intimately entwinedwith a politics of difference (e.g., Yuval-Davis, 1997). In positioning ethnicity within such a framework, the state-imposedethnic labelling of Malay, Chinese, and Indian, and the political categories of native and non-native carries with it dif-ferent forms of political, economic, and social powers. Intergroup relations are mooted in a zero-sum belief where finiteresources are distributed in way that will favour the dominant Malay at the expense of the non-dominant ethnic com-munities. There are special privileges available through affirmative action programmes for the indigenous native groupand there is a symbiotic relationship between the ethnic collectives of Malays and Chinese within the political and eco-nomic spheres. In addition, the Malay ethnic identity has always been tied with Islam, which brings in another angleto the politics of ethnic identity based on power differences. In analysing the acculturation models of Malaysia, theyare basically based on ethnic differences and are in reality, not much different from the “divide and rule” policies ofthe British—the elites of the main ethnic parties control the politics of differences based on ethnicity to maintain theirposition.

Singapore was equally ethnically divided at independence. But because former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argued forequal treatment for all races when in Malaysia (Chang, 1968), its model of multiculturalism was designed with a multiracialideology in mind. Here, individuals are recognized to have only one racial identity (Chinese, Malay, Indian or Others) that

depends on the state to both protect and preserve their differences. Implicitly the city-state subscribes to the conceptof Multicultural Hypothesis, as it believes that socio-economic security is a necessity prerequisite in forging inter-racialconfidence regardless of group status. In contrast to the Malaysian model, social policies are not formulated with a zero-sumbelief or with the intention to suppress the development of other ethnic communities. Each group is also essentialized, with

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24 N.M. Noor, C.-H. Leong / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 37 (2013) 714– 726

ach associated with “unique” cultural traits—language, religion, way of life—as differences to be preserved to maintainnter-group harmony.

As argued by Vasu (2012), this form of governance is dependent on these racial differences being entrenched, with thetate elite responsible for ensuring that inter-group relationships are harmonious. Using this foundation, Singapore promoted

structured form of multiculturalism but emphasises self-reliance, justice and equality to produce an inclusive, superor-inate Singaporean identity. This form of governance has enabled multicultural ties to flourish but the relentless influx of

mmigrants and migrant workers in recent years has threatened social cohesion in the city-state. Perceived resource com-etition and cultural encroachment from the non-native have redrawn intergroup boundaries. In Singapore, the discourseurrounding cultural diversity is no longer centred in the realm of racial identity but as a component of immigration—howhe influx of immigrants changes the cultural fabric of the nation.

Thus, the understanding of multiculturalism in Malaysia and Singapore is somewhat different. As the foregoing analysisas demonstrated, ethnicity will remain to be part and parcel of Malaysian political discourse. In this case, what would behe most viable way of managing cultural diversity in Malaysia? “Multiculturalism,” as generally understood where equalegard is granted to the many cultures extended into politics and the constitution, would be difficult for two main reasons;he perception of symbolic threats among the Malays, and the erosion of the competitive economic advantage among non-

alays, i.e., realistic threat. Therefore, the feasible option is to continue with the series of compromises and accommodationshat have been the hallmark of Malaysian politics since independence.

Multicultural policies work in Singapore partly because the dominant race already enjoy an advantage, but the valueshat underpin acceptance of diversity has eroded as people feel threatened, in Singapore’s case, because of immigration. Theapid influx of immigrants and the widening income gap has called for a new social compact that places greater emphasis onostering social cohesion than the pursuit of economic growth. The public discourse on the foreign-local schism has redefinedhe meaning of multiculturalism and there are signs that a culturally conscious, inward-looking and assertive Republic ismerging, one that makes a strong distinction on native versus non-native status. Singapore’s past success formula in theanagement of ethnic diversity will be tested yet again in the context of immigrant acculturation.

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