Soft Power in the EU Enlargement Strategy

8th Semester Project 2011

Soft Power in the EU Enlargement Strategy A liberalist analysis of the speech 99/130 on Enlargement, ISPA and SAPARD

Jesper Blaabjerg Holm, Julie Hvilshj Ovadja and Kristina Presis

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1

1. 2 Background ............................................................................................................................................. 2

2. Methodology ................................................................................................................................................. 4

2. 1 Problem Formulation .............................................................................................................................. 4

2. 2 Empirical Data ......................................................................................................................................... 4

2. 3 Theory ..................................................................................................................................................... 6

2. 4 Approach ................................................................................................................................................ 6

2. 5 Delimitation ............................................................................................................................................ 7

2. 6 Definition ................................................................................................................................................ 8

2. 6. 1 Soft Power ...................................................................................................................................... 8

3. Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................................................. 9

3. 1 Liberalism ................................................................................................................................................ 9

3. 2 The EU as a unitary actor ...................................................................................................................... 10

3. 3 Soft power and the EU .......................................................................................................................... 11

3. 4 Soft Power: A (Neo)liberal Perspective ................................................................................................ 15

3. 5 Operationalisation of soft power ......................................................................................................... 17

4. Historical Background .................................................................................................................................. 21

5. Empirical Data .............................................................................................................................................. 23

5. 1 Speech/99/130 on Enlargement ........................................................................................................... 23

5. 2 ISPA ....................................................................................................................................................... 25

5. 3 SAPARD ................................................................................................................................................. 28

6. Analytical part .............................................................................................................................................. 31

6. 1 Analysis of Speech/99/130 on Enlargement ........................................................................................ 31

6. 2 Analysis of ISPA ..................................................................................................................................... 33

6. 3 Analysis of SAPARD ............................................................................................................................... 34

7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 37

8. Proposal for Further Research ..................................................................................................................... 40

9. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................. 42

Soft Power in the EU Enlargement Strategy

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1. Introduction

In the contemporary world order, some scholars argue that the nature of power is changing

(Heywood, 2007). The argument, which generally is associated with the liberal, but also the

constructivist, school of thought (Gallarotti, 2011), circles around the assumption that in

international politics of today soft power is increasingly becoming as important as hard power

(Heywood, 2007), if not more important (Gallarotti, 2011): Military power, the traditional

currency of world politics, has certainly not become irrelevant, but its use is greatly

undermined when it is not matched by hearts and minds strategies (Heywood, 2007, 142).

Liberalist scholars argue that this change derives from various factors, such as economic

interdependence, the process of globalisation (which further strengthens the economic links

between states) , the obsolescence of war due to the deterrent character of nuclear weapons,

the spread of democracies and finally the growth of cooperative networks between states (e.g.

international organisations and regimes) (Gallarotti, 2011).

The European Union (EU), in this context, has a great potential for obtaining a vast influence

on the global stage. Without resting on hard power, it has already managed to deepen and

expand itself from the Atlantic Ocean up to the borders with Russia (Moravscik, 2010).

Moreover, it has created a positive image and gained credibility abroad in comparison to other

states (Krastev & Leonard, 2007). In fact the creation and continuing expansion of the EU is

considered to be the most successful peace project in the world history (Tuomioja, 2009).

In addition to this, according to Andrew Moravscik (2010), professor of Political Science at

Princeton University, the success of the EU enlargement has been due to the soft power

strategy exercised by the EU (Moravscik, 2010). Since the first enlargement of the EU in 1973

where Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the original members of the European

Coal and Steel Community, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands,

the EU has been in a constant process of enlargement. This process has for a large part been

following political changes on the European continent, such as the fall of the totalitarian

regimes in Portugal and Spain that around a decade later led the way for those two countries

to join the EU or the reunification of Germany that welcomed East Germany into the EU in

1990. Eventually the end of the Cold War and the fall the Iron Curtain also opened up for

accession for some of the former East Bloc countries to enter the European Union in 2004 and

2007 (European Commission, 2009a).

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Therefore, because of the importance of soft power in the world today and the fact that the EU

enlargement has played such an important role in the history of the EU while at the same time

being considered one of the greatest achievements obtained with the use of soft power

(Moravscik, 2010), it is relevant to study the enlargement strategy more in detail. This paper

seeks to find out how soft power is applied in the strategy and if soft power is focused more on

structural changes in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) or if the measures

in the strategy are meant to influence the view on the EU in the eyes of the public in these

countries. It is interesting because it may have a broader validity that can be applied in other

contexts as well.

1. 2 Background

With the collapse of Communism in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, the thought of a wider

integration of the CEECs into the EU became realistic (Glenn, 2001). Nevertheless, scholars

argue that the gap1 between the EU and the applicant countries from Central and Eastern

Europe had never, in comparison to previous enlargements, been so wide (2001). The process

of enlargement was therefore not only about preparing the new economies to enter the

European markets, but also about narrowing this gap. Scholars, such as Moravscik (2010),

argue that soft power plays a large role in projecting regional influence (Moravscik, 2010,

159) in response to the security threat that many scholars in the period after the end of the

cold war thought would be brought about with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mearsheimer,

1990).

The enlargement process which integrated the CEECs into the EU began in 1989 with the

launch of PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies)

(European Commission, 2010a) and culminated with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. In the

addition to the extension of PHARE to all of the countries applying for membership, the EU also

created a number of policies and regulations. These included the Copenhagen Criteria, a

number of standards that had to be fulfilled by the applicant countries prior to membership, a

National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) individually constructed for each

applicant country, and the two pre-accession instruments in addition to PHARE, the Special

Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) and the Instrument for

1 Glenn (2001) argues that the gap between the CEECs and the EU was wider than it had been in the case of previous

enlargements. Glenn (2001) links this to the ideological division between East and West that ruled the bipolar world

order during the Cold War. This division can be understood to include political, economic, cultural and social

dimensions.

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Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), both created in 1999 (European Commission,

2010a).

By linking the growing importance of soft power in international relations and the EU

enlargement being the most suitable example of expansion through measures of soft power,

this project proposes following problem formulation:

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2. Methodology

2. 1 Problem Formulation

From a liberalist perspective, based on the 1999 EU pre-accession tools, SAPARD and ISPA,

and a public statement of the European Commission from the same year, this project aims to

analyse to what extent soft power was part of the EUs enlargement strategy and if soft power

was mainly focused on reform of the political and/or economic structure and/or public opinion

in the CEECs.

In order to address the problem formulation, one must attempt to answer the following core

questions:

- What is soft power and how is it operationalised in the project?

- What is liberalism in IR theory?

- Can the EU be seen as soft power and if so, in what ways?

- What are the most determinant policies in the EU enlargement strategy and does soft

power have a place in them?

These questions will be dealt with in the project.

2. 2 Empirical Data

This study hopes to contribute and stimulate further interest and research in the changing

nature of power and the growing importance of soft power in the current world order. Despite

the fact that the project is only focusing on one world region and a specific time framework,

we believe that it has broader implications and can be applied to other regions as well. It

assumes so by coming from the current debate in international relations on the changing

nature and sources of state power. One of the driving forces behind this project was to find

validation for the argument that in the contemporary world international prestige and

diplomacy often play an important role, and are in some cases perhaps even more significant

than economic power and extensive military might.

The study of soft power and the measures through which they are applied give an insight to

both small and big nations how to successfully conduct foreign relations and diplomacy with

their counterparts. Thus, the research of what has been called the most successful project of

an expansion ever realised in the world history through soft power measures (Tuomioja,

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2009), will present the best example for ways through which other states can be able to

further national interests and goals more effectively.

The methodology of this project is based on a qualitative analysis as a quantitative analysis

cannot be applied due to the non-material nature of soft power. Therefore this study is going

to be founded on the ideas and observations grounded in theory rather than on the

examination of hard scientific data.

The conduct of the research is based on the use of primary sources, such as official

publications and government documents. This is mainly due to the fact that the empirical data

that we are using is very specific and it has not been widely discussed among the scholars.

There is furthermore awareness that relying on primary sources helps us as researchers to

avoid the pitfall of relying on information that could be biased, misinterpreted or falsely cited

by others. For the basis of the empirical data the two official EU policies, ISPA and SAPARD,

are chosen. They put forward the pre-accession strategy of the EU towards the CEECs in the

areas of agriculture and transport and environment. Furthermore, a publication of a speech on

enlargement from October 1999 by the former President of the European Commission,

Romano Prodi, is also included. The public statement presents the vision of enlargement

strategy as well as the perception of the EU towards the CEECs in the enlargement process.

The sources which are used for the analysis are all official and acquired from the web-site of

the European Commission. The descriptive overview of ISPA, SAPARD and the speech will be

the basis for the analysis and will therefore be used to observe to what extent and how soft

power was present in the pre-accession strategy towards the CEECs.

The speech by Prodi has been chosen because it presents an overview of the enlargement

strategy as a whole from the perspective of the EU.

The reason for choosing SAPARD and ISPA as the empirical background for the analysis is that

they can be considered such an integral part of the EU enlargement strategy.

SAPARD plays a particularly important role in the enlargement process as it covers one of the

most sensitive sectors of the economy of the CEECs - agriculture. Agricultural share of Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) was roughly twice that of existing EU members and trade in

agricultural goods had a larger share in their total trade (World Bank, 1999, 128). Therefore it

is assumed that SAPARD aimed to contribute significantly in the reconstruction of the CEECs.

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ISPA, in turn, aims at facilitating the implementation of the acquis communautaire in the fields

of transport and environment which are also important areas in the EU. Especially environment

is considered to be a central issue that for instance was reflected in the negotiation proposal

presented by the EU at the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP15). The EU

was committed to reduce CO2 emissions by thirty per cent if other developed nations would be

committed to cut comparable parts (European Commission, 2009b). Considering the

importance of the environment on the EU agenda, ISPA can therefore also be considered a

central part of the pre-accession strategy.

Altogether, SAPARD, ISPA and the speech present an overview of the enlargement strategy

and they are therefore considered important for the analysis.

2. 3 Theory

This project will be done from a liberalist school of international relations (IR) point of view.

This is done mainly because of the view of soft power in liberalism. From a liberal perspective

the importance of soft power in international affairs has been growing since the Cold War

(Moravscik, 2010, 156). Liberalists argue that with the end of the Cold War the rise of

democratic regimes, deepening economic interdependence, spreading of the social democratic

idea and a reduction of interstate war have reduced the level of conflict between the great

powers of the world (Moravscik, 2010, 156). Liberalism presupposes that if a state wants to be

a great power in a world that has been changed in the direction of modern democracy, then

soft power is fundamental. It is, furthermore, believed that influence in the current world order

cannot be obtained through a traditional hard power approach (Moravscik, 2010, 156). This

idea that the importance of soft power had increased corresponds with the idea that the EU

has actively been using soft power tactics in its strategies towards the CEECs.

Because of the importance of soft power in liberalism the idea of soft power in this project will

also be derived from the liberalist school of thought, relying mainly, but not exclusively, on the

work by scholars, such as Andrew Moravscik, Andrew Heywood and Joseph Nye. On the basis

of the works of these scholars this project presents its own operationalisation of the term soft

power in order to make it possible to search for soft power and the variants of soft power that

has been part of the enlargement strategy of the EU.

2. 4 Approach

In order to meet the objectives set forth by the problem formulation, the project will start with

an introduction to the IR theory of liberalism with a special emphasis on soft power. Then it

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continues with a description of how liberalists see the use of soft power in connection with the

EU. The idea is to give a theoretical standpoint for further analysis in the paper as well as an

introduction to the presentation of the different definitions of soft power that lay the ground for

our operationalisation of the term.

Thereafter we will be giving a thorough description of two significant parts of the EU pre-

accession strategy; SAPARD and ISPA and the related statements of the Commission, given in

October 1999 speech on enlargement by the President of the Commission at the time, Romano

Prodi. This is done in order to afterwards be able to analyse these on the basis of our

operationalisation of soft power.

Finally, on the basis of the analysis we will seek to find out to what extent the EU focused its

strategy of soft power to affect and reform the political and economic structure and public

opinion in the CEECs by deriving in what form soft power has had the most emphasis in the

pre-accession strategy. By doing so it should be possible to answer if there is more focus on

changing public opinion, if it is more a matter of structural changes or if these weight equally.

2. 5 Delimitation

In this project it has been necessary to make some delimitations which means that there are

aspects of the problem that are not touched upon. First of all, it leaves out the concept of hard

power that could also play a role in the pre-accession strategies. This can be justified by the

theoretic approach applied in this project, liberalism, which does not define hard power as an

overly important factor in IR.

Nor the actual implementation of the enlargement strategy is used. It is recognised that the

implementation of the strategies might not fully comply with the intended strategy but since

the focus is directed to how the EU originally intended to use soft power, a further assessment

of the implementation process is not presented.

Furthermore, we do not look at the utilisation of soft power in the enlargement strategy from

before or after 1999. This is done firstly because we find that 1999 is a crucial year as SAPARD

and ISPA added a new focus to the enlargement strategy. Secondly, we believe that analysing

these two important strategies as well as the speech made by the Commission will be able to

give us a good overview on how the EU focused its attempt to use of soft power in the

enlargement strategy.

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2. 6 Definition

2. 6. 1 Soft Power

In the literature there are different characterisations of what soft power is, among them are;

soft power the preference of non-military instruments, civilian power a power that is aimed

rather that expanding its interests aimed at changing the international environment, a

normative power - that is a model of terms and values for others, a transformative power a

power that is aimed at exporting its own economic, political or social model and a tranquil

power that is averse to power projection (Biscop, 2007, 10). In this project the definition of

soft power embraces all the above-mentioned variations.

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3. Theoretical Framework

3. 1 Liberalism

Since the renaissance international relations theory has been dominated by realism. Realism is

though not without critics. From the classical liberal tradition, there has in the past two

centuries sounded criticism from scholars, such as Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Richard

Cobden, Woodrow Wilson, Norman Angell, Joseph Schumpeter and John Maynard Keynes.

Classical liberal thought has found its way into different liberal schools of international relations

theory, such as republican liberalism, pluralist liberalism, commercial liberalism, regulatory

liberalism, etc. Even though these are all liberal based they are often treated as different

hypotheses or separate criticisms of realism (Moravscik, 1992, 1).

According to Moravscik liberalism can be expressed in three core assumptions; the essential

social actors and their motivations, the relationship between state and civil society and the

circumstances under which the state develops its strategies and makes choices in the

international system (Moravscik, 1992, 6).

The first assumption of liberalism is that the most important political actors are members of

the domestic society, which refers to individuals and privately-constituted groups seeking to

promote independent interests in the political system. This is because the Liberalists have the

conception that society is pluralistic. According to the liberalists, society is comprised of

individuals with different identities and interests and they seek, through the formation of

groups, organisations and arrangements, to further their political and social goals. This means

that the interest of the state is the aggregated result of the individuals that make up society

(Moravscik, 1992, 6-7).

The second assumption is that all governments represent some segment of the domestic

society, whose interests are reflected in state policy. According to liberalists, not all

governments represent the entire population. The relative size of the represented population is

determined by the type of governmental system. The extreme types of governmental systems

in relation to the representation of the interests of the population are pure tyranny that

represents the interests of one person and pure or direct democracy which represents the

interests of all citizens (Moravscik, 1992, 9).

The third assumption is that the behaviour of the states reflects the nature and configuration

of state preferences and thereby the levels of international conflict and cooperation. Liberalism

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is based on the assumption that state actions are determined by the demanded outcome. In

order to understand what might seem obvious it is necessary to know the opposite point of

view posed by the realists. The realists believe that power politics can prevent states from

achieving the real intentions of the state. In other words, according to the realists, state

behaviour is determined by what the state can get and not necessarily what it wants

(Moravscik 1992, 10).

3. 2 The EU as a unitary actor

The EU is sometimes considered a non-unified international institution and it is then argued

that the EU must be a unified actor to become or remain a superpower. This can only be

achieved if the EU expands the use of majority voting, elects a centralised spokesperson,

establishes a common military force and defence policy, etc.. This argument is, however, not

accepted by scholars, such as Moravscik, who believes that one of the reasons why the EU is a

superpower is exactly because of its decentralised state, and that the flexibility that the EU

gains from the decentralisation is making it more efficient (Moravscik, 2010, 170).

In this project the EU enlargement pre-accession strategy is being treated as a unified strategy

for the whole of the EU. This is considered possible first of all because EU enlargement is

considered by scholars, such as Moravscik, as one of the few parts of EU policy that is highly

centralised (Moravscik, 2010, 170). Secondly the EU can be seen as one actor because this

project does not look at the decision-making process behind the enlargement strategy, but

solely analyses the finished product. Therefore, any disagreements that might have been

between the different actors in the decision-making process are not considered relevant for

this analysis. Finally, the EU enlargement pre-accession strategy is considered a unified

strategy, because of the way that EU law works. Both SAPARD and ISPA are Council

Regulations. This means that they are directly and immediately enforceable law in all member

countries simultaneously. According to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union

Article 288:

To exercise the Union's competences, the institutions shall adopt regulations,

directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.

A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly

applicable in all Member States.

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A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to

which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and

methods.

A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.

Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force (European Union, 2006).

Since a regulation is binding in its entirety for all member states, it must be assumed that the

pre-accession measures that are part of the programmes in SAPARD and ISPA are important

components of an EU-strategy that all the different actors in the EU by law have to commit to.

All the arguments mentioned above prove that there is a unity of the EU policies and actions

which provides support for the argument that the EU can be considered a unitary actor in the

case of the enlargement strategy.

3. 3 Soft power and the EU

From a liberalist point of view the EU can be considered a great power or even a super power.

This is evident in works by scholars, such as Mitchell P. Smith, Andrew Moravscik, Sven Biscop

and Joseph Nye.

Moravscik argues that the world is bipolar and will continue to be so (Moravscik, 2009). The EU

and the United States (US) are the only superpowers and the EU is a much greater power than

people usually think (Moravscik, 2009). The reason why the EU is so strong is not because of

hard power which is not so strange since the annual U.S military expenditures exceeds those

of all the EU member states combined (Smith, 2006). However, this does not mean that the

EU is insignificant when it comes to military power, because if the numbers of EU military

spending are put in another context then they actually look quite impressive: the EU accounts

for twenty-one per cent of the worlds military spending, whereas Chinas is five per cent,

Russias three per cent, Indias two per cent and Brazils one and a half per cent (Moravscik,

2010, 157). Nevertheless, even though the EU does have a strong military power and does use

military intervention, it is still considered a last resort (Biscop, 2007, 5 and 7).

However, if it is not the reliance on hard power that shapes the assumption that the EU is a

powerful actor in international politics, then what is it? According to the scholars mentioned

above, it is soft power, but where does this soft power originate from? Smith (2006) argues

that the EU is a strong economic power. This power is shared with the US and China and also

increasingly with the rising regional economies, such as Brazil, India and South Africa. At the

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same time Smith also points out that the EU is a world leader when it comes to global

humanitarian aid and development assistance (Smith, 2006, 21).

Moravscik is a bit more specific when it comes to exact evidence of what makes the EU a soft

power. He claims that this assumption mainly stems from different instruments, such as the

EU enlargement, The Neighbourhood Policy and diplomatic engagement, multilateralism,

international law, trade, investment and finance, aid, political and social values (Moravscik,

2010, 159-163).

The most powerful policy instrument of the EU is the accession the CEECs into the EU. The

EUs power of attraction is so strong that for the last two decades it has been a stabilising force

in the institutions and economies of many of EUs neighbouring countries. The effect of the EU

enlargement is not only seen in the dozen countries that have recently joined the EU but also

in other countries that aspire to become members in the future (Moravscik, 2010, 159). In

comparison to the enlargement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the enlargement

of the EU can be seen as having way more impact while still being less provocative to other

states such as Russia. Even after the latest enlargement of the EU the European leaders still

continue to work towards enlarging the union even further, although this policy has very low

public support (Moravscik, 2010, 159). Moravscik asserts that such an efficient tool as the EU

enlargement cannot be found in any of the other great powers: the US, China and Japan, for

example, do not have any comparable tool for projecting regional influence (Moravscik, 2010,

159).

The EU also gains a lot of power from its neighbourhood policy and diplomatic engagement.

The EUs neighbourhood policy is considered to be very active, as there is a lot of evidence of

the EU intervening diplomatically in other countries to resolve conflicts and promote political

and economic reform backed by the economic, financial, legal and military might of the EU.

The EU is also disposed to sign association and free trade agreements and does not limit itself

to only dealing with the state that are candidates for membership. It also reaches out and

makes agreements with other countries, such as Libya, Morocco and Israel. Some might argue

that the EU neighbourhood policies are a bit slow but more proactive and realistic. This is in

comparison to US shock and awe tactics (Heywood, 2007, 142) in the foreign policy, which,

for example, can be associated with the extension of NATO membership to Georgia and the

democratisation of Iraq (Moravscik, 2010, 159-160).

Soft power for the EU is also gained from the fact that the EU is a strong and consistent

supporter of international law and institutions. The EU is the largest financial contributor to the

United Nations (UN) where the EU funding accounts for thirty-eight per cent of the regular

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budget, two-fifths of all UN peacekeeping operations, and nearly half of all contributions to UN

funds and programmes. On top of that the EU members have also signed nearly all

international treaties that are currently in force and the EU countries are also overrepresented

and very active in most international organisations (Moravscik, 2010, 160).

As a genuine superpower in the global economy much of EUs soft power also stems from its

trade and investments in this area. The EU is larger than the US and far ahead of countries

such as China and India. In trade the EU is very dominant especially in the Middle East and

Africa where the EU is the largest trading partner for all countries, except Jordan (Moravscik

2010, 162). The EU is also the largest importer and exporter of the world (Germany alone

exports as much as China). Furthermore, the EU trades more with China than the US and has

a stronger bilateral trade balance. Also in investment the EU is very important. From 2000 to

2007 fifty-eight per cent of all US foreign direct investment was in Europe compared to

fourteen per cent in all of the BRICs (in the same period the US invested more than twice as

much in Ireland than in China. European companies accounted in 2007 for seventy-one per

cent of all foreign investments in the US (Moravscik, 2010, 162).

Soft power is also accumulated from aid. The EU grants fifty per cent of the worlds foreign aid

compared to twenty per cent of the US. Even private aid from the EU exceeds that of the US

(170 million dollars from Europe compared to 105 million dollars from the US in 2007)

(Moravscik, 2010, 162-163).

Last but not least, Moravscik argues that political and social values are very important. Even

though the US is often seen as the symbol of freedom, democracy and a free market economy,

both polling and practice suggest that European political and social models are more attractive

than the models used in the US. This, according to Moravscik proofs to be true because people

around the world favor generous social welfare and health policies, parliamentary government,

adherence to international human rights standards and a smaller role for money in politics all

associated with Europe, rather than libertarian social policies and incomplete health coverage,

the separation of powers, idiosyncratic national human rights definitions without international

oversight, and large role for money in politics all of which are associated with the United

States (Moravscik, 2010, 163). Not many of the recently democratised countries have chosen

to copy the US political system. Instead they have chosen a model more like the German,

South African or Canadian one.

In his description of what makes the EU a soft power, much of the argumentation falls under

what Moravscik defines as social and political values. Joseph Nye (2004), the dean of the

Harvard Kennedy School of Government argues that the EUs soft power stems from e.g. the

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fact that European countries are amongst the countries in the world that have the most Nobel

Prizes in literature and chemistry and that the three countries with the highest music sales are

after the US and Japan are European. Also in book sales and internet web hosts European

counties score high, and the country that attracts the most tourists is also Europe. Nye also

points out that European football is much more popular internationally than both American

Football and baseball. Furthermore, even though Britain and France are much smaller than the

US, they each spend about the same amount of money on public diplomacy. Some of the

sources for soft power that both Moravscik and Nye points out are the high levels of

development of the EU as being a source of soft power, the attractiveness of the European

political system and the economic power of the EU. Moravscik and Nye also agree on the

attractiveness of the European values. Nye mentions that the European views on capital

punishment, gun control, climate change and the rights of homosexuals are probably more

similar to the views of the majority of young people and rich people around the world than the

views of the US government (Nye, 2004).

As showed above it can be argued that the EU has a very strong soft power base. However,

being a great- or super power is only relevant if you can translate your power into actual

results. Smith mentions different achievements that the EU has realised with the use of its soft

power. The primary example he mentions is the transition of the CEECs into democracies and

market economies in a very short period of time. Moreover, the EU approach towards such

countries as Turkey and Ukraine is mentioned as another example of great soft power

achievements. These are massive countries with a combined population of more than 100

million that have been altered by the attraction of eventual membership. This, for instance, is

seen in a speech before the European Parliament by Viktor Yuschenko from February 2005

where he said: the new president and government of Ukraine have clearly defined the

ingredients and forms for future decisions. These are the norms and standards of the European

Union, its legislation, legal, political, economic, and social culture. European integration is the

most effective and, in fact, the only programme of reforms for contemporary Ukraine (Smith,

2006, 22). In Turkey one of the most important changes that can be attributed to the soft

power of the EU is the change of the role of the military in the political system: It went from a

system where The National Security Council was a tool of the militarys power excise over the

executive branch to a system where the National Security Council is now an advisory board

with a majority of civilians. Additionally, the Turkish parliament has got oversight over the

defence budget and has brought corrupt officers to justice (Smith, 2006, 22).

As a result, Moravscik sees the changes that have happened in the CEECs as a product of EUs

soft power. He puts emphasis on the stabilisation of the polities and economies that has been

15

brought about in these countries since 1989 due to the EUs power of attraction. Also in

countries that have not achieved the status of membership, the result of the soft power of the

EU has been seen. An example is the successful attempt to avert war between Serbia and

Montenegro. As Nye, Moravscik also mentions the changes in Turkey as a great result

originating from the soft power of the EU. Also the successful diplomatic initiatives, in

membership countries, countries with a distant possibility of achieving membership (as Nye,

Moravscik mentions Ukraine) or countries that essentially have no chance of achieving

membership, are accredited to soft power. Morocco is highlighted by Moravscik as one of the

countries where EU soft power has encouraged political and economic reform.

3. 4 Soft Power: A (Neo)liberal Perspective

To understand the place of soft power in liberalism it is important to understand how liberalists

asses global power. Liberalists do not assume that conflicts between nations are determined by

a zero-sum game. Neither do they assume that every issue is contentious and that

governments will mobilise all their power resources including military to try to come out

victorious in every conflict. Instead they believe that most conflicts can have a positive-sum

outcome that could be achieved through negotiation with concessions made by both parties.

This means that the nature of power varies from issue to issue and does not necessarily have

to be militaristic, but it can also take an economic and/or cultural form (Moravscik, 2010, 156).

This adds to the discussions of Steven Lukes (2005) in his latest research on the power

relations. He refers to the idea of Thomas Wartenberg (1990) who distinguishes power

between domination and beneficent. Lukes (2005) argues that power can be exercised in a

way that can be productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity (Lukes,

2005, 109). To cite an example, he is comparing the role of beneficent power with the role of a

mother or a teacher in relation to a child or student. Hence, Lukes comes up with a conclusion

that actors can also benefit from the power of others. It consequently leads to the conclusion

that exercising power or influence on others does not necessarily mean that there is a conflict

or imposition. This is in fact fits very well with one of Kenneth Bouldings concept of soft

power- integrative power meaning when both parties can do what is better for both of them

(Boulding, 1989).

The term of soft power was first applied by Joseph Nye in 1990 in his book Bound to Lead: The

Changing Nature of American Power. He defines the concept of soft power as the ability to get

others want what you want without resting on military force and coercion (Chouliaraki, 2007,

1). In his view, this power resides on the ability to attract, induce and persuade; something

16

that can be achieved through building alliances, cooperation and diplomacy. This view is also

supported by Andrew Heywood (2007). In his words [s]oft power is the ability to influence

other actors by persuading them to follow or agree to norms and aspirations that produce the

desired behavior. It relies on attraction rather than coercion (Heywood, 2007, 142). These

views are by some seen as quite abstract as they do not mention any measures through which

soft power can be exercised, but merely what it is supposed to do (Gallarotti, 2011).

Later in his research Nye is becoming more precise using the term. He sees soft power as an

ability to set agenda for others, determining their preferences...thus controlling the values and

norms which guide proceeding and actions of others (Nye, 2004, 5). According to his

observations, soft power can also derive from the great economic achievements with the

capacity for innovation and regulation and also extensive international presence like in the

case of providing humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations in conflict zones (Nye, 2004).

Moravsciks vision of soft power is similar to what Joseph Nye proposed. He sees soft power in

terms of high income per capita, investments, a central position in trade networks, an

important role in international institutions and the attractiveness of social and political values

(Moravscik, 2010, 156).

Thus, both Nye and Moravscik believe that the emphasis on military force, conquest and

coercion is losing its relevance to a more positive image of modern world affairs managed by

law and international institutions. In his view this approach would result in a more favourable

public support and credibility abroad (Gallarotti G, 2011, 11). Finally they conclude that a non-

violent soft power approach leads to the establishment of a more balanced and stable

relationship between states based on multilateral cooperation and coordination.

There are no methodological methods to measure and assess soft power. It is not visible or

quantified and has long term effects (McClory, 2010). There is academic literature however

which presents constituent parts or sources of soft power that can lead to its creation.

Systematically, soft power could be derived from two general sources: international sources

and domestic sources based on the evaluation of its foreign policies and actions. Both sources

tend to shape a positive image among other nations which would in turn help the soft power

nation to influence world politics and to create a sense of legitimacy in its course of actions

(Gallarotti, 2011).

International source of soft power derives from showing the respect for international law,

norms and institutions, disposition against violence as well as the multilateral posture in its

17

foreign policy. Tending to behave as a unilateral actor can be costly. Nations that do not

participate in multilateral fora which focus on addressing world threats and/or problems are

taking a risk of being marginalised from the Community. This in turn would mean diminishing

the possibility to influence a decision-making process or at worst not to be taken into account

(Gallarotti, 2011).

Building alliances and respect for treaties are principles that furthermore are considered to be

crucial for the creation of soft power. By withdrawing from alliances and international

commitments in favour of unilateral solutions, a nation would create an image of a square peg

in a round hole that relies on traditional sources of power embedded in multilateral support

networks. Moreover a nation must be willing to sacrifice its own national short term interests

for the sake of achieving a collective goal or solution. By being consistent with international

norms of conduct and commitment a nation would gain a considerable respect or even

endearment among other nations (Gallarotti, 2011).

From the liberalist perspective, a nation must pursue liberal foreign economic policies such as

economic openness, transparency and free trade. These policies represent a commitment to

give a chance and hope for other nations for economic growth and development. The greater

this commitment is, the more elevated the national image will be (Gallarotti, 2011).

With regards to domestic sources of soft power, Joseph Nye distinguishes between two areas:

the power inherent in political institutions and the power derived from culture. He suggests

that the political system must be democratic and deliver pluralism, liberalism and

constitutionalism while culturally deriving from the principles of freedom, human rights,

tolerance, equal opportunities for individuals and an elevated quality of life (Nye, 2002).

Both international and domestic sources of power reflect the emphasis on policies and actions

that originate from the principles of fairness, justice and collective concern.

In this regard it could be clearly observed how the principles of political liberalism can

contribute to the capacity of a nation to use and increase its reliance on soft power.

3. 5 Operationalisation of soft power

In order to be able to analyse the EU enlargement strategy and find indications of the use of

soft power in them, a clear definition of soft power is needed. In this project it is not possible

to simply rely on the definitions of Moravscik and Nye presented above, as Moravscik deals

mostly with soft power as something a state has and not as measures that can be observed in

18

the policies of an actor. Nyes definition of soft power is similar to this, but he adds that soft

power is also the ability of a state to make other states do something. However, as Moravscik,

he does not mention the specific measures used to do this. A combination of the definitions of

soft power provided by Moravscik and Nye will serve as a foundation for the operationalisation

of soft power in this project.

This project accepts the assumption that soft power is derived from high income per capita,

investments, a central position in trade networks, an important role in international institutions

and the attractiveness of social and political values. The project also accepts the assumption

that soft power is the ability to get others to follow by virtue of attraction rather than coercion.

Soft power enables the possessor to achieve desired outcomes at minimal cost by avoiding the

use of military force and sharing the burden of enforcement with allies (Smith, 2009, 21).

Finally it accepts that [s]oft power is the ability to influence other actors by persuading them

to follow or agree to norms and aspirations that produce the desired behaviour (Heywood,

2007, 142). If this is accurate, then it means that soft power as a measure is derived directly

from having a high income per capita, a central position in trade networks, an important role in

international institutions, and the attractiveness of social and political values, etc. This is

transformed into an instrument to make other states voluntarily do what you want them to do,

to agree to norms that produce the desired behaviour and/or to improve the image of a state

in the eyes of others.

In this project there will be a distinction between two kinds of soft power measures. The first

measure seeks to transform the view of the state that uses soft power in the eyes of the

population in the state on to which the strategy of soft power is targeted. The other kind of

soft power measures directly seeks to change the political, democratic or economic structure of

another country. Among the examples of soft power measures that seek to change the view of

the population, one can mention aid. Aid is a measure of power that has a direct influence on

the lives of the recipients without necessarily having any influence on the political structure of

the country. The force of such a measure can then be increased by actively making the

recipients aware of the origin of the aid, e.g. by labelling the aid as aid from the actor who

made use of this measure.

An example of a measure that seeks to make structural change in another country could be

derived from the choice made by one actor to promise market access and/or to help build up

institutions in this country in order to help it establish a free market. This might have, as a

secondary effect, some influence on the public opinion in this country, but the main outcome

19

will be that the actor that uses soft power will have influence on the structure of the market in

another country.

In this project the definition of soft power will be based on the idea that soft power, which is

derived from economic prosperity, attractiveness of political and social values and influence in

the international sphere, is the ability to influence others to voluntarily do what you want them

to do without the use of coercion. As an effect this can bring about change to the structure of

the political and/or economic system and/or it can change the image in the eyes of the

population of the country you wish to influence. In the analysis we will therefore be looking for

measures that, as an effect of a soft power strategy, are bringing about changes in another

country without the use of coercion, while at the same time looking whether these measures

are focused on changing the structure, the image or both.

The illustration below presents a systematic picture of the use of soft power, from the sources

of it to the goals it aims to achieve.

20

Sources

Sources for the creation of soft

power:

Domestic Sources:

Culture

Literature

Media (Movies, Music etc.)

Education (Exchange programmers)

Sport

Tourism

Freedom

Equal Opportunities

Tolerance

High Income Per Capita

Elevated Quality of Life Political Institutions

Democracy

Constitutionalism

Liberalism

Pluralism International Sources Respect for:

International Laws

Norms

Institutions

Treaties

Alliance Commitments

Liberal foreign economic policies

Means

Means to use soft

power:

Supporting

Facilitating

Helping

Supervising

...desired changes

through technical and

financial assistance.

Goals

Goals of the use of soft power:

Favour public opinion

Cause Structural Changes o Political System

Institutional and legislative framework

Bureaucracy o Economic System

Free Trade Free Market Open Barriers Fair Competition

21

4. Historical Background

In 1989, after the breakdown of Communism in the CEECs and the fall the Berlin Wall it

became clear that the European region was subject to change (Dingdale, 1999). Realist

scholars, such as Mearsheimer (1990), predicted the eruption of war on the European

continent. Yet others saw this as an opportunity to increase peace and prosperity in Europe by

opening up for the integration of new countries into the EU (Glenn, 2001).

Thus, the process of enlargement and integration of some of post-socialist CEECs into the

Union began in 1989. It began with the launch of PHARE, which initially was created to assist

Poland and Hungary in their aims to restructure their political and economic spheres. Since

then PHARE was expanded to include the other candidate countries of the 2004 and 2007

enlargement: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Bulgaria and Romania2 (European Commission, 2010a). Initially it focused on providing know-

how to the countries whereas later on it centred more on aid, investment and assistance,

especially in areas where the criteria set by the EU are extra demanding, such as transport,

environment and working standards (2010a). After the 1993 Copenhagen Councils invitation to

the Central and Eastern European countries to apply for membership PHARE was reshaped

towards preparing candidate countries for accession (2010a).

The Copenhagen Criteria were created at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in

1993 (Marktler, 2006). Countries that wish to enter into the Union have to fulfil following

conditions: First of all they have to have stable institutions that guarantee democracy; the

rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (European Commission,

2010b). Second of all, they need a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope

with the pressure of competition and the market forces at work inside the Union (2010b).

Finally, they must have the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular

adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union (2010b).

After 1993, with the deepening of the Union through the Maastricht Treaty, the enlargement

process started to take off. From 1994 to 1995 the EU received membership applications from

Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and

Slovenia (Andrews, 2000). The Copenhagen European Council had, besides from setting up the

criteria for accession, also made a commitment to absorb those countries that wished to

2 Until 2000 the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia) were also beneficiaries of Phare (2010a)

22

become members (2000). In 1997 the European Commission published a report, Agenda 2000,

which, among other things, addressed the enlargement process. The report assessed

candidates and pointed out the countries that were ready to begin bilateral negotiations with

the EU and the ones that needed more preparation (2000). However, negotiations with these

second wave (2000, 8) countries, which comprised of Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania

and Romania, were initiated in February 2000 following the Helsinki European Council meeting

in December 1999 (2000).

Furthermore, in 1999 PHARE was complemented with two other pre-accession policies

(European Commission, 2010b), ISPA, which would allocate around one billion Euros to assist

the reforms in the environment and transport sectors of the candidate countries (Andrews,

2000) and SAPARD, which would allocate around 500 million for agricultural modernisation

and restructuring (2000, 14).

In addition to the pre-accession policies, the accession process also consisted of the

construction of a bilateral NPAA between each candidate country and the EU. This involves the

commitment of the country to the adoption, implementation and enforcement of all the EU

rules already in force (European Commission, 2010b). Out of the 31 chapters in the acquis,

some examples that are relevant to this project are the chapters concerning environment,

transport and agriculture, which ISPA and SAPARD address (2010).

It can be argued that the enlargement process accelerated towards the end of the 1990s when

the EU, in two waves, invited the candidate countries to commence bilateral negotiations: The

breaking point was 2000 when Phare became accession oriented and two more financial

programmes, Ispa and Sapard, were added as part of the Unions enhanced strategy for

preparing CEECs for membership (Neklova, 2005, 1), especially in the agriculture,

environment and transport sectors of these countries. Thereafter the goal of EU membership

was finally obtained in 2004 in the case of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,

Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (European Commission, 2007b, 5),

and 2007 in the case of Bulgaria and Romania (2007).

23

5. Empirical Data

5. 1 Speech/99/130 on Enlargement

In order to detect a soft power strategy in the outwards attitude of the EU in 1999, an

examination of the speech on enlargement, given by the President of the Commission of that

time, Romano Prodi, in the European Parliament on the 13th of October 1999 (Prodi, 1999), will

be made. The speech was given after a Commission meeting earlier the same day. It presents

the views of the Commission on the enlargement process, particularly relating to the

absorption of the CEECs into the EU in the years to follow 1999 (1999) and gives

recommendations before the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki later that year.

In the speech Prodi argues that the enlargement process can be seen as a great opportunity

that arose from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the breakdown of the Soviet Union. He

sees it as a prospect to unite Europe in a way that it had not been united since the fall of the

Roman Empire (1999). In connection to this unity he adds the principles of peace, security,

freedom, justice and equality (1999), which are the principles that in his opinion should

dominate the new European order. He also emphasises the importance of democracy, the

respect for human rights, the rule of law and the single market that offers growth and

prosperity (1999). These are all the aspects mentioned in the Copenhagen Criteria, which

were defined in 1993 as the criteria to be fulfilled by the candidate countries prior to accession

into the Union (European Commission, 2010b).

However, according to Prodi it is not all mere opportunities. Although the candidate countries

are making attempts to comply with the criteria of membership and showing their capacity for

change (1999), there are also some challenges involved with the process. This, defined by the

Commission is, in particular, the conflict between speed and quality (1999). Prodi states that

the integration of the CEECs into the Union should be as fast as possible, but not at the

expense of the compliance with the criteria set up by the EU. He holds that the Copenhagen

criteria are so fundamental that the European Council meeting in Luxembourg and Cologne

recommended further accession negotiations only with countries which meet them (1999).

This is what he labels as the hard line approach of the EU (1999). At the same time he

stresses that the efforts of the candidate countries must be rewarded in such a way as to

encourage further progress while dispelling complacency (1999). Prodi mentions that it is all

about finding the right balance between these two approaches.

24

In order to create this balance, Prodi finds that an enlargement strategy is needed. The pre-

accession strategy is part of this framework. This includes screening and setting priorities for

the candidate countries, providing them with financial and expert assistance, involving them in

Community programmes and agencies, and closely monitoring their progress toward meeting

the membership requirements (1999), which mostly refer to the fulfilment of the Copenhagen

Criteria. Prodi makes clear that the process of adapting to the criteria for membership is

different from candidate country to candidate country. The countries that at the time of the

speech had complied with these criteria were already negotiating with the EU, whereas the

European Council meeting in Luxembourg and Cologne recommended opening further

accession negotiations only with countries which meet them (1999).

Prodi argues in his speech that the reason the EU is so strict with the importance of the

fulfilment of the criteria for membership is for the sake of the people in the candidate countries.

Prodi emphasises that the EU feels a responsibility towards these people in terms of the rights

to democracy and protection of human rights.

The Commission furthermore makes a recommendation to the European Council to begin

negotiations in 2000 with countries that have fulfilled the political dimension of the criteria for

membership and uttered that they are prepared to do what is necessary to fulfil the economic

dimension as well. However, this recommendation is under four conditions, which all imply

concessions that the applicant countries need to make, such as dismantling of unsafe nuclear

power stations and progress in the implementation process of economic reform in the case of

Bulgaria, and reforms of child care institutions and macroeconomic situation in the case of

Romania.

Prodi also recommends that the principle of differentiation should be applied in the individual

negotiation process between the candidate countries and the EU. Each country shall negotiate

one-on-one with the EU and the process of integration into the Union should match the

capacity of each country. He also recommends that a transition period for implementing the

criteria is put forth by the EU in fields, such as energy, infrastructure and the environment,

where a great deal of work still has to be done at considerable cost (1999). The reforms

needed in these areas are very high if the candidate countries want to live up to the demands

of the EU.

On, the side of the EU, Prodi puts emphasis on the need for institutional reform in order to be

able to absorb the new members: Institutions designed for six members, and which are

already inadequate now, will certainly not be able to manage a Union of 25 or 30 countries

(1999). If the EU manages to make the institutional reforms by the end of 2002, Prodi argues

25

that it is only up to the applicant countries to meet the criteria of membership. If they do, he

states that the first accessions can take place as from the 1st of January 2003.

In the speech it is made obvious that any aspiring member state can become member if it

complies with the EUs criteria and show that they have a capacity to change and adapt their

economic, social, environmental and legal systems (1999).

With regards to Turkey, which Prodi also devotes some time to in his speech, he explains that

it requires special treatment. Although, the relationship between Turkey and the EU is

becoming more positive, he maintains that accession negotiations cannot be opened until

Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen Criteria. In order to help ease this process, Prodi suggests that

an Accession Partnership is set up between the two parties.

With regards to the neighbourhood policy of the EU, Prodi argues that the enlargement will

expand the European market, and non-EU members will have to comply with the EU standards

in order to sell their goods and services in this market. This, in general as he describes it, will

lead to increased prospects of prosperity to the wider Europe. In addition to this, he claims

that the enlargement of the EU can lead to stability and peace in the rest of Europe through

the incentives they get to join the Union by seeing their neighbours joining. This is what he

identifies as virtual membership (1999), something that also calls for more cooperation

between the EU and these countries.

Towards the end of the speech, Prodi sends out a message to Albania and the countries of the

former Yugoslavia making clear that the EU sees them as members of the European family and

that there is a possibility for membership if they live up to the criteria put forth by the Union.

He also emphasises that it is important not to create a dividing line between prosperity and

poverty in Europe, especially with regards to countries such as Russia, Ukraine and the

Caucasus and Maghreb countries (1999)

This all in all is the strategy for enlargement proposed by the European Commission. He

stresses that the enlargement process is not necessarily easy, but it is a grand and

worthwhile project (1999) which he calls the construction of Europe (1999).

5. 2 ISPA

ISPA, the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession, which was created in 1999 and

commenced in 2000, is one of the pre-accession strategies (together with PHARE and SAPARD)

to assist countries that are applying for EU membership (European Commission, 2008). It

26

came about after the Luxembourg European Council meeting in December 1997, which

concluded that an enhanced pre-accession strategy was needed in the case of the CEECs (The

Council of the European Union, 1999a). ISPA assists in infrastructure projects, provides aid

and helps facilitate the implementation of the acquis communautaire3 in the fields of transport

and environment (European Commission, 2008). According to the Regulation and the

conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council meeting of December 1997, the aid allocated

in through ISPA will be distributed according to the principle of equality and with focus on the

countries that need it the most (The Council of the European Union, 1999a).

The main objective of the policy is, as expressed in ISPA (1999a):

to provide assistance to contribute to the preparation for accession to the

European Union of the following applicant countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic,

Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia,

hereinafter referred to as the beneficiary countries, in the area of economic and

social cohesion, concerning environment and transport policies in accordance with

the provisions of this Regulation (1999a, Article 1).

Another objective as defined by the Regulation is to make a national programme with each

beneficiary country to ensure the improvement of the environment and of infrastructure

networks (1999a, Article 2).

The measures stated in the Regulation to fulfil the objectives are divided into two main

measures: environmental measures and transport infrastructure measures. The Regulation

states that as a standard each measure shall have a cost of at least five million euros (1999a,

Article 2.2). Assistance can be granted to studies made prior to and necessary for the

implementation of the policies in the fields of environment and transport infrastructure as well

as to technical support measures, including information and publicity actions (1999a, Article

2.4 (b)). The technical support measures include the following three measures:

3 Lacquis communautaire or acquis communautaire originates from French and means that which has been acquired

by the community. It is an umbrella term that is used to describe all of the legislation made in the EU including

everything from treaties and directives to legal practice from the Court of Justice, declaration, international

agreements, etc. This all amounted in to around 30.000 legal acts or more than 100.000 pages in 2009. When a

member country joins the EU is has to fulfil the acquis communautaire from day one (Folketinget EU-Oplysningen

2007).

27

1. horizontal measures such as comparative studies to assess the impact of Community

assistance (1999a, Article 2.4 (b) (i)).

2. measures and studies which contribute to the appraisal, monitoring, evaluation or

control of projects and to strengthening and ensuring the coordination and consistency

of projects with the Accession Partnerships (1999a, Article 2.4 (b) (ii)).

3. measures and studies to ensure effective project management and implementation

and to make any necessary adjustments (1999a, Article 2.4 (b) (iii)).

The allocation of the assistance provided to the candidate countries by the EU is in the

Regulation characterised as indicative allocation, which refers to the fact that it is made by the

Commission on the basis of the criteria of population, per capita GDP in purchasing power

parities and surface area (1999a, Article 4). Account will be held over how well the candidate

countries have performed in the previous years in their attempts to comply with the

membership criteria in order to keep track of the relative success of the reforms in the areas of

transport infrastructure and environment.

The aid can take any form, including repayable as well as non-repayable direct assistance

(1999, Article 6.1). With regards to repayable assistance the Regulation stresses that following

aspects should be kept in mind:(a) the availability of co-financing; (b) the measures capacity

to generate revenues, and (c) an appropriate application of the polluter pays principle (1999a,

Article 6.2). In return to the assistance the [b]eneficiary countries shall ensure, in particular,

that directly visible display panels are erected showing that the measures are being co-

financed by the Community4, together with the Community logo, and that representatives of

the Community institutions are duly involved in the most important public activities connected

with Community assistance granted under ISPA (1999a, Article 13.1).

According to Article 8.2 of the Regulation, the assistance can be cancelled if the candidate

country has not yet begun to make reform and structural changes under the contractual

conditions of this Regulation (1999a, Article 8.2).

Requirements from the Commission to the countries receiving the assistance according to ISPA,

include the assurance to properly implement the assistance received by the EU, division

between the management and control functions and clear documentation showing how the

assistance has been implemented in practice. This should all occur in the time between

4 The EU

28

January 2000 and January 2002 (1999a, Article 9.1 (a)). This Article also gives the EU the

right to supervise that the measures are being rightly implemented in the beneficiary countries.

With regards to publicity, Article 13 of the Regulation emphasises that the beneficiary

countries ensure that the public is conscious of the role of the EU in providing the assistance

and aid to the country (1999a).

Finally, it is important to stress that the assistance given through ISPA is given merely in the

pre-accession stage. Upon entrance into the EU, a country loses its right to support under the

Council Regulation (EC) No. 1267/1999 (1999a, Article 15). Thus, ISPA is a financial

instrument with the intention of assisting an applicant country in preparing for entry into the

EU, specifically in the fields of environment and transport.

5. 3 SAPARD

As PHARE and ISPA, SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural

Development) is a part of the pre-accession policy package. Its main objective was to reduce

an excessive reliance of the ten applicant CEECs on agriculture and combat their major socio-

structural problems in this sector before entering the EU in 2004 (The Council of the European

Union, 1999b).

The programme itself was established in 1999 by the Council of the European Union (European

Commission, 2007a). Broadly this policy was a part of the pre-accession strategy to support

the CEECs current economic and social reforms as well as the integration of their economies

into the Community economy (The Council of the European Union, 1999b). More specifically it

meant assisting these countries to adopt the EU structural adjustment programmes in rural

areas and agriculture sector as well as helping them to implement the acquis communautaire,

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)5 and related polices in their national legislative framework

(European Commission, 2007a).

To accelerate and facilitate the process of adaption for the CEECs, through SAPARD the EU

initiated and took measures to provide technical, advisory and financial assistance of overall

560 million, available for the applicant countries between 2000 and 2006 (European

Commission, 2007a).

5 Common Agricultural Policy has since the founding of the European Economic Community been one of the most

central policies of the EU. CAP consists of rules and mechanisms that regulate the production, sale and treatment of

agricultural products in the EU (Folketinget EU-Oplysningen 2011)

29

The measures through which the money was allocated for building development strategies

were listed in the Article 2 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1268/1999:

1. reconstructing and modernising production along with processing and marketing of

agricultural and fishery products

2. ensuring the protection of the environment in these processes as well as maintaining

the countryside

3. improving the structures of quality, veterinary and plant-health of foodstuff control for

consumer protection to meet the EU health and quality standards

4. developing and diversifying employment activities in rural areas for alternative income

in case of unemployment

5. setting up farm relief and farm management services

6. assembling producer groups

7. managing agriculture water resources

8. improving vocational training

9. establishing and updating land registers

10. renovating and developing villages as well as protecting and conserving rural heritage

11. improving land and reparcelling

12. attracting and supporting investment for agriculture enterprises and forestry in

particular

The total eligible cost of implementing these measures may be fully covered by the Community,

while for revenue generating investments it may only amount up to seventy-five per cent out

of fifty per cent contributed by the state aid (The Council of the European Union, 1999b, Article

8).

Apart from financial aid, two per cent of the budget was going to be spent on the technical

assistance provision which focuses on preparation, monitoring, control and evaluation of the

Programme as well as information and publicity campaigns designed to inform beneficiaries

and the general public in the CEECs of the aid delivered by the EU (1999b, Article 6.4).

These measures sponsored and supported by the EU were oriented to prepare the large-scale

farmers of the CEECs to the market economy-oriented competition in the EU and also adapt a

new legislation which had to be consistent with CAP and other provisions of the Europe

Agreement (European Commission, 2007a).

30

The allocation of financial resources was according to national prosperity which was

determined by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the percentage of agricultural force involved,

territory and land features (The Council of the European Union, 1999b, Article 6.3).

As the EU grants financial assistance to the CEECs it also claims to have a legitimate right to

assess and monitor each countrys process of implementing reforms and its further

performance (European Commission, 2007a). Therefore the assistance is expected to be

decided and provided in close collaboration between the Commission, the applicant country,

expertise groups and the economic and social partners (1999b, Article 3.1).

After consultations each applicant country has to submit its own National Programme for

Agriculture and Rural Development to the Commission for further appraisal and approval. Each

national plan has to comply with the specific Structural Fund rules, correspond to the principles

and guidelines of the agricultural and rural development policy and finally be consistent with

acquis communitaire and the Common Agricultural Policy (1999b, Article 4).

In return, the Commission has to present an annual plan of the support granted to the CEECs

to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the

Committee of the Regions (1999b, Article 13).

Furthermore, as it is the case in ISPA, SAPARD also emphasises that in case that the applicant

countries do not comply with the criteria and do not take enough measures to adopt a

structural programme, the European Commission may reduce, suspend or cancel aid for the

measures concerned (1999b, Article 10).

31

6. Analytical part

6. 1 Analysis of Speech/99/130 on Enlargement

Based on the definition of soft power set forth in the project as being the ability to influence

others to voluntarily do what you want them to do without the use of coercion, the speech will

be analysed in order to see if the EU is using a soft power strategy in the process of

enlargement and if so then to what extent this is focused to bring about a structural change in

the CEECs and/or change the image of the EU in the eyes of the population of the CEECs.

Furthermore, upon the commencement of this analysis, one must also remember that this

project maintains while soft power in practice is the ability of one actor to produce a desired

behaviour in another actor, soft power is not something you have. Soft power is derived from

economic prosperity, attractiveness of political and social values and influence in the

international sphere.

In this view, it is clear that the EU is a wielder of soft power, first of all, because it is one of the

largest economies in the world. Second of all the attractiveness of its political and social values

can be seen in the wishes of the CEECs to join the Union. Finally, the EU has a large influence

in the international sphere, both in international institutions and non-institutional activities

around the globe6. While the pre-accession strategies can be seen as measures to change

something, specifically the sectors they refer to, then perhaps the EUs use of soft power can

be seen as an attempt to bring about a structural change in the CEECs. The speech, on the

other hand, is not directly changing anything, but rather it focuses on promoting the image of

the EU and the enlargement process.

Nevertheless, it cannot be verified whether the speech, in addition to presenting some

recommendations to the European Council prior to their meeting later that year in Helsinki,

was also directly focusing at amending and promoting the image of the EU and the

enlargement process in the eyes of the population of the CEECs. This speech is therefore

mainly analysed to detect to what extent soft power was a part of the EUs enlargement

strategy and not addressing the changes, whether in structure and/or in public opinion, that

this may or may not bring about.

The enlargement process can be seen as a measure of soft power through the virtue of

attraction. If you employ this projects operationalisation of soft power, the ability to influence

6 See Chapter 3.3

32

others to voluntarily do what you want them to do, then Prodis illustration of the enlargement

process as a way to construct a wider European area of peace, stability and prosperity7 can be

described as an attempt to influence the CEECs through the virtue of attraction of social and

political values.

In the speech, Prodi talks about the enlargement process as a way to unite Europe again. This

can be seen as the objective behind the process of expanding to include the CEECs as well.

However, the method used is attractiveness of social and political values. As examples of these

values, Prodi mentions peace, security, freedom, justice, equality, democracy, respect for

human rights and the rule of law as well as growth and prosperity seen in connection to the

single market. It can be speculated that the candidate countries wish to become members of

the EU, because they were attracted by these principles. Many of these principles are factors

included in the Copenhagen Criteria which have to be adopted and complied with prior to

accession into the Union. Though, the EU is not forcing the candidate countries to comply with

the criteria and join the Union. Rather, the criteria function as a mechanism of integrative

power: the candidate countries are actually convinced that it is genuinely beneficial for them to

comply with the criteria. For instance, the political elements, such as democracy, the respect

for human rights and the rule of law, are seen as fundamental for maintenance of peace and

stability in the region. The economic elements, especially the single market, are seen as

essential to prosperity and growth. Soft power, thus, lies in the mechanism of attracting the

CEECs through the principles advocated by the EU

Another aspect of soft power, supported by the operationalisation of the concept in this

project, is found in Prodis reference to the pre-accession strategy, which is a part of the

enlargement strategy as a whole. Investments are the soft power measures that are

mentioned in order to ease the process of accession of the CEECs into the Union. In the pre-

accession strategy the EU is investing in the CEECs through for example providing them with

financial and expert assistance. This can be seen as a means of soft power, because if the EU,

through investment and aid, can exercise influence over this countries and make them want to

adapt to the main principles of the Union, it will ease the process of absorption into the Union.

The process of shaping the CEECs, both structurally but also normatively, can be argued to

lead the way for a European unity, guided by peace and stability. When Prodi argues that the

candidate countries are making attempts to comply with the criteria of membership and

actually showing their capacity to change, it further supports this argument. The EU has

managed to make the CEECs want to change. Whether this change is merely triggered by the

7 See Chapter 5. 1

33

economic incentives given by the EU is less relevant than the fact that the majority of the

countries are showing that they are willing to change.

Furthermore, in the speech, soft power is used, not only as a measure to influence the

candidate countries, but also to countries that aspire to become members of the EU. Prodi

makes clear that any aspiring member state can become member of the Union if it complies

with the EUs criteria and also, as mentioned above, show that they have the capacity to adapt

their economic, social, environmental and legal systems to fit the principles of the EU.

Another way of using soft power, is through providing a chance and prospect for other

countries, besides from the candidate countries, to become a part of this process as well and

thereby get a share of the economic prosperity, stability and peace. According to Prodi the

countries that are not yet part of the enlargement process get incentives to adapt their political

and economic structures to that of the EU be seeing their neighbours joining.

Prodi directly appeals to countries, such as Albania and the countries of the former Yugoslavia,

to make efforts to adapt the criteria for membership. If they manage to do so successfully the

EU might be able to open up membership negotiations with these countries. Thus he offers a

prospect to these potential candidates that also they can become members if they want it

enough.

All in all, the speech by Romano Prodi shows clear indications supporting the argument that

the EU is using soft power in its enlargement strategy. In the speech different measures of soft

power can be identified. Th